Electoral Democracy, Liberal Democracy and the Global Recession of Democracy
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Transcript of Democracy
Irish Jesuit Province
DemocracyAuthor(s): Michael ConnollySource: The Irish Monthly, Vol. 81, No. 954 (Feb., 1953), pp. 43-48Published by: Irish Jesuit ProvinceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20516492 .
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DEMOCRACY By MICHAEL CONNOLLY, SJ.
?yn VERY age is befooled by the notions which are in fashion in
IH-it. Our age is befooled by democracy." These words of
William Graham Sumner express a viewpoint which has
never lacked advocates since the revolutions in England, North
America and France ushered in the era of modern democracy. But
of late the dissentient voices have been almost silenced by democracy's tremendous prestige. We were continuously assured during World War
II that the United Nations' war aim was to make the world safe for
democracy. The great Spanish nation, which alone of all Western
countries has met and vanquished in arms the Communist challenge, has been persistently cold-shouldered by the other anti-Communist
States on the ground, it is said, that the Spanish Government is not
democratic. Even the benign authoritarianism of Dr. Salazar has
been looked-at askance, though its conspicuous success in giving wise and beneficial rule to Portugal can scarcely be denied. Indeed, it would seem that the vacuum created by the evanescence of religion in many Western countries is being filled, after a fashion, by the
cult of democracy. Western statesmen are coming more and more
to realize that the fight against Communism requires not merely atomic weapons, but weapons of the spirit too, a counter-idealism
to oppose to the ardent mystique of Marxism. And they can find
nothing at hand to fill the need save something called democracy. Yet when their theorists endeavour to express in words what they mean by democracy, they find the task a difficult one. If they are
well read in the history of political thought, they cannot ignore the
fact that, in ancient Greece, where the word was first coined,
democracy had an unpleasant meaning, connoting something akin
to "
mob-rule ". And to-day the tyrannies beyond the Iron Curtain
call themselves democracies, "
Peoples' Democracies ". Nor is it
right to assume that the word is used cynically or as a piece of audacious and deliberately misleading propaganda. The Nazi r?gime, against which the great war of democracy was victoriously waged, itself claimed to be a true democracy. Hitler called himself an
" arch
democrat "
and National Socialism the "
truest democracy ". Rudolf
Hess referred to National Socialism as the "
most modern democracy of the world ", based, as it was, on
" the confidence of the majority ".
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IRISH MONTHLY
That this was not an idle claim is acknowledged by such eminent French Catholic writers as D?los and Ducatillon.
The puzzle is explained when we advert to the ambiguity which
lurks in the word. In England and North America, democracy is
commonly supposed to include, as a necessary attribute, respect for
the personal rights and liberties of citizens and minorities. The
English parliamentary Monarchy and the Republic of the United
States have always had a strong liberal character. Hence, English
speaking people too easily assume that democratic political machinery
automatically secures liberal rule, that government by the people is
the sure and, to-day, the sole, safeguard of personal liberties. For
it is important to remember that in classical antiquity, and even at
the present day over most of Europe, democracy has a strictly
political meaning, standing for a governmental device or arrangement; it does not necessarily imply that power will be exercised liberally rather than autocratically. In this strictly political sense, democracy is taken to contain three characteristics: political equality of all
citizens, universal suffrage, majority rule. That these are quite com
patible with totalitarian tyranny the sad experience of the present
century proves. To clarify this difference of meaning between the Anglo-Saxon and
the Continental usage of the word democracy is one of the merits
of a recent book1 by the Austrian Catholic author, Erik von Kuehnelt
Leddihn. It aims at interpreting the European Continent to the
English-speaking world, an important task surely, if the common
front against Soviet imperialism is to be united and compact. As
I read it, I was reminded of a splendid little book published in Ireland
before the war, Modern Democracy, by Professor James Hogan of
University College, Cork. Professor Hogan shows that of the three aims of the French Revolution, Liberty and Equality are mutually
incompatible, while Fraternity is impossible without the Christian belief in the Fatherhood of God. Mr. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, too, stresses
the antithesis between freedom and egalitarianism; indeed, this
opposition gives his book its tide. You may have personal liberty without equality, or equality may be enforced at the expense of
liberty (that is the tendency of popular governments); but you cannot
have both together. Mr. Kuehnelt-Leddihn develops this theme in 1 Liberty or Equality. The Challenge of our Time. London: Hollis and
Carter, 1952. 30/
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DEMOCRACY
90 ample a manner that his book could fittingly borrow Professor
Hogan's title: Modern Democracy. Personally, I prefer Professor
Hogan's work; it is profounder, yet clearer and shorter. But the very
different approach of Liberty or Equality forms a useful complement to that of the Cork professor.
Mr. Kuehnelt-Leddihn claims to be a thomist. but acknowledges,
too, his indebtedness to the researches of modern psychology and
even to existentialism. He has learned from the Scholastics the
valuable art of setting forth his views in order. Thus he begins by
frankly stating his philosophical allegiance, and his first chapter
clearly defines his terms and outlines the treatment. His observations
on the Suarezian doctrine of the origin of political authority show
that he is versed in the discussions of the Schools. His book is not
a continuous treatise on a single theme, but a series of studies loosely knit together by the effort to illuminate modern democracy from a
number of different angles. There is a critical appraisal of democracy as compared with monarchy; a suggestive chapter on the reasons why
parliamentary democracy has succeeded better in Protestant than in
Catholic countries; and two chapters of careful, historical research
on the origins of Nazism. It is the work of a serious student, but
(despite the eighty-five pages of references to books in thirteen
different languages) not of a bookworm; there is independence of
view, imagination, and a serious striving to understand and interpret the political forces at work in the world to-day. The style is often
irritating. It abounds in parentheses, asides, allusions (often cryptic), and an arch use of inverted commas to give a special meaning to
familiar words, but often leaving those nuances quite obscure. There are challenging generalizations, though always accompanied by
copious documentation in the form of precise references to authorities. The whole book suggests a course of university lectures, and we are
not surprised to learn that the author has lectured on political science at different American universities. As a result, some of his material
is of quite specialized appeal (e.g., the chapters on Nazism); but most of it is interesting to all who are concerned with the future of
parliamentary democracy. And in a country like ours, which is de
scribed in its Constitution as "
a sovereign, independent, democratic State ", this subject should be of interest to many.
Those fathers of political science, Plato and Aristotle, considered
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IRISH MONTHLY
the transition from democracy to tyranny dangerously easy. Their
intellectual heirs, the scholastics of the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance, while teaching a democratic doctrine of the origin of
political power, were far from holding that political power should
remain democratic; St. Thomas, in the 13th century, and St. Robert
Bellarmine, in the 16th, favoured monarchy. During the 19th century, while the democratic fervour of the French Revolution swept the
world, many wise observers were filled with forebodings. Chapter III
of Liberty or Equality quotes their gloomy prophecies. They fore
told, with uncanny foresight, such 20th century phenomena as the
totalitarian one-party r?gimes, the Welfare State and even the Russian menace. And, underlying all, they saw the democratic insistence on
equality. De Tocqueville believed that this craving for absolute
equality at whatsoever cost was motivated by envy. Reduced to
practice, it inevitably led to despotism. Few tyrannies can be so
absolute, so all-pervasive as that of a secure majority in a r?gime where majority decision is the sole criterion of just or unjust law.
The autocratic monarchs of pre-revolutionary Europe would never
have dared to claim the same rights of intrusion into private and
family life which certain modern democratic governments daily allow
themselves. "Even a Louis XIV would probably have been slain
twenty-four hours after proclaiming prohibition . . ." (p. 156). The
kings who claimed to rule by Divine right held themselves responsible to God, and often went in fear of His judgments. Modern democratic
rulers profess responsibility to the majority of the people and curry the favour of the majority. Now the true source of responsibility is God, Whose will is always righteous. Whereas the favour of the
majority is no guarantee of rectitude; recent experience shows how
intolerant?nationally, racially, religiously?majorities can be. That
democracy has remained liberal in certain countries for so long is due, the author thinks, partially to the retention of the institution of
monarchy, albeit in an attenuated form. Liberal democracy has
succeeded better in Protestant than in Catholic countries because of
the Protestant genius for compromise. Whether these r?gimes, un
changed, can meet the challenge of modern, autocratic totalitarianism, the author doubts; democratic procedures are not conducive to the
rapid decisions required by total or lightning war. Thus from many
viewpoints, but especially from its inherent trend towards tyranny,
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DEMOCRACY
the democratic type of government is subjected to searching criticism.
The argument is stimulating, often provoking. We have grown so
accustomed to regard democracy as obviously the finest product of
political experience that objections and protests at once rise to our
lips. Has not representative, parliamentary democracy worked well
in the most civilized countries of to-day? Is not democracy the best
means of safeguarding personal liberty? Are not Catholic thinkers,
is not the Pope himself, in favour of democracy? This book has
most of the answers. Perhaps they are not always adequate, but
they are all shrewd, thoughtful, erudite.
Dealing with democracy in Catholic countries, Mr. Kuehnelt
Liddihn confines himself to Continental States, and, beyond one or
two vague references to "
the Irish experiment ", does not comment
on the democracy of this country. Yet his book has its lessons for
Ireland, and could be read with profit by Irishmen interested in the
good government of their country. Thirty years are not a long span in the life of a State, yet long enough to reveal significant trends. If the author and his favourite political theorists are right in believing in the inherent tendency of democracies to degenerate into tyrannies, it may occur to us to inquire whether any signs of impending despot ism are to be noted in our Irish democracy. Fortunately, few can
be discerned. Yet many people are perturbed by one feature of all our Governments since 1922, namely, the tendency of the Executive to increase its power at the expense of the other organs of govern
ment, central and local. As long ago as 1933, Professor J. J. Horgan
pointed out that, while the then Constitution was anti-authoritarian in tone, the constant trend of legislation had been to concentrate
power in the Executive. This showed, in his opinion, that such was
the real need and political instinct of "
our primitive and patriarchal agricultural society", and that the liberal democracy of the
Constitution was only political window-dressing. The trend noted by Professor Horgan twenty years ago has persisted until now it is
matter for serious misgivings. They have been voiced quite recently by Mr. F. C. King, in a paper to the Statistical Society which bears the ominous title: "Drifting to Absolutism?
" The trend, however,
is not confined to Ireland, but seems to be shared by most parlia mentary democracies to-day. It certainly is shared by the British
democracy on which our system of government is modelled. There,
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IRISH MONTHLY
too, the question is causing grave anxiety. A recently published book
by Professor G. W. Keeton (The Passing of Parliament) more than
hints that the end of the drift may be absolute dictatorship. And he
is by no means the first English lawyer to express this fear. Peoples, it is said, get the governments they deserve; and if a people values
State-provided economic security more than freedom plus the burden and responsibility of making personal provision, it must not
be surprised or aggrieved if its Government adapts itself to thai
preference. Democratic mechanisms are no guarantee of personal
liberty, if the society which they control has not a high esteem for
liberty and is not willing to be vigilant and to make sacrifices for
its preservation. Well-distributed private ownership and responsible,
private initiative are two institutions which powerfully safeguard
liberty. Certain trends in present-day Irish legislation and adminis
tration are unfavourable to both, and should make us wary. I refer
especially to the continuous growth of the sector of State-enterprise in our national economy and to the fondness of our administrators
for State-managed, social welfare services on the English Socialist
model. Such tendencies weaken a people's will to freedom. In
modern times the Church is everywhere showing herself the firm
bulwark of personal dignity, responsibility and freedom. Her presence and influence in any country lessen the menace of the servile State.
It is not to be wondered at, however, if tensions should develop between her and the ever-encroaching civil authority. Mr. Kuehnelt
Leddihn's remark on p. 247 is here ? propos: "
The inherent acquisi tiveness of the modern State makes a struggle between it and the
Church almost everywhere inevitable."
THE MODERN STATE The modern State, heir of the kings of old, has a concept of itself
as a person superior to the body politic, and either dominating the
body politic from above or absorbing the body politic in itself.
Now, since the State in actual fact is not a persona, but a mere im
personal mechanism of abstract laws and concrete power, it is thk
impersonal mechanism that becomes superhuman, when that idea
comes to develop its whole potentiality. In the result the natural
order of things is turned upside down : the State is no longer in the
service of men, men are in the service of the particular ends of the
State.?Man and State (Maritain): HoUis & Carter.
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