This article was downloaded by: [University of Auckland Library]On: 15 April 2013, At: 17:26Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Beliefs & Values: Studies inReligion & EducationPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjbv20

Democracy, religion and secularism:reflections on the public role ofreligion in a modern societyBrenda Watson aa Formerly Director of the Farmington Institute, Oxford, UKVersion of record first published: 21 Sep 2011.

To cite this article: Brenda Watson (2011): Democracy, religion and secularism: reflections onthe public role of religion in a modern society, Journal of Beliefs & Values: Studies in Religion &Education, 32:2, 173-183

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2011.600816

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representationthat the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of anyinstructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primarysources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Democracy, religion and secularism: reflections on the public roleof religion in a modern society

Brenda Watson*

Formerly Director of the Farmington Institute, Oxford, UK

The present article focuses on the relationship between democracy and secular-ism and, in particular, the presumption that a secularist approach is the mostpractical solution to the problem of pluralism of beliefs. It raises the question ofhow far those countries in the West which claim to be democratic are justifiedin the way that they treat religion. Logical and pragmatic arguments are put for-ward suggesting that, in the name of the very values which they profess, secu-larists should extend a more generous hand to religion as opposed to continuingthe suspicious, confrontational attitude inherited from the Enlightenment. Thearticle finishes with some brief suggestions towards a practical solution for pre-serving the integrity of all, religious and non-religious alike, in the public arena.

Keywords: democracy; pluralism; religion; secularism

One of the democratic West’s most serious mistakes in the last two centuries hasbeen its marginalising and even despising of religion. At a time when democracy ispoised to become more truly implanted in the Arab world, it is particularly oppor-tune to reconsider what the relationship between democracy and religion might be.The West may then be able to offer Muslim nations a better model. The EgyptianNobel Prize-winner Ahmed Zewaih (2011) argues that extensive science teachingand development is essential for Egypt to progress democratically. If the virulentstrain of science–anti-religion which is still bedevilling the West is also conveyed,this could do damage.

Simon Schama (2011) has sought to open up debate on the future of democracy andits links with the Enlightenment – specifically ‘debate in our hearts and minds aboutwhether secularism has a place in middle eastern democracies’. He went on to note thathe has become convinced of the indispensable role played by religion in history.

The requirement of secularity for democracy?

It is largely assumed in the West that a democratic state must be publicly secular.Keeping religion out of public space is interpreted in many ways but normally includessuch requirements as not permitting reference to God in any public statements,constitutions, mission statements, state ceremonies, laws etc.; no representatives ofreligion in parliament; not permitting religious reasons to be given for consideration inlaw-courts, parliament, civic meetings; and no worship in state schools.

*Email: bgwatson@waitrose.com

Journal of Beliefs & ValuesAquatic InsectsVol. 32, No. 2, August 2011, 173–183

ISSN 1361-7672 print/ISSN 1469-9362 online� 2011 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13617672.2011.600816http://www.informaworld.com

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

The extent of secularisation in countries which call themselves democracies var-ies a great deal, from the ‘assertive secularism’ of France to the ‘passive secularism’of the USA (Kuru 2009, 11). In Britain secularism is in some ways dominant, yetofficially restrained. If ‘the mother of democracies’ manages to cling on to its reli-giously under-girded monarchy and its Established Church, this is an out-workingof the British facility in compromise whereby historical institutions of governmentare permitted to evolve and support democratic rights for all. Many, however, seeboth monarchy and the Established Church as anomalies that should disappear inthe interests of creating a truly democratic state. The assumption behind this wish isthat anything to do with religious commitment must be absent from the publicsquare. A clear indication of the argument here was given by Lord Justice Laws inthe Gary McFarlane case:

In the eye of everyone save the believer religious faith is necessarily subjective. . .thepromulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely on religious groundscannot be justified. It is irrational, as preferring the subjective over the objective. Butit is also divisive, capricious and arbitrary. . . The law of a theocracy is dictated with-out option to the people. . . (Christian Concern 2010)

David Kettle (2010, 2), writing for The Gospel and Our Culture Newsletter, seesthis as constituting a new illiberal form of liberalism. Non-believers, however, canperceive that there is something irrational at work in the Judge’s summing-up. TheGuardian writer Andrew Brown (2010) takes issue with his dismissal of religion assubjective:

All societies have to believe that they are founded on objective truths, and not meresubjective preferences. This is as true of the secular US constitution as of the Britishone. It’s perfectly possible to replace an established church with an established secu-larism. But in both cases there will be an unprovable belief system privileged by thestate as true.

He earlier had noted that the Judge’s words were ‘a lurch away from the Christianityof our constitution. . . that does in some sense necessarily privilege Christianity’.

Irrespective of the rights or wrongs of this particular case, the points whichBrown (2010) makes are important. Lord Laws was in fact speaking from a positiv-ist position with its clear-cut fact/belief divide. This is very definitely a committedposition, not a neutral one. His assumption that there is no truth in religion is simi-larly a specific publicly un-provable personal judgement. The anti-discriminationlegislation which he was defending is shot through with beliefs and values, notablythe belief in the equality of all people and their right to equal opportunities. It raisesthe question, therefore, of the justification for any state legislation whatsoever. Inpractice life has to be lived by what are probabilities. Absolute certainty is impossi-ble because subjectivity necessarily enters into everything thought, said or done.The supposed glory of a democracy is that the disagreements between citizens onsuch important matters can be openly debated instead of dogmatically set aside inthe way that Lord Laws advocates.

A far more moderate discussion of the relationship between religion and democ-racy appears in an article by Cecile Laborde (2010) for the RSA Journal. It is worthnoting that the RSA (Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturesand Commerce) is a highly self-conscious Enlightenment institution which largely

174 B. Watson

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

ignores religion. Laborde (2010) argues that the future of democracy depends onsecularism but is careful to note that:

. . .secularism properly understood – as a political philosophy – need not be anti-religious. The secular state is not a state committed to substantive atheism or to the mar-ginalisation of religion from public and social life. It is, rather, a state in which citizensshare a language – a secular language – for discussing political issues. (10)

She seeks to play fair to religion by acknowledging that many religious people canand do accept secularist values. She notes that:

. . .anti-religious sentiment can be as suspect as appeal to religious truths. . . Neitherthe view that religion is true, nor the view that religion is false, counts as a public rea-son. . .as neither can be proven according to widely accepted epistemological stan-dards. (Laborde 2010, 14)

Despite acknowledging that neither atheism nor religion can rationally prove theirbeliefs she still, however, wants a secular state: ‘What is not permissible is to subsi-dise religion on the grounds that it is intrinsically valuable, or that it promotesimportant truths, since this would violate the requirement of state neutrality’(Laborde 2010, 14). Yet, as we have already seen, the state cannot be neutral, andthe claim that it is or can be indicates naivety or self-delusion.

The purpose of the present article is, therefore, to examine more closely theclaim that in order to be democratic religion must be kept out of the public arena.Several arguments are considered under three headings: ‘Rationality’, ‘Historicity’and ‘Practical consequences’.

Critique of the need to privatise religion in a democracy

Rationality

There are problems connected with the word ‘secular’. It can be understood asdefined primarily by what it is not, and to the extent that it does signify positivevalues this can reinforce the negativity in its meaning. Such inherent negativity veryeasily implies, and will actually promote if used extensively without specific coun-ter-balancing, a negative view of what is excluded, namely of religion. It is a shortstep from the constant affirmation of ‘non-X’ to the notion that ‘X is unimportantper se’.

Such a step is aided if various logical fallacies waiting in the wings are allowedan appearance. Four in particular are dangerous and widespread in the West.

1. The ease with which what it is not, i.e. religion, can be seen as a singlemonochromatic entity

In the real world ‘religion’ embraces huge and often incompatible variations.Besides sociological classification into major world religions, there are highlysignificant differences in interpretation within each world religion. Moreover, manyreligious people are unhappy to be pigeon-holed within any specific religion orreligious grouping. The enormous range of interpretations regarding religion warnsus against any monolithic understanding of the term. Lumping all religious people

Journal of Beliefs & Values 175

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

together, however wildly different they are in perception and performance, is a com-monly heard logical fallacy of misleading generalisation (‘concealed quantifica-tion’); the New Atheists (Dawkins, Dennett, Harris et al.) offer hundreds ofexamples of this fallacy at work. More moderately inclined atheists such as PollyToynbee (2008) also can state, for example, that religions ‘infantilise us with impos-sible beliefs’; ‘each religion believes it has the one divinely revealed truth’ and‘religions are inherently anti-women and anti-gay’. All these statements may be trueof some religions but certainly not of all, as is implied.

2. Subtle encouragement to oppose secularism to religion

Such opposition is reinforced by the fact that when people argue for a secular statethey have something very positive in mind. The high esteem in which ‘secular’ isregarded in the West signifies the values which have coalesced around it such asequality, tolerance, the freedoms of the individual etc. This use of ‘secular’ as away of referring to these kinds of values easily becomes a claim to possession ofsuch values, giving the impression that these are primarily non-religious and notalso religious values. Yet, most religious people who fully accept the value of, say,equality are not so much agreeing with secularist beliefs, as seeing equality as thenatural out-working of their religious belief. The New Testament points very clearlyto the notion that all are equal. The early Christian movement was remarkableindeed for the much fairer way in which it treated women by comparison with thelegal and political restraints imposed on women in the Graeco-Roman world. Again,the movement to abolish slavery was spear-headed by people of religiouspersuasion.

If it be objected that it is only since the Enlightenment that racism, sexism andthe like have been focused on in a real thrust towards equality, we need to remem-ber that change in values which do not appeal to selfishness requires a very longincubation period, similar to how long-buried seeds suddenly appear as plants inSpring. Such high ideals are very hard to actualise with the power of vested inter-ests ranged against them. It is unsurprising that within religion itself powerful forceshave been arraigned against the very ideals at the centre of religion – which is whyreligiously inspired movements for reform have always been a feature of greatreligions.

As Melvyn Bragg (2011) clearly showed in his TV programme, the King JamesBible was a powerful source of inspiration for religious people working and fightingfor democracy. He acknowledged that the Bible could be used also for reactionarypurposes, but the fact that many saw its message as pointing in the opposite direc-tion to freedom is sufficient to put a question mark beside claims that equality is asecular value and not also a religious value. It constitutes the logical fallacy ofBogus Dilemma to oppose religion and secularity in this way.

3. The temptation to vilify what it is not

When secularism is strongly advocated, the vilification of religion may happenunintentionally yet by implication. This is because when secularism is affirmed asgood it necessarily implies a judgement on what it is not, i.e. religion, even if thatjudgement is not voiced. From that it is quite an easy step to adopting a sneeringattitude towards what is deemed of little importance.

176 B. Watson

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

Scott Aiken and Robert Talisse (2011) discuss what they term ‘Mom’s maxim’;i.e. a polite taboo in ordinary conversation on political, moral or religious argumentbecause some people might find this uncomfortable. They note that the impliedjudgement on what is not affirmed can easily encourage what they term a ‘NoReasonable Opposition strategy’ by which ‘we tell ourselves that our opponentsreally have no objections anyway; we portray them to ourselves as benighted, igno-rant, unintelligent, wicked, deluded, or worse’ (Aiken and Talisse 2011, 38).

A clear application of ‘Mom’s maxim’ appears to be in the political world. Ron-ald Dworkin (2006), for example, began his book Is Democracy Possible? by refer-ring to the conduct of American politics as ‘in an appalling state. We disagree,fiercely, about almost everything. . . each side has no respect for the other. We areno longer partners in self-government; our politics are rather a form of war’. Simi-larly, scorn of religion is a marked feature of intellectual life in the West. Unlessrestrained, this constitutes an affront and betrayal of the very notions of toleranceand openness for which secularism claims to stand.

4. One-sided application or non-reciprocity

Laborde (2010) argues that in a democratic state all must be bi-lingual speaking asecular language for the public square as well as their own faith language. The rea-son Laborde argues thus is obvious, because secular language makes no reference toGod and religious people can talk it without losing integrity, while atheists cannotuse religious language without losing integrity. The same argument applies regardingthe notion of worship in schools. The non-religious cannot be expected to pray ifassemblies are religious, but the religious can happily join in secular assemblieswithout any problem. Atheists cannot be asked to speak religious language, whilereligious people can be asked to speak secular language. The state which has toembrace all varieties of belief must have a ‘lowest common denominator’ principle.

Yet, this is not as un-contentious as it may appear. For secularist language isinherently atheist – not in the explicit sense of actually verbalising that there is noGod but by omission of any reference to God. Atheism is, therefore, privileged – itis the default position making religion effectively an outsider. So this is a duty orimposition only on religious people. Atheists do not have to be bilingual. Is thisfair? It is interesting that Lord Laws, in the judgement earlier referred to, actuallygave as a reason for secularity:

The precepts of any one religion – any belief system – cannot, by force of their reli-gious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any other. Ifthey did, those out in the cold would be less than citizens, and our constitution wouldbe on the way to a theocracy, which is of necessity autocratic.

May we not say that excluding religious people equally pushes them out in the coldand our constitution would be on its way to ideological totalitarianism by imposinga secularist world-view?

Laborde (2010) tries to say that religious convictions are not excluded if theycan be expressed in a secular language open to all: ‘By exercising religious restraintwhen we are sincerely unable to provide secular reasons for our views, we showrespect for our fellow citizens, only seeking to appeal to public standards’ (13). Theproblem is that the ‘widely accepted epistemological standards’ to which appeal can

Journal of Beliefs & Values 177

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

be made may have already excluded the possibility of a religious perspective. Thisis the case if only empirical evidence can count, available supposedly to everyone.Lord Laws, quoted previously, was appealing to the empirical positivism so com-mon in the West generally. This has been so embedded in its education systems inparticular that is has affected almost everyone (see my article ‘What is education?’[Watson 2009]).

What kind of inclusivity is this? Even without any element of possible scorn ofreligion, there is something unprincipled about a notion of claiming, as the secularstate does, to embrace difference whilst banishing some from the public square. Thisis a kind of inclusivism which excludes many, and a notion of equality which deniesthe rights of some (cf. George Orwell’s [1945] famous aphorism in Animal Farm: ‘allanimals are equal but some animals are more equal than other’). This does not makelogical/rational sense. Nor does it make historical sense, and to this I now turn.

Historicity

Not only are there religious reasons for adopting democratic values; they may beseen as originating in the centuries-long immersion of Western civilisation in specif-ically Judeo-Christian thinking. The rationale, historically, for the value of equalitylies in the teaching that God loves and values every human-being, high or low, richor poor, strong or weak, as epitomised powerfully for the public in the Christiannativity stories.

The Christian origin of equality is no idle claim but is cogently argued for byDavid Bentley Hart (2009), who offers an impressive refutation of secularistattempts to re-define and re-position Christian achievement in the Ancient World.He considers that Christianity:

. . .introduced into our world an understanding of the divine, the cosmic and thehuman that had no exact or even approximate equivalent elsewhere and that madepossible a vision of the human person that has haunted us ever since, century uponcentury. (203)

It follows that Christian values and beliefs about the world and human nature haveso deeply penetrated our culture that Enlightenment atheism, Humanism and thelike are virtually singing from the same hymnbook of values.

Striking recent testimony to this comes from research done by Niall Ferguson(2011) for his TV series ‘Civilisation: The West and the rest’. A scholar from theChinese Academy of Social Sciences reported:

We were asked to look into what accounted for the ascendancy of the West all overthe world. . . At first we thought it was because you had more powerful guns than wehad. Then we thought it was because you had the best political system. Next wefocused on your economic system. But in the past 20 years we have realised that theheart of your culture is your religion: Christianity. That is why the West has been sopowerful. The Christian moral foundation of social and cultural life was what madepossible the emergence of capitalism and then the successful transition to democraticpolitics. (Ferguson 2011, 287)

It is interesting to note, however, that this comment is not reflected in the choice of‘killer applications’ into which Ferguson arranges his material. Many Western intel-lectuals indeed would vehemently disagree with the Chinese scholar. They would

178 B. Watson

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

see the value of equality emanating not from Christianity but from the Enlighten-ment, which rebelled against Christianity by re-animating the virtues of the ancientclassical world. Thus, Robert Louden (2010, 38) argues that the Enlightenment was‘a morally motivated effort to expand human freedom and equality and establish alasting peace’ and he notes that ‘for a brief period during the Enlightenment, therewas an enviable level of commitment to making a moral world’.

Yet, the Enlightenment itself was inextricably influenced by religiously promul-gated ideals and endorsed and promoted by many religious people (e.g. Descartes,Locke, Newton, Berkeley, Priestley, Mendelssohn, and prominent Deists such asPaine, Tindal, and Toland). Nor can the value of equality be accounted for throughthe re-discovery of the classical world. Its spectacular achievements did not includeanything approaching the inclusivist ideal of treating women, slaves, the poor, thesick and disabled as equal citizens.

From a philosophical angle, Roger Trigg (2007) points out that Nietzsche, animplacable opponent of Christianity, also attacked the idea of human equality: ‘Hebelieved that, once Christian metaphysics was removed from the scene, equalitycould no longer be taken for granted’. Trigg continues: ‘the project of finding arational basis for equality is not an irrelevant academic exercise’ (Trigg 2007, 82).

The historical evidence for the links between democracy and Christianity needsto be taken very seriously indeed.

Practical consequences

The privatisation of religion comes with a large and complex price tag.

1. Marginalisation

What is not articulated can very easily disappear from view altogether. This is espe-cially the case when considerable effort is required in real use of freedom to pursuean ideal, as it is regarding religion. To sustain religious faith is far from easy – itrequires a maximum use of autonomy and self-discipline for people to free them-selves from many factors such as conditioning by others, internal emotional drives,problems imposed by ignorance and lack of experience.

2. Closing down options

This is not only unfair to religious people, but it also infringes the very concept offreedom, which secularists claim as so decisive. What is excluded, not thought about,not focussed on, is not an area for free choice because people cannot decide on whatthey know nothing about. Therefore, this impacts on the freedom of choice at theheart of the much-claimed secular pursuit of autonomy. This may be a largely unfa-miliar view of religion which has tended for most people to be associated with emo-tionalism, obedience to authority, and faith presumed to be irrational. It indicates yetagain the dangers of a monochromatic view of religion which thrives on ignorance.

3. The promotion of hypocrisy, lack of transparency and deception

The private/public dichotomy appears to be a convenient way of resolving manytensions. At root, however, it is impossible to draw a strict line between private and

Journal of Beliefs & Values 179

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

public. What anyone believes really firmly always influences – for good or ill –how they act and react all the time. People carry their private world around withthem, whether it be religious, atheist or whatever, just as what they experience inthe public world affects their private world. Attempting to require this separation ofprivate from public thus invites a form of schizophrenia rigidly enforced in totalitar-ian states but properly having no place at all in a democracy. Rather, a thrivingdemocracy requires the proper voicing of all views which are not actually anti-social. It is significant that the religious reasons that Bush and Blair had forembarking on the war with Iraq did not receive open theological debate. It can beargued that absence of debate at a religious level had very serious consequences.

4. Inhibiting the search for social cohesion

Religious people learn from this one-sidedness that their views are not welcome – orat most they are tolerated in patronising fashion. The secularity of the public spacehas already excluded the possibility of taking any religious position seriously. Thezig-zag approach of Britain towards the arrival of large numbers of Muslims, Hindusand Sikhs unfortunately illustrates this only too well. Lack of initial proper welcomein the 1960s and 1970s produced eventually a policy dubbed ‘multiculturalism’which went to the other extreme in actually promoting a ghetto-mentality whichneed not take the host culture’s values and beliefs seriously. The current disenchant-ment felt by many for such ‘multiculturalism’ is justified to some extent, yet the fairand properly democratic way forward must be to want open dialogue which encour-ages, instead of discouraging, public affirmation and criticism of deeply held beliefs.

5. The danger of promoting fundamentalist attitudes

By not permitting religious voices to be properly heard in public, a dangerousghetto mentality is fostered. This means that many criticisms of what might betermed unsavoury developments in religion are not heard by the very people whomost need to hear them. This is particularly serious regarding the development offundamentalist attitudes which harden under duress. The explosive power of reli-gion and its capacity for going wrong argues for the public voice of religion, notbanishing it to the private sphere. Let the light of public debate and of understand-ing shine on unacceptable developments. This will help, for example, democrati-cally orientated Muslims everywhere to deal with the dangerous firebrands in theirmidst. The London 7/7 bombers, for example, were badly let down by the stateeducation they received in Britain, which failed to engage with the religiousinstincts of those vulnerable to becoming fundamentalists.

6. Re-interpreting religion

Excluding religion from the public domain goes against the grain of what religionis. To privatise it is to re-interpret it in such a way that religious people cannot rec-ognise it. The derivation of the word ‘religion’ is ‘what binds together’. All reli-gions stress the communal side and the ideal unity between belief and outward life.Moreover, a major problem for all secular states is how to fill the vacuum createdby the abandonment of what Richard Harries (2008) has called ‘the enchantment ofreligion’. Are the alternatives to religion for holding democracy safely together,

180 B. Watson

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

such as nationalism, reliance on reason, trust in individual autonomy, or the rule oflaw, adequate? Secular states, by privatising religion, have created a vacuum need-ing to be filled with ideals, values and beliefs. As the Archbishop of Westminster,Vincent Nichols (2010, 47), put it: ‘increasingly in our society there is a sense thatwe need some stronger shared foundations’.

Towards a solution

It would appear, therefore, that the secular state is not only irrational and un-princi-pled but also pragmatically unsound. A change of heart is thus needed in our soci-ety concerning thinking about religion, which has been too often demonised,especially by those who should know better – by the educated elite.

If public space in a democracy should not be characterised by the absence ofreligion, how can the state play fair to both religious and non-religious people?How can religion be properly represented in education, both in schools and univer-sities, in the media, in political debate and in public awareness generally?

There needs to be clear articulation and nurture of those values which demo-cratic states must hold in common to flourish or even to survive. Equally, however,the origins and raison d’Átre of those values held in common must be openlyacknowledged as both non-religious and religious. In this way, citizens who thinkdifferently over so important a matter as the source of democratic and moral com-mitment will not feel excluded.

Obama (2006, 55) managed to include both religious and non-religious fairly inthis statement as a basis for public policy-making:

We value a faith in something bigger than ourselves, whether that something expressesitself in formal religion or in ethical precepts. And we value the constellation ofbehaviours that express our mutual regard for one another: honesty, fairness, humility,kindness, courtesy and compassion.

The crucial point is to find a way of being inclusive while articulating a religiousposition as well as a secularist position. It should not be beyond the wit of intelli-gent and sensitive supporters of democracy to find phrases which can do this. Ioffer a few examples:

(1) The constitution could openly acknowledge the validity of a religious per-spective even as not all might hold it. Words such as: ‘We hold these truthsto be self-evident, which many of us see as “under God”. . .’ could be used.

(2) Mission statements for schools, organisations, hospitals, etc. could include areference to the way many people see the values expressed as emanatingfrom their religion. Thus, for example: ‘These are the values to which weare committed. . . We see these as our duty as human-beings and, for someof us, also as religious people’.

(3) Times for public prayer could also be possible provided that alternative waysof responding are voiced. Thus, before public meetings a short period ofsilence could be prefaced by words such as ‘Please use this two-minute per-iod of silence to reflect or to pray, according to your beliefs’.

(4) For school assemblies, religious material could be introduced in some suchways as the following: ‘Sing these words as a song or as a hymn according

Journal of Beliefs & Values 181

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

to what you believe’, or ‘Listen to this prayer and if you wish, silently say“Amen”’.

In such ways religion would thereby be welcomed alongside atheism/agnosticismwith the proviso common to both religious and non-religious commitments that theydo not seek to destroy democratic values. Individuals in a society will opt for oneor the other, but effectively to outlaw one of these from public expression would bethe mark of an irrational leadership of that society. It would be just as irrational toinsist on the divine ordering of society as in a theocracy as to insist on the secularordering of society as in an aggressively atheist regime, for both embody contestedviews which cannot be rationally and publicly resolved.

Finally, it should be remembered that a democracy thrives on the airing of dis-agreements, provided this is done in a respectful, intelligent and sensitive way. Thisis where freedom of speech comes into its own – the ability to say what others maydisagree with. An impressive example of this at work is the support the gay activistPeter Tatchell (2010) gives to those threatened with the law for voicing stronghomophobic views. In December 2010 he wrote:

Bigoted views should be rebutted by debate and protest, not by criminalisation. . . Afree society depends on the free exchange of ideas. . . .Let’s not forget that generationsof people suffered to win us the right to freedom of expression; people like themartyred Bible translator William Tyndale and the jailed Chartist leader WilliamLovett.

In a democracy, the inherent controversy surrounding what people see as the mostimportant aspects of life should not have the effect of pulling people apart butrather of bringing them together in civilised and civilising interaction.

Notes on contributorBrenda Watson was formerly Director of the Farmington Institute, Oxford, UK.

ReferencesAiken, S., and R. Talisse. 2011. Argument in mixed company: Mom’s maxim v. Mill’s

principle. Think 27: 31–43.Bragg, M. 2011. The King James Bible: The book that changed the world. BBC. Television

programme.Brown, A. 2010. Carey slapped down by senior judge. The Guardian, April 29. http://www.

guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/andrewbrown/2010/apr/29/law-christianity.Christian Concern. 2010. Justice denied for Christians as counsellor refused right to appeal.

April 29. http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/sexual-orientation/justice-denied-christians-counsellor-refused-right-appeal.

Dworkin, R. 2006. Is democracy possible? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Ferguson, N. 2011. Civilisation: The West and the rest. London: Allen Lane.Harries, R. 2008. the re-enchantment of morality. London: SPCK.Hart, D.B. 2009. Atheist delusions: The Christian revolution and its fashionable enemies.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Kettle, D. 2010. Faith, freedom and illiberal liberalism. The Gospel and Our Culture

Newsletter 58. http://gospel-culture.org.uk/2010.htm#Newsletter, Newsletter 58 (Summer’10).

Kuru, A.T. 2009. Secularism and state policies toward religion. Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Laborde, C. 2010. In defence of the secular state. RSA Journal, Summer: 10–14.Louden, R. 2010. A new enlightenment? RSA Journal, Autumn: 34–9.

182 B. Watson

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013

Nichols, V. 2010. ‘This society is not secular’: interview with Daniel Johnson. StandpointJan/Feb: 44–7.

Obama, B. 2006. The audacity of hope: Thoughts on reclaiming the American dream. NewYork: Crown/Three Rivers Press.

Orwell, G. 1945. Animal farm. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.Schama, S. 2011. The difficulties of toleration: Jews amidst the Christians and Muslims.

Lecture sponsored by the Woolf Institute, March 8, at Cambridge University.Tatchell, P. 2010. Christian homophobes should not be criminalised. Author’s website,

December 23. http://www.petertatchell.net/free_speech/Free-speech-christian-preachers.htm.

Toynbee, P. 2008. My Christmas message? There’s probably no God. The Guardian,December 23.

Trigg, R. 2007. Religion in public life: Must faith be privatized? Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversity Press.

Watson, B. 2009. What is education? The inhibiting effect of three agendas in schooling.Journal of Beliefs & Values 30, no. 2: 133–44.

Zewaih, A. 2011. We must unleash the power of Egypt’s youth. The Times, February 16.

Journal of Beliefs & Values 183

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f A

uckl

and

Lib

rary

] at

17:

26 1

5 A

pril

2013