Democracy Promotion Good- Middle East War€¦ · Web viewNathan Sharansky, Israel’s Minister...

Democracy Promotion Good- Middle East War

West Coast PublishingDemocracy Promotion Good-Bad4

Democracy and Democracy Promotion Good/Bad

Democracy Good – War2

Democracy Good – Terrorism3

Democracy Good – Economy4

Democracy Good – Afghanistan5

Democracy Good – Middle East War6

Democracy Good – Middle East – A2: Impossible7

Democracy Promotion Good – US Key8

Democracy Promotion Good – Peace/Heg9

Democracy Promotion Good – Middle East War10

Democracy Promotion Good – Middle East Moderates11

Democracy Promotion Good – Middle East Democratization12

Democracy Promotion Good – Africa13

Democracy Promotion Good – Africa14

Democracy Promotion Good – A2: Transition Wars15

Democracy Bad – War16

Democracy Bad – Middle East War17

Democracy Bad – Middle East Hegemony18

Democracy Bad – Middle East Hegemony19

Democracy Bad – Middle East Proliferation20

Democracy Promotion Bad – US Not Key21

Democracy Promotion Bad – Ineffective22

Democracy Promotion Bad – Terrorism23

Democracy Promotion Bad – Heg24

Democracy Promotion Bad – Africa25

Democracy Promotion Bad – Feminism26

Democracy Promotion Bad – A2: Terrorism27

Democracy Promotion Bad – A2: Peace28

Democracy Good – War

1. DEMOCRACY PREVENTS NUCLEAR WAR—IT SOLVES THEIR IMPACTS

Nathan Sharansky, Israel’s Minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs and former Soviet dissident, 2004.

THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 88.

Now we can see why nondemocratic regimes imperil the security of the world. They stay in power by controlling their populations. This control invariably requires an increasing amount of repression. To justify this repression and maintain internal stability, external enemies must be manufactured. The result is that while the mechanics of democracy make democracies inherently peaceful, the mechanics of tyranny make nondemocracies inherently belligerent. Indeed, in order to avoid collapsing from within, fear societies must maintain a perpetual state of conflict. Nondemocratic societies have always been powder kegs ready to explode, but today the force of that explosion can be far more lethal than it was in the past. In an age of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, the dangers of ignoring the absence of democracy in any part of the world have increased dramatically. For a half century, the totalitarian regime in Pyongyang has threatened the security of South Korea. Once it developed long-range missiles, it threatened the security of neighboring Japan and endangered other countries with the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Now that Pyongyang has reportedly developed nuclear weapons— weapons that can be provided to international terrorist organizations—it endangers the security of the entire world. The threat posed by North Korea is not a function of the increase of the destructive capacity of its weapons. Rather, it is the enhanced capacity of its weapons coupled with the nature of its regime that is the source of the problem. Just as nuclear weapons in the hands of a democratizing Russia do not pose the same threat as they did in the hands of the Soviet Union, the weapons of a democratic North Korea would pose no greater danger to the world than if they would be in the hands of a democratic South Korea. In the hands of leaders whose power is dependent on people who see war as a last resort, weapons of mass destruction will be a weapon of last resort. But in the hands of leaders whose survival depends on maintaining a constant state of tension, the danger of these weapons being used directly, or via terrorist proxies, increases enormously.

2. THE PREPONDERANCE OF STUDIES AND THE DECLINE OF CONFLICT IN THE 90S PROVES DEMOCRACY SOLVES WAR

Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005.

THE DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE, p. 12.

Counter to the expectations of the prevailing school, a great deal of research in the 1990s on the political dimension of conflict has revealed a powerful pattern of a “democratic peace.” Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with each other. This pattern has held from the establishment of the first modern democracies in the nineteenth century to the present. As an ever-greater share of the world’s states become democratic, the implications for global peace are profound. Indeed, as the number of democracies has been increasing, major conflicts around the world (including civil wars) have declined sharply. Since 1992, they have fallen by two-thirds, numbering just 13 as of 2003.

3. DEMOCRACIES DON’T GO TO WAR—ACCOUNTABILITY CHECKS MILITARY ADVENTURISM

Nathan Sharansky, Israel’s Minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs and former Soviet dissident, 2004.

THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 78-80.

So if the majority of people in all societies are inherently peace-loving, then what is so unique about democracies that keeps them from waging war with one another? The answer can be found in the political mechanics of every democratic society. Democratic leaders depend on their people. There-fore they have an enormous incentive to satisfy the demands of their constituencies if they want to stay in power. In democracies, the personal interests of the political leadership, even the most venal among them, is effectively tied to improving the lives of those they govern. Those leaders who are perceived to be delivering peace and prosperity tend to be reelected, while those who are not tend to be removed from office. As the United States learned during Vietnam, and the government of Spain learned during the recent war in Iraq, no democratic government will be able to fight a protracted war that the majority of its citizens does not support.

Democracy Good – Terrorism

1. DEMOCRACY SOLVES TERRORISM

William Crotty, Director of the O’Neill Center for the Study of Democracy at Northeastern University, 2005.

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL TERRORISM, p. 8-9.

Democracy and terrorism represent the extremes of the political continuum. Democracy, that is, a fully functioning liberal democracy—one that includes political rights; accountability of elected officials; inclusive electorate, competitive, and policy-relevant political parties; an independent legal system, and normal individual freedoms—effectively offers the norms, values, motivations (the expansion of political support), and institutions that help effuse terrorist developments. This is not to say that democracies do not suffer from terrorism. However, they do so at a much lower level and by clearly distinguishable groups of actors: the lone terrorist (such as Ted Kaczynski, Eric Robert Rudolph, or the individuals charged with assassinating U.S. presidents from Lincoln on) or a small number of terrorists acting on their own (as with Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols in the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building in which 168 people were killed) are two examples. Political assassinations by disturbed individuals is another (Crotty 1970). Regional secessionists (the Basques in Spain) or out-of-the-mainstream groups (for example, religious fanatics, radical communitarians, right-wing militia, the Ku Klux Klan historically, antinativists or antireligious organizations) can author limited, and largely isolated, terrorist acts. Democracies can also serve as targets for terrorist attacks, as the September 11 attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., and the later train bombings in Madrid demonstrated. The point is that inclusive, representative democratic systems offer outlets to identify and address social and economic inequalities effectively enough to make terrorism as a political act moot and, when engaged in, largely ineffective. Terrorism, at least internal terrorism, is viewed as principally a criminal act. In a fully democratic society, terrorism is neither encouraged nor viewed as a logical course of action to achieve a group’s ends.

2. DEMOCRACY PREVENTS TERRORISM

Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005. THE DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE, p. 120.

The upside to this discussion is that international terrorist networks rarely emerge from democracies. By guaranteeing freedom of expression, the right to political organization, opposition to a party in power, and prospects for political change, democracies provide mechanisms through which dissent can be systematically channeled into recognized public institutions. In this way, terrorist activity—calculated violence aimed at generating a political objective—is discouraged. This system is built on the recognition that in any society there will be varied and competing interests. Rather than repressing all views but those held by the party in power, democracy channels dissent into debate and deliberation. As competing views must ultimately gain the support of a plurality of an electorate to be made policy, there are incentives to appeal to a broader audience by moderating one’s position. The process of debate and scrutiny also exposes the risks from pursuing radical policies, positions that can easily flourish in controlled environments. In the process, radical rhetoric falls on deaf ears, rather than mobilizing masses as it does in a repressive state. Militant groups that do emerge in democracies direct their energies inward rather than outward.

3. DEMOCRACY IS KEY TO STOP TERRORISM

Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Fall 2004. THE NATIONAL INTEREST, date Accessed May 6, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_77/ai_3164

The United States has a moral imperative to advocate that individuals around the world have the freedom to pursue their dreams in a secure, prosperous and peaceful environment. Promoting democracy also advances other important interests worldwide. Most immediately, it is an indispensable component of any viable strategy for winning the global war against terrorism, which poses a grave threat to international security in the 21st century. Democracy facilitates the establishment of legitimate and law-based political systems in states that may become sponsors or havens for terrorists, creates peaceful channels to reconcile grievances that can otherwise fuel bloody and destabilizing conflicts within nations, and instills hope, replacing the sense of powerlessness and despair that sometimes transforms ordinary people into willing terrorist recruits. It can also contribute to broader prosperity, which enhances stability and creates opportunities to expand trade and investment ties between nations.

Democracy Good – Economy

1. DEMOCRACY IS KEY TO STABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT



What explains the consistently superior development outcomes of democracies? We outline the conceptual underpinnings of democracy’s superior developmental performance in Chapter 2. The reasons are many and varied, but boil down to three core characteristics of representative government: shared power, openness, and adaptability. Although holding free elections is what commonly defines democracy, what makes it work is the way it disperses power. Consequently, in contrast to most autocratic governments, a broader range of interests are considered on a more regular basis. This increases the likelihood that the priorities of the general public will be weighed. Indeed, the argument that authoritarian governments can ignore special interest groups and therefore make decisions that are for the overall good of the society is based on a series of highly dubious assumptions. One is that the unelected leaders in these systems actually have the interest of the public at heart. The behavior of Fidel Castro in Cuba, Kim Jung-Il in North Korea, Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, and Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in Sudan, to say nothing of former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, would strongly suggest otherwise. Another assumption is that authoritarian governments don’t have to satisfy their own special-interest constituencies. In fact, most authoritarian systems are built on the foundations of extensive patronage networks upon which they rely to stay in power. Although typically shielded from public view, these networks have enormous impacts on economic opportunity and development. The separation of powers inherent in a democracy acts as a constant reminder to the public that the central government’s powers are limited. Thus, it encourages the expansion—and the independence—of the private sector. This, in turn, fosters a climate of innovation and entrepreneurship, the engines of economic growth. The multiplicity of influences on the decision-making process in democracies also leads to more moderate and nuanced policies. This moderating influence contributes to one of the most distinctive qualities of democratic development—its steadiness. The ups and downs of economic growth in low-income countries are smaller in democracies. Rather than experiencing alternating bouts of boom and bust, economies in democracies are more likely to undergo a stable pattern of moderate gains and small declines. For poor democracies, that quality of steadiness is exceedingly important, for it means that they are more able than countries run by dictators to avoid economic and humanitarian catastrophes.

2. AUTHORITARIANISM DOESN’T FACILITATE EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT



A strong case can be made that they are the worst suited. Since they are narrowly based, the economic growth that is realized is likely to be confined to a sliver of the population. Lacking transparency, autocratic governments tend to encourage patronage and corruption. Their repressive nature also makes them susceptible to internal conflict. Far from nudging their economies to that magical middle-income threshold, autocratic government may actually impede the process. We believe that a policy strategy dependent on autocratic-led economic development is thus perpetually caught in a vicious circle. Since these societies rarely develop, they are never considered “ready” for democracy.

Democracy Good – Afghanistan

Successful Afghan democratic transition is key to mideast democracy

Jeffery D. Rhinefield, Lieutenant, United States Navy, MA in Int’l Security Affairs, 2006, “IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIETAL FRAGMENTATION FOR STATE FORMATION: CAN DEMOCRACY SUCCEED IN AFGHANISTAN?,” ; http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445561

The success or failure of Afghanistan in creating a Western style democratic government, with recognizable and well-defined political institutions, will have a great impact on, not only the United States and its stated policies for the region, but also a great impact on Afghanistan’s neighbors. Currently, the region as a whole is facing numerous challenges that threaten to force many actors (on the state, organizational, and individual levels) into conflict with one another over a varying degree of issues. These are issues ranging from weapons proliferation to drug trafficking to the creation of new transportation corridors that will be able to link new markets forming in Central Asia with the remainder of the global trading community for the first time in history. A successful Afghan government that is able to embrace democratic ideals and govern legitimately can become a shining example, to not only its neighbors to the north, the Central Asian Republics, but also to states like Iran, Pakistan, and even possibly China and Iraq. A well-formed and functioning democratic Afghan government can help stabilize the region and allow for the development of strong ties between regional actors and power brokers by possibly becoming the “middleman” state. Finally, the success of Afghanistan would help legitimize American foreign policy goals of spreading democratic ideals throughout the region and strengthen the position of the United States, by allowing for greater leverage in the future when dealing with actors in this region.

Democratic transition is key to prevent another terrorist attack on the U.S.

Steven A. Cook, Next Generation Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2005, “The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform,” CFR

Unfortunately, none of these policies proved very effective, and the failure of the United States to generate political reform in the Arab world before now should serve as a source of caution. Washington's poor track record, however, must not dissuade U.S. policymakers from trying again; the cost would simply be too high. Although the process may be difficult and fraught with risk, promoting the rise of liberal democratic political systems in the Arab world is the only way to reduce, over the long run, the odds of another attack on Americans by Middle Eastern terrorists. It is time, therefore, for Washington to refocus on the challenge: How can it best foster an environment in the Middle East that is conducive to reform? And how can it do so without sacrificing its key interests?

That’s key to prevent nuclear war

Patrick Spiece, JD Candidate, William &Mary, February 2006, William and Mary Law Review, P. Online

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate humanand economic losses. (49) Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. (50) In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. (51) This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, (52) as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. (53).

Democracy Good – Middle East War

1. MID-EAST DEMOCRATIZATION SOLVES WAR AND TERRORISM

Nancy Birdsall et al, founding President of the Center for Global Development, 2005. IN SUPPORT OF ARAB DEMOCRACY: WHY AND HOW, date accessed May 10, 2006, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/cfr001/cfr001.pdf

More open Middle Eastern polities and economies will likely have four positive interrelated effects: First, although extremism will certainly continue to exist in the region, forces of moderation and tolerance will have greater opportunity to frame the terms of debate in a more open political environment. Second, political, economic, and social reform will likely, over time, reduce the reservoir of recruits to extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda and others that target the United States and Americans. In addition, there is substantial evidence to support the “democratic peace theory,” which posits that democracies do not fight each other. Although it is true that countries in transition may be more belligerent, the emergence of democracy in the Middle East would, over the long run, reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict in the region.

2. MID-EAST DEMOCRATIZATION DECREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

Ray Takeyh, Professor of National Security Studies and Director of Studies, Near East and South Asia Center, National Defense University, Spring 2004. THE NATIONAL INTEREST, date accessed May 10, 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/RayTakeyh-Arab%20Democracy.pdf

Yet, the notions that the public is averse to conflicts with long-term costs and that democracy restrains aggressive rulers have merit. Fully constitutional rule would lead an independent legislature examining the causes of war, a free press assessing the claims of the executive and an informed public questioning the necessity of the burdens it must bear. Democracies may not necessarily be peaceful, but neither are they naturally prone to indiscriminate belligerence and adventurism. For Arab dictatorships that have often viewed war as a means of enhancing their prestige, an injection of democratic accountability can go a long way toward arresting some of their impetuous impulses. Even a cursory examination of the post-independence Middle East reveals that far from being a stable and placid region, the Arab world has been marked by persistent inter-state conflict. Under the banner of its transnational ideologies, the aspiring hegemons have waged war and conspired against their fellow rulers. Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser and his brand of Pan-Arabism, Saddam and his Ba’athist creed and Iran’s Ayatollahs with their mandate from heaven have all engaged in prolonged conflicts with their neighbors. Subversion, proxy war, assassination attempts and even outright military aggression have been the currency of Arab international relations, belying the realpolitik confidence in the strategic stability of Arab autocracy. Would Arab democracies have behaved differently? Counterfactual history is always a precarious exercise. However, a case can be made that a more democratic Iraq and Iran would likely not have waged an eight-year war against one another that was largely sustained by the personal animus of their leaders. Similarly, a pluralistic Iraq would likely have settled its dispute with Kuwait in a more peaceful manner and not undertaken another costly invasion shortly after the end of an exhausting war with Iran. It is not unreasonable to assume that a more democratic Egyptian ruler needing public support would likely have avoided Nasser’s 1962 Yemeni quagmire that was utterly inconsistent with Egypt’s strategic interests.

3. DEMOCRATIZATION IS KEY TO PREVENT VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Ray Takeyh, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2004. THE NATIONAL INTEREST, date Acessed May 3, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_78/ai_6618/pg_4

The necessity for reform in the Middle East has never been more compelling. The Arab world faces the real possibility of social implosion. The Middle East confronts a demographic revolution, with nearly half of its population under twenty years of age. It is estimated that the region must create 100 million jobs over the next 15 years to accommodate its "youth bulge." Such a daunting challenge requires that governments implement structural reforms designed to boost economic growth by promoting investment and trade. (1) Yet it is difficult to see how any government in the Middle East can undertake meaningful economic reforms without political modernization. After all, the preconditions for a successful market transition, such as the rule of law, accountability and transparency, are also the essential components of a democratic polity.

Democracy Good – Middle East – A2: Impossible

Mideast democratization is possible

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2003, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=csd

Some skeptics believe that democracy is largely a Western, Judeo-Christian phenomenon that is not well suited to other regions, cultures, and religious traditions. They have a ready answer for this freedom gap: Islam. I believe this answer is wrong on substantive grounds that I will come to shortly. But it is also questionable empirically. There are 43 countries in the world that pretty clearly have a Muslim majority. The 27 of these outside the Arab world have an average freedom score (5.04) appreciably better than the Arab states (5.81). A quarter (seven) of these 27 non-Arab Muslim-majority states are democracies. Moreover, as Alfred Stepan shows, when one examines the level of democracy in the non-Arab Muslim world in relation to level of economic development, one finds an unusual number of “great electoral over-achievers,” that is, political systems that have at least a minimal electoral democracy despite being much poorer than the presumed minimal economic development level necessary to sustain democracy. Further, Stepan shows, non-Arab Muslim countries have some considerable cumulative experience over the last thirty years with political freedom.

Its not incompatible with local culture

Muqtedar Khan, visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Fall 2003, http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol10/0309_khan.asp

As far as the incompatibility between Islam and democracy is concerned, recent surveys conducted by Pippa Norris of Harvard University and Ron Inglehart of the University of Michigan,26 and the Pew Research Center have revealed that Muslims overwhelmingly prefer democracy to any other form of government. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the democratic ideal is quite widely upheld in the Muslim world. Also, there are more nations in the Muslim world that claim to be democratic -- Bangladesh, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt, Indonesia, Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria -- than Islamic (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Malaysia and Sudan). Half of the self-proclaimed Islamic states (Iran, Malaysia and Pakistan) also claim to be democracies. There is nothing in Islam or in Muslim practice that is fundamentally opposed to democracy, justice, freedom, fairness, equality or tolerance. There are a few Muslims who reject democracy because they reject the West, allowing the West to have ownership of this universal value. The large number of Muslims who come out to vote in the presidential elections in the United States and those Muslims who vote in the hundreds of millions in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and elsewhere testify to their comfort with democracy. In the minds of these hundreds of millions of Muslims who practice some form of democracy, there is no dispute between Islam and democracy. Not only do Muslims value democracy, there is now a growing consensus that Islam and democracy are compatible. The first Islamic state, established by the prophet of Islam, was based on a social contract called the constitution of Medina. The state of Medina was a multicultural and multireligious federation in which Muhammad ruled by the consent of those whom he governed through the processes of shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus building). The constitution of Medina establishes the importance of consent and cooperation for governance. According to this compact, Muslims and non-Muslims are equal citizens of the Islamic state with identical rights and duties. Communities with different religious orientations enjoy religious autonomy, which essentially is wider in scope than the modern idea of religious freedom. The constitution of Medina established a pluralistic state, a community of communities. It promised equal security and equality under the law to all. The principles of equality, consensual governance and pluralism are enmeshed in the compact of Medina. It can serve as an excellent model for developing modern Islamic democracies. This constitutional precedent of the Prophet Muhammad suggests that Islam is not a barrier, but can actually serve as a facilitator and an inspiration for democracy.27

Democracy Promotion Good – US Key

THE UNITED STATES IS THE ONLY ACTOR THAT CAN THWART AUTHORITARIAN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

Mauro Lorenzo, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 2007.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, China and Africa, Date Accessed 4-4-07, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25912/pub_detail.asp

To the frustration of African interlocutors, the discussion is rarely focused on what Africa should do to take advantage of the new opportunities that China's expanded commitment to Africa offers. To China's experts, criticism of the country's intentions and investments in Africa seems like part of a strategy by Western countries to "thwart China's development," as one scholar put it.

THE UNITED STATES HAS MASSIVE LEVERAGE OVER EMERGING AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES

Larry Diamond, senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, 1998.

SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF EDUCATION, USA Today, Restoring Democracy in Africa., pg. 57

In Africa, more than any other region, the international community has the power to demand more democratic, responsible governance and to support the people and organizations that are pressing for that cause within individual countries. African states are very weak and dependent (for example, 70% of Chad's budget comes from international donors). Even in Nigeria, with its $8-10,000,000,000 annually in oil revenue, the regime needs foreign investment and finance and its leaders crave legitimacy and acceptance in the world. Moreover, the personal assets of many corrupt African elites are invested heavily in Europe, Canada, and the U.S. Their children attend private schools there and they want to shop and spend holidays in the Western world. They need visas to do this. This gives the Western democracies true leverage, if they have the will and vision to exercise it.

Democracy Promotion Good – Peace/Heg

1. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IS KEY TO US LEADERSHIP

Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch, July 7, 2004.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, p. np.

Third, promoting human rights and democracy is important because America's moral authority partly depends on it. American power in the world is more likely to be respected when it is harnessed to goals that are universally shared. People around the world are more likely to aid the United States in the fight against terrorism and other important goals if they believe the United States is also interested in defending their rights and aspirations. When America is seen to be compromising the values it has long preached, its credibility and influence are diminished.

2. DEMOCRACIES BEST PRESERVE PEACE AND PROTECT RIGHTS

Michael McFaul, Helen and Peter Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Winter 2004-2005.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p. 148-149.

In On Democracy, Robert Dahl succinctly summarizes the advantages of democracy as a system of government.3 According to Dahl, democracy helps prevent rule by cruel and vicious autocrats, guarantees citizens a set of fundamental rights, ensures a broader range of personal freedoms, helps people protect their own fundamental interests, provides the maximum opportunity for self-determination—the freedom to live under laws of one’s own choos-ing—provides the maximum opportunity for the exercise of moral responsibility, encourages human development, fosters a relatively high degree of political equality, promotes peace—as modern representative democracies do not fight one another—and generates prosperity. Throughout most of modern history, Dahl’s claims would have invoked heated debate. For millennia, monarchs, emperors, mullahs, and kings ruled and based their legitimacy on the claim of authority from God. In pockets of the world, these kinds of autocrats still remain, but divine right alone is no longer a sufficient justification for their power. These rulers must now also present other cultural or developmental arguments to explain why implementing democracy would be inappropriate or premature.

3. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IS THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT WAR

Victor Davis Hanson, senior fellow and historian at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University April-May 2005. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, date accessed May 4th, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2185/is_3_16/ai_63098

And while promoting democracy is idealistic, it does not necessarily follow that it is naive. What, after all, prevents wars? Hardly the U.N.; and not just aircraft carriers either. The last half-century of peace in Europe and Japan, and the end of our old enmity of Russia, attest that the widest spread of democratic rule is the best guarantee against international aggression. Ballots substitute for bullets in venting internal frustrations.

4. BACKSLIDING DEMOCRACIES ARE A THREAT TO GLOBAL DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Richard Lugar, Congressman and Chairman of Giving Voice to the People, 2006. 109TH CONGRESS, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Date Accessed 4/13/07, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/democracy.pdf

Democracy backsliding anywhere is a threat to democracy promotion everywhere: Failure to check democracy backsliding in any given country harms democracy promotion efforts worldwide. Because democracy underpins global political stability, economic growth and international security, lack of will to challenge instances of the erosion of democracy sends mixed signals to our partners abroad who share our goals. In repressive and backsliding systems, the importance of democracy programs is magnified. They serve as a needed counterweight to forces of repression, corruption, and disenfranchisement.

Democracy Promotion Good – Middle East War

1. MID-EAST DEMOCRATIZATION SOLVES WAR AND TERRORISM

Nancy Birdsall et al, founding President of the Center for Global Development, 2005.

IN SUPPORT OF ARAB DEMOCRACY: WHY AND HOW, date accessed May 10, 2006, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/cfr001/cfr001.pdf

More open Middle Eastern polities and economies will likely have four positive interrelated effects: First, although extremism will certainly continue to exist in the region, forces of moderation and tolerance will have greater opportunity to frame the terms of debate in a more open political environment. Second, political, economic, and social reform will likely, over time, reduce the reservoir of recruits to extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda and others that target the United States and Americans. In addition, there is substantial evidence to support the “democratic peace theory,” which posits that democracies do not fight each other. Although it is true that countries in transition may be more belligerent, the emergence of democracy in the Middle East would, over the long run, reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict in the region.

2. MID-EAST DEMOCRATIZATION DECREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

Ray Takeyh, Professor of National Security Studies and Director of Studies, Near East and South Asia Center, National Defense University, Spring 2004.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST, date accessed May 10, 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/RayTakeyh-Arab%20Democracy.pdf

Yet, the notions that the public is averse to conflicts with long-term costs and that democracy restrains aggressive rulers have merit. Fully constitutional rule would lead an independent legislature examining the causes of war, a free press assessing the claims of the executive and an informed public questioning the necessity of the burdens it must bear. Democracies may not necessarily be peaceful, but neither are they naturally prone to indiscriminate belligerence and adventurism. For Arab dictatorships that have often viewed war as a means of enhancing their prestige, an injection of democratic accountability can go a long way toward arresting some of their impetuous impulses. Even a cursory examination of the post-independence Middle East reveals that far from being a stable and placid region, the Arab world has been marked by persistent inter-state conflict. Under the banner of its transnational ideologies, the aspiring hegemons have waged war and conspired against their fellow rulers. Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser and his brand of Pan-Arabism, Saddam and his Ba’athist creed and Iran’s Ayatollahs with their mandate from heaven have all engaged in prolonged conflicts with their neighbors. Subversion, proxy war, assassination attempts and even outright military aggression have been the currency of Arab international relations, belying the realpolitik confidence in the strategic stability of Arab autocracy. Would Arab democracies have behaved differently? Counterfactual history is always a precarious exercise. However, a case can be made that a more democratic Iraq and Iran would likely not have waged an eight-year war against one another that was largely sustained by the personal animus of their leaders. Similarly, a pluralistic Iraq would likely have settled its dispute with Kuwait in a more peaceful manner and not undertaken another costly invasion shortly after the end of an exhausting war with Iran. It is not unreasonable to assume that a more democratic Egyptian ruler needing public support would likely have avoided Nasser’s 1962 Yemeni quagmire that was utterly inconsistent with Egypt’s strategic interests.

Democracy Promotion Good – Middle East Moderates

1. MID EAST DEMOCRATIZATION DOES NOT CAUSE RADICALISM

Ray Takeyh, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2004.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST, date Acessed May 3, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_78/ai_6618/pg_4

ONE REASON Washington has been historically reticent to press for democracy in the Middle East is its inordinate fear of Islamists. More than any other factor, the specter of Mgeria informs and distorts the democracy debate. The ill-conceived Algerian democratization of the early 1990s led to the electoral surge of Islamists, culminating in a civil war that cost approximately 150,000 lives. The reigning autocrats routinely invoke the "lessons of Algeria" as they claim that opening the system would only benefit religious zealots determined to usher in a theocratic order. In a strange nexus, the Western governments' fear of Islamists and the dictatorial regimes' clever rationalizations have conspired to defer much-needed reform of the region's political order. As with most ideological tendencies, the complexion of Islamism is changing, as more temperate forces are assuming the leadership of this movement. In states as varied as Turkey, Morocco and Bahrain, moderate Islamist parties are coming to the forefront, calling for participation in the political process as opposed to waging violent campaigns against the state. Indeed, beyond the glare of Western media, a subtle intellectual transformation is underway in many Islamist circles, with leading figures such as Iran's Muhammad Khatami or Egypt's Hassan Hanafi calling for harmonization of Islamic injunctions with democratic precepts. To be sure, given the retaliatory power of the state and the inability of radical Islamists to dislodge the regimes through violence in the early 1990s, such reconsiderations may seem a tactical concession to an altered balance of power. Nonetheless, the inclination of many Islamists to reconsider their ideological strategies should not be discounted. De-radicalization is not a new trend, as leftist forces in Latin America moderated their objectives once presented with the opportunity to participate in the political process. Once part of the governing order, the imperative of getting reelected led many leftists to actually abandon their disruptive and costly utopian schemes in search of more practical solutions to their societies' conundrums. It is time to test the premise of "moderate Islam" and not continuously invoke the Mgerian trauma as a justification for prolonging a deficient autocratic rule.

2. POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION MODERATES ARAB POLITICS

Ray Takeyh, Professor of National Security Studies and Director of Studies, Near East and South Asia Center, National Defense University, Spring 2004.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST, date Acessed May 3,2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_75/ai_7650/pg_3

Today, the only way to disarm radicalism is to liberalize political society. An expanding marketplace of ideas will not only expose the intellectual poverty of Islamism but undermine its claim that only violence can serve as an agent of constructive change. The relatively progressive Jordanian monarchy has demonstrated the utility of inclusive politics, as its Islamists parties, the Muslim Brotherhood and in a more recent incarnation, the Islamic Action Front, have been able to contest parliamentary elections and therefore to be consulted by its executive. Largely because of this, Jordan has been spared the type of Islamist violence that has afflicted closed societies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The value of democratic rule is not just that it constrains rulers by fostering competing institutions and a critical public, but that it engenders a political culture that emphasizes consensus-building, transparency, tolerance and suspicion of radical solutions. By claiming to avoid radicalism, genocidal despots such as Saddam Hussein and profligate monarchies such as the House of Saud also avoid these long-term advantages. This is no longer an acceptable excuse.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DA RESPONSES

Democracy Promotion Good – Middle East Democratization

1. SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IS POSSIBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Michael McFaul, Helen and Peter Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Winter 2004-2005.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p. 152.

Wealthier countries do have a greater prospect of sustaining democratic regimes than poorer countries.13 Yet, little evidence suggests that only wealthy people desire democracy, nor do cultural and religious differences vary support for democracy as a value.14 Instead, survey data suggest that support for democracy is robust and at relatively similar levels in every region of the world.15 Furthermore, in the Arab world, surveys suggest that a strong commitment to Islamic ideas does not hinder the embrace of democratic principles.16 The real values gap between the Arab world and the West does not concern the general concept of democracy as a system of rule but is rather found in men’s attitudes toward the rights of women.17 Polls conducted by the World Values Survey team show that support for antidemocratic ideologies varies throughout the world, with respondents in some countries ready to trade some democracy for more order. In no country surveyed, however, does support for dictatorship exceed support for democracy.

2. MIDEAST DEMOCRACY IS POSSIBLE

Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Fall 2004.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST, date Acessed May 6, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_77/ai_3164

Some have argued that attempting to introduce greater democracy to the Middle East is futile and that Islam and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. This is demonstrably false. On the contrary, as Freedom House has pointed out, the majority of the world's Muslims live under democratic governments in countries like Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey and in western Europe and North America. One should not make the mistake of believing that there is anything inherent in Islam, or any other faith or culture, that will prevent the emergence of democracy. Similar assumptions, held widely decades ago, have already collapsed in Latin America and Asia, where democracies are flourishing. Iraq's fledging democracy could begin the same process in the Middle East and North Africa. And in fact, there have been a variety of encouraging developments in the region. The emir of Bahrain has announced that his nation will conduct parliamentary as well as municipal elections that will permit women candidates to run for office. This is a significant step forward for women's rights, political and economic reform, and broader political participation in Bahrain.

3. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION WILL BE EFFECTIVE

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, June 2003.

POLICY REVIEW ONLINCE, date accessed May 5th, 2005, http://www.policyreview.org/ju/diamond.html

The fully global triumph of democracy is far from inevitable, yet it has never been more attainable. If we manage to sustain the process of global economic integration and growth while making freedom at least an important priority in our diplomacy, aid, and other international engagements, democracy will continue to expand in the world. History has proven that it is the best form of government. Gradually, more countries will become democratic while fewer revert to dictatorship. If we retain our power, reshape our strategy, and sustain our commitment, eventually — not in the next decade, but certainly by mid-century — every country in the world can be democratic.

Democracy Promotion Good – Africa

AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES ARE LESS LIKELY TO GO TO WAR

Joseph Siegle, Associate Director at the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector at the University of Maryland, 2006. BRENTHURST FOUNDATION, Democratic Divergence in Africa: Lessons and Implications for Aid, http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/files/Africa_Beyond_Aid/African_Democracy_and_AidSiegle.doc

The central theme from Africa’s democratization experience for aid donors is that the transformation of African political systems from personalistic to accountable structures of shared power should be at the heart of all that they do. Democracies and democratizers in Africa consistently generate superior development outcomes, avoid economic and humanitarian catastrophes, and are less prone to civil conflict.

THE UNITED STATES HAS A MORAL OBLIGATION TO PROMOTE AFRICAN DEMOCRACY

Chris Fomunyoh, Regional Director for East, Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), 2005. GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Beyond the Ballot Box, Africa’s Democratic Deficit, Vol.6, Iss. 2; pg. 13

While at first glance an assessment of democracy in today's Africa points to a rather negative set of facts, looking a little deeper brings to the fore some success stories and a lot of potential that can be harnessed to provide for a more hopeful future. Although some experts express anguish in stating that "the hardest place in the world to be an optimist is Africa," democracy's plight on the continent is the story of the uncut, unpolished diamond. True, African democrats and the international community have yet to find the continent-wide pearl, and the upcoming path will be long-winded and rough.9 Regardless, African democrats and their allies worldwide have a responsibility to continue their efforts to ensure that the democratic light will shine from the tops of Mounts Kilimanjaro and Cameroon.10

REWARD SYSTEM PROMOTES DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVELY

Joseph Siegle, Associate Director at the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector at the University of Maryland, 2006. BRENTHURST FOUNDATION, Democratic Divergence in Africa: Lessons and Implications for Aid, http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/files/Africa_Beyond_Aid/African_Democracy_and_AidSiegle.doc

External actors can contribute to the spread of democratic norms in Africa by rewarding countries that pursue these reforms while facilitating the exchange of lessons learned around the continent. Regional and sub-regional bodies are important forums for conveying these standards.

PREDICTABLE AND STABLE AID COMING IN GRANTS SOLVES THE PITFALLS OF PREVIOUS AID

J. Martin Ramirez, MD and PhD works at the Institute for Biofunctional Studies and is the head of the Department of Psycobiology of the Universidad Complutense Madrid, 2005. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE, Peace and Development in Africa Vol. 22, 2005, pg. 53

Aid should be predictable, to help the recipient plan for the long term. It should mostly be in the form of grants, not loans, to avoid future debt traps. It should support the local priorities of African governments rather than [donors'] special enthusiasms. And it should be untied: that is, the recipient should not be obliged to buy goods from the donor, in order to avoid unnecessary abuses in the aid. Any type of aid given to Africa has very strong political, economic, social, and technological ties to the donor country. The aid forces many countries in the continent to adopt inappropriate technology, hire experts, and use companies and industrial products from the donor country.

Democracy Promotion Good – Africa

1. DEMOCRATIZATION IS CRUCIAL TO AFRICAN STABILITY

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, 1998.

Hoover Digest, ACESSED 5/17/2007 http://www.hooverdigest.org/983/diamond.html

The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war, and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite. In such circumstances, every political clique and ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth.

2. THE ONLY WAY TO STABALIZE AFRICA IS TO BUILD DEMOCRACY

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, 1998.

Hoover Digest, ACESSED 5/17/2007 http://www.hooverdigest.org/983/diamond.html

The only real antidote to this decay is a constitutional framework that facilitates the limitation, separation, devolution, and sharing of power so that each group can have a stake in the system while checking the ruling elite and one another. In essence, this means a democratic political system, to one degree or another.

3. AFRICAN DEMOCRATIZATION IS KEY TO SOLVE ETHNIC CONFLICT AND STATE COLLAPSE

Darren Kew, professor, Dispute Resolution Program at University of Massachusetts, March 2005, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/shjdir/v6n1/shjdir_v6n1g.pdf

Nonetheless, a consensus is emerging that the distinction between the growing number of successful African states and the continent’s failing states is the degree to which they have democratized. The more consolidated democracies are successful precisely because they are more capable of resolving the ethnic security dilemma, which in turn allows them to undertake sustained efforts to address their economic concerns.

4. CONTINENT-WIDE STATE COLLAPSE IS INEVITABLE WITHOUT DEMOCRATIZATION

Peter Schwab, Professor of Political Science at Purchase College, SUNY, 2001. AFRICA A CONTINENT SELF-DESTRUCTS, p. 167.

A continent confronted by the worst plague to strike the earth since the fourteenth century can ill afford such pernicious pacesetters. Yet here they are, and unless something truly fundamental is done to promote democracy, the previous 10 years will have been merely a harbinger of the decade just begun, a destiny that may well encompass a continuing series of coups, countercoups, wars, ethnic explosions, and an elephantine number of AIDS fatalities.

5. DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA IS POSSIBLE

H. Kwasi Prempeh, law professor at Seton Hall Law School, former Director of Legal Policy and Governance at the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2006 “Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa” TULANE LAW REVIEW

Since the early 1990s, several of sub-Saharan Africa's forty-something states have experienced a return to open and competitive politics. Military regimes, one-party rule, and "life presidents," once the norm in postcolonial Africa, have given way to elected and term-limited presidents and representative parliaments in countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Benin, Uganda, and Mali. As elsewhere in the postauthoritarian world, constitutional reforms have underwritten the tentative democratic gains made in contemporary Africa.

Democracy Promotion Good – A2: Transition Wars

1. Democratic transitions don’t lead to conflict


The Democracy Advantage, p. 100.

Surprisingly, despite the logic of this argument, the rate of conflict in a democratizing society was no higher than the global norm in the 1980-2002 period. Democratizers had a 15 percent likelihood of experiencing conflict in a given year, compared to the 16 percent rate globally. However, these figures do not take into account differences in national income. And as we noted earlier, low-income countries (a group that comprises most contemporary democratizers) are much more likely to become engaged in conflict. A more apt comparison, therefore, is to ask, “Are democratizers more likely to become embroiled in conflict than other low-income countries?” Framing the question in this way finds that democratizers are actually somewhat less likely to face conflict than other countries in their income group. In the 1980—2002 period, democratizers with per capita incomes below $4,000 had an 18 percent probability of conflict in any given year, compared with the 21 percent global norm for this income group. Considering a sample of lower-income countries (that is, below $2,000), the comparable stability of democratizers expands to 17 percent versus 22 percent. As noted previously, the 1980s were a period of great turbulence. Nonetheless, countries starting down a democratic path during this period of geo-strategic change were no more likely to become engaged in conflict than (the mostly autocratic) low-income states that were not making democratic advances.

2. MANSFELD AND SNYDER’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION MODEL IS INCORRECT

David L. Rousseau, Professor @ the University of Pennsylvania and Writer for the Stanford Press, 2005.

Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict, pg. 279

The Mansfield and Snyder theoretical argument and quantitative analysis (1995a, 1995b) was criticized from a number of quarters. Wolf (1996) argued that the theoretical model was most appropriate for the demise of feudal states; consequently, its applicability to the recent demise of communist states in Europe was doubtful. Weede (1996) criticized the analysis on three grounds: (1) the results were statistically weak using conventional levels of significance (particularly weak for inter-state wars); (2) the overlycomplicated research design made it impossible to distinguish the impact of regime change in general, from democratization (or autocratization) in particular; and (3) and Weede claimed that all democracies, not just democratizing states, suffer from a lack of coherence in foreign policy.

3. SEVERAL SUPERIOR STUDIES REFUTE MANSFELD AND SNYDER’S CLAIM ABOUT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

David L. Rousseau, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania and Writer for the Stanford Press, 2005.

Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict, pg. 279.

Enterline (1996, 1998) argued that conflict initiation rather than conflict involvement is a more direct test of the logic of Mansfield and Snyder's argument. Focusing on regime change along a continuum rather than categorical shifts, Enterline's reanalysis rejected the hypothesis that democratization increases the probability of war and conflict. Rousseau (1997) criticized the lag structure employed in the Mansfield and Snyder model, which allowed a regime change in one year (for example, 1811) to be linked to the outbreak of war almost two decades later (1830).

Democracy Bad – War

1. DEMOCRACIES START MORE WARS

Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002.

Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 146.

Are Democracies More Peaceful than Nondemocracies with Respect to Interstate Wars? The results indicate that democracies are more war-prone than non-democracies (whether democracy is coded dichotomously or continuously) and that democracies are more likely to initiate interstate wars. The findings are obtained from analyses that control for a host of political, economic, and cultural factors that have been implicated in the onset of interstate war, and focus explicitly on state level factors instead of simply inferring state level processes from dyadic level observations as was done in earlier studies (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal and Ray, 1997). The results imply that democratic enlargement is more likely to increase the probability of war for states since democracies are more likely to become involved in—and to initiate—interstate wars.

2. DEMOCRACIES ARE MORE LIKELY TO START WARS


Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 68-70.

My findings refute the monadic level DPP, which suggests that democracies are more peaceful than nondemocracies, and they reveal that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to be involved in—and to initiate—interstate wars and MIDs. Wedding these findings to those in Chapter 2, it appears that the spread of democracy may precipitate an increase in the likelihood of wars as individual states become democratic and, subsequently, more war-prone. Further, casting these findings in the light of recent studies of the DPP highlights some daunting prospects for global peace. For example, recent empirical findings indicate that regime changes are much more likely to occur during or following wars and that losing states are much more likely to experience regime change (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992). Since democracies are more likely to win wars as compared to nondemocracies (Lake, 1992; Stain, 1996; Reiter and Stain, 1998a), it follows that nondemocracies are more likely to experience regime change, which in some cases may result in their full democratization. The result is that war involvement may actually increase the proportion of democratic states in the system and, subsequently, increase the likelihood of warfare for those newly democratic states. From this perspective, the spread of democracy will create more of the most war-prone states, thereby increasing the likelihood of war involvement and initiation for those states. These relationships hardly encourage a sanguine view of the prospects for peace with a democratic enlargement strategy.

3. Democratic transitions lead to civil wars


Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 147-148.

Are Democracies in the Postcolonial World Less Likely to Experience Civil Wars? The results fail to support the democratic peace for civil wars in post-colonial states since democracy is not significantly associated with a decreased probability of intrastate war in postcolonial states. Instead, the results corroborate previous findings that semidemocracy is associated with an increased likelihood of civil war. Therefore, although coherent democracy does not appear to reduce the likelihood of postcolonial civil wars, partial democracy exacerbates the tensions that result in civil war. Given the findings from Chapter 6, these results suggest that democratic enlargement as a strategy for peace is not likely to succeed for those states that need it most—the postcolonial, or third world, states. Further, even if full-fledged democracy were to engender peace within these states—which is not indicated by the findings reported here—it would likely generate conflict, internationally, since democracies are more prone to initiate and become involved in interstate wars and militarized disputes. As noted earlier, the promise of egalitarianism, which is the true appeal of democracy, seems to involve a Hobson’s choice for citizens of postcolonial states: equality with an increased likelihood of domestic instability or inequality with a decreased likelihood of international stability.

Democracy Bad – Middle East War

1. MIDEST DEMOCRATIZATION WOULD INCREASE REGIONAL HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL

Ray Takeyh, Professor of National Security Studies and Director of Studies, Near East and South Asia Center, National Defense University and Adjunct Scholar at the Center for American Progress, Spring 2004.


Nor would a more democratic Middle East necessarily serve the cause of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the integration of Israel into the regional order. The intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may obscure the historical pattern of gradual accommodation between the Arab states and Israel. The fact remains that during the past two decades, much maligned autocracies have gradually come to terms with the Israeli state. Two of Israel’s neighbors, Jordan and Egypt, have even signed formal peace treaties with their erstwhile nemesis. Such a halting process of normalization would likely be reversed if Arab regimes become responsive to their respective collective wills. The region’s public opinion continues to reject Israel as an agent of an alien and pernicious ideology and a usurper of Arab lands. Such rejectionist views go far beyond the Islamist parties that are the chief opponents of the peace process. In Egypt, the state with the oldest peace treaty with Israel, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and the secular Wafd party find common ground in denouncing the Camp David Accords. In a similar vein, a Jordanian parliament that features both Islamists and secular parties routinely calls on King Abdullah to abandon the 1994 peace treaty between Amman and Jerusalem. Throughout the region, anti-peace process campaigns emanate not just from Islamist circles but also from the secular parties with leftist pretensions. The neoconservative assumption that democratic Middle Eastern states would lessen their enmity toward the Jewish State is not substantiated by evidence.

2. MID-EAST DEMOCRATIZATION INCREASES THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL

Leslie Susser, Staff Writer, April 2005.

THE JERUSALEM REPORT, p. 20.

For the Islamists, Kramer argues, democracy means only "freedom from" - as in freedom from foreign or corrupt rule. But they lack any commitment to Western principles of "freedom of" - as in freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of conscience. In other words, for the Islamists, there is no concept of individual rights. But the notion that democracies prefer peace to war stems at least partly from their inherent respect for the individual, who should not be casually sacrificed. Islamist democracies, Kramer argues, are no more likely to be peace-loving than the dictatorships they replace. Kramer also rejects the American neoconservative argument that "freedom from" democracy, which entails a submission to Islamic law and tradition - on the lowly status of women, for example - would be only a transitional phase, and that to keep power, Islamists would eventually move to full-fledged democracy. There is not a single example, Kramer says, of a regime that has made the transition. "In Iran they removed the despotic shah, but they've been stuck in the 'submission to' stage for 25 years, because the people who exercise power under the rubric of God's divine will don't see themselves as interim figures," Kramer asserts. Moreover, he adds, experience shows that the wider Arab public is generally hostile to making peace with Israel: "The fact is that we have made peace with dictators, and the Arab street, which democracy would empower, has not been particularly sympathetic to the peace agreements. In fact, we might not have reached the agreements we have with Egypt and Jordan if more attention had been paid to public opinion." Egypt is a good illustration of Kramer's concern. The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty has been the cornerstone for all Israel's peacemaking efforts in the Arab world. And, over the past few months, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak has been playing a key facilitating role in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. But Mubarak has also been speaking of greater democratization in Egypt, specifically of opening up the next presidential race to all would- be candidates. And the question arises: What would happen to the Israeli-Egyptian peace and to Egypt's good offices on the Palestinian track if, in an open election, Islamists came to power?

Democracy Bad – Middle East Hegemony

1. ARAB DEMOCRATIZATION LEADS TO EXPULSION OF US PRESENCE IN THE MID EAST, COLLAPSING HEGEMONY

Michael C. Hudson, Seif Ghobash Professor of Arab Studies and Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University, March 22, 2005.

MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Will new liberal-democratic regimes serve American interests? To answer this question, we begin by invoking the old Chinese proverb: Beware of what you ask for; you might get it. In the Arab world, reformers working for political liberalization and democracy very often also strongly oppose certain American policies in the region. They ask: If the regimes in countries with close U.S. ties, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen (to name a few), were genuinely free and democratic, would they permit American military bases and many other facilities that buttress the American strategic hegemony in the region, especially while the U.S. military is occupying Iraq and the administration is turning a blind eye to Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories? The public-opinion polls from across the region are devastating evidence of the broad popular antipathy toward the United States.

2. ARAB DEMOCRATIZATION WOULD LEAD TO U.S. EXPULSION FROM THE MIDDLE EAST



Beyond public opinion samples, free elections do not necessarily bring forth groups willing to accommodate U.S. presence. In two countries on the periphery of the Middle East—Turkey and Pakistan—both with relatively free legislative contests, elections have resulted in parliaments suspicious of American priorities. In both states the Islamist and secular parties have managed to set aside their other differences and oppose the U.S. agenda. The parliamentary elections held in October 2003 in Pakistan witnessed the emergence of such a coalition, as the Pakistan People’s Party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid, the Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal (MMA) and the National Alliance. This coalition demanded that President Musharraf reconsider his close relationship with Washington. The freely elected Turkish parliament may feature contenting ideological parties, but they all cooperated with each other in rejecting an American request to invade Iraq through its territory. In both cases, such actions were widely popular.

3. MIDEAST DEMOCRATIZATION UNDERMINES SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICY



On issues ranging from the Arab- Israeli peace process to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Washington may find a more democratic Middle East less prone to adhere to its mandates. Freed from the restraints of authoritarianism, the nationalistic Arab masses are unlikely to acclaim the merits of the liberal American imperium and eagerly embrace its priorities. In the end, while the spread of democratic rule in the Middle East is likely to stabilize one of the most volatile regions of the world, it will extract its costs in terms of key U.S. preferences.

Democracy Bad – Middle East Hegemony

1. MID EAST DEMOCRATIZATION KILLS US INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

Ray Takeyh, Professor of National Security Studies and Director of Studies, Near East and South Asia Center, National Defense University, Spring 2004. THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Accessed May 3, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_75/ai_7650/pg_3

If the spread of democracy might stabilize inter-Arab relations, how would emerging democracies deal with an intrusive American presence and its expansive regional agenda? In her August 2003 Washington Post op-ed advocating the promotion of democracy, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice proclaimed, "A democratic Iraq can become a key element of a very different Middle East." Indeed, it can. For instance, Iraq's contending ethnic and religious factions have arrived at a rare consensus in their demand for eviction of American forces. Despite the enterprising efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 58 percent of Iraqis demanded to be allowed to "work this out themselves", according to a recent poll conducted in four major Iraqi cities, including in Shi'a Basra and Kurdish Kirkuk. The ongoing acts of resistance--as well as the growing frustration with the presence of U.S. and British forces even in the Shi'a areas of the country--suggest a nationalistic rejection of the occupation. Iraqis were happy to be rid of Saddam but show limited inclination to be directed by the United States in any aspect of domestic and foreign policy. Under such conditions, it is difficult for a leader to be responsive to American concerns and, at the same time, seek an electoral mandate from a disgruntled populace that does not necessarily share America's vision. The case of Iraq is not unique. The most significant political force in today's Middle East is nationalism--and that nationalism insists on autonomy from superpower domination. Various public opinion surveys point to the manifold problems that the United States confronts in the region. The most recent Pew Survey on Global Attitudes conducted in December 2003 reveals that a "very favorable view" of the United States did not reach double digits even in the most moderate regional states with long-standing ties to the United States. In Jordan, only 6 percent had a positive view of the United States, while Pakistan and Egypt recorded equally dismal statistics of 2 and 3 percent respectively.

2. ARAB DEMOCRATIZATION UNDERMINES US REGIONAL INFLUENCE

Ray Takeyh, Professor of National Security Studies and Director of Studies, Near East and South Asia Center, National Defense University, Spring 2004. THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Accessed May 3, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_75/ai_7650/pg_3

It is customary for the unsettled Washington establishment to blame such daunting numbers on regimes that castigate the United States as a means of deflecting attention from their own deficiencies. But the opposite may actually be the case--namely that the regimes' campaigns are not designed to cultivate anti-Americanism but actually placate public opinion that is strongly averse to U.S. policies. The Arab masses actually do admire, in their own way, American values, culture and technological prowess, but merely seek liberation from a series of Western empires that have historically arrogated to themselves the right to condition the region's political order. Democratic Arab states would certainly seek diplomatic, trade and cultural ties with the United States, but would object to America's cumbersome presence with its military garrisons and national security doctrines that legitimize pre-emptive warfare--doctrines that apply only to America. Democratic peace theory has clearly failed to assess relations between imperial powers and their dependencies once public opinion enters the political scene.

3. STRONG DEMOCRACY PROMOTION UNDERMINES VITAL US INTERESTS

Richard Haass, president, Council on Foreign Relations, January 24, 2005. THE WASHINGTON POST, p. A15.

Trade-offs for the United States are unavoidable. President Bush's statement Thursday that "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one" doesn't hold up to careful scrutiny. The United States has a vital interest in China helping to eliminate the North Korean nuclear program, in Russia helping to eliminate the Iranian one, in Pakistan going after al Qaeda, in Israelis and Palestinians making peace. We may prefer that China, Russia, Pakistan and Palestine also be democratic, but a preference is something markedly less than a vital interest. The United States simply cannot afford to allow promoting democracy to trump cooperation on what is truly essential.

Democracy Bad – Middle East Proliferation

1. MID EAST DEMOCRATIZATION CAUSES NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Ray Takeyh, Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University and Nikolas Gvosdev, editor of In the National Interest, March 5, 2003.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, date accessed May 9, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/pub7344/ray_takeyh_nikolas_k_gvosdev/arab_democracy_and_american_security.php

Nor would the United States find a democratic Middle East more hospitable terrain for its anti-proliferation priorities. In the era of the Bush Doctrine, with its penchant toward unilateralism and pre-emption, it is hard to see how any beleaguered state would dispense with the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Prospective democracies in the Middle East would face even greater nationalistic pressure for modernization of their armed forces and achievement of a true balance of power with a nuclear-armed Israel. Washington may be able to coax, bribe and pressure Arab despots into maintaining their compliance with its non-proliferation treaties, but it can do little with democratic regimes relying on the votes of a public complaining about the inequality of the Israeli nuclear monopoly. It is significant that none of the opposition parties in Pakistan -- not even the most "secular" or "Western" of these movements -- support any move toward de-nuclearization (certainly as long as India and Israel remain nuclear powers).

2. MID-EAST DEMOCRATIZATION LEADS TO PROLIFERATION


THE NATIONAL INTEREST, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/RayTakeyh-Arab%20Democracy.pdf

The attempt to halt the trend toward the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction has been one of the Bush Administration’s central pre-occupations. Under the auspices of its new national security doctrine, Washington has even argued in favor of pre-emptive military intervention as a tool of counter-proliferation. However, the aspirants of greater democracy in the Middle East may find a more intensified regional commitment to production of such deadly arsenals should elected regimes come to power. Nations pursue weapons of mass destruction for a variety of strategic and nationalistic reasons. However, potential Arab democracies would face enormous popular pressure for achieving military parity with Israel. A public that complains about the inequality of an Israeli nuclear monopoly is likely to press elected leaders toward modernizing their armed forces and even acquiring the “strategic weapon.” Through political pressure and even bribery, the United States has been relatively successful in compelling Arab despots to adhere to their non-proliferation commitments, such leverage would be less effective against leaders who rely on democratic majorities demand a viable balance of power with Israel. In the end, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and the inevitable surge of nationalism in a democratic polity would further complicate America’s attempt to reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

3. DEMOCRATIZATION CANNOT CHECK MID-EAST PROLIFERATION

Joseph Cirincione, Director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 11, 2005.

THE GLOBALIST, date accessed May 9, 2006, http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3217

Proliferation issues arise in democracies as well as dictatorships. Even if democratic transformations sweep the Middle East, a new Iraq and a new Iran would still want nuclear weapons as long as Israel has them — and as long as they are seen as the currency of great powers. The Iranian nuclear program began under the Shah in 1958, with the first U.S.-supplied reactor going online in 1967. The program will likely continue under future governments unless fundamental regional dynamics are altered.

Democracy Promotion Bad – US Not Key

1. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY GLOBALLY

Thomas Carothers, director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

UNCHARTED JOURNEY, Ed. by Marina Ottaway, Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endownment, pg. 221

Once U.S. officials determine which reform steps would be most meaningful and feasible in the current context, they should continue with an inventory of important U.S. interests in the country (military/strategic, counterterrorism/law enforcement, political. economic, commercial) and a realistic-but not defeatist assessment of the influence the United States possesses. It is important to see clearly the limitations of U.S. influence: Short of the use of military force, the United States generally cannot make things happen in other countries against the will of the host government.

2. THE US DOES NOT HAVE INFLUENCE OVER DEMOCRACY PROMOTION



Here it is important to recall that, even in the handful of countries in the region where the United States is influential, U.S. influence is generally indirect Not only can the United States not force governments to change, but also it cannot control the pace or direction of change once it begins. In many cases, the sort of change and the ways it manifests itself may not suit U.S. tastes perfectly.

3. US INVASION OF IRAQ PREVENTS CREDIBILITY FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION



A major reason for the skepticism about U.S. intentions by Arab publics is that the United States started pushing the democracy agenda at the same time as it started preparing for the war in Iraq. One of the main arguments used by the George W Bush administration to convince Americans to support the war in Iraq-that the war would open the way for a democratic regime in Baghdad and that the change would have a demonstration effect on the rest of the region-has been given a sinister interpretation in the Arab world When the United States talks of promoting democracy, many Arabs have concluded, it is really talking about forcefully removing regimes it does not like and replacing them with ones willing to safeguard U S. interests.

4. NATIONALISM PREVENTS BENEVOLENT DEMOCRATIC LEADERS

Sebastian Rosato, PhD @ The University of Chicago, 2003.

“The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, vol. 97, issue 4, pg. 11

Third, democratic leaders are as likely to lead as to follow public opinion. Since nationalism imbues people with a powerful spirit of self-sacrifice, it is actively cultivated by political elites in the knowledge that only highly motivated armies and productive societies will prevail in modern warfare (e.g., Posen 1993). Democratically elected leaders are likely to be well placed to cultivate nationalism, especially because their governments are often perceived as more representative and legitimate than authoritarian regimes. Any call to defend or spread “our way of life,” for example, is likely to have a strong resonance in democratic polities, and indeed the historical record suggests that wars have often given democratic leaders considerable freedom of action, allowing them to drum up nationalistic fervor, shape public opinion, and suppress dissent despite the obligation to allow free and open discussion.

Democracy Promotion Bad – Ineffective

1. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IS INEFFECTIVE

Michael Desch, Robert M. Gates chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-making at the George H.W.Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, January 25, 2005.

THE AUSTRALIAN, p. 13.

Take the question of whether the US can reasonably expect to spread democracy to large swaths of the globe. History teaches us that democracy is a fragile flower that blooms only in the most hospitable soil. Without the requisite economic and cultural preconditions, which most of the world lacks, the prospects for spreading stable democracy are poor. Outside efforts have rarely brought democracy, the much discussed post-World War II German and Japanese cases notwithstanding. Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington shows that of the roughly 35 cases of democratisation between 1974 and 1990, only Grenada and Panama came about through direct US military intervention. Both were small countries right in the US's backyard and neither became a robust democracy. In the other 33 cases, democracy was largely the result of internal developments in those states.

2. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION FAILS

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, January 24, 2005.

THE WASHINGTON POST, p. A15.

It is also difficult to spread democracy. It is one thing to oust a regime, quite another to put something better in its place. Prolonged occupation of the sort the United States carried out in Japan and West Germany after World War II is the only surefire way to build democratic institutions and instill democratic culture. But as Iraq demonstrates, the rise of modern nationalism and modern methods of resistance means that such opportunities will be rare, costly and uncertain to succeed, despite an investment of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. Prospects for the democratic improvement of a society can prove even worse absent occupation. Those who rejoiced 25 years ago in the overthrow of the shah of Iran should reflect on the fact that unattractive regimes can be replaced by something far worse. We thus need to be measured in what pressures we place on such countries as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Here as elsewhere it is important to observe the Hippocratic oath and first do no harm. Time is a factor in another sense. There is no realistic way that democracy will arrive in either North Korea or Iran before nuclear weapons do. And even if "freedom" were somehow to come to Tehran, it is almost certain that free Iranians would be as enthusiastic as the mullahs are about possessing nuclear weapons owing to the political popularity of these weapons and their strategic rationale given Iran's neighborhood.

Democracy Promotion Bad – Terrorism

1. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION INSPIRES TERRORIST ATTACKS

William Crotty, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy at Northeastern University, 2005.

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL TERRORISM, p. 525.

Eighth, exporting democratic values and institutions is not easy. This is seen in much of the world as manifestations of Western culture and as not unrelated to economic expansion and exploitation, an experience most nondemocratic countries are familiar with and one that serves to legitimize much of the terrorist rage against the West. The attack against the World Trade Center, was, in essence, an attack against wealth and the symbol of capitalism. The Pentagon attack focused on the military. Combined, the world’s wealthiest and most powerful nation experienced devastating assaults on two of its most proud and representative symbols. None of this, of course, was by accident; rather, it was the outcome of long-term, careful, and technically sophisticated planning.

2. DEMOCRATIZATION INCREASES TERRORISM

Thomas Carothers, director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment, 2004.

CRITICAL MISSION, p. 252-253.

One obstacle is the facile assumption that a straight line exists between progress on democratization and the elimination of the roots of Islamic terrorism. The sources of Islamic radicalism and the embrace of anti-American terrorism by some radicals are multifaceted and cannot be reduced to the simple proposition that the lack of democracy in the Arab world is the main cause. Moreover, any rapid opening up of the closed political systems in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or even Egypt could well, in the short to medium term, allow extremist groups to operate more actively and give strength to the wider Islamist organizations that sometimes feed the extremists. There may be an analogy to the much-debated relationship between the existence of democracy in countries and the proclivity of countries to go to war: Although established democracies tend not to fight wars with one another, countries setting out on the turbulent path from dictatorship to democracy are often more war-prone. Even the successful achievement of democracy offers no guarantee that a society will not produce terrorists. More than a few established democracies have struggled with persistent terrorist threats, whether it is Spain confronting Basque terrorists, Italy facing the Red Brigades, or Great Britain grappling with the Irish Republican Army.

3. DEMOCRACY DOESN’T SOLVE TERRORISM

Marina Ottaway senior associate at the Democracy and Rule of Law Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Thomas Carothers, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, November/December 2004. FOREIGN POLICY, date accessed May 9, 2006, http://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2705&page=3

“Middle East Democracy Is the Cure for Islamist Terrorism” No. This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism. History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country’s history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government’s promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region. Moreover, democracy is not a cure-all for terrorism. Like it or not, the most successful efforts to control radical Islamist political groups have been antidemocratic, repressive campaigns, such as those waged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the 1990s. The notion that Arab governments would necessarily be more effective in fighting extremists is wishful thinking, no matter how valuable democratization might be for other reasons.

Democracy Promotion Bad – Heg

1. Democratization undermines support for US policies

Robert Blecher, teaches history at the University of Richmond, March 2003.

MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Accessed May 3, 2005, http://www.merip.o

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