Defining Imagination Sartre Between Husserl and Janet

8/13/2019 Defining Imagination Sartre Between Husserl and Janet

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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2005)4:133153 C Springer 2005

Defining imagination: Sartre between Husserl and Janet1

BEATA STAWARSKADepartment of Philosophy, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, U.S.A.

(E-mail: [email protected])

Abstract.The essay traces the double, phenomenological and psychological, background of

Sartres theory of the imagination. Insofar as these two phenomenological and psychological

currents are equally influential for Sartres theory of the imagination, his intellectual project

is situated in an inter-disciplinary research area which combines the descriptive analyses ofEdmund Husserl with the clinical reports and psychological theories of Pierre Janet. While

Husserl provides the foundation for the prevailing theory of imagination as pictorial represen-

tation, Janets findings on obsessive behavior enrich an alternative current in Sartres thinking

about imagination as spontaneous and self-determined creativity.

Key words:Husserl, imagination, Janet, phenomenological psychology, Sartre

The objective of this essay is to trace the double, phenomenological and

psychological, background of Sartres theory of the imagination, presented

in his treatise Limaginaire and announced in a preceding critical study

Limagination (see Sartre 1972, 1983, 1986). I intend to demonstrate that

these two phenomenological and psychological currents are equally influen-

tial for Sartres own theory of the imagination, and so that his intellectualproject is situated in an inter-disciplinary research area which combines the

descriptive analyses of Edmund Husserl with the clinical reports and psy-

chological theories of Pierre Janet. The interest of this essay lies then not

simply in documenting the undeniable indebtedness of Sartre to other schol-

ars no philosopher works in an intellectual vacuum but more importantly

in demonstrating that some of the key texts produced in the post-Husserlian

phenomenology result from a deliberate crossing of the disciplines, with en-

lightenment and inspiration for phenomenological reflection being found di-

rectly in the research results of the applied sciences. I will address Husserls

and Janets influence on Sartres theory of the imagination respectively.

InLimaginaire Sartre develops a rigorous project of formulating a uniform

theory of the imagination. This uniform theory hangs on the claim that a rangeof apparently disparate objects such as portraits (e.g. the portrait of Charles

VIII in the Offices of Florence), caricatures, actors imitations (Franconay imi-

tating Maurice Chevalier), schematic drawings and hypnagogic images belong

to one family and can therefore be subsumed under the heading of the image

family (la famille de limage) (Sartre 1986, pp. 40112; 1983, pp. 1762).

The term picturefamily might better capture the defining characteristic of

imagination theorized by Sartre though, since the author states that images

function aspictorial representations of absent, and possibly even non-existent,


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134 BEATA STAWARSKA

entities. It is the function of depictingsomething or someone, shared by por-

traits, caricatures, actors imitations, drawings and mental images, that allows

Sartre to arrive at a uniform theory of imagination. Imagination gets theorized

in terms of an image (or picture) family where all images (or pictures) are

functionally identical (Sartre 1986, p. 43; 1983, p. 18).

Sartres theory of imagination as image/picture family finds its principal

source of inspiration in the Husserls writings available at Sartres time, notably

intheIdeas I.2 Sartre praised Husserl in fact for having blazed the trail for his

own theory of the imagination, even though he regretted that the scattered and

fragmentary character of Husserls observations on imagination contained in

theIdeas Imakes their exposition exceedingly difficult (Sartre 1972, p. 143).

For the sake of being complete I shall therefore comment on Husserls laterpublished texts in what follows as well, especially as they point to some diffi-

culties inherent in an exclusively pictorial account of imaginary activity and

raise the question of how Sartre countered these difficulties in his own theory.

To the principal merits of Husserls phenomenological theory belong, in

Sartres view, firstly, explicating the intentional structure of conscious acts, in-

cluding the imaginary acts of consciousness, and, secondly, laying the ground

for the assimilation of pure fantasy with the consciousness of physical pic-

tures (paintings, drawings, photographs). The latter contribution is especially

important in that it provides the basis for Sartres own unitary theory of imag-

ination which subsumes mental images and physical pictures in one ex-

tended family. Consider these two principal insights which Sartre draws fromHusserls observations in theIdeas Iin more detail.According to Sartre, the principal merit of the intentionality thesis is that it

providesthe only means of preserving the transcendence of the object of a con-

scious act, whether perceptual or imaginary. Defining consciousness in terms

of intentionality ultimately breaks with any form of immanentism where the

object ofconsciousness gets identified with a content in consciousness, and so

where its transcendent character with regard to consciousnessis compromised.

Sartre targets Berkeleys idealism for having reduced transcendent objects to

their mode of appearance, and so reduced the objective world to subjective

impressions. The intentionality thesis permits, Sartre contends, to restore the

transcendent character to the world, because the intendum ceases to be the

content of the subjective act. To be sure, the act of consciousness is still com-posed of impressional data, but these hyletic components of a subjective act

are not to be confused with theobjectof a conscious act (Sartre 1972, p. 132).

More importantly still, the intentionality thesis provides the ultimate means

of breaking away with a long and faulty tradition of theorizing imagination

as a variant of perception. Sartres critical studies of the dominant theories of

imagination produced in the history of Western philosophy, from Descartes to

Bergson, aim to dissipate the common illusion haunting these theories that the

image is a sort of a lesser thing, a trace of the perceived object. This illusion


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DEFINING IMAGINATION 135

gives rise to, what Sartre calls, the naive ontology of the image for which

[t]he image is made into a copy of the thing, existing as a thing. (Sartre 1972,

p. 4). Sartre objects, however, that images are not lingering impressions left

behind by antecedent perception and imagination is not a secondary percep-

tion of reflections of perceptual objects left behind in consciousness. Images

are not, as Hume would have it, weak perceptions.3 If the difference between

perception and imagination lay in the intensity of impression only (perceptual

objects are given with greater vivacity than images) and if there was no dif-

ference inkindbetween perception and imagination, then there would be no

absolute way of distinguishing the two, yet one has no problems telling them

apart. The upshot of this argument is that the procedure of locating images in

the mind renders it impossible to distinguish between perception and imagi-nation; furthermore, it falls prey to the illusion of immanence which takes

consciousness to be a receptacle for mental representations.

The intentionality thesis permits to theorize imagination otherwise than as

observation of perceptual traces left behind in consciousness with the minds

eye. The image ceases being an immanent psychic content. Sartre refers to

Husserls example of imagining a centaur playing the flute from Section 23

ofIdeas Ito illustrate this point. Following Husserl, the centaur produced in

this flight of fancy can be called a mental representation only as long as it

is understood that we mean by representation what is represented rather

than a psychic state. The centaur can thus be termed an intentional object

of the imaginary consciousness even though it does not have an independentexistence and is no more than a product of the mind. It exists neither in the

soul nor in consciousness nor anywhere. It does not exist at all, it is invention

through and through. (Sartre 1972, p. 133). Sartre thus credits Husserl for

having restored to the centaur, in the very heart of its unreality, its transcen-

dence. (Ibid., 134). The centaur can be regarded as a transcendent nothing

(Ricoeur 1981, p. 170), irreducible to the mental act despite its non-existence.As previously noted, Sartre does not deny there being a real content in

the imaginary act despite the imaginary object being a nothing. The ques-

tion of what makes up this psychic content is discussed fully in Limaginaire,

and will be taken up in further sections of this essay. It suffices to note at

this stage that, following Sartres line of thought, the impressional matter or

stuff of imaginary consciousness supports the assimilation of pure fan-tasy, such as imagining a flute-playing-centaur, with the consciousness of a

physical picture, such as a painting, a drawing or a photograph. Sartre finds

the germ of this assimilation in another passage from the Ideas I, where

Husserl comments on Durers engraving The Knight, Death and the Devil.

Husserl distinguishes there between two ways in which the engraving can

be apprehended: it can be an object of a normal perception, where it is

grasped as a physical thing, a sheet of printed paper, or it can be an object

of aesthetic contemplation where the figures of the Knight, Death and the


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136 BEATA STAWARSKA

Devil get represented in image or where we are directed to the imaged

realities (abgebildet), the knight in flesh and blood, etc. This passage leads

Sartre to conclude that the consciousness of a physical picture, for example

The Knight, Death and the Devil engraving, can be aligned with an act of

pure fantasy, e.g. imagining a flute playing centaur, in that both acts consist of

intentionally animating some content, which may be either physical or mental

(Sartre 1972, p. 135). The foundation for Sartres image/ picture family is

thus established on the basis of relevant passages from Ideas I.

As previously noted, Sartre could not have been familiar with Husserls

lectures on picture consciousness, even though he was knowledgeable of

their existence (Sartre 1972, p. 136; Husserl 1980). It is helpful therefore

to briefly overview some relevant points from Husserls lectures, especiallysince Husserls investigations into imaginary consciousness initially led him

to take the function of pictorial representation as essential to imagination as

a whole. One can therefore trace a picture family in Husserls theory of

imaginary acts as well, which combines the consciousness of a physical or

external picture ( ausseres Bildbewusstsein) with that of an internal picture

of pure fantasy, or what Sartre terms a mental image. It is equally instruc-

tive to highlight the difficulties inherent in the unitary theory of imagination

as picture consciousness encountered by Husserl, in view of subsequently

articulating how Sartre countered these difficulties in Limaginaire.

Husserls elaboration of picture consciousness is part of the analysis of

intuitive acts whose object is either present in person or is not itself presentbut represented. The former presentation of the object is a perception, the

latter, a re-presentation of the object by means of a picture. Perception enjoys

the bodily (leibhaft) presence of the object; picture consciousness is limited

to a mediate, as if revelation of the object.The picture can be physical or external as in a painting, a pho-

tograph, a sculpture. The consciousness of such a physical or an external

picture is a complex act which combines perceptual apprehension of a phys-

ical picture with an apprehension aiming at the absent object (a piece of

landscape, a person) represented by this picture. The latter apprehension suc-

ceeds in transforming the physical thing (piece of canvas, sheet of photo-

graphic paper, block of stone) into a picture properly so-called, i. e. into

an object where an absent person or thing is brought into a phantom-likepresence. The two apprehensions at work in the overall consciousness of a

picture are co-dependent and their concerted action makes an intuitive pre-

sentation of something absent in the (present) picture possible. Perceptual

apprehension gives picture consciousness its intuitive character, while non-

perceptual apprehension fantasizes the absent object into the physical thing

and turns it into a picture. Picture consciousness involves therefore three inter-

related elements: the picture-thing (Bildding), i.e. the physical thing (a piece

of canvas, of paper, of stone) which serves as the material of the picture; the


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picture-object (Bildobjekt), i.e. the picture apprehended not simply as a per-

ceptual object but as a representation of a referent i.e. of the so-called

picture-subject (Bildsujet).4

Following Husserl, pictorial representation can also be also at work in the

imaginary activity of fantasy, as well as in memory. In that case, physical or

perceptual picture/image becomes replaced by an internal and non-physical

one. Is this to say that the triple picture thing/subject/object/structure can also

be discerned in fantasy, which no longer supports itself on physical or ex-

ternal things? Images, unlike physical pictures, are not independent from

the consciousness that apprehends them; they are contents of consciousness,

forming an integral and internal part of an imaginary experience. Unlike the

physical picture which persists as a piece of canvas, paper, or stone, eventhough it ceases to function as a pictorial representation of an absent being,

the internal picture does not survive the end of the fantasy episode, there

is nothing left of it once the subject ceases to fantasize. The question arises

whether such an immaterial picture can serve the function ofrepresenting

an absent picture-subject or how an evanescent no-thing can be a symbol of

another thing. Material content seems indispensable if the picture is to fulfil

its representational function: only as a perceptual thing can a picture yield an

intuitiveapprehension of an absent referent. In order to function as a repre-

sentation (Bildobjet), the picture must be a thing (Bildding), i.e. there must

be a physical support if the picture is to symbolize the absent picture-subject

(Bildsujet). Yet such physical support is wanting in the case of internalpictures. In fantasy, it is impossible to distinguish a picture-thing from the

picture-subject it represents, and so it is difficult to see how the internal pic-

ture can serve the symbolic function at all. One can therefore hardly sustain

the interpretation of fantasy as the consciousness of non-physical pictures and

preserve a uniform theory of imagination as picture consciousness.5 These

difficulties led Husserl to progressively abandon the picture consciousness

theory as paradigm for the imagination. The question to raise then is whether

Sartres account of the imagination, which rehabilitates the theory of pictorial

representation and conjoins, in a manner analogous to early Husserl, exter-

nal and internal or, to use Sartres terminology, physical and mental

pictures, can counter similar difficulties.

Sartre assimilates physical pictures and images based on their sharedanalo-gizingfunction,i.e. on the function of makingan absententity appear by means

of an analogue. The definition of imagination reads therefore as follows: it

is an act [of consciousness] which aims at an absent or non-existent ob-

ject as a body (dans sa corporeite), by means of a physical or mental con-

tent which is present only as an analogical representative of the object

aimed at. (Sartre 1986, p. 46; 1983, p. 20). The question that arises at this

stage is whether pure fantasy can be included in this definition. When dis-

cussing Husserls identification of fantasy with picture consciousness, I noted


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138 BEATA STAWARSKA

that an object must have material content in order to function as a picture and

that insofar as internal pictures do not seem to have any content, it is diffi-

cult to understand how they could depict or represent their referent. It seems

that Sartres definition of imaginary consciousness, mapping the structure of

(physical) picture consciousness onto fantasy, is bound to encounter a similar

difficulty of accounting for how mental images could serve asanaloguesof

other absent entities. However, following Sartre, mental images, even though

they are not physical things but internal representations, do have mate-

rial content nevertheless. The only difference between physical pictures and

mental images consists in the fact that the former have material content which

can be perceived in a non-analogizing way, i.e., not as an analogue of an-

other absent entity but as a visible material thing, whereas the latter cannotbe perceived in that way (Sartre 1986, p. 111; 1983, p. 61). In the case of a

photograph or a caricature, the material can be perceived for itself: it is not

intended to function as the material of an image. [il nentre pas dans sa nature

propre quelle doive fonctionner comme matiere dimage] This photograph,

taken by itself, is a thing: I can try to ascertain the duration of its exposure

by its color, the product used to tone it and fix it, etc.; the caricature is a

thing: I can take pleasure in studying its lines and colors without thinking that

they were intended to represent something. (Sartre 1986, p. 42; 1983, p. 17).

In case of mental images, however, the material is not accessible in a direct

fashion, and that is why the material of the mental image is more difficult to

determine. (Sartre 1986, p. 42; Sartre 1983, p. 18). Still, it is evident that themental image must also have a material (Ibid.). Sartre reiterates that point

elsewhere in the text: we know since this is an essential necessity that

in the mental image there is a physical data ( un donne physique) which func-

tions as an analogue but when we wish to ascertain more clearly the nature

and components of this data we are reduced to conjectures. (Sartre 1986, p.

111; 1983, p. 61).6

What essential necessity stipulates that mental images have content? An

imaginary experiment proposed by Sartre provides elements of the response

(Sartre 1986, pp. 4041; 1983, p. 17).

I wish to recall the face of my friend Peter. I make an effort and I

produce a certain imaginary consciousness of him. But my objective isvery imperfectly attained: certain details are lacking, others are suspect,

the whole is very blurred. There is a certain feeling of sympathy and

pleasantness that I want to restore to the face but which will not come. I do

not give up, I rise and take a photograph from a drawer. It is an excellent

portrait of Peter, it gives me all the details of his face, even some that

had escaped me. But the photograph lacks life; it presents perfectly the

external traits of Peters face; it does not give his expression. Fortunately I

posses a skillfully drawn caricature of him. This time the facial features are


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deliberately distorted, the nose is much too long, the cheeks too prominent,

etc. Nevertheless, what is missing in the photograph, vitality, expression,

is clearly present in the drawing: I rediscover Peter.

In this imaginary experiment, the three images/pictures served a pre-

determined aim of representing a concrete yet absent referent, thus lending

themselves to being subsumed under the form of picture consciousness. Grad-

ually moving from the mental image through the photograph to the caricature,

we moved from less to more representative representations of Peter, i.e.

from the unsatisfactory representation in the mental image (lacking detail and

expression) to more adequate representations in the photo and the caricature

(the detail is present and the expression is restored). It can be concluded thatthe passage from the mental image to the caricature is uniform in that each

of the steps grants a (at first partial and then gradually more complete) ful-

fillment of the original aim. The mental image, the photo and the caricature

appear as three stages of the same process, three moments of a unique act.

(Ibid.). And yet, Sartre adds, only the first one is usually termed an image.

A question arises whether it is justified to reserve this term for subjective

representations (Ibid.) only and whether objective representations (Ibid.)

like photos and caricatures should not be called images as well. In Sartres

view, they certainly should, insofar as they share the function of bringing an

absent referent into intuitive quasi-presence.

According to Sartre, it is not only plausible but even necessary to arguefor the materiality of internal pictures on the basis of the analogical character

they share with physical pictures. Throughout the above recounted imaginary

experiment, the aim remains the same: I want to recall Peter, yet since Peter

is not there, I have recourse to a certain material (Sartre 1986, p. 42;

1983, p. 17), which renders Peter present in a quasi-way. In order to make the

materialityof mental pictures evident, I need only compare my initial empty

intention with my mental image of Peter. At first I wanted to produce Peter

out of the void, and then something loomed up which filled in my intention.

The three cases are therefore strictly parallel. They are three situations with

the same form, but in which the material varies. (Sartre 1986, p. 42; 1983,

p. 18). Insofar as the mental image fulfils my originally empty intention of

wanting to recall Peter and succeeds inrepresentingPeter, even though inan imperfect way, itmustshare the material character of physical pictures and

musttherefore have a content. I cannot know with absolute certainty that there

is one, and yet the representational potential of mental images constrains me

to argue that they are non-empty.7

Theproblemencounteredby Husserl of how there could be internal pictorial

representationsseems therefore to have been disposed of. Insofar as the mental

image has a content, it istranscendentto the consciousness that apprehends it

and canrepresent another entity in theway a physicalpicture does. Both mental


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images and physical pictures are said to be objectsof consciousness (Sartre

1986, p. 110; 1983, p. 61), even though the transcendence of mental picture

needs to be differentiated from that of physical ones. The mental picture,

or better, its content, does not have the exteriority (exteriorite translated

as objectivity) which belongs to the physical picture. We see a portrait,

a caricature, a blot (une tache): but we do not see a mental image. To see

an object is to localize it in space, between this table and that carpet, at a

certain height, to my right or left. But mental images do not mingle with

surrounding objects (ne se melent pas aux objets qui mentourent). (Sartre

1986, p. 109110; 1983, p. 60). The transcendence of the mental image is

not to be interpreted in terms of the exteriority of a perceptual object but has

to do solely with the representational character of an object grasped as ananalogue of something other (Ibid.). Sartre terms that sort of transcendence

the transcendence of the representative (Sartre 1986, p. 10; 1983, p. 61), in

contradistinction from the transcendence of a physical thing (Ibid.).8

A question that still remains unanswered, however, is whether all imaginary

experiences must necessarily involve pictorial representations. If imagination

consists in representation by means of (mental and physical) content, then the

imaginary act that doesnot support itself on an image/picture either cannot

take place or cannot qualify as imaginary. And yet Sartre does admit that some

imaginary experiences are not accompanied by images as in the case of aes-

thetic appreciation of an artistic work, say a novel (Sartre 1986, p. 126; 1983,

p. 70). Another question left open is whether a picture consciousness theoryof imagination, which reduces imagination to a search for representations of

absent entities, does not assume that imagination has a merely reproductive

and not creative or productive function. As such, it raises the question of how

to theorizefictionwithin the picture consciousness framework. In fact, upon

examination, it turns out impossible to subsume fiction under the category of

pictorial representation and its double picture-original structure.Ricoeur (1981), for example, has pointed out to the difficulties of theorizing

fiction within the picture family paradigm. Recall the example of the fantasy

of a flute-playing centaur analyzed by Husserl in Section 23, Ideas I. In

this case, Ricoeur notes, it is impossible to draw a distinction between the

realand the representedobject, and so to subsume the fantasy of a centaur

under consciousness of a pictorial representation of an absent referent. Theobject of imaginary consciousness is one, even though it does not exist. Yet

it can be termed an objectof consciousness nevertheless, since it is not a

psychic state, it is not the invention itself (Ricoeur 1981, p. 170). Up to

that point Sartre is in agreement with Ricoeur, as will be clear to the reader

from the previous discussion of the intentional character of the imaginary

consciousness. The contention between Sartre and Ricoeur arises due to the

former subsuming the relation to a non-existent object under reproductive

consciousness, forcing the unreal centaur into the picture-model structure.


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Ricoeur argues that the referent of the fiction and the referent of the picture

cannot be treated within the same framework. [. . .] But inLimaginationit is

uncritically assumed that the theory of the picture may be extended to that

of the fiction, and vice versa. (Ibid.). The procedure of identifying picture

consciousness with fiction is unjustified and has the consequence of making

one forget that fiction is a creative process, which producesits object rather

than merely representing it. In more general terms, the picture consciousness

theory of imagination leads to positing the primacy of the original, (Ibid.)

i.e., it gives primacy to theperceptualexperience of a given entity and endows

imagination with the subservient role of providing replicas of it. This seems

to ultimately undermine the validity of the guiding line of Sartres project,

namely that the image and the perception, far from being two elementarypsychical factors of similar quality and which simply enter into different

combinations, represent the two main irreducible attitudes of consciousness

(les deux grandes attitudes irreductibles de la conscience). (Sartre 1986, p.

231; 1983, p. 138).It can be objected, however, that Sartres understanding of the image in

terms of an intentional relation to a transcendent object rather than an im-

manent psychic content may support a non-representational paradigm of the

imagination. After all, having chased images outside of consciousness, Sartre

proclaims that the image stands only for the way in which consciousness

intends its object. The word image can [. . .] indicate only the relation of con-

sciousness to the object; in other words, it means a certain manner in whichthe object makes its appearance to consciousness, or, if one prefers, a certain

way in which consciousness presents an object to itself. (Sartre 1986, p. 21;

1983, p. 5). As a pure intentional relation, the image is therefore not a content

in consciousness. Yet it is extremely difficult to square this claim with the

definition of the image as an analogical representative, i. e., anobject, either

exterior to consciousness due to being a physical thing or transcendent to

it in virtue of its representational character. These two conflicting claims (the

image is a relationanda picture) both serve the purpose of dislodging the im-

age from consciousness: the argument that the image is a relation prevents all

attempts of inserting images into consciousness; the argument that the image

is a picture supposes that it is transcendent to consciousness. Yet the implica-

tions of these two arguments and the theories of imagination built upon themare strikingly different. Following the former account, one need not invoke

representational character of imagination and its dependence on perceptual

givenness of the original. In this perspective, imagination is as Sartre

wanted it to be an intentional relation equal in dignity and yet irreducible to

perception. However, if the picture consciousness theory is advocated, then

it is an analogue, i.e. the object mediating my access to something absent,

which deserves the name of the image, and which is a condition sine qua non

of an imaginary experience. As long as the latter theory is followed, imaginary


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consciousness does not appear as a pure relation but as a consciousness oftwo

objects: the picture/image and the original. A consequence of that formulation

is the assumption of the primacy of the original, which turns imagination,

despite or against Sartres intentions, into a servant of perception.

It appears therefore that Sartres overtly unitary theory of imagination is

destabilized by an inner tension between two non-identical accounts. This

tension is manifest in the list of the four possible positional theses Sartre

assigns to imaginary consciousness. Imaginary consciousness can posit its

object: as non-existent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere; imaginary

consciousness can also neutralize itself, that is, not posit its object as exist-

ing (Sartre 1986, p. 32; 1983, pp. 1112). These positional theses express the

fact that the imaginary object is not present in person, but they do it in differentways. The first thesis states that the object, insofar as it does not exist, cannot

be made present in flesh and blood at all. It is impossible to perceive e.g. a

flute playing centaur, even though it is possible to imagine it. The centaur

is a mythicalbeing, and so, even if one day I was to come across a being

that displayed all the features of a centaur, still I could not claim that I have

encountered the chimera in person.9 Fictional beings are encountered in

the imaginary realm only. As for the theses 2 and 3, they are interrelated and

express the fact that the object can in principle be perceived but at the moment

it isnotpresent in person. The second thesis is purely negative and stipulates

that the object, e.g. my friend Peter, is absent; the third thesis is a positive

reformulation of the preceding one and it can supply further information con-cerning the object (Peter is in Berlin). The fourth thesis expresses a general

suspension of belief in regard to the imagined object. For example, When I

look at the photographs in a magazine they mean nothing to me, that is, I

may look at them without any thought that their subjects exist. (Si je regarde

les photos du journal, elles peuvent tres bien ne rien me dire, cest-a-dire

que je les regarde sans faire de position dexistence.) (Sartre 1986, p. 55;

1983, p. 26). In this case, I abstain from deciding whether the object exists or

not, is alive or dead, could or could not be met in person.

All the theses state that the imagined object is absentin the general sense of

not-being here. The absence seems most radical in the case of the first thesis:

non-existent beings cannotde jurebe perceived, their absence can never be

substituted by presence. The objects whose existence is put into bracketsmay but need not be capable of being rendered present. Absent and existent

elsewhere beings can, on the other hand, in principle be encountered in flesh

and blood. One wonders, however, whether it is still justified to subsume the

suspended existence and non-existence of purely fictional characters under the

heading of absence. It seems more appropriate to take suspended existence

andnon-existenceas the contrary ofposited existence, and to ascribeabsence

and presence (existential categories) to beings that are posited as existent

only. A centaur cannot be absent(nor present), since it does not belong to


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the class of things posited as existent. This being so, the centaur (and any

other fictional being) can no longer be argued to function as a referent of a

picture representing something absent, and consciousness imagining a centaur

cannot be mapped onto the consciousness of a picture representing an external

referent or an original. The difficulty of forcing fiction and fantasy into

the rigid framework of pictorial representation becomes apparent again. At

the same time, an alternative approach to the imagination becomes manifest

in Sartres account: the suspension of belief in the reality of the imagined

world. In the remaining part of this essay, this alternative approach will be

traced back to Janets observations on obsessive behavior, notably the so-

called diminution of the reality function (la diminution de la fonction du reel)

apparent therein. This latter approach unveils a possibility of conceptualizingimagination differently than as a purely reproductive process of fabricating

imperfect copies of perceptual reality. Imagination can be theorized as an

activity of transcending the real and producing the unreal, wherein the subject

re-asserts its creative potential and freedom.10 Furthermore, it is no longer

necessary to stipulate that pictorial representations are a condition sine qua

nonof imaginary experiences: imagination theorized as suspension of belief

may but need not necessarily include visual content. Room is therefore open

for imaginary attitudes without images, for example, aesthetic appreciation

of fiction.

Consider Sartres remarks about suspension of belief in the cases of fiction

reading, as well as dreaming, and hallucination, before assessing Janets in-fluence on the formers views. When reading a novel, Sartre says, one adopts

an imaginary attitude with regards to the world represented in it. That is not

to say that one actually produces mental images to illustrate the narrative;

images appear rather when we cease reading or when our attention begins

to wander (les images apparaissent aux arrets et aux rates de la lecture)

(Sartre 1986, p. 126; 1983, p. 70)). Why then take reading to be an imaginary

attitude? It has to do with the fictional character of the world of the novel in

which the reader becomes engaged: the world enjoys a complete existence in

the unreal (Ibid.). The reader comes to believe in the world of the novel if

belief is defined as fascination without existential assumption (fascination

sans position dexistence) (Sartre 1986, p. 326; 1983, p. 197). For reading

is a sort of fascination and when I am reading a detective story I believe inwhat I am reading. But this does not mean in the least that I fail to look

upon the adventures of the detective as imaginary. (Ibid.) Not dependent on

a sequence of images, each of which would stand for an absent referent, the

imaginary experience of reading has more to do with enlarging the limits of

ones possible experience by living a life in the unreal.The intense engagement in a fictional world aligns the example of read-

ing with other imaginary experiences, such as dreaming and hallucination. A

dream is structurally similar to reading, in that it usually consists of a sequence


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144 BEATA STAWARSKA

of interrelated events unfolding in time. Hence every dream is a story (Sartre

1986, p. 322; 1983, p. 195), and it is frequently dreamt as a tale that is read

or narrated by someone (Sartre 1986, p. 320; 1983, p. 194). The feeling of

belonging to the story is however more intensely lived in a dream than in

a literary narrative, due to a more profound identification with a character

representing me in the dream that could ever be realized in aesthetic contem-

plation (Sartre 1986, p. 331; 1983, p. 200). In dreaming, the conscious self

ceases being an external spectator and turns into a captivated participant of

the unreal scenario. Yet despite this intensely lived participation in the dream

world, the positional character of the conscious act remains the same as in the

case of reading. The dreamer, as the reader of a novel, may be said to believe

in the dream story. However, that does not turn the content of the dream intoa reality posited as existent: the positional thesis of the imaginary conscious-

ness remains that of suspended existential belief.11 In fact, as Sartres analyses

demonstrate, the moment the dreaming consciousness starts attributing reality

to things, it necessarily wakes up.

Referring to a dream in which the red coloration of the sun light passing

across a screen was experienced as standing for blood, Sartre observes that

grasping the red light as blood in a dream does not mean that red light produces

a mental image of blood in consciousness; nor is red light apprehended directly

by the dreamer. It is the red light which is experienced as blood. It is the way

we have of apprehending it. (Sartre 1986, p. 317; 1983, p. 192). The dreamer

does notpositthe blood as something existent a dream is not a hallucinatoryperception. The object is simply graspedasifit were blood; the redcolorinvites

a comparison with blood without leading to a (false) perceptual identification

of the light with the bodily liquid. Sartre comments that in a dream, things are

grasped. . .not for what they are but as analogues of other realities. (Sartre

1986, p. 316; 1983, p. 191). He refers to certain dreams cited by Janet, which

clearly show how a successively repeated noise is experienced as standing

fora number of different objects but neverfor itself. Hence the noise of an

alarm clock is at first experienced as an analogue of the noise of a fountain, the

ringing of bells, the rolling of a drum, etc. Once we apprehend the striking

for what it is(that is, a succession of shrill and vibrant sounds) (Ibid.), i. e.

once we posit the striking as existent, we shift from the imaginary attitude to

the perceptual one and wake up (Sartre 1986, pp. 317318; 1983, p. 192).One might conclude from the above that Sartre should make a distinction

between dreaming and hallucination, the latter involving a (false) positional

belief in the reality of the hallucinatory world. Recall, however, that Sartre re-

gards imaginary activity as a free act of consciousness, wherein consciousness

re-asserts its creative potential. And as Dufrenne observes, this freedom to

posit the unreal implies that the positional act of the image-forming conscious-

ness is well aware (of) itself in other words, the imaginary cannot create an

illusion (Duffrenne 1987, p. 47). It follows that the imaginary consciousness


13/21


cannot believe in the hallucinations it has itself produced, just as it cannot be-

lieve in the reality of the dream. The task taken up by Sartre in the discussion

of the Pathology of the imagination (Sartre 1986, pp. 285308; 1983, pp.

171186) is then to demonstrate that hallucination involves a consciousness

enchanted by its own production of (un)realities, unable to emerge from the

hallucinatory world just as it cannot decide to wake up from a dream, and yet

never believing in them in the way it believes in the world of perception.

Sartre challenges the possibility of a veritable hallucination primarily by

disputing the claim that a hallucinating person could attribute reality to the

hallucinatory vision in the same measure that she would posit the perceptual

world as existent. The hallucinating person cannot be said to oscillate between

these two equally real, from her, even though not from an external observerspoint of view, worlds. The hallucinating person does not gain a supplementary

reality cut off from direct access of non-pathological subjects, and to be in-

ferred from the overt behavior of the one who hallucinates. The hallucinating

person is rather a victim of a generalized weakening of the sense of the real

(affaiblissement du sens du reel), an alteration affecting the entire conscious-

ness which prevents her as much from positing the reality of the perceptual as

of the imaginary world (Sartre 1986, p. 293; 1983, p. 176). Referring to a case

of a motor hallucination of a man whose voice remains the same when others

speak to him but (who) knows when it is they who speak and when it is he

(Ibid.), Sartre comments that this patient might be just as unable to perceive

his speech normally when he attributes it to himself as when he claims that itoriginates from an external source. It is from the point of view of an external

observer only that the patients attribution of his speech to himself seems to be

a normal act of perception because it happens to be correct; in fact, the patients

perception is hallucinatory throughout this curious monologuea deux: the

patient hallucinates as much when he assumes that the words he is emitting

are his own as when he attributes them to another. (Sartre 1986, p. 294; 1983,

p. 177; translation corrected). This double inability to have veritable and false

perceptions applies not only to cases of motor but also of auditory and visual

hallucinations according to Sartre. In all cases, the perceptual world is dreamt

or fantasized by the patient in an equal measure as are his hallucinations.Without expressly crediting Pierre Janet for the above interpretation,

Sartres argument about the weakening of the sense of the real closely fol-lows the formers views on the generalized diminishment of the sense of

reality in obsession. Janet commented that the obsessive patients, whom he

also described as the scrupulous because of their attachment to minute even

though apparently banal details, have lost both a sense of reality and an ability

to fall victim to an illusion of reality, the latter being indispensable for false

positional belief or hallucinatory perception. They are generally incapable of

positing the content of their experience as real or existent, insofar as the neces-

sarymentaloperation enabling both perception of realityand illusion of reality


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146 BEATA STAWARSKA

has become diminished.12 Hence the pervasive feeling of the imaginary, the

unreal (le sentiment de limaginaire, de lirreel) accompanying the patients

perception both of the world and of their own selves (Janet, 1919, p. 297). This

unrealization results in the world being apprehended as if through a veil and

with a dream-like quality, the patient often feeling as if she were a personage in

a dream (Janet 1919, p. 288, 297). Janet found also that the so-calleddeja-vu

experience frequently noted amongst the obsessive population is but another

example of this disturbance of perceptual functions and not, as habitually

claimed, of memory. The deja-vu feeling is a negation of thepresentcharacter

of a perceived phenomenon rather than an affirmation of its past or elapsed

(passe) character, and as such exemplifies the generalized loss of reality in

obsession (Janet 1919, p. 296).The diminishment of the reality function, accompanied by unaffected self-

awareness as well as recurrent stereotyped thoughts and images, belong to

the clinical picture of obsessive behavior compiled by Janet; these features

provide also the point of departure for Sartres reflections on the imaginary

consciousness in hallucination. Insofar as the notion of the diminution of the

sense of reality represents the principal trait of the obsessive condition, it is not

surprising to find Sartre apply this condition as a paradigm for theorizing the

hallucinatorystates, the loss of reality beingsupposedly structurally analogous

in hallucination to the one observed in obsessive behavior (Sartre 1986, p.

295; 1983, p. 177). However, it should not be forgotten that Janet himself

wavered before qualifying the imaginary disturbances occurring in obsessionas complete full-blown hallucinations and regarded them rather as imperfect

pseudo-hallucinatory states due precisely to their lack of positional belief. This

difference reflects the divergence between Janets and Sartres views regarding

the possibility of veritable hallucinations accompanied by positional belief.The clinical category which regroups the symptoms of compulsive obses-

sion in Janets nosography bears the name of psychasthenia, and belongs to

the two major nosographic forms of mental disorder studied by Janet, the

latter being represented by hysteria. Without being able to compare the two

groups in detail in the limited scope of this paper, let me note that while Janet

(1999, p. 646) characterizes hysteria by a dissociation of personality and a

so-called narrowing of the field of consciousness (retrecissement du champs

de la conscience), such that hysteric symptoms can occur without the apparentawareness of the person executing them, in obsession, personal consciousness

remains unaffected, thus leading to a paradoxical combination of lucidity and

madness (une folie lucide, un delire avec conscience, une obsession con-

sciente). The patient is clearly aware of her compulsively recurring images

and thoughts and able to report their content in detail to the therapist, even

though unable to subject them to her control.13 Psychasthenia testifies there-

fore to a possible dissociation between consciousness and voluntary action,


15/21


demonstrating that consciousness may operate independently or even in a

direct antagonism to the precepts of the will. This lack of identity between

consciousness and the agency of the will advocated by Janet provides a critical

insight not only for Sartres understanding of pathological forms of imagina-

tion but also for the more general argument concerning the nature of con-

sciousness. According to Sartre, the egological center of voluntary action (I

will) is not a subject but rather an object external or transcendent to conscious

life.14

Consider some examples of imaginary experiences which combine this

loss of voluntary control with unaffected consciousness. One example, cited

in Limaginaire (Sartre 1986, p. 296; 1983, p. 178), is provided by Janets

patient Claire, who was tormented over the years by a frequently recurringvision of a naked man, or more precisely of the exposed masculine genitalia,

in the process of profaning holy bread. Another tormenting image is provided

by the patient On. . ., who has the vision of the soul emerging from the bottom

of his deceased uncle (Janet 1919, p. 10). These two examples of obsessive

thoughts enact unsettling juxtapositions of the spiritual and the holy with

the profane. Typically, however, obsessive images are much more banal and

stereotyped, and what is most distressing is not the content but rather the

frequency of the obsession. Sartre contended in fact that the limited variation

of content in obsessive phenomena, typicallyrepeating a fixed imaginary scene

or thoughtad infinitum, is in line with the poverty of content of hallucinatory

phenomena in general. Despite the apparent inexhaustible richness of imagesin hallucination, hallucinatory episodes tend to consist of minimal content, be

it a sequence of banal insults in auditory hallucinations or a limited number of

shapes and personages in visual hallucinations. This poverty of content lends

further support to the analogy between obsession and hallucination in Sartres

view (Sartre 1986, p. 295; 1983, p. 178).

The attractiveness of the pathological condition affectingconsciousness it-

selfin psychasthenia to Sartres phenomenology does not come as a surprise.

Unlike in hysteria, the psychasthenic condition does not take the form of dra-

matic crises intermittent with periods of relative tranquility, but consists rather

in continuous mental preoccupation with a given subject, punctuated simply

by moments of exasperation (Janet 1999, p. 640). The temporality of obses-

sion can therefore be equated with that of consciousness itself, and obsessioncan provide insight not only into imagination but also into conscious life in

general. Since the work of Janet, it has been recognized that the obsession is

not a strange body that occupies consciousness in spite of itself like a stone in

the liver. In fact, the obsessionis a consciousness; and consequently it has the

same traits of spontaneity and autonomy as does the rest of consciousness.

(Sartre 1986, p. 296; 1983, p. 178).Sartre believes that obsession unveils the so-called impersonal spontane-

ity as the dynamic force driving the consciousness to produce disquieting


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148 BEATA STAWARSKA

thoughts and images. This is what the works of Janet on psychasthenics show:

the tragic nature of the obsession is derived from the fact that the mind forces

itself to reproduce the object of which it stands in fear. There is no mechanical

reappearance of the haunting image nor a monoideism in the classical sense

of the term: but the obsession is willed, reproduced by a sort of dizziness

(vertige), by a spasm of spontaneity. (Sartre 1986, p. 241; 1983, p. 142).

Narratives of Janets patients confirm this experience of an upsurge of an im-

personal force as the motor of their obsession; one patient comments that it

is not me who thinks, who chooses the subject of these thoughts; it is rather

something that thinks in me and I do no more than feel what it thought in my

head. She addsthatit is more effective to resignto the flow ofimages and ideas

than to bring them to a halt, thus pointing to the feelings of loss of agency anddepersonalization which typically accompany the obsessive condition (Janet

1903, p. 266, my translation). Janet observed that this loss of personal control

over the course of ones mental states may lead to the attribution of ones inner

experience to external sources, with the patient reporting being under a direct

influence of foreign agents who make him think obsessive thoughts irrespec-

tively of her will (Janet 1999, p. 678). This syndrome of influence does

not, however, mask the origin of obsessive episodes within consciousness, as

Sartre notes, in accordance with Janet (Sartre 1986, p. 301; 1983, p. 181).

Consider an example of how mental associations can be formed in obses-

sion: a young man claims to be ill because he ate the bread coming from

the baker who was indicated to his mother by an individual whose wife diedon the same day on which he met a servant woman, the memory of whom

troubles him and incites to genital obsessions. Janet comments that such a

cascade of ideas leading from eating bread to the servant woman does not

contain a natural causeeffect sequence similar to the relation between flames

and fire; the arbitrary mental constructions are devised by the patient himself

in order to feed his obsession (Janet 1999, p. 646). Hence the patient both

suffers and perpetuates his obsessive state by connecting the per seunrelated

strings of ideas. He may be very well be aware of the unrealistic nature of

this endeavor and the improbability of his associations, and yet is unable to

bring their current to a halt.15 This compulsive mental productivity reported

by Janet provides inspiration for Sartres aforementioned notion of impersonal

spontaneity at work in hallucination: it is consciousness alone rather than anextrinsic source which lies at the basis of the pathology of imagination.

From the point of view of the etiology of obsession documented by Janet,

the liberation of consciousness impersonal spontaneity results from a gen-

eral weakening of the vital and central nervous functions, otherwise termed

nervous insufficiency, which correspond to the so-calledneurasthenicstate.

The origin of this state is said to be predominantly hereditary; however sec-

ondary causes, such as the intoxication of the organism resulting from contin-

ued malnutrition or a traumatizing event in the patients personal history, may


17/21


play a considerable role as well. This weakening of nervous functions alone

does not yet explain the specificity of the obsessional disorder; the state of

energetic depletion is said to provide the embryonic form of numerous neu-

roses and even psychoses (Janet 1903, p. XI). The initial lowering of nervous

tension turns into a psychasthenic condition when it is accompanied by the

sense of personal inadequacy (incompletude), manifested by the feelings of

doubt, anxiety, and fear, which predispose one towards obsessions. As soon as

some abstract and general ideas or imaginary constructions, which go beyond

the initial diffuse feelings and are likely to center on a particular person or

problem, become attached to these feelings of inadequacy, a passage to the

clinical condition of psychasthenia proper occurs.

Janet defines the psychasthenic symptoms according to two correlated per-spectives, quantitative (or economic) and functional. The former refers to

the individual organization of the psychic energy, the latter to a hierarchi-

cal organization of psychic functions. Economically speaking, the obsessive

condition is characterized by an astheniaor weakness of the psyche (hence

psych-asthenia), specifically a lowering of the psychologicaltension. Janets

psychological economy distinguishes betweenforce, i.e. the quantity of dis-

posable energy, whether latent or manifest, andtension, i.e. the capacity to

utilize this energy at a higher or lower levelin the hierarchical system of mental

operations. In a non-pathological condition, there is an equilibrium between

disposable force and psychological tension such that the person is able to

channel her dynamic capital into normal action in the world. Should thebalance between the energy level and its disposal mechanism be disturbed, as

in the case of lowering of psychological tension in psychasthenia, the energy

will no longer be directed outwards to concrete action but wasted in the pro-

cess of compulsively recurring inner episodes, such as interminable mental

ruminations, abstract speculations, anguishing doubts, manias of verification,

precision and perfection.The superior psychological functions, which depend on an elevated level

of psychological tension, subsumed under the function of mental synthesis (la

synthese mentale), are perturbed as a resultof this energetic imbalance. Mental

synthesis is a function of adaptability to the changing environment which

integrates the elements provided by perception and memory. As such, mental

synthesis includes the aforementioned reality function, as well as the relatedpsychological abilities of will and attention. These high value operations of

mental synthesis are marked by the so-called co-efficient of reality, a term

adopted from Spencer, which designates action and knowledge of real events.

Following the principle of Janets psychologicalhierarchy which stipulatesthat

the higher the reality co-efficient of an act is, the sooner does it diminish at the

onset of psychasthenia, the operations of mental synthesis are the first to wane

in obsession (Janet 1903, p. 497). As a result of this suspension of superior

functions, inferior mental operations which can be fully exercised despite


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150 BEATA STAWARSKA

the lowering of psychological tension, such as non-task-directed emotions,

memory and fantasy, take over.

Janets hierarchical account facilitates a distinction between psychological

health and illness on the basis of a polarized top/bottom scale, which distin-

guishes between superior high tension activities accompanied by existential

belief and inferior low tension activities with existential belief suspended.

Insofar as reality makes a high demand on the individual psychic economy,

it is the reality function which gets affected in mental asthesia; paradoxically

then, it is not cognitive ability but concrete pragmatic action that receives

the most elevated place in this hierarchy of psychic functions. Based on this

hierarchization of mental and practical processes, it is not surprising that the

author occasionally devalues philosophical pursuits as an example of suchan inferior psychic activity, removed from the demands set by the real world

and derived rather from the pervasive feeling of uncertainty and doubt, which

fuels a quest for apodictic knowledge and motivates existential questions of

the type: does God exist? or why is there something rather than nothing?

(Janet 1903, p. 302). Based on observations of his psychasthenics preoccupied

with the abstract and shying the concrete, Janet concludes that cogitating is a

far lower achievement than real action (Janet 1919, p. 494).16

Following the diminishment of reality in psychasthenia, mental activity is

preserved intact but executed excessively, escaping the control of the will. Fre-

quent imaginary activity, including hallucination, is but a plastic expression

of this generalized liberation of mental productivity from personal control.Referring back to the case of the patient Claire, Janet comments that her

sacrilegious vision marks a culmination point of a longer process of men-

tal preoccupations with this religious subject, including prolonged studies

of divine anatomy in the church (Janet 1919, p. 64). Hence it is the sub-

jects own mental efforts that produce the image of profanation (Janet 1999,

p. 647). The visual character of this symbol confers some exteriority upon

it, yet it fails to appear as an element of the physical world nonetheless.

Hence the lack of belief in the existence of the visual scenario, which ap-

plies, in Sartres view, to all cases of hallucinatory behavior. Janet confines it,

however, to visual constructions in delirious obsession, where hallucinatory

representation is accomplished only partially, despite the apparent effort of

the subject to affirm the reality of what she sees. Janet speaks of a hallucina-tory mania (manie de lhallucination) to underscore these futile hallucinatory

efforts in obsession, in distinction from a veritable hallucination accompa-

nied by existential belief. The latter complete form of hallucination is typical

of hysteric disorders, in Janets view, where the imaginary vision attains the

richness and detail akin to actual visual perception (Janet 1919, pp. 501503).

As previously noted, this claim points to a limited analogy between Janets

and Sartres views on what typifies hallucination: it is Sartre, but not Janet,

who argues, firstly, that the content of hallucination is by definition poor and


19/21


schematic, and secondly, that hallucination is never accompanied by positional

belief.

Despite these divergences and potential difficulties in adopting Janets

views on obsession as a paradigm case for hallucination, it remains uncon-

testable that Janets observations provide a major source of inspiration for

Sartres thinking about the pathological forms of imaginary activity and feed

his account of imagination as a productive rather than merely reproductive

faculty. The lines of convergence between Janets account of obsessive behav-

ior and Sartres theory of imagination include the suspension of existential

belief and the related liberation of the impersonal consciousness from the

constraints of reality, which facilitates the spontaneous productivity of con-

sciousness, notably the imaginary production. It can be concluded thereforethat Janets views on the effects of the obsessive condition on consciousness

constructively influenced Sartres thinking about imagination, providing a ba-

sis for an alternative theory to the one based on pictorial representation, which

Sartre drew from Husserl. They are the source of an account of imagination

which emphasizes the creative and unrealizing potential of the imagination,

over against the primarily representational and reality-bound one contained in

the picture-family theory. As such they make room for a theory of imagination

which is not subservient to perception, but operates in relative independence

from perceptual experience. Henceforth, even though Husserl provides the

foundation for the prevailing theory of imagination as pictorial representa-

tion inLimaginaire, it is Janets clinical studies and theoretical observationson obsessive behavior that enrich the alternative current in Sartres thinking

about imagination as spontaneous and self-determined creativity, which un-

derpins both the pathological derivatives of imagination as well as its creative

expression in fantasy and fiction. It seems therefore valid to conclude from

this overview of Husserls and Janets impact on Sartre that his early study in

phenomenological psychology actively combines contributions drawn from

phenomenological as well as psychological disciplines, relying in equal mea-

sure on reflective and applied methods in an attempt to arrive at an exhaustive

definition of the imagination.

Notes

1. Some of my discussion of Husserls influence on Sartre was published previously in

Stawarska (2001).

2. Husserl, E. 1982. In his two books on the imagination, Sartre makes references also

to Husserls Logical Investigations, Cartesian Mediations and the lectures On the Phe-

nomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time.

3. According to Sartre, Humes distinction between impressions and ideas on the basis of

intensity illustrates the confusionbetween perception and imagination very well. Following

Hume, Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name


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152 BEATA STAWARSKA

impressions. . .By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. . ..

(Hume,Treatise; quoted in Sartre 1986, p. 18; 1983, p. 2).4. For further analysis of the interdependence of the three elements of a picture, see e.g.,

Bernet, Kern and Marbach 1993, pp. 151152.

5. See Claesens (1996, pp. 13035) discussion on the problem of material content of mental

pictures. Having put into question the possibility of an internal picture, Claesen con-

cludes: Dans lanalyse des imaginations externes, il faut [. . .] insister sur lessentialite

duBilddingpour leBildobjektet ainsi reconnatre la materialite de limage, image qui a le

pouvoir de representer un sujet. Pour ce qui est de limagination interne, cette theorie de

limagination est serieusement remise en question sil est vrai quon ne peut concevoir

une image-objet transcendante qui soit en meme temps pure ou immaterielle; si on suit ce

modele, alors une imagination interne est proprement impossible.

6. Translation corrected. Misleadingly, un donne physique was translated into English as

a psychic factor.7. This argument can best be presented by means of a standard-form categorical syllogism:

1. All pictures have a material content.

2. Mental image is a picture.

3. Therefore mental images have a material content.

Thanks to the syllogism, one can see more clearly where the logical necessitythat mental

images have material content lies. Insofar as mental images belong to the general class of

intuitive analogical representations of absent objects, they must be material, even though

their materiality is never given directly.

8. The question of what makes up this transcendent psychic content is studied by Sartre

in the section of the no longer certain but merely probable part ofLimaginaire(Part

Two: The Probable the nature of the analogue in the mental image). Sartres argumentis that affects and kinaestheses provide content of imaginary acts. Both affective and ki-

naesthetic acts are argued to possess a representational potential and to intend (affective

and kinaesthetic) analogues, which serve as a building block for the consciousness of an

image. Sartre implies that there is an intention of an analogical material discernible in

motility and emotions, just as there is a consciousness of a (physical and mental) ana-

logical material discernible in imagination; these rudimentary (affective and kinaesthetic)

proto-pictures are said to provide content for imaginary representations or mentalpictures

properly so-called.

9. A similar point has been made byKripke (1982, p. 24) about unicorns: I think that even if

archaeologists or geologists were to discover tomorrow some fossils conclusively showing

the existence of animals in the past satisfying everything we know about unicorns from

the myth of the unicorn, that would not show that there were unicorns.

10. Pour quune conscience puisse imaginer il faut quelle echappe au monde par sa nature

meme, il faut quelle puisse tirer delle-meme une position de recul par rapport au monde.

En un mot, il faut quelle soit libre (Sartre 1983, p. 353; 1986, p. 213).

11. Everything that happens in a dream is something I believe. I do no more than believe it:

that is, the objects are not themselves present to my intuition (Sartre 1983, p. 315; 1986,

p. 191.)

12. Non seulement ils [les scrupuleux] nont plus lapprehension de la realite veritable, mais

ils narrivent pas non plus a lillusion de la realite. Ce fait suffit a prouver. . . que le

trouble ne consiste pas dans une action insuffisante de la realite sur le sujet, mais dans une

insuffisance des operations mentales qui conduisent soit a la perception de la realite, soit

a lillusion de cette perception (Janet 1919, p. 448).


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13. Les hysteriques ontperdu laction conscienteet personnelle,les psychastheniques nont

perdu que laction volontaire et libre. (Janet 1999, p. 698).

14. This argument is developed in Sartre (1972). For an overview, see Stawarska (2002). It

would be worthwhile to trace Janets influence on Sartres postulate of non-egological

consciousness as well, especially as Sartre directly refers to Janet to support his theory of

the monstrous freedom of consciousness in this text.

15. Lobsede. . .est tout pret a declarer son obsession ridicule; mais tout cela nempeche pas

quil sen preoccupe, quil y pense sans cesse. Il y croit donc dune certaine mani ere mais

il ny croit pas completement. (Janet 1999, p. 652).

16. Consider also this passage from Les Nevroses (Janet 1999, p. 774): Qui ne croirait, a

premiere vue, quun raisonnement syllogistique demande plus de travail cerebral que la

perception dun arbre ou dune fleur avec le sentiment de leur realite et cependant, je crois

que ce point de sens commun se trompe. Loperation la plus difficile, celle qui disparat

le plus vite et le plus souvent, dans toutes les depressions, est. . .

lapprehension de larealite sous toutes ses formes. Elle contient laction qui nous permet dagir sur les objets

exterieurs, laction surtout difficile, quand elle est sociale, quand elle doit sexercer, non

seulement surle milieuphysique, mais encoresur le milieusocial dans lequelnous sommes

plonges. . .

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Defining Imagination Sartre Between Husserl and Janet

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