Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Violence in the Philippines
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Transcript of Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Violence in the Philippines
Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Violence
in the Philippines1
Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER) July 2007
1 This is the case study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and which is the
basis for the section on the Philippines of the UNDP paper entitled ―Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia‖
published in 2011.
2
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Problem of Violence ……………………. 6
Chapter 2 History of Elections in the Philippines ……………………. 9
Chapter 3 The Philippine Electoral System ……………………. 12
Legal Framework for Elections ……………………. 12
The System of Elections ……………………. 13
Who can vote ……………………. 15
Who can contest elections ……………………. 16
Election Body: The Philippine Commission on Elections ……………………. 17
Chapter 4 Features of Election Violence ……………………. 20
Election Violence ……………………. 20
Election Contests and Disputes ……………………. 24
Focus Group Discussions ……………………. 20
Chapter 5 Role of Actors in Propagating or Mitigating Violence ……………………. 32
Candidates and Parties ……………………. 32
The Commission on Elections ……………………. 33
State Security Forces ……………………. 34
Insurgency groups ……………………. 34
Election Monitors and citizen arms ……………………. 35
Chapter 6 Case Study:
2004 Philippine Presidential Election Impasse
……………………. 36
The Issue of Presidential Legitimacy ……………………. 36
The Protagonists ……………………. 38
Election Results ……………………. 38
The Issue of Cheating ……………………. 40
Continuing Crisis ……………………. 44
Chapter 7 Issues and Recommendations/Good Practices ……………………. 45
Bibliography ……………………. 48
Research Team ……………………. 51
Annexes ……………………. 52
3
List of Annexes
Annex 1 Philippine Elections held after 1986
Annex 2 Proportion of Voters to Population
Annex 3 Total number of Contestants for the Elected House in the Last 3 Elections
Annex 4 Number of Candidates by Party Affiliation (2004 Elections)
Annex 5 Number of Elected Candidates by Party Affiliation (2004 Elections)
Annex 6 Number of Elected Candidates by Party Affiliation (1998 Elections)
Annex 7 Election Contests
Annex 8 Procedure in Election Contestation
Annex 9 Election Protests for the year 2002 - 2004
Annex 10 Number of Deaths by Government Position (2004, Elections)
Annex 11 Comparative Statistics on Election-related Incidents (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004,
2007 Elections)
Annex 12 Discussion Sessions and Participants’ Affiliation
Annex 13 Philippine Election Laws
Annex 14 COMELEC Organizational Structure
List of Tables
Table No. 1 - Philippine elections held after 1986 …………. 14
Table No. 2 – Number of seats and candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections …………. 15
Table No. 3 – Powers and Functions of the Commission on Elections …………. 18
Table No. 4 - Number of violent incidents, deaths, and injured (1992-2007) …………. 23
Table 5. – Judicial Body where election contests are filed
…………. 24
4
List of Acronyms
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARD Assistant Regional Director
ARMM Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
BEI Board of Election Inspectors
BOC Board of Canvassers
BP Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature)
CA Commission on Appointments
CBCP Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines
CER Consortium on Electoral Reforms
COMELEC Commission on Elections
COMPACT COMPACT for Peaceful Elections
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
DepEd Department of Education
DILG Department of Interior and Local Governance
EA Election Assistant
EAC Election Areas of Concern
EDSA Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
EIAC Election Areas of Immediate Concern
EO Election Officer
ERAP Joseph Ejercito Estrada
ERVIs Election-related violent incidents
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FPJ Fernando Poe, Jr.
FPTP First-Past-The-Post
GARCI Former Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
GMA Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
HRET House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
IFES International Foundation for Election Systems
IPER Institute for Political and Electoral Reform
IPER Indigenous Peoples
KBL Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement )
LAKAS-CMD LAKAS-Christian Muslim Democrats
LAKAS-NUCD LAKAS-National Union of Christian Democrats
LP Liberal Party
MILF Moro International Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MMDA Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
NAMFREL National Citizen's Movement for Free and Elections
5
NCR National Capital Region
NP Nacionalista Party
NPA New People's Army
OAV Overseas Absentee Voting
OEC Omnibus Election Code
PAGs Partisan Armed Groups
PES Provincial Election Supervisor
PET Presidential Electoral Tribunal
PNP Philippine National Police
PPCRV Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting
PTC Permit-to-Campaign
RA Republic Act
RED Regional Election Director
RPC Revised Penal Code
SC Supreme Court
SET Senate Electoral Tribunal
SK Sangguniang Kabataan (Youth Council)
SONA State of the Nation Address
SWS Social Weather Station
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
ULAP Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
6
Chapter 1 Problem of Violence
The post-martial law period in the Philippines call for the need to re-establish democratic
processes and institutions. The EDSA People Power I2 escalated from the worsening social,
political, and economic order and widespread election manipulations and irregularities of the
Marcos government especially in the 1986 snap presidential elections. The uprising led to the
eventual ouster of Marcos and the installation of Corazon Aquino as the new democratic
president.
A new constitution was crafted to restore civil and political rights to the people, and to
provide for restricted powers of the president, multi-party system, promotion of the role of non-
government and sectoral organizations, and proportional representation in the legislature.
General elections have been held regularly and the Commission on Elections—the election
management body in the Philippines is given not only quasi-judicial but judicial powers as well.
Three major election exercises were immediately held after the drafting of the new
Constitution: a national plebiscite for the approval of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987;
election for members of the legislature in May 1987, and local elections in January 1988.
Since then elections have been a major component of Philippine democratic processes.
Unfortunately, Philippine politics is still challenged by instability. Violence and fraud continue
to mar democratic elections. The Philippines‘ transition to democracy is not exempt from the
transitions (―…either from or towards authoritarianism‖) which have a ―…high probability of
causing escalating levels of domestic political violence‖. [Croissant and Kneip, 2006 :12]
Several authors point to facets of Philippine politics: ―undeveloped party system, elite
dominance and the ideological sameness of candidates, exclusion of those who fail to muster the
considerable resources needed to mount a campaign, the subordination of issues to particularistic
concerns, elaborate forms of terrorism and fraud, and the cultural baggage of traditional values of
power and dependence‖. [Mojares(1991), Rocamora(2000)]3
Election is a major feature and mechanism for transfer of power in democracies.
Election-related violence can significantly influence the free and fair conduct of elections and
exercise of the right to vote. Election violence or election-related violence is included in the term
political violence which is defined by Croissant and Kneip (2006) as:
―‗Political violence‘ is a generic term demoting the efforts of individual or collective
actors to force public concerns by threatening to use or actually using physical or mental
violence against life and limb. This includes forms of action such as attacks on property;
rioting; violent confrontation between members of opposing parties; political groups;
fighting with one another or with the police/military; violent attacks directed against
persons, when one political group attacks another group, or members of the elite or the
2 In February 1986 Filipino people from various sectors of society including the religious and the military rose up in
a non-violent revolution against Marcos dictatorship. 3 Gutierrez, Eric. U, et.al. (1992). All in the Family A study of elites and power relation in the Philippines. Quezon
City: Institute for Popular Democracy. 189 pp.
7
public, causing injuries or death; random violent attacks, when organized violence is
directed against persons, regardless of their political or social identities and armed
seizures of place and people‖.
The International Foundation of Election Systems or IFES4 defines electoral conflict and
violence ―as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence
an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical
assault, forced ‗protection,‘ blackmail, destruction of property or assassination.‖5 Victims can be
people, places, things, or even data.
Election violence in the Philippines includes, among others, abductions, killings, physical
attacks, intimidation and other acts resulting in death, injuries, and damage to property.
Election-related violent incidents are measured in the number of deaths and injuries as recorded
and reported by the Philippine National Police (PNP), COMELEC and other election monitors.
Meanwhile, the various forms of coercion, harassments, and intimidation are harder to quantify.
Violence during and in connection with the electoral process has been a feature of every
post-Marcos election in the Philippines. If at all, the picture is getting worse, with hundreds of
local areas regularly designated as election violence ―hot spots‖ during elections.
The election irregularities in the form of fraud and violence attending the conduct of
Philippine elections continue to cause growing cynicism of the general Filipino electorate. It has
led to many losers rejecting the election outcome and filing hundreds of cases of electoral
protests. It caused many voters to forego participation in the elections and, more alarming, to
peddle their votes for money. The electoral process as the democratic means of transfer of power
thus is constantly undermined.
Apart from regular electoral processes, transfer of power also happens through
mobilizations. This was the natural recourse in 1986 in the people power uprising that brought
down the Marcos dictatorship. However, in 2001, a second people power removed the Estrada
administration from power amidst a failed impeachment process. In the post-Marcos period
people‘s mobilizations played a major, if not a decisive role, in policy redirection and leadership
changes at various levels of the Philippine political structure.
The communist and Moro insurgencies are also a significant factor in the consideration of
the country‘s political and security situation. During the election period, these affect the local
electoral processes as the rebels maneuver to use these for their own causes. Especially in case of
the local communist insurgency, elections are an opportunity to raise funds, capture elective
positions, and make political statements. Generally, insurgencies position themselves as
alternatives to the failures of electoral democracy.
To a certain extent, mobilizations flows from the constitutional recognition of various
direct democracy mechanisms such as recall of elective officials, referenda, and people‘s
4 www.ifes.org
5 IFES, (2002), Electoral Conflict and Violence A Strategy for Study and Prevention.
8
initiative. These forms of direct democracy complement the electoral processes of representative
democracy.
However, they can also be a measure of the fragility and weak credibility of the formal
electoral process. When done in the context of the perceived failure of democratic constitutional
processes, they counterpose themselves as alternative processes. It is quite easy from here to
jump to extra-constitutional temptations such as military extremism, civil disobedience or even
rebellion. The electoral system is rendered useless in this scenario.
9
Chapter 2 History of Elections in the Philippines
During the pre-colonial Philippines, leaders were chosen based on his/her capacity to
ensure the survival of his/her tribe and clan. Wisdom, skills, and respect for people were the
important qualities for leadership. A system of election was first practiced in the Philippine
Republic under the Malolos Constitution6 during the colonial period. However, the process was
only limited to male voters who are members of the rich classes, and was more of a ceremonial
rather than a genuine democratic mechanism.
A leap in the sectoral struggle and political participation was realized in 1937. This was
when Act 4112, granting women the right of suffrage, was implemented; and when the peasant
movements gained meaningful participation in political parties and in the actual filling of
government positions.
The first democratic elections in the Philippines after the Second World War was the
1946 elections for President and Vice-President of the Republic, and members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives. From then on, the country operated on a two-party system
where two major political parties, the Nacionalista (Nationalist) Party and the Liberal Party,
figure in succeeding elections.
By 1965, Philippine elections have settled to a predictable pattern of specific governance
issues against the incumbent party or leader. Campaign issues in these elections were not a
surprise: peace and order problem; rampant graft and corruption; continued rise in prices of
consumer goods; and continued smuggling of dutiable goods. The opposition Nacionalista Party
led by Ferdinand Marcos won over the Liberals. Marcos ran for re-election in the next election
and made history as the first president to be re-elected. The campaign can be characterized as an
exchange of accusations and attacks on issues concerning nationalism, land reform, foreign
policy, cronyism, and graft and corruption.
When Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, the 1935 Constitution was
scrapped, an Interim Batasang Pambansa was created and a new (1973) Constitution was
adopted. Election for the Interim Batasang Pambansa was called for in 1978. The Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL) (New Society Movement) became the administration party. The election
was claimed to be towards restoration of old political order but Marcos‘ purpose was to gain
legitimacy for his unpopular administration and to create a rubber stamp legislature. The
electoral exercise defied democratic procedures, and was characterized by rampant electoral
manipulation done by the Marcos government to ensure victory.
Local election in 1980 was characterized by widespread terrorism, violence and
wholesale fraud. Intense opposition coming from the peasant and student sector in the
countryside supported peasant and labor unrest. In 1981, Marcos submitted himself to the
electoral process to regain legitimacy. This is mandated by the constitutional provision of a
parliamentary system.
6 The first Philippine Republic convened its Congress in Malolos, a town in Bulacan province just outside Manila.
The Malolos Congress passed the Malolos Constitution, the constitution of the first Republic.
10
The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 resulted in waves of protest forcing the
creation of wider democratic space. Batasang Pambansa elections happened in 1984 to replace
the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The exercise was intended to divert the people‘s attention away
from the Aquino assassination. Still, the period was marked by weakening popularity of Marcos
and the people‘s growing political will to guarantee that their sentiments are reflected in election
results.
Snap elections were held in 1986. The widespread election manipulations and
irregularities and the worsening social, political and economic order triggered the EDSA uprising
in the same year. The mass action known as the People Power Revolution of 1986 called and led
to the ouster of Marcos, the collapse of KBL, the installation of Corazon Aquino as the
President, and the replacement of the 1973 Constitution.
Aquino‘s program of restoring democracy, promoting stability, and establishing political
legitimacy involved three major electoral exercises: national plebiscite for the approval of the
constitution on February 1987; election for members of the Senate and House of Representatives
on May 1987; and local elections on January 1988. The 1987 Constitution was crafted to restore
civil and political rights to the people, and to provide for restricted powers of the president, and
proportional representation in the legislature. General elections have been held regularly and the
Commission on Elections---the election management body in the Philippines is given not only
quasi-judicial but judicial powers as well.
During the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the people voted for president
for the first time under the 1987 Constitution. The main campaign issue was doing away with
“trapo”7 or traditional politics. Other campaign issues were economic reform, political stability,
clean governance and social justice. An army general who also figured during the EDSA
uprising, Fidel V. Ramos of the LAKAS-NUCD Party was declared winner in that presidential
race. During that elections too, the first protest contesting the results of a Philippine presidential
election for charges of fraud was filed by another candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago against
Fidel V. Ramos, before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). In 1995, congressional and
local elections were held. A new form of fraud dubbed as ―dagdag-bawas‖ (vote-
padding/shaving) or the subtraction of votes from one candidate to be added to the contending
candidate was in practice during these two major elections.
In 1998, the first party-list election was held under the virtue of the Republic Act 7941 or
the Party-List Law. The constitutional mandate for proportional representation was realized only
after almost a decade. During the same elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada8 was seated as
President of the Republic, topping a field of five candidates with 38 percent of the votes.
However in January 2001, EDSA 2, a repeat of the 1986 People Power in EDSA
removed Estrada from Malacañang on the heels of a failed impeachment process and based on
7 Trapo is the term used to refer to traditional politics or traditional politicians. In the Filipino language, trapo also
means dirt rug. 8 Estrada or popularly known by his screen name ―Erap‖ is a well-known actor who also had long been a
government official as a town mayor, as a senator, and as the vice-president.
11
charges of corruption and mismanagement. EDSA 2 also seated Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the
new president.
The Estrada opposition did not quite accept the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s
ascension to power via people power. A series of political protests, capped by another failed
people power in May 2001 and a military mutiny in 2003 ensued but failed to unseat her.
In 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo ran and was reelected as president in a
controversial electoral contest against Fernando Poe, Jr., Estrada‘s actor-friend. Right after
proclamation, the opposition launched protests against her presidency, accusing her of winning
through massive electoral cheating.
In June 2005, voice tapes surfaced, purportedly recording conversations between the
president and an election commissioner. This precipitated a political crisis that has not yet
abated, marked by the resignation of almost half her Cabinet, two impeachment attempts, an
attempted military withdrawal of support, and intense pressures on various political institutions,
including congress, constitutional bodies such as the Commission on Elections, Ombudsman,
and Sandiganbayan (ombudsman court), the courts, and the military and police.
With the electoral controversy of 2004 Philippine election-rigging allegations against no
less than the president and an election officer, the political and election system are in no way
lifted to higher ground. President Macapagal-Arroyo's satisfaction rating has been ―unfavorable
for nine consecutive survey rounds, ever since the Third Quarter of 2004‖.9 The credibility of the
election commission is also questioned. The electorate is in a situation where electoral choices
mean one member of political elite over another. Appreciation of the value of the vote is very
little. Even with the shift to a multi-party system, rivalries among elites10
and alliances are still
shaped by clan membership. ―The trend toward party-switching or political turncoatism a
significant feature of party politics during the pre-Martial law era continues to exist in the
present is determined by the movement and dynamics of political clans‖. (Gutierrez, et. al.
1992:6)
Various issues in the 2004 elections raised by the opposition, peoples‘ mobilizations, and
impeachment complaints posed a great challenge to the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
and to the credibility of the COMELEC and even elections in general.
The challenge then is for the government, political parties and the civil society to pursue
reforms to counter public cynicism on the credibility of the election process and institution and
the legitimacy of the elected officials. Fundamental reforms in the system of ―can be critical for
areas as diverse as conflict management, gender representation and the development of political
party systems‖.11
The value of integrating responsibility of safeguarding the integrity of the
9 Social Weather Survey for the 3
rd quarter of 2006 finds ―37% Satisfied and 48% Dissatisfied with the performance
of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for an unfavorable Net Satisfaction Rating of -11‖. From sws.org.ph 10
Elites are mostly the same clans and families during the Marcos years which are able to re-align themselves and
dominate government positions in the post-Marcos politics. 11
Reynolds, Andrew, et.al., eds. (2005).pp.viii.
12
election process (and thus lessening the use of violence and fraud) of a strong party system is
lacking in the Philippines.
Chapter 3 The Philippine Electoral System
Legal Framework for Elections
Elections in the Philippines are mandated under the 1987 Constitution. Two other
international documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), govern the right of suffrage in the Philippines.
These three instruments similarly provide universality of the right of suffrage; equality in access
to public service; and secrecy of the vote.12
Recent addition to international human rights
instruments such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
and Convention on the Political Rights of Women also provide for the right of suffrage.
The current Philippine Constitution provides for a bicameral presidential system of
government, multiparty system, partial proportional representation in the legislature, absentee
voting for overseas Filipinos, and equal propaganda opportunity. The Omnibus Election Code of
1985 through Batas Pambansa Bilang (or Republic Act No.) 881 is the basic law on elections.
The 1987 Constitution and succeeding laws13
served as amendments to the Omnibus Code.
Republic Act (RA) 6646 or the 1987 Electoral Reforms Law was passed to govern the
first elections under the 1987 Constitution and introduced reforms in canvassing, candidate
eligibility and disqualification, and election propaganda. Another law provided for synchronized
holding of national and local elections every three years. The Voters‘ Registration law adopts a
system of general and continuing voter registration. RA 9006 or The Fair Elections Act of 2001,
guarantees candidates and political parties ―equal opportunity for public service‖ particularly
access to media time and space, public information, fora, and campaigns, and protection from
harassment or discrimination in relation to the election process. The Overseas Absentee Voting
System14
implements the constitutional mandate to ensure the right of suffrage of Filipinos
abroad. The electoral modernization law of 1997 provided for the use of automated systems as
early as the 1998 elections. However, the full automation was not implemented. Ten years after,
another election law was passed mandating amendments to the previous modernization law and
the use of an automated election system in the succeeding elections. The most recent 2007
elections did not see to the implementation of this law even in pilot areas due to lack of time for
preparation.
12
Provisions on the right to vote are in: Article 21 (1-3) of the UDHR; Article 25 (a-c) of ICCPR; and Article 5,
Sec.1-2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 13
See Annex 13 for a list of Philippine Election Laws. 14
Republic Act 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 is lauded for granting method for registration
and voting in Philippine national elections foreign land-based and sea-based Filipinos.
13
The System of Elections
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance classifies the
Philippines as having mixed and parallel voting system which combines elements of both the
plurality and the proportional representation electoral systems.15
The presidential, senate, and
local elections adopt a first-past-the-post (FPTP), where a candidate or party who wins the most
number of votes wins the seat. A mix of plurality-FPTP system and proportional representation
through the party-list system is used in election of the members of the lower house or the House
of Representatives.
The mixed system for congressional elections was intended to broaden representation by
hitherto marginalized and underrepresented sectors in the legislature. However, this intent is
itself undermined by the compromises in both the constitution and the election laws. The
constitutional limit of 20% for party-list seats means a permanent minority status for party-list
groups.
The law reserves this system to party-list groups and excludes the first 5 major parties. A
Supreme Court decision also interpreted the 20% constitutional limit as a target and not
mandatory. These effectively prevented the filling up of the reserved seats for party-list. In the
1998 elections, the first year of implementation, only 13 seats out of a possible 51 were filled up.
In the 2007 elections, a maximum of 20 seats will be filled up out of the possible 55 that are
reserved for the party-list system.
On the other hand, the FPTP system—which governs all other elections in the country—
has produced some undesirable effects. Electoral fraud and violence have become
institutionalized because of the winner-take-all nature of the system. Coupled with a weak party
system, incumbents are often tempted to build political dynasties composed of their families and
close allies. Term limits often have no meaning in a dynastic setting where wives, sons and
daughters often replace the incumbent in a play to maintain the power, sometimes despite the
negative vote of the electorate.
In the current manual system, balloting requires voters to write down the names of each
candidate for every position. Counting, canvassing of votes, and transmission of election results
are also done manually. An automated system of elections was already legislated but has yet to
see implementation.
Since the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, elections for President and Vice-President
are held every six years, while elections for Senators and members of the House of
Representatives and local government officials happen every three years. Regional elections
particularly in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), local executive and
legislative councils, barangay (village) elections and Sangguniang Kabataan (youth council)
elections are also held periodically.
15
Reynolds, Andrew, et.al., eds. (2005). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook,
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp.171.
14
The Constitution provides that a President can only serve 1 term of 6 years. A second
term or reelection is prohibited. A Vice-President and a Senator have a term of 6 years and
cannot run for a third term after an uninterrupted service of 2 terms, although they may run again
after an interval of 1 term after the second term. Members of the House of Representatives and
elective local officials cannot run for a fourth term after uninterrupted service of 3 terms, but
may run again after a lapse of 1 term after the third term.
The bicameral national legislature is made up of the Philippine Senate and the House of
representatives. The 250-plus-membership in the House is completed through direct election of
single-member district representatives, of which 20% are party-list representatives elected on
proportional representation. Representatives have three-year term and are limited to three terms.
Twenty four senators are elected on a nationwide basis for a six-year term and are eligible for
one re-election. Half of the composition of the Senate is elected every three years.
Local Government officials are elected for a three-year term and are allowed re-election
up to three consecutive terms. Regional officials---governor and vice-governor are now given
three-years in office. Table No. 1 - Philippine elections held after 1986 (See Annex 1 for detailed list of elections)
Year Type of Elections
1987 Congressional Elections (Senate, House of Representatives)
1988 Local Elections
1989 Barangay (village) Elections
1992 Presidential, Congressional, and Local Elections
1992 Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections
1994 Barangay Elections
1995 Congressional and Local Elections
1996 Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections
1996 Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections
1997 Barangay Elections
1998 Presidential, Congressional, and Local Elections
2001 Congressional and Local Elections
2002 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections
2004 Presidential, Congressional, and Local Elections
2005 ARMM Elections
2007 Congressional and Local Elections
Elections are also highly competitive as shown by the seat-candidate ratio for elective
positions. During the most recent national and local elections in 2007, there were a total of
17,880 national and local positions that were vied upon by more than 87,000 candidates.
Running in highly competitive elections entails very high electoral campaign costs and other
election –related expenses. In most instances therefore, election cheating and violence become
part of the over-all campaign strategy of candidates and political parties to ensure victory.
15
Table No. 2 – Number of seats and candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections
2004 2007
Government Position Number of Seats Number of Candidates
Number of Seats
Number of Candidates
President 1 5 0 0
Vice-President 1 4 0 0
Senator 12 48 12 37
Party-List representatives 52 n/a 55 n/a
Congressman 212 650 219 --
Governor 79 284 81 --
Vice-Governor 79 227 81 --
Board Member 758 2,107 770 --
Mayor 1,615 4,264 1,628 --
Vice-Mayor 1,615 4,303 1,628 --
Councilor 13,292 38,312 13,406 --
Total 17,716 50,204 17,880 87,000+
Who can vote
Article V of the 1987 Constitution is devoted to Suffrage. Section 1 provides that suffrage
may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at
least 18 years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least 1 year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement is imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Congress is also directed to provide for a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot, as well as a system for absentee-voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
All citizens of the Philippines, eighteen years of age or over, and a resident of the
Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding the election are qualified to vote.
The following are disqualified from voting:
a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less
than one year. However, he/ she may reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.
b. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any
crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in
accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon
expiration of five years after service of sentence.
c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority
In addition, RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Law entitles all Filipino citizens
overseas, not otherwise disqualified by law, and immigrants and permanent residents with
affidavit of intent to resume residence in the Philippines, to vote for elective positions in the
national level: President; Vice-President; Senators; and Party-List Representatives.
16
There is a conservative estimate of 3.5 million Filipinos who are qualified to vote under
the law. However, only around 500,000 registered in the 2007 elections which is already the
second elections where overseas absentee voting was implemented. Of this number, only 14%
voted. This dismal voting was traced partly to various restrictive provisions such as the
requirement for a pledge to return to the Philippines three years after the elections, personal
appearance at both registration and voting in Philippine embassy or consulate offices in many
countries, and lack of widespread public education among overseas Filipinos.
The overseas absentee voting system still needs to be improved. Relaxing the rules on
mail balloting, internet voting, and residency requirements are only some of remedial measures
being discussed. However, as a democratic measure, it is already accepted by the electorate.
Who can contest elections
Several requirements are enshrined in the 1987 constitution for the various elective
positions. There are corresponding requisites for citizenship, age, literacy, and residency. All
candidates should be registered voters, natural-born citizens, able to read and write. Presidential
and vice-presidential candidates should be forty years old or above and should have 10-year
residency in the country. Senatorial candidates should be at least 35 years old and 2-year
residency. Congressional candidates should be 25 years old or over and have at least resided in
his or her district for at least a year. These are minimum requirements provided by the
constitution. Other practical requirements for elections are machinery and the resources to run a
campaign.
Candidates except for party-list representatives can run independently or under a political
party or coalition. Party-list representatives can only vie for legislative seats through votes for
their parties. All candidates are also required to file candidacy with the Commission on
Elections.
The 1995 IPER psychographics study on the voting behavior of the Filipino electorate
shows that the voters choose their candidate primarily on their popularity. The next determinant
of vote is the endorsement of traditional network and organization. The third determinant of vote
is the characteristics that can be of benefit to the voter and the last determinant is the Party
Program.
An update of this study was made in 2003. This time the primary consideration of the
voters in choosing a candidate is the characteristics that can be of personal benefit to voters. The
second factor is political machinery. The third factor, which is the primary factor in the 1995
study, is popularity. The last factor that the voters consider is the endorsement of traditional
network and organizations.
These determinants in both studies attest to the relative immaturity of the Filipino
electorate in their choices. The 2003 study went further and identified a growing cynicism
towards the political process itself. In the 2007 elections, numerous popular media figures lost—
attesting to the continued weakening of sheer popularity as basis of voter choice.
17
In the current government set-up, the Philippine legislature generally constitutes the well-
off segment of society. A study on the post-1986 Philippine Congress describes it as composed
of ―richer, older, better educated and better connected…‖ or ―…are part of families who have
been in public office for two or more generations‖.16
Political machinery, connections, and
money still figure very prominently in elections and consequently the government.
With the passage and implementation of the party-list system law, the smaller political
and sectoral parties are now able to get seats in the legislature. The provision giving 20% of
Congress seats to representatives of national, regional, and sectoral parties17
is meant to
introduce proportional representation. This principle when adopted in an appropriate state of
party system is supposed to initially extend representation to more sectors and smaller parties
and to encourage more program-based campaign and legislative agenda. In effect the democratic
space for empowerment and participation of people in governance would have widened.
Various election contestations are available to citizens of the Philippines as provided for
in the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. The OEC grants any voter the right to contest
the qualification of any person seeking to register, and any voter, election registrar or registered
political party the right to petition the annulment of permanent list of voters.
Election contests for the position of provincial, municipal, and barangay offices can be
filed by any candidate who has filed certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same
position. Pre-proclamation controversies can be raised by any candidate, registered political
party or coalition of parties.
A more detailed presentation of election contestation for local and national candidates is
done in Annexes 7 and 8.
Election Body: The Philippine Commission on Elections
In the Philippines, the Commission on Elections or COMELEC is the constitutional body
tasked to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. It also has ―…exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections‖. (Philippine Omnibus Election
Code)
The creation of the COMELEC was one of the constitutional mandates for the basic
principle that ―(s)overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them‖.18
Created by a 1940 amendment to the 1935 Constitution, the Commission was given
more members and more powers by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Officials and personnel of
the Commission exercise not only administrative and quasi-judicial powers, but judicial power as
well.
16
In Coronel, et.al. (2004), THE RULEMAKERS How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress, pp.viii. 17
As provided for in Article 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 18
Article 2, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
18
Table No. 3 – Powers and Functions of the Commission on Elections
National COMELEC (which includes Chair, Commissioners, Department Heads)
Local COMELEC (which includes Regional Election Directors, Provincial Election Supervisors, Elections Officers, Election Assistants
Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs)
1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and rules
2. Promulgation of rules and regulations/ resolutions 3. Jurisdiction and resolution over all election contests 4. Decision over all questions affecting elections 5. Deputation of teachers, police and military for election duties 6. Registration of candidates political parties, organizations, or coalitions 7. Registration, inclusion or exclusion of voters 8. Prosecution for election offenses/violations 9. Recommend measures to minimize election spending 10. Removal or disciplinary action of deputized officer or employee, recommendation to the President; 11. Monitoring election expenses of parties an/candidates 12. Report to President and Congress on conduct of election (or plebiscite, initiative, referendum or recall) 13. Prescribe forms and appropriate technology for elections 14. Supervise of production and procurement of election materials 15. Distribution of election materials 16. Supervision of training of election officials and regional directors and provincial supervisors 17. Conduct of Information campaign and voter education 18. Tabulation and publication results
1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and
regulations 2. Registration of candidates
political parties, organizations, or coalitions 3. Supervision of registration of
voters/ correction of voter list 4. Prosecution for election
offenses/violations 5. Distribution of election
materials 6. Conduct of Information
campaign and voter education 7. Tabulation and declaration of
results 8. Collection and storage of
election materials
1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and
regulations 2. Receiving election
materials 3. Supervision of voting 4. Counting of votes in their
respective polling places 5. Return of results and
materials 6. Deputies of the
Commission in the supervision and control of the election in the polling places/precincts
The Commission is composed of a Chairman and six (6) Commissioners who are
appointed by the President and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments (CA)19
. Of
those first appointed, three (3) members shall serve for seven years, two members for five years
and the last members for three years, without re-appointment. These COMELEC officials ―…can
be removed from office only by impeachment and are provided with salaries fixed by law which
shall not be decreased during their term of office‖.20
19
The Commission on Appointments is a congressional body composed of the Senate President as Chair, and 24
members, (12 from the Senate and 12 from the House of Representatives) constitutionally mandated to confirm all
government appointments by the President. 20
From COMELEC website, www.comelec.gov.ph
19
Appointees for the posts of COMELEC chair and commissioner should not have run for
any elective positions in the most recent elections and should have the following qualifications:
natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
at least thirty-five years of age (at the time of their appointment);
holders of college degree;
majority of members including the chair should be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
The Commission has a national central office and field offices, further divided into
regional and local offices. The Regional Election Office is headed by Regional Election Director
and assisted by the assisted by the Assistant Regional Director (ARD) and other officers or
employees appointed by the Commission.
The Provincial Election Office is headed by the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) and
assisted by officers or employees appointed by the Commission. The City/Municipal Election
Office is headed by the City/Municipal Registrar and assisted by an election clerk or other
officers or employees appointed by the Commission. During election period, the Commission
forms a Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) for every precinct to be composed of a chairman and
a poll clerk who must be public school teachers. Those designated to be BEI should neither
engage in any partisan political activity nor take part in the election except to discharge his/her
duties and to vote.
The Commission may delegate its powers and functions or order the implementation or
enforcement of its orders, rulings, or decisions through the heads of its field offices. Too, the
Commission has the authority to deputize members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) during elections. For the recent 2007 elections,
the following are deputized by the COMELEC.
The Department of Education (DepEd) through the public school teachers are deputized
by the COMELEC to serve as BEI during election period. The Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) is deputized only to provide security in areas with ―serious armed threats‖, manning
checkpoints, and enforcement of gunban but not in handling, counting, or transporting the ballots
nor in providing security to COMELEC officials, personnel, or deputies, or candidates. The
Philippine National Police (PNP) is deputized to provide security to polling places, members of
BEI, COMELEC personnel and representatives and protect voters from threats, intimidation,
coercion, harassments, reprisals. The PNP, National Police Commission, and the National
Bureau of Investigation are deputized to enforce prohibitons set in the Omnibus Election Cod
and other election laws and COMELEC resolutions. The Metro Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) and the barangay officials and tanods through the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) are deputized for the 2007 elections to tear or remove illegal campaign
materials and campaign materials posted outside common poster areas, to make a report on these,
and to arrest persons distributing unlawful election materials.
Part of the quasi-judicial functions of the Commission also hears and resolves petitions
filed by political parties and other groups, and coalitions for accreditation to field candidates in
various national and local positions as well as for the party-list elections. The Commission is
20
also tasked to undertake voter education and accreditation of citizen arm, political parties, and
party-list groups.
The COMELEC has the duty to appoint or accredit citizens‘ arm which will serve to help
the Commission in some of its work like voter education, election monitoring, pollwatching, and
parallel count. The Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) and the National
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) had been the arm for pollwatching and parallel vote
count respectively.
Chapter 4 Features of Election Violence
Election Violence
Election violence in the Philippines includes abductions, killings, physical attacks,
intimidation and other acts resulting in death, injuries and damage to property. While election
violence reports are measured in the number of deaths and injuries as recorded and reported by
the PNP, COMELEC and other election monitors, the various forms of coercion, harassments,
and intimidation are harder to quantify.
Incidence of violence related to elections can be grouped across various election phases:
pre-election or registration period; campaign period; election day; counting and canvassing
period; and proclamation phase. ―Victims and perpetrators of lection violence are not limited to
the candidates and their campaign operators‖ but extend to insurgent factions, military, police
and other security forces as well.21
Different election stakeholders also work together to at least
monitor and at most counter these incidents. COMELEC, PNP and the AFP, election watchdog
and civil society organizations such as National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL),
Parish Pastoral Council for responsible Voting (PPCRV), Compact for Peaceful Elections
(COMPACT) and the Consortium and Electoral Reforms (CER).
The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, albeit having undergone several
amendments, outlines the election-related prohibited acts or offenses in Article XXII Section
261. The following are considered ―violent‖ acts during the election period as they relate to
coercion, intimidation and harassments:
1. coercion of subordinates;
2. threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion;
3. coercion of election officials and employees;
4. transfer of officers and employees in the civil service;
5. intervention of public officers and employees;
6. the use of undue influence;
7. appointment or use of special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or the like
from campaign period to election day;
8. illegal release of prisoners 60 days before and 30 days after election;
9. carrying and use of deadly weapons, firearms and armored land, water, and air craft;
10. wearing of uniforms and bearing arms outside the vicinity of place of work of public and
private security and police organizations
21
Patiño and Velasco in Croissant (2006), pp.223.
21
11. organization or maintenance of reaction forces, strike forces, or other similar forces
12. suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer
The Commission on Elections through the PNP (and in some areas, members of armed
forces) monitors and keeps record of election-related violence incidents (ERVIs). The Philippine
National Police (PNP) lists the following as election-related incidence of violence:
Shooting
Explosion
Ambush
Harassment
Burning/ Arson
Ballot Snatching
Gun Ban Violation (refers to ―bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly
weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public
conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by
the Commission.‖22
The gun ban is intended to curb political violence during the election
period.)
The Commission also declares ―hotspots‖ or areas with observed or expected high degree of
violence. Additional security forces are deployed in these areas. Exemptions on gun ban are also
lifted in these areas. In the most recent 2007 elections, the COMELEC declared 10 provinces
(12% of the 81 Philippine provinces) as election areas of concern (EAC) and 46 provinces or
more than half of the total number of provinces as areas of immediate concern (EAIC). These
EAIC cover 201 municipalities and six cities.
EAIC are classified as critical hotspot and their administrative activities and deployment of
local police and other security units are placed ―under direct administrative control of
COMELEC‖ especially during election day and canvassing periods.23
Meanwhile, provinces
declared as EAC were generated based on ―several parameters broken down into two major
categories‖.24
Category I are areas with: a history of election-related violent incidents in past
elections; existence of intense political rivalry between contending parties; and possible
employment of partisan armed groups by candidates in the area. Category II are areas where
there are serious threats posed by the local communist movement particularly the CPP/NPA
southern Philippine secessionist groups such as the MILF and MNLF, and other similar
organizations. The degree of affectation and capability threat groups in these areas are the point
of consideration.
When IPER did a psychographics study in 1995 and 2003 it lists the following activities as
common election (mal)practices. These offenses are also those indicated in the Omnibus Election
Code.
22
Article 22 of the Philippine Omnibus Election Code defines election offenses. 23
Ibid., pp.224 and COMELEC and PNP data. 24
PNP News Release. February 2007 and May 2007.
22
Vote Buying
Flying Voter
Threatening of Voters
Bribing Local COMELEC
Ballot Snatching
Cheating in Counting
Coercion and Terrorism
Election-Related Killing
Respondents to the survey were asked of their views of the following practices in
Philippine elections and majority of the respondents still view that election-related violent
practices should not be tolerated.
COMPACT for Peaceful Elections or COMPACT lists four incidence observed to be
predominant in the last 2004 elections.
Permit to Campaign (PTC) fees and other acts of violence by armed groups
Threat or declaration of an intention or determination to injure another by the
commission of some wrong
Coercion or the physical violence or moral pressure in a determined and constant manner
Coup d‘etat or the swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth directed against the authorities
Moreover, Compact also lists the following usual violent incidents observed during election
period:
1. Political assassinations;
2. Threats or attacks on candidates and their supporters;
3. Attacks on rallies, headquarters or home of candidates and their supporters;
4. Clashes between supporters of opposing camps;
5. Destruction or seizure of campaign paraphernalia;
6. Kidnapping for ransom to raise funds;
7. Ballot box snatching;
8. Destruction of voters‘ list or other election materials;
9. Disruption of transportation of voters perceived to be voting for the rival candidate;
10. Threats on and harassment of voters to vote for a certain candidate or for them not to vote
at all;
11. Threats or attacks on election officials;
12. Instigating disorder in the polling precincts;
13. Threats of coup d’ etat; and
14. Demands for ―Permit to Campaign fees‖ (PTC) by the New Peoples‘ Army (NPA).
The NPA‘s practice of collecting PTC fees from candidates has been going on for years,
largely unnoticed by mass media. It became rampant when the NPA declared it as an official
policy, prompting many quarters to denounce it as plain and simple extortion. Since the NPA has
a nationwide infrastructure centered on remote rural areas, they can influence mostly the local
23
elections. However, they are able to project beyond the locales through a coordinated campaign
where organized approaches are made to provincial, congressional and even senatorial
candidates.
Permits-to-campaign are sometimes supplemented by permits-to-win in areas where the
rebel movement is confident enough that they can influence the outcome of the elections.
Influencing often ranges from letting candidates enter their own zones of influence to campaign,
actual campaigning for or against certain candidates, committing electoral fraud, and ultimately,
the use of electoral violence such as threats, harassments, ambush, assassination, or raids against
candidates or their constituencies.
Table No. 4 - Number of violent incidents, deaths, and injured in the last three national elections
(1992-2004)25
Year and Type of Election Incidents of election-related violence
Number of Deaths Number of Injured
1992 national and local 157 89 138
1995 congressional and local 121 79 111
1998 national and local 267 67 162
2001 congressional and local 269 111 293
2004 national and local 249 148 261
2007 congressional and local 229 121 176
As the table above shows, there were fewer incidents of election violence in the recent
2007 than in the past three elections (1998, 2001, 2004). Unfortunate however is the record of
growing number of deaths in the last four elections. Also more hotspots are being placed under
COMELEC control.
Election observers and monitors and even the police recognize that election-related
violence ―have become more targeted and less random‖. The more prevailing trend is that
election violence occur more in the local levels, thus making it a local phenomenon. 26
The pre-election period saw much more violence than during the day of the election and
the post election period. PNP and COMELEC considered election day in 2007 as generally
calmer and more peaceful. However, there were allegations that actual voting did not happen in
some precincts, but are done by community and other local leaders on behalf of their
constituents. The security situation can also prevent voters to cast votes or force them to vote in
favor of certain candidates or parties. Meanwhile it is also recognized that ―election-related
intimidation occurs in isolated barangays, where barangay captains exercise control over the
population‖.27
Given this political situation and phenomenon of violence, fraud, irregularity and
intimidation during election, disputes are inevitable. The same employment of violence and
intimidation figure in election disputes in the Philippines. In election disputes, violence and
intimidation become both means and causes.
25
Figures from 1995-204 are based on compiled from PNP and COMELEC Reports, while 1992 data are from
Patiño &Velasco in Croissant (2006), pp.225. 26
CEPPS report on the May 2004 Philippine Elections. 27
Ibid.
24
The main government bodies tasked to conduct election and process election disputes
have continued weak credibility because of allegations of partisanship and politicking. This fact
makes for a more problematic handling of election disputes.
Election Contests and Disputes28
Pre-proclamation controversy or question pertaining to the proceedings of the board of
canvassers (BOCs) or on preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns can be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. The OEC cites the following
as possible issues29
of such controversy:
Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
Incomplete, defective, tampered or falsified copies of canvassed election returns;
The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
The Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies and
can motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or
total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual partially or totally any
proclamation.
On the other hand, in cases of post-proclamation election contests, the Commission on
Elections has the judicial function of hearing and resolution of election contests on matters of
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the legislature as well as elective regional,
provincial and city officials. The lower courts have the counterpart judicial functions for
municipal and barangay level election contests.
Table 5. – Judicial Body where election contests are filed
Election Contests for: Can be filed with: Period of Filing
National legislative positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results
Elective regional positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results
Elective provincial positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results
Elective City positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results
Elective Municipal positions Regional trial Court Within 10 days after proclamation of election results
Elective barangay (village) positions Municipal or Metropolitan trial court
Within 10 days after proclamation of election results
28
Annex 7 details the forms of election contests, and corresponding role and action of the Commission on Elections. 29
Sec 243, Article 20 of the Philippine Omnibus Election Code.
25
Focus Group Discussions
The research team held two ―dialogue sessions‖ in the form of focus group discussions
(FGDs). One session was conducted in Davao City in Mindanao, while another was held in
Quezon City.
Participants from the various sectors and organizations were invited. In each of the
dialogue sessions, two focus groups were formed based on the number of participants and the
sectors represented. In Mindanao, one group was composed of representatives from election
implementing body, monitoring groups, political parties, media, other civil society organizations,
and youth and women sectors. Another group consisted of local election actors, members of
Moro/ Moslem groups, indigenous peoples (IPs) representative, local election campaigners and
operators.
The session in Quezon City covered participants not only from Metro Manila but from
nearby Luzon provinces as well. One group included officers from government agencies
involved in elections and dispute resolutions, board members of monitoring bodies, officers of
political parties, and academe, media, and youth representatives. Another group was composed
of civil society groups working on election and electoral reform advocacy, and actors in local
elections of rural areas commonly tagged as ―election hotspots‖ in the Luzon region.
Representatives from Northern, Central, and Southern Luzon participated in the discussion. An
invitation was extended to members of the national police body. They were not able to send
representative as the schedule of discussion coincided with preparation of the police for the
President‘s State of the Nation Address (SONA). A separate interview with a police general was
however granted on August 8, 2006.
Common to all focus groups are three main issues: 1) perception and experience of the
participants on election-related violence; 2) perception on dispute resolution mechanisms; and 3)
recommendations for electoral systems reforms, election dispute laws and mechanisms, and
measures to address the problem of election violence in their respective areas and in the country
in general.
In the first issue, each participant shared with the group current and past capacities of
involvement in the electoral exercise and then proceeded to give their perception and various
experiences of election-related violence. Specific issues discussed vary depending on the
presence or applicability of such concerns in their respective areas. Some of the issues discussed
were:
Permit to campaign fees
Communist/NPA Insurgency
Moro rebellion/Insurgency
Clan dynamics in elections and politics in Mindanao
Warlordism
Guns, goons, gold
26
The portion on dispute resolution mechanisms covered not only perception on available
resolution mechanisms but also on the election body, election laws, and the topic covered in the
case study---in this case, the election-related controversy involving no less than the President of
the Philippines and an election official.
Insights of the FGD participants are reported here according to the three main topics
discussed:
Perception on and experience of election-related violence
There was a leveling-off among the group participants on their definition of violence or
more specifically election-related violence.
For most discussants, violence is very much a part of Philippine election and politics.
Election-related violence is deemed to occur not only during the actual election day but spans the
whole election period---one year before election up to the post-proclamation period.
From the discussions, election violence is defined as a systematic and premeditated act
aimed at monopolizing electoral victories through various coercive ways. It consists of
―infringement of liberty‖ or the freedom to choose (candidates and parties) during elections. The
absence of that freedom is equivalent to violence. Violence may be manifested not only by
―direct physical assault‖ but also in the fear and threat inflicted the individual. One participant
equated any deviations from the ―prescribed‖ processes as ―irregular‖ and ―violent‖.
From the Mindanao discussion sessions, it was inevitable to discuss violence alongside
with electoral fraud. Much of the discussion is devoted to irregularities and fraudulent activities
they are aware and have actually experienced.
Some of the usual violence and election irregularities that the participants experienced or
are aware of are:
Black-out or power failure during counting and canvassing
Missing names of voters, unequal tally of votes against the number of registered voters
Intimidation of Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) which is composed of three teachers
as chairs and members
Pressure on the election officer to delay the proclamation of winners
Threat on the watchers (verbal, physical, emotional)
Seizure of hand-held radio and other forms of communication of candidates
There are also areas where incidence of harassment and threats is so high that monitoring
bodies cannot deploy watchers, making the system very open for any form of irregularity.
Demand for payment of permit-to-campaign fees
Non-payment of PTC fees result in: removal of campaign posters and candidates and
supporters cannot enter NPA-controlled areas during campaign periods
Areas which are considered hotspots are under the control of political clan, landlord, or a
revolutionary group
Killings which involve mostly local candidates
27
There is a new trend in the strategy of candidates and some political parties in order to
ensure election victory. In one province, for instance, as one of the participants recall: To replace
buying and selling votes among voters or through community leaders, candidates and political
parties ―buy‖ votes or spend instead during the counting and canvassing phases. ―Vote-buying‖
now transpires between the candidates (through their operators or campaigners) and the people in
charge of the local COMELEC, and members of the board of canvassers.
Violence and fraud are used in elections as two different strategies. One is the direct use
of violence as a strategy to win the elections. Some political candidates or parties hire ―goons‖ or
―mercenaries‖ as ―stand-by mechanism‖ as observed by an election officer from Mindanao.
These ―mercenaries‖ pose as threats to the rival candidate or party. In this instance,
―representatives‖ of the candidates are careful not to violate the Revised Penal Code (the
Philippines‘ penal laws).
However, in extreme cases of political competition, ―goons‖ are employed to harass or
eliminate the political rival to ensure victory in the electoral exercise. In this case, electoral
violence parallels and even replaces the election itself as determinant of the outcome. Usually,
this happens in a very close fight or as a last resort of the losing candidate, particularly if the
candidate is an incumbent.
The second is the view of one local campaigner/operator from Luzon who shared his
experience where he and his political group employed violence and money to prevent or counter
the violence and fraud that their political rivals employed against them.
One local campaigner from Mindanao, who managed the campaign for a congressional
candidate in 2004, shared that there are two components of a campaign—the ―good campaign‖
and the ―bad campaign‖. The good campaign involves distribution of campaign materials, house-
to-house campaigns, participation in community dialogues and candidates‘ debates. The ―bad
campaign‖ makes use of ―dirty‖ tactics to ensure votes or to guard votes from fraud and
manipulation from the opposing candidates. Unfortunately, however the same participant and his
husband suffered the strongest form of political violence when they were shot to death two
weeks after.
Another participant affiliated with a party-list group which caters to multi-sectoral
interests, shares that before the elections, they prepare for the non-violent and violent arena. For
the violent arena, their response is to go public by holding press conferences—which for him is a
limited capacity to counter violence.
Marginalized sectors in the society such as indigenous peoples find it difficult to compete
in electoral exercises especially in the national level, such as in the party-list representation. The
primary limitation is machinery and resources to undertake campaign and eventually to win
seats. Illiteracy is also a problem among the indigenous peoples, thus making voters from this
sector vulnerable to manipulation during elections.
28
COMELEC officials, teachers who serve as board of election inspectors, some party
watchers are the persons who are susceptible to the commission of fraud and violence. Some
election officers can undertake delaying tactics for a price, or at most times, for the highest price.
But the discussion groups proved that there are still a substantial number of local election
officers and personnel who continue to be faithful and to make efforts of ensuring clean
elections.
Given this insight, local election actors in the group see the percentage of ―faithful‖
election officers and personnel as the opportunity for reform. Continuing education and
organizing among these personnel can be a significant force that can pressure the ―corrupt‖ ones
and can work towards repairing the credibility of the Commission. Consolidation of efforts albeit
a difficult task, is seen as vital in effecting reforms.
The role of the police and the armed forces are also seen as very crucial especially in
election hotspots. In the recent 2007 elections, there were efforts to insulate the armed forces of
election duties except to vote and in areas identified to have serious armed threat to the electoral
process only by: providing security through the deployment of sufficient AFP military personnel
to man and patrol the area; manning the checkpoints in locations jointly identified the
COMELEC and the AFP; enforcing the ban on carrying of firearms by persons without gun ban
exemptions.30
From the experience of participants who have long been actors in local elections,
members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) are the ―crucial‖ persons in the exercise. On
one hand, it is viewed that the school teachers who serve as BEIs are not only burdened with the
tedious election procedures but with the impending election-related threats on them as well. On
the other hand, there are BEIs who have been really corrupted to perform irregularities.
One group raised the impact of modernization or automation of the election system on
election fraud and violence. They view that automation can be a deterrent to electoral
manipulation and violence. Given the faster means of registration, voting, and counting and
canvassing of votes there is little room for politicians and parties or their representatives to
coerce election personnel, or manipulate the counting process. The burden of election personnel
in the manual counting and canvassing will of course be lessened. The only reservation is the
uncertainty of a foolproof automated system.
Perception on election dispute and dispute resolution mechanisms
Some FGD participants admit that they are not very much aware of all election laws and
dispute resolution mechanisms in the country. Much of their knowledge refers to the ones that
have practical applications according to their experiences. Local election actors who have filed
post-proclamation cases learn about available mechanisms, institutions, processes and rulings
which involve post-proclamation election conflicts. Protests on party accreditation will
encourage gathering of laws and procedures on accreditation.
30
COMELEC Resolution 7747 promulgated in November 2006.
29
Participants representing the civil society and monitoring bodies view that no election
protests succeed at the local level. Candidates find it difficult to make their cases proceed or even
prosper in the regional trial courts and in local COMELEC.
The problem of resources (especially financial) hinders candidates‘ or parties‘ attempt to
resolve election dispute. Organizations and sectors such as the indigenous peoples and ethnic
groups also stumble on this problem in their attempt to even file cases or protests.
Organizing component is important in tackling election disputes. But it is not enough to
be organized. The venue where people should fight and the mechanisms should be made
available. However the mechanisms and institutions for filing, processing and resolving election
disputes are also tainted. People then turn to violence and fraud as a strategy for dispute
resolution.
In the experience of some local campaigners, engagement in the mainstream political and
electoral arena means the use of violence and fraud as defense for the true results of elections.
What is frustrating for local leaders is the effort to keep their constituencies believe in the
system and the laws when the same system fails to provide the mechanisms for dispute
resolution.
The institutions which are constitutionally and legally mandated to handle election
disputes continue to have tainted image and credibility. Election protest cases filed in courts and
the COMELEC seem to stay longer in the dockets.
The COMELEC suffers its lowest point in terms of credibility after the Hello Garci-
GMA controversy. The alleged involvement of COMELEC Commissioner, the president, other
national and local candidates and members of the armed forces in election results manipulation
has reached the grassroots. Even the unorganized and least politically involved sectors of the
society became aware of the credibility question of the Commission. The tendency of the
electorate to accept the situation as normal is alarming.
There are civil society organizations which continue monitoring and engagement with
election management bodies. These organizations discuss venues for complementation of efforts
with the implementors.
Political parties and party-lists hold an important role in counterbalancing election
violence and election disputes. Democratic forces particularly in the local level can serve as the
base for dispute resolution because the local politics is where election violence and disputes
mostly happen. Most of the participants see the value of studying the phenomenon of election
violence in the country which is hoped to form basis for addressing the same phenomenon.
30
On civil society mobilizations
When asked if civil society mobilizations are still effective in response to election
disputes or political crises, the participants have varied responses. Some participants deem it
necessary to maintain the active role of civil society of expressing democratic rights in the
government. Without the civil society, the ills of the government and the system will be more
entrenched.
Although some still consider ―people power‖ as one response for political crises, most of
the participants expressed that after the two ―EDSAs‖ (or mobilizations in EDSA which led to
the change in leadership), several failed impeachments, there is decline in the people‘s
perception on effectiveness of such. People want to see changes as a result of mass actions.
The looming cynicism and apathy of the people stem from the lack of substantial change
(for the better, that is) in the quality of leaders, quality of election process, and quality of life.
People perceive that in the current political crisis, change in leadership will not ensure the
needed changes. They expect their present economic and political plights will remain.
People now feel the need for an ―alternative‖ that will address the fundamental problem
of poverty and of governance. And that alternative should come with the reforms.
There are existing organized groups but some are not organized and do not know where
to run or turn to. People again need a figure or an organization or coalition that can unify the
efforts at mobilizations.
The issue or program-based politics, encouraged in the party-list system of
representation, should have a corresponding personality that can compete with the traditional
elite leadership.
There are inevitable limitations of the civil society in that they can only have substantial
intervention in disputes at the municipal levels (or in other lower courts). After the cases are
brought to the national courts or the COMELEC, organizations, parties, and individuals are now
limited by resources to monitor the proceedings of the election cases.
The lengthy process of case proceedings is also a deterrent against resource-poor
candidates, particularly in cases where the electoral protest may stretch into the next campaign
period. In many cases, the protesting candidate either diverts his attention and resources to the
next election rather than continue with the protest. In other cases, the election protest is
continued but only within the context of the next election campaign. The protesting candidate
hopes thereby that a favorable decision can be handed down before the election and he can use
whatever resources of the public office for his or her campaign.
31
Summary of Concerns
Two general sentiments came up in both discussion sessions but have a different turnout.
In the Mindanao region, the group composed of the local election actors saw very little (or no)
hope at all at addressing the problem of election violence and fraud, while the group of
representatives from sectors, monitoring bodies, and local implementing body was more
enthusiastic in the thought that reforms can still be done in the current system particularly
through massive voter education campaigns.
During the session in the National Capital Region, the same hope and enthusiasm was felt
more by the local election actors from various election hotspot areas. However, this hope and
enthusiasm is coupled with the expressed need for a body or a civil society organization that will
lead the reforms.
Another major insight from all discussions is that ―money‖ figures very prominently in
most election processes. Most of the participants refer to the availability of ―money‖ or other
resources as a big advantage in electoral processes while the lack of these resources makes it
difficult for candidates or political parties to succeed in election contests. There is also a view
that the incumbent politicians particularly those aligned with the administration are most likely
to benefit from the available resources and machinery. Some also view that election violence
comes from the elite and powers that be.
The weakening view and trust of voters and candidates on the electoral process and
institutions result in the employment of election violence and fraud. Violence (as defined during
the discussion), as well as fraud are seen to be strategies used not only to win electoral seats but
as response or counter-strategy to election disputes and electoral fraud. The incidence of
election-related deaths happen more in the local electoral arena.
The tendency of the electorate to accept things as part of the situation can be addressed
by continuing voter education. The education campaign recommended one that will go beyond
the election period. Changes and reforms in the election system should be seen in the light of
giving more access and participation to the grassroots.
32
Chapter 5 Role of Actors in Propagating or Mitigating Violence
As previously mentioned, actors in the election violence phenomenon are not limited to
the political candidates and campaign operators and supporters, although of course they figure as
the most obvious ones.
Patiño and Velasco identified six groups of actors in the election violence phenomenon:
―politician candidates, goons and private armies, partisan armed groups, police and military,
communist separatist rebels and election monitoring groups‖. (Croissant, et.al. eds. 2006)
Candidates and parties
While national politician candidates and their operators or supporters employ the use of
―media wars‖ in campaigns and elections, local candidates and operators resort to violence and
fraud as a strategy to secure victory. This victory refers not only for their candidacy but for the
candidacy of the national candidate/s they are supporting.
In areas particularly election hotspots, politicians employ personal bodyguards who may
also carry arms or may increase to become the politician‘s personal or private army. Goons and
private armies not only provide protection but can pose as threat or intimidation factors against
rival supporters and candidates. There are a recorded 114 private armies in the Philippines (2004
figure), 78 of which are in ARMM.
Private armed groups are usually bodyguards of specific politicians and sometimes
disguised as private security guards, local police or even military personnel. In a few cases,
rebels provide the armed personnel. They exist—and continued to thrive—in a political
environment dominated by political dynasties.
Apart from the personal army or goons, there are also partisan armed groups (PAGs)
which also work for politician candidates as ―guns for hire‖ or for ―specific missions or services‖
such as liquidation of politician‘s rival candidates or known critics. Private armies are regular
employees while PAGs are on a professional contractual or output/mission-based relation with
the politician. In the 2004 elections there are 115 existing partisan armed groups (PAGs) which
from the 2001 PNP figure decreased by 39. The PNP reports 21 to have been neutralized and 74
dismantled during the period of 2004 elections.
While the police and military forces are deployed by COMELEC to provide security in
election areas, some elements of the state security forces are corrupted by politicians or parties to
serve in their favor based from previous experiences and allegations. In this instance, these
forces which become partisan are at an advantage because of their access and status in the
government. This contributes to decreasing public trust in the institution.
It is of course a fact that the existence of partisan armed groups are a violation of existing
laws, including electoral laws, and that the Commission on Elections in every election outlaws
these groups and deputizes the military and the police to run after them. The COMELEC also
imposes a gun ban during the election period.
33
However, PAGs are also a reality in every election. They are in effect tolerated by the
state and even the COMELEC because of their political connections. It is only when electoral
violence by these armed groups reach unacceptable level and there is a popular outcry that these
are suppressed.
With a weak political party system, the local political dynasties controlling these armed
groups are usually allies or provide the political base of the national politicians. Thus the
persistence of these partisan armed groups directly depends on the political patronage system
that replaced the political parties.
Given this reality, the COMELEC—in itself heavily politicized—cannot provide the
political will to go after these personal armed groups. In fact, in the last 2007 elections, it issued
more than 23,000 gun ban exemptions—effectively negating the ban.
The Commission on Elections
As the election administration body mandated by the Constitution, the Commission on
Elections has the principal responsibility of maintaining peace and order in relation to elections.
To be able to do this, it deputizes the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National
Police and any other government agency it sees fit to mobilize. The only limiting constitutional
provision is the requirement for the acquiescence of the President to the deputization.
When they are deputized, the COMELEC has almost absolute power to transfer military
and police personnel, to deploy them to protect the electoral process, to order the arrest of
violators, order a gun ban, institute a liquor ban, to take over local government functions in areas
of probable electoral violence, and any other action in support of the peaceful conduct of the
electoral process.
However, in practice, there are many constraints on the COMELEC, both internally and
externally. It is subject to political pressure and may compromise as a result. In areas where
warlord political dynasties prevail, the COMELEC usually tiptoes and avoid direct
confrontations.
The institution is compromised politically in so many ways. The vast majority of its
personnel are political appointees, having been endorsed by politicians. Most of their offices are
located in local government premises by virtue of the ―generosity‖ of local incumbents. The
presence of partisan armed groups by local warlord-politicians also provides a threat to local
election officials. These politicians may also have influence over the local military and police
units and exerts pressure over their assignments.
The result is the weak or even the absence of political will on the part of the COMELEC
to prevent or even prosecute election violence cases. It is usually left to the police to follow-up
on cases of election violence.
34
However, the COMELEC has the potential to control election violence because of its
sweeping constitutional powers. If it so decides to exercise these powers, it has the ample
capability to do it. As it is, the level of election violence is inversely proportional to the level of
political will of the election administrator.
State security forces
The Philippine National Police (PNP) has the chief mission of maintaining peace and
order in the country. During election period, it is deputized by the COMELEC for election
duties. The Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) is also usually deputized, particularly for
areas that have insurgencies or have armed groups that may potentially disrupt the elections. In
some elections in the past, the military reservist force, such as the Reserve Officers Training
corps (ROTC), are also deputized for election duties.
When deputized, these state security forces primarily provide for security of election
personnel, equipment, poll centers, and movement of candidates and voters. However, in some
cases, the military and police units substitute for the Board of Inspectors (BEIs) when civilians
are not available or there is imminent danger for civilians in this role.
The problem arises when these units are themselves politicized or become partisan to
specific candidates. Then, they become a liability, either by toleration or turning a blind eye to
threats or actual electoral violence acts of the politicians and their armed followers or by
participating in the acts of electoral violence themselves.
The assignment of military and police officers is a major arena among contending
candidates, particularly in areas where warlord-politicians prevail. They may well determine the
outcome of the elections in these places, by either preventing or tacitly supporting private or
partisan armed groups.
The COMELEC, with the consent of the President, may reshuffle these officers and
thus—in theory—prevent the influencing of these officers. However, this is easier said than done
when the careers of many of these officers—even those from the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA)—owe much to their politician-sponsors.31
Many officers are also members of political
clans as the latter, learning the lesson from Marcos, include influencing the military and police
in their political strategies.
Insurgency groups
Communist and separatist insurgents also make use of violence and attacks during
elections to send message to the government. In the Philippines, the long-standing communist
insurgency is waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed component
the New People‘s Army (NPA). In the 2004 elections, they went public with their permit-to
campaign (PTC) policy sowing more violence and intimidation through the NPA‘s demand for
31
The Philippine Military Academy as the premier military training institution of the country allows the practice of
honorary class membership of politicians. Thus PMA Class 1978 has for adopted member President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo while PMA Class 1974 has the Presidential Spouse Mike Arroyo as its adopted member.
35
money, contribution, and material and arms support in exchange for access to rebel areas during
campaign and election periods. The separatist rebels in the Southern Philippines are grouped as
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The CPP-NPA and the MILF continue to have
conflicts with the military, thus threatening the security situation of various areas too.
While the police and military forces are deployed by COMELEC to provide security in
election areas, some elements of the state security forces are corrupted by politicians or parties to
serve in their favor based from previous experiences and allegations. In this instance, these
forces which become partisan are at an advantage because of their access and status in the
government. This contributes to decreasing public trust in the institution.
Election monitors and citizen arms
Existence of election monitoring organizations such as NAMFREL and PPCRV works in
two ways for a democracy like the Philippines. PPCRV, a nation-wide parish-based group of
volunteers accredited as COMELEC citizen‘s arm was established in 1992 and undertakes voter
education and pollwatching. NAMFREL conducts election quick count through precinct,
municipal, provincial and national volunteers.
The CER also works for citizen voter education and election monitoring. On one hand, it
promotes the mandate of civic participation in government processes by maintaining watchdogs
and as providers of voter education. In the 2007 elections, CER formed the Bantay-Eleksyon
2007 (Election Watch 2007) or the People‘s Coalition to Monitor the 2007 Elections to act as a
domestic monitoring mission. It also participated in a Pera at Pulitika (Money and Politics)
monitoring of campaign expenditures.
One major area of citizen election monitoring is electoral violence. International and
domestic monitors continually speak on this in their reports. These have noted, time and again,
the prevalence of election violence as a ―normal‖ part of Philippine election process. The only
differences are in the level of violence, number of incidence, and quality of targets.
It is only in the 2007 elections that so many of them have come out with a
recommendation for the serious campaign by government to eradicate warlordism. They noted,
as in the resolution of the influential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP),
that warlordism in certain areas such as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
has reached a proportion that can affect the outcome of the national vote, including the
presidential election this coming 2010.
On the other hand, the growing number of local and international organizations which
conduct election monitoring and observation also manifest that Philippine politics and elections
suffer from democratic flaws not only in the available legal instruments and institutions but most
particularly in the actual conduct of democratic processes. All in all, more than 10 national and
international election monitoring initiatives were conducted during the 2007 elections.
Collectively, they were able to prevent the massive cheating that would have affected even the
national election results.
36
Of course, the big reason for this explosion of monitoring efforts was the realization that
Philippine democracy cannot take another beating with questionable elections such as the one
that dogged the 2004 presidential election. The latter precipitated a political crisis that still roils
the political landscape up to the present. Unfortunately, the Commission on Elections itself has
low credibility because of the alleged involvement of some of its personnel in the 2004 electoral
fraud issue. It was not in a position to guarantee the credibility of the 2007 elections.
Chapter 6 Case Study: 2004 Philippine Presidential Election Impasse
The Issue of Presidential Legitimacy
Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to power in 2001 through a reprise
of the people power of 1986. Under siege from a week-long demonstration of more than half a
million Filipinos and confronted by the withdrawal of support of the leadership of the armed
forces and members of his cabinet, then President Joseph Estrada left the Malacañang Palace in
the morning of January 20, 2001. Vice-President Arroyo took over when the latter
―constructively resigned.‖32
As president, she continually faced the issue of legitimacy. Cases were filed with the
Supreme Court to reverse its decision to recognize the legality of her presidency.33
In May 2001,
hundreds of thousands of Estrada‘s urban poor supporters besieged both the historical EDSA
people power shrine and Malacañang palace for several days. In August 2003, several hundred
officers and men of elite armed forces units occupied the plush Oakwood hotel in the country‘s
central business district and attempted to rally for a withdrawal of support. Every sector of the
people divided on the issue. The political opposition centered on Estrada never accepted
Macapagal-Arroyo‘s accession to presidency.
These events in 2001 and subsequent years provided the backdrop to the 2004
presidential election. By this time, the early euphoria of the largely middle class-based support
for Macapagal-Arroyo had evaporated and her popularity ratings were down.34
However, these
erstwhile supporters were not ready to embrace the political opposition, particularly those
identified with Estrada.
The 2004 presidential election offered itself as a possible political solution to the issue of
presidential legitimacy. Under the 1987 Constitution, the rare instance that a sitting president—
32
Sabrina M. Querubin, Ana Rhia T. Muhi, and Charisse F. Gonzales-Olalia, Legitimizing the Illegitimate:
Disregarding the Rule of Law in Estrada v. Disierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Public Policy (January-
June 2003 Special Issue), pp. 108. The Supreme Court eventually decided that Estrada‘s acts during second People
Power can be termed as resignation even if there was no formal act of resignation. 33
The relevant cases are the Estrada v. Disierto (G.R. Nos. 146710-15) and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R.
No. 146738). 34
The Social Weather Station tracked President Macapagal-Arroyo‘s net satisfaction rating from a high of +24 in
March 2004 (just after she became president) to a lower -3 in November 2003 (before the start of the 2004 election
campaign). See Social Weather Station, Third Quarter 2006 Social Weather Survey, Press Release,
www.sws.org.ph.
37
who only is allowed one six-year term—can succeed oneself if he or she has served for less than
four years as a replacement president.
The president initially announced in December 2002 that she will not run anymore in the
2004 elections. However, when the time came to make a decision, she decided to run, citing her
desire to protect the gains of her initial term. Predictably, the opposition and even some among
her supporters criticized her flip-flopping.
This action by the president set the stage for a very acrimonious presidential election. The
president‘s camp questioned the citizenship and educational qualifications of the second-running
presidential candidate, popular actor and Estrada‘s friend Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter expectedly
brought up the issue of the 2001 Macapagal-Arroyo‘s ―grab‖ for power and her poverty
eradication record.
The 2004 presidential election itself became controversial when the opposition
candidates, except for former senator Raul Roco, did not accept the results. Poe and his running-
mate for vice-president, former senator Loren Legarda, filed their respective election protests
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.35
In December, 2004, barely seven months after the May elections, opposition candidate
Poe died. His electoral protest died with him.
The rest of the opposition maintained their rejection of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s electoral
victory. They initiated street demonstrations, congressional corruption investigations, and even
agitated for military intervention.
In June 2005, wiretap tapes36
of alleged conversations between President Macapagal-
Arroyo and an election commissioner, Virgilio Garcillano, became public. This fanned the
simmering political crisis into a firestorm that has not yet died down. It is still a major, if not the
number one issue, in the 2007 midterm national and local elections.
The 2004 presidential electoral dispute, as far as the legal process is concerned, is already
over when the Presidential Electoral Tribunal ended Poe‘s protest upon his death.37
It has since
then graduated into continuing attempts to force President Macapagal-Arroyo from office, both
constitutionally and extra-constitutionally.38
35
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal consists of the whole Supreme Court, convening as the former. 36
On June 6, 2005, alleged phone conversations between the president Macapagal-Arroyo and election
commissioner Virgilio Garcillano taken by the military‘s intelligence services became public, ironically through
presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye. 37
Under the rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the presidential and vice-presidential candidates with
the second and third highest votes, respectively, can lodge their respective protests within 30 days after the
proclamation of the winner. The spouse, who can do so in relation to lesser elective posts, is prohibited from
continuing with the protest. See 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, p. 11. 38
Several options have already been done by the opposition. A significant number of Cabinet officials resigned in
July 2005, calling for the President‘s resignation. Two impeachment complaints were filed in 2005 and 2006. An
aborted withdrawal of military support sparked a declaration of national emergency last February 2006.
38
The Protagonists
The 2004 presidential election involved five major candidates: President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, actor Fernando Poe, Jr., former senator Raul Roco, former police chief and
senator Panfilo Lacson, and religious evangelist Eduardo Villanueva.
At the start of the election, it was already obvious that the main opponents were President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Estrada‘s friend, Fernando Poe, Jr. The contrast between the two main
presidential candidates is striking.
Macapagal-Arroyo, an economist by profession, campaigned on a platform of economic
performance, asserting that her policies led to the stabilizing of the Philippine economy. The
1997 Asian crisis and Estrada mismanagement, by 2001, led to major fiscal deficits and
economic downturn. She is the daughter of the late President Diosdado Macapagal.
She had consistently won national elections with convincing majorities, first as the top-
ranking senator in the 1992 elections and as vice-president in the 1998 elections. However, this
is attributed more to her political acumen and political network than her popularity. In the
campaign, she carefully skirted the political issues.
Poe, on the other hand, is a newcomer to politics, with no record of any previous
government position. However, as the Philippines‘ top actor, he is very popular—even more than
Estrada. He harped on the political legitimacy issue and her alleged power grab in 2001. He did
not do much campaigning, being short on funds and political savvy. Instead, he relied on his
movie popularity and clean image to bring him to power. 39
Election Results
Under the Philippine constitution, it is only Congress, with both the Senate and the House
of Representatives meeting in a joint session, which canvasses the election results and proclaims
the winner of the presidential and vice-presidential contest.
After one month of canvassing, it proclaimed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
president and her running-mate, Senator Noli de Castro, as vice-president. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, by official Congressional canvass, got 12,905,808.40
His closest opponent,
Fernando Poe, Jr., got 11,782,232.
All the quick counts plus an exit poll by the Social Weather Station (SWS) showed the
president leading.41
Also, surveys two weeks before the elections predicted a close fight with the
president leading.42
The following chart shows both official and unofficial tallies (in percent):43
39
Fernando Poe, Jr. is popularly known as ―Da King‖ for his dominance in box office and movie world. He has a
vast following among Filipinos, especially the numerically important electorate from the lower classes. The
opposition expected him to win on sheer popularity, as Estrada did in 1998. 40
Figures are from the Congressional Joint Committee‘s Official Canvass Result for President. 41
The Social Weather Station (SWS) was the only one who conducted an exit poll showing: the following: GMA
45%, FPJ 34%, Lacson 10%, Roco 6%, Villanueva 5%. The relatively large margin of the president over Poe
became controversial when it was not supported by the official and unofficial counts.
39
As can be seen in the all the tallies, the fight between Macapagal-Arroyo and Poe was
tight. The president‘s three-percent margin in the official tally was not enough to convince the
opposition and many among the people of her victory. The opposition, including other
presidential candidates Lacson and Villanueva, claimed Poe won, albeit also by a small margin.
An election monitoring group, the Coalition of Hope (Honest, Orderly, Peaceful Elections)
branded the election a fraud. It even questioned the Catholic church leaders and the Catholic-
backed election monitoring groups NAMFREL and PPCRV for certifying that the results of the
election show the will of the people.44
An election analysis also concluded that, ―It was a very
close contest, with the most probable results ranging from a GMA win of around 156,000 votes
or less, to an FPJ win of around 84,000 votes or less.‖45
The US-led international election monitoring group, Consortium on Elections and
Political Party Strengthening (CEPPS) Philippine mission, was also not able to conclude on the
fairness of the election results, although it acknowledged the ―deeply rooted mistrust that
characterizes the relationships between and among virtually all participants in the processes.
42
SWS final pre-election survey for May 1-4, 2004 has the following results: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 37%,
Fernando Poe Jr. 30%, Panfilo Lacson 11%, Raul Roco 6%, Eddie Villanueva 4%, Eddie Gil 0.3%, and 12%
undecided, with an error margin of ±3%. 43
Figures as compiled by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), as part of the report on
the 2004 elections by the Consortium on Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) Philippines
Election Observation Program. 44
The Daily Tribune, Church Leaders Prefer To Hide Truth By Absolving Cheats – Hope, June 2, 2004. 45
Roberto Verzola, The True Results of the 2004 Presidential Elections Based on the NAMFREL Tally: A Final
Report, p. 11. (PDF format). This article was also published in Kasarinlan, University of the Philippines Third
World Study Center journal.
40
There is little evidence of faith in the system or in the honest intent of any of its participants. All
parties in the process are assumed guilty of actual or planned malfeasance, and there are no
accepted or respected processes or evidentiary standards for demonstrating otherwise. The
basic integrity and the legitimacy of virtually every elective office is in question.‖
In the end, the presidential election was not able to decisively resolve President
Macapagal-Arroyo‘s claim to a legitimate presidency. Instead, on top of the 2001 legitimacy
crisis, a new crisis founded on charges of electoral cheating hounded her after the election.
The Issue of Cheating
The issue of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s cheating at the 2004 presidential election is essentially
a political one. It is being fought in the political arena, within the constitutional border as well as
outside in the extra-constitutional arena.
The constitutional venue of the legal electoral protest, allowed only for the second- and
third-ranked presidential candidate, was effectively closed when Fernando Poe, Jr. died in
December 2004. Panfilo Lacson, the third-ranked candidate, did not file any immediate protest
and he was barred by the 30-day rule for filing one. It is Loren Legarda, the second-ranked vice-
presidential candidate and running-mate of Poe, who still pursues her electoral protest before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
The problem of an electoral protest in the Philippines, including the presidential electoral
protest, is that it is a very expensive proposition and takes a long time to have a final decision.
All fees related to the protest are borne by the protesting candidate, including legal fees,
attorney‘s fee, revision fee, and reproduction fees. In a national election protest, this runs into at
least tens of millions of pesos or millions of dollars. The painstaking opening of ballot boxes and
counting votes, accompanied by legal debate, also prevents any quick protest settlement.
An example is Senator and presidential candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago‘s case
against President Fidel Ramos in 1992. Three years and millions of pesos later, she decided to
just run again as senator. It was a practical decision—with her protest going nowhere and the
next presidential election looming in 1998.
The impracticality and expenses of the electoral protest in the Philippines lend
themselves to electoral manipulation and corruption. In the case of Poe, it mercifully ended with
his death. His running-mate Legarda, in the meanwhile, tried to pursue her own protest but also
chose to run again in the 2007 senatorial elections, just like Defensor-Santiago in 1995.
Given the legal impediments and its historical background, the issue became politically
contentious from the start. The opposition, with a substantial presence in the Senate, started
various investigations into the use of government funds and illegal gambling contributions for
President Macapagal-Arroyo‘s campaign. These include the alleged use the funds from the road
users‘ tax to hire 100,000+ contractual streetsweepers for three months coinciding with the
election campaign, the distribution of 6-month temporary health cards to the poor from the
government health insurance, PhilHealth, the construction of highly-visible infrastructure
41
projects during the campaign period,46
the use of government transportation ostensibly for
project inspection but ending up in presidential campaign rallies, and the disappearance of
hundreds of millions of fertilizer subsidy funds and agrarian reform funds, including those
coming from the returned Marcos Swiss assets.
These investigations targeted the public opinion. By November 2004, barely six months
after her election, President Macapagal-Arroyo had a net satisfaction rating of -5%, a huge drop
from her June 2004 rating of +26%.47
As early as August 2004, an SWS survey found 23%
saying that Fernando Poe Jr. and Loren Legarda were definitely cheated, and another 32% saying
that they were probably cheated, or a total of 55% doubting the official result of the 2004
presidential election.48
Unrest also plagued the military, with rumors of military rebellion appearing in the media
intermittently. One reason for this is the politicization of the armed forces and police officer
corps—initiated by Marcos and not quite corrected up to the present—that led to divisiveness
among them. Former senator and coup leader Gregorio Honasan, who maintains strong links
with the younger officers, served as Poe‘s chief security during the presidential campaign. The
Oakwood mutiny in 2003 is being attributed to him by Malacañang despite his role in ending it.49
The Left, including the underground Communist Party of the Philippines, who had been
friendly with President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in her earlier term, now started aligning with
the opposition.
In June 6, 2005, pre-empting the opposition, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye announced
the existence of the so-called Garcillano tapes, which purportedly record wire-tapped
conversations between Commission on Elections (COMELEC) commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano and President Macapagal-Arroyo. He attempted to downplay these tapes as fakes and
presented ones that were supposedly correct.
It was a mistake. People got curious and demands for the public airing of the tapes
resounded. The opposition, sensing the public mood, released its own copy. The resulting
recording, heard or transcribed, supported the allegation of electoral cheating.50
The President hemmed and hawed. Her spokesperson first denied completely the tapes,
branding them as ―fakes.‖ Later, on June 27, 2005, in a national address, she admitted that her
voice was the one on the tape. Later, her people would again deny the admission.
46
There is an election ban on government projects during the election period although an exception is made with
regards to projects started before the start of the election period. 47
SWS surveys of June 4-29, 2004 and November 25-December 2, 2004. SWS Press release of July 9, 2004 and
SWS Press Release of December 17, 2004. 48
SWS Press Release of August 25, 2004. 49
The Malacañang-created Feliciano Commission issued a report linking Honasan to the Oakwood incident. See
http://www.i-site.ph/Record/fffc-findings.html for the whole report. 50
All the versions of the Garcillano tapes can be downloaded from this site: http://www.pcij.org/blog/wp-
files/tapes.php.
42
The damage was done. Ten members of her Cabinet resigned on July 8, 2005 and called
for her resignation. The Liberal Party under Senate President Franklin Drilon, a member of the
ruling coalition, seconded the call. The only other woman president, Corazon Aquino, also called
for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
However, the majority party Lakas-Christian-Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), rallied to
her under the leadership of former president Fidel Ramos and House Speaker Jose de Venecia.
The president, thus encouraged, refused the call.
Public opinion weighed in, giving the president the worst record in presidential
popularity. The Social Weather Survey of May 14-23, 2005 finds 26% of Filipinos satisfied, and
59% dissatisfied, with the performance of Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, giving her a Net
Satisfaction Rating of -33%, which is a new record low for Presidents since 1986. By February
2007, while rising again, it still remained negative at -4%. [See chart]
The nationwide 3rd Quarter 2005 SWS survey found 79% wanting President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo impeached, 64% favoring her resignation, and 51% saying she should be
removed by People Power if the House of Representatives would reject her impeachment.51
The key factor in the negative sentiment, according to SWS, is the belief of most
Filipinos that the president's admitted phone calls to "a COMELEC official" amounted to
instructing him to cheat in the 2004 election, and were not merely meant to protect her votes as
she claimed in her June 27 apology.
The president chose to fight it out. Sensing that the people were not keen on using extra-
constitutional means just yet and that both the Catholic church and the middle class called for
51
SWS Press Release of September 10, 2005.
43
constitutional means to settle the issue, she rejected the option to resign and maneuvered in the
House of Representatives where her allies hold the majority to prevent the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against her.52
She also rejected the convening of an independent
commission to investigate the charges.
Two impeachment charges, in 2005 and in 2006, were filed and defeated in the lower
House against President Macapagal-Arroyo. A nascent plot to withdraw military support in
February 2006 was also narrowly aborted when she declared a short-lived state of national
emergency.
The president‘s camp took advantage of the weaknesses of the opposition and
maneuvered to prevent the critical political mass from developing against her. They also tried to
preserve and consolidate their own bases among the congressmen and the local officials,
promising them extended terms without the constitutionally-mandated elections in 2007.
Their main strategy to achieve a ―no-election‖ scenario in 2007 was to undertake
constitutional change before the elections, thereby shifting to a unicameral parliamentary system,
and establishing an interim transition parliament composed of the current legislators. In order to
pursue constitutional change, they undertook parallel efforts to convene a constituent assembly
and a people‘s initiative.53
The pro-Arroyo majority coalition in the lower House of Representatives tried to call for
a constituent assembly on its own. Meanwhile, Arroyo allies among the local officials through
the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) and a newly-organized organization,
Sigaw ng Bayan (Shout of the People), tried to sponsor a people‘s initiative effort.
Both efforts failed. The Senate vigorously campaigned against the holding of a unilateral
―constituent assembly,‖ when the pro-Arroyo majority in the lower house unilaterally passed a
resolution convening it, the people—led by the Catholic Church and other religious groups—
threatened to hold a people power assembly against it. Both the Commission on Elections and
the Supreme Court rejected the ―people‘s initiative.‖
With the defeat of Arroyo constitutional change initiatives, the arena shifted to the 2007
midterm elections. Even if there is no election for presidency, the key issue in these elections still
remains the legitimacy of the presidential victory in the 2004 elections. Since one-half of the
Senate seats and the whole of the House of Representatives are up for elections, the possibility
exists for the opposition to get one-third of the House of Representatives and two-thirds of the
Senate—and thus mount a successful impeachment in the new 14th
Congress in July 2007.
52
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a ⅓ vote of all members of the House of Representatives can impeach
constitutional officers, including the president. The Senate act as the impeachment court. Only one impeachment
process can be done against a particular official in a year. 53
A constituent assembly is Congress convened in a joint session to propose a revision or amendments to the
constitution while a people‘s initiative is a direct democratic method to propose amendments by at least 12% of
registered voters nationwide (with at least 3% of registered voters in every legislative district).
44
Continuing Crisis
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, so far, successfully fought off all pressures,
maneuvering and using all the resources at her disposal. On the other hand, her government is
now a government of survival.
The political opposition is also fragmented, with sections coming from both pro-Estrada
and anti-Estrada camps, various shades of the Left, including the CPP rebels, and some Church
and middle class formations. There is no clear-cut leader, much more a unified platform and
alternative. They are still far from achieving the cohesiveness, unity and solidity needed to force
the hand of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. The situation is one of a political impasse.
One political solution would have been negotiations on a possible political compromise
with the opposition. The logical way to resolve the impasse is to hold another presidential
election, one that is credible and acceptable to the opposition. However, this has not gone very
far because of the intractable nature of the issue and the stubbornness of the president‘s camp.
Presidential legitimacy rests on the body politic accepting the rule of the person holding
the presidency. Precisely, this is the issue. Any presidential election will almost certainly lead to
the loss of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s presidency because of the solid majority public opinion against
her. As long as this is the case, she will not agree to a new presidential election.
The 2007 elections loom as a threat because her low public approval may lead to the
defeat of enough loyal congressmen for the opposition to succeed in impeaching her. She may
also lose her political base as these congressmen and local officials jockey at the local levels in
the elections.
In the process of the crisis, almost all post-Marcos political institutions became victim.
They were attacked or put under tremendous pressure from both sides of the political divide.
The president and her allies maintain their dominance in the executive department, the
House of Representatives, the Lakas-CMD party and coalition. They also maintain considerable
influence in the military and police, the judiciary, the ombudsman, the commission on elections,
and other instrumentalities of government. They also have some influence in the various major
religious groups, including the powerful Catholic hierarchy, among big business groups, and
mass media. They have a certain level of grassroots support, coming from the base of its loyal
local government officials.
The opposition holds the Senate and also has considerable influence within and outside
the government.
Recently, distancing has been observed from the Catholic hierarchy, media and big
business. The Supreme Court and even the armed forces are taking a more neutral stance. The
Supreme Court decisions against the crisis policies of the president, including the recent decision
against the so-called ―people‘s initiative‖ to change the constitution does not augur well for the
president‘s camp.
45
The positioning of the Supreme Court and the neutral stance of the military has
guaranteed constitutional stability amidst the crisis. There is therefore the channeling of energies
towards the electoral solution.
The 2007 elections may well become the ―indirect referendum‖ on Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo‘s presidency. However, if this is not credible or is thwarted, the danger rises sharply
towards an extra-constitutional channel. The fate of Philippine democracy lies in balance.
Chapter 7 Issues and recommendations/Good Practices
Election violence and election dispute resolution in the Philippines take place within the
context of a fragile democracy struggling to consolidate itself. In the post-Marcos dictatorship
period, this democracy has to contend not only with the usual problems associated with the
democratic and electoral process of seeking power but also with institutions, practices, and
forces left behind by the Marcos regime.
The main issue in relation to election violence is the persistence of political dynasties and
its patronage politics. These dynasties or political clans see political power as the end-all and be-
all politics in the country. To this end, they are willing to do all that is necessary—including
undemocratic methods—in order to seek and maintain the power.
These dynasties and clans have built a power structure stretching from the national to the
community or village level that is unmatched by any political party, insurgency group or other
political forces.
A related issue is the inevitable corruption of democratic institutions in such a situation of
dominance of dynastic politics. This includes the election administration agency, the military and
police, the courts, and various electoral tribunals. Election disputes are often settled without
satisfying the losing side and often spill over to election violence.
The third issue is the politicization of the electoral process, including election
management and election dispute resolution. The practice of peer judges in the case of senate
and congressional election disputes lends itself to political meddling in election disputes. The
appointments of COMELEC commissioners and personnel via endorsement or confirmation by
political bodies or politicians lead to the political partisanship within the election administration.
The existence of political dynasties effectively excludes marginal groups from
participating fully in the elections and other political processes. Running for office requires huge
amounts of money, connections to government and electoral bodies, and even access to police
and military that marginal groups cannot hope to compete on an even playing field with the
political clans.
Exclusion of marginal groups from political participation provides the main political
rationale for local insurgencies and undermines the foundations of Philippine democracy. The
46
rise of extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances targeting members of open Left groups,
the media, and other critical sectors of society represents a setback to democracy is easily
understood if taken within the policy of political exclusion. Of course, insurgencies will persist
precisely because of the latter.
Gender participation in Philippine elections is also heavily skewed in favor of male
dominants who are usually dynastic leaders in a patronage feudal setting. Less than 20% of
elective officials are women. Many of the latter are wives or daughters of clan political leaders
who are elected within the rationale of maintaining clan political dominance.
Only comprehensive political and electoral reforms can effectively broaden participation
in Philippine democracy. Curbing election violence and credible electoral dispute resolution can
only be done if these reforms are in place and working. Among these are the following urgent
ones, as reiterated in the recommendations of election monitors in the 2007 elections:54
1. The Commission on Elections need to be revamped from top to bottom as the vital
first step in bringing back the credibility of the institution and reform the electoral
system. Among the first steps here is the appointment of four new, competent
commissioners with reputation for integrity, have management skills, and capability
for undertaking reforms. It is also necessary to weed out political appointees who do
not have the necessary impartiality or skill competency for the work of the
COMELEC. There is also the need to professionalize the COMELEC organization,
raise salaries, promote on merits, and conduct necessary trainings of COMELEC
personnel.
2. Election modernization should be implemented. This means the implementation of an
automated election system in time for the 2010 elections, modernization of
COMELEC infrastructure, and training of COMELEC personnel and public
education on the modernized system.
3. The political party reform bill should be passed by congress immediately so as to
strengthen the political party system.
4. The party-list law should be amended in the light of lessons learned not only in the
2007 elections but in earlier elections.
5. The overseas absentee voting law needs to be revisited to ensure its full
implementation in the next elections. Measures to educate overseas Filipinos should
also be devised and carried out.
6. The Omnibus Election code should be amended to reflect the requirements of election
modernization as well as to address the weaknesses and loopholes of the present
electoral laws.
54
This is the set of recommendations by Batay-Eleksyon 2007 (Election Watch), the domestic monitoring mission
organized by the consortium on electoral Reforms (CER).
47
7. The COMELEC should be given the necessary capability to enforce election laws and
prosecute election violators.
8. There should be a major initiative to address the problems of anomalous election
practices in ARMM and elsewhere and the phenomenon of massive and organized
cheating.
9. The problem of election violence needs to be addressed and effectively stopped in a
systematic manner.
10. Citizen participation in the electoral process should be heightened and made on a
continuing basis in order to make effective Philippine democracy.
48
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51
Research Team
Ramon C. Casiple
Maria Sonia B. Atienza Liñan
Rosa Bella M. Quindoza
Lalaine N. Marfil-Apugan
Jay Martin S. Ablola
Arturo Guerrero T. Liñan