Deleuze on Phenomenology (cambridge companion)

8132019 Deleuze on Phenomenology (cambridge companion)

httpslidepdfcomreaderfulldeleuze-on-phenomenology-cambridge-companion 124



103

5 Phenomenology and

metaphysics and chaos on thefragility of the eventin Deleuze

983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154

Deleuze is frequently characterized as a critic of phenomenology YetDeleuzersquos thought cannot be understood unless we recognize its simi-larities to phenomenology There are in fact three similarities First phenomenology takes up what Deleuze in Difference and Repetition calls ldquothe task of modern philosophyrdquo that task is to reverse Platonism(DR 983093983097) Through the epocheacute phenomenology reduces any transcend-ent world or transcendent thing in itself to a phenomenon anything

transcendent comes to be located within experience Second throughthe preposition ldquowithinrdquo we see that the reversal of Platonismamounts to a reduction to immanence No greater debt to phenom-enology appears in Deleuzersquos thought than in his use of the wordldquoimmanencerdquo Immanence in both Deleuze and in phenomenologyrefers to a transcendental (but not transcendent) ground A third simi-larity appears in the fact that the grounding relation in both phenom-enology and in Deleuzersquos thought is paradoxical All transcendentalphilosophy results in a paradoxical relation the ground of experience

must remain within experience (the ground must not be separate fromthe grounded) and the ground must be at the same time different fromwhat it grounds (the ground must not resemble what it grounds) Inother words the ground must remain immanent and yet as imma-nent not result in a vicious circle It must be the case that what isbeing grounded is not presupposed in the ground

This chapter extends my ldquoThe End of Phenomenology Expressionism in Deleuzeand Merleau-Pontyrdquo in Leonard Lawlor Thinking through French Philosophy (Bloomington Indiana University Press 983090003) pp 9830960ndash9830974

Downloaded from Cambridge Companions Online by IP 1303712978 on Sat Feb 23 122903 WET 2013httpdxdoiorg101017CCO9780511753657006

Cambridge Companions Online copy Cambridge University Press 2013



983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154104

It is in relation to the third similarity ndash the paradoxical rela-tion of ground and grounded ndash that we can see Deleuzersquos specificcriticism develop1 Both phenomenology and Deleuze seek the

elimination of all transcendence both seek to arrive at a planeof immanence Despite the similarity however phenomenologydefines immanence by a dative relation it relates the plane ofimmanence back to ndash in this ldquotordquo we have the dative relation ndash asubject or consciousness that constitutes the given (WP 46)983090 Inorder however for there to be a pure plane of immanence a planewith no transcendence whatsoever there must be no dative rela-tion In other words the plane of immanence must not be an imageof something else In particular it must not be an image of whatit is attempting to ground There must be a difference or a het-erogeneity ndash a non-resemblance relation (LS 983097983097) ndash between groundand grounded between condition and conditioned or between ori-gin and derivative According to Deleuze the phenomenologicalreduction merely moves the phenomenologist from the naturalattitude (doxa ) back to what Husserl calls Urdoxa 3 In other wordsthere is a resemblance of opinions with no difference betweennatural opinion and proto-opinions (WP 14983097ndash9830930 DR 137) Despite

Husserlrsquos attempt to escape phenomenology falls into a ldquoviciouscirclerdquo (LS 10983093)

Deleuzersquos criticism of phenomenology resembles those foundat roughly the same time in the works of Foucault and Derrida4 Although Deleuze is unique among his generation of French phi-losophers because he embraces (at least at the moment of the endof the 198309760s) the term ldquostructuralismrdquo his criticism of phenomen-ology arises like Derridarsquos and Foucaultrsquos from reflections on struc-

turalist concepts like the floating signifier983093

Moreover like DerridaDeleuze links the criticism of phenomenology to the criticism ofmetaphysics of ldquothe old metaphysicsrdquo Once again the task of mod-ern philosophy is to reverse Platonism However unlike DerridaDeleuze criticizes both phenomenology and metaphysics together(phenomenology as metaphysics) by means of the concept of theevent to reverse Platonism for Deleuze is first and foremost todepose the old metaphysical essences with events (LS 9830933) Yet theconcept of event appears not only as a reaction against phenom-enology and metaphysics It is also a reaction against (a ldquocounter-effectuationrdquo of) chaos Deleuzersquos thought is always in a two-front





Phenomenology and metaphysics and chaos 10983093

battle at once against already formed ideas and concepts (clicheacutes)this is the battle against ldquophenomenology and metaphysicsrdquo Buthis thought also battles against the undifferentiated abyss of chaos

(such as the experiences of schizophrenia alcoholism and mad-ness disclose) Hence the title of this essay ldquoPhenomenology andMetaphysics and Chaosrdquo However it is the subtitle ndash ldquoOn thefragility of the eventrdquo ndash that indicates the primary thesis of thisessay We shall argue that the event in Deleuzersquos precise sense ofthe term is unlimited (he says ldquoeternalrdquo) The unlimitedness of theevent will lead us into the problem of potency and impotence powerand inability Despite its singularity and novelty the event doesnot end it is incessant (Deleuze negates the French verb cesser at crucial points in his discourse)6 The event has a potency thatcannot be stopped (ldquoil ne cesse pasrdquo) As the word ldquocannotrdquo alreadyimplies what calls forth the eventrsquos unlimited potency is the fragil-ity indeed the impotence of the event the inability to make it stopWhat cannot be stopped is dying What cannot be stopped never-theless must be stopped what cannot be grasped must be graspedAnd that imperative ndash given in a vision ndash tells us that all events arelike battles As we shall see Deleuze wages a two-front war on cli-

cheacutes and chaos because he is precisely a thinker of the event as astruggle

We shall be able to see this two-front war develop only if weexamine Deleuzersquos 19830976983097 The Logic of Sense in fact the entire fol-lowing essay takes place within the confines of this book In TheLogic of Sense we find Deleuzersquos most explicit criticism of phenom-enology (of Husserlrsquos 198309713 Ideas I ) coupled with his strongest appro-priation of the idea of structure More importantly however in this

book we find Deleuzersquos most developed concept of event In fact aswe shall see the concept of event that Deleuze invents in The Logicof Sense contains four inseparable features (1) novelty (983090) effectu-ation (3) counter-effectuation and (4) unlimitedness It is the lastfeature ndash unlimitedness ndash that will lead us to the battle As title ofDeleuzersquos book indicates we shall be able to reach the concept ofevent as struggle and therefore reach Deleuzersquos two-front battleindeed we shall be able to reach his very concept of philosophy(laying out a plane of immanence and creating concepts) only if wepass through ldquothe logic of senserdquo This is a logic inspired by ldquophe-nomenology and structuralismrdquo





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154106

983120983144983141983150983151983149983141983150983151983148983151983143983161 983137983150983140 983155983156983154983157983139983156983157983154983137983148983145983155983149

The logic of sense (or the requirements

for a true genesis)To write a logic of sense (ldquosensrdquo is the French word ldquoSinnrdquo in Germanboth terms mean ldquomeaningrdquo as well as ldquodirectionrdquo and both are con-nected to words like ldquosensibilityrdquo) means to write a transcendentalphilosophy (LS 10983093) Above when we spoke of the paradoxical ground-ing relation we summarized what we might call Deleuzersquos ldquoprincipleof all principlesrdquo for transcendental philosophy (ldquothe principle of allprinciplesrdquo being a phrase coined by Husserl) Here is the principle

in more detail the ground ndash sense or what is expressed by a propos-ition or a sentence ndash must not be posited as existing outside of thegrounded or expression and at the same time the ground must notresemble the grounded (see especially LS 9830901 and LS 983097983097 for the twoclauses of the principle)7 The first clause of inseparability removessense from ldquothe old metaphysicsrdquo while the second clause of resem-blance removes sense from anything subjective such as universalsor general concepts and from anything objective like things or states

of affair This ldquoprinciple of all principlesrdquo is the principle of imma-nence The ground cannot be a second world a world of essences itcannot be separate from this world it must be within immanentYet as immanent it must not be immanent to anything else notgrounded on anything not copied off anything else For Deleuze thisprinciple is not a principle of conditioning (as in Kantian transcen-dental philosophy) but a principle of genesis The logic of sense isa logic of genesis (and for Deleuze as for Derrida there is no conflictbetween structure and genesis)983096 Indeed what is at issue in The Logicof Sense is what Husserl calls ldquothe donation of senserdquo or constitution(LS 71) What is at issue is the determination of the ldquotranscenden-tal fieldrdquo (LS 10983093) or ldquotrue genesisrdquo (LS 983097983096) What is required for truegenesis according to Deleuze Sense must generate the other dimen-sions of the primary element in discourse that is the proposition Inother words sense must generate (1) the state of affairs denoted by theproposition (denotation) (983090) the signified concepts and classes of theproposition (signification) and (3) the states of the subject manifested

by the proposition (manifestation) All of these aspects of the prop-osition are aspects of belief of doxa As the genetic source however






sense must not duplicate doxa (or opinions) Sense must be neutral inregard to all the modes of the proposition and yet it must be product-ive it must generate those propositional modes

Phenomenology (or Deleuzersquos criticism of Husserlrsquostheory of constitution in Ideas I )

Deleuze is interested in phenomenology because as he says ldquophe-nomenology [might] be the rigorous sciencerdquo of sense for which heis seeking (LS 9830901)983097 To determine whether phenomenology is thisldquorigorous sciencerdquo Deleuze focuses as we said on Husserlrsquos 198309713Ideas I 10 Husserl seems to ldquodiscover senserdquo in Ideas I through theidea of the noema (LS 9830976 also LS 3983090)11 As the Greek word indicates(from ldquonoeinrdquo to think) the noema is the thought-object which iscorrelated to what Husserl calls ldquonoesisrdquo (thinking) At first glanceit seems according to Deleuze that the noema ndash the entire appar-atus of intentionality laid out in Ideas I ndash satisfies the requirementsfor a true genesis The noema in Husserl looks to be ldquoindependentrdquoand ldquoneutralrdquo because Husserl distinguishes the noema from thephysical object from the psychological or from lived experience

from mental representations and from logical concepts (LS 101) Inother words the noema seems to differ from denotation manifest-ation and signification It does not seem to resemble what it is sup-posed to generate

As the word ldquoseemsrdquo suggests however Deleuze argues thatHusserlrsquos genesis occurs only in ldquoappearancerdquo (LS 100) it is aldquosleight of handrdquo (LS 9830977) In fact Deleuzersquos criticism of Husserlrsquosgenesis takes place in three steps First Deleuze notices that when

Husserl discusses the noema he uses the image of a core the noemaor sense has according to Husserl a nucleus1983090 As Deleuze saysldquoNucleus metaphors are disquieting they envelope what is in ques-tionrdquo (LS 983097983096 also LS 9830901983090) What Husserl has done according toDeleuze is determine the nucleus of sense as a ldquopredicaterdquo (LS 9830977)Determining sense as a predicate (the greenness of the tree in theproposition ldquothe tree is greenrdquo) Husserl understands the nucleus asa concept or a generality If sense is a generality then it gives itselfready-made the form of signification ndash rather than generating itThe nucleus of sense being determined as a generality is related forHusserl to ldquoa something = Xrdquo which is an object in general So as





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315410983096

Deleuze stresses just as signification is given ahead of time ready-made denotation is given ahead of time ready-made In relation toboth signification and denotation the donation of sense remains

within a ldquovicious circlerdquo (LS 10983093) Second Deleuze stresses thatHusserl determines the something = X as an Idea in the Kantiansense (an approximation to an ideal) The idea in the Kantian sensemaintains reason as the basic form of genesis More precisely bymaintaining reason Husserl seems to be presupposing ldquoan origi-nary faculty of common senserdquo the originary faculty of commonsense accounts for the identity of the object in general (the identityis what is held in common by all the possible objects) (LS 9830977 also LS 116 LS 11983097) According to Deleuze Husserl even seems to be assum-ing a good sense good sense (this is the Ideas in the Kantian sense asa telos ) accounts for the process of identification of all the objects ingeneral to infinity (the process is always seeking the identificationof all objects as if that identification is the good) (LS 9830977)13 Alwaysseeking the same commonality always seeking the same identi-fication the genesis once again falls into a vicious circle Finallythird Husserl maintains the form of consciousness (LS 10983090 alsoLS 1983090983090)14 According to Deleuze Husserl divides consciousness ndash a

ldquoradical separationrdquo ndash between actual doxic (or believing) conscious-ness which is productive (it posits that something exists and makesjudgments) and a merely ldquothinking ofrdquo consciousness which isneutral and non-productive (its neutrality means that it posits noexistence and makes no judgments)1983093 Actual consciousness (or theactual cogito ) is under the ldquojurisdiction of reasonrdquo while the con-sciousness that merely thinks is not Deleuze stresses that Husserldetermines the relation between the two kinds of consciousness as

a relation of proper and improper and he provides an image of thisrelation For Husserl the neutral that is improper consciousnessis the shadow while the proper and rational consciousness is thething that casts the shadow Thus according to Deleuze Husserlthrough the ldquoseparationrdquo makes a ldquodisjunctionrdquo within conscious-ness endowing the form of actual consciousness with the potencyof genesis (productivity) while the neutralized consciousness hasno productive potency However in order to have a genuine gen-esis the generating sense must be at once neutral and productiveIn other words Husserlrsquos genetic source is not neutral in relation tothe generated forms of consciousness that are actually manifested






in the proposition Once again Husserl falls into a vicious circlesince he makes one actual form of consciousness (the rational form)be the genetic source of those forms of consciousness that are mani-

fested Overall therefore in these three steps what Deleuze showsis that the forms of doxa (a nucleus of proto-doxa ) of reason (com-mon sense and good sense through the Idea in the Kantian sense)and of consciousness (proper consciousness) are used as the geneticsource and then these same forms appear in what is generated Inother words although the noema is Husserlrsquos great discovery it is not truly neutral

Structuralism (or true genesis)In The Logic of Sense Deleuze clearly takes inspiration from theentire apparatus of intentionality that we find in Husserlrsquos Ideas I As have seen however there are three ways according to Deleuzein which Husserl (or phenomenology) makes transcendental genesis(constitution or sense donation) false or be only apparent First bygiving himself the forms of the object and the concept (generality)ready-made genesis in Husserl remains a vicious circle Second

by maintaining the form of reason and the direction of an Ideain the Kantian sense Husserl presupposes a common sense and agood sense (the Urdoxa ) Thanks to the Urdoxa genesis functionsby means of identity and teleology What is produced is distributedhierarchically in relation to the identity and oriented purposivelyAgain the vicious circle appears Finally by determining neutralconsciousness as only a shadow only as improper consciousnessHusserl maintains the form of consciousness as the model for what is

generated Fundamentally the criticism that Deleuze levels againstthe apparatus that Husserl sets up in Ideas I is that genesis is a kindof copying The noema is not neutral in relation to the dimensionsof the proposition Based in intentionality genesis is not an eventsense is not a singularity As Deleuze says ldquoOnly when the worldteeming with hellip impersonal and pre-individual singularities opensup do we tread at last on the field of the transcendentalrdquo (LS 103translation modified)

We now enter into one of the most complex parts of Deleuzersquosthought the determination of the transcendental field In order todesignate the transcendental field Deleuze employs several negative





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154110

terms nonsense paradox anti-generality informal incorporealindetermination indifference infinitive a-conceptual anonym-ous immediate impersonal impenetrable impassible non- (or pre-)

individual counter-God unlimited and unconscious These nega-tive terms function as a guardrail to steer us toward the fact thatthe ground in Deleuze does not resemble ndash no copying relation ndash thegrounded And yet their negative function is supposed to open ontosomething positive (LS 136 19830903) What the negative function opensout onto is something smaller than beliefs (doxa or opinions arrivedat by consensus) generalities forms bodies smaller than deter-minate differentiated or finite terms and concepts smaller thanwhat has a name smaller than mediation persons individualsthan what can be penetrated than what is either active or passivesmaller than God (or man) a limit and consciousness (LS 63ndash64)16 What is a singularity It is no larger than a point or an instantHusserl in Deleuzersquos eyes remains at the level that is too largeas it is itself constituted by the smaller processes of singularitiesBut insofar as Husserl does not reduce to the small he also doesnot reach the really large that which does not stop the eventumtantum (LS 19830931)

For Deleuze the singularities that populate the transcendentalfield form a structure Deleuze tells us that there are ldquothree minimalconditionsrdquo for a structure (LS 9830930) First there must be two heteroge-neous series a single series does not make a structure Here as to beexpected since The Logic of Sense appears in 19830976983097 Deleuze makesuse of structuralist terminology saying that the one series is theldquosignifierrdquo (a repeatable phonic or graphic form) while the secondis the ldquosignifiedrdquo (what the form means) Throughout The Logic of

Sense Deleuze refers to dualities such a signifierndashsignified but alsowordndashthing and as we shall see bodiesndashincorporeals The hetero-geneity of the two series is due to a ldquoperpetual relative displacementrdquoor ldquoperpetual disequilibriumrdquo the two series are always ldquoout of stepwith one anotherrdquo (ldquodeacutecalagerdquo) (LS 983093983090ndash9830934) The ldquodeacutecalagerdquo ensuresthat fundamentally there is no resemblance between the two ser-ies Second as in structural linguistic the terms in the series aredetermined in relation to one another that is by the difference invalue between the terms To these relations or to the value of theserelations ldquovery particular events correspond that is singularitiesrdquo(LS 9830930 Deleuzersquos emphasis)17 Each series then has a distribution






of singular points that is of events As already indicated (mention-ing Derrida as well) Deleuze stresses that it is a mistake to opposestructure to event What a structure registers is events and what a

structure produces is more events Structure is genesisThe third condition concerns genesis The two heterogeneousseries converge toward what Deleuze calls a ldquoparadoxical agencyrdquo(ldquoinstance paradoxalerdquo also paradoxical instance paradoxical lastcourt of appeal) (LS 40 983097983096)1983096 The inspiration for what Deleuze callsa paradoxical agency comes from Lacan One example of the para-doxical agency then is a phantasm that is a childrsquos real or unrealrepresentation of the parental coitus (LS 7 98309010) The psychoanalyticexample indicates that the paradoxical agency is a representation ofsomething real but separated from that reality it is imaginary tooAnother example this time from Leacutevi-Straussrsquo structural anthro-pology is the ldquofloating signifierrdquo (LS 4983096ndash4983097)1983097 A signifier (a phonic orgraphic form) such as the Polynesian term ldquomanardquo does not possessa determinate signified (or meaning) not having a determinate sig-nified this signifier ldquofloatsrdquo between the series of signifiers (it differsfrom the rest of the signifiers since it lacks a determinate signified)and the series of signifieds (it seems to be its own signified) The

paradoxical agency belongs then to neither series (neither the realnor the imaginary neither the signifiers nor the signifieds) althoughit is situated between or (just above) the two series The paradoxicalagency articulates or differentiates the two series reflects the oneinto the other makes them communicate coexist and resonate (LS 9830931) In short the paradoxical agency donates sense onto the two ser-ies The paradoxical agency is able to endow the two series withsense because it is equally present in the signifying series and in the

signified series it is ldquotwo-sided ldquoat once word and thing name andobjectrdquo (LS 40) The paradoxical agency by its very nature is splitapart in relation to itself incomplete As Deleuze says there is noth-ing stranger than ldquothis two-sided thing with two unequal or unevenlsquohalvesrsquordquo (LS 41)9830900 What makes the agency strange is the fact that itis in default defective or lacking (ldquodeacutefautrdquo) The paradoxical agencyis defective the signifier ldquofloatsrdquo because it lacks a determinate sig-nified it includes non-sense (LS 6983096ndash71)9830901 Since it includes non-sensethe paradoxical agency lacks ultimate determination and a uniquedirection or one sense (LS 77) Precisely because it lacks sense it isable to give too much sense The combination of not enough and too





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315411983090

much explains why for Deleuze the paradoxical agency is definedby a question a question with too many answers because there isno one ultimate answer (LS 9830936) The combination also explains why

the paradoxical agency is problematic it is a problem with too manysolutions because there is no one ultimate solution Most import-antly the paradoxical agency ldquodoes not stop circulatingrdquo (ldquone cessede circulerrdquo) within the two series (LS 40) It never stops it has noend (no determinate direction) the paradoxical agency is unlimitedinfinite and therefore it has as Deleuze says an ldquoeternal truthrdquo (LS 63) Because the paradoxical agency is two-sided it is neither denota-tion nor signification Lacking a determinate sense the paradoxicalagency is a ldquosomething = Xrdquo but this X is not an Idea in the Kantiansense (LS 66) The paradoxical agency ldquodestroysrdquo both good senseand common sense (LS 3) Finally because it is a structure and anunlimited structure it does not have the form of consciousnessThe paradoxical agency does not endow sense only apparently buttruly Structuralismrsquos discovery of the paradoxical agency results inthe idea of true genesis It produces sense as an event Thus struc-turalism for Deleuze in The Logic of Sense belongs to the movementof reversing Platonism

983127983144983137983156 983145983155 983137983150 983141983158983141983150983156983103

Earlier we claimed that Deleuze had taken inspiration fromHusserlrsquos phenomenology in his logic of sense Then we saw howhe appropriates structuralist thinking (Lacanrsquos psychoanalysisand Leacutevi-Straussrsquo anthropology) The real inspiration for Deleuzersquosconception of sense as an event however comes from Stoic logic

(which he sees operating in Lewis Carrollrsquos writings) As he saysldquothe Stoics undertake the first great reversal of Platonism the radi-cal reversalrdquo (LS 7) The genius of Stoic philosophy according toDeleuze lies in the new ldquocleavagerdquo it makes in the causal relationUnlike Aristotle and Kant who distinguish types of causality theStoics ldquodissociaterdquo the causal relation they make a ldquoborderrdquo wherethere never was one before between cause and effect On the onehand ndash this is one of the many dualities in The Logic of Sense wehave already noticed ndash there are bodies and mixtures of bodies themixtures are the causes The interaction between bodies is calledldquomixturerdquo because the interaction is accidental It is however the







983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154114

metaphysical essences and Platonic ideas they are not generalitiesor universals Events (with a lower-case ldquoerdquo) do not exist but rather insist Not being facts (or bodies) and not being generalities events

(lower-case ldquoerdquo) according to Deleuze are verbs (LS 3 9830901 98309014ndash1983093)For example the event expressed in the proposition ldquothe tree isgreenrdquo is not found in the predicate ldquogreenrdquo but in the infinitiveldquoto greenrdquo (LS 98309014) Since the event is expressed in an infinitive theverb has the potency or power to divide itself into other tenses andnumbers This power ndash it is this power that defines a ldquopure eventrdquofor Deleuze (LS 136) ndash makes the event unlimited Unlimited theevent (still written with a lower-case ldquoerdquo) ldquofollows the borderrdquo orldquoskirts along the surfacerdquo (LS 10)9830903 Then the event (lower-case ldquoerdquo)is virtually identical to ldquothe one and the same Eventrdquo The event isalways said twice (LS 34)

We anticipated these two senses of the event in Deleuze ndash Eventas surface and event as surface effect ndash when we spoke of the para-doxical agency In fact there is no difference in Deleuze betweenparadoxical agency and event The event is paradoxical it is two-sided it is always both incorporeal and corporeal ideal and factualsurface and surface effect at once (LS 983096) Despite the doubleness

what first and foremost defines the event just as for the paradox-ical agency is singularity This is the list that Deleuze produces ofwhat counts as a singularity ldquoturning points or points of inflectionbottlenecks knots foyers and centers points of fusion condensa-tion and boiling points of tears and joy sickness and health hopeand anxiety lsquosensitiversquo pointsrdquo (LS 983093983090) On the basis of the list wesee that what makes something be a singularity lies in its beingcaused effectuated or realized by mixtures of bodies9830904 Bodies mix

and there is contagion which causes illness bodies mix and there isheartbreak which causes tears That an event results from an ldquoeffec-tuationrdquo means that an event is always at first an effect always atfirst a fact or an accident For Deleuze there can be no event nosingularity that does not begin as an accident What happens whathas happened is that when bodies mix (again contagion or poison)the mixture has an effect Then it is possible that something of theeffect is selected (LS 19830931) What is selected is what there is ldquoin prin-ciplerdquo or ldquoby rightrdquo (ldquoen droitrdquo) in the event (LS 983090983090 17) For instanceand we shall return to this example below what is selected fromthe accident of a wound is the idea of a scar that at once disjoins and






joins These two features ndash referring to a ldquono longerrdquo whole and refer-ring to a ldquonot yetrdquo whole ndash are made consistent in the selection983090983093 Inother words the selection transforms the factual accident into an

ideal event becoming neutral (indifferent) in relation to the waysit is effectuated through bodies Yet because the selection of whatis ldquoby rightrdquo is within the effect (inseparable from the effect) theevent remains at once corporeal and incorporeal Most importantly for Deleuze this doubleness affects the temporal status of the eventThe event is a singularity because it is effectuated in the presentinstant In this regard the event is really singular unlike anythingelse unlike any other event it is a novelty Yet when the ldquoby rightrdquofeatures of the event are selected when they are expressed the min-imum of being that those features acquire turn the event into aldquocounter-effectuationrdquo The event is ldquoagainstrdquo effectuation becausethe features selected have as we mentioned earlier ldquoeternal truthrdquoor the temporal status of being ldquoeternalrdquo They are ldquoeternalrdquo not inthe sense of an eternal present that never changes or of a circle oftime that constantly returns to the present Events (lower-case ldquoerdquo)are ldquoeternalrdquo in the sense of being non-present that is they referlike a verb to an unlimited past and future (LS 61)9830906

Once more it is necessary to stress that the event is a singularitya novelty However even though it is not separable from the cause(it is once again not a Platonic idea) ndash it has only extra-being ndash theeffect is expressed in language For Deleuze linguistic expressionmeans minimally that the effect takes on a form The minimum ofbeing means a minimum of language nothing more than the ldquostut-teringrdquo of the infinitive (LS 9830904) Nevertheless the minimal formal-ization differentiates the event from the effect When formalized

the event becomes repeatable It is a caused factual by chanceaccident and at the same time something that can be repeatedThe repeatability is the power or potentiality of the event Withthis power it ldquoskirts along the surfacerdquo and becomes almost iden-tical to the Event (with an upper-case ldquoerdquo) As almost identical toone and the same Event the event becomes larger than any of itscorporeal effectations Then the form of the event ldquosupervenesrdquo(ldquosurvientrdquo) on bodies and their mixtures (LS 9830904) The relationshipof supervenience means that the event now ideal an ideal formtakes on the characteristic of being an a priori condition for itsown factual or empirical effectuation It appears to be originless or





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154116

self-originating having no beginning opening out onto an unlim-ited past The event is nevertheless itself a singularity and thuscaused The event is a first that is a second and a second that is

a first Being caused and yet prior to its own cause the event is arepetition without an origin Like the paradoxical agency the eventis based on a lack on nothing on no sense The lack explains whyDeleuze defines the event in this way ldquothe event is the identity ofform and emptinessrdquo (LS 136) It explains his use of all the nega-tive terms that we have seen but especially this one ldquothe infor-malrdquo (LS 107) It is formal (minimally formal) although it lacks anultimate form The emptiness or void refers to the surface havingno limit in the past having no stopping point in that direction Butthe event is always bi-directional (it has no good sense or commonsense) It is a question for which the answer was not given ahead oftime and for which no one answer will ever fully respond Not onlydoes the event supervene on the mixtures of bodies (functioningas their prior condition in the past) but also the event ldquosoars overrdquo(ldquosurvolerrdquo) the mixtures (functioning as what exceeds them intothe future) (LS 1983093983093) In this second direction into the future theeventrsquos power is excessive It never stops being able to be repeated

beyond any limit or over any stopping point it is incessant andendless (LS 40 9830931 6983090 63 19830930 167) Instead of one determinate endit possesses an unlimited number of ends

983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150 983152983144983141983150983151983149983141983150983151983148983151983143983161 983137983150983140983149983141983156983137983152983144983161983155983145983139983155 983137983150983140 983139983144983137983151983155

We are able to summarize the concept of event that we just devel-

oped in the following way The event is a singularity it is a noveltyWhat makes the event new is that it is caused accidentally or bychance by a mixture of bodies The event is always effectuatedThe source of effectuation is chaos depth or the abyss Howeverit is possible that something of the effect is selected The selectionof what is ldquoby rightrdquo or ldquoin principlerdquo in the effect is not effectu-ation (it is no longer what is by chance or accidentally) but counter-effectuation Counter-effectuation makes what was in the depthrise to the surface Counter-effectuation produces the surface andthe surface effects the one and the same Event and ideal eventsAlthough above the depth the Event and the ideal events are still






lower than the height of Platonic ideas and generalities We haveseen that Deleuzersquos concept of ideal events resembles the psycho-analytic phantasm and the structuralist floating signifier But

Deleuze in fact models the concept on literature The one and thesame Event is a story (ldquoune histoirerdquo) composed of turning pointsboiling points points of crisis (LS 9830930) The question posed by theparadoxical agency is the question of the tale and the novella (LS 63)what happened what is going to happen9830907 These questions cannotbe answered with causes Even more we must recognize that theevent implies that there are no ultimate answers to these questionsThese questions remain answerless because the Event or paradox-ical agency is ldquoeternalrdquo or more precisely unlimited The paradox-ical agency is a repeatable form that lacks a determinate originLacking a determinate origin it becomes repeatable incessantly ithas a potency that is endless To be as concise as possible we cansay that the Deleuzian concept of event contains these four insep-arable features (1) novelty (983090) effectuation (3) counter-effectuationand (4) unlimitedness983090983096 Similarly here is the list of the examples ofthe Deleuzian event that we have seen so far (1) the psychoanalyticphantasm (983090) the structuralist floating signifier (3) the infinitive

(the verb) and now (4) the tale and novellaBesides these four examples there is one more Indeed it is the

most important example We anticipated it above when we spoke ofthe wound and the scar Deleuze says ldquothe battle is not one exampleof an event among others hellip [it is] the Event in its essencerdquo (LS 100)The battle is the Event in its essence because it fits the definition ofthe event that we have seen so far Due to the chance mixtures ofbodies on the battlefield each battle is novel singular and differ-

ent from all the others The mixtures of bodies cause or effectuatethe battle But also the battle fits the definition because the battleldquosoars overrdquo (ldquosurvolerdquo) its own battlefield (LS 100) That the battlesoars over the battlefield means that it can be the subject of a coun-ter-effectuation The counter-effectuation (the selection of by-rightfeatures) makes the battle be neutral in relation to all its effectua-tions in the present indifferent in regard to the victor and the van-quished the brave and the cowardly Because counter-effectuationtakes place in language Deleuze mentions famous novels about warby Stendhal Hugo Tolstoy and Stephen Crane The counter-effectu-ation in the novel makes the battle ldquoeternalrdquo It is no longer simply





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315411983096

the present of effectuation instead the battle is ldquoalways to come andalready passedrdquo (LS 100) That is as an ideal sense battle appears tolack an origin but also as an ideal sense it exceeds all possible ful-

fillments Deleuze says that the non-present temporal status makesthe event ldquoall the more terriblerdquo (LS 100) It is all the more terriblebecause the linguistization of the battle (as in a novel) the graspingof the battle (as in a philosophical concept) is the unlimiting of lifeor more precisely the unlimiting of life in its struggle with deathThe example of the battle (but really the battle shows what the eventtruly is) therefore provides us one more feature of the event Thisfeature is really why it is the Event in its essence It shows that everyevent is like a plague war or death (LS 19830931)

For Deleuze the battlersquos effectuation and counter-effectuation ndashindeed effectuation and counter-effectuation in general ndash are likethe ambiguity of death Here in regard to the ambiguity of deathDeleuze follows Blanchot983090983097 Blanchot had shown that death is notonly personal me dying my life being too weak when the momentcomes it is not only a so to speak ldquobig deathrdquo But also death isimpersonal without a relation to me with me being too weak forlife which as it exceeds limits is like a series of ldquolittle deathsrdquo In

other words there is the portion of the event that is accomplishedand realized (personal death me as a soldier with a proper name Iam dying) then there is the portion that cannot realize its accom-plishment (impersonal death other soldiers whose names I do notknow they are dying and never stop dying) The lack of accomplish-ment means that impersonal death is incessant ldquothey never finishup with dyingrdquo (ldquoon nrsquoen finit pas de mourirrdquo) (LS 1983093983090) Behind theemptiness of the question behind the answerlessness of what hap-

pened and what is going to happen there is always dying It is thisendless death that has risen up from the depths of the battlersquos chaosto the surface The surface is fragile (LS 983096983090 9830974 19830900 167) It is fragilebecause the soldier is mortally wounded personally ldquoin his ownfleshrdquo (LS 101 see also LS 19830936) He has risked his life in the abyss ofthe battle In this moment of grace between life and death howeverthe battle in its unlimitedness hovers above the battlefield enoughfor the soldier to ldquoseerdquo it30 What does the soldier see It is the visionof so many singularities dying (not just soldiers with unknownnames dying but also animals perishing and countrysides and citiesbeing destroyed) It is the vision of life in its endless struggle with






death chaos or as Deleuze sometimes calls it ldquoBichatrsquos zonerdquo31 Itis this vision that cannot be ldquograspedrdquo (LS 19830936) It is this vision ofdeath never ceasing never ending never accomplishing itself never

making itself be over once and for all this vision cannot be thoughtThe inability to stop (ldquoil ne cesse pas ne cesse jamaisrdquo) is the impo-tence of the event And yet from this powerlessness comes powerThe unthinkable must be thought the ungraspable must be graspedResponding to the vision the mortally wounded soldier ldquoin a singleact of violencerdquo includes all violence and all mortal events in onesingle Event in a plane of immanence that denounces and deposesall violence and all death (LS 1983093983090ndash9830933) The mortally wounded soldiermust write the story of the battle ndash in order to liberate it ldquoalwaysfor other timesrdquo and ldquoto make us go farther than we would havebelieved possiblerdquo (LS 161)3983090 As Deleuze (and Guattari) would say in A Thousand Plateaus the vision of the battle is grasped (some partof it) in order to make us become

Perhaps the mortally wounded soldierrsquos vision of the battlersquos sur-face (the vision of this plane of immanence) is like a phenomeno-logical intuition We do not know33 What we know however isthat Deleuze connects his criticism of phenomenology to another

criticism Like Derrida at the same moment Deleuze associatesphenomenology with metaphysics Deleuze says ldquoMetaphysicsand transcendental philosophyrdquo that is phenomenology ldquohavereached an agreementrdquo (LS 106) Metaphysics and phenomenologyset up an alternative (LS 106) On the one hand metaphysics hasGod as a sovereign Being completely and infinitely analyticallydetermined by its concepts Yet still on the first hand transcen-dental philosophy (that is phenomenology) has the finite form of

the Person which synthesizes representation We see what is onthe first hand it is God and man What is on the other hand indistinction from God and man is ldquoan undifferentiated ground agroundlessness formless non-being an abyss without differencesand without propertiesrdquo (LS 106) It is this alternative ndash either theanalytic form of the sovereign being plus the synthetic form of theperson or chaos ndash that Deleuze is criticizing and continues to criti-cize throughout his entire career Only if we recognize Deleuzersquosrejection of this alternative do we understand the philosophy andthe conception of philosophy that emerges from his criticisms ofboth phenomenology and ldquothe old metaphysicsrdquo Philosophy in





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315419830900

Deleuze is a two-front fight against already constituted forms (cli-cheacutes) and against the chaos of no form at all What emerges fromthis two-front fight is the conception of philosophy presented in

What Is Philosophy as concept creation and the laying out of a planeof immanence But only with this two-front battle in mind do wesee that the purpose of concept creation lies in the fight againstclicheacutes while the purpose of the laying out of a plane of imma-nence lies in the fight against chaos What is still at issue in WhatIs Philosophy is surface effects and the surface The purpose or endof philosophy for Deleuze really means that what is required inphilosophy is to ldquograsprdquo the event in its singularity a singularitythat verges on the formless chaos on the one hand and on the formsof the ready-made on the other Philosophyrsquos specific power is tocreate concepts to ldquograsprdquo the event but this power is based on avision of immanence that cannot be grasped34 As Deleuze says inWhat Is Philosophy (with Guattari) ldquoWe will say that THE planeof immanence is at the same time that which must be thoughtand that which cannot be thought It is the nonthought withinthoughtrdquo (WP 983093983097) Imitating Deleuzersquos capitalization of ldquoTHE planeof immanencerdquo we are tempted to write this final sentence ldquoTHE

plane of immanence it can NOT be thoughtrdquo

983118983151983156983141983155

1 Alain Beaulieu has written an excellent essay on Deleuzersquos criti-cisms of and his relation to phenomenology Alain BeaulieuldquoEdmund Husserlrdquo in Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (eds) DeleuzersquosPhilosophical Lineage (Edinburgh University Press 98309000983097) pp 98309061ndash9830961James Williamsrsquo Gilles Deleuzersquos ldquoLogic of Senserdquo also has a precise

summary of Deleuzersquos criticisms of Husserl overall it is an excellentintroduction to The Logic of Sense James Williams Gilles DeleuzersquosldquoLogic of Senserdquo (Edinburgh University Press 98309000983096) pp 1983090983097ndash34 JoeHughes has also written an excellent discussion of Husserl and TheLogic of Sense in his Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation (London Continuum 98309000983096)

983090 See also ES 98309673 Edmund Husserl Experience and Judgment trans James S Churchill

and Karl Ameriks (Evanston Northwestern University Press 198309773)

section 13 p 983093983097 Deleuze also has in mind Merleau-Ponty See MauriceMerleau-Ponty The Phenomenology of Perception trans Colin Smith






and rev Forrest Williams (London Routledge and Kegan Paul 19830976983090rev 19830979830961) p 61

4 Foucaultrsquos criticisms of phenomenology are found in The Order ofThings and in The Archaeology of Knowledge The Order of Things crit-icizes phenomenology for thinking in a circularity (ldquoa vicious circlerdquoas Deleuze would say) in a ldquodialectic of the samerdquo between all the dou-blets that determine the modern concept of man while The Archeologyof Knowledge criticizes phenomenologyrsquos teleological thinking in favorof a thinking of the event See Michel Foucault The Order of Things An Archaeology of the Human Sciences trans anon (New York Vintage19830979830974) and The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language trans A M Sheridan Smith (New York Pantheon Books 19830977983090)

983093 For structuralism in Deleuze see also ldquoHow Do We RecognizeStructuralismrdquo DI 170ndash983097983090 For structuralism generally see Fran ccediloisDossersquos History of Structuralism trans Deborah Glassman(Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press 19830979830977)

6 See LS 40 9830931 6983090 63 19830930 161 1677 Deleuze presents the logic of this principle in EPS 46ndash47983096 Here we are focusing only on what Deleuze calls ldquostatic genesisrdquo

which he opposes to ldquodynamic genesisrdquo In The Logic of Sense Deleuzesays ldquoThe expressed makes possible the expression But in this casewe find ourselves confronted with a final task to retrace the historywhich liberates sounds and makes them independent of bodies It isno longer a question of a static genesis which would lead from the pre-supposed event to its effectuation in states of affairs and to its expres-sion in propositions It is a question of dynamic genesis which leadsdirectly from states of affairs to events from mixtures to pure lines from depth to the production of surfaces which must not implicate atall the other genesisrdquo (LS 19830966 Deleuzersquos emphasis) The final third ofThe Logic of Sense concerns dynamic genesis (Series Twenty-Seven toThirty-Four) For more on genesis see DR 19830963

983097 By calling phenomenology a ldquorigorous sciencerdquo Deleuze of courseis referring to the well-known work by Husserl ldquoPhilosophy as aRigorous Science in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy edQ Lauer (New York Harper 19830976983093)rdquo

10 Edmund Husserl Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology andto a Phenomenological Philosophy First Book trans Fred Kersten(The Hague Martinus Nijhoff 19830979830963) Kerstenrsquos translation uses theHusserliana volume while Ricoeurrsquos uses the third edition (1983097983090983096) ofthe original Max Niemeyer publication The first English transla-tion (by Boyce Gibson) also uses the Niemeyer edition See EdmundHusserl Ideas General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology trans








13 The definition of good sense given in The Logic of Sense is ldquogood senseaffirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or directionrdquo (LS 1) Deleuze frequently refers to good sense and common sense The mostthorough discussion occurs in Difference and Repetition chapter 3

14 Deleuze refers to Ideas I sections 110 and 1141983093 Kersten renders Husserlrsquos ldquo radikalen Scheidung rdquo as ldquoradical separ-

ationrdquo Ricoeur renders it as ldquocoupure radicale rdquo Deleuze then usesldquocoupure radicale rdquo which is rendered in the English translation of TheLogic of Sense as ldquoradical cleavagerdquo (LS 10983090)

16 Here Deleuze also speaks of ldquolarge differencesrdquo See also Differenceand Repetition rsquos discussion of Leibniz and Hegel (DR 4983090ndash9830930)

17 To explain this idea of a singularity referring to the value of a relationDeleuze refers to differential calculus (LS 6983093 983093983090)

1983096 Deleuze appropriates the idea of the paradoxical agency from Lacan(LS 3983096ndash40) Deleuze cites Jacques Lacan ldquoSeminar on lsquoThe PurloinedLetterrsquordquo in Eacutecrits The First Complete Edition in English transBruce Fink (New York Norton 983090007) pp 6ndash4983097 In The Logic of Sense Deleuze distinguishes the phantasm from the simulacrum See LS 9830974 98309016 The simulacrum remains bound to the causality of bodies indepth while the phantasm is a surface effect For more on the simulac-rum see Deleuzersquos ldquoLetter-Preface to Jean-Clet Martinrdquo in DI 361ndash63Of course Deleuzersquos major study of psychoanalysis appears in Anti-Oedipus (written with Guattari)

1983097 ldquoThe floating signifierrdquo comes from Leacutevi-Strauss Deleuze cites ClaudeLeacutevi-Strauss Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss trans FelicityBaker (London Routledge and Kegan Paul 19830979830967) pp 61ndash6983090

9830900 Stressing the two sides of the paradoxical agency Deleuze says ldquoForwhat is in excess on one side is nothing other than an extremelymobile empty place What is in default on the other side is a rapidlymoving object an occupant without a place always supernumeraryand displacedrdquo (LS 41 Deleuzersquos emphasis) This quotation anticipatesDeleuzersquos idea of a people to come and a land (une terre ) to come

9830901 Nonsense in Deleuze has nothing to do with the philosophy of theabsurd which had defined nonsense simply as the absence of sense (LS 71) In contrast for Deleuze nonsense is not in a simple oppositionalrelation to sense (LS 71) rather sense and nonsense exist in ldquoan ori-ginal type of intrinsic relation a mode of co-presencerdquo (LS 6983096)

983090983090 Franccedilois Zourabichvilirsquos Deleuze une philosophie de lrsquoeacuteveacute nement (Paris Presses Universitaires de France 19830979830976) presents an excel-lent summary of Deleuzersquos thought with particular attention to theconcept of event See especially p 983096983097 for a discussion of the relation ofincorporeals to bodies





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315419830904

9830903 When the event (lower-case ldquoerdquo) starts to skirt the surface the eventbecomes a kind of ldquorefrainrdquo (LS 9830937) The idea of a refrain will play animportant role in A Thousand Plateaus See A Thousand Plateaus theeleventh Plateau ldquo198309637 Of the Refrain [ldquoritournellerdquo]rdquo ldquoRitournellerdquois the French translation of the Italian ldquoritornello rdquo which in Baroquemusic refers to a recurring passage in music

9830904 This is the problem of the ldquothird orderrdquo in Spinoza See EPS 9830903983093ndash9830934and 317 The English translation of Logique du sens renders the Frenchword ldquoeffectuationrdquo as ldquoactualizationrdquo This translation is correct butit loses the direct connection to the idea of an effect So we are render-ing it here as ldquoeffectuationrdquo

983090983093 In What is Philosophy consistency of ldquodistinct heterogeneous andyet not separablerdquo features is the definition of a concept See WP 1983097

9830906 The temporal status of events is what Deleuze calls ldquoAionrdquo Deleuzeopposes Aion to Chronos But he also stresses that Aion and Chronosamount to two different ldquoreadings of timerdquo As two ldquoreadingsrdquo Aionand Chronos have an inseparable relation just as the event containsinseparably the features of effectuation and counter-effectuation Forldquotwo readingsrdquo see LS 983093 61 16983090 164

9830907 These questions are taken up in A Thousand Plateaus Plateau 983096983090983096 For a helpful summary of the Deleuzian concept of event see Franccedilois

Zourabichvilirsquos Le vocabulaire de Deleuze (Paris Ellipses 983090003) pp36ndash40

983090983097 Deleuze cites Maurice Blanchot The Space of Literature trans AnnSmock (Lincoln University of Nebraska Press 1983097983096983090) p 19830903

30 Deleuze speaks of how Stendhal Hugo and Tolstoy make their heroesldquoseerdquo the battle then he speaks of a ldquovolitional intuitionrdquo of the battlein regard to Cranersquos ldquoyoung manrdquo (LS 100ndash1)

31 He says this in reference to Foucaultrsquos work especially The Birth ofthe Clinic See F 19830901 I have developed this idea in my Implications ofImmanence (Bronx NY Fordham University Press 983090006)

3983090 The importance of writing in Deleuze (and Guattari) is seen in thefirst Plateau of A Thousand Plateaus I have argued for the import-ance of writing (either a story or a philosophical concept) in Deleuzersquosthought and in particular to his concept of becoming in my ldquoFollowingthe Rats An Essay on the Concept of Becoming-Animal in Deleuzeand Guattarirdquo in SubStance 117 The Political Animal 373 (98309000983096)16983097ndash9830967

33 Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this chapter to compare thissort of intuition which Deleuze says is different from all ldquoempiricalintuitionsrdquo to what Husserl calls ldquoeidetic intuitionrdquo Such a compari-son would require an investigation of Bergsonrsquos concept of intuition






But the investigation would be guided by this comment from FoucaultrsquosHermeneutics of the Subject ldquoMeditating death (meditari meletan )in the sense that the Greeks and Latins understand this hellip is placingoneself in thought in the situation of someone who is in the processof dying or who is about to die who is living his last days The medita-tion is not therefore a game the subject plays on his own thought withthe object or possible objects of his thought It is not something likeeidetic variation as we would say in phenomenology A completely dif-ferent kind of game is involved not a game the subject plays with hisown thought or thoughts but a game that thought performs on the sub-ject himself It is becoming through thought the person who is dyingor whose death is imminentrdquo Michel Foucault The Hermeneuticsof the Subject Lectures at the Coll egrave ge de France 983089983097983096983089ndash983089983097983096983090 transGraham Burchell (New York Palgrave Macmillan 98309000983093) pp 3983093983097ndash60In Husserl an eidetic variation results in an eidetic intuition WhatFoucault is implying here is that the phenomenological eidetic intu-ition does not transform the subject doing the variation and having theintuition In contrast the volitional intuition like meditation in thissense transforms the subject

34 In What is Philosophy Deleuze (and Guattari) compare the plane ofimmanence to an intuition (WP 40)



103

5 Phenomenology and

metaphysics and chaos on thefragility of the eventin Deleuze

983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154

Deleuze is frequently characterized as a critic of phenomenology YetDeleuzersquos thought cannot be understood unless we recognize its simi-larities to phenomenology There are in fact three similarities First phenomenology takes up what Deleuze in Difference and Repetition calls ldquothe task of modern philosophyrdquo that task is to reverse Platonism(DR 983093983097) Through the epocheacute phenomenology reduces any transcend-ent world or transcendent thing in itself to a phenomenon anything

transcendent comes to be located within experience Second throughthe preposition ldquowithinrdquo we see that the reversal of Platonismamounts to a reduction to immanence No greater debt to phenom-enology appears in Deleuzersquos thought than in his use of the wordldquoimmanencerdquo Immanence in both Deleuze and in phenomenologyrefers to a transcendental (but not transcendent) ground A third simi-larity appears in the fact that the grounding relation in both phenom-enology and in Deleuzersquos thought is paradoxical All transcendentalphilosophy results in a paradoxical relation the ground of experience

must remain within experience (the ground must not be separate fromthe grounded) and the ground must be at the same time different fromwhat it grounds (the ground must not resemble what it grounds) Inother words the ground must remain immanent and yet as imma-nent not result in a vicious circle It must be the case that what isbeing grounded is not presupposed in the ground

This chapter extends my ldquoThe End of Phenomenology Expressionism in Deleuzeand Merleau-Pontyrdquo in Leonard Lawlor Thinking through French Philosophy (Bloomington Indiana University Press 983090003) pp 9830960ndash9830974





983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154104





















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154106

983120983144983141983150983151983149983141983150983151983148983151983143983161 983137983150983140 983155983156983154983157983139983156983157983154983137983148983145983155983149





















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315410983096




















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154110


















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315411983090



983127983144983137983156 983145983155 983137983150 983141983158983141983150983156983103









983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154114



















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154116




983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150 983152983144983141983150983151983149983141983150983151983148983151983143983161 983137983150983140983149983141983156983137983152983144983161983155983145983139983155 983137983150983140 983139983144983137983151983155

















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315411983096




















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315419830900




983118983151983156983141983155







































983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315419830904





















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154104





















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154106

983120983144983141983150983151983149983141983150983151983148983151983143983161 983137983150983140 983155983156983154983157983139983156983157983154983137983148983145983155983149





















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315410983096




















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154110


















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315411983090



983127983144983137983156 983145983155 983137983150 983141983158983141983150983156983103









983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154114



















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154116




983107983151983150983139983148983157983155983145983151983150 983152983144983141983150983151983149983141983150983151983148983151983143983161 983137983150983140983149983141983156983137983152983144983161983155983145983139983155 983137983150983140 983139983144983137983151983155

















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315411983096




















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315419830900




983118983151983156983141983155







































983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315419830904































983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154106

983120983144983141983150983151983149983141983150983151983148983151983143983161 983137983150983140 983155983156983154983157983139983156983157983154983137983148983145983155983149





















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315410983096




















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 983116983137983159983148983151983154110


















983116983141983151983150983137983154983140 98311698313798315998314898315198315411983090



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Deleuze on Phenomenology (cambridge companion)

Documents

Transcript of Deleuze on Phenomenology (cambridge companion)