Democratization theory and the case of Cuba
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Transcript of Democratization theory and the case of Cuba
The emergence of democratization theory The negative case of Cuba
Xhensila Gaba
Course: intro to political science / comparative politics
Instructor: Tom Hashimoto
Time: Thursdays 9.00-12.00
Date: 26 January 2010
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Because most of the states have become democratic, especially during the late 1990s, it
seems like this will be the final shape for each governance model, meaning that the future of all
regimes would be their democratization. However, the transition process has not taken part in the
same way in different countries and the differences are viewed in the time period when the
transition occurred and on the reasons that initiated the transition. Democracy is presumed as the
most necessary achievement for further development. Even though nowadays the majority of the
governments are democratic, still we cannot neglect the presents of non-democratic
governments, and this reality leads to continue the research on the factors that would promote a
democratic transition for these regimes. The democratization theory has emerged from studying
and observing empirical cases that have experienced transitions to democracy, leaving behind
their old authoritarian regimes. These theories on democratization process have passed through
different steps and have developed their points by widening their range. These theories include
the “first wave” until the “third wave” of democratization by including the transition happened in
Latin America, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe. However the democratization theory has
been in the focus of the comparative analysis, because of its flaws in categorizing variables of
transition into indispensable and dispensable ones for the transition. Because of the theory not
correlating properly the variables with each other, there is space for contradicting it. One
negative case for the democratization theory is Cuba. The case of Cuba confronts with each other
the democratization theory on one side and the non-transitions to the other side, showing another
flaw of this theory, which is taking into consideration only the successful transitions to
democracy and leaving out of focus the non-occurrence of the transition at all. Countries like
Cuba that have experienced regime stability for long term period, should be compared to the
countries in which a regime change has happened, which means making the range of cases
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wider, so we can conclude more adequately on the variables that cause democracy and also of
the valuables that are not enough for causing a transition.
The scope of this paper is to compare the case of Cuba to the democratization theory in
order to identify the absent factors that are holding back the transition in Cuba. On the other
hand, I want to analyze if there are present any pro-transition factors in Cuba, but still failing to
start a transition. Why these factors that according to the theory can stimulate democratic
transition, are not functioning in Cuba? Probably what is happening is that in Cuba do exist
variables that lead to transition, but they are not enough in the Cuban domain. If we expand the
range of dependent variables, then it will be more exact to group the independent variables in
two groups-- the ones that for sure initiate transition and the ones that without a correlation with
other variables or without a certain domain (political, economical, and social) cannot lead to
transition to democracy, therefore they produce ongoing stable authoritarian regimes. Even
though Cuba is a single case, still it opens new avenue for rearranging the theory, meaning that
the previous conclusions are not to be totally changed, but just reviewed.
First I would explain what the democratization theory consists of and how has it
emerged. Then I would focus on Cuba and compare it with the theory, focusing on the variables
pro-democratization found there but that still fail to give the expected outcome (democracy). I
would analyze two of these variables: the economic crisis and the international actors. The
question I pose here is why have they failed in Cuba? I will analyze carefully the factor related
with the economic crisis. How has Cuba passed through that crisis in the early 1990s, when
almost all the post-communist states couldn’t escape the collapse of the Soviet economy and
therefore they became vulnerable to the democratic transition? Then, I will focus on the factors
that are missing in Cuba, which are the soft liners and the civil society. Why are they absent? Is
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this group of variables (soft-liners and civil society) more important and necessary for starting a
transition compared to the other group dealing mostly with structural pressure (economic crisis
and international pressure)?
Before starting my comparative analysis, it would be necessary to show that the case of
Cuba, although it is considered having many distinguished features, still cannot be considered
exceptional, meaning incomparable with other cases, but rather it would be called different. Cuba
has some common characteristics with both Latin America and Eastern Europe, which are states
that have travelled down the road of transition. Some shared features with Latin America are:
both were Spanish colonies, constantly intervention from the U.S. , similar levels of economic
growth, including GDP per capita and also a heterogeneous population (in terms of race).
Similarities with Eastern Europe are: the non-existence of a functioning civil society, their
history marked by the Communist rule, past Soviet influence (Hawkins, 2001). Also, Cuba
shares some common characteristics even with other states that survived the collapse of the
economy after the secession of the Soviet Bloc, such as China, North Korea, Vietnam; all states
that were based on their legitimacy or nationalism. The existence of some distinguished features,
such as being an island, favors it in being isolated from other countries; also experiencing a
popular revolution or having a very charismatic leader who exercise strong repression, still do
not make the case of Cuba unique, but probably different. Thus we can draw a comparative line
on Cuba for comparing it with other cases studied by the democratization theory, and trying to
find out why is it different, why does it have a different outcome, which is non transition to
democracy.
Now, let’s focus on what the democratization theory consists of. The theory emerged
when many governments started to change their regime from authoritarian to democratic ones in
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1974 and continuing through the early 1990s (Munck, 1994). Although they have the same
outcome (democracy) still the latest cases differ from the classic ones (referring to the first mass
democracies in Western Europe). In the classic ones, the previous old regimes were bureaucratic
authoritarian, state socialist, post-totalitarian, which are very different from the oligarchic
regimes of the late 19th century. The actors participating in the transition are also different. At the
beginning, the Western European transitions studies have lead to the theory to conclude that if
the right to vote was applied among different levels of population, then it would excluded the
rise of democracy through elite non-approval, and this is the main characteristics for these
transitions (Munck, 1994). But the latest transitions to democracy made political scientists focus
more on the democratization theory and expand it. Huntigton focused on the Eastern Europe
transitions and called them the third wave of democratization. In 1986, O’Donnell and Philippe
Schmitter publish “Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain
democracies”. Then, Mainwaring, O’Donnell, Valenzula publish “Issues in democratic
consolidation” which is a companion volume for the previous one, which expands its studies not
just in the transitions from the authoritarian regime, but also on the process of democratic
consolidation (Munck, 1994). Adam Przeworski develops more the democratization theory by
publishing “Democracy and the market”, in which he aims to compare political transitions and
economic reforms both in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Przerworski outlines the results of
the choices made by four important groups of the society, soft-liners and hardliners within the
regime, and moderate and radicals within the opposition part (Munck, 1994). Also he draws the
theoretical base for “Economic reforms in new democracies: A social democratic approach”
(Remmer, 1995). Huntington is distinguished for expanding the theory by having a more detailed
focus on what he called the third wave of democratization, meaning the rapid and most large
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number of states in Eastern Europe mainly becoming democratic. He focuses on the prerequisites
or the initial condition for the transition to take off and also on the consolidation of democracy.
The most important question that the theory tries to give an answer is why, when and in what
way do the transitions occur? According to O’Donnell-Schmitter model, the clear separation of
the hardliners and soft-liners is necessary for the transition to initiate. Przeworski maintains, “It
is easier to explain why communism had to fall than why did it actually fall” (Munck, 1994). He
argues that the incentives in Eastern Europe to start were internal, but still the pressure was from
external forces. On the other hand, O’Donnell-Schmitter state that Latin America and southern
European transition started as a response to internal factors and pressure from domestic answers.
Huntington sees the initiators of transitions as following: legitimacy problems, pressures from
external factors, the effect of demonstrations.
So, the democratization theory emerges in the effort of establishing variables that lead to
the democratic transitions. Yet the theory leaves avenues for further research in the comparative
analyses. The main problems or flaws of the theory are; first it takes into consideration only
successful case studies that have experienced democratic transition, leaving out of focus the
other possibility, which is non-transition to democracy. Moreover, the theory fails to well-
categorize different forms of dictatorship, and by not distinguish properly the differences
between them, then the initial conditions that lead to the breakdown of transition are not enough
to explain many questions on this field. For example, why did the Eastern Europe experienced
later the transition compared to Latin America? Or if we pose the question differently: why did
socialist regimes (communist) started later than bureaucratic authoritarian (Remmer, 1995)? This
empirical cases show that the theory must distinguish the primary conditions before the transition
takes place. Third problem of the theory is that it is very difficult to give an adequate
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generalization, but instead it seems like each author establishes new variables pro-transition, but
they are not correlated to each other through a comparative analysis or that they are not put into
the proper domain. Thus, I decided to compare the case of Cuba to the other cases included in the
democratization theory, in order to find out which part of the theory works and which does not.
One structural factor that is believed to contribute in initiating transition is economic
crisis. As Huntington states, “The combination of both high expectations of people to continue to
improve their lives and a short term economic crisis can cause political instability; therefore it
would serve as an incentive for democratic change” (Hawkins, 2001). Still this hypothesis seems
to fail in the case of Cuba. The Soviet Union was the most important partner of Cuba because it
supported Cuba in many sectors of economy, and therefore after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, every political scientist was expecting Cuba to fall, and the transition to begin. This did
not happen, even though in the years 1991-1993, Cuba was suffering a big recession of the
economy. The GDP decreased from 20.8 million pesos in 1989 to 16.7 million pesos in 1993
(Corrales, 2004). It is believed that the collapse of the economy converges with the collapse of
the political regime, but Cuba demonstrated the contrary, showing that the economic crisis is not
enough for initiating a transition. Now the question is—how it is possible that Cuba could pass
through the crisis and avoid the expected transition?
In 1991-1993, Castro undertook some reforms, and probably this is the period in which
Cuba was more open to FDI (foreign direct investments), liberalization of agricultural markets,
and some forms of self-employment (Corrales, 2004). Although these reforms were more
constraint compared to Latin America or Communist China, still these reforms resembled a
progressive step in the hermetic policy-making of Cuba. Cuba experienced a significant reform
and change in some areas, while in others it avoided reforms at all. As many would have thought,
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economic reform and opening would yield political liberalization, too. But why did this not
happen? One possible factor is the uneven or disproportionate economic reform, which
contributed to regime survival (Corrales, 2004). Those partially reforms helped for annexing
(misleading) the internal and external influences who were pressuring for deep economic and
political opening, giving them the impression that the regime was changing to a more open
economy. This was the movement to cope with the pressures coming from reforms advocates.
The uneven nature of economic reforms amplified the power of the state by letting the others
know that the state is the one who can control incentives as well as constraints. In Cuba, limited
reforms enhanced the power of the state by converting it into a gatekeeper, a notion used for
describing the Cuban state as the only actor who has total access to the profit generated by the
partially liberal economy, a remote and distant part of the true economy infrastructure in Cuba
(Corrales, 2004). By increasing the state rewards to societal loyalty, the number of winners
decreased (because they didn’t have access to benefit from open market), the reward that actors
win for showing loyalty towards the state is becoming more valuable. Castro avoided the
economic crisis by allowing a small opening to soft liners in 1993-1995. The cabinet was
renewed, but only 5 technocrats were present, meaning that the other new members were coming
from military, high-ranking officers, who had higher levels of loyalty and also some
technological knowledge. Castro has always backed the hardliners by reforming carefully and
leaving reserves for them. When the economy was recovering, Castro interrupted the reforms for
not risking. The small winning coalition of Cuba enjoyed the benefits of this opening market
period, thus the loyalty is paid more and therefore the result is a stable ongoing authoritarian
regime. The case of Cuba also doubts the correlation between market reform and
democratization as Przerwoski states (Munck, 1994). The case of Cuba does not object in total
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the hypothesis, but it makes the function between those two variables not linear, but rather
exponential function, meaning that the amount of the input (market opening) does not give the
same amount of output (democracy). In this case, because the economic reform was uneven and
because it touched only some sectors, it didn’t yield transition.
Now let’s move on to the other pro-transition variable that didn’t function in Cuba, which
is the international pressure. According to the theory, the international actors include pressure
from the U.S. and Europe, international human rights organizations, important NGOs, the
collapse of regional partners (the domino effect), etc (Hawkins, 2001). Until 1990s, Cuba was
supported by the Soviet Union. But still, when it collapsed, Cuban regime continued to resist to
the domino effect. Moreover, the U.S. has pressured Cuba through interrupting trade relations or
financial embargoes. Also it has tried the propaganda for isolated Cuba diplomatically. For
example, during the Cold War it threaded that would penalize the companies in third countries if
they invest in Cuba (Hawkins, 2001). Also, the NGOs have accused Cuba for its human rights
violation and have promoted change through diplomatic ways. Most of Cuba’s regional
neighbors have democratized and they show clearly their disapproval for the domestic policies of
Cuba. Why have the international actor failed in Cuba? One possible hypothesis is the absence of
will between people to oppose Castro; the sovereignty is one of Castro’s most important
achievements. Also, Castro has used the U.S. embargo as a boomerang, meaning it served for
blaming America for many economic problems in Cuba, and rallying people against a common
enemy.
Now, let’s see what are some of the variables missing in Cuba and let’s try to give some
reasons for their absence. First factor that is necessary for the initiation of transition, as
O’Donnell and Schmitter state is the division between hardliners and soft liners (Hawkins,
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2001). The soft liners are more elastic and predisposed to the political liberalization, meaning
that they think that in the long run it is important to establish new political institutions that would
be controlled from the authority. In this way, the authoritarian can avoid a strong and widespread
opposition. But in Cuba the soft-liners are absent and they have very little space to say their
opinions. The only soft-liner that spoke in public about his reform ideas, Carlos Aldana, who was
pro the Gorbachev’s model of Perestroika (the economy should go gradually to an opening
market) was removed from his post and disappeared from view (Hawkins, 2001).
Another factor missing is the civil society. It is weak, controlled by the state, has little
resources and with no political influence. Their voice cannot be heard. But according to that part
of democratization theory which focuses mostly on the democratizing actors rather than
structure, the presence of a strong and independent civil society is very important, because it
serves as catalysts for making the transition more widespread and radical, although the transition
has to be initiating by the soft-liners. But why are both these factors missing and therefore
postponing the transition in Cuba? One explanation can be the charismatic leader, Fidel Castro
and its regime owning some legitimacy. When the domestic institutions have lost some of their
functioning effectiveness, the personal influence of Castro has increased. He is the central
decision makers in Cuba. He has undertaken the right decisions in the right time by altering its
strategies. He has worried mostly to keep satisfied the loyalty by being the one who has access
on the reward or punishment. Also, he has secured to discourage regime opposition and demands
for change by repressing them. He has taken reforms in economy to endure the crisis (the case of
1993-1995, when he applied little opening to soft-liners), but still its reforms have been carefully
structured to not allow soft-liners or NGOs to emerge. According to the legitimacy, the Cuban
regime came to power by a popular revolution motivated by Castro’s charisma. This is a
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characteristic that differentiates Cuba from the other Communist countries (Hawkins, 2001). The
lack of protests, low levels of blank ballot box and the support for the socialist program show for
at least minimal levels of legitimacy. Also because the social groups have difficulties in gaining
independence, Cubans expect the state to secure them their needs, so for them it is useless
engaging in independent social groups.
In conclusion, the case of Cuba strongly demands for the democratization theory to
expand its range, meaning that the studies should consider not only the positive cases (the ones
that have experienced a successful transition) but also the negative case, including the non-
transitions. In this way it is possible to separate the variables that are necessary for the transition
to occur and the variables which are just complementary to democratic transition. In the case of
Cuba, we can say that the democratizing actors, such as soft-liners or civil society seem to be
necessary for the transition to happen, and on the other hand we can say that the structural
factors, such as economic crisis and international pressure, are not enough variables, and that if
not correlated with the previous actors do not yield the expected outcome (transition). Factors
that are holding back the emergence of the democratizing actors are the leadership, meaning that
a skilful leadership can stimulate reforms and democratize further the state, or can keep stable an
authoritarian regime for a long period, making it immune to many pro-transition factors. Also,
because of the fact that the regime in Cuba was established by a popular revolution, makes the
regime have minimal legitimacy, therefore, people believe in their state more than any other
option, as far as they expect the state to guarantee them all the needs, since the Cuban cannot act
in autonomy. Last, this paper may suggest for finding new cases that have escaped the
democratic transition and comparing it both with the Cuba case and the democratization theory
in order to test our hypothesis listed above.
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References
Corrales, J. (2004). The Gatekeeper state: limited economic reforms and regime survival in Cuba, 1989-2002. Latin American Studies Association, 39(2), 35-65.
Hawkins, D. (2001). Democratization theory and nontransitions: Inside from Cuba. Comparative politics, 33(4), 441-461.
Munck, G. (1994). Democratic transitions in comparative perspective. Comparative politics, 26(3), 355-375.
Remmer, K. (1995). New theoretical perspectives on democratization. Comparative politics, 28(1), 103-122.
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