Definition of Religion- A Sociological Critique

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DOI: 10.1177/003776867302000403 1973; 20; 535 Social Compass

Karel Dobbelaere and Jan Lauwers Definition of Religion- A Sociological Critique

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535

Definition of Religion -A Sociological Critique (*)

Karel DOBBELAEREJan LAUWERS

Les auteurs indiquent, pour commencer, sur base dunecomparaison entre les travaux de Berger et Yinger, que lechoix entre une dfinition substantielle et une dfinition fonc-tionnelle de la religion nest pas une simple question de got :ce choix exerce une influence dcisive sur le rsultat de lana-lyse.

Ils enqutent ensuite sur la praticabilit des dfinitions fonc-tionelles et substantielles. Il en ressort que la

"

religion " nestpas une entit, mais une qualit qui est attribue certaineschoses et certaines fonctions par des catgories sociales oucatgories de positions. Une variation est vidente dans ceque certains appellent

"

religion " et dautres pas. Il endcoule que le sociologue doit porter son attention sur lecontexte structurel et situationnel du processus de dfinitionde la religion. Sans cela, il court le risque de reprendre son compte la dfinition dune catgorie de positions dans lasocit. Cela apparat avec force en ce qui concerne lemploides dfinitions substantielles ou fonctionnelles dans les tho-ries qui prennent parti implicitement ou explicitement au sujetde la scularisation.

Si le sociologue veut prendre distance de tout point de vueidologisant dans sa dfinition de la religion, il ne lui restequune seule alternative : il ne doit pas dfinir lui-mme lareligion, mais la laisser dfinir par les diffrentes positionssociales prsentes dans la socit. La dfinition de la religionnest pas un point daboutissement pour la recherche sociolo-gique, mais elle appartient lobjet tudier. Elle est unlment de la ralit sociale changeante que le sociologueveut considrer.

..

* Revision of a paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Society for theScientific Study of Religion, Chicago, October 21-23, 1971, by Karel M. DOBBELAERE,which was further elaborated with parts of an article published by Jan LAUWERS inPolitica : &dquo; Ideologische achtergronden van de sociologische secularisatietheorien&dquo; ,XXII (1972), 327~348.


536

Sociologists who study religion have always been confronted withthe difficult problem of defining their material object. Durkheim madeat least one attempt before publishing his study on the elementary formsof religious life, and in his book the first question he starts with is thedefinition of religious phenomena and of religion. Most introductory intextbooks in the sociology of religion start with a chapter on the definir-tion of religion. Weber, on the other hand, states : &dquo; to define religion,to say what it; is, ,is not possible at the start of a presentation such asthis. Definition can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of thestudy. The essence of religion is not even our concern, as we make itour task to study the conditions and effects of a particular type of socialbehavior. &dquo; However, the particular type of social behavior had to bespecified. This is what Weber implicitly did. &dquo; De facto, &dquo; as Berger,writes, &dquo; Weber follows the definition of the scope of religion current inthe Religionswissenschaft of this time. &dquo; 4

Explicitly or implicitly every sociologist of religion seems to have wor-.ked with a definition of religion. In this paper we will study the majortypes of definitions of religion used in the sociology of religion andtheir influence on sociological research.

1. Are definitions. of religion &dquo; de gustibus &dquo; ?If we study the kinds of definitions used in sociological textbooks, two

types are prevalent : substantive and functional ,definitions.:! Substantivedefinitions of religion say what religion is ; functional definitions of re-ligion say what religion does, i.e. what its consequences are for its struc.-tural context.

Berger offers a good example of a substantive definition : Religion,is the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established. &dquo; Thedifferentia in this definition is, of course, the category of the sacred,which, as he writes, was taken essentially in the sense understood bythe Religionswissenschaft since Ru~dolf Otto. &dquo; By sacred is meant herea quality of mysterious and awesome power, other than man and yetrelated to him, which is believed to reside in certain objects of experien-ce.

&dquo; 6 Sacred is antonym to profane, it is apprehended as &dquo; sticking out &dquo;from the normal routines of everyday life, and, on a deeper level is inopposition to another category: chaos. The sacred cosmos providesmans ultimate shield against chaos, the terror of anomy.7

1 E. DURKHEIM, " De la dfinition des phnomnes religieux", in LAnne Socio-logique, 1898, 1-28.

2 E. DURKHEIM, Les formes lmentaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, P.U.F., quatrimed., 1960, 31-66.3 M. WEBER, The Sociology of Religion, Boston, Beacon Press, 1963, 1.4 P.L. BERGER, The Sacred Canopy, Garden City, Doubleday, 1967, 176.3 E.g. P.L. BERGER, ibid.,; J.M. YINGER, Religion, Society and the Individual : An

Introduction to the Sociology of Religion, New York, Macmillan, 1957, 6. We eliminateas Yinger does valuative definitions as " inappropriate for the tasks of science ".

6 P.L. BERGER, ibid., 26 and 178. 7 Ibid., 26-28.


537

Yinger gives us a clear example of a functional definition &dquo; Religion,then can be defined as a system of beliefs and practices by means ofwhich a group of people struggles with... ultimate problems of humanlife. It is the refusal to

-capitulate to death, to give up in the face offrustration, to allow hostility to tear apart ones human associations. &dquo;8These ultimate problems are described by T. Parsons as frustrationoriginated by &dquo; uncontrollable events &dquo; (death, natural catastrophes, butalso unexpected and therefore &dquo; unearned &dquo; good fortune) and &dquo; unicertainty.

&dquo;

e ODea talks about &dquo; the three brute facts of contingency(the &dquo; uncertainty context &dquo; ) , powerlessness (the &dquo; impossibility context &dquo;,death, suffering, coi~-rcion ... ) and scarcity (and consequently, frustrationand depciva~ion) . &dquo; 1 .Not all definitions are either substantive or functional : some are a

combination of the two. Take e.g. Durkheims well-known ,definiton &dquo; A

religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacredthings, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and prac-tices which unite into one single moral community called a church, allthose who adhere to them. &dquo; 11 The substantive part of the definiton hasto do with the essence of religion &dquo; a unified system of beliefs and ~pracrtices relative to sacred things. &dquo; A functional element is added to thedefinition &dquo; which unite into a single moral community... all those whoadhere to them. &dquo; In other words, Durkheim says that the consequence,the function of religion, is integration, is a cohesive collectivity.The alternative to a substantive or a functional definition is discussed

by P. Berger in terms of its usefulness. He defends his choice of asubstantive definition and concludes : &dquo; It must be emphasized, though,that the choice of definitions need not imply differences in the inter-pretation of particular socio-historical developments. &dquo; To make his pointhe refers to Luckmann, who ,defines religion in terms of its social function,and with whom he not only agrees, but is indebted to for his inter-pretation of the processes of secularization .12 Bergers final conclusionis : &dquo; In the long run, I suppose, definitions are matters of taste andthus fall under the maxim de gustibus. &dquo; Is

This answer to the definitional dilemma does not satisfy us. It isbased on a comparison of work on secularization done by Berger andLuckmann,. But we must investigate if in his study of socio-historicaldevelopments, Luckmann does not work implicitely with a substantivedefinition of religion.Luckmann makes a difference between an elementary and non-spe-

cific social form or religion &dquo; and &dquo; a specific historical form of reli-

8 J.M. YINGER, op. cit.. 9. 9 T. PARSONS, " Motivation of Religious Belief and Behavior ", in J.M. YINGER,

op. cit., 381-382..10 Th.F, ODEA, The Sociology of Religion, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1966, 5.11 E. DURKHEIM, op. cit., 65 ; in English translation by J.W. SWAIN, The Elementary

Forms of the Religious Life, New York, Free Press, 1965, 62.12 Ibid., 178 and 208.13 Ibid., 178.


538

gion. ! +4 The sociological theory of religion is only interested in spe-cific forms of religion in -society.l5 In the past, these specific forms hademerged out. of elementary and nonspecific forms, the so called &dquo; worldviews &dquo; which were religious because of their social function : the trans-cendence of biological nature.16 Typical for a -specific historical form ofreligion was that it was a distinct layer in the world view consistingof symbols which represented the inner hierarchy of significance under-lying the world view, and which referred explicitly to a distinct levelof reality &horbar; a level in which ultimate significance was located - thesacred COSMOS.17 Later it developed into a still more specific social form,a

&dquo;

religious institution &dquo;, with things such as religious dogmas and anecclesiastic organization.18 Studying the past socio-historical developmentshe defines the sacred cosmos essentially in the same terms as Bergerdoes.i9 As a result, during this study his functional definitions becomesa substantive one and his conclusions are the same or similar to thoseof Berger.

In order to judge the results of a sociological analysis done with asubstantive or a functional definition we will compare some of Bergerswork on secularization with Yimgers study on &dquo; Religion and SocialChange, &dquo; 2 because Yinger, in contrast to Luckmann, sticks to a func-tional ~definition.21

Yinger, if we read him correctly, suggests that Berger, in his bookThe Noise of Solemn Assemblies, talks about secularization with a doublemeaning. On one hand the redefinition of religion, &dquo; the in,evitable and,justment of the church (beliefs and practices) to dramatic changes inthe world within which it works &dquo; - what Yinger prefers to call &dquo; re-ligious change &dquo; - and, on the other hand, meaning &dquo; many fields oflifes decisions carried out without reference to religion &dquo; - what Yingercalls &dquo; the usual dictionary meaning of secularization. 22 Due to this ~ambiguity in the use of the term, Berger, according to Yinger, mustconclude that there is secularization and no-secularization in the U.S.A.Secularization is occurring through the development of a &dquo; cultural reli-gion &dquo; - an &dquo; American way of life &dquo; with religious overtones.23 How-ever, Berger ascertains that on the other hand, one finds within theU.S.A. &dquo; a strong mutual involvement of our religious beliefs with ourpolitical processes and institutions &dquo;, which he calls symbolic integration -

14 Th, LUCKMANN, The Invisible Religion, New York, Macmillan, 1967, 50-61.15 Ibid., 56.16 Ibid., 48-53.17 Ibid., 58-61.18 Ibid., 62-68.19 Ibid., 58 ; P. BERGER refers explicitly to it : " Luckmann treats (the sacred cosmos)

as virtually interchangeable with his conception of the religious ", op. cit., 178.20 J.M. YINGER, Sociology Looks at Religion, New York, Macmillan, 1966, 67-74.21 Ibid., 68 : " I will not ask whether or not the changes really represent religious

developments, for the asking of such a question usually implies a substantive definitionof religion that is too narrow for our purpose ".

22 Ibid., 69-72.28 P. BERGER, The Noise of Solemn Assemblies, Garden City, Doubleday, 1961,

esp. 39-50.


539

a political, social and psychological religion,24 and which is a counterin-dication of secularization. 25

It seems to us that Berger attempts to indicate, in the churches of theU.S.A., a process of desacralization - a process of

&dquo;

religious change &dquo;in Yingers terms - and that as a result of this process the churchesare all still maintaining their central symbolic position. He makes thispoint very clearly in another book in which he compares Europe and theU.S.A.

-&dquo; At least as far as Europe concerned, it is possible to say with so-me confidence, ..., that church-related religiosity is strongest (and thus,at any rate, socio-cultural secularization least) on the margins of modernindustrial society, both in terms of marginal classes (such as the rem-nants of old petty bourgeoisie) and marginal individuals (such as thos8eliminated from the work process). The situation is different in America,where the churches still occupy a more central symbolic position, butit may be argued that they have succeeded in keeping this position onlyby becoming highly secularized themselves, so that the European andthe American cases represent two variations on the same underlyingtheme of global secularization. &dquo; 26 Bergers use of the term &dquo; seculariza..tion &dquo; as &dquo; desacralization &dquo; is a consequence of his definition of reli-gion. In the churches of the LT.S.A. he observes the development of areligion, &dquo; a religious affirmation of the same values held by the com-munity at large &dquo; : 27 secular values (&dquo; an intense this-worldliness, &dquo; &dquo; suc-cess competitively achieved, &dquo; &dquo; a-ctivism, &dquo; &dquo; social adjustment, &dquo; etc.)replace sacred values.28 This is desacralization, or the secularization ofreligion.

Yinger could never affirm this because of his functional definition ofreligion. There is no secularization in the U.S.A., in his opinion : &dquo; Ifone defines religion statically - in terms of a system of beliefs andpractices that emerged at a given time and were subject thereafter tono essential revision - religious change is nearly identical with secu-larization. It represents the falling away from the great tradition. Ifone thinks of religion, however, as an ongoing search, subject to changedforms and revised myths, then lack of orthodoxy does not mean weakeningof religion. It can be a sign of strength. In short, the increase in re-ligious activity and interest in the very context of supposed &dquo; seculari,zation &dquo; is paradoxical only to the sectarian, not to the analyst. It is anindication of an expected churchlike response to dramatic changes inthe conditions of life among the middle and upper classes in a pros-perous society. &dquo; 29 In other words, Yinger cannot describe the situationas a process of secularization since &dquo; churchlike &dquo; religion still integratessociety, thus is functional for society.

24 P. BERGER, op. cit., 51-104.25 J.M. YINGER, op. cit., 71.26 P. BERGER, The Sacred Canopy, 108.27 P. BERGER, The Noise of Solemn Assemblies, 41.28 Ibid., 42-49.29 J.M. YINGER, op. cit., 73.


540

The above analysis proves to us that the definition of religion cannotbe a matter of taste and thus cannot fall under the maxim de gustibus.In some cases the definition of religion one works with can have a fun-damental influence on the outcome of the analysis.

1

2. Substantive and functional definitions : some problemsThe above cited definitions are all very clear and they seem easy to

apply, but some important problems are still unsolved.

A. The social context and the religious community .

If we use the functional type of definition, how are we going to study&dquo; functional ~alternatives &dquo; ? Is there place ~for &dquo; functional alternatives &dquo;,when every possible &dquo; alternative &dquo; must, by definition also be consi-dered as a religion ? Yinger solves this problem by defining religion as

&dquo;

a certain kind of effort &dquo; to perform various functions.30 In other words,he introduces an element other than functions into his definitions : notevery effort to perform various functions but a certain kind of effort.Consequently, there remains a further question to be solved : who isgoing to specify that certain kind of effort ?As we see it, one answer seems to be given to that question by Yingers

arguments on another problem concerning his functional definition : &dquo; Ifit can be shown that a given system of beliefs and practices that isgenerally thought to be religion is not performing the functions bywhich religion has been defined, then one declares that such a systemis not &dquo; really &dquo; religion at all. This error can be avoided by indicatingthat religion is an effort to perform certain functions for man. &dquo; 31 Itseems that here Yinger is specifying that &dquo; certain kind of effort &dquo; asbeing that which is &dquo; gen.erally thought to be religion &dquo; by society.

In fact, Yinger is not talking exclusively about functions. Implicitly,he adds descriptive elements to his functional definition in order to beable to study &dquo; functional alternatives &dquo; or what &dquo; is generally thoughtbe religion &dquo; in the community under study - even if this so-calledreligion is not performing the functions by which religion has beendefined.

Similar problems come up when using a substantive definition. Asnoted above in connection with Bergers definition, the sacred &dquo; is be-lieved to reside in certain objects of experience. &dquo; &dquo; This quality, &dquo; Bergerspecifies, &dquo; may be attributed to natural or artificial objects, to animals,or to men, or to the objectivations of human culture. &dquo; 32 Thus, the30 Ibid., 8.31 Ibid.32 P. BERGER, op. cit., 26. He talks in a concrete way of chieftains, customs, in-

stitutions, space, time, sacred beings, forces or principles. E. DURKHEIM points outthe same: " anything can be sacred... The circle of the sacred objects cannot bedetermined, then, once for all ", op. cit., 52.


541

distinguishing traits of religion lie not in the &dquo; entities &dquo; themselves but&dquo; in an attitude extended toward certain ideas, objects and acts, &dquo; 33and this attitude is extended to them because, society attributed sacredqualities to them. As in the functional definition, one has to introduce,a specifying factor, namely the society which is being studied; into thesubstantive definition, in order to make this definition operational.

Does this mean that we are going back to one of Durkheims definitionalelements, namely, the &dquo; one single moral community &dquo; ? ? Only partly.The problem with Durkheims definition is that he does not differentiatebetween &dquo; society &dquo; and the . religious community. &dquo; It is probable thatin primitive societies both tended to overlap each other but, analytically,it should have been possible to distinguish between religious community -the &dquo; church &dquo; he was referring to - and society. This analytical dins-tinction could have prevented him from circulatory reasoning - socialcohesion - as he is charged with by Demerath and Hammond.34 Andas result, he might then possibly have come up with the followingquestion : under what conditions is societal cohesion a consequence ofthe moral cohesion of the religious community ? 15 Of course this ana-lytical stand is also needed in modern societies, but is easier to accom-plish as we have, for the most part, several different religious commu-nities within societies - churches, denominations, sects and cults -even transgressing the national bounderies. Taking this into account wewould certainly extend E. Nottinghams interpretation of the world&dquo;

church &dquo; in Durkheims definition - &dquo; the moral unity of any groupof worshippers, whether composed of an entire tribe of people or amore limited group &dquo; 86 - by adding &dquo; or a larger group. &dquo;The need for a specification of &dquo; the religious community &dquo; and the

&dquo; societal context &dquo; in Durkheims definition is shown very clearly bythe use Schneider makes of it. &dquo; Whatever its merits or shortcomings,this is plausibly a sociologists definition. Durkheim was interested in&dquo;

integration, &dquo; the integration of men in society, as indicated by his

concern with the operation of religion as uniting men into &dquo; a singlemoral community &dquo; - and integration is one of the great historic con-cerns of the discipline of sociology. &dquo; 37 This evaluation is a good example

33 E. NORBECK, Religion in Primitive Society, New York, Harper, 1961, 10-11. Seealso E.K. NOTTINGHAM, Religion and Society, New York, Random House, 1954, 4-5,and E. DURKHEIM, op. cit., 364.

34 " At points Durkheim argued that religion is produced by social cohesion; atother points he argued that social cohesion is a product of religion; and at still otherpoints he had it both ways ". In our opinion this is not only due to his methodologicalstand, to wit, that one social fact can only be explained causally and functionally by other social facts (E. DURKHEIM, Les rgles de la mthode sociologique, Paris, P.U.F.,1956, 13th ed., 109), as is suggested by N.J. DEMERATH III and Ph. E. HAMMOND(Religion in Social Context, Tradition and Transition, New York, Random House, 1969,28-29), but especially to the fact that he does not make the distinction between" religious community " and " society ".35 The remarks of R.K. MERTON about religion and the postulate of the Functional

Unity of Society are also very pertinent here: R.K. MERTON, Social Theory andSocial Structure, Glencoe, Free Press, 1957, Revised and enlarged ed., 25-30.

36 E.K. NOTTINGHAM, op. cit., 6. 37 L. SCHNEIDER, Sociological Approach to Religion, New York, John Wiley, 1970, 11.


542

of the result of reading Durkheims definition equating &dquo; one singlemoral community called a

&dquo;

church &dquo; with society. With this point ofview he is following Durkheim himself. As a result of Durkheims de...finition and his omission of making a distinction between society andthe religious community, it is not surprising that, at the end of his study,Durkheim ascertains that religion is integrative, unifying the societieshe was studying.38 Yinger comes directly to the point in stating, &dquo; Ifreligion is defined tby what are thought to be its functions then oneshould not be surprised to find it functional, &dquo; 39 even for society sinceDurkheim does not differentiate between society and religion. It is ob-vious that Durkheims definition and the use made of it carries with itthe possibility of -contamination ; 40 Demerath and Hammond speak ofthe fallacy of tautology lurking in Durkheims definition.41We can conclude the following : a functional definition and a functional

analysis is possible only if one specifies descriptively the &dquo; item &dquo; towhich one is attributing functions. Yinger spoke about &dquo; a certain kindof effort, &dquo; effort which society

&dquo;

generally thought to be religion, &dquo;i.e., that which society calls religion. The analysis of Durkheims defini-tion allows us to specify the &dquo; item &dquo; more sociologically as the &dquo; religiouscommunity &dquo; . churches, denominations, sects, cults, etc ... But in orderto be able to talk about functions we do not only have to specify theitem, the religious structure to be studied, we also must specify thesocio-structural context for which it is functional and/or dysfunctional. 42These aspects were also stressed in the above analysis of Durkheimsdefinition and the problems raised in applying it. A substantive definitionalso needs a specification of the socio-structural context, as was alreadybriefly indicated above.

B. The sacred H in a socio-structural context

A substantive definition of religion searches for the essence of religionand defines it as &dquo; sacred. &dquo; A universal approach to the religious phe-nomenon - which is typical of the Relgionswissenschaft sociologistsusing a substantive definition follow - only allows a specification ofthis concept in formal terms : e.g.

&dquo;

sticking out, &dquo; &dquo; opposed to chaos, &dquo;a &dquo; mysterious and awesome power &dquo;, &dquo; set apart and forbidden &dquo; ...This approach is culturally loaded as no reference is made to the socio-structural context. On the contrary, these sociologists try to exceed thesocio-structural context, and search for a general evolutionary scheme.

38 For similar remarks see P. BERGER, op. cit., 176 ; N.J. DEMERATH III and Ph. E.HAMMOND, op. cit., 28-29.

39 J.M. YINGER, op. cit., 8.40 E.V.W. VERCRUIJSSE, Het ontwerpen van een sociologisch onderzoek, Assen,

Van Gorcum, 1960, 171-173: The above described situation is very similar to whatLazarsfeld calls the " drift of indicators ", more specifically the case of " expressiveindicators " replaced by " predictive indicators ". As a result of this what should beempirically verified is already logically predefined.

41 N.J. DEMERATH III and Ph. E. HAMMOND, op. cit., 29.42 R.K. MERTON, op. cit., 50-54, esp. (1) and (4) of the " paradigm ".


543

Researchers such as Berger, Luckmann and others like Bellah are studyingcultural or religious evolution.43 In fact their work is too global to besociological. 4.4 Concrete sociological research is only possible if one dropsthis global approach and studies what is called &dquo; sacred &dquo; in a concretesocio.-structural context.

In the context of our Western society the term &dquo; sacred &dquo; is used tostimulate in people attitudes of awe, veneration, and respect. Examplesof this are shown near Verdun (France), &dquo; la voie sacree &dquo; (the sacredroad) and the &dquo; lieu sacre die Douaumont &dquo; (the sacred place of Douau-mont). &dquo; Psychological states hardly if at all distinguishable from certainof the emotional reactions we commonly call religious are evoked bya variety of things never conventionally described as religious. Theunfurling of a flag, the playing of stirring music such as a nationalanthem, ... appear to invoke subjective emotional states describable interms indistinguishable ifrom those which depict psychological and phy-siological states often associated with religion. What, then, can we safelyand profitably use to distinguish the religious. from the nonreligious ?The least constricting terms our vocabulary provides to enable us toset off the realm of religion from the rest of culture are the naturaland the super-natural. &dquo; 4-1The Marxian sociologists of religion also point to the need of diff e-

rentiating between religion and &dquo; weltlich begrundete ethische Systeme &dquo;(&dquo; &dquo; secular &dquo; ethical systems) : &dquo; Atheismus &dquo; (atheism) ; &dquo; Wissenschaf t &dquo;(science), &dquo; Marximus &dquo; ( lVIarxism ) , &dquo; Humanismus &dquo; ( humanism ) ,

&dquo; Faschismus &dquo; ( f ascism ) , etc.46 In another paper we have shown thatthey limit religion to beliefs and rituals related to &dquo; something &dquo; super-and extra-natural. 47 The same is pointed out by E. Pin, who underscoresthe need of taking into account the societal context of religionWe are aware of the fact that Durkeim did not want to differentiate

between the natural and the supernatural in order to define religion.He states &dquo; the idea of the supernatural, as we understand it,dates only from to.-day ; in fact, it presupposes the contrary idea, ofwhich it is the negation, but this idea is not all primitive. In order tosay that certain things are supernatural, it is necessary to have the sen-timent that a natural order of things exists ... But this idea ... is of recent

43 R.N. BELLAH, "

Religious Evolution ", in: American Sociological Review, 29(1964), 358-374.

44 See for additional arguments R. CREYF, "

A Sociological Reflection on Methodo-logical Problems in the Empirical Study of Secularization ", in : Religion and Religiosity,Atheism and Non-belief in Industrial and Uurban Society, Lille, International Con-ference for the Sociology of Religion, Acts of the 11th Conference, 1971, 405-418.45 E. NORBECK, op. cit., 11.46 J. KLUEGL,

"

Zur Kritik der strukturell-functionalistischen Religionssoziologie ",in : Religionssoziologie, 1966, 2, 51-55.

47 K. DOBBELAERE and J. LAUWERS, "

Involvement in Church Religion. A Socio-logical Critique ", in : Actes de la Xe Confrence Internationale : Types, Dimensionsand Measures of Religiosity, Rome, Confrence Internationale de Sociologie Religieuse,1969, 120-121.

48 E. PIN, "

Contexte culturel et dfinition de la religion", in : Actes de la XBConfrence Internationale, op. cit., 417-418.


544

origin. -&dquo; 49 However, Durkheim didnt take into account the socio~struc~tural context and tried to define religion as a universal. phenomenon.But &dquo; Is Religion Universal &dquo; ? -10 We tend to agree with W. Cohn itis not: &dquo; attempts to do so are based on a switching of meaning of religion for non-western societies. &dquo; 51 A f urther argument is that wecannot impose a concept with a definite cultural meaning upon othercultures. 52

In fact sociologists of religion usually study what is called religion intheir own cultures and then analyze its functions to see which beliefsand ritual systems in other cultures perform the same or similar functions.In order to include these belief and ritual systems in their definition,they come. to a broad definition that no longer includes the &dquo; necessaryand exclusive content &dquo; of their own culturally bound notion of religion,which in a Western context is the &dquo; idea of supernatural. &dquo; 53 Sociologistsdo this not only ,cross..culturally, vis-a-vis non-Western societies, theyalso do it vis-a-vis non-religious and anti~religious expressions in theirown cultural context, e.g. atheism. They attribute &dquo; religious &dquo; qualitiesto atheism on the basis of an explicit or implicit functionalist definitionof religion

According to Norbeck, Kliigl, Pin, et al. the substantive definitionof religion then becomes in our Western societies of to..day : &dquo; A systemof beliefs and rituals relative to supernatural things which unite into amoral collectivity those who adhere to them. &dquo; Functional alternativesof religion would then by systems of beliefs and rituals relative to na-tural things, e.g~. the material world, which unite into a moral collectivitythose who adhere to them e.g. Humanism, Communism, Nationalism,etc.55

C. Discussion

,

The need to specify the socio-cultural context was to a certain extentachieved in the preceding section. There the societal context was re-duced to the West and as a consequence the sacred became restrictedto the supernatural. However, when studying Western societies it isobvious that the definition of religion is not as clear as the substantivedefinition just arrived at seems to suggest. First of all, we can pointto so called religions without supernatural referent, and secondly, tocommunities with a supernatural referent whose religious qualities areexplicitly or implicitly questioned. Let us give a few examples.

49 E. DURKHEIM, op. cit., 41.50 W. COHN, " Is Religion Universal ? Problems of Definition ", in : Journal for

the Scientific Study of Religion, II (1962), 1, 25-33.51 Ibid., 29.52 Iibid., 30-31.53 Ibid., 33.54 E. PIN, op. cit., 416-417.55 Ch. Y. GLOCK and R. STARK, Religion and Society in Tension, Chicago, Rand

Mc Nally, 1965, 11.


545

Let us first all consider the death-of-God or radical theology.56 Itrejects the supernatural referent: &dquo; there once was a God to whomadoration, praise and trust were appropriate, possible, and even necessary,but ... now there is no such God ... It is an atheist position. &dquo; 57 But&dquo; Both men (Altizer and van Buren), ...,

546

point to communities with a belief system, which have a supernaturalreferent, but which are not accepted or only partly accepted as &dquo; religious &dquo;in that society. Take e.g~. ~the Black Muslims in the LT:S.A. Several rea-sons could be given for this particular situation, -, the most .importantbeing that their belief system is made up of mostly alien religious andcultural elements and as such is considered to be dysfunctional for theAmerican society. Nevertheless they consider themselves a religiousgroup, even though many white Americans dont, Consequently, con-flicts over the acceptance of a community as a

&dquo;

religious &dquo; collectivitycan emerge.The above cases indicate that different social categories in a society

can take different stands towards the acceptance of a &dquo;religious &dquo; com..munity or category, depending upon the situational context. This de.-W onstrates that every Western society probably has groups of which theephithet &dquo; religious &dquo; is debatable. A study of these groups, their beliefssystem and rituals, and of the conflicts with their socio..structural con-text, is a good means of establishing how society, and especially dif-ferent categories in society, define religion. If the epithet &dquo; religious &dquo; ischanging, such conflicts must enable us to study it sociologically. To doso, we have to take the socio-structural context seriously.

If we restrict the socio-structural context to society in general andits cultural context (cf. supra A and B) then we work with the majoritysdefinition of religion and do not consider the empirical diversity. Religionis not an entity,16 but a quality given to certain things and functions bycategories o f positions.The sacred - the differentia in the substantive definition - is defined

by some as supernatural, by other as not. This depends upon their po-sition, their situational context and historical facts. Sociologists shoul~d,not look for the essence of religion ; this is a philosophical question.For them the essential aspect of religion is that it is differently definedby different categories of actors according to their position and theirsituational context. These definitions are also a result of historical pro-cesses.

.

_

. Functional definitions are likewise dependent upon the situational andhistorical context of categories of positions. For example, some considersects as functional units in a society. 67 and thus religious ; others considerthem dysfunctional - a drag on social change - and anti-religious,because anti-prophetic. If one defines religion by its legitimating orcomforting function, i.e. its &dquo; integrating&dquo;, function, how can one callchallenging or prophetic groups &dquo; religious &dquo; ? ? However, not only canwe point to the fact that both functions have been part of the churchesrole in society,611 - but also that so-called &dquo; religious &dquo; groups have opted

66 L. SHINER, "

The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research ", in Journalfor the Scientific Study of Religion, 1967, 2, 218.

87 P.L. BERGER, The Noise of Solemn Assemblies, 83-84.68 Ch. Y. GLOCK, B.B. RINGER and E.R. BARBIE, To Comfort and to Challenge:

A Dilemma of the Contemporary Church, Berkeley, University of California Press,1967, 203.


547

explicitly for the challenging function.119 This dilemma of the &dquo; religious &dquo;functions should prevent sociologists from taking a partisan stand.The ideological aspect of functional and substantive definitions can

clearly be pointed out by their use in secularization theories, whichwe will study in the next paragraph.

3. Functional and substantial definitions in secularization theories

. Social change cannot be imagined without various social positionsprogramming, realizing, impeding, legitimating, or repudiating this change.This also holds true for the religious change wich secularization theoriesattempt .to explain. Each one of these positions has its own terminologyfrom which the necessity or the undesirability of certain changes; thedefinition of &dquo; religion &dquo; is one element of these ideological terminologies.

In connection with the religious changes in modern western society,some positions have applied -the secularization scheme as a legitimatingterminology. They have interpreted these changes in terms of &dquo; eman-cipation &dquo; : emancipation of society from religion, emancipation of religionfrom society, emancipation of the religious individual from the churches.These various forms of emancipation are condensed into the secularizationscheme. Within this scheme and also among the positions applying it,many variations can be observed. For our argument however, it is suf-ficient to notice that with respect to religious changes, a secularizationscheme and an anti-secularization scheme are being used and that thepositions involved in these changes can be divided into a group of

&dquo;

se-

cularizers &dquo; and of &dquo; anti-secularizers. &dquo; The functional and substantialdefinitions of religion, then, appearing in the secularization theories,usually fit into the terminology of the &dquo; secularizers. &dquo;

There are various reasons why the ideology of the &dquo; secularizers &dquo; isapparent in the functional definition. First, &dquo; religiow &dquo; is -defined as aform which may receive all possible contents, and hence may also bedissociated from all possible contents. All values, all norms, all behaviorand all organizations can have an integrating function in certain cir-cumstances That which is integrating, that which gives meaningand which does not, is dependent upon the point of view takenor upon the situation. This implies that everything can be religion,bust also that everything can cease to be religion. This is alsothe &dquo; secularizers &dquo; starting point, for they have legitimatized the sepa-ration of Church from the State precisely by means of the thesis thatthe essence of religion and its actual &dquo; stuffing &dquo; are two separate things.According to them the actual historical content is at least a narrowingif not an usurping distortion of the essence of religion. It is through thisdistinction between the essential form or the function of religion andits actual content that the critical study of religion has become possible.It is also on the basis of this idea - namely that everything can be

69 The collective statement on " apartheid " of the South African Council of Churchesin August 1972.


548

an expression of religion and that .no actual organization has the rightto claim a monopoly on this - that the elimination of religious orga-nizations. from social life can be legitimated.A second reason why the ideology of the &dquo; secularizers &dquo; can be iden-

tified in the functional definition of religion, is that, by this ~definition,&dquo;

religion &dquo; is labeled as a necessity. If religion is defined as having ainintegrating function, it is also an essential part of any integrated society.A society without religion then would result in -anomy and social chaos.This need for religion also belongs to the ideology of the &dquo; secularizers &dquo; . :in this way they are able to show that emancipation is not directedagainst relilgion, that they want to hold to a religious order or a Christiancivilization, that even without ecclesiastical power religion is deeply rootedin social life. It is the ideology of the &dquo; secularizers &dquo; to criticize theChurch in order to save religion. Even &dquo; secularizers &dquo; within the chur-ches (as for example Gogarten) try to save religion by dissociatingit from the actual structures which are in danger of becoming marginal.At any rate, both categories of

&dquo;

secularizers &dquo; have associated the needfor religion with the randomness of its actual appearance. By adoptingthis idea of necessity in a functional definition the sociologist of religionmay overlook the legitimating effect of this idea.

There is also a third reason why the functional definition is relatedto the ideology of the &dquo; secularizers. &dquo; As experts, they define religionwithout taking into account the fact that in social reality the samething is not always called &dquo; religion. &dquo; One may regard the churchesas irreligious when they do not function integratively (as W. Herbergand Th. Luckmann have a tendency to do), and ideologies such asMarxism or the &dquo; American Democracy &dquo; may be considered religiousas long as they perform an integrating function. In both cases it is nottaken into account that in reality the churches are considered a religionby society while Marxism is not. Thus it is assumed that the boundariesof religion are not traced in social reality, but that it is possible to lookfor the &dquo; true &dquo; boundaries of religion beyond this social reality.

It is assumed that defining religion is a matter of expertise and notof social evaluation. In this way, one associates with the rational andtechnocratic way of thinking of the &dquo; secularizers, &dquo; since an import-antargument in their legitimating system is that religion is not soundlydefined by the church authorities nor by any other social body, butonly by the expertise of &dquo; enlightened minds.&dquo; The -application of afunctional definition is based on the assumption that such an &dquo;enligh-tened &dquo; view is possible.

All in all there is sufficient evidence to believe that the -functionaldefinition uncritically adopts the ideological way of thinking of the&dquo;

secularizers. &dquo; Hence this kind of definition must rather lead to anideological theory instead of to a relativizing sociological theory.The substantial definition also usually associates itself with the ideo...

logical terminology of &dquo; secularist &dquo; thinking. First there are the termsthemselves (sacred and secular), which give the impression that thereare two provinces or two realities, viz. that of religion and that of non-religion. Thus it is taken for granted that religion is something apart,


549

that religion and the world are separated. It is this idea of separationwhich &dquo; secularist &dquo; thinking freely avails itself of in order to imposethis separation in social reality as well.

Secondly, the substantial definition is also used -to separate the essenceof religion from what is accidental. But determining the essence isprecisely an evaluation ; it is the construction of a pattern of prioritieswith which one can legitimate ones attitude towards reality and change.This has been the most important legitimating moment in the realizationof secularization as an ideological pattern : certain religious., structuresare attacked with the argument that they are not &dquo; tru~ly &dquo; religious,that they do not belong the essence of religion but rather are an acci-,dental narrowing or distortion of it. Inversely, opposition to this move-ment is justified by stating that the essence of religion is violated.Thus the distinction between &dquo; essence &dquo; and &dquo; accidence &dquo; of religionis the central debating issue around which conflicts and changes havetaken place. These terms are the legitimating slogans in the emancipationstruggle. When a sociologist has the intention of determining the essenceof religion himself, he must inevitably take a stand with respect to thisstruggle.

Thirdly, the same remark can be made as above, namely that as adefining sociologist one considers oneself to be one of the &dquo; enlightenedminds, &dquo; trying to obscure the ideological character of ones definitionof religion by attributing ~a scientific character to it.

4. ConclusionAs we pointed out previously, definitions of religion are not de

gustibus, &dquo; they have a fundamental impact on the outcome of the study( 1 ) . What is more, an analysis of their general applicability hasrevealed an ideological bias. The essential aspect of religion, the basisof the substantive definition, is defined differently by different categoriesof individuals according to their position and the historical and situationalcontext. Likewise, the functions given to religion vary according to thesituational and historical context of categories of positions. If sociologistsopt for one essential aspect or one function, they take a stand for onecategory of positions ( 2 ) . This was also clearly revealed in the ana-lysis of the ways in which types of definitions are used, in the secu-larizations theories ( 3 ) .When the sociologist defining religion wants to keep aloof from every

ideological standpoints, only one alternative is possible : to avoid definingreligion himself but have it defined by the social positions in society.Then, the definition of religion is not a starting-point for sociologicalresearch but it is part of the object to be examined. It is itself an ele-ment of the changing social reality which is being investigated. There-fore, one must not look for one single definition which is valid for allsituations and all positions within these situations - a definition withwhich the degree of religiosity of all social reality and all social behaviorcould be measured. On the contrary, one must examine how different


550

positions -in different situations always use different &dquo;

measures, &dquo;

anddifferent &dquo; definitions &dquo;of religion, in order to justify calling their ownand others behavior &dquo; religious &dquo;. or &dquo; irreligious. &dquo; One must examinehow these positions, using the different .&dquo; measures &dquo; are related toeach other ; what ,power each has ; what their prestige is; to what extentmutual communication is possible and realized about their &dquo; definitionsof religion &dquo; ; ; how they affect each other how their &dquo; definitions ofreligion &dquo; are constructed into hard social facts and in turn are confirmedor altered by these constructions. Only when the sociologist allows the&dquo; definitions of religion &dquo; and the positions supporting them to be partof the social reality to be studied, is he able to spot the diversity andthe complex process-like character of these definitions. Only then is heable to discern critically the idealogical a prioris with which the posi--tions themselves approach &dquo; their &dquo; own social reality, and to relate themto their respective social contexts. In order to .avoid an ideological socialstandpoint himself, the sociologist must make this &dquo; Copernican &dquo; reversal :not to start from a definition of religion, but to move towards existingdefinitions of religion ; not to construct or apply any measure oneself,but to determine how the measures which are being used socially aremeasured against each other and against the social reality which theyintend to measure (and which is an indurated measure itself).Even with this reversal the problem of defining religion is not yet

entirely solved. To the sociologist (in this case, the sociologist of reli-gion), a definition of religion is not only the naming of and the measureof a part of social reality, but it is also the delimitation of a part : thedefinition of religion allows him to delimit his area of investigation. Theproblem then remains as to how the sociologist of religion may be ableto delimit this area without resuming an ideological standpoint andwithout abandoning the possibility of approaching and relativizing thedefinitions of religion, which are being used socially, as objects of inves-tigation and thus preventing them from becoming unquestionable startingpoints again ? , I

This problem of delimitation is wrongly regarded as a purely scien-tific problem. Delimination is, as much as defining and measuring, asocial fact - the construction of a social standpoint. The sociologistof religion deals with an area which is fixed by his own socially shapedinterest or situation ; by the. division of labor within his universityor department ; by whatever other &dquo; sociologists of religion &dquo; are doingor are not

~doing ; by whatever is submitted to him (possibly by hissponsor) as a problem. Thus, to the sociologist, the delimination of hisarea of investigation is a matter of social involvement with a problem,indirect though it may be and whatever may have led to it. In thisway it may be stated that the sociologist of religion does not need adefinition of religion in order to delimit his area, since social realitycould only legitimate this social fact.

However, when this idea is directed towards actual research, it alsomeans that the sociologist always starts from a social definition ofthe problem : either from his social definition of the problem or from


551

the social definition of his sponsor or the ones who have posited theproblem in general, or from both. Even if the problem is stated exclu-sively by sociologists it is formulated from and within the social posi-tion of these sociologists. Just as the sociologist of religion starts froma social involvement with the problem, he also starts from a social de-finition of the problem. Does this lead to the conclusion that he cannotavoid an ideological social standpoint ? If he commits himself to theproblem and its social -definition as the starting point of his sociologicaldefinition, then it is true indeed. But it is not true if he considers thisinvolvement and this social definition as a first object to be studied, asa first fact to be located socially. Indeed, every sociological investigationbegins with social definitions concerning a stated &dquo; problem, &dquo; the po-sition of the sociologist, the position of the sponsor and the other positionswith regard to the problem. The first thing a sociologist has to do, then,is to turn all of the social definitions into object of research, to try tolocate them socially, to compare them mutually. It may be of help thatfrom the start various social definitions and formulations of the problemare implicated, concerning both his task and the object of his investi-gation.7o

In conclusion we may say that the sociologist of religion cannot avoidstarting from ideological social definitions of religion, but instead ofleaving these definitions unquestioned, in his research he must try todetermine the social context of these definitions, and show how thesedefinitions are supported and realized in society by concrete social po-sitions. -

70 Methodological problems of such an approach are discussed by R. CREYF, op. cit.


Definition of Religion- A Sociological Critique

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