DEFENCE Force JOURNAL · Strategic Context The Enterprise Architecture Model Practical benefits to...

NO.144

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

2000

A U S T R A L I A N

JOURNAL

JOU

RN

AL

OF

TH

E A

US

TR

AL

IAN

PR

OF

ES

SIO

N O

F A

RM

S

DEFENCEForce

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier Steve Ayling, AM (Chairman)Air Commodore Ken BirrerGroup Captain Allan CroweColonel Roger DaceCaptain James V.P. Goldrick, RANColonel Michael Goodyer

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should betyped double spaced, on one side of the paper, or preferablysubmitted on disk in a word processing format. Hardcopyshould be supplied in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:The EditorAustralian Defence Force JournalR8-LG-001Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(02) 6265 1193Fax (02) 6265 6972

CopyrightThe material contained in the Australian Defence Force Journalis the copyright of the Department of Defence. No part ofthe publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwisewithout the consent of the Managing Editor.

Email: [email protected]/pacc/dfj/

© Commonwealth of Australia 2000ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 2000

Bronwen GreyKaren GriffithDr Ron HuiskenLieutenant Colonel Neil F. JamesMr Darryl JohnstoneColonel Paul McGrane

NO. 144

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

2000

DEFENCEForce

JOURNAL

Managing Editor

Michael P. Tracey

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

Contributors are urged to ensure the

accuracy of the information contained in

their articles; the Board of Management

accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

Permission to reprint articles in the Journal

will generally be readily given by the

Managing Editor after consultation with the

author. Any reproduced articles should bear

an acknowledgement of source.

The views expressed in the articles are the

author’s own and should not be construed as

official opinion or policy.

Printed in Australia

by National Capital Printing,

Fyshwick, ACT 2609

A U S T R A L I A N

CONTENTS2. Foreword3. Introduction

Dr Andrew Krepinevick, Centre for Strategicand Budgetary Assessments Washington DC,USA

5. Future Warfare Concepts: Designing theFuture Defence ForceBrigadier S.H. Ayling, Office of the RMA

12. The Rapid, Decisive Operation: AConstruct for an American Way of Warin the 21st CenturyColonel David J. Ozolek, US Army (Retired)

21. Impact of RMA on Command andControl – An SAF PerspectiveLieutenant Colonel Hugh Lim, SAF

27. The RMA, C2 and Coalition OperationsCaptain Xavier Rolin, French Joint Staff

30. The RMA in South-East Asia: Securityand External DefenceMr J.N. Mak, Malaysian Institute of MaritimeAffairs

41. Revolution in Military Affairs: A NewGuide for China’s Military ModernisationDr You Ji, School of Political Science, Universityof NSW

60. RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives toSecurityRear Admiral Werapon Waranon, RTN

65. “Not the size of the dog in the fight…”RMA – The ADF ApplicationAir Commodore John N. Blackburn, AM, DGPolicy and Planning – Air Force, CommodoreLee Cordner, DG Navy Strategic Policy andFutures and Brigadier Michael A. Swan, DG,Future Land Warfare HQ

70. Network-Enabled Force SynchronisationDr. Jason B. Scholz, DSTO

78. Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Changeand the Revolution in Military AffairsDebateMichael Evans, Australia’s Land Warfare StudiesCentre, Duntroon

90. Revolutionising Australia’s Approach toRevolutionary TimesGraeme Cheeseman, School of PoliticsUniversity College, University of NSW

98. Reviews

2

As defence planners examine the nature offuture warfare in the information age, it is

apparent that new paradigms for the conductof military campaigns are emerging. Theseparadigms redefine complacent thinkingconcerning the: • nature of threats to security; • constraints on the conduct of military

campaigns; and• the character and predictability of

adversaries.The Australian Government established the

Office of the RMA (ORMA) within theDepartment of Defence in May 1999, with thechallenge of “extracting the maximum valuefrom the RMA for the ADF – be it in equipmentacquisition and development, training, doctrinedevelopment or alliance relations".

Using a collaborative approach, ProjectSPHINX was created to identify and exploreinnovative future warfare concepts and theircapability implications through: • Concept Initiation Teams: drawing on people

from throughout Defence, innovative futurewarfare concepts have been developed thatinclude potential organisational, doctrinal andtechnological changes to realise superiority inthe six warfare categories: command, control,communications and computers; intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance; tailoredeffects; force projection; force protection; andforce sustainment.

• Campaign Wargames: the KRAIT series ofseminar-style wargames set in 2025, areplayed at the operational/strategic level toexamine campaign and warfare concepts.Competing campaign concepts are debatedbetween red (using current warfareconcepts), blue (using future warfareconcepts) and coalition and interagencyparticipants. Three KRAIT wargames havebeen conducted to date, with another threeplanned for 2001.

• RMA Working Group: with diversemembership from across Defence andindustry, this group meets on a regularbasis to discuss relevant issues,“compare notes" and workshop specificagenda items. The SPHINX DiscussionForum (on the DEFWEB intranethttp://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/sphinx/)encourages people to generate ideas,comments, responses and papers that leadto the further refinement of the futurewarfare concepts.Project SPHINX has lead to the development

of robust campaign and warfare conceptsrelevant to Australia’s strategic context as partof the Asia Pacific region. These concepts nowform the basis for collaboration within theDefence community, and also presentopportunities to engage with regional and othercountries.

In May 2000, ORMA and the AustralianDefence Studies Centre convened a conferencein Canberra: The RMA in the Asia-Pacific:Challenge and Response. The conference washighly successful and included participants andrepresentatives from Indonesia, Malaysia, theUS, the Republic of Korea, France, Vietnam,New Zealand, Sweden, Thailand, the Philippinesand Singapore.

This special edition of the AustralianDefence Force Journal includes articles byspeakers and participants from the conference.Their articles demonstrate the potential andbenefits of regional engagement andcollaboration.

We hope you find the articles challenging,thought provoking, and useful in developing aconceptual understanding of the impact of theRMA in the unique Asia-Pacific region.

Chairman of the BoardAustralian Defence Force Journal

Foreword

3

Military revolutions over the past twocenturies have tended to conform to this

definition. Some examples include: The Railroad, Rifle and TelegraphRevolution of the mid 19th century thatdisplaced Napoleonic era warfare; The Aviation, Mechanisation, and RadioRevolution of the early 20th century thatproduced the blitzkrieg form of landwarfare and strategic aerial bombardment,while displacing the battle line at sea; and The Nuclear Weapon-Ballistic MissileRevolution of the mid 20th century. Military revolutions tend to bring about

new forms of military operation. For example,the interwar period of the 1920s and 30sbrought about mechanised air-land warfare,strategic aerial bombardment, and integratedstrategic air defences. Prior to World War I, theworld had never experienced a strategicsubmarine blockade.

At present, it seems highly likely that weare in the midst of an emerging militaryrevolution, one driven by rapid advances ininformation and information-relatedtechnologies. Among the new forms of militaryoperation that may fully emerge are: long-range precision strike, information warfare,“anti-access” or “area-denial” operations, spacecontrol and denial, and new forms of maritimecommerce raiding and blockade.

History offers some interesting insights asto the character of military revolutionsthemselves, insights that in some cases clash

with conventional wisdom over the futuremilitary competition:

While technology is a key element in amilitary revolution, it is typically not theelement from which competitive advantageis derived; Having an early lead in developing the newform of warfare that defines the revolutionis no guarantee of long-term success; Transformation paths may be diverse –relatively small, or “niche,” competitorsmay compete quite effectively, as may“asymmetric” competitors; While the entire process of transforming toa new warfare regime tends to take ageneration – or even longer – when theshift comes, it is manifested quite rapidly,offering little time for lagging militarycompetitors to adapt; Relatively small perturbations in militarycapital stock can produce large competitiveadvantages; and The competitive dominance of the firstmilitary organisation to exploit a militaryrevolution is typically short-lived. Military revolutions pose challenges to

national security leaders charged with strategicplanning. Uncertainties abound. For example,the timing of the regime shift is often unclear.While new forms of military operation mayemerge, the scale at which they can beconducted may be critical in determiningmilitary advantage. Yet it may be difficult togauge accurately the “scale factor.” There alsoexists the possibility of “intra-regime shifts” inemerging military competitions. Moreover,

IntroductionDr Andrew Krepinevick, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, USA

A military revolution typically occurs when the application of new technologies into asignificant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts andorganisational adaptation in a way that dramatically increases military effectiveness andfundamentally alters the character and conduct of military competitions.

4

while certain military systems or capabilitiesmay be identified as elements of the comingmilitary regime, it is not often clear whatspecific attributes they should possess. Thus thepriorities (e.g. size, range, speed, armament,armour, command and control linkages) thatshould be given greatest weight in designing,developing and fielding new systems andcapabilities are often unclear.

Compounding the problem, importantassumptions must often be made underconditions of relatively high uncertainty withrespect to the basic characteristics of emergingmilitary competitions. Will they be offensive ordefensive dominant? To what extent does thescale of effort determine such dominance? Isthis dominance stable or dynamic?

On the positive side, experimentation,especially through field exercises, can be animportant means for narrowing the uncertaintysurrounding the systems, doctrines, personnel,and force structures that will be required tooperate effectively in the coming militaryregime. Steps can also be taken in themanagement of defence capital stock to

narrow uncertainty and enhance organis-ational agility.

The defence planners' challenge withrespect to coping with the military revolutionis compounded by the Asia-Pacific region'sgeopolitical flux. The distribution of power inthe region today is significantly different fromthat which existed during the Cold War. Thefuture promises even greater change, with therise of regional powers, such as China andIndia, a recovering regional power in Russia,and a self-limited regional power in Japan. Theinformation revolution may induce majorshifts in the wealth – and power – to thosestates best able to exploit it (as for example,the industrial revolution stimulated GreatBritain's rise to global power status). How willthese changes, combined with the emergingmilitary revolution, influence the long-termrelationships and the balance of military poweramong these powers, the other powers in theregion, and the United States – at present theworld’s only global power? This importantquestion will, no doubt, tax even the mosttalented strategic planners.

Dr Andrew Krepinevich is an accomplished author and lecturer on defence and national security issues with extensiveexecutive and strategic planning experience. Before retiring from the United States Army in 1993, Dr Krepinevichserved on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. In 1997 he was appointed to the Secretary of Defense toserve on the nine-member National Defense Panel. Dr Krepinevich is a graduate of West Point and holds an MPA anda PhD from Harvard University. He is the author of numerous books and articles on defence and security matters.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 144 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2000

5

Changing Security Environment

The requirement for a conceptual approachis clear when the changing features of our

national security environment are consideredin terms of constants, trends and shifts.Constants are those features that endure overtime. Trends describe those aspects that arechanging permanently in the long-term. Shiftsdescribe those elements that can changetemporarily in the short-term. The higher thedegree of change, the greater the need forinnovation to manage it.

ConstantsThe most enduring feature of Australia’s

strategic environment is the focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Australia will act globally wherenecessary to protect its interests, but its primefocus remains the immediate region.

Also, the fundamental reason for theexistence of our defence force remainsconstant. Regardless of other types ofoperations Australia may undertake, the ADFmust be able to unilaterally defeat attacks onAustralia if necessary. Similarly, regardless ofany changes to the nature of the adversary, theADF must be able to defeat the most ruthlessand sophisticated adversary imaginable.

TrendsThe information age is the most significant

trend in Australia’s changing security

environment. The nature of warfare ischanging due to technological developmentsthat are enhancing the speed, range, stealth,precision, impact and flexibility of weapons.While some military technology is onlyavailable to advanced defence forces, otherapplications are commercially available, givingpotential adversaries access to technology theycannot develop themselves.

Most importantly, the possession ofadvanced technology alone does not confer anadvantage. It is the combination oforganisation, doctrine and technology thatleads to a superior military capability. Take theexample of recent conflicts. Technologicalsuperiority can lead to a stunning and decisivevictory over a less sophisticated adversary, asin the Gulf War. However, as in Kosovo, aninnovative adversary can attempt to countersuch measures by targeting political andmilitary weaknesses to prolong the campaignand defeat political objectives. Lastly, EastTimor demonstrates that high technologywarfare is not always necessary or appropriateto conduct a successful campaign.

Information technology is having hugeimpacts on the military in the areas ofcommand and control, communications,intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.Commercially sourced information and

Future Warfare Concepts:Designing the Future Defence Force

By Brigadier S.H. Ayling, Office of the RMA

Our national security environment is becoming increasingly complex and ambiguous. In order tooptimise the ability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to effectively and successfully conductmilitary campaigns in the future, it is necessary to adopt a conceptual approach to future warfare.The design of the future ADF is not a theoretical activity, but one that must deliver affordable andpractical solutions that are consistent with Australia’s strategic context as defined by Governmentsecurity policy. This article describes an innovative architecture for future warfare concepts that canbe used to incorporate organisational, doctrinal and technological changes into the current ADF toensure that the objectives of Government security policy can be successfully achieved in the future.

6 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 144 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2000

technology has an increasing role to play. Inaddition, the power and scope of informationtechnology employed by the media ensuresthat the public is better informed than everbefore, and that public opinion can impact ondecision-makers.

Asymmetric threats to security will becomeincreasingly prevalent. As it continues tobecome more difficult for nations to maintainconventional military superiority or even toremain competitive, the threat from chemical,biological and information attacks willincrease. Non-state actors such as terrorists arealso likely to use such unconventional means.

There is an increasing trend towards totalnational involvement in Defence. This isreflected in the increasing links with industry,other government agencies, non-governmentorganisations and the community. The otherside of the coin is increased Defenceinvolvement in operations short of war, suchas humanitarian relief, illegal fishing andimmigration, counter-terrorism activities andsearch and rescue.

Lastly, one of the major trends in theemerging security environment is the increasein the number of coalition operations. Thereare two main reasons this is occurring. First,the need for international legitimacy is bestsatisfied by the participation of multiplecountries in a UN-sanctioned mission, as thisindicates broad support for the operation’sobjectives. There is also the practical aspectthat no single defence force (apart from maybethe US) either possesses or can afford to supplyall the necessary military components for anygiven campaign.

ShiftsSocial and political influences on the

security environment tend to be shifts. That isthey are temporary and can change at shortnotice in any direction. These sorts of shiftsimpact heavily on democratic governments’decisions as to when, why and how to usemilitary force. Two examples are government

policy, which may shift with a change ingovernment and public opinion. One key issuesubject to public opinion is the willingness ofthe domestic electorate to tolerate casualties.The media plays a significant role in shapingperceptions and shifts in public opinion.

Another potential shift is the degree ofinstability in our region, especially in the innerarc, for example Indonesia and PNG.

Future Warfare Concepts

Warfare CategoriesGiven the changing security environment

described above, concepts provide the mostsuitable basis for designing the future ADF. Aconceptual approach allows decision-makers tofocus on the contribution of certain capabilities(in the broadest sense) to the achievement ofGovernment security policy, rather than thetechnical merits of individual platforms andsystems. An architecture that describes thedimensions of warfare has been developedusing six warfare categories. It provides anintellectual framework to guide theincorporation of organisational, doctrinal andtechnological changes into the ADF throughthe use of warfare concepts. The frameworkallows analysis of current warfare and aims topromote innovation in the ways we conceiveof military superiority in the future, yet providea structure that allows objective assessment ofthe relative priority of various capabilities.

The six categories of warfare used in thedevelopment of future warfare concepts are:• Command, control, computers and

communications;• Intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance;• Tailored effects;• Force projection;• Force protection; and• Force sustainment.

Warfare Concepts Future warfare concepts can be specified

using an Ends, Ways, Means methodology.Superiority in a particular warfare category

7FUTURE WARFARE CONCEPTS: DESIGNING THE FUTURE DEFENCE FORCE

(Ends) is provided by adoption of the mostsuitable warfare concepts (Ways). Concepts aretranslated into actual capabilities through forcestructure, organisation, doctrine and technology(Means). It is through the Means that theServices, DSTO and Industry can generateinnovative options and ideas for capabilitydevelopment from their area of expertise.

The concepts are based on the warfightingabilities necessary to meet the range of possiblesecurity threats in 2025. They are notnecessarily discrete, stand-alone concepts, butcan be used in various combinations. Nor arethey of equal importance. An initial analysisidentified key, enabling and supportingconcepts. It is important to focus on theconcept rather than the organisational,doctrinal and technological changes thatenable it, as they will change over time. Indeedthe aim of innovation is to cause such changesin the search for the optimal capability.

Campaign PlanningIt is by placing warfare concepts into the

context of campaign plans and testing them instrategic wargames that we can establish whichconcepts offer the best way to achieve militarysuperiority in each warfare category. Campaignplanning is the process of orchestrating asequence of actions in time and place toachieve the outcomes required by Government.Campaign planning must be dynamic andflexible in scope to maximise the optionsavailable to commanders in achieving thedesired military endstate. This planning processapplies for everything from disaster relief todefeating an attack on Australia. Whatever thetask, the campaign plan can be built fromelements of the six categories of warfare.

This “campaign" approach incorporatesactions at the strategic, operational and tacticallevels of command whereas the moretraditional “operations" approach tends tofocus on tactical level issues. Future warfarerequires this integrated approach whereby a

single cohesive entity can plan and directoperations.

There are several vital aspects that arecommon to every campaign. Campaignplanning seeks to maximise the overall combatpower of the forces be they joint, combined orcoalition forces. It must also addressmanagement at the three levels of command:the political-military interface at the strategiclevel, the allocation of forces to the theatre ofoperations at the operational level, and actionstaken against the adversary within the theatreof operations at the tactical level of command.Campaign planning must also accommodatethe influence of non-military organisations inthe theatre of operations: including neutralcitizens or refugees, government and non-government organisations, UN agencies andthe media.

Campaign plans are developed for specificreal crises where a military response is beingconsidered (immediate planning). Campaignconcepts can be developed to prepare forhypothetical crises (deliberate planning).Warfare concepts are the components of acampaign concept. Analysis of campaignconcepts allows us to establish whether awarfare concept can contribute to theachievement of Government’s securityrequirements and to identify whichtechnological, organisational and doctrinalimprovements should prove valuable.Campaign concepts must take into account thechallenges presented by the constants, trendsand shifts in the security environment so as toprovide a basis for the structured analysis ofwarfare concepts.

An objective and disciplined analysis of thecampaign concepts serves to highlightcapability weaknesses and can providesubstantial guidance to overcome the threatsposed by both current and future adversarycapabilities, in order to minimise potentialvulnerabilities. The orchestration of theaggregate warfare concepts serves to matchstrengths against weaknesses in the campaign


concepts that will be targeted by the adversary.The philosophy of “competitive strategies"characterises this approach. This process canhighlight relative priorities for capabilitydevelopment needs in a logical framework thatremains consistent with the strategic context inwhich the ADF will operate.

Concept Evaluation – KRAIT wargamesThe strength of the warfare concepts over

previous attempts to enhance strategicguidance to the capability development processis that their evaluation in strategic levelwargames provides some measure of objectiveevidence of their strengths and weaknesses. Itis this objective assessment of the conceptsthat enables the identification of thoseconcepts that are key to the successfulachievement of a campaign. Strategic levelwargames are designed to objectively debatethe relative merits of both current and futureconcepts.

The intention of the KRAIT wargames is toprovide a level of objective judgement on therelative merit of warfare concepts. The firstKRAIT wargame was run in October 1999using the same model as the US Office of NetAssessments Joint 20XX concept games. Underan Asia-Pacific scenario set in 2025, two blueforces were pitted separately against asophisticated and ruthless enemy force in acoalition campaign setting. The first blue forcewas an “evolved" force based largely oncurrent warfare and campaign concepts butsubject to modernisation. The second blueforce was a “transformed" force, incorporatingthe future warfare concepts. The coalition teambrought two key dimensions to the campaign:the availability of support from the US toovercome specific force weaknesses and thedemands of other coalition participants on theADF. By assessing the relative success orotherwise of the “evolved" force and the“transformed" force against the adversary, thewargame provided sound comparisons ofcurrent and future concepts.

The evaluation of concepts must occurover a succession of wargames in order toform a reasonable judgement. A series of fourwargames in the KRAIT series is in progressto evaluate all six warfare categories. KRAIT99 evaluated force projection and forceprotection. KRAIT 00-1 evaluated intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance and forceprotection; KRAIT 00-2 evaluated commandand control and force sustainment; andKRAIT 00-3 will evaluate tailored effects andforce projection.

In addition to the KRAIT series of strategicseminar wargames, there is a range of otherwargames that could be used to evaluate theEnds, Ways and Means of the warfareconcepts. The TAIPAN strategic wargame seriesevaluates the viability of current campaignconcepts through the use of complicated, yetcredible regional contingencies. The ForceStructure Analysis program (not a wargame)tests various force structure options. There arealso a wide variety of strategic level USwargames (Joint 20XX, AAN, Global, GlobalExchange, FLOW, Dynamic Commitment) thatcould provide the opportunity for us to testthose ADF current and future concepts that arerelevant to combined operations. Theevaluation of the concepts through wargamesis critical to establishing sufficient evidence fortheir acceptance and recognition as animportant input into the capabilitydevelopment process. Evaluation of ADFconcepts in US wargames provides a furtherlevel of evidence in addition to being avaluable basis for the exchange of informationand technology.

Basis for CollaborationWarfare concepts provide a viable basis for

strategic engagement within Defence tofacilitate a truly joint approach to capabilitydevelopment. Collaboration with areas outsideof Defence, such as industry, should also beencouraged in the search for innovativesolutions. Also, future warfare concepts


provide a sound basis for collaboration withprincipal allies and regional friends. The needfor a conceptual approach to future warfare isgaining wide acceptance in the US andregionally. The challenge now is to determinehow best to collaborate on the developmentand evaluation of concepts, particularly thosecritical to the conduct of combined andcoalition campaigns.

Strategic Context

The Enterprise Architecture ModelPractical benefits to the ADF warfare

capability can only be gained if thedevelopment of future warfare concepts isplaced in the specific context of the Asia-Pacific strategic environment, Governmentsecurity policy and the capacity of the DefenceOrganisation to manage and fund newcapabilities. The Enterprise Architecture Modeloffers a recognised means of representing thefunctions and outcomes of the DefenceOrganisation.

The model comprises four interconnectedlevels representing the policy, operational,systems and technical components of theorganisation. The “policy" level represents thecorporate executive level where strategicguidance and policy are determined and

includes the security objectives that Defence isrequired to achieve. The “operational" leveldefines the concepts and capabilities used toachieve stated security objectives. The“systems" level develops the force structureand preparedness to achieve these objectives,and the “technical" level is made up of theunderlying processes including acquisition andbudget. The model seeks to link all aspects ofthe defence process in order to overcome thetendency to contain changes such as fundingcuts in the technical and systems levels alone.The operational level provides the critical linkbetween the policy and systems levels toredress this weakness, by using the warfareconcepts to translate strategic direction into thegeneration of future ADF capability.

The Operational LevelThe operational level of the enterprise

architecture model describes both immediateand deliberate planning. That is, theorchestration of campaign plans for currentoperations and the development of campaignconcepts to address plausible futurecontingencies. As described above, campaignconcepts can be based on the commonframework provided by the six warfarecategories and can address joint, combined or

Policy

Operational

Systems

Technical

Deliberate andimmediate planning

Strategic policy andmilitary strategy

Capability andoperational plans

Force structure andpreparedness plans

People, budget,acquisition and doctrine

Australian Defence Organisation(Enterprise Architecture Model)


coalition forces together with inter-departmental agencies. Analysis of the futurewarfare concepts through deliberate planningcan seek ways of redressing current capabilityweaknesses to counter predicted threats to ADFcapability out to 2025.

Previously, Defence has tended to rely onimmediate planning at the tactical andoperational levels of command, and theflexibility and versatility of our commanders tomeet warfare contingencies as they arise. Asthe nature of warfare changes and budgetsbecome more constrained, it is vital that moreattention be given to deliberate planning toensure that the capability development processresults in the capabilities the ADF needs tomeet Government’s security objectives. Theintention is to maximise the overlap betweendeliberate and immediate planning so that thedegree of advance preparation is as high aspossible. It is recognised that the degree ofoverlap between the two will vary for differentmilitary response options depending on thecomplexity of the task. However, the pointremains that expanding the use of deliberateplanning through the application of futurewarfare concepts and campaign concepts andthe definition of a substantive operational levelof Defence enterprise architecture is anessential step in the development of superiorfuture warfighting capabilities.

Military Response OptionsThe Australian Military Strategy (AMS)

provides a deliberate planning tool based oncurrent strategic guidance, adversary capabilityand the security environment in theforeseeable future. The AMS expresses thewarfighting options available to meet thestrategic objectives of Government. The AMS iscomprised of Military Strategic Objectives(MSO) which can form the basis of the“contract" between the Government andDefence to provide the scope of likelycircumstances in which the Government willcommit force and the potential constraints that

will be imposed. The MSO are reasonablygeneric in order to comprehensively cover allplausible security challenges and will beenduring over time. They can be furtherdefined as specific Military Response Options(MRO) to meet particular crises and articulatethe various campaign requirements necessaryto achieve the MSO. The MRO are defined bycampaign concepts at any given point in timeand so will evolve as constants, trends andshifts lead to changes in the strategicenvironment and the level of threat. Anotherway of looking at this is to say that theoptimal organisational, doctrinal andtechnological means for achieving warfareconcepts will change over time as the strategiccontext changes. An achievable outcome ofthe operational level architecture is thegeneration of a practical transition strategy toguide the necessary changes between the ADFforce-in-being, the programmed force, and thefuture force.

ConclusionFuture warfare concepts are an essential

step in the design of the future ADF. Thenature of warfare is changing, a trendcomplicated by the influences of theinformation age on the size, shape andaffordability of military forces; theresponsibilities of governments and globalorganisations; the demands of democraticsocieties; and realities of economic andmonetary pressures. The Australian strategiccontext requires a conceptual approach toallow the opportunities and realities of theinformation age be grasped, and incorporatedinto affordable ADF military capabilities tomeet the expectations of Government and theAustralian people. The approach must alsoincorporate ideas and innovations that aregenerated from a wide base, not only fromexperts within the Australian DefenceOrganisation but from the government,financial, business and consumer sectors of thepopulation. The approach must be sustained by


fresh innovative solutions to challenges for thefuture, to avoid complacency or inferiority incapability planning.

The design of the ADF of the future can bebased on a logical approach that comprisessix categories of warfare: command, control,communications and computers; intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance; tailoredeffects; force projection; force protection; andforce sustainment. Warfare concepts for eachcategory can be specified using an Ends,Ways, Means methodology providing acommon architecture in which innovativeideas can be represented and analysed. TheEnds is the superiority over the adversary ineach warfare category. The Ways is the rangeof possible future warfare concepts that canpotentially achieve the endstate and theMeans is the potential organisational,doctrinal and technological changes thattranslate the warfare concepts intocapabilities for the ADF. By aggregatingwarfare concepts into campaign conceptsrelevant to Australia’s strategic context,decision-makers can focus on the broadercapability implications in terms of the ADF’sability to meet Government securityobjectives rather than the technical merits ofindividual platforms.

This goal can be achieved through theeffective definition of the “operational" level

of the enterprise architecture model. Betterdefinition of the “operational" level isdependent on a disciplined approach to thedeliberate planning of campaign conceptsthat meet the scope of military responseoptions necessary to achieve the broadermilitary strategic objectives defined byGovernment security policy. Evaluation ofalternate campaign concepts through strategicwargames and the analysis of currentoperations provides an objective assessmentof the suitability of the Ends, Ways, Meansspecification for each warfare concept. Thewargames can replicate the challenges ofjoint, combined or coalition operations beingconducted in situations with inter-agencyinvolvement, against the probable actions ofsophisticated and ruthless adversaries. Theoutcome of the evaluation is a warfareconcept that can inform and reliably guidethe incorporation of selected organisational,doctrinal and technological opportunitiesfrom the information age to enhance themilitary capability of the ADF.

Failure to design the future ADF toadequately meet the challenges of the 21stcentury will increase the risk of failure inoperations. The development and evaluationof future warfare concepts to guide capabilitydevelopment will meet this challenge.

Brigadier Steve Ayling is currently Director General Military Strategy in Strategy and Ministerial Services Division, ADHQ. He waspromoted to Brigadier and assumed his appointment in March 1999 following a short appointment in Army Headquarters – FutureLand Warfare Branch. From September until November 1999, Brigadier Ayling was detached to Strategic Command as the DirectorGeneral INTERFET Branch, where he was the Australian Military Coordinator of the multi-national force that operated in EastTimor. Brigadier Ayling graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1975 and was allocated to the Royal Australian Corps ofSignals. He completed the British Army Telecommunications Engineering Management Course at the Royal School of Signals,Blandford Forum in the UK, and after several communications staff and regimental appointments attended the Pakistan ArmyCommand and Staff College, Quetta in 1986. Brigadier Ayling has commanded 103 Signal Squadron 3rd Brigade and the 2nd Signal Regiment, and served on the Directing Staffat the Australian Army Command and Staff College. He deployed to Cambodia in 1992 as Commander of the Australian Contingentto the UNAMIC and the UNTAC Missions. In this appointment he was also Commanding Officer of the Force Communications Unit(FCU) and Chief Signals Officer on HQ UNTAC. The FCU comprised Australian Army, RAAF, RAN and New Zealand Defence Forcepersonnel.On his return to Australia as a Lieutenant Colonel he attended Joint Services Staff College followed by a staff appointment in JointCommunications Electronic Branch Operations Division HQADF prior to his promotion to Colonel on appointment as Director ofPlans-Army. He attended the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, graduating as a member of Academic Year 1998.Brigadier Ayling was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia (Military Division) in 1993 for services as a Commanding Officer2nd Regiment and Commander of the Australian Contingent UNTAC.

12

In the 1990s, we were introduced to thechallenges we will face in the 21st century.

In operations the United States conducted inHaiti, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia, wewere given a glimpse of the types ofcontingencies that we can expect in the firstpart of this century. We learned that ouroverwhelming capabilities for conventionalmajor theatre war may not provide the toolswe need to succeed in this environment.Although we ultimately accomplished most ofour objectives in these operations, oursuccesses were neither as rapid as we hadplanned, nor always as decisive as we wouldhave liked. Our challenge is that of buildingthe capability to bring such contingencies to arapid and decisive close, while at the same timenot losing our ability to prevail in the event ofa major theatre war.

The United States Joint Forces Command(USJFCOM) is experimenting with a newconstruct of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)for addressing these types of situations. It aimsat enabling success at acceptable cost in alimited conflict with a competent regionalpower. An RDO is an operation that achievesrapid victory by destroying the coherence ofthe enemy’s war-making capabilities throughthe precisely distributed application of the full

range of joint and national capabilities in anearly, direct, and multi-dimensional strikeagainst the enemy’s critical functions. Theobjective of the operation is to incapacitate theenemy by destroying its ability to conductcoherent operations and breaking its will tofight. It is a new paradigm for operations inwhich we, not our adversaries, dictate theterms by which we will fight. We prevail byasymmetrically assaulting the enemy with allthe elements of national power, fromdimensions and directions against which theenemy has no counter. We use the synergisticapplication of the full capabilities of the nationto inflict an awesome, shocking application ofnational power that paralyses the enemy’sability to act. It precludes its options, seizes theoperational and strategic initiatives, denies itany opportunity to achieve its objectives, andgenerates in the enemy a sense of inevitablefailure and defeat.

Our objective is to use to advantage thetechnical, operational, economic, andintegrating capabilities unique to our nation(and a few of our closest political and militaryallies) to confront the enemy with sucha complex and overwhelming set ofasymmetrical challenges that it quickly realisesit cannot resist. As a result of our operation,

The Rapid, Decisive Operation:A Construct for an American Way of War

in the 21st Century By Colonel David J. Ozolek, US Army (Retired)

The new century is confronting the United States with a set of national security challenges forwhich we are not yet fully prepared. A changed geostrategic situation generated by the end of theCold War has resulted in an age of instability and the emergence of a new and different spectrum ofthreats that are extremely difficult for our legacy capabilities to address. Dramatic technologicaldevelopments in the information, biological, and space sciences offer extraordinary opportunities forthe advancement of military science and, equally, present significant dangers to our security.Together, this geostrategic change and the proliferation of advanced technologies have reconfiguredthe battlescape in which military operations in the 21st century will occur.

13

the enemy is left with the clear understandingthat it has only two options: 1) concedeimmediately, or 2) face ultimate destruction indetail.

The asymmetric advantages we will exploitin this fight include our ability to:– Dominate the information environment so

that we gain a degree of knowledgesuperiority that allows us to exploit theconditions of the battlespace, while limitingthe enemy’s ability to understand thesituation.

– Control the sea and to come from the sea.No other nation in the next decades has thecapacity to create a credible challenge toour ability to control the maritime domain.

– Control the air and to strike from the air.Although the enemy will attempt to denyus use of the air through advanced airdefence system, we alone possess thecapability to conduct operationallysignificant air operations

– Conduct significant operations from andin space. Other powers will attempt toapply existing space-based capabilities(such as leveraging third party commercialassets), but we alone in the next decadeswill have the capability to shape the spacedimension of the battlespace.

– Use stealth technology to deny the enemyknowledge and understanding of ouractions.

– Conduct rapid global force projection anddeep operational reach.

– Apply integrated precision effects in theconduct of effects-based operations. The RDO concept provides a joint context

for the application of current and emergingsea, air, land, space, and information systemsin a coherently joint rapid and decisiveoperation. The integrated nature of RDO willassist the Service force providers with planningand refining their programmed and envisionedforces. RDO concept development andexperimentation will demonstrate not onlyhow well Service concepts and systems work,

but more importantly, how well they worktogether in a common joint environment.

The RDO concept also calls for greaterinteraction among the Department of Defenceand the other departments of government. Itacknowledges that in 21st century warfare,defeat of the enemy’s warfighting capabilitiesalone may be insufficient to generate thedecisive effects required. Instead, we will haveto defeat its war-making capability. Thisrequires striking at not only the enemy’smilitary means, but possibly also the political,production, distribution, financial, andinformation systems that support it. We willuse appropriate and proportionate kinetic andnon-kinetic, lethal and non-lethal means fromacross the departments to generate the preciseand specific effects required to disrupt thesynergies that enable the enemy to operatecoherently.

The Rapid Decisive Operations concept is abody of joint operational principles thatextends across the first decades of the century.Although it exploits revolutionary capabilities,it does not depend on any specific technology.In RDO concept development and experi-mentation, we will explore how we can applythis new operational paradigm as ourtechnological capabilities change across time.We will determine how we need to enhanceour current forces for operations in this decade,and how those forces need to evolve in orderto successfully conduct an RDO in the decadethat follows.

Our current force was designed primarily tofight and win a major theatre war against amilitary peer competitor. Since the fall of theSoviet Union, we have re-sized the Cold Warforce into a smaller, but not different, versionof itself. Most of our Cold War doctrine,including our principles of operations andforce design, remains in effect. Following ourconvincing demonstration of major theatre warcapability against Iraq in 1991, it is unlikelythat we will face a major conventionalchallenger in the next few decades. No single

THE RAPID, DECISIVE OPERATION – A CONSTRUCT FOR AN AMERICAN WAY OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

14

nation currently has the economicinfrastructure and technological base to field aforce capable of competing in major theatrewar against us. The likelihood of an alliance ofnations emerging with the consensus onideology, interests, and approach needed to puttogether such a force is even more remote.Although major theatre war remains thegreatest threat to our nation’s interests; thelikelihood of such a conflict is slim.

We also maintain a significant capability toconduct low-intensity operations. We have“lighter” forces that can dominate low-intensity operations such as stability operationsor humanitarian assistance. Although theseforces are capable of quick response andsuccess on the low end of the operationalspectrum, they do not have the lethality andtactical mobility necessary to succeed against asophisticated regional power.

What is likely and dangerous, however, isthe emergence of a number of regional powersthat can develop a competent militarycapability by accessing the sophisticatedmilitary technology available in the globalmarketplace. Such a power could achieve,within an acceptable cost and in a very neartimeframe, a level of military capacity thatcould give them the ability to exploit thecurrent limitations of our legacy force andachieve an operational-level victory against us.Such adversaries have been learning from ourrecent operations and adapting intoincreasingly dangerous threats. We need ajoint force that can achieve rapid and decisivevictory over the threats we can reasonablyexpect to encounter in the next decades. Thesuccess of that force needs to come from itsoperational proficiency; not from theoverwhelming national resources it hasavailable and can consume.

The RDO is a concept for projectingsufficient national power across globaldistances to militarily incapacitate, in days orweeks, a capable regional power that mayhave:

– A numerically superior combined armsforce;

– The “home field” advantage;– The capability to deny us access through

asymmetric means that may include:– Theatre missiles;– Integrated and mobile air defences;– Weapons of mass destruction;– Mines and sophisticated forms of

coastal defence;– A modern, distributed, and effective C4

system;– A competent Information Operation

capable of attacking our national andcoalition will to fight;

– A significantly different value system thataccepts a willingness to inflict and sustainsignificant military and civilian casualties;

– The capability for adaptive learning and noconstraints on the time required to achievesuccess.This enemy will attempt to defeat our force

by drawing us into a prolonged, slow, andindecisive operation. It will focus on denyingus access to the theatre of operations throughthe use of asymmetric anti-access systems. Itwill attempt to draw us into a costly landbattle of attrition. Its objective will be to inflictmajor casualties on our forces in order to causeus to doubt our ability to win. It will target thewillingness of the American people to stay thecourse. Our imperatives become rapid access,highly efficient operations, acceptable cost, andearly success.

To succeed in this environment, we mustmitigate some of the current limitations toconducting rapid and decisive operations.These include:– Insufficient capability for rapid strategic

deployment resulting from a force tooheavy to move for the limited number ofstrategic lift (sea and air) platformsavailable.

– Less-than-optimum capability to conductcoherently joint operations that synergise,


15THE RAPID, DECISIVE OPERATION – A CONSTRUCT FOR AN AMERICAN WAY OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

vice deconflict, the full range of joint andnational capabilities

– Dependency on extensive logistical supportfrom forward bases that may not beavailable.

– Insufficient capability to mitigateasymmetric access-denial systems such astheatre ballistic missiles armed withweapons of mass destruction, or mobile,integrated long-range air defence systems.

– Cold War, attrition-oriented doctrine thatcannot achieve decisive results rapidlyenough to meet the political realities of the21st century.

– A constraining set of political-militaryrealities that include:– New dynamics for strategic decision-

making; – Expectation of victory in weeks, not

months; – A requirement for zero American

casualties; – A desire for near-zero collateral

casualties and the infliction of onlyprecision, limited destruction of theenemy;

– A necessity of retaining the political,moral, and ethical “high ground” inoperations.

The RDO will differ significantly andfundamentally from the way we currentlyconduct a campaign. The power of informationsuperiority systems available today and thoseexpected to emerge throughout the decade willenable radical changes in the way we canconduct operations. By fighting for, achieving,and exploiting information superiority, we canreduce the risks that are today associated withbold action, and we can dramatically increasethe pace, coherence, and effectiveness ofoperations. However, to exploit the power ofinformation and knowledge, we will have tochange several of the fundamental principlesthat govern today’s operations.

For much of our post-World War II militaryhistory, the primary function of the joint force

headquarters in any operation has been todeconflict the operations of its Army, Air Force,and Navy components. Deconfliction ensuredthat the greatest number of targets wereengaged, duplications were eliminated, andelements from different services (often lackinginteroperable command and control systems)did not interfere with each other’s operations.Under this deconfliction construct, Servicecomponent commanders retained a highdegree of independence of action. However, inmany ways, multiple concurrent campaignswere conducted, only loosely connected to acommon goal.

In the 1990s we achieved a considerablyhigher degree of joint action by establishingmechanisms for synchronising, vicedeconflicting, the actions of the Servicecomponents of the joint force. Functionalcomponent commanders began to directdimensionally similar elements (air, ground,sea) from multiple services to achieve thecommon, joint, dimensional objectives definedby the joint force commander. Effective (yetsometimes cumbersome) joint controlmechanisms, such as Joint Target CoordinationBoards, served as operational-levelsynchronisation centres for applying thecapabilities of the joint force across the jointoperational area. However, the ground, sea,and air components still often perform asseparate entities within the campaign, oftencompeting for limited key resources such asstrategic lift.

In RDO we strive for a level of jointnessabove synchronisation of effort. Coherentjointness means that operations are plannedjoint from the beginning. All assets areconsidered joint assets, regardless of theService that provides them. There are noobstacles to any element of the joint forceimmediately supporting or being supported byany other element of the joint force. Operatingelements of the joint force are organisedaccording to purpose and function, notaccording to Service or even dimensional lines.

16

The mission of joint functional componentcommanders expands from one of integratingdimensionally similar assets from differentServices, to one in which they integrate, asrequired, even dissimilar assets from differentServices, to achieve specific operational effects.For example, in RDO, the construct of close airsupport to enable ground manoeuvre andengagement could be complemented by aconstruct of close ground support to enable airmanoeuvre and engagement.

In today’s operations, we strive to ensurethat commanders develop a keen sense ofsituational awareness. Situational awarenessmeans the ability to identify the locations andactions of friendly, enemy, and all otherentities that materially affect the conduct ofthe battle. It also requires the ability to analyseand understand the physical characteristics ofthe battlespace and the advantages of criticalterrain features. Commanders and planners usethis awareness of the terrain and the relativecapabilities of friendly and enemy capabilitiesto anticipate enemy courses of action, and toenable the focus of joint efforts where theybest and most directly contribute to achievingobjectives. Intelligence Preparation of theBattlespace (IPB) identifies likely or potentialenemy courses of action and indicators thatcan confirm enemy activities. IPB provides thetool by which commanders can “read thebattlespace” as the operation unfolds, gaining adecision-making advantage by having pre-planned options available for rapid executionas indicators confirm the enemy is executingthe potential courses of action the IPB processdefined.

However, our “stove-piped” intelligencesystems and the relatively “primitive” sensingand fusing capabilities of our legacy forcemake this an unreliable and risky way ofoperating. Our current doctrine (JointPublication 3-0) warns: “commanders andplanners should carefully consider theinformation upon which decisions are beingbased. Where possible, multiple or redundant

sources of information from various dimensionsshould be employed in the decision-makingprocess.” The result is that commandersmitigate the risks that come with bold actionby taking more deliberate steps to develop thesituation before committing to decisive action.This includes such cautionary measures asleading the advance with small elements thatconfirm suspected enemy locations and thenassist the subsequent employment of decisiveforce against them. The requirements to verify,expand, and then assess and developinformation require time and resources thatconstrain the velocity of the operation. Wetrade time for reducing the risks that comefrom our limited current capabilities forgenerating situational awareness.

In Rapid Decisive Operations, we movefrom merely developing Situational Awarenessto exploiting Battlespace Understanding.Information Superiority enables us to mitigaterisk by providing commanders and plannerswith an accurate, comprehensive, timely, andshared view of the battlespace. The capabilityfor Battlespace Understanding comes from thecombination of near-real time and detailedinformation collected by a networked systemof advanced sensors, and the capability to fusethat information into a common andcomprehensive understanding of thebattlespace. This understanding includes notonly the awareness of the terrain, location ofmilitary elements, and potential enemy coursesof action provided by IPB, but also anoperational net assessment of the enemy’sintent, actions, and vulnerabilities. It integratesthe political, cultural, economic, andinformation realities of the enemy into anunderstanding of the situation from theenemy’s perspective, avoiding the “mirror-imaging” that sometimes clouds our ability toappreciate how the enemy will react to ourefforts.

The success of today’s operation is oftenmeasured in the amount of enemy materiel,infrastructure, or personnel destroyed as a



result of our attacks. We focus primarily ondestroying the enemy’s physical ability toconduct war. Our principal targets are enemycombat formations – ground manoeuvre units,air squadrons, fleets or flotillas. We supportthese efforts with attacks on enemy supportfunctions by engaging enemy C2 locations,supply points, and air defence sites. Theconstruct is that by physically damagingsignificant numbers of key enemy elements,we can defeat them by reducing a number ofcombat elements below a certain threshold ofeffectiveness, or we can destroy the balance byreducing certain essential supporting functionsbelow their ability to control or sustain theforce.

The keys to successful attrition warfare arenumerical superiority and the application ofoverwhelming force. We teach that ourattacking forces must have a 3:1 or betternumerical advantage in order to succeed. Thisleads to situations as we saw in the KosovoCampaign of 1999 when we determined wewould need multiple ground divisions in orderto succeed against the number of Serbianground manoeuvre elements present inKosovo. The result is we require unacceptableamounts of time to build up the overwhelmingcapabilities prescribed by our current doctrineas necessary to ensure success. In recent yearswe have begun to appreciate the advantagesthat qualitative superiority and joint actionbrings to the fight, but we have not yetcompletely divorced ourselves from the idea ofneeding overwhelming numerical superiorityto achieve success.

In the RDO, we replace reliance onnumerical superiority and overwhelming forcewith focus on the velocity of the operation andthe application of precision effects. Our attackis more than force-oriented; it is oriented onthe coherence of the enemy’s force. We rely onthe qualitative superiority of our asymmetricadvantages and our coherently joint approachto attack the synergy that holds the enemy’scapabilities together. A construct of nodal

analysis and complex targeting identifies theconnections among enemy capabilities anddestroys them. As required, we can continue toattack enemy formations and functions indetail, but they are not our primary targets. Weidentify through detailed analysis that whichthe enemy holds in highest value and denythose either through destruction, isolation, orsuppression. Success is measured not inmagnitude or scope of destruction, but in thedegree of effect achieved on the enemy’sability and willingness to continue the fight.

The types of forces involved in theseoperations will derive their effectiveness (andsurvival) from superior knowledge, mobility,precision stand-off capabilities, and the abilityto integrate the capabilities of the joint force,not from armoured protection and volume offirepower alone.

Because of the mass necessary to win theprimarily land-centric battle we anticipated inCold War, Central Europe, we developed aforce structure in which all units wereconfigured for rapid integration into theprincipal fight. We built a relativelyhomogenous “general purpose” force designedfor the battle in Central Europe. When lessercontingencies developed, we organised anexpeditionary force for the particular task athand, defined the mission of that force,conducted the reorganisation and training forthe mission, and executed the operation whenready. We called this principle taskorganisation. At the conclusion of the mission,the elements involved returned to their place inthe Cold War order of battle and re-configuredand retrained themselves for their primarymission. Since these contingencies were seenas having minor risk compared to the centralbattle, we could accept the cost of time,training, and re-configurations necessary fortask organisation.

However, the operational requirements ofour early 21st century environment cannotaccept the costs associated with ad hoc taskorganisations. The necessity of rapid response

18

does not allow for extended re-organisationand training for the deploying force.Constrained budgets, multiple globalrequirements, and limited force structure makeextended configuration and re-configurationunacceptable. We can no longer accept theinefficiencies of the construct of taskorganising major Service headquarters intoJoint Task Forces on a mission-by-missionbasis. Instead, RDO proposes that we form jointoperational-level headquarters as our primaryoperational-level structures.

Historically, our operations have beenlargely symmetrical in nature. We expected tofight an enemy whose way of fighting wassimilar to our own. In legacy operations, westrove to achieve dimensional superioritythrough dimensional means. Our fleet rolledback the enemy’s maritime assets and clearedthe sea; our air forces rolled back the enemy’soffensive and defensive air capabilities andcleared the air; our ground forces defeated theenemy’s ground forces in a series ofengagements that led to the decisive clashamong like elements. The joint forceheadquarters at best synchronised, or at worstdeconflicted, these symmetrical clashes. As ourconcept of jointness matured fromdeconfliction to synchronisation, we began toidentify advantages to asymmetrical supportwithin operations. We developed concepts forJoint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses inwhich we augmented the aerial capabilities ofthe joint force with support from ground ornaval fires to mitigate the enemy’s air defencecapabilities. However, these early asymmetricjoint operations were conducted primarily onthe tactical level. At the operational level,functional component commanders normallycontinued to put their primary focus ondefeating their enemy sea, land, or aircounterparts.

In the RDO, we create favourableasymmetries at the operational level. We useour maritime dimensional superiority to exploitopportunities ashore. We use our aerial

elements as not only fire support, but alsomanoeuvre elements in their own right. Weemploy our ground elements, in conjunctionwith all the other elements of the joint force,against enemy air defence, theatre missile, andair bases – not just enemy ground forces - toshape and open opportunities for engagementfrom other dimensions. We employ decisivesea and air-based effects against enemyground combat elements, as enabled by ourground elements. The decisive battle is notseen as a titanic, final clash of groundelements, but instead the total joint force’sdistributed and comprehensive attack on theenemy’s coherence.

Another fundamental difference of RDO isthat we move from today’s concept of linearoperations to a construct of distributedoperations. The measures we use today to planand control operations consist of such tools asLines of Communications, Fire SupportCoordination Lines, Forward Lines of Troops,Lines of Departure, etc. Lines are essential fordeconflicting the battlespace to keep our forcesfrom interfering with each other. Stepping overa line can cause significant disruption to thelinear flow of our operations. We follow a line(or axis) of advance that links together“decisive points.” We debate the merits of“interior” and “exterior” lines. Because of ourlimited ability to visualise the battlespace, weproceed linearly through the area ofoperations, ensuring no gaps in our formationsthat an undetected threat might be able toexploit. We teach mutual support as a keyoperational construct. We keep our elementsphysically close enough to be able to provideimmediate support when unexpected situationsarise.

In RDO, we think in terms of networkedand distributed operations. The high degree ofbattlefield understanding we achieve from ourinformation superiority efforts allows us tomanoeuvre through space and time in waysnot previously possible. We can take actionsthat our old paradigm would consider



unacceptably risky. We don’t have to open andsustain lines of communication – we create orexploit time-definite opportunities in thebattlespace that can meet our needs. We don’tworry about physical connectivity betweenand among manoeuvre elements. Informationconnectivity is more important. Our currentconstruct of mutual support is replaced by aconstruct of network support. Any of theelements in the joint force can receive near-instantaneous support from any other elementin the joint force, not just neighbouring,similar elements. The links among elements inthe battlespace are as important as theelements themselves. Operations take place infour (physical space + time), and even five,dimensions (a battlespace in which theknowledge domain becomes a manoeuvredimension).

The result is a construct of a trulydistributed battlespace in which thenetworking of opportunities shapes theconstruct of the operation. Friendly and enemydynamics are seen as systems of systems thatgenerate the synergies upon which war-making capability depends, and the networksthat tie them together. The connections thatgive them their coherency become the truecentres of gravity for effects-based operations.

In linear operations, seizing and holdingterrain has always been an imperative of mostoperations. We have a military folk axiom thatstates “Never pay for a piece of terrain twicewith soldiers’ blood.” In RDO we would re-write that axiom to state “Never pay in bloodto hold on to a piece of terrain you no longerneed”.

In RDO, terrain is a means to an end, notan end in itself. It is of value only for the timeit contributes advantage to the force.Battlespace Understanding tells us where andwhen terrain is of time-definite value. Weexploit our superior mobility to get to it beforethe enemy can understand its value and reactto the situation. Instead of establishingenduring support or other operational

locations, we create and occupy “sanctuaries”only for the time-definite period that we needthem. At the end of their usefulness, wecollapse them and invest no further resourcesin retaining them. We subsequently re-use theassets to establish new sanctuaries at otherplaces and times in the battlespace.

The time-definite aspects of terrain alsoapply to the effects we generate on enemycapabilities. We are constantly shaping and re-shaping the battlespace as the situationevolves. We use a variety of means to createtime-definite effects, which we can reversewhen we need to. For example, instead ofdestroying bridges across major obstacles, wemay use non-kinetic means to deny the enemyuse of the bridge for a specific period of time.At the end of the defined time, the effectdisappears and the bridge becomes available tous. The orientation of our effort is on theenemy’s coherence. Terrain is seized only whenit provides a tactical or operational advantageand is held only as long as it produces thatadvantage.

Our current processes are primarilysequential. We analyse the situation, developcourses of action, decide, issue orders, prepare,move, etc., in a sequential basis. No one wouldthink of moving before the order to do so isprepared. This methodology is firmly rooted inour joint and Service doctrine as the deliberateplanning process. Crisis action planningprovides for a few shortcuts, but still requireslargely sequential steps. The sequence requiresconsiderable time. We repeat the process ateach level of command, as the order movesdown the operational hierarchy, burning uplarge quantities of precious time as intentprogressively rolls downhill.

In RDO, we use advanced informationmanagement capabilities, such as collaborativeplanning tools and the Common RelevantOperational Picture (CROP), to compress theamount of time necessary to move fromawareness to action. Collaborative tools enablemultiple levels of command to plan

20

simultaneously in order to avoid having topass the plan through each level beforeproceeding on to the next. The CROP providesall levels with a common understanding of thesituation. Because we have an accurate andshared understanding of such key elements asthe location, capabilities, and status of all ofthe elements of the joint force, movement canbegin while planning is underway. The netresult of advanced information managementtools is the dramatic compression of the timenecessary to begin the decisive operation.

Over the next four years, US Joint ForcesCommand will conduct several majorexperiments that will explore alternativemeans for enabling this new way of fighting.In 2002 the Command will execute a majorfield event called “Millennium Challenge” thatwill employ several of the Services’ excitingnew concepts in a coherently joint operation.These elements include the Air Force’s“Aerospace Expeditionary Forces”, the Army’s“Interim Brigade Combat Teams”, the Navy’sconstruct for “Network-Centric” warfare, andthe Marine Corps concept for “Ship toOperational Manoeuvre”. The purpose of the

experiment will be to assess the effectivenessand interoperability of these concepts inmeeting the requirements of an RDO. Theresults of the experiment will identifyremaining issues that must be resolved to givethe US forces the capability to conduct RapidDecisive Operations in the second half of thisdecade.

In 2004 a subsequent experiment dubbed“Olympic Challenge” will examine RDO in the2015 timeframe. This experiment will explorewhat revised or additional capabilities will berequired for a successful RDO against thosecapabilities potentially in the hands of regionalthreats in the next decade.

The Command appreciates the importanceof potential allied contributions to theseefforts. It recognises that such operations areunlikely to be successful unless conducted in amulti-national context that leverages thecapabilities of a coalition. As a result, theCommand is issuing invitations forparticipation in the RDO concept developmentand experimentation campaign to selectedallied and coalition partners.

David J. Ozolek is a member of the Old Dominion University Research Foundation on appointment to the US JointForces Command as a special assistant for joint experimentation. In his 30 years of active duty with the US ArmyInfantry, he commanded tactical units from the platoon through the brigade level. He served three tours in Cold WarGermany and participated in operations in Vietnam, Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, and Albania. His final active dutyassignment was as the Director of the joint experimentation program’s Joint Warfighting Experimentation BattleLaboratory.


21

Half a decade after Desert Storm and amidsthuge drawdowns in Western military

Research, Development & Acquisitionexpenditure, all of us saw a differentrevolution. The Internet revolution was drivennot by military but by commercial initiatives.We in the military have had to quicklyfamiliarise ourselves with a whole newvocabulary in the last five years comprisingsuch terms as Moore's Law, “point-and-click”,“cookies” etc. The military has also recognisedthe value of “dual-use” to offset the reductionsin military R&D budgets, but has begun tograpple with the new challenges of dealingwith threats coming via the informationfrontier.

In the decade after Desert Storm, we havealso begun to note the increasing challenges tomilitary operations in a globally-connected,uni-polar world: • The influence of global media on political

agendas and military objectives. • The increasing linkage between the

perception of vital national interests versusthe acceptability of military casualties.

• The need to balance the real interests ofnations operating as parts of UN-sponsoredcoalitions versus an evolving set of perhaps

not-so-universal principles of internationalconduct.

• Uncertainty over the shifts in centres ofeconomic, political and military power andthe preparedness of the world's existingmajor powers to contain, counter or engagethem.

What RMA?With these as a backdrop, let me begin by

asking whether we really have a commonnotion of what the RMA really entails, andwhether we have seen all the drivers unfolding.The popular press would like to simplify this toa technology-based revolution, in step with theInternet revolution gripping many societies. InSingapore, the talk is on “Old Economy” versus“New Economy”. Without an “e-strategy”,businesses feel they will have no competitiveadvantage in the brave new world of theWireless Application Protocol (WAP).

The reality, I believe, is that the RMA isbeing shaped by the confluence of severalcurrents of change - technological, social,political and economic in nature. Certainly, thepotential for a new war-form to emerge basedon technological innovation has been brewingfor several decades but it is the coincidence of

Impact of RMA on Command and Control –An SAF Perspective

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Lim, Assistant Chief General Staff (Plans),Singapore Armed Forces

In the last few years, a tremendous volume of discussion has been generated both in academicand professional military circles over the impact of a Revolution in Military Affairs.

A decade ago, CNN brought vivid images of the high-tech weaponry used in Operation DesertStorm into our living rooms and fired the imagination of military planners and operators aroundthe world. The contribution of precision weapons to a military operation was observed on anunprecedented scale as was the effervescent presence of the media. The lightning pace of thesuccessful operation and the low number of Allied casualties stood in marked contrast to theprotracted conflict between Iran and Iraq of the earlier decade characterised by indecisive outcomesand high casualties.


many other factors which has propelleddiscussion on it to the forefront. Fifty yearsfrom now, we will probably have much greaterconsensus over when the RMA started andwhen things stabilised. In the meantime, thedilemma many of us face is whether and howto organise around information and exploit theinformation dimension.

I will now go onto the impact of the RMAon the SAF and its C2 concepts. I would like toclarify that I will be speaking largely from anArmy perspective, though the doctrine ofintegrated warfare between the Services iscentral to our thinking. The term “RMA” whilstfamiliar to us is not defined for the purpose ofdevelopment within the SAF.

The RMA and the SAFThe impact of technology-inspired change

for the SAF has perhaps not been as unsettlingas we see technology as a key enabler to offsetour other resource constraints. There has alsobeen less to tear down and break apart becausewe are still in the process of change. Our AirForce and Navy are both relatively young,having been established as separate Servicesonly after the establishment of the SAF itself.For the Army, every two to three years – theduration of service for our fulltime NSmen –we have an opportunity to introduce neworganisational structures and equipment atrelatively lower pain to the system.Domestically, a very techno-savvy populationhas served as an added catalyst for riding thewaves of change. The advent of widespread,international professional discussion on RMAhas therefore served as a valuable input as theSAF considers how to incorporate precisionweapons and information operations into ouroperational doctrines and force structures. Theevolution of new command and controlconcepts for the SAF is a product of how wewish to fight and what we have to fight with.

Operational DoctrineThe SAF's mission is to deter aggression,

and should deterrence fail, to secure a swift

and decisive victory. The consequence of thismission focus is for the SAF to develop aspectrum of capabilities which enable us todeter aggression across the spectrum ofconflict. The armed forces has also to beprepared to support undertakings other thanwar, such as the evacuation of our citizensfrom Cambodia and our recent INTERFETparticipation in East Timor.

In order to prosecute operations to achievea swift and decisive victory, the SAF believes itmust be prepared to fight fully integratedacross the various physical theatres of conflict.This entails active cross-Service participationto achieve our military objectives, be they onland, in the air or at sea. A physically crowdedarea of operations like Singapore demands thateach Service does not attempt to duplicateanother's core assets. Our Air Force, forexample, operates all aircraft, and we do nothave separate air corps for the Army or Navy.The command of forces remains the purview ofthe Service best positioned physically orinformationally to control them in operations.The Joint Staff in the SAF serves in operationsas a coordinating HQ to allocate shared assetsand facilitate better integration betweenServices as opposed to a command HQ whichdetermines how operations should unfold onland, in the air or at sea.

Capability and Force Structure DevelopmentOur capability and force structure

development has evolved to incorporate theneed to balance our growth in terms of threemain capability areas:

Manoeuvre. To have dominant manoeuvrecapabilities requires us to be able to positionour forces in strategic and critical points toachieve positional advantage. On land, theArmy is organised with both light but highlymobile forces and mechanised forces withgreater punch. The development of manoeuvrecapability in our force structure combines agiledirect firepower with staying power asexpressed in protection and sustainability.

23

Firepower. The focus of our firepowerdevelopments is on being able to attack highpay-off targets with surgical precision from astand off position. We see this as a means ofachieving economy of force whilst promotingsurvivability of our forces by minimisingexposure to direct engagements only where itcounts for the purpose of achieving positionaladvantage.

Information. Our focus here is to developcapabilities to facilitate our speed and freedomof action, whilst undermining the enemy'sdecision cycle and ability to attack ours.

Development in these areas is not boundedwithin each Service, but in the areas ofprecision firepower and information operationsthere is a great impetus to pool efforts acrossall three Services. We believe that the realoperational pay-off is achieved not fromindividual units and platforms, but the abilityto leverage and integrate across Services toachieve a systemic capability, regardless of theoperations manager.

Implications on C2Tactical. Superior numbers in platforms

such as tanks, new planes and ships cannot betranslated into operational advantage unlessthey can be integrated into a unified, flexibleand effective fighting system. The key enablerfor the effective command and control of thethree capability pillars is an informationstructure providing comprehensive awarenessthrough: • Better sensors; • Seamless electronic messaging system; • Automated data fusion and info processing;• Automated location and status reporting; • Intelligent Decision Support; • Effective Info Dissemination System; and • Secure, wide area communications

Optimal pay-off, however, is achieved onlyif we can systemically leverage ourinformation advantage with a quick decision-making process, complemented by a

responsive array of agile manoeuvrecapabilities and precise firepower means.

Operational. The concept of informationwarfare targeted not at materiel but at thedecision-makers has widened the military'spotential scope of operations. At the sametime, the rise of on-the-scene global mediareporting represents a strong independentconduit of information transfer. Consequently,our C2 structures and processes will have toevolve to take into account the influence ofinformation flows and the media on militaryoperations as demonstrated in Vietnam, theGulf, Somalia and more recently Kosovo. Inparticular, Commanders and Staff mustconsider and plan for the possibility ofunfavourable news reports being blown out ofproportion in the international arena, directlyor indirectly shaping the political will andconsequently the military effort.

Strategic. The emergence of the infosphereas a potential axis of attack has also raised thequestion of whether it is a unique environmentbest managed as part of a Service HQ'soperations, centrally “commanded” from theJoint SAF level, or whether in fact it demandsa new kind of national defence agency.

At every level of war, we anticipate that theRMA has major implications on militaryoperations and consequently on its commandand control. The issues which we are stillexamining include the following, which I willpresent for discussion.

Military DoctrineInformation Overload. One of the chief

concerns expressed by our commanders is howto deal with information overload. The promiseof better sensors and C2 information systemsdoes not necessarily address how commanders,given a higher ops tempo, more assets toemploy, and the prospect of round-the-clockoperations will be able to digest and decide onthe best course of action. Given the timesensitivity of certain critical items ofinformation, there is a related question of

IMPACT OF RMA ON COMMAND AND CONTROL – AN SAF PERSPECTIVE


whether new C2 info systems should bedesigned based on a philosophy of informationpush or pull. Info push threatens to overwhelmthe commander whereas the worry over infopull is whether the commander will knowwhen and where to pull. One thing we are clearon is that the education and training ofcommanders must evolve to equip them tooperate in the new environment.

Flatter Structures. Coupled with thepromise of technology-enabled wider spans ofcontrol, there is a question of whether and towhat extent we can de-layer our structures.The problem is that whilst the tools may beimproving, the pace and complexity ofdecisions may also be increasing. A flatterstructure also suggests the need to creategreater redundancy in the remaining HQ layerto avoid it becoming the critical point offailure. We have noted that globally, larger,more established armed forces are also treadingcarefully in answering this question.

Uncertainty and Reserves. Recently, AlanGreenspan, the US Federal Reserve Chairman,spoke about how information technology hadimproved the efficiency of operations so muchthat companies could significantly reduce theamount of stocks which they used to hold tocater for uncertainty. Similarly, the stockpilingof military logistic reserves might be reducedgiven better information on their rates ofconsumption. With better tactical informationavailable to commanders, however, it remainsto be seen whether they will choose to actmore boldly through quicker action or byreducing the amount of tactical reserves heldduring any phase of the operation. Unlikebusiness, the key variable faced by militarycommanders is the extent of enemy action toundermine their information advantage.

Shift from Direct to Indirect Forms ofCombat. The introduction of the telegraphenabled armies to exploit artillery not as adirect fire weapon but as an indirect supportweapon, out of range of the enemy's smallarms. The subsequent introduction of radio

communications overcame the vulnerability oflines being cut at a critical juncture of thebattle, and enabled more reliable C2 of indirectfire. The introduction of the tank enabled anew kind of mobile, survivable artillery toenter the battlefield. Presently, the increasinglethality of anti-tank weapons coupled withthe need to balance protection with mobility, isfuelling a new rethink as to the role of tanksand the future of direct fire in the battlefield.With better battlefield sensors and precise,stand off weapons, could we see the land battleshift towards one where indirect fireengagements become dominant? Thecomparison I make is to the naval theatre,where all engagements are out of visual range,and long-range anti-ship missiles operate witha host of electronic measures and counter-measures. The very design of tanks may evolveto become highly mobile, thinner-skinnedplatforms firing precision-guided beyond-line-of-sight munitions, and sporting a host ofelectronic counter-measures and supportsystems, rather than as highly protected, gun-based systems. For this to become a reality,sensors will have to overcome the traditionallimitations posed by foliage, relief, clouds andurban terrain, which distinguish the landtheatre from the sea. C2 doctrine and systemswill evolve very differently if this is indeed theexpected trend of the future.

TechnologyA key challenge for C2 is in managing the

technology seen as essential to its futureeffectiveness in the battlefield. The challengesstem from recent trends to adapt commercialtechnology for military C2 applications.

First, we note that commercial standardsare changing so quickly that it is often difficultto decide on a particular standard for SAF-wide implementation. Adopting MicrosoftWindows as a de facto standard, for example,would appear to address interoperability issuesbut also renders us more vulnerable tocommercial risks such as if the US Government

25

were to force a break-up of the company,leading to a loss in future supportability.

Secondly, commercial vendors design onthe basis of short product life cycles topromote market share, but this is inevitably anightmare for military planners who requirestability.

Thirdly, commercial standards are notnecessarily designed with military applicationsin mind. For example, whilst they may be idealfor use in an office, desktop environment, theyare generally memory and bandwidth hungryand pose a challenge for wireless applications.Their robustness against info attack may alsonot be a prime consideration, forcingsignificant modification if we wish to use themfor military applications.

We have to weigh the problems ofadopting commercial standards, however,against the problem of trying to developapplications unique to the military. Other thancost, supportability is a real challenge, as themilitary has to compete with the dot comworld for the services of its softwaredevelopers. Maintaining compatibility withcommercial equipment is the other challenge,since there is little incentive for equipment andchip manufacturers to consult with the militarybefore implementing new designs.

Meeting the C2 ChallengesWhilst there are many challenges to be met

in gearing up C2 for the demands of the future,I would like to close by speaking about howwe are dealing with them.

At the strategic and operational level, wehave initiated efforts to examine new C2structures and processes to manageinformation operations both within themilitary and with other agencies. This is likelyto take some time given the continuing rapidpace of change, and the large number ofagencies involved.

At the tactical level, we have set in motionstudies to examine the impact of informationpush and pull in a tactical environment, in

order to lay the groundwork for the design offuture C2 processes and systems. At the sametime, we are also looking closely at how toincorporate new sensors into the C2 process sothat they actually contribute to better decision-making rather than overloading the decision-maker. We have set in motion a series ofexperiments also to gauge the usefulness andcontribution of new planning and decisionsupport tools for tactical HQs. The realchallenge appears to be in supporting theinformation needs of commanders inconducting the battle when they are on themove, rather than tied to a static HQ location.

In equipping, we have adopted a policy ofcascading C2 systems to avoid blockobsolescence, with the implication ofmanaging more than one generation ofsystems at the same time. As we are nowdeveloping the second generation of tacticalC2 Info Systems, it remains to be seen what theconsequence of this policy will be on futureinteroperability and support.

Lastly, in conceptualising future fightingsystems, we are raising the level of thinkingfrom platforms to unit sets. In the past, wemight have added on new sensors and C2systems to existing structures. As part of ourlong-term planning, we are now allowingmuch more interplay between the design offorce structures, our fighting platforms and C2systems. We anticipate the exponential growthof smart devices, and see our future tanks andsoldiers as distributed intelligent nodesoperating as a complete system which allow usto maximise the impact of precision guidance,remote sensors, autonomous systems andbattlefield robotics. Whilst the exterior offighting vehicles may look similar, we expectthere to be a discernible shift from apreponderance of mechanical-based systems to“wired” systems leveraging fully the electronicspectrum.

The continuing challenges that Singaporefaces will affect the SAF. As a small andresource-scarce nation, how do we mobilise

IMPACT OF RMA ON COMMAND AND CONTROL – AN SAF PERSPECTIVE

26

our limited resources to realise our vision foran effective defence capability? The criticallinchpin is the quality of our people. We willcontinue to invest in the quality of ourpersonnel by focusing on training andeducation to enhance their skills. The SAF willthen be able to reap the benefits of highquality performances and returns from a highquality force.

ConclusionThe challenges of evolving C2 for the

emerging warform of the 21st century arecomplex and not limited to the military per se.We have to consider both the opportunitiesafforded by technology and the pressures of anuncertain geostrategic environment, tailored toour own domestic and economic situations.

Almost a century ago, J.F.C. Fuller wrote: Our present theory is to destroy personnel,our new theory should be to destroycommands. Not after the enemy's personnelhas been disorganised, but before it has

been attacked, so that it may be found in astate of disorganisation when attacked. Extracted from J.F.C. Fuller's memorandum

“Strategic Paralysis as the Object of theDecisive Attack,” May.

We now have an opportunity to acquire thetechnology enablers to make Fuller's “new”theory practicable. How much longer it will bebefore it becomes widespread is anyone's guessas the pace of change cannot be discernedaccurately from the direction of change.Factors such as cost, conservatism andconversance with technology will affect thepace of development.

From an SAF perspective, the RMA is bothreal and evolving. Our specific approach toriding the waves of change meets our uniquerequirements, but we believe that we will sharemany things in common with other armies aswe all grapple with the challenges of theRevolution in Military Affairs.

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Lim is presently holding the appointment of Assistant Chief of the General Staff (Plans) inthe Army of the Singapore Armed Forces. He holds a Bachelor of Engineering (Hons 1st class) in Engineering Scienceand Industrial Management from the University of Liverpool and a Master in Science (Management of Technology)from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also a graduate of the US Army Command and General StaffCollege.


27

In the past, underlaying technologies whichmade the revolutions possible, were readily

available to many countries. But in each case,only one country transformed the essentialelements of its armed forces in such a manneras to achieve a dominant and decisiveadvantage in warfare.

Actually, for an RMA to be possible, theremust be a very large synergy between thescientific and technological level of theindustrial community, the intellectual level ofpeople, energies and financial resourcesmobilisation, and the innovative capacity of anation.

These synergies are hardly achievablewithin a nation. Are they achievable in acoalition environment, between nations withdifferent politic and economic objectives, anddifferent defence environment? The question istherefore: how to make an RMA processemerge between coalition partners? Can it beglobal or focused on selected objectives? Whatare the conditions of success?

Coalitions are characterised by the diversityof nations and forces that work together. Acoalition is a temporary group of nations whochoose to agree to expend resources to reach aparticular goal in a given timeframe andgeographical area.

But, in such a situation where vital interestsare not at stake, intentions and motivations ofone or the other may be much different.Agreeing on the coalition's goal does not meanthat coalition members agree on the bestmeans to achieve that goal. Politicalparameters are important and present at eachlevel of the command structure, from thestrategic level to the tactical level.

So one must admit that any RMA processcannot apply from only a technical approach,but must take into account political constraintsand other national factors. One must alsoadmit that a prudent and selective approachwill be easier to manage than a global one.

The key issue for coalition operations is anefficient C2 organisation with interoperablecommunication and information systems. AsRMA is coming mainly from informationrevolution, C2 is the right domain, for itsimportance and its relation to information, tomake a coalition RMA process emerge in aselective approach.

But C2 interoperability and cooperability,meaning the successful bridging betweencoalition partners of differences in doctrine,organisation, concepts and culture, require farmore than the ability to exchange informationamong the CIS of the coalition partners. Theyalso require a degree of organisationalcoherence and compatibility.

The variety of organisational issues and therelevant solutions suggest the term “commandarrangement" is more appropriate than theclassic “command and control" when militaryoperations other than war are conducted. Theterm “command arrangement" recognises thatmilitary forces within coalitions will only takedirect orders to the extent they are consistentwith the agreements made by theirgovernments and that the other actors(international organisations and non-governmental organisations for example)cannot be given orders at all, but rather mustbe persuaded to cooperate with militaryorganisations. Organisational forms should bematched to the type of mission assigned. In

The RMA, C2 and Coalition OperationsCaptain Xavier Rolin, Office of the Preparation of Future Military Operations, French Joint Staff

RMA is a process, which, starting from emerging technologies, drives to a revolution in themilitary domain, after these have been taken into account in concepts, doctrines and organisationstransformations.


other words, no single organisational typeshould be presumed to be ideal for warfightingand peace support operations. Moreover, thesuitability of organisational forms is partlydependant on the technological capabilitiespossessed by members of the coalition withrespect to communications, data collection andprocessing, information handling, and theexchange of knowledge. The fact thatcommercial practice has demonstrated bothstructural changes (flattening of organisations)and functional changes (elimination of somefunctions, integration of others), asinformation technologies have developed andtheir applications have matured is seen assuggestive of changes than can be anticipatedin military coalitions.

But not all technical feasible organisationalforms are either practicable or desirable. Bothcultural and economic factors need to beconsidered. Moreover, doctrinal issues mayneed to be resolved before some nations canfind effective and efficient ways for theirmilitary establishment to work effectivelytogether.

So current organisational C2 solutions, asgeographical or functional separation, liaisonteams, and combined headquarters, even ifthey are not the most effective in a moderncombat, will be often the only achievablesolutions. But RMA could help to leveragethose solutions and explore alternativeorganisational approaches, through, forexample, exploratory experimentations.

C2 architectures actually will have to adaptthemselves to different situations, to differentnations, facing different security andreleasability policies. So one can hardly definestandard organisations and architecturesrelevant to any circumstances for any coalitionoperation. So a coherent RMA program canhardly be built for various nations which arenot strongly associated in a shared structure, asan alliance.

But a set of convergences and commonunderstanding can be found to leverage

efficiency with RMA process within a coalitionenvironment.

Coalition Common Understanding– coalition operations are not alliance

operations; vital interests of nations are notat stake.

– coalition operations will be mainly peacesupport operations, even if high intensityoperations must be envisaged for shortperiods during crisis:• C2 interoperability will be the key

factor of military efficiency;• Interoperability level in C2 systems

must be coherent with informationexchanges requirements commonlyagreed ; those exchanges will dependon releasibility policy of each nation;

• An other key factor will be theconvergence of all releasibility policyon a minimal standard policyacceptable in any coalition;

• C2 architectures will be driven by IER,and consequently by releasabilitypolicies;

• Political constraints on the decisioncycle reduce the speed of this cycle. C2architectures and technical solutionsmust be coherent with this constraint.

• Convergences on orientations• The key issue, where an RMA process

is valid, is C2;• RMA process must help to shape

flexible architectures, adaptable todifferent coalition situations;

• Technologies issued from an RMAprocess in C2 must offer technicalsolutions accessible to all nations, andcommonly agreed standards;

• Limited technological transfers mustbe granted by most advanced nationsto others to reach an acceptable RMAmean level;

• Convergences on releasibility policymust be looked for to allow aminimum information sharing, so that

29

a minimum coherent coalitioncommon operational picture can bebuilt.

• Security will be the cornerstone ofinteroperability. Convergences must befound to agree on coalition securitylevels acceptable by all.

• Small experiments focused on selectedaspects of interoperability andcooperability, as shared awareness,coherent coalition planning, couldhelp to explore C2 improvement.

Cooperability is becoming more difficultbecause of the different rates at whichcountries are adopting and assimilating newtechnologies, as well as of different culturalapproaches that influence how militaries adapttheir concepts of organisation, doctrine,education and training to exploit the newtechnological capabilities. The achievement ofgreater cooperability, through improved C2,

needs to build upon advances in informationtechnology on offer. Most of the advances ininformation technology are products of thecommercial sector and are widely availablethroughout the world. Developed for the massmarket, information technology is moreaffordable than heretofore. These factors makethe application of advanced technology to thechallenge of coalition C2 issues moreachievable, even for restrained budgets.

So the emergence of an RMA processfocused on C2 can be envisaged, based mainlyon commercial technologies. Experimentationscould help to test architectures andinteroperability solutions. But cooperabilitydepends on security and releasability issues. Ahigh level focus on coalition militaryoperations in each nation's security structurewould allow a greater concentration of effortin addressing means of enhancing C2 incoalition operations.

Captain Rolin was commissioned into the Navy in September 1969. His early years were spent in Polynesia on asupply ship, and on the French Atlantic coast aboard an anti-submarine frigate.He attended the signal officer course in 1975. Thereafter, he was appointed Signal Officer on various warshipsstationed in the port of Brest, then Company Commander in the naval academy, and Signal Officer on the cadettraining ship Jeanne d’Arc. He went on to command Quartier Maitre Anquetil, a coastal anti-submarine warship in1984. He attended the naval war college in 1986.After a tour as Executive Assistant to an admiral in the naval staff in Paris, he was appointed Commanding Officer ofan anti-submarine frigate in Brest, and was promoted to captain in 1991. He became Executive Assistant of theadmiral in command of the French Atlantic zone in 1992, and took command of le Primauguet, a new anti-submarinefrigate in 1994. Captain Rolin attended the high military studies course from September 1996 to July 1997. He is now appointed onthe joint central staff in Paris, in a high level studies cell, in charge of C4ISR.

THE RMA, C2 AND COALITION OPERATIONS

30

The ASEAN members had, in relative terms,spent substantial amounts on arms

acquisitions until the economic crisis of 1997.Fundamentally, arms spending in South-EastAsia reflected a change from counter-guerrillawarfare to a more conventional emphasis. Itwas noted that there was a tendency to acquirehi-tech weapons. In addition, the region is alsoundergoing an economic and technologicaltransformation, with advances in InformationTechnology (IT) making for new and radicallydifferent ways of doing business. This has ledto speculation that South-East Asia might alsobe embarking on the path to a Revolution inMilitary Affairs (RMA).

But what would constitute an RMA forSouth-East Asia, and how would we be able toidentify it? What would constitute the elementsof an RMA? Would a shift from counter-insurgency warfare to conventional warfareconstitute an RMA in South-East Asian terms?After all, it does represent a very different wayof war fighting for the South-East Asian armedforces.

This article does not attempt to define theRMA at any great depth. Functionally, it canbe defined as any development or cause thatwould make South-East Asian armed forcesoperate radically different from the way theyare doing now, and which will at the sametime, enhance their effectiveness dramatically.It takes as axiomatic that today's RMA wouldinvolve distributed information networks,enormous computing power, real time

information gathering and distributedcommand and control systems.

Evaluating regional RMA developments inSouth-East Asia is difficult because nosubstantial literature on the subject exists.Neither is there any coherent body of doctrinereadily available by which to judge whetherthis sub-region is putting in place the elementsof an RMA, or how regional armed forcesperceive the issue. As such, this article attemptsto address the issue of a South-East AsianRMA by asking three basic questions:

What nature of threats can South-EastAsian states expect to face?

What will be the nature of future war in theregion?

Can the RMA (as defined in currentliterature) make it easier or more effective, forSouth-East Asia to combat these threats?

It then analyses Information Technology(IT) developments in South-East Asia, since ITliteracy is one important element whichcontributes to an RMA. The article argues thatan RMA is essentially about human beings andhow they think wars can be won, and notmerely about material resources. The mainquestion for South-East Asia is therefore notwhether the elements for an RMA are, or arenot, being emplaced, but what the RMA can doto address the threats that confront South-EastAsia. In other words, apart from the materialresources available, are South-East Asianarmed forces thinking of radical new ways ofconducting, fighting and winning wars? Isthere a sufficient body of innovative thinking

The RMA in South-East Asia:Security and External Defence

By Mr J.N. Mak, Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs

“We failed then – as we have since – to recognise the limitations of modern, high-technologymilitary equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people'smovements".

– Robert S. McNamara.1

31

and thinkers to make an RMA happen? Peopleand their thoughts (strategy, doctrines), notmachines, make an RMA happen. For that, wehave to understand their threat perceptions,force structures, and most important, thestrategic objectives and doctrines of the 10ASEAN members. Such an approach ofidentifying the objectives of grand strategy,supported by appropriate doctrines, would helpus understand whether any move towards anRMA is taking place.

A military embedded in society will reflectcivilian developments. Hence it is alsonecessary to analyse IT skill levels as well asResearch and Development (R&D) spending.The conclusion is that the IT revolution is notreally embedded in South-East Asian societies.For example, a PC is still a comparative rarityin Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. InMalaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and thePhilippines, computer literacy is confined tourban areas only. Only in Singapore is a PCculture well entrenched. The number ofresearchers and the expenditure spent on R&Din South-East Asia is also not particularlyimpressive.

Overall, South-East Asia is still preoccupiedwith regime security and legitimacy, and withestablishing a strong state. Moreover, all thesestates, with one exception, do not considerthemselves as facing any imminent externalthreat. In other words, the RMA is of minimalutility today to South-East Asia. The exceptionthat proves the rule is Singapore because of itsunique history and geo-strategic position. Assuch, there are no conscious attempts in theregion to work towards a Revolution inMilitary Affairs. This is because the RMA is stilla little irrelevant to the needs of the sub-region. Regime security still remains theprimary paradigm for South-East Asia. Assuch, there are no indications at all that, apartfrom Singapore, that the ASEAN countries areconsidering doing things differently from whatthey have been doing over the past decade.

ASEAN Defence Doctrines & StrategiesConventional defence doctrines and

strategies in the region still remain vague andill-defined despite relatively ambitiousprograms to acquire modern, sophisticatedweaponry. This is because defence againstexternal threats has not been the priority ofASEAN, except in the case of Singapore. Thisgeneral neglect of conventional defencestrategy and doctrine is accounted for only inpart by the fact that many ASEANgovernments had to face various insurgencythreats between the 1950s and early 1980s. Forinstance, Indonesia which had a clearlyarticulated “external" defence doctrine andstrategy, put a premium on national or internalsecurity before external defence.2 Thispreoccupation with internal (usually regime)security is because the six core ASEANmembers arguably are still weak states.3

As post-colonial creations, their primaryproblem and preoccupation was with state-building, i.e. to consolidate the state internally.External defence was deemed relativelyunimportant because of two factors. The firstwas the relative stability provided by the USsecurity umbrella during and after the ColdWar. Equally important, the sanctity of stateboundaries has been increasingly deemedinviolable by the international communityafter the Second World War. This “territorialcovenant" has ensured that state boundaries,with very few exceptions, have not changedthrough the use of force.4

For these reasons, South-East Asian statessee domestic threats as more pressing andimmediate. Thus, these states will always putregime security before the defence of nationalborders. External defence is therefore unlikelyto be given greater priority over domesticimperatives such as economic growth in thewake of the 1997 financial crisis. Despite theprimacy of the internal threats, ASEAN spentrelatively large amounts of money onconventional armaments in the 1990s toensure the loyalty of the armed forces by

THE RMA IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA: SECURITY AND EXTERNAL DEFENCE


catering to their perceived institutional andequipment needs. At the same time, there wasalso the hope that the acquisitions of modernweaponry would also contribute to defenceagainst external enemies in the moremultipolar post-Cold War world. Finally,defence modernisation had been affordable forthe ASEAN countries until 1997 because oftheir rapidly growing economies.

However, while an ASEAN militarydoctrine remains a myth, the old ASEANmembers do share a common security doctrinebased on the concept of non-interference andcomprehensive security. Economic develop-ment, freedom from external interference intheir domestic affairs, and the preservation ofdomestic stability are regarded as equally, ifnot more, important than military force fornational survival.

This article focuses on three ASEANmembers – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore– because: • They form a natural ASEAN geo-strategic

unit or “core". Malaysia and Singapore'sdefence have been described as indivisible,while Indonesia sees Malaysia as a“natural" strategic partner (for geo-strategicreasons).

• These three countries constitute what hasbeen termed by a number of Indonesiandefence officials as ASEAN kechil (whichcan be translated as “little ASEAN" or“inner ASEAN"). ASEAN kechil isapparently an Indonesian proposal for thecommon defence of Indonesia, Malaysiaand Singapore.

• As post-colonial states, Indonesia, Malaysiaand Singapore also represent contrastingapproaches to the problem of reconcilingnational defence with internal security.5

• All three countries emphasise “compre-hensive security" in one form or another,with non-military defence being consideredas important as military defence. Thedefence doctrines of these countries areostensibly based on the notion of total

people's defence, i.e. mobilising the entirepopulation for the defence of the country.Interestingly enough, none of thesecountries can be regarded as mono-ethnic.

• They are all, to a greater or lesser degree,maritime nations faced with the problemsof maritime defence and security. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia provide

very interesting contrasts in terms of geo-strategy, and the defence strategies anddoctrines developed as a result. Indonesia is thelargest archipelagic nation in the world, whileSingapore is the smallest South-East Asiannation. Malaysia is a classic example of anation divided by a body of water. Indonesiabases its external defence on a guerrillastrategy of defence-in-depth, fundamentallybecause it cannot afford a large conventionalmilitary force. Tiny Singapore had little choicebut to adopt a strategy of forwardconventional defence. Malaysia, because it seesthe external security environment asessentially benign, in contrast, prefers to givepriority to domestic and regime security ratherthan spend scarce resources on building up“excess" military capability. As a consequence,while both Singapore and Indonesia have veryclearly enunciated defence doctrines andstrategies, that of Malaysia remains somewhatnebulous. Nevertheless all three states lay greatemphasis on the domestic dimension ofsecurity. Even Singapore, which has beendescribed as one of the most heavily defendedpieces of real estate in the world, has in recentyears been paying more attention to theconcept of total or comprehensive security.Overall therefore, the notion of comprehensivesecurity remains fundamental to the defence ofASEAN. In this sense, if there is an ASEANdefence doctrine, then it is that ofcomprehensive security based on nationalresilience.

ASEAN and Domestic Insecurity Mohammed Ayoob argues that insecurity is

the “defining characteristic of Third Worldstates".6 This is the direct result of their late

33

entry into the international system of states,and hence, their late attempts at state-makingrather than nation-building.7 Thus, these ThirdWorld states, including the majority of theASEAN members, are beset by the problems of: • Lack of internal cohesion. • Lack of unconditional legitimacy. • Easy susceptibility to internal and inter-

state conflicts, and • Easy permeability by external actors.

These are all internal or domestic problemswhich contribute to most Third World statesbeing weak states, with still no congruencebetween nation and state. It is, in fact, theinternational system which empowers many ofthese states by recognising them as sovereignstates. The international system therefore givesThird World regimes legitimate or juridicalcontrol over well-defined boundaries. What arethe threats facing post-colonial states such asthe ASEAN members? The danger of sovereignborders being physically violated by externalaggressors seems increasingly unlikely becauseof the post-Second World War trend tostabilise international boundaries. Jackson andZacher term this trend to regard internationalboundaries, however arbitrarily drawn byformer colonisers, as sacrosanct and inviolateas the “territorial covenant". The key elementsof the “territorial covenant" are:8

• Only existing interstate borders arelegitimate and legal.

• If borders are to be changed, all statesaffected by the change must give theirconsent.

• Change of borders by force is illegitimateand illegal.

• The only recognised nation-state (sic) is thepolitical nationality defined by statejuridical boundaries.

• Colonialism is illegitimate and illegal. • Secessions are to be discouraged by the

members of the society of states (author'semphasis). These international norms guarantee to a

great extent the integrity of state borders from

external aggressors. States by and large are notin any serious danger of having their bordersrevised by external aggressors. Existingterritorial borders are safe becauseinternational norms enforce the notion of thesanctity of international borders.

However, international norms are lessstringent with regard to secession, i.e. changesto borders from within a state except todiscourage it. It is noteworthy that the majorityof post-colonial states are multi-ethnic. Butthis does not affect the legitimacy of theirborders “which define the population as apolitical entity" rather than in ethno-religiousterms.9 The end of the Cold War may haveencouraged secessionist movements, as witnessthe breakup of the former Soviet Union andYugoslavia, but it can be argued that thesanctity of interstate boundaries remainessentially untouched. In the context ofASEAN, secession has been a major problemfor Indonesia, while Malaysia is not entirelyfree of the spectre of potential secession. Likenearly all post-colonial states, the politicalboundaries drawn by the former imperialists ofSouth-East Asia were:

...drawn for purposes of administrativeconvenience or as a result of territorialtrade-offs among imperial powers (and) cutacross ethnic, tribal, religious and linguisticties; dismembered established politicalunits; and linked more than one pre-colonial political entity in uneasyadministrative unions....Most new ThirdWorld states, therefore, found themselvesfacing challenges of either a secessionist oran irredentist character...10

The secessionist/irredentist legacy ofcolonialism is exacerbated by the stresses ofmodernisation. A number of ASEAN regimesremain relatively narrowly-based, authoritarianand quasi-democratic in character. This makesthem appear less than legitimate to sizablesegments of their population, and vulnerable tointernal challenges because they “preside overartificial colonial constructs".11



The Spectre of External Intervention If one defines legitimacy as meeting the

four criteria of shared norms and values,conformity with established rules for acquiringpower, proper and effective use of power, andconsent of the governed, then the majority ofASEAN countries do not enjoy unconditionallegitimacy.12 While external militaryintervention is deemed quite unlikely, the lackof unconditional legitimacy makes the ASEANmembers vulnerable to indirect and “soft" orideological intervention. The Western test of“good governance", specified in terms ofdemocracy, human rights and a free marketeconomy,13 therefore threatens many South-East Asian regimes by potentially delegit-imising them even more. This latter threat isseen as more dangerous than outright militaryattacks.

This fear of external interference isreflected in one of the key founding principlesof ASEAN – that of non-interference indomestic affairs by outside powers, includingeven (or especially) close neighbours. This fearof external interference is in turn, a reflectionof the general lack of unconditional legitimacyamong the ASEAN regimes. Ethnic andlinguistic ties between the various South-EastAsian nations, and the presence of historicaltensions, makes it easy for countries to subvertand destabilise their neighbours. Thus ASEANdeveloped the concept of national and regionalresilience to deal specifically with the problemof maintaining domestic, and moving outward,regional stability. One key tool for ensuringinternal stability was the concept of non-interference by outside powers. These fragileregimes felt that their states could be easilyundermined and their authority challenged byoutsiders, hence they worked at a modusvivendi to ensure that they would be left aloneto manage - or mismanage - their own states.The realisation of their fundamentalvulnerability, it is argued, is the principalreason why ASEAN elevated the “unexcept-

ional" international norm of non-interferenceto the status of virtually an ASEAN doctrine.

The history of the ASEAN non-interferenceprinciple in practice is marked more by realpolitik rather than any internationally acceptednorms of morality. When it comes to choosingbetween non-interference and morality andjustice, the choice has invariably been infavour of upholding the principle of non-interference. For instance, when Indonesiaforcibly annexed East Timor in 1975, the issuewas put before the United Nations GeneralAssembly as a hostile resolution. All theASEAN members except one, supportedIndonesia. Singapore's representative, however,abstained, perhaps reflecting Singapore's ownperceived weakness as a small state flanked bytwo larger Malay neighbours. However,Singapore subsequently changed its positionand supported Indonesia's annexation. The fearof a potential regional hegemon in thisinstance, was out-balanced by the perceivedneed to ensure that non-intervention, bothdirect and indirect, would remain an ASEANcore value. Thus the need to ensure thatASEAN remained cohesive more thanoutweighed any advantage of censuringIndonesia for annexing a Portuguese colonialrelic.14 It was clear too, that Singapore wasunlike East Timor in that it was a trulysovereign state, had external alliance linkages,and that potential aggressors would findSingapore to be a distasteful “poison shrimp".

When the Pol Pot regime embarked on abloody pogrom in the mid 1970s, ASEAN didnot condemn Cambodia. However, whenVietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978and ejected the Pol Pot regime, the ASEANleaders were quick to condemn Vietnameseaggression. The invasion of Cambodia byVietnam brought into sharp focus thevulnerabilities of weak states to externalintervention. The concerted opposition ofASEAN to the invasion was the result of thecollective fear that such a precedent in theregion should not be allowed at all. Apart from

35

the security implications of the balance ofpower shifting in favour of Vietnam inmainland South-East Asia, and the threat itposed to Thailand, the Vietnamese invasion ofneighbouring Cambodia was seen as setting adangerous precedent. Similarly, ASEANwillingness to accept Myanmar into theassociation, despite Yangon's poor humanrights record, reflects its real politik approach.Yangon's human rights abuses, are after all,part of an attempt to ensure the survival of theState Law and Order Committee (SLORC), andtherefore purely an internal affair. This ASEANstand is understandable if one accepts theassertion that “the sanctity of nationalsovereignty is the most sacred [ASEAN]corporate value".15

For much of their history, the ASEANmembers have grappled with very seriousproblems of nation-building and nationalconsolidation. This has made them inward-looking in terms of security. As relatively weakstates militarily, the ASEAN membersespecially have relied on a variety of non-military instruments to deal with externalthreats. These instruments included militaryalliances and/or alignments; adopting policiesof non-alignment and other foreign policy anddiplomatic initiatives.16 As a result, all fiveoriginal founding members of ASEANsubscribe to the concept of comprehensivesecurity and national resilience, though tovarying degrees and with differing emphasison its components.17 Instead of depending onpure military power, ASEAN has depended ondiplomatic initiatives to keep hostile militarypowers away from its borders. The South-EastAsian Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality(ZOPFAN) concept was an attempt to keepSouth-East Asia for South-East Asians.18 The“ASEAN way" of managing security was,however, effective in managing sub-regionaltensions only because there was a securityumbrella provided by the US which lookedafter the main external threats to the region.

The Dis-Utility of Military Power Most ASEAN members today may be

described as militarily unambitious states. Theydo not need vast military power to meet theirregional ambitions. They only seek limitedpower to deter relatively weak neighbours.Their military objectives are strictly limited.This applies even to Singapore, despite its quiteformidable (by regional standards)conventional military capability. However,because of the changes in the regional securityarchitecture – including a more unpredictableregional order – after the end of the Cold War,ASEAN's attitude towards arms acquisitionsand military power has perceptibly changedover the last 15 years. ASEAN members haveresponded by using a twin track approach –contingency planning for defence anddiplomatic engagement. ASEAN contingencyplanning is not based on threats, but is peggedto economic growth. Defence spending inASEAN ranges from a low of about 1 per centof gross domestic product (GDP) in Indonesiato a high of 6 per cent in the case ofSingapore. Most countries typically spend 3 to4 per cent of their GDP per annum on defence.It is only within this contextual framework ofASEAN military power that we can understandthe external defence doctrines and strategies ofthe ASEAN members.

Given all the above considerations, it isobvious why the majority of the originalASEAN members have but paid tokenattention to their external defence capability.Their priority is internal security and/or regimemaintenance rather than protecting the nationfrom external aggression. The ASEANemphasis on the internal/domestic dimensionof security is reflected in the ASEAN conceptof national and regional resilience, which linkseconomic development directly with stability.ASEAN members were therefore expected tolook after their own domestic constituencies byensuring economic growth and development.

As a result of all these factors, the rulingelites generally consider it more important to



concentrate resources on state-building andregime-strengthening. Until and unless thepresent international system shows signs ofbreaking down, South-East Asian states areunlikely to spend scarce resources onupgrading the military to take on tasks aboveand beyond its primary responsibility ofensuring domestic and/or regime security.

The ASEAN NEXUS: Indonesia, Malaysia andSingapore

Only two countries of the original ASEANsix – Singapore and Indonesia – have clearlyarticulated defence doctrines. Doctrine may bedefined as the “fundamental principles bywhich the military forces guide their actions insupport of objectives. It is authoritative butrequires judgment in application".19 The sameapplies to strategy, which may be defined asthe “art of directing military activity in war".

It is significant to note that it was Suharto'sNew Order (Order Baru) Government whichfirst emphasised economic development as thebasis of security. Suharto recognised, afteryears of high defence spending by the latePresident Sukarno, that a focus on externaldefence was not only costly, but couldeconomically weaken and undermine thelegitimacy of the regime in power. Hence heconcentrated on delivering the basic economicgoods to the people to keep levels ofsatisfaction up and levels of dissension down.This approach was subsequently concept-ualised as the notion of national resilience.This concept was eventually adopted by therest of the ASEAN members, hence leading towhat has been termed regional resilience.

Indonesia also provides an interestingASEAN case study because of the role of theArmed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, orAngkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia(ABRI). ABRI's role was not merely nationaldefence, but it saw itself as the primarycustodian of a unitary Indonesia, i.e. to preventIndonesia from breaking up. In this sense, thiswas the heart of ABRI doctrine. Hence ABRI's

role was as much political as military. WhilePresident Suharto came to power via themilitary by quelling the so-called putsch ofSeptember 1965, he adroitly steered away frombeing entirely dependent on the military for hiscontinued dominance of Indonesia. Suharto,ASEAN's longest-serving leader, had beenprimarily concerned with regime security andsurvival. To ensure his continued hold onpower, he fostered, and exploited, economicdevelopment as a means of regimelegitimation. As such, ABRI saw nationalsecurity in quite different terms from PresidentSuharto himself. After the ouster of Suharto in1998, ABRI`s name was changed to TenteraNasional Indonesia (TNI).

ABRIs attempts to suppress domesticdissension during Suharto's last days in powerproved futile. But its attempts to prevent EastTimor from breaking away, and its toughstance against Achenese secessionists,illustrated that it was attempting to follow itsstrategy and doctrine of preserving a unitaryIndonesia. At present, Indonesia is being rivenby centripetral forces, and the TNI is moreconcerned with restoring law and order than ingrand designs of war.

The development of Singapore defencedoctrine and strategy is synonymous with thesurvival and political dominance of the rulingPeople's Action Party (PAP). Singapore defencedoctrine, seen in this light, is fairlystraightforward. It is essentially aboutmobilising society and all its resources toensure the survival of the miniscule city-state.Like many city-states in history, Singapore haslittle natural strategic endowments. It has nostrategic depth, no natural resources, and avery limited manpower base. To compound itsdifficulties, it sees itself located in a strategicenvironment which could very quickly turnhostile and unfavourable to the island republic.

Singapore's defence doctrine initiallyemphasised mobilising its citizens for theexternal defence of the city-state in the mid1960s. It achieved this by emphasising the

37

external dangers to threatening nationalsurvival, and hence the need to establish acredible defence force. Two decades later, afterhaving built up a credible deterrent capability,Singapore's defence doctrine took on a morecomprehensive approach by addressing theissue of domestic cohesion. This was becausethe earlier perceived military threats toSingapore had already receded, and thecontinued existence of the nation was nolonger in doubt. However, the PAP embarkedon a re-mobilisation campaign in the mid1980s, this time with the aim of endowingSingaporeans with the values and identitysynonymous with the aspirations of the PAP.The aim was both to ensure regime continuity,and to make sure that Singaporeans did notbecome over-complacent and “flabby"regarding the success and survival of the city-state.

Of the three countries studied here, it canbe said that Singapore is the only one whichhas seriously implemented the concept of totaldefence. In this, the ruling People's ActionParty was helped by the perception ofimminent threat, and this concept of survivalbecame the “linchpin of Singapore's internalcohesion and its intangible independence".Thus it was able to reconcile domestic socialorder and external vulnerability bysubordinating the former to the latter.20

Singapore was therefore able to introducenational service in 1967, both to build up itsarmed forces, avoid the strain of maintaining alarge standing armed forces, and to socialisethe various ethnic groups to promotemultiracism and tolerance.21

Singapore's external defence doctrine thenwas essentially that of deterrence, based on thestrategy of forward defence and lightning faststrikes at any potential aggressor. It seemednatural to turn to Israel, both for doctrinal andtraining advice. The strategy and doctrineformulated by Goh Keng Swee, one of thePAP's most able organisers, envisaged the:

… capacity for the lightning destruction ofany potential aggressor launching a firststrike, and a citizen-soldier systemoperating throughout the whole population,as in Israel.22

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) becamea highly capable, and technically sophisticatedforce, for two reasons. The first was the alreadyhighly technocratic administrative service,many of which members were incorporatedinto the PAP ruling regime. The second wasthe technocratic bent of the PAP elite itself,such as Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee.23

Thus, they emphasised technological solutionsto Singapore's defence problems. Moreimportant, however, technology was seen asthe key to overcoming Singapore's lack ofstrategic depth, and its limited human resource.Weapon systems were carefully chosen fortheir effectiveness, taking into account bothmaintainability and the strategic environment.The result is that the SAF has become probablySouth-East Asia's most capable conventionalforce, also establishing in the process a minimilitary-industrial complex.24

Singapore external defence doctrine andstrategy has apparently undergone littlechange over the decades. The SAF and itsequipment is not displayed during SingaporeNational Day merely to impress observers. It isstill intended to send a clear signal ofSingapore's determination to “launch a swiftand decisive response against any foreignthreats to its vital national interests".25 Indeed,the whole notion of a pre-emptive strike –using offensive counter-air operations and theseizure of territory – is still central toSingapore defence strategy.26 Together with aclear strategic objective, Singapore is alsoconscious of its small population concentratedon a small island. As such, it would consideran RMA to offset its demographic weaknesses.

Malaysia provides a revealing contrast toboth Singapore and Indonesia. Of the threecountries, its military doctrine is the vaguestand least well articulated. While Malaysian



military doctrine pays token tribute to thenotions of “forward defence" and “people'sdefence", there exists no guideline for theireffective implementation. Military doctrine is,in fact, handled individually by each of thethree Services although the Malaysian ArmedForces is working on a joint doctrine. This stateof affairs, it is argued, is largely becauseexternal defence is accorded relatively lowpriority by Malaysia. The emphasis, instead, ison the concept of comprehensive security, i.e.the establishment of domestic stability, orderand cohesion. The primary instrument foreffecting these aims is economic development.

It is also a reflection of the fact thatdomestic security is often equated with regimesecurity. As a consequence, force developmentin Malaysia often takes on a peculiar logic ofits own. Force development is as often meantto secure the regime as to ensure the securityof the nation from external threats. WhileMalaysian politicians tend to stress Malaysia'sdefensive self-reliance, the truth is thatMalaysia had, on the contrary, traditionallyrelied on an alliance strategy for its externaldefence. Alliances ranged from the veryexplicit Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement(AMDA) to the looser, consultative Five-PowerDefence Arrangement (FPDA), and finally, toan implicit reliance on the US securityumbrella. Malaysia demonstrates clearly theemphasis placed on regime security and non-military means of defence. The Malaysiandoctrine of comprehensive security clearlyspells out the importance of domestic stabilityto be achieved through economic progress. Itwas a “butter before guns" approach whichunderplayed the importance of military powerin the defence of Malaysia.

Overall, it is clear that Indonesia andMalaysia tend to give precedence to economicprogress and domestic security instead ofexternal defence. Singapore, being a highlytechnocratic island state, has alreadyestablished very effective control over allsources of domestic dissension. Hence, it sees

external conventional defence as essential forpreserving the nation. Nevertheless, evenSingapore feels the need to remobilise itscitizenry by emphasising comprehensivesecurity, which in Singapore parlance, isknown as “Total Security". Indonesia, Malaysiaand Singapore therefore reflect different, yetsimilar, approaches to defence. Indonesia reliedon an essentially guerrilla warfare strategy anddoctrine for its external defence. This is, inlarge part, because of its size which gives itstrategic depth. Singapore, precisely because ithas no strategic depth, has no choice but toadopt an avowedly conventional defencestrategy based on forward defence. Malaysiahas traditionally relied on extra-regionalpowers to underwrite its external defence,preferring to spend its limited resources onstrengthening the regime and ensuring thelatter's continued hold on political power. Atthe same time, it is telling to note that all threecountries pay great emphasis on the non-military aspects of security, which isencapsulated in the ASEAN notion of nationaland regional resilience. Thus, while there aredifferences in defence strategies, it can beargued that virtually all the ASEAN coremembers share a similar doctrine in theiremphasis on the non-military aspects ofsecurity. Most ASEAN members fit into one ofthe three models, or somewhere in between theextremes represented by Indonesia andSingapore.

Impact of RMAGiven this background, what can the RMA

do for South-East Asian states? It seemsobvious that nothing much has changed overthe last decade and, except for Singapore, anRMA would not address the key securityproblems of the region. South-East Asia is stillpreoccupied with regime legitimation andeconomic development, especially after 1997,together with a number of “threats other thanwar" such as piracy, illegal migration, andnarcotics running. Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos

39

and Vietnam all have various degrees ofdomestic political and economic problems.These new members of ASEAN are relativelyunderdeveloped, and lack the IT infrastructurefor an RMA.

While the rest of South-East Asia might berelatively better developed, it is difficult toimagine what an RMA can do to further thestrategic objectives of these countries. Thereare no indications that military elites arethinking of new ways of conducting wars, orusing IT and information dominance as aweapon against potential enemies. If anything,it is business-as-usual.

Malaysia has not changed its assumptionthat the country will face no serious externalthreat for at least the next decade. Its prioritytherefore is still on economic development, andto make Malaysia an industrialised country inthe next few decades. Indonesia's domesticproblems are too well known to be worthrepeating here. In a nutshell, its securityproblems are primarily internal, withinternecine clashes in Ambon and Moluku, anda separatist war in Acheh. It is difficult toimagine Indonesia investing billions of dollarson RMA resources to solve the Acheh problem,for instance.

One difficulty encountered whileresearching this article was simply the dearthof information on the significant use of IT, andIT policy, in the military. For instance, theRoyal Malaysian Navy's IT Master Plan,approved in 1996, has entered its second stageencompassing office automation and“applications development throughout RMNbases and ships".27

Today, South-East Asian armed forces areno longer the cutting edge innovators for thenation that they were 40 years ago. Thecivilian sector would, instead, provide a betterindicator of the prospects of an RMA.

The South-East Asian countries are still notvery “wired". Singapore, not surprisingly,belongs to the upper categories. Given thissituation, it is hard to imagine that South-East

Asia is on the threshold of an RMA, or that thearmed forces will embrace the conceptwholeheartedly.

NOTES1. R.S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and

Lessons of Vietnam, Random House Inc, NewYork 1995, p. 322.

2. “Internal security" in this article refers todomestic stability and the continued survival ofthe state in certain instances, as in the case ofIndonesia and Singapore. It is also usedsynonymously with regime security andsurvival. Most of the other ASEAN states place apremium on regime security rather thandomestic/national security.

3. “State" here is defined as a “structure ofdomination and coordination, including acoercive apparatus and the means to administersociety and extract resources from it". In thisdefinition, a state does not require politicallegitimation. A “nation-state" is a politicalcommunity whose territorial and juridicalboundaries coincide with the boundaries of thenation. “Regime" is the organisation at the centreof political power, and it determines who hasaccess to that political power. “Government" isdefined as the actual exercise of political powerwithin the framework of the regime. TheGovernment would therefore control all thosepeople and institutions, including the militaryand bureaucracy, that are in control of statepower. See Muthiah Alagappa (ed), PoliticalLegitimacy in South-East Asia, StanfordUniversity Press, Stanford, 1995, pp.26-27.

4. See Robert H. Jackson & Mark W. Zacher, “TheTerritorial Covenant: International Society andthe Stabilization of Boundaries”, Institute ofInternational Relations, The University of BritishColombia, Vancover, Working Paper No. 15,July 1997.

5. Indonesia won its independence from theNetherlands in 1949 after a four-year struggle.Both Malaysia and Singapore were grantedindependence as part of the British divestment ofEmpire process. Malaysia became independent in1957. Singapore was briefly federated withMalaysia from 1963 to 1965 before becoming atotally independent nation in 1965.

6. Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World SecurityPredicament: State making, Regional Conflict,and the International System, Lynne ReinnerPublishers, Inc, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, p. 16.

7. Mohammed Ayoob defines state-making asinvolving three functions: . External war-making: The expansion and consolidation of theterritorial and demographic domain under apolitical authority, including the imposition of


40

order on contested territorial and demographicspace. . Internal policing: The maintenance oforder in the territory where, and over thepopulation on whom, such order has alreadybeen imposed. . Taxation: The extraction ofresources from the territory and the populationunder the control of the state essential to supportnot only the war-making and policing activitiesundertaken by the state but also themaintenance of apparatuses of state necessary tocarry on routine administration, deepen thestate's penetration of society, and serve symbolicpurposes. War-making is obviously not high on theagenda of ASEAN state-making, since juridicalborders are already well-established and well-defined under the international system of states.Policing and taxation are the major functions ofASEAN state-making. Mohammed Ayoob, op.cit., pp. 22-23.

8. Jackson & Zacher, op. cit., p. 10. 9. Jackson & Zacher, op. cit., p. 4. 10. Mohammed Ayoob, op. cit., pp. 34, 35.11. Mohammed Ayoob, op. cit., p. 41. 12. Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Political Legitimacy in

South-East Asia, Stanford University Press,Stanford, 1995, p. 15.

13. Muthiah Alagappa, op. cit., p. 48. 14. There is a paradox here. Any ASEAN member

condemning Jakarta's invasion would have beenregarded as interfering in the internal affairs ofIndonesia although East Timor was never part ofthe Netherlands East Indies. From Jakarta'sperspective, East Timor is regarded as well withinthe Indonesian sphere of influence, and vital tothe former's security.

15. Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security ofSouth-East Asia, op. cit., p. 14.

16. For a comprehensive discussion of theseinstruments, see Muthiah Alagappa, TheNational Security of Developing States: Lessonsfrom Thailand, Auburn House, Dover, Mass.,1987, pp. 19-28.

17. See Muthiah Alagappa, “ComprehensiveSecurity: Interpretations In ASEAN Countries",in Robert A. Scalapino, et al (eds.), AsianSecurity Issues Regional And Global, Institute OfEast Asian Studies, University of California,Berkeley, 1988.

18. First mooted in 1968 by Malaysia's second PrimeMinister Tun Abdul Razak, the original idea wasto persuade China, the US and the Soviet Unionto become the guarantors of a neutralised South-East Asia. China demurred. The concept wasadapted and refined by the ASEAN ForeignMinisters in 1971 as the Kuala LumpurDeclaration, 1971. The ZOPFAN conceptcontains “ground rules" covering political co-existence, non-interference in the domesticaffairs of nations, as well as a nuclear weapons-free clause in the ZOPFAN region. See B.A.Hamzah (ed), The Zone of Peace, Freedom andNeutrality (ZOPFAN): Revisited, Friedrich EbertStiftung & Institute of Strategic andInternational Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, KualaLumpur, 1991, pp. 6-8.

19. Multinational Maritime Operations, Departmentof the Navy, Naval Doctrine Command, Norfolk,Va, September 1996.

20. Philippe Regnier, Singapore: City-State in South-East Asia, S. Abdul Majeed & Co, Kuala Lumpur,1992, pp. 230, 239.

21. The conscription National Bill, and the reservists'New Enlistment Bill, were introduced in 1967.

22. Philippe Regnier, op. cit., p. 256. 23. It has been argued that senior members of the

Singapore civil service merged with, and evensupplanted, the political leadership. Similarly,there has been an increasing trend to co-optformer senior officers of the SAF into both thecivil administrative structure as well as thecorporate sector. See Cho-Oon Khong,“Singapore: Political Legitimacy ThroughManaging Conformity", in Muthiah Alagappa,Political Legitimacy, op. cit., pp. 117-119.

24. The Sheng-Li holding group of companies is atthe heart of this complex, and has under itgovernment firms manufacturing, assembling orupgrading naval vessels, ordnance, artillery,armoured fighting vehicles, military aircraft, andmilitary electronics.

25. Tim Huxley & David Boey, “Singapore's Army -boosting capabilities", Jane's Intelligence Review,April, 1996, p. 174.

26. Huxley & Boey, ibid. 27. “The Royal Malaysian Navy: A Worthwhile and

Reliable Partner", Naval Forces, No. V/1999, Vol.XX, p. 32.


41

Embracing the Revolution in Military Affairs

The Chinese military research learned theconcept of RMA quite early when they

noticed that the Soviet military circles startedto discuss revolution in military technologicalaffairs in the 1970s. At the time the US defenceanalysts also caught up with this Soviet termwhich made them nervous. They thought thatthe USSR was sending out signals that it hadobtained some superiority over the US due toits scientific and technological breakthroughs.Only later did the US discover that the Sovietresearch on revolution in militarytechnological affairs was actually aimed atstudying the innovations in US militarythinking, which were stimulated by the greatleap forward in hi-tech discoveries. Thesystematic study of the linkage betweentechnology and military affairs in bothsuperpowers resulted in a foresightedprediction that revolution in informationtechnology would fundamentally transform theway the war was pursued.2

RMA has been brought to prominence onlyrecently by the military actions in the 1990s,such as the Desert Storm and the Kosovo War,which revealed the new dimensions ofbattlefield combat. However, as the first groupof eager learners, the Chinese seriously studiedthe discussion of RMA in the US and USSR.Since the 1980s they have published a largenumber of articles on RMA, anticipating thatsomething revolutionary may soon happen inmilitary science and armed conflict.Immediately after the official adoption ofDeng's “people's war under modernconditions" in the early 1980s, the CentralMilitary Commission (CMC) launched anationwide campaign to study how the PLAwould fight in the turn of the century. In 1987a strategist in the PLA Academy of MilitaryScience stated that a qualitative change inmilitary science was in the making. Thischange was stimulated by the development ofhi-tech conventional armoury, such as laserand fixed energy weapons systems, whose

Revolution in Military Affairs: A NewGuide for China's Military Modernisation

By Dr You Ji, School of Political Science, University of NSW

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has become the biggest challenge to China's economicdevelopment and military modernisation at the turn of the new millennium. To the Chinese politicaland military leaders RMA is not only a new military theory, it also promises a new type of war ofmass destruction. The Chinese leadership has genuine reasons to be worried. The countries mostvigorously advancing RMA and most capable of bringing the theory into reality are all China'spotential opponents. The US is particularly using RMA to consolidate its military superiority in thedecades to come.1 Worse still, for a long time to come the PLA will have very limited capabilities todeal with the war of mass destruction brought about by RMA, nor will it be able to achievebreakthroughs in military technology necessary for applying RMA in its own defencemodernisation. It is likely that China may be left further behind, as RMA helps the superpowerachieve a new qualitative leap in its power projection in the new century. Exactly because of thegravity of the issue to China's long-term national security the Chinese military has shownenormous enthusiasm learning, absorbing and applying RMA in its own catching up efforts. IfChina can successfully translate the RMA concepts into its strategic guideline, weapons programand force restructuring, given time the PLA will take on a new look and the whole Asia-Pacificregion will feel the consequences.


effect was increasingly approaching that ofnuclear weaponry.3 In a keynote speech to thePLA's first all-Services conference on thefuture war in 1986, General Zhang Zhen, thesecond in ranking in the PLA in the 1990s,said he believed that if the PLA could notforesee the developmental trend of militaryscience, it would be further left behind.4 Sincethe mid 1990s the concept of RMA hasattracted enormous interest in the rank and fileof the PLA, which witnessed the prototypeapplication of RMA ideas by the US in realwars. In a sense China is fortunate to havebeen exposed to such international events andtechnological revolution at a time when itsleadership is under minimal ideologicalconstraint. This unprecedented level of politicalrelaxation has permitted PLA researchers totake a realistic approach to the study of newwars. Now it has actually become a vogue forPLA soldiers to talk about RMA. AndrewMarshall, Stephen Blank, Martin Libiki, andothers have been quoted frequently.

Such a PLA zeal to learn RMA hassurprised many Western analysts. “Surprised"in a way that RMA is an invention by theadvanced military powers but is now embracedso eagerly by China whose technologicalfoundation can hardly sustain any real PLAattempts to put RMA into practice, let alone itstraditional propensity against the West'sideological penetration. This has told a lot ofthe PLA today which is much more open andpragmatic. As pointed out by MichaelPillsbury, the PLA's elaboration of the RMAhas shaken up Western notions about thebackwardness of the PLA's strategic planning.Indeed, the very fact that RMA is studied inChina is an indication of the PLA's advance;besides the Chinese, only Americans andRussian wrote on the subject in the early1990s.5

RMA and the Three Schools of Thought in thePLA

Within the PLA, however, it is quite clearthat many influential PLA generals entertain

reservations about RMA, as they insist that theconcept is far away from the PLA's reality.Currently there are three schools of thought inthe PLA, each debating with the other two overwhat should be the best strategic guidelines forChina's future military modernisation. The firstschool of thought is that of “people's war",supporting either the Maoist original version orthe Dengist revision. The people of this schoolof thought are remaining Long Marchers whostill exert influence in the PLA and their closeassociates in active service. They believe thatgiven the present backwardness of thecountry's military technology, the PLA has nochoice but depend on people's power and itscurrent equipment to frustrate any enemy'sinvasion.6 The number of people in this schoolof thought is the smallest among the three. Yettheir argument cannot be entirely dismissed:the US defeat in Vietnam and the Sovietdisgrace in Afghanistan showed that the formof people's war is not without its logic in thedefence of a continental country. The US isfearful of casualties. Therefore, the usefulnessof people's war has not been exhausted againsta land war threat of the superpower even inthe hi-tech era. Certainly, the influence of LongMarchers is continuously dwindling becauseeven people in this school have realised thatwhat China may face in a future war is not aninvasion on its land mass but either lighteningair and missile surgical strikes or sustained airand missile bombardment, as seen in Kosovoin 1999.

At present the majority of PLA generalsstill belong to the school of hi-tech warfare.Led by powerful military leaders such asAdmiral Liu Huaqing, former vice chairman ofthe CMC, (retired in 1997), these senior officersman the key PLA positions and run its dailyaffairs. This school of thought concludes thatChina has not yet entered information age andso it has not had a solid technologicalfoundation for practicing RMA. Their view issimilar to the prediction of US analysts thatRMA can happen in China only after the

43REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: A NEW GUIDE FOR CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNISATION

second decade of the next century.7 In additionto timing, this school also differs to the schoolof RMA in that the latter takes a moreintegrated view on the features of InformationWarfare (IW). More importantly, people in thisschool do not envisage an urgent need for afundamental overhaul of China's armed forcesin the foreseeable future. They agree to somerestructuring of the PLA, giving more emphasison the development of the specialised services,such as the Air Force and Navy.8 Yet theydismiss the idea of establishing digital Armydivisions and constructing digitalisedbattlefield as relevant to China's militarymodernisation. For instance, they believe it istoo early to think of preparation for replacingthe current C3I system linking the CMC, sevenmilitary regions and a number of war zoneswith a new integrated five-dimensional C3Isystem (land, sea, air, space, and electronicspace) that removes the current functionaldivisions of command between geographicallocations and different services. In other wordsthis school of thought stresses only individualaspects of IW, although it acknowledges thechanging patterns, modes and processes of hi-tech wars.9 China's current national defencestrategy bears the name of this school ofthought whose specific features are discussedin the later section.

In contrast, the RMA school of thoughttheoretically tends to aggregate all the featuresof IW and analyses these features in a forwardleaning manner. The number of true believersof RMA in the PLA is small and clearly manyof them are simply copying the minds of theirUS colleagues without a real grasp of thenature of the concept. These enthusiasticsupporters of RMA are those war planners inthe headquarters of PLA specialised servicesand the academic staff in PLA education andresearch institutions. It is they who havespearheaded the study of advanced Westernmilitary ideas and convinced PLA top brassthat times have changed. They are young,well-read, visionary, and anxious to create a

new PLA that is more professional thanrevolutionary. They favour China'smodernisation but reject its wholesaleWesternisation. They entertain strongnationalist feelings but oppose closed-doorism.More interestingly, they see communism asirrelevant to China's goal of self-strengtheningbut accept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)as the vehicle for the realisation of thatnational goal. Painfully conscious of theircountry's present state of militarybackwardness, they seem to harbour asuppressed ambition which may explode inhawkish rhetoric concerning China'ssovereignty disputes.10 Looking into the futurethey will wield increasingly more influencewithin the PLA and even over national politicsas a whole. Partly this is because they arestrategically positioned in PLA headquarters atvarious levels with a promising upward careerahead. In PLA tertiary institutions they areteaching the future PLA leaders and forginguseful personal networks with them. Moreimportantly, their views on RMA are based ontheir understanding of technologicaldevelopment in the new century and this haswon them firm support of the Chinese leaderJiang Zemin who, as a foresighted technocrathimself, is very enthusiastic about RMA. Thishas been the fundamental reason for RMAbecoming so popular in the PLA, as those RMAadvocates get better chances of promotion withJiang's blessing. It is safe to predict that whenthese people are in senior commanding postsin the new millennium the future developmentof the PLA will be guided more visibly by theideas of RMA.

The significance of the debate among thethree schools of thought is that beforetechnocrats took over the leadership in the CCPand military, technology was only one of thechanging variables in the formulation ofnational defence strategy. The generalists-dominated leadership had a natural tendencyof belittling the role of technology, as reflectedby Mao who eyed nuclear bombs as paper


tigers. Now the technocrats have a real graspof the technological revolution andconsciously direct the military decision-makingprocess based on the current and futuretechnological innovations. This has eventuallyresulted in the Party's new political line oftransforming the PLA from a quantitative toqualitative military, formally discarding a longPLA tradition that identified strength withlarge numbers of infantry soldiers. As onesenior PLA theorist commented: It is inevitablethat a military has to evolve from drawingphysical strength from numbers (tineng) torelying on technological hardware (jineng) tobecoming eventually a military of intelligence(zhineng).11

However, what should be mentioned here isthat it is a mistake to believe that the threeschools of thought have created deep cleavagesin the PLA. The PLA has a general consensusthat information age has arrived, and thetechnological breakthroughs in the world haveprofoundly altered the way of fighting. AllPLA personnel agree that China needs to catchup with this change. At the same time theytake useful elements of each school to fit in thechanged time. The idea of people's war isregarded as still valid in some circumstances,e.g. in a territorial conventional war against aninvading enemy. The hi-tech strategy school ofthought is designed to deal with limitedregional hi-tech wars, the main type of actionChina is preparing for. In a war as such thePLA will rely on its hi-tech capable elite units,especially the specialised services to carry outwar plans. At the moment this is probably allthe PLA can do with its limited amount of hi-tech hardware. In the future when China hasachieved solid technological foundation andthe PLA has overcome its current equipmentvacuum, it will be better able to implement theideas of RMA, utilising advanced militarysatellites, miniatured super computers andlong-range precision weapons to digitalise itsarmed forces. So the RMA school of thought isfor now rather a philosophical blueprint than a

practical roadmap for China's defence. It isonly growth in China's comprehensive nationalstrength that can make RMA a real guide forthe PLA's war preparation and thus unify thethinking of its high command.

Understanding and Sinifying RMA For the time being the PLA has worked

hard to understand the effects of RMA on themilitary establishments. In 1998 the PLANational Defence University convened a majorworkshop on RMA. The participants tried towork out a definition of RMA. They agreedthat RMA was made up of five revolutions:military thinking of the officers, militarytechnology, military equipment, strategictheory and force structure. They also agreedthat the core of RMA was fast development ofinformation technology which spearheadsRMA.12 In a way the workshop has played animportant role to systemise the PLA's effort oflearning RMA. Indeed, the PLA's effort in thisregard has caught attention of an Americanprofessor at the Armed Forces Staff Collegewho commented: “the Chinese defenceanalysts appear to be at the cutting edge of theimplications of information war for traditionalinstitutions such as the military."13 Whatexactly has the PLA learned from RMA? MajorGeneral Chen Youyuan, Director of the OfficersTraining Bureau in the General StaffDepartment, summarises the key features of theRMA, as understood by the PLA. According tohim, RMA is profoundly altering the worldmilitary in the following areas: • RMA is changing the components of the

armed forces, especially for the campaignformation between different Services;

• RMA is introducing new combat means; • RMA is generating much larger combat

space; • RMA is creating new modes of operations; • RMA is inventing new methods of combat

engagement. All this in turn propels the military to make

theoretical breakthroughs so as to accom-


modate these new developments in technologyand combat operations. In his view the PLAhas, together with other major military powers,entered an existing era of new militarythinking, new military ideas and new militaryconcepts. Thus whoever fails to follow RMAwill be beaten in the future.14

In studying RMA, PLA thinkers haveindeed come up with a number of new ideasthat they want to incorporate into theirplanning for the long-term modernisation ofthe Chinese armed forces. Among other thingsthe following are some of their findings: • Strike from long distance. New

sophisticated terminal guidance systemsand precision weapons have made beyondvision attack possible. This will minimisehuman engagement and greatly reducecasualties. PLA researchers have noticed theUS's new concepts of combat such as“disengagement and indirect assault", and“concentrated firepower but dispersedmanpower". They accept the claims by USmilitary experts that in the distant futuretank battles, aircraft “dog-fight" andexchange of fires by warships' big gunswill become history.15

• Small-sized battle formation withoutcompromising the strength and outcome.Crack force structure and simple-layer C3Isystems are more suitable for IW which ischaracterised more by combat betweenhardware/software than between personnel.Digitalised and precision ammunition havemultiplied the fire power of campaignunits. Therefore, a small hi-tech force canoverpower an army ten times morenumerous. Digitalisation is particular is akey indicator of a military of the future. Itprovides a high level of battlefieldtransparency to the side which has themeans of multi-dimensional intelligenceacquisition.

• Linkage between superiority in informationand victory of an operation. Informationtechnology has not only become an

indispensable means for better commandand communication, it has also constitutedan effective weapon to be used to kill theenemies directly. Combat between opposingmilitaries is first of all between theircapabilities to gather, process and analyseinformation. So combat engagement beginslong before soldiers shoot at each other andit may have become physically invisible.That is to say attacks at the enemy'sdefence nerve centres can be achievedwithout using aircraft, warships andmissiles. They can be carried out simplythrough computer virus and softwarebombs to paralyse its C3I systems.Superiority in information technologyamounts to superiority in combatoperation.16

On the other hand, the Chinese are not onlylearning RMA, they are trying to sinify itaccording to their own tradition, currentpractice and future needs. In other words theyare injecting Chinese characteristics intoRMA.17 By the definition of Professor ZhuGuangya, China's top defence scientist, RMA isthe product of socio-economic andtechnological development. It is the organicand timely combination of advanced weaponssystems, new military theoretical guideline andsuitable force structure. This combination cangenerate qualitative change in the employmentof military power.18 The key to sinifying RMAis the PLA's understanding that it will bedoomed to failure if the inferior militarymechanically copies the RMA-induced newforce structure and combat patterns of theadvanced opponent. It should have its ownRMA ideas and practice that suits its situationas a strategically defensive force with inferiorweaponry. In other words to many PLAstrategists RMA should not simply be atechnological privilege endowed only to asuperpower.19

The Chinese believe that RMA is still in itsformative years with its initial phase extendedto 2030.20 Therefore, it is difficult to see its full


potential in releasing powerful energyembodied in the combination of the newtechnology and force structure. To the PLA,however, it is easier to talk about catching upthan really to do it. One precondition for thesuccess of catching up is to have a correctunderstanding of what RMA means, especially,of what it means to the Chinese militarymodernisation. Even with a properunderstanding achieved, the Chinese leadershipstill confronts a tremendous task in research onhow to apply the understanding in the policy-making process. Political consensus does notmean automatic removal of the bureaucraticbarriers, existing vested interests andbudgetary limitations in restructuring forcecomponents, re-sequencing weapons R & Dand equipping priorities, and re-formulatingspecific war plans.

In order to meet the challenge of RMA theChinese armed forces have worked out anumber of principles of learning RMA. First,the PLA is instructed by the CCP leadership tofurther emancipate the minds of its officersand men and constantly upgrade its war-fighting theories. Major General Chen Youyuanargued that although RMA is driven by therevolution in military technology, newtechnology itself will not automaticallyproduce theoretical guideline for the PLA's warpreparation. Without new combat theorytechnology cannot win the war by itself.Moreover, new theory will not be inventedwithout a fundamental change in the mentalityof PLA senior officers.21 In fact, RMA is seen asnot only bringing pressure to bear on the PLA,but also opening up new opportunities for it:RMA provides a best stimulant for the PLA toshake off its historical burdens rooted in therevolutionary ideology and old militarystrategies.

Secondly, the PLA makes it an urgent taskto broaden it horizon and follow closely themajor military powers regarding their newtheories and practice. The PLA now believesthat the recent limited hi-tech wars have

provided good cases of study for China tounderstand the logic, operation features andcombat patterns of its potential adversaries.These should serve as the useful reference forthe PLA to work out counter-measures. At thesame time the PLA should use these cases as aguide to develop its own combat theories andprinciples.

Thirdly, the PLA believes it should studyIW carefully in order to learn its merits and,simultaneously, find its points of weakness.This is crucial for the PLA which will for along time rely on inferior weapons to fightpowerful enemies. One important learningmission the PLA has set up for its researchinstitutions is to study thoroughly the KosovoWar. They have analysed how the NATO airattack was hampered by the bad weather anddifficult terrain; why the Yugoslavia'sintegrated air defence system could not shootdown a significant number of invading aircraftand why the NATO forces failed to inflict ahigh level of casualties onto Yugoslavia; andwhat lessons the PLA could draw from thisone-sided warfare which may just mirror asimilar situation in which the PLA will have tostruggle to survive in the future. In the finalanalysis, to most PLA generals RMA is nolonger a theoretical concept but a type ofwarfare China has few counter-measures tohandle. Yet this predicament even furtherhighlights the need for the PLA to study theideas related with RMA.

The Nexus of RMA and Humanitarian MilitaryIntervention

For China it is theoretically not too late tocatch up with this crucial developmental trendbut time is running short. If the Kosovo Warproves anything, it is the West's trigger-happyinterventionism in world affairs. This newinterventionism is dependent on its superiorweaponry which makes it possible for RMAconcepts to be implemented, as indicated bythe unprecedented zero combat casualty.22 TheKosovo War can be a watershed event in


contemporary world history. In a way it wasjust the first in a long list of similar caseswhere such intervention may be repeated againand again. Indeed, global interventionism is aninevitable brainchild of the end of historymentality. It takes a whole decade to be inform and may become an historical trend inthe future. As a philosophical notion it iscrystallised in Tony Blair's thesis of the ThirdWay that gives major powers natural rights tointervene in other countries' internal affairs, ifthere is a humanitarian disaster there.23

To the Chinese the connection betweenpolitical intervention and military interventionis dangerous for its national security. The RMAhas become the actual mechanism to put thistheoretical concept into practice in the realworld politics. The logic is quite clear in thisconnection: if the West has set an ultimatepolitical goal for mankind based on therealisation of democracy, it cannot achieve thisgoal without a level of military interventionbecause many countries do not accept this goalautomatically. Economic intervention in theform of sanctions is not powerful enough forthe endeavour. The West believes that to somecountries only through military interventioncan the goal of democratisation beaccomplished.

Humanitarian military intervention is aparticular content of this political objective:restricting dictators' freedom of militarychoices and deploying peace-making andpeacekeeping forces on the ground of war-torncountries. This political employment of armsrequires a different type of warfare: long-rangeand pinpoint attack at the enemy's militarytargets, total control of the air, and suffocationof the opponent's military capabilities, and soon. The key to success of RMA type ofintervention is to minimise the Westernpersonnel casualties and losses of civilian livesof the opposite side. If the civilian losses areheavy, then the just nature of the humanitarianinterventionism becomes difficult to justify.RMA makes it possible to achieve a human

rights objective without waging an all-out waron the ground and thus makes it possible towage an interventionist warfare relativelyeasily on the part of the West. In other wordsbecause in the past there was not a proper typeof warfare against the authoritarian regimes,all the West could do was either conduct amassive war or just watch helplessly.

Therefore, international interventionism isbased on technological superiority and militarydominance in hardware. Politically speakingthe larger the gap in the balance of power, theeasier is the process of an interventionist war.However, it is risky to indulge in a mentality ofusing the RMA type of warfare to resolvehuman rights problems. Such a mentalitycauses tensions to regional security, as trigger-happy interventionist actions are not based onthe fully developed RMA superiority that canbe employed politically to achieve the desiredeffects, as seen from the Kosovo War. A lot ofpeople get killed in such an intervention.“Everything is under control" is just wishfulthinking.

China and most regional countries areopposed to the concept that human rights isabove national sovereignty and they believethat the Third Way can be disruptive for theregional security order. So they responded tothe Kosovo War with criticisms: it was viewedas the testing ground for the Third Way thesisto be translated into power play by the West.Then international relations will be definedand served by might.24 Indeed, China's reactionto the Kosovo War had much to do with theleadership's concern over China's own ethnictensions. Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan all havepotential to experience what happened inYugoslavia and invoke outside interference.Anti-China forces in the three places all enjoyexternal support. Stability in Tibet ismaintained largely by force. Taiwan's futurewith China is particularly uncertain. Chinadoes not want to fight a war with Westernpowers in these areas. Therefore, outside


involvement of the Kosovo type there wouldbe a nightmare for the Chinese people.

The reality is that the superpower has apolitical obligation to assist Taiwan under theTRA and it has actually worked out concretemilitary contingency plans to intervene in caseof an armed conflict in the Strait.25 In recentyears the US arms sales have a distinctivepurpose of intervention: to keep Taiwan'smilitary technology more advanced than thePLA's in order to prevent Taiwan from yieldingto the PRC's pressure. This trend has beendeepened with the humanitarianist zeal. Thenew challenge to China's military securityposed by the US in a possible Taiwan war isthat the intervention is to be moreoperationalised. For instance, if the UScoordinates the combat activities of theTaiwanese armed force through its advancedC4ISR systems in the Pacific, the PLA willsuffer greater human and materiel losses. IfTaiwan is admitted into the TMD network,China's missiles will have to be furtherimproved to achieve the same level of effect.More dangerous for the PLA is the possibilityof the US imposing various direct militarymeasures to restrict China's likely actions inthe Strait. These may include blackout of thePLA's C3IRS networks, and disruption of itscomputer systems. When the conflict escalates,the US may blockade the movement of theChinese warships in international waters. Itmay also impose a no-fly zone in the TaiwanStrait to prevent China from launching airraids on Taiwan's military facilitates. The USmay even select some PLA command andcontrol hubs as the targets for surgical strikes.Watching how the Chinese Embassy wasbombed, this could not be excluded altogether.These are the worst case scenarios but thepressure is real. The use of force and theprospect of being attacked have both loomedlarge in the second half of the 1990s.

Injecting RMA into the Hi-tech Defence Strategy The PLA's embracing of RMA has provided

a timely guideline for it to improve its newnational defence strategy, both in theory andin practice. This is a major attempt to sinifyRMA according to its own defencerequirements. Now PLA generals have beenconvinced more than ever before that winninga hi-tech war relies on hardware superiority,sound tactics and a suitable force structure.They have also realised that Deng's “people'swar under modern conditions" fomentedconfusion regarding the basic direction of thePLA's development. Conceptually, it hasbecome self-contradictory, conflating two verydifferent strategies of relying on populationpower (luring the enemy into the heartlandand engaging it in a protracted people's war)on the one hand and on firepower (modernconditions, namely withholding the enemy inkey war directions by the professional armedforces) on the other. The doctrine of activedefence, the concrete form of Deng's strategy,which was designed at the beginning of the1980s to withhold a Soviet land attack throughpositional warfare, seemed to have been out ofstep with the evolution of internationalaffairs.26 Then the strategy of fighting a limitedregional war, formulated in the second half ofthe 1980s in dealing with China's borderdisputes, was regarded as providing no long-term guide for the PLA to address its securityconcerns and practical needs for weaponssystems. That is to say that China as a majorworld power cannot base its militarymodernisation simply on considerations of thepotential conflicts in the South China Sea oralong its borders with Asian states.27

So for some time at the turn of the 1990s,China was experiencing a vacuum in nationaldefence strategy. Fortunately for the PLA, theGulf War erupted and supplied the Chinese aconcrete image of what future war would belike, and more importantly, what future warthe PLA had to fight. Jiang Zemin summarisedhis grasp of the future military affairs during


his inspection tour to the PLA NationalUniversity of Science and Technology in 1991that any future war would be a war of hi-tech,a war of multi-dimensions, a war ofelectronics, and a war of missiles. The PLA hadto be ready for such a reality.28 Since thenJiang has worked very hard to build aconsensus within the top civilian and militaryleadership on China's national defence strategyin the information age. In 1992 the CMCapproved such a new strategy, tentativelydefined as fighting a future war under hi-techconditions, which, while remedying thetraditional doctrinal defects, laid thegroundwork for force restructuring, generaltraining and formulation of updated “wargame" plans to counter-measure China'spotential threats.

What is the relationship between DengXiaoping's doctrine of fighting a people's warunder modern conditions and the post-Dengstrategy of fighting a future war under hi-techconditions? The latter has clearly evolved fromthe former but brought it much closer to thepolitical and security reality of the informationage. Both envisage active defence to hold anenemy's invasion at bay rather than luring itinto the heartland. Both prefer advancedmilitary hardware to human resources and callfor building a high-quality standing army.Both highlight the need of launching combinedmilitary operations in contemporary warfare,emphasising the decisive role of the specialisedservices, especially the Air Force.

Yet drawing on the crucial elements ofRMA theory, the hi-tech strategy differs fromDeng's strategy in several important respects.First, the former calls for establishing a linkagebetween active defence and forward defence,which may mean power projection beyond thecountry's land borders. This is a radicaldeparture from Deng's active defence, whichwas confined basically to territorial defence ina form of positional warfare around majorcities. Deng's defence is “active" onlycompared to Mao's passive people's war.

Forward defence is the key to the new strategy,as it recognises that in a hi-tech war the enemycan strike from a long distance, a key contentof RMA. For instance, the PLA repeatedlyquotes the example that the advancement ofmilitary technology in the 1970s, as seen fromthe development of long-range precisionweapons, allowed NATO to attack the Sovietsecond and third echelon formations from afar,thus denying its initiative of launching a largescale conventional war. Previously NATOcould only plan for a war of attrition againstthe preponderant Soviet ground force. The PLAhas noticed that with RMA unfolding thedefining line dividing the front and rear hasbecome more and more academic. This hasforced the PLA to enlarge greatly its strategicdepth, which, according to PLA war planners,should not be restricted to within Chineseborders. For example, air and missile defenceshould be stretched even beyond the enemy'sfirst line air base.29 To the PLA expandingdefence depth may not prevent the enemy'slong-range attack, like what happened inKosovo. Yet if the enemy can be effectivelyengaged in the outer defence line of thecountry, the PLA may at least pose a greaterthreat to the enemy, secure precious earlywarning moments and thus reduce thepersonnel and materiel losses on the defensiveside. Moreover, in geo-political terms thisforward defence can take the form of forwarddeployment in areas subject to overlappingterritorial disputes. As an expression ofsovereignty claims, this entails the permanentstationing of PLA units in, and regular militaryexercises around, these areas. In some extremecases, this even entails a demonstration of warbrinkmanship to protect China's vital nationalinterests such as its sovereignty integrity.

Secondly, the hi-tech defence strategy islargely an offensive oriented strategy reflectingthe PLA's shifting emphasis towards the“active" versus the “defensive" side of warpreparation. In a way this is a reverse ofDeng's doctrine. The PLA was quick to learn


immediately after the Gulf War that hi-techwars will not be fought along fixed defencelines. The line between battleground frontierand its depth will become very thin. Trenchwarfare will be rare. According to this change,some PLA strategists argue that China's post-Cold War military guideline should be changedfrom Deng's yifang weizhu fangfan jiehe, or“defence as overall posture, offence as thesupplement", to linghuo fanying gong fangjiehe, or “adroit response based on acombination of offensive and defensivecapabilities". Offence is now understood ascapturing the nature of information warfare:the evolving hi-tech hardware is highly biasedtoward a fast offensive strike becausetechnological innovation has increasinglyblurred the boundaries between offensive anddefensive weaponry. Indeed, RMA is abouthow to maximise the offensive effects.Digitalised battlefield, electronic soft kill, andpinpoint elimination of the enemy's key targetsall indicate that it is the offensive side that canseize the first initiative of the war and has thebest chance of success. The offensive postureand pre-emptive strike are especially crucial fora weak military at the beginning of a hi-techwar.30

In practice the post-Cold War uncertaintieshave required the PLA to enhance rapidreaction capabilities to cope with new sets ofevents, expected or unexpected. Under somecircumstances active defence can mean pre-emptive offensive campaigns to neutralise animminent threat.31 PLA strategists argue that acountry's need to protect its territorial integritydictates a forward posture. Take Taiwan as anexample. Here the Chinese are politically anddiplomatically reactive to the efforts of theindependence movement on the island.Militarily, however, the PLA has to develop thecapability powerful enough to deter any suchattempt by the Taiwan authorities. If this fails,it has to launch an offensive operation.Inevitably the PLA has to formulate its detailedinvasion plans based on available offensive

weaponry. More importantly, this propensity toemploy military forces is closely linked to theconcept of military deterrence at various levelsof possible armed conflict. A strategy ofdeterrence against foreign invasion differsfrom that of safeguarding national sovereignty.Generally, a defensive oriented militarystrategy cannot make the latter credible. This isespecially true when the political forces forsplitism have the support of a hi-techmilitary.32

Third, as RMA envisages changing forms ofaction in the not too distant future, China'spost-Deng defence strategy also leaves largespace for adjustment in absorbing newtechnologically induced innovations inmilitary modernisation. Politically, the strategyis forward-leaning as well. Its hi-tech focusaims mainly at defence against strategicconcerns, namely the major military powers.At the same time the strategy is flexible inprinciple, catering to different scenarios, frommajor hi-tech wars to small-scale borderconflicts. This is the response of China's armedforces to the country's changing securityenvironment in the post-Cold War era.Militarily, China's post-Deng defence strategyis not just a change in doctrine. It is forward-looking, as it is geared to preparation foraction in the new century. Therefore, itprescribes concrete measures for weaponsprograms, force organisation, campaign tactics,and research priorities, which do not aim atequipping the PLA in the next few years but atthe frontiers of hi-tech breakthroughs somedecades from now.33

What is the significance of this newmilitary thinking ahead of the present time? ToRMA advocates establishing a right directionof development may be more important thanimmediate availability of advanced hardwarefor the PLA's future. They point out that theimportance of RMA does not lie in how todevelop hi-tech equipment but in how toutilise it. Without a sound strategic theoreticalframework, even if the PLA acquires


sophisticated weaponry in the new century, itcannot not be used scientifically to realise itsfull potential. They illustrate one example toprove their point: in the 1930s France andGermany had similar numbers of tanks. Whiletanks were scattered in the French Army, theywere concentrated in the elite Army divisionsin Germany, making them unstoppable inground battles. The different deploymentmethods produced vastly different effects inthe war, giving birth to a new revolution inmilitary affairs.34 This examples has convincedthe PLA that national defence strategy,weapons development and force structure arethe trinity of one entity to make the armedforces powerful. Without either itsmodernisation will be led astray.

Putting RMA Ideas into Practice Although the Chinese leadership has no

illusions of how far the country is away fromrealising its RMA dream, it does not give uptrying. Indeed, it has made small steps infollowing the direction of RMA in its drive ofdefence modernisation. At the moment whatthe PLA can do is not much but it believes it isimportant to lay a solid foundation, both intheoretical and materiel terms, for the daywhen the country is finally capable oftranslating its RMA blueprint into reality.Below are a few initiatives that the Chinese aredoing in putting RMA ideas into practice.

Asymmetry Warfare: the Missile Threat The PLA sees missile attack as a very useful

weapon of asymmetry warfare with which aweak military deals with a strong one. Theefforts to increase conventional missiles ofChina's Strategic Missile Force (SMF) has thusbeen a top priority in the PLA's preparation foran RMA type of war. Maintaining a relativelyhigh level of missile threat is regarded as theonly feasible means to compensate China'sinferior offensive capabilities. As the PLA'sother punches by the Navy and Air Force areweak and short, employment of conventionalmissiles becomes one of its few deterrents

against a major power.35 For instance, at theinitial stage of a war across the Taiwan Strait,the PLA will unlikely engage the opponent inan aerial dog of war or a naval sea battle. Thismay not just be due to the PLA's shortage ofthe fourth generation aircraft and modernwarships. Launching pinpoint missiles is lessthreatening politically and strategically thandirect personnel engagement. At the same timeit reduces the human losses for the PLA, itcreates a higher level of psychological effect.Moreover, missile launches are moremanageable, as they can be stopped promptly.This is advantageous for the mainland in thatit can scale down the escalation of war andsave China from direct confrontation with thesuperpower. Yet concentrated use of missilescan paralyse the carefully selected militarytargets of the enemy.36

Accordingly, the SMF has in the past fewyears made serious efforts to formulate a newset of guidelines and concepts for futuremissile warfare. This includes research onimproving the terminal accuracy and oncountering the tactics and style of a potentialenemy's attack. The importance of these effortsis elaborated in a research report of the PLANational Defence University:

The PLA's conventional missiles will beused exclusively against the enemy's keymilitary targets which the weapons of otherServices cannot reach. These targets includethe communications hubs, weapons deliveryplatforms, and most practically the aircraftcarrier battle groups. Since these systemsare under heavy protection, the demand forthe conventional missiles is thus very high.Moreover, how to use these missiles is amatter of military art involving theoptimum timing and smart selection oftargets.37

Secondly, the use of conventional missileunits of the SMF has been highlighted by thePLA's emphasis on united warfare.Traditionally, however, the SMF has largelyconfined its war doctrines and training


programs to itself, given the nature of nuclearweapons and warfare. United campaignsinvolving the SMF with other Services havenever been a priority in the PLA's warpreparation. Technological improvement ofconventional missiles has made the SMF auseful tactical offensive force and thus made itpossible for it to join other Services in likelywar scenarios. For instance, the missile attackagainst enemy's C4IRS centres and airfields isseen to be conducive to the Air Force's effortsto achieve air superiority. Since training forunited campaigns is currently prioritised forthe joint exercises of the Army, the Navy andthe Air Force, the SMF has been ordered by theCMC to formulate protocols for itsparticipation. In effect the officers from theSMF are required to join the headquarters ofunited campaigns in each war zone, adeparture from past practice. Now the SMF'scoordination in such war efforts is seen ascrucial to whether a war can be won.

The missile firing by the conventionalmissile units of the SMF in the March 1996military demonstration against Taiwan,codenamed “Strait 96 Number One", was thefirst known case of the SMF's activeparticipation in a large united campaignexercise at the level of Army groups with aparticipation of 60,000 soldiers, includingthose of the Air Force, the Navy and the SMF.The early timing of missile firing in relations toother Services in the exercise seems to indicatethat ballistic missiles would be used in theinitial stage of a conflict in preparation for airstrikes and amphibious landings. Moreover,during the exercise the missiles were fired fromat least two widely dispersed units. This maybe a deliberate design by the SMF to test itscommand, control and communicationeffectiveness.38

Parallel to the PLA's efforts to enhance itsmissile attack capabilities is China's own TMDprogram. To China TMD is a grave threat to itsmilitary security in that it is a weapons systemthat may potentially neutralise part of China's

strategic deterrence. The TMD system isregarded as an integral component of the RMAtype of war of mass destruction. Politically,TMD is, like SDI, a symbol of the extension ofthe SDI Cold War. It signals a redefined powerrelationship in the Far East. An effective TMDcannot leave any geographic holes in itsnetwork.39

Psychologically, TMD further worsens thetraditional security dilemma. A workable TMDcertainly widens the gap of military balance infavour of the US-led alliances. When one sidein the race is losing its strategic deterrentcapabilities, it will easily panic. Its impulsivereaction will be to increase its arsenal of attackmissiles in a hope that even if some of itsmissiles are neutralised by the enemy's TMDshield, at least a decent number of missiles canstill penetrate through the network. Thus theTMD initiative serves as a trigger to uplift thearms race in both qualitative and quantitativeterms.

TMD stimulates the PLA missiledevelopment in several aspects. First, itrequires the PLA to increase its missile stocksubstantially in order for it to launch a saturateattack. One important step in this regard is thequickened pace of developing cruise missilesthat are better capable of penetrating theenemy's missile defence. Secondly, itgalvanises the PLA to lift the general level ofmissile technology so as to evade the TMDinterception. This requires a number of keytechnologies: enhanced electronic warfarecapability, e.g. installation of sophisticatedguidance systems such as IR/laser imagingguidance and active/passive guidance systems,and ECCM and on board jammers; stealthyfeatures; advanced solid fuelled motors andcomposite ramjet engines.40 Thirdly, TMDforces the PLA to increase the speed of itsmissiles and develop more supersonic missilesin order to outpace the interceptors. From themilitary point of view the PLA is in fact nottoo much concerned about a TMD networkbecause at the current technological level, it is


a lot more expensive and demanding todevelop a workable missile defence systemthan simply to add the number of missiles.PLA analysts put the ratio to be 5 to 1 andcome to a conclusion that China is capable ofsweeping any missile defence systems in theFar East with its concentrated launches.41 Thisis especially true in the situation in the TaiwanStrait. The short geographic distance can givethe armed forces in Taiwan only a few minutesof early warning time against incoming cruisemissiles, causing people to ask a seriousquestion of whether TMD is reliable. Thedecision of the Korean Government not to jointhe US-Japan TMD R & D presents a practicalexample of this tyranny of distance for missiledefence.

Setting the National Goal for Hi-tech Research RMA has become a driving force for the

development of science and technology forChina. The Chinese leadership rightlyconcludes that without a sound technologicalfoundation there is no point of talking aboutRMA. China's hi-tech base is currently quitethin. Only in limited technological areas hasChina reached world level, such as its spaceindustries. The market reform has createdopportunities for gradually strengthening thisweak foundation, as China's rapid economicgrowth makes the research for hi-tech weaponsmore affordable than before. However, theChinese recognise the fact that it is too early toseriously contemplate the narrowing oftechnological gap with the West. This is thereason why China feels vulnerable with theRMA type of warfare. On the other hand,China's technocrats-turned leadership hasmade it a state policy to enter the hi-tech racewith the major powers, although the policydoes not put gun above butter.42 They have notfailed to notice that the US technological racewith the USSR helped it to achieve a superiorposition in the post-Cold War world economiccompetition. The new understanding is thatdefence related hi-tech has always led

scientific and technological revolutions. Theapplications of military informationtechnology can be wide-ranging andprofitable.

Since the beginning of the Cold Peace era,China has confronted new challenges to itsmilitary and economic security, now seen asbuilt upon a scientific and technologicalcompetitive edge. Therefore, the civilian andmilitary leaders share the same policy objectivein placing hi-tech development as the topnational priority. This determination has beenfurther hardened by NATO's bombing of theChinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in May 1999and has won wide public support. In concretesteps, it has been decided that in the next fewdecades concentrated national efforts will bemade in boosting China's defence technologyas quickly as possible. As a result R & D andweapons programs have increasingly focusedtowards research of military space network,fixed-energy and laser equipment, electronicweapons and super computer. Logically, thisdemands a continuing and sizeable increase inmilitary budget, for hi-tech driven militarymodernisation is bound to be expensive. Indeed,more funds will be allocated in the R & D of hi-tech weapons, including new generation ofnuclear and convention missiles, aircraft andnaval vessels.

Making Military Research Closer to New WarScenarios

One logical outcome of China's embracingof RMA is a major re-sequencing of the PLA'stheoretical and applicable research priorities. Inthe past PLA researchers were inclined to studythe PLA's war history. For instance, a largeproportion of the research projects in the PLAAcademy of Military Science were devoted tocontinuous evaluations of the PLA's successfulcampaigns between 1927 and 1953. In 1993Jiang Zemin instructed the PLA researchbodies to shift their research focus from thepast to the present. More concretely, hedecided that over 60 per cent of research


projects had to serve the PLA's immediateneeds (e.g. restructuring and weaponsprograms), practical war plans (e.g. specificforce redeployment and employment againstspecific enemies), and likely military operationsin the future (e.g. detailed theatre campaignobjectives and protocols). He emphasised theimportance of research on the way in whichpersonnel and weapons are related in theinformation age, especially in a situation wherethe PLA has to use low-tech hardware againstsome particular hi-tech opponents.43

Consequently, the PLA's research on majorpractical issues (zhongda xianshi wenti) and itstheoretical exploration of the RMA have beencombined together under the post-Deng hi-tech military strategy. In recent years the CMChas ordered the PLA to employ advancedmeans to improve its research on RMA. Oneimportant effort is to use computer simulationsystems to reconstruct major hi-techoperations of the major powers in their recentlimited wars. One specific research project is tostudy how to employ asymmetry warfareagainst an overwhelmingly powerful enemy,such as concentrated use of conventionalmissiles against the aircraft battle groups. Tomake research and training closer to hi-techwarfare, textbooks in the military institutionshave been completely rewritten in the last fewyears and since 1993 a comprehensive trainingreform has been carried out to drill soldiers notonly to learn hi-tech wars but also to learnhow to fight specific hi-tech enemies.

Initiating Qualitative Force Restructuring There is no doubt that by now both Chinese

civilian and military leaders have firmlyaccepted the central theme of RMA that in theinformation age victory of a war ispredominantly dependent on the quality oftechnology rather than quantity of soldiers inuniform. With this consensus the PLA hasspeeded up its efforts to build a qualitativemilitary by initiating large scales of forcereductions. The Army was ordered to let go

500,000 personnel in 1997. Already its size isthe smallest since the founding of the PRC butfurther cuts are likely to follow beyond thisround. Sooner rather than later its totalstrength will drop below two million.Meanwhile the specialised Services continue toenjoy priority for modernisation. Enormousefforts have been made to strengthen thesecond strike nuclear deterrence capability,create offensive air power and develop a bluewater Navy.44

Concrete restructuring progress has beenmade to match the PLA with the world trendof RMA, although the progress is slow, to thepoint of annoying party leader Jiang Zemin.So far the most visible change in the topcommand structure is the establishment of aGeneral Equipment Department (GED)immediately under the CMC in 1998, with thesame ranking with the GSD. This departmenthas taken over the functions of weapons R & D,testing, acquisition, allocation and relatedmatters formerly assumed by the various topagencies in the PLA headquarters. For instance,it incorporated the Department of Equipmentin the GSD, administrative and operationalmissions of the State Commission on Science,Technology and Industry for National Defence(COSTIND) under the State Council, includingall military R & D projects and procurementagencies in the General Logistical Department.

The significance of the creation of this GEDcan be seen from the following two angles.First, it constitutes an effective measure tosubstantiate the hi-tech defence strategy.Without a sufficient amount of sophisticatedhi-tech weaponry, the strategy will remain anempty shell. The new GED reflects thedetermination of the CMC to concentrate allresources it can to advance the weapons R & Dand to quicken the process of equippingcombat units with the best hardware. Secondly,the department is also a concrete step totranslate the theory of RMA into practicalapplication. For instance, the GED willfacilitate the weapons R & D and acquisition in


accordance with the requirements of unitedwarfare. One precondition for this is to rectifythe current state of affairs in weaponsdevelopment by different Services, which canbe summarised as uncoordinated with an effectof weakening united campaign capabilities ofthe PLA. The GED will have power to overseeweapons programs of all Services in order tomake them serve the purpose of unitedwarfare.

Another indicator has been the reneweddiscussion of abolishing the seven militaryregions in the recent months. The PLA highcommand invited debate among top brass inthe early 1980s about whether to replace allmilitary regions with strategic front armies. Forinstance, the Shenyang Military Region wouldbe restructured into the Northeast Front Army.The difference between the two was that theformer was at once a level of administrativeagency and operational command. This madethe leadership structure unwieldy. Instructionsfrom the CMC had to go through several layersto reach the units they should go to. Incomparison the Northeast Front Army weremerely a level of operational command. Itwas directly placed under the CMCadministratively. Another advantage of thereform was to uproot the too intimateconnection between PLA regional commandand local government. However, the debate didnot bring any concrete results due to theresistance of military regions. Later on theCMC abolished the attempted reform simplysaying that the conditions were not ripe.45

Since 1997 a new round of discussion ofthe same theme has been carried out amongPLA leading agencies. This time the“conditions" may seem to have been ripe tomany PLA analysts. One senior PLA researcherhas this to say: “The revolution in informationtechnology changes with each passing day thebattleground structure, operation modes andconcepts of time and space, which dictatesoverhaul of the traditional “centralised" and“tier-by-tier" administrative/command

structure. It has also been proposed that thecurrent seven military regions be substitutedby five strategic war zones. There are severalmerits in this reform. We have alreadymentioned the simplified command structurebetween the central military authority and thebasic campaign units (group armies ordivisions). Political need is even more pressing.However, the motivation is also rooted in theneed to initiate a thorough overhaul of PLAcommand structure in order to suit it better inIW. For instance, the war zone concept willguide the integration of all Services in jointoperations under a united command. It is veryinteresting to watch the outcome of thisreform.46

Implementing New Campaign Tactics Closely linked to the PLA's adaptation of a

RMA related national defence strategy is a neweffort to implement new campaign tacticsdeprived from the study of the likely forms offuture wars. Lieutenant General Hu Changfa,deputy president of the PLA National DefenceUniversity made the following summary at anall-armed-forces conference on campaigntheory in late 1996:

The changes in the international strategicenvironment and the wide application of hi-tech in the military realm have posed anenormous challenge to the PLA. Now we arefacing new forms of warfare, new opponents infuture wars, new campaign tactics and newpatterns of engagement in campaigns. How towin the next war under hi-tech conditions isour primary task of study.47

To tackle this task the PLA has firstidentified the new forms of its most likelyforms of engagement in a hi-tech campaign.According to General Hu, there are two basicforms. The first is mobile operations and thesecond is united operations.48 Mobile operationdictates a fundamental revision of the PLA'soperational doctrine centred on the positionalwarfare and promotes a kind of non-linedefence warfare. The PLA has realised that line


defence belongs to the era of rifles, guns andtanks, the short-range engagement. Non-linedefence represents future, requiring long-rangemobility and stifling attacks at the enemy'srear with precision missiles and electronicbombardment. Inevitably the campaignoperations have to be supported by satelliteguidance and multi-dimensional strikecapabilities.49

Therefore the essence of mobile operation isoffensive oriented operation (gongshi zuozhan)which will be the main form of the PLAcampaign engagement with its opponents.50 ToPLA theoreticians, mobile operation is seen askey component of a campaign in informationage. Hi-tech limited wars are characterised bynon-fixed campaign battlefields, fast change inoperation formats, and little distinctionbetween the front line and the defence depth.Only through mobile operations will the PLAtake the initiative of the war. Mobileoperations are also required by China'sstrategic landscape. In the future campaignsthe PLA may be confronted with the missionof operating in multiple strategic directionsand over a vast space of war zones. It has tomove very rapidly in order to establishregional superiority in terms of humanresources and hardware.

Another dimension of the PLA's newcampaign tactics is joint operation. Jointoperation is now seen as reflecting the natureof IW. This is a major departure from the PLA'slong time emphasis on combined operation,which was regarded as its basic campaigntypology designed to be centred around theground force combat. “Combined" refers toemployment of different arms of Services(junzhong) within the Army: units of tank,artillery, anti-chemical warfare, engineering,telecommunications, and others are broughttogether executing a ground campaign.Specialised Services such as the Navy, the AirForce and the missile force were, however,given only a minor role. This campaign form isin agreement with the level of China's overall

military technology: the specialised Servicesare left far behind in hardware development.After all the Chinese armed forces grew fromthe ground force and are dominated by it. Nowthe PLA high command believes that time hascome for the rectification of the flaws both incampaign theory and typology. The specialServices have made progress in boththeoretical guidance and hardware upgrading,making them more capable of supporting jointoperations. In IW the status of specialisedServices has at least risen to parallel theground force. More importantly, fighting withpotential opponents requires a more crucialparticipation of the specialised Services.According to Lieutenant General Hu, in China'sfuture strategic war direction landing operationof some scales will be the PLA's primary task.Landing operations have to be unitedoperations which makes the basic form oftheatre campaign under hi-tech conditions.51

Conclusion There is no doubt that RMA has inspired

the PLA to formulate its long-termmodernisation guideline according to a new setof rules of the game. To the PLA RMA is theworld standard and development trend for apowerful military that it cannot afford toignore. Indeed, it is the very fact that China haslittle capability to cope with the RMA type ofwar that stimulates the PLA to study RMA andto apply, where it can, its principles in practice.To the Chinese leadership the danger of RMAas applied against China does not lie in itseffect of mass destruction in military terms butits political consequence in destabilising thecountry's social stability and government. Thisis where the CCP is very much worried and hastaken measures of self-protection. In the nextfew decades PLA watchers will see continuingreforms within the Chinese armed forces alongthe line of RMA. The PLA's C3I systems willgradually be streamlined and digitalised. Itsforce size will be significantly trimmed andforce components restructured to allow more


space for new specialised arms of Services toemerge. Military R & D programs will givegreat emphasis to the development of newconcept weapons. National defence strategy,campaign tactics and combat principles ofdifferent Services will be under constantreview to guide the PLA to follow the latestinnovations of the major military powers. Inshort the PLA will gradually become moreopen, flexible and forward leaning. As a result,it will become more professional and hi-techoriented.

To the PLA rectifying doctrinal defects ismore important than immediate possession ofmodern combat hardware in its long-termmodernisation. Embracing RMA and trying toput it into practice may have set the PLA in theright direction. However, adopting a correctstrategic guideline does not guarantee the PLAwill succeed in transforming itself eventuallyinto a world class fighting force. People mayquestion: yes, the Chinese can copy Americanthoughts but whether they can also materialiseRMA is not at all obvious.52 If the Soviet failurein its technological race with the US tells usanything, it is that the closed socio-politicalsystem may stifle the imagination of thescientists and doom the long-term potential ofthe nation. Therefore, the biggest challenge toChina's search of a major power status maynot be the current backwardness of itstechnology but the rigidness of its governingprocess.

NOTES1. Li Jijun, “Xinjunshi gemin yu zhanlie siwei de

biange" (RMA and changing strategicmentality), The Journal of PLA NationalDefence University, January 1999, p. 20.

2. Cheng Bojiang, William Perry and others, “Junshigemin yu meiguo kua shiji de guofang fazhan"(RMA and US defence development in thecentury beyond), The Journal of PLA NationalDefence University, December 1998, p. 50.

3. Liu Jishan and Qian Zunde, Dangdai waiguojunshi sixiang (Contemporary military ideas inforeign countries), Beijing: the PLA Academy ofMilitary Science Press, p. 32.

4. Zhang Zhen, “Guanyu wojun zhanyi lilun dejige wenti" (Some questions concerning PLAcampaign theory), Editor Group (eds),Tongxiang shengli de tansou (Exploring theways towards victory), Beijing: the PLAPublishing House, 1987, p. 16.

5. Pillsbury, cited in Far East Economic Review,24 July 1997.

6. Sun Jizhang, “Tantan zhanfa de texin" (On thepattern of war), The Journal of PLA NationalDefence University, January 1999, p. 47.

7. Liu Honji, “Lun youzhongguo tese de xinjunshigemin" (On RMA with Chinese characteristics),The Journal of the PLA National DefenceUniversity, nos. 2-3, 1998, p. 62.

8. See for instance, Liu Yicang, Gaojishuzhanzheng lun (On hi-tech war), Beijing: Junshikexue chubanshe, 1993, chapter 4.

9. Information gathered in China throughinterviews with PLA officers in 1999.

10. Typical of these younger officers is MajorGeneral Zhu Borong, currently deputycommander of the PLA Hong Kong garrison.He received a tertiary education, served as anactive duty officer and worked in Westerncountries as a military attache. When he led theInstitute of Strategic Studies at the PLANational Defence University, he developedgood working relations with the university'spresident, General Zhang Zhen, as the Institutefrequently put forward innovative ideasconcerning the PLA's modernisation. All thishas been of great help for him to be picked upby Zhang Zhen as a key leader in the HongKong garrison, along with Zhu's experience inEngland and his fluent English.

11. The PLA Daily, 8 March 1991. 12. Zhang Hui, “Xinjunshi gemin enti yanjiu

xinlun" (The new ideas in the study of RMA),The Journal of the PLA National DefenceUniversity, nos. 2-3, 1998, p. 67.

13. Ehsan Ahrat, “Chinese Prove to Be AttentiveStudents of Information Warfare", Jane'sIntelligence Review, October 1997, p. 472

14. Chen Youyuan, “Junshi jishu gemin yu zhanyililun de fazhan" (RMA and the development ofcampaign theory), The Journal of PLA NationalDefence University, January 1999, pp. 37-38.

15. ibid. 16. Li Qingshan, Xinjunshi gemin yu gaojishu

zhanzhen (New revolution in military affairsand hi-tech warfare), Beijing: The PLAAcademy of Military Science Press, 1995,Chapter 5 & 6.

17. Liu Honji, p. 62.


18. Wang Gezhen and Li Mindtang, “Junshi gemingsouyi" (Some discussion on the revolution inmilitary affairs), The Journal of the PLANational Defence University, no. 11, 1997, p. 22.

19. Li Jijun, p. 22. 20. Zhang Hui, p. 67. 21. Chen Youyuan, p. 38. 22. See the numerous media coverage after NATO's

bombing of Chinese embassy. 23. See for instance, Anthony Giddens, The Third

Way: the Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity,Cambridge, 1998.

24. Xu Ji, “Erxin pengzhang de baquan zhuyixinzhanlie" (the explosion of hegemonism andits new strategy), Bauhinia Monthly, no. 6,1999, p. 17.

25. See for instance, the talk of the commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Fleet in Australia inearly May 2000, Sydney Morning Herald, 5May 2000.

26. “Active defence strategy" was first raised byfour star general Su Yu on 11 January 1979 toa group of senior PLA officer at the PLAAcademy of Military Science. See, Su Yu, “Duiweilai fanqinlie zhanzheng chuqi zouzhanfangfa jige wenti de tantao), Junshixueshu, no.1, 1979, pp. 1-12.

27. For more detailed analysis, see You Ji, TheArmed Forces of China, Sydney: Allen &Unwin, 1999, Chapters 2 and 7.

28. The PLA Daily, 20 March 1991. 29. Guo Yongjun, “Fangkong zuozhan ying shuli

quanquyu zhengti fangkong de sixian" (Airdefence should be guided by the theory of areaand integrated defence), Junshi xueshu, no. 11,1995, pp. 47-49.

30. Shi Zhigang, “Jiji fangyu zhanlie sixiang zhaixinshiqi junshi douzheng de tixian" (Theapplication of active defence strategy in themilitary preparation in the new era), TheJournal of PLA National Defence Univerisity,August-September 1998, p. 100.

31. Ouyang Wei, “Lung guojishu jiubu zhanchengde zhanyixing zuozhan xintai" (The forms ofcampaign operations under hi-tech warfareconditions), The Journal of the PLA NationalDefence University, no. 4, 1995, p. 20.

32. Gao Jinxi, “Duiguojia yujin xitong jianshewenti de tansuo" (On the construction of thenational early warning system), Junshixueshu,no. 3, 1995, p. 93.

33. Tao Bojun, “Dangde sandai lingdao jiti yu kejiqianjun" (The Party's three generationleadership and strengthening the armed forcesthrough technological breakthroughs), ChinaMilitary Science, no. 3, 1997, pp. 65-73.

34. Xie Dajun, “Qiantan zhishi jingji jiqi dui junshigemin de yingxiang yu tiaozhan" (The influenceand challenge of knowledge economy to RMA),The Journal of PLA National Defence University,January 1999, p. 27.

35. You Ji, “Revolution in Military Affairs and theHigh-tech Warfare", Contemporary SoutheastAsia, Vol. 21, No. 3, December 1999, pp. 325-345.

36. You Ji, “Nuclear Power in the Post-Cold WarEra: the Development of China's NuclearStrategy", Comparative Strategy, Vol. 18, No. 3,August 1999, pp. 245-259

37. ibid, p. 47. 38. Gerardi, Greg, and Fisher, Richard, “China's

Missile Tests Show More Muscle", Jane'sIntelligence Review, March 1997, p. 127.

39. Robert Manning and James Pryzstup, “Asia'sTransition Diplomacy: Hedging againstFutureshock", Survival, Vol. 41, no. 3, 1999, p.59.

40. Wang Jianmin and Zhang Zuocheng, “The fastgrowth of China's cruise missile technology",China Aerospace, no. 9, 1996, pp. 12-17.

41. Interview with China's defence analysts inBeijing in January 2000.

42. See, for instance, the Decision on AdvancingTechnological and Scientific Research by theCentral Committee of the CCP, May 1995.

43. The PLA Daily, 29 May 1997. 44. Liu Zuoxin, “Kongzhong jingong zhanyi liliang

goucheng he zhanyi zhihui chutan" (Initialresearch on the force structure and command foroffensive air campaigns), The Journal of the PLANational Defence University, no. 10, 1995, p. 40.

45. Ian Wilson and You Ji, “Leadership by “Lines":China's Unresolved Succession", Problems ofCommunism (Washington D.C.), Vol. 39,January 1990, pp. 40-41.

46. For more information about the concept andconstruction of war zone, please see You Ji, TheArmed Forces of China, Sydney: Allen &Umwin, 1999, Chapter 2

47. Hu Changfa, “Guanyu gaojishu tiaojian xia jubuzhanzhen zhanyi lilun yanjiu de jige wenti"(Several key questions of the theory of hi-techcampaigns), The Journal of the PLA NationalDefence University, no. 1, 1997, p. 33.

48. ibid, p, 34. 49. Wang Qunbo, “Jidong zhanzhong de kungjun

zuozhan zhidao" (The guideline for Air Forcemobile campaigns), Junshixueshu, no. 12, 1994,p. 28.

50. Hu Changfa, p. 34. 51. ibid, p. 34. 52. Ahrari, 1997, p. 473.


Dr You Ji is senior lecturer in the School of Political Science, University of New South Wales. He received his firstdegree from Beijing University in 1980. He did his doctoral studies at the Australian National University between1990 and 1993. In the past six years he has taught politics in Northeast Asia and international relations at theUniversity of Canterbury in New Zealand and the UNSW in Sydney. He has published widely on China’s political,economic, military, and foreign affairs. He is the author of three books: In Quest of High Tech Power: theModernization of China’s Military in the 1990s, ADFA, University of New South Wales, 1996, China’s EnterpriseReform: Changing State/Society Relations after Mao, London: Routledge, 1998, and The Armed Forces of China,Sydney, London & New York: Allen & Unwin and I.B. Tauris, 1999.He is also the author of numerous articles. The most recent ones include: “Revolution in Military Affairs and the High-tech Warfare”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 3, December 1999, “Nuclear Power in the Post-Cold WarEra: the Development of China’s Nuclear Strategy”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 18, No. 3, August 1999, “ChangingLeadership Consensus: the Domestic Context of War Games”, in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Making Sense of the CrisisAcross the Taiwan Strait, London: Routledge, 1999 and “Adding Offensive Teeth to the PLA Air Force”, Issues &Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, March/April, 1999.

Royal United Services Institute of Australia (RUSI)ABN: 83 657 442 244

TRIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL SEMINARCanberra, Australia, 16-17 November 2000

‘Seeking Affordable Defence in the 21st Century’REMINDER NOTICE

Top Australian and overseas Defence Personalities include:The Honourable John Moore MP, Minister for Defence, Australia

Admiral Chris Barrie, AO, RAN, Chief of the Defence Force, AustraliaDr Allan Hawke, Secretary, Department of Defence, Australia

Mr Michal Roche, Under Secretary Defence Acquisition, AustraliaAdmiral Dennis Blair USN, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, United States

Mr Kevin Tebbit CMG, Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Defence, UKGeneral Siphiwe Nyanda, Chief of National Defence Force, South Africa

Mrs Chua Siew San, Deputy Secretary Policy, Ministry of Defence, SingaporeChairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, India (invited)

Representative of the Chief of the Defence Force, FranceDefence Industry Forum: Mr Jean-Georges Malcor, ADI Limited; Mr Andrew Johnson, Tenix Pty Ltd;

Mr Peter Anstiss, BAE Systems; and Mr Ken Peacock, Boeing Australia Ltd

Seminar CostsThe Seminar cost of $250.00 includes lunch on both days and a copy of the Seminar Proceedings. A 10%discount is available for group bookings of three or more. A formal dining-in night for seminar attendees andpartners is being held on the night of Thursday, 16 November 2000, at the Officers Mess, Australian DefenceForce Academy. Cost for the dinner is $60.00 per person.

Registration Details Enquiries to:

On-line at: www.defence.gov.au/rusi The National Secretary, RUSI of AustraliaOr by mail to: RUSI Seminar Secretariat Telephone: (02) 6266 2866

GPO Box 1085 Facsimile: (02) 6266 4378CANBERRA ACT 2601 Email: [email protected]

60

Anew pattern of military revolution, whichis more effective for other countries, is

attempting to be established through the studyof the United States warfare pattern in theaforementioned events. This type of warfarehas been presented concisely by some authors:

Desert Storm began with operationsdesigned to neutralize the most dangerous Iraqioffensive and defensive capabilities, todiminish Iraq’s ability to sustain its forcesoccupying Kuwait and to directly attack thecombat capabilities of Iraq’s land forces. Oncethese objectives were achieved, the final phasebegan. The last phase had two basic objectives:to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to denyto Saddam Hussein the ability to reinforce thetheater or to pose a threat to Kuwait in thefuture.1

The Gulf War exhibited an impressivestage in the evolution of blitzkrieg, especiallyin aspects of the continued integration ofdominating manoeuvre and precision strike.2

A “blank cheque" was effectively madeavailable for the prosecution of the war. Themassive effort cost over $US 60 billion andthis burden was shared between a dozen or sonations.3

In the case of Kosovo, US and NATO hadachieved agreement for peace, after air bombsduring 24 March – 9 June 1999. Yugoslaviahad to withdraw all the troops from Kosovo

and let the multinational peacekeeping forcesinto Kosovo. NATO spent several billiondollars. The US Congress signed for budget12.9 billion dollars for this operation.4

It is clear that the successful operations inthe Gulf and Kosovo were because of thetechnological sophistication and the massivebudget of the Coalition forces. Theseoperations possessed some useful technicaltools; however, ASEAN countries shouldconsider their conditions relative to the US, ifthey want to make a difference in futurewarfare.

Although military leaders in ASEAN havepaid attention to the progress of militarytechnology, their internal security problemshave to be solved before developing theirmilitary power. In the Cold War, the armedforces of each ASEAN country consisted of alarge number of military personnel, out ofdate weapons, and their emphasis was onguerilla warfare. Even though they procuredsome modern weapons, it was not asystematic development of their militarypower.

The economic problems in this region andthe dated technology are the mainobstructions that make military developmentof ASEAN countries different from themilitary revolution Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevichmentioned.

RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives toSecurity

Rear Admiral Werapon Waranon, Royal Thai Navy

A lesson learnt from the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, created a school of thought in ThirdWorld countries, that they would be able to gain victory over modern countries with technologicallyadvanced weapons by using “out-of-date" weapons and guerilla warfare. But the overwhelmingvictory of the Coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm and the “one–sided" war of NATO forcesin Kosovo made these military leaders reconsider developments in the patterns of warfare that theywill face in the future. The new type of warfare has proved effective for the United States both inDesert Storm and in Kosovo.

61RMA IN ASEAN: THE ALTERNATIVES TO SECURITY

Military revolutions comprise fourelements: technological change, systemsdevelopment, operational innovation, andorganizational adoption.5

ASEAN countries do not have newtechnology and cannot afford to develop newsystems. The dependability of Westerncountries on technology and new weaponssystems requires a very high budget theycannot necessarily afford. Recently, ASEAN’seconomic crisis and changing situation hasforced them to rapidly change their military.They cannot keep a quantity of old weaponsand personnel because of their diminishingmilitary budgets. They cannot let their militarypower become weak whilst other powers arestrong. Thus, new organisation is required toaccomodate decreasing defence budgets, whilekeeping capability at suitable levels.Nevertheless, ASEAN countries cannot avoidthe military revolution. But this revolutionmay be different in concept from that of theWestern countries.

Security Concerns in South-East AsiaThe countries in South-East Asia,

consisting of Brunei, Cambodia, thePhilippines, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam,previously divided into groups and conductedconflicts based on political belief. Theseconflicts almost disappeared when the ColdWar ended. The cause and possibility ofconflict using military force in this region wasalso reduced. Lessons learnt from past eventsencouraged each country to join together toabolish conflict, and increase regional stability.The similar connections of these countries,with regards to geo-political, economic, andsocial issues should make this region peaceful,but peace depends on the stability of eachindividual country. When one countryexperiences a problem that may encourageintervention through outside powers, it is likelythat other countries in this region will facesimilar problems. For example, if Myanmar

faces security problems within the country, itwill affect the peace near theThailand–Myanmar border. There will berefugees that Thailand is expected to support,with the probable intervention from an outsidepower. The best way to build up the security inthis region is to look at the whole picture, andnot solely concentrate on individual securitywhich has been the focus of the past.

In most of the South-East Asian countries,there are major differences in the social,cultural, economic and political patterns oftheir societies. These governments areconfronted with issues of ethnic minorities,income disparities, unemployment, rebellionand even insurgencies. This has resulted in astate of turmoil and instability in many of thecountries in South-East Asia.6 However,turmoil and instability in the political systemare not peculiar to South-East Asian states.These issues exist in every society comprised ofpeople from diverse racial, religious andcultural backgrounds. Even in developedWestern societies, ethnic clashes, protests byalienated groups, separatist movements,industrial strikes and even rebellions arecommon features. Hence, domestic instabilityis a characteristic of nearly all societies.

Thus, with regards to the domestic stabilitywithin the South-East Asian states, theproblems of internal stability and security aremanageable and pose no threat to the patternof the existing political system. Internally, thepolitical differences can be resolved in a wayamenable to the political leaders of each state.Only where power struggles have involvedsuperpower intervention, as was the case inIndochina, has there been widespread conflictand bloodshed. Further, where externalinfluences and external intervention arepresent, the implications for regional stability,as well as global security, have beensignificant.7

At the intra-regional or interstate level,conflict between South-East Asian states,arising from disputes over such matters as


ethnic-cultural, economic and territorialdisputes, illegal crossing/refugee problems,border delineation and other politicaldifferences, have been present since pre-colonial days. These conflicts still persist.

Examples are as follows: Malaysia and thePhilippines were at odds with each other overthe Moro or Muslim rebellion in the SouthernPhilippines; Malaysia and Thailand, over theThai Muslims in southern Thailand; andThailand and Laos, over the Laotian minorityin northeast Thailand. A number of states wereinvolved in territorial disputes: the Philippinesand Malaysia over Sabah; Malaysia and Bruneiover Limbang; Indonesia, Malaysia andVietnam over certain islands in the SouthChina Sea; and Thailand, Indonesia andSingapore have yet to resolve the traffic insmuggling across their common borders andterritorial waters. Then, on the question ofillegal immigration or refugee crossings,Myanmar and Thailand have quarrelled overthe movements of Burmese refugees into Thaiterritory.8

The above examples of conflicts,experienced in the South-East Asian region,have caused tension and strained relationsamong states. Sometimes, conflict has led tothe boycott of trade and even the breaking ofdiplomatic relations. But at no time have suchintra-regional conflicts resulted in seriousmilitary conflict or forceful occupation ofterritories except in cases where externalpowers were involved. Malaysia and thePhilippines broke off diplomatic relations in1962 as a result of their conflictingrelationship. Thailand and Cambodia hadproblems over territories and sacred placesalong their common border, until theresolution of this matter by the InternationalCourt of Justice. Malaysia and Singapore hadheated arguments over economic and politicalmatters after separation, but these differenceswere eventually resolved through bilateralnegotiation.

Another example is in the Indochina stateswhere, since 1975, the communists achievedpower in Vietnam, Laos and Kampucheathrough military means. But the events cannotbe categorised as a domestic or even intra-regional development simply because of theinvolvement of foreign powers. When the ColdWar ended, these states reached peace andorder.

The threat to regional stability andsecurity in South-East Asia has been due tointervention on behalf of imperial and externalpowers. Western imperialism was imposed inSouth-East Asia through military means. Itpersisted even after World War II when theFrench in Indochina and the Dutch inIndonesia refused to withdraw from theircolonial possessions. After the war, the SovietUnion instigated the upsurge of communistinsurrections in the late 1940s and early 1950sin Myanmar, Malaya, Indonesia and thePhilippines. The Soviet Union providedsubstantial aid to the Parti Komunis Indonesia(PKI) – influenced Sukarno regime, whichembarked on military confrontation againstMalaysia in the early 1960s. From the mid1960s to mid 1970s, there was the Americanand Soviet intervention in the Indochina states.In all these cases, the imperial and foreignpowers exploited the conflicting issues atdomestic and intra-regional levels, in order topursue their own objectives in South-East Asia.

In summary, at present, South-East Asiahas been threatened at three analyticallyseparable levels of security concern: domestic,intra-region, and South-East Asia as a theatreof superpower competition. However, onlysuperpower intervention causes serioussecurity problems to the region.

Threats Opportunities and Future WarChanges in the international security

environment present new threats to all South-East Asian states. The Western strategy ofcontainment of communism was replaced bythe strategies of promoting democracy, dealing

63RMA IN ASEAN: THE ALTERNATIVES TO SECURITY

with environment issues, expanding free trade,and respecting human rights.9 This newstrategy is the most effective weapon to date,to be used by the West, towards intervening inthe political, economic and military aspects ofthe Third World countries included in theSouth-East Asian states. The economicsanctions in Myanmar and the peace operationin East Timor are the latest intervention, andare unlikely to be the last case for this regiondue to the rising internal problems in this area.These problems are seemingly exacerbated byWestern intervention, which may causeconflict between South-East Asian states, ashas happened in the past.

None of these states can ignore the processof change occurring around the world, butthey should not let these changes master them.There are differences amongst states of South-East Asia; communism, non-communism orsocialist states, however, it must be recognisedthat all of the above states are members ofASEAN. ASEAN was formed, in the 1960s, foreconomic cooperation, based on the desire toreduce conflict and tension among South-EastAsian countries and the possibility of “a greatpower" intervention. It should be recognisedthat although they have never cooperated in amilitary operation, except for bilateralexercises, there is an effective channel to makemilitary cooperation available in the future.

The future of war for ASEAN should notinclude fighting amongst ASEAN countries.Conflicts about disputed boarder, nationalism,religious, or ideology should be solved by thepolitical means of ASEAN. However, there willbe some problems, such as the case in EastTimor, that will lead the way for outsidepowers to intervene. The members of ASEANshould take a bigger part in participating inthis kind of operation, for they can better servetheir members than outside countries and theywill limit the outside intervention. For thisreason, the military operation shouldemphasise peace operations, and therefore, will

not raise the feeling of threat amongst ASEANcountries.

RMA in ASEANTo prepare for the new type of military

operation, the “peace operation", the ASEANcountries should take on board the newconcepts derived from the Revolution inMilitary Affairs (RMA), in developing theirmilitary forces. The RMA in ASEAN shouldconsist of changing the way military leadersthink, the military role, organisation, andsuitable weapons and doctrine.

The military leaders of the future shouldnot only specialise in military operation, theyshould also be specialists in political andeconomical aspect, and should be the leadersof the RMA.

The military role should not place emphasison protecting their own national interest, but itshould expand to the stability of ASEAN as awhole. So, they should develop militarycooperation with other members of ASEAN.

Military organisations should not be asextensive as the military forces of the ColdWar, because such organisations needsubstantial financial support which has thepotential to cause an economic problem incertain states. Military organisations shouldemphasise the effectiveness of new types ofoperation; the peace operation.

According to Western philosophy, this newtype of operation needs new weapons and newdoctrine. But most of the ASEAN countriescannot afford the procurement of the necessarynew technological weapons. However, if theyhave to perform this kind of operation withtheir current capabilities, they could adapt thenew doctrine to their particular situation. Thedifficulties of maintaining these weapons canaccentuate weaknesses in military effective-ness, however, the key determinant of the mostcapable military forces is the quality of itspersonnel. To gain superiority in thiscircumstance, the states concerned need to


improve their military training and alsodevelop new doctrine for these new operations.

It is not easy for ASEAN to conduct suchan RMA, but the new threats, challenges, andopportunities amplify the need for morethought and discussion on these issues toensure that they will be able to contribute toSouth-East Asian peace, order and stability.

NOTES1. Carl E. Vuons, “Desert Storm and the Future of

Conventional Forces", Fundamentals of ForcePlanning Vol. II, Defense Planning Cases, US.Naval War College, 1991, pp.347.

2. Alan Hinge, “The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs: Some Opportunities and Risks", TheRevolution in Military Affairs: Warfare in theInformation Age, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, 1997 pp.117.

3. ibid, pp.116.4. International News Analysis, Strategic Studies

Center, Institute of Advance Naval Study, RTN,June 1999.

5. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cavalry to Computer:The Pattern of Military Revolutions, Strategyand Force Planning, US. Naval War College,1997 pp. 431.

6. Robert O. Tillman, Southeast Asia and theEnemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of ExternalThreats, Westview Press, 1987 pp.152 – 164.Tillman discuss Tiger in the Kitchen: TheEnemy within, of the member states of ASEAN.

7. Robert O, Tillman, Southeast Asia and theEnemy Beyond, pp.149 – 152. Tillman arguesabout threat perception of ASEAN, Tigers at theDoor and Tigers in the Jungle.

8. Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States andRegional Security, Hooper Institution Press,1982, pp. 38 - 41.

9. A National Security Strategy of Engagementand Enlargement, The White House, February,1995.

BIBLIOGRAPHYAlves, Dora. “Change, Interdependence, and Security

in the Pacific Basin". The 1990 PacificSymposium. Washington, DC: National DefenseUniversity Press, 1991.

Alves, Dora. “Cooperative Security in the PacificBasin." The 1988 Pacific Symposium.Washington, DC: National Defense UniversityPress, 1990.

Black, Eugene R. Alternative in Southeast Asia. NewYork: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969.

Brown, Frederick z. Second Chance, The United Statesand IndoChina in 1990s, New York: Council onForeign Relations Press, 1989.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Andthe International Institute for Strategic Studies,London. Committee on International Conference.Regional Security Developments and Stability inSoutheast Asia. Singapore: Singapore NationalPrinters. 1980.

Leifer, Michael. Dilemmas of Statehood in SoutheastAsia, Vancouver: University of British ColumbiaPress, 1972.

Lyon, Peter. War and Peace in Southeast Asia,London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Morley, James W. Security Interdependence in theAsia Pacific Region. Massachusetts: LexingtonBooks, 1986.

Morrison, Charles E. and Suhrke, Astri. Strategy ofSurvival. New York : St. Martin’s Press, p.1979.

O’Neill, Robert. Security in East Asia. New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1984.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.Power in IndoChina since 1957, Canberra: 1981.

Sandhu, Kernial S. Southeast Asian Affairs 1989. SanFrancisco: Westview Press, 1989.

Simon Sheldon W. The Asian States and RegionalSecurity. California: Hoover Institution Press,1982.

Warshaw, Steven. Southeast Asia Emerges. California:Benziger, 1975.

Wilson, Dick. The Neutralization of Southeast Asia.New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

Rear Admiral Waranon was commissioned from the Royal Thai Academy into the Thai Navy in 1972. He has aBachelor of Science from the Naval Academy and is a graduate of the Thai Naval Staff College and Naval War College.Rear Admiral Waranon took many courses in the USA, including Anti-Submarine Warfare, Amphibious Planning,Defense Resource Management, and Naval Command College. He has won four prize essay competitions, includingthe first prize in the US Naval Command College, international prize essay competitions in 1991. From 1972 to1990he served in the Royal Thai Fleets. He was the Commanding Officer of HTMS Kirirath during 1986-1987 and DeputyChief of Staff, Patrol Squadron in 1988. He assumed his current appointment as the Chief of Staff of the Institute ofAdvanced Naval Studies on October 1998. Rear Admiral Waranon will assume the position of Commander in Chief ofPatrol Squadron at Sattakip in October 2000.

65

Australia is a modern middle-power – a“David" rather than a “Goliath". There are

financial, personnel, and other limitations,which are challenges for the AustralianDefence Force (ADF). The ADF has to have theability when called upon to fight larger andmore numerous opponents and win. In order toachieve this the ADF must seek to generate anadvantage that does not simply rely upon sizeand brute force. Therefore the ADF must besmart in the way it thinks, the way it trains,and the way it fights.

IntroductionToday’s ADF is committed to developing an

integrated Navy, Army and Air Force that iscapable of being that 21st century “David".Each of the Services must develop with anintegrated view of the future – not just with thecurrent view of single Service units operatingindependently. In furthering that view eachService must acknowledge that it comes to thestage with it’s own paradigms and particularlanguages. This is not in itself an obstacle todevelopment, as each Service has particularstrengths, such as expertise in an environment– Land, Sea or Air, which can be integrated intoa superior force. Indeed, each Service mustmaintain specialist core skills to be used as theconflict dictates. What each Service must have

is the knowledge of each other’s capability andwhere each unit, regardless of Service, fits intothe Integrated Battle. The ADF can no longerafford to take for granted the joint nature ofwarfare. Historically, for Australia, operationshave, and will continue to be, of a joint nature.The Australian Navy, Army and Air Force facea common future and will gain greater synergyand integration by addressing these challengescooperatively.

This article will outline how the threeServices see the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA) being applied operationally. In doing soit will cover what the RMA means to the ADF;the relevant RMA concepts affecting the ADF,and each Service; and how each Service isimplementing the opportunities the RMAprovides. It is also important to look at thepersonnel and equipment aspects of the RMAin the ADF context. But what is the RMA?

Revolution in Military AffairsThe Revolution in Military Affairs provides

the potential to develop David’s Sling concept.To answer this question, a long andquestionable debate could be stimulatedresulting in a general conclusion that the RMAis based on the benefits of embracingrevolutionary technology in warfare. Thesemantics of the RMA is largely irrelevant.

“Not the size of the dog in the fight...”RMA – The ADF Application

By Air Commodore John N. Blackburn, AM, Director General Policy and Planning – Air Force,Commodore Lee Cordner, Director General Navy Strategic Policy and Futures and

Brigadier Michael A. Swan, Director General Future Land Warfare, Army Headquarters.

David put a coat of armour on him and a bronze helmet on his head. Then he took his staff inhis hand, chose five smooth stones from the stream, put them in his pouch and, with sling in hand,approached Goliath.

Reaching into his bag and taking out a stone, he slung it and struck Goliath a fatal blow to theforehead. After he killed him, David cut off Goliath's head with his own sword. The Philistines thensaw their hero was dead and they turned and ran.


What is truly important is to understand thatrapid changes in modern warfare areoccurring. These changes will obviouslyprovide challenges and many opportunities.Similarly, the opportunities will not berestricted to the Australian military but mayprovide the catalyst for a currently inferioradversary to gather momentum and emerge asa credible threat. The challenge of the ADF is toexploit the opportunities provided by “theRMA" to develop and maintain a capabilityedge over any adversary. A single Serviceapproach to this challenge risks duplication ofeffort and misuse of valuable human resourcesand assets. The ADF has the potential tobecome a disjointed force through an inabilityto integrate, and to tempt failure by notdeveloping the requisite capabilities foreffective joint operations. Equally, it is theServices with their deep expertise and desire forpractical application of ideas, which is moreoften than not the originator of new concepts.The RMA is not simply about technology. TheADF must also address the way it is organised,the doctrine it develops, and the trainingmethods it employs in order to be an effectivewarfighter in the future. Even when all theseaspects are addressed, the RMA does notprovide a “silver bullet". Warfare will continueto be a human endeavour that remainsuncertain, chaotic, dangerous, and at timesbloody. Nevertheless, to ignore the RMA wouldalso be a mistake, and technology is animportant aspect of the RMA.

Technological developments have thepotential to realise a battlespace in which sea,land, air and space assets will achieve acommon awareness and engagementcapability. For a small force such as the ADFthis will generate the capacity to temporarilydominate decisive points in time and space,allowing the optimum deployment of assetsand weapons, and the effective disruption ordislocation of an adversary’s capabilities. Thetechnological developments influencing theRMA have had important flow-on effects of

increasing the speed and agility of operationsand threats. Increased speed and agility aresignificant concepts to address. Regardless ofthe impact of the RMA, there will be atendency toward higher intensity, short time-frame operations. It may become necessary toexploit this trend by generating the ability tovary the tempo of operations, both speedingthem up and slowing them down to suit theADF’s needs. Controlling tempo will be crucialgiven the ADF’s size. Generating tempo in theUS sense, through the constant acceleration ofoperations, is simply unsustainable for theADF. Additionally, potential adversaries maybe non-conventional in structure, technique orintent. Actions against non-conventionalnation-state or non-state adversariesemploying asymmetric capabilities will requiresmaller widely dispersed footprints both ashoreand at sea. These issues present real challengesas to how warfare is undertaken in any futureenvironment. Current expeditionary operationsconsist of Army Elements embarked in a NavalTask Group, with Air Force assets assigned toprotect and sustain the offshore force. It isimportant to consider the complete task forceas a single integrated force with the ability toinfluence the land, sea, aerospace, andcyberspace environments. Although theServices will bring niche, or expert, capabilitiesto this theatre, the force requires the flexibilityto employ selected capabilities across allServices to achieve specific effects. To achievethe mission decisively and efficiently the forcewill require the full integration of C4ISR,offensive fire support, air defence, andsustainment (or logistic capabilities). Thisapproach raises two important questions: Whowill command this integrated force? Andwhere does the commander best sit, especiallygiven the nature of non-linear battlespace anddistributed operations?

Future TechnologiesThe development of network-enabled

operations will allow the commander to sit

67“NOT THE SIZE OF THE DOG IN THE FIGHT. . .” RMA – THE ADF APPLICATION

almost anywhere from the strategic level,completely divorced from the battleenvironment, to the tactical level where he orshe can just as easily view the operation inperson. The Service of the Force Commanderdoes not matter either as network-enabledwarfare gives all arms of the force the sameexposure. The ADF cannot, and probably willnot, be able to unilaterally afford operations inseveral theatres at once nor will it have thecapacity to be engaged in protracted orattritional warfare. However, through the useof integrated local information, sensor andengagement systems, the most efficient courseof action can be taken to ensure any operationis surgical and decisive. The technologiesattached to the RMA have the potential toprovide increased situational awareness, speed,reach, precision, lethality, agility,miniaturisation, stealth, tailored effects,sustainability, and reliability. Each of thesewarfare categories has the further potential toincrease operational effectiveness.Unfortunately, as with most new Defenceequipment, the development and implemen-tation of new technologies come with anincreased cost. Arguably, the most importantfactor of any operation is the ability to knowall that the enemy is doing. The key words areIntelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.They will not win any war but they will allowthe correct decisions to be made, such as whereto focus the attention of limited resources.Once critical targets, which when eliminatedwill cause the greatest detrimental effect on theadversary, have been selected, the nextchallenge is to effectively coordinate andsynchronise attacks in real time. Paralleloperations can be conducted simultaneously tocompletely disorient and dislocate the enemy,not allowing its decision cycle to operate at all.For a defence force like the ADF, with limitedforces and limited resources, this provides thegreatest opportunity to influence the attacker.Previously, the ADF has been platform-centricwhich has meant it was forced to take old

warfare techniques into the modern battle. It isnow necessary to shift the ADF’s focus on tothe ability to deliver tailored effects, from anumber of different platforms or mediums,targeting particular battlespace characteristics.These effects might not require the delivery oflethal force but may involve cyber attack ordiversion, and deception techniques, in whichcase other non-military departments may havea leading role. An example of this is the ADF’sneed to deliver a cost-effective force projectioncapability. One concept is for a multi-role shipthat could be tasked to either projection, orsustainment missions. In addition toembarking land elements and a deployablejoint force headquarters, the vessel could alsooperate the full range of ADF helicopter typesand UAVs, perhaps this future UAV squadronmay be manned by personnel from everyService. Personnel are vital to the applicationof RMA. As reliability of equipment improves,and the percentage of commercially availableequipment used for military purposes increasesthe required skill sets for Service personnel willchange markedly.

Future ConceptsIt shall be necessary to recruit people who

are Information Operations (IO) specialists. IO isa key element of the RMA and even more sofor a medium power, like Australia, tomaximise its combat power. For example, howmany computer hacker billets are there intoday’s ADF? Not many, if any at all. In 20years time it could be a core skill of IO warriorsand a frontline position. Computers and theirassociated networks do not replace people.Intellectual thought, the will to resist, and thewill to win is fundamental and a uniquelyhuman response upon which states act. Thestate that has more personnel engaged in the“thinking war" will prevail. Having looked atthese conceptual aspects, the question to beasked is how are the three Servicesimplementing them, as individual Services andtogether, as an integrated force. A good


example of the Services working together is acurrent initiative by the three ServiceHeadquarters to develop a joint WarfightingConcept. This work will build on the ProjectSPHINX Future Warfighting Concepts. Sincetheir inception the single Services have alwayshad some sort of long-term plan. But it is onlyin recent years that they have had dedicatedFutures Directorates.

Service Futures – The NavyThe RAN only recently created its Strategy

and Futures directorate. The challenge for theNavy is that it must look at a range of futureconcepts and technologies to see which areappropriate for the future RAN. As a mediumpower navy this is a considerable challenge. TheRAN has blue water responsibilities as well as arequirement to operate in an integrated fashionin the littoral. With finite funds and personnelresources it is essential to the Service’sdevelopment to make informed decisions.Integral to this development is charting a coursefrom Navy 2000, through the Enhanced Fleetand on to the Future Fleet. Recently the Navycompleted work on its two future plans – PlanBlue and Plan Green. Plan Blue examines theway ahead for the RAN out to 2030 while PlanGreen looks at the immediate future of the RANover the next five years. These two documentsform the map on which the RAN will chart itsfuture course to an integrated Service. A keyfinding of the RAN’s futures work is thepromotion of various trials involving futuristictechnology. For example, the Navy has HMASJervis Bay, a fast sealift catamaran, undergoingtrials in alternate missions including a role as asurface combatant. These trials are an attempt topractically explore the tactical impact of highspeed in the war at sea. In conjunction with theother Services the RAN is also looking at suchthings as Network Centric Warfare, CooperativeEngagement Concept or CEC, WarfightingConcepts and UAVs.

Service Futures – The ArmyThe Army commenced its futures work in

1995 with the Army in the 21st Century Study.This work has formed the basis for the largesttrial ever undertaken by the ADF in the“Restructuring the Army" trials. These trialsinvolving the 1st Brigade in Darwin, nowdrawing to a close, after three intensive yearsof hard work sought to provide a rigorousanalytical basis for defining an appropriateforce structure for the Army. Many of theinsights gained have provided the foundationfor further experimentation and design of thenext Army, termed the Enhanced CombatForce that will exist in the 2015 timeframe.The synergy generated by Army’s Futures workhas created a foundation upon which it candevelop and utilise the advantages generatedby the RMA. The articulation of a concept-ledand capability-based approach to Army’smodernisation relies on future concepts toguide Army’s ongoing development.

Service Futures – The Air ForceIn the RAAF, Project ORACLE 2030 seeks

to identify the possible futures out to about2030 and develop the new concepts andstrategies required to “pre-adapt" the force towhat will most likely be a future very differentfrom today. The Air Force is undertaking trialsof new technologies including UAVs withlimited payloads and in addition to this isinvestigating future aerospace options throughthe AIR 6000 Project. Work is also ongoing tomeld the insights from ORACLE 2030 with thechange initiatives already extant in the force,to achieve a strong continuum from a knowntoday to futures perceived only through aglass, darkly. This work is the subject of the“Air Force Strategy 2015".

ConclusionNational security planning for the 21st

century is addressing a broad spectrum ofpotential operations, many of which areoutside traditional defence frameworks. Thisspectrum of operations exists within a strategic

69“NOT THE SIZE OF THE DOG IN THE FIGHT. . .” RMA – THE ADF APPLICATION

environment characterised by ambiguity anduncertainty. International, and Australian,society is evolving to adapt to new globalnorms. Also, real-world resource constraintsmean that the military must be cost effectiveand relevant to a changing context – it mustproduce the most “bang for the buck". It is anongoing challenge to military forceseverywhere, to ensure that they can adapt tomeet national, coalition, and UN security needsin a dynamic strategic environment. Theinternational system has been experiencing astrategic surprise about every 18 months andsuch surprises are likely to increase infrequency. The question is how will the ADFadapt to meet these surprises head on? This isthe evolving context from which the ADF mustderive the operational initiatives that will“pull" the force forward, to effectively addressthe burgeoning threat spectrum.

There has been a trend of blockingtechnological advances due to cultural andorganisational inertia, our current capabilitydevelopment process does this with its short-term outlook. Work such as Project SPHINXunderway in the Department of Defence’sStrategic Policy and Planning Division andassociated work in the Navy, Army and AirForce Headquarters are trying to grapple with

these very issues. An area where efficienciescan be made is in sensors and their application.If platforms are becoming network enabled,there is no reason to duplicate sensors acrossall of the platforms in the battlespace. Onlysufficient sensors are required to alert thesystem, be it Automated or Human in theLoop, so that additional sensors and ultimatelyeffects could be focused on the area of interest.

The basis of the ADF must be three strongeffective Services with environmentalexpertise. In order for that capability to benurtured, and to grow, it is essential that eachService stay informed by their futuresprograms. Often some of this work is at theoperational or tactical level that is outside thepreserve of ADHQ and unashamedly focuseson developing single Service capabilities. Thisdoes not however, mean that the Services’futures areas are working in isolation. It shouldbe clearly understood that there is a great dealof cross-pollination, and where appropriate,collaborative effort undertaken by each of thethree Services. The RMA, properly applied, willprovide Australia the sling it requires inmeeting the security challenges of the future.However, as noted, this sling requires a well-trained arm, an accurate eye and a sharp mindif it is to ever slay a Goliath.

Air Commodore Blackburn, Director General Policy & Planning – Air Force, joined the RAAF in 1975. Afterconversion to the Mirage aircraft he had postings to 77 SQN and 3 SQN in Butterworth, Malaysia. In 1980 AirCommodore Blackburn attended the Empire Test Pilots School in the UK before returning to Australia as a test pilot atARDU. He spent four years in the US on tactical fighter projects followed by several years back at 77 SQN. His seniorappointments have included Deputy Director Airspace Control in HQADF, Officer Commanding 41 WG and DirectorGeneral Policy and Planning – Air Force. Air Commodore Blackburn holds a Master’s Degree of Defence Studies and aMaster of Arts in Strategic Studies.Commodore Lee Cordner, Director General Navy Strategic Policy & Futures, joined the Navy in 1968. He hascommanded two small ships (Betano and Bass) and two frigates (Sydney and Adelaide). He served in the Vietnamand Gulf Wars. He is a graduate of the US Naval War College and Australian Joint Services Staff College. He hasmasters’ degrees in management and international relations.Brigadier Swan graduated from the Royal Military College in 1972 to the Royal Australian Signals. His primaryspeciality has been in the field of strategic communications culminating in the command of the DefenceCommunications Group (1992-95). He has served with the United States Air Force at Nurrangar and has had avariety of regimental and staff appointments. He was awarded a Masters’ Degree from ADFA in 1988 and attendedACDSS in 1996. Brigadier Swan has served as the Director General Information Management – Army, the DirectorGeneral Information Policy and Plans in Defence Information Systems Branch, and assumed his appointment as theDirector General Future Land Warfare in Army Headquarters in May 1999.

70

The increased complexity and dynamicsinvolved in the planning and conduct of

modern military operations drives the need tosearch for improved means of synchronisationto realise political and military endstates.

Australia has focused on combiningmanoeuvrability, the use of highly capableforce elements, and the support of wide-areasurveillance to achieve an edge in militaryoperations. This edge is facilitated byinfluencing the actions of the adversarythrough a superior decision cycle, whichcentres on the exploitation of information forcommand. The ability to synergise operationsby coordinating wide-area manoeuvre,concentrating combat power, and focusinglogistics, may be achieved through theexchange of information. Information becomesthe binding force for all elements, with thedeep implication of this synergy that the forcemay achieve a level of effectiveness equivalentto that of a much larger force. The power ofthis network is derived from the quality andtimeliness of shared information and from thenew kinds of system and commandrelationships that it enables. A network-enabled force has the potential to operate at

higher levels of capability by changing theelements in the information-decision-actioncycle. For example, the network enables a shiftfrom radar-pilot-missile, to say, SAR/EO-jointair operations centre-cruise missile (land / airlaunched).

Self-synchronisation has been illustrated[Alberts et al. 1999] as a potential emergentproperty of such a networked force andconstitutes an alternative model for planningand operations. Self-synchronisation of acollective is facilitated when the actorsachieve “network awareness”, that is, theyshare a common perspective of the goalsand the environment, underpinned by thecommunications necessary to allow dynamicalliances to gather and converge.

However, the potential benefits andapplication of the concept of self-synchronisation to military operations remainslargely unarticulated. In operations whereinternetworking between coalition partners hashistorically been poor, synchronisation hasbeen planned through clear and deliberateseparation of activities over the dimensions oftime, space, and tasking, largely to avoidfratricide. These seams in the coalition offer

Network-Enabled Force SynchronisationBy Dr. Jason B. Scholz, Defence Science and Technology Organisation

Modern warfare is characterised by unprecedented levels of complexity and high rates ofchange. These characteristics manifest in military planning and operations which are required toform a broad spectrum of conflict from humanitarian assistance in a multi-national coalition,through to precision weapon strikes.

To manage dynamics and complexity, synchronisation is employed in the lead-up to anoffensive operation, and whenever a change in the situation is observed or expected.Synchronisation coordinated across a large and distributed enterprise requires a network that willautomate complex information processing, facilitate shared situation awareness, and transformlarge volumes of information into assimilated knowledge by commanders.

We consider the contexts for military synchronisation, and study the concept of self-synchronisation in a networked enterprise. Several enabling technologies are described to potentiallysupport self-synchronisation. Experiments with alternate organisation and technologies as requiredto enable self-synchronisation are described.

71NETWORK-ENABLED FORCE SYNCHRONISATION

vulnerabilities that an adversary may seek toexploit [Carpenter, 1994]. Future joint andcoalition operations may be significantlyenhanced through a rich coalition informationenvironment, allowing the potential forintegration, and new synergies in coalitionplanning and execution to emerge, sealing upthe gaps in these dimensions.

Planned synchronisation of forces is vitalin the lead-up to an offensive operation whereprecise timing of effects over a wide area needsto be realised. The potential for self-synchronisation on the other hand, occurswhenever a change in the situation is observedor expected. We next examine, categorise anddiscuss contexts for synchronisation.

Contexts for SynchronisationThe success of joint and coalition warfare

in future will rely heavily on the ability ofotherwise disparate forces to synergise andsynchronise to focus military effects. A 1999report to the US congress [US Secretary ofDefense 1999] on the state of PLA joint andintegrated operations describes a familiar storyon the maturity of force synchronisation:

The PLA conducts interservice exercisesat the tactical level, but the services arenot fully integrated into a cohesivecombat force. Disparate elements trainsimultaneously and in proximity, but do notappear to be controlled at the operationallevel by a joint commander and staff.Ground and air components exercisetogether with regularity and are improvingtheir interoperability. Integration of groundand naval forces, however, is rarelyexercised, particularly at the operationallevel, where synchronization and commandand control are of greatest importance inthe conduct of complex operations. Thenavy is beginning to conduct morecombined operations between ships andnaval aircraft. The PLA also is looking intothe possibility of instituting a “jointcommand” structure at the operational or

theater level, similar to that of the U.S.military.Any force is indeed likely to be

more effective with operational levelsynchronisation, however, if such a force wasenabled by a network facilitating informationflows across command levels and betweencoalition logistic systems, reconsideration ofthe nature of synchronisation may benecessary.

Conventional synchronisation is plannedby an operational commander in an attempt toemploy assigned land, air, sea and electroniccapabilities to strike the enemy simultaneouslythroughout the theatre of operations. Thesestrikes are aimed to exploit an enemy’s criticalvulnerabilities and to allow penetration to theenemy centre of gravity. This planning andscheduling activity is achieved with thecooperation of other national and internationalefforts devoted to the same objective includingfor example, diplomatic and economicactivities.

Synchronisation of forces is required in thelead-up to an offensive operation andwhenever a change in the situation is observedor expected. These would include, for example:a. Change of objectives and tasks,b. Regrouping,c. Reallocating support,d. Change to areas of responsibility of

components,e. Change to the time schedule,f. Change of subordinate commanders,g. Arrangement of support from higher or

adjacent authoritiesh. Commitment of reserves,

Self-SynchronisationChange in tasks requires reallocating

resources and is a division of labour problemfor which evidence in natural systems[Delgado and Sole, 1998] suggests that self-synchronisation, enabled through minimalcommunication with neighbours is moreefficient than random reassignment of agents


to tasks. Of course, reassignment would not berandom in a military network, however,reassignment from a top-down perspectivetakes valuable time, so that a tactical asset maylose the opportunity to respond to unexpectedand perhaps fleeting opportunities to exploitan enemy’s weakness. Although thisvulnerability may become apparent throughshared situation awareness, synchronisation isrequired to coordinate a rapid, considered andeffective response.

In considering self-synchronisation we usethe term “agent” to represent either human orsoftware entities, which communicate andprocess information as part of an “informationnetwork”.

Self-synchronisation might be bestcharacterised as the ability of a well-informedforce to organise and coordinate complexwarfare activities from the bottom up. Themost formal definition [Alberts et al. 1999] is:

a mode of interaction between two or moreentities … with shared awareness, a ruleset, and a value-adding interaction. Thecombination of a rule set and sharedawareness enables the entities to operate inthe absence of traditional hierarchicalmechanisms for command and control. Therule set describes the desired outcome in

various operational situations. Sharedawareness provides a mechanism forcommunicating the ongoing dynamics of theoperational situation and triggering thedesired value-adding interaction. Figure 1accompanies this description:

This description and diagram does notexplain the required behaviour of intelligentself-synchronising agents. To describe what wewould consider to be a minimum set ofessential layers of agent behaviour needed toproduce self-synchronisation, we will draw ona model for successful human partnerships[Covey, 1994], illustrated in Figure 2.

We assert that the “self” in “self-synchronisation” implies the ability of anagent to arrange timing aspects of its ownactivities without the influence of other agents.This means that an agent is capable ofindependence. In order to be truly independent,the agent must first be pro-active, usingsituation awareness to best position itself foraction with respect to the enemy and as a partof the broader coalition force, rather than reactin the face of a change in situation. Secondly,the agent must begin its course of action withthe command intent and endstate in mind. Thisinvolves visualising the effect of ones potential

Figure 1. Alberts’ Model for Self-synchronisation

Agent

Agent

Agent

Awareness

Rule Set 1

Rule Set 2

Awareness


action before taking it. Thirdly, the agent mustbe able to prioritise its activities. All of theseaspects relate to the behaviour of an individualagent, and are necessary attributes upon whichto build its behaviour in a collectiveenvironment.

The term “self-synchronisation” is naturallyapplied not only to an individual agent, but toan arbitrary number of networked agents, andin this sense implies a collective“synchronising” behaviour. This collectivebehaviour is agent interdependence.Interdependence is built upon a pre-requisitebasis of independence. Returning to Figure 2,“thinking win-win” a coalition agent entersinto a relationship with another seeking amutual value-add outcome so both benefitfrom the exchange – i.e. rather than win-lose,lose-win or lose-lose. This involves the sharingof material resources, recognition and power,and acknowledges that the notion of “limitedresources” applied to human agents is flawed.In considering courses of action against anadversary in the process of military planning,this concept may be seen as the precise andconsidered application of effects to result in adesired adversary reaction. It is recognition

that to force an overwhelming win-loseoutcome on an adversary results in their loss offace, damages your public image, and serves tofurther harden resolve against you. For anagent to seek to first understand others’perspective’s before expressing its own,penetrates to the essence of mostcommunication problems. When one listensactively and understands another, therelationship is transformed and a deeper levelof trust may be established. This is a balance ofcourage and consideration. Synergising agentsare in a position to self-synchronise to thecollective. Synergy produces solutions that arefar better than what either agent may haveproduced originally. Rather than being basedon negotiation, which at best achieves acompromise, synergistic communication usesunderstanding of basic underlying needs andinterests to find solutions to satisfy both. Thefinal behaviour not shown in Figure 2, is forself-renewal, a process of continuousimprovement to refine these behaviours.

A collective of agents behaving in this wayorganises a flexible and unique set of internaland external linkages for each new operation.Unlike a bureaucracy, with fixed relationships

Figure 2. Covey’s model for achieving successful partnerships as a model underpinning self-synchronisation.

Achieve more than the sum ofthe parts (creativity self-

synchronisation)

Understand your partners(courage balanced with

consideration)

Aim for mutual value-add(mentality of abundance)

Prioritise(draws on will power)

Command intent & endstate(decide within the time, talent,

& tools available

Situation Awareness(especially own-force teleology)

Synergise

Seek to understandbefore being understood

Think win-win

Put first things first

Begin with theend in mind

Be Pro-active

Interdependence

Independence

Dependence

TheNetwork

Perspective

SelfPerspective


for processing all problems, this networkedorganisation moulds itself to the operation athand. It adapts itself not by top-managementcommand, but by leadership vision,interactions with problems, people andresources; and within the broad constraints ofthe strategy, members autonomously work outrelationships [Nohira and Eccles, 1992].

Levy [Levy, 1997] describes a synergistic,regulated human group as a “collectiveintelligence” which is distributed andconstantly enhanced, coordinated in real-time,and results in the effective mobilisation ofskills. With respect to the temporal dimensionof self-synchronisation, Levy comments thattime in the networked community spreadsitself out, blends with itself and calmly gathersitself together. The paradox is that to achieve asymphony requires time to make sure that theright agents are involved, to forge bonds, andto agree on actions. However, independentagents have their own periodicities. Theinformation network with intelligent agents isa knowledge space, which although it uses realtime technologies, is focused on its interiorrhythms – not to achieve simultaneity withinan external time, but to allow adjustment tothe environment and to asynchronoussituations.

Distributed Network Technologies to EnableSelf-Synchronisation

To facilitate a network-enabled operation,coalition-wide synchronisation of sensors,command, effects and flow of resources isrequired. It is not unreasonable to ask why thissynchronisation could not be achieved by arelatively simple, centralised, operationalcommand. An illustrative example is the AirTasking Order (ATO) used with success in theGulf War to permit coalition-widesynchronisation of air space to reducefratricide [Carpenter, 1994]. This centralisedprocess worked for the air environment, butthere are a number of reasons why the ATO

approach is unlikely to facilitate self-synchronisation: 1. the ATO schedule period which cannot be

serviced without significant whole-of-forcereprioritisation and rescheduling;

2. although aimed to shrink considerablythrough ongoing US DARPA researchprograms, the ATO schedule planning-to-dissemination period is finite, and criticalityis shifted to communication of the schedulewhich must be accepted by all participatingforce elements before execution;

3. a schedule of air space usage does notreveal the full teleology behind it to thetactical-level participants, so that localconstraints are not accounted for, andunforseen efficiencies cannot be exploited;

4. in theory, fratricide is a tactical issue notfor the operational level of war andtherefore should be controlled at thetactical level.1

To allow coalition-wide synchronisation ofassets, knowledge of the teleology of all sharedresources is required. That is, what asset isproposed to be used, who is requesting accessto it, who has authority for its use / release,how it is to be used, when it is to be employed,where it is to be employed / moved to, where itis now, and why that asset was chosen, etc.This information must be generated and sharedby the coalition. The volume and complexityof such shared information, spanning coalitionintelligence, command support, finance,personnel, and logistics systems need to bemanaged. The information typically resides ina wide variety of National and non-Government databases, which are globallydistributed, disparate and at different securityclassification levels. To gain answers tocomplex queries requires new forms ofsoftware infrastructure [Hawthorne et al. 2000],which embody knowledge of the relationshipsbetween business entities or assets.

Humans alone could not possibly processthe sheer volume and complexity of sharedinformation. Decision-makers will in future


require the support of secure pervasivecomputing resources employing softwareagents to roam the network to gather, process,share, integrate and present the information asrequired [Jagiello et al. 2000].

Ecology is a word that describes thesynergism in nature – everything is related toeverything else. To make best use of assets andresources, a communication system thatfacilitates an “information ecology” is required.In such a system, at any time, an agent may bea producer or consumer of information,leaving the significant challenge of routinginformation to other agents who require it. Ifan agent has information to share (e.g. acombat system registers after an engagementthat five less missiles are available in theweapon rack), it may be difficult to decide who(other than the enemy!) would benefit fromknowledge of the event, and therefore where tosend the information. In this example, theinformation would be vital to other combatsystem agents to assist in computing optimumfuture firing solutions, however, it may also beused immediately by shore-based logistics toplan resupply (which may be provided througha coalition partner). In future we wouldenvisage the establishment of such aninformation relationship to be initiated andmaintained by machines, to enable bestinformed decisions.

The publish/subscribe model is a commonand simple protocol used in distributed systems

(particularly middleware) as illustrated inFigure 3. However, due to the free-form natureof information, the use of subscriptionchannels or categories (as is common inexisting Defence command support systemse.g. Lotus Notes) does not scale – the numberof information classes soon becoming too largeto manage. To deal with this, the Elvin system[Arnold et al. 2000] searches the content ofpublished information to match it to a set ofrules in the subscription specification, therebyallowing only specific information relevant tothe consumer to pass, who is notified of theavailability of that information. This form oftechnology has the potential to form the basisfor new forms of interoperability for very largescale pervasive computing.

The simplicity of this model belies thesophistication of network relationships thatmay emerge as a direct result of itsemployment.

ConclusionsWe have considered the nature of

synchronisation and particularly self-synchronisation in the context of a network-enabled coalition force. We believe that animproved model of agent behaviour (bothhuman and intelligent computer-based entities)in a networked environment is necessary toprogress development of these conceptsbeyond situation awareness. The principles ofthis model may be incorporated into doctrinalprocedures as well as embodied in the design

Figure 3. Undirected Communications Model.

Producer ConsumerServer

publishnotify

subscribe


of software agents. Emerging technologiessuch as those described will be crucial to find,process and communicate complex, distributedand voluminous information facilitating thedynamic alliance between agents at the heartof self-synchronisation.

NOTES1. Elicited from discussion with Vice Admiral

Arthur Cebrowski. Note however, that withouta self-synchronisation framework, there is noclear means to control fratricide at the tacticallevel.

REFERENCES[Alberts et al. 1999] David S. Alberts, John J.

Garstka, Frederick P. Stein Network CentricWarfare – Developing and Leveraging Infor-mation Superiority, 2nd Edition (Revised), Aug.1999, Available on the Internet at:http://www.dodccrp.org

[Delgado and Sole, 1998] Jordi Delgado, Ricard V.Sole Self-Synchronization and Task Fulfilmentin Social Insects, Submitted to Proc. RoyalSociety B., Available on the Internet:http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Abstracts/98-08-069abs.html

[Carpenter, 1994] P. Mason Carpenter JointOperations in the Gulf War: An AllisonAnalysis, Thesis Presented to the Faculty of theSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies, Schoolof Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University,Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1994.Available on the Internet: http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/carpente.htm

[Gossink et al. 1999] Don E. Gossink, Jason B.Scholz, and Lin Zhang A Comparison ofTechniques for Optimisation of C3I ProcessesRealised on Resource-Limited Networks,Information, Decision and Control Conference(IDC99), Adelaide, Australia, 1999.

[US Secretary of Defense, 1999] Security Situation inthe Taiwan Strait, A Report to CongressPursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill,Available on Internet at: http://dtics5.dtic.mil/pubs/twstrait_02261999.html

[Nohira and Eccles, 1992] Nitin Nohira and RobertG. Eccles (Editors) Networks and Organisations:Structure, Form and Action. Harvard BusinessSchool Press, Boston, MA, 1992.

[Levy, 1997] Pierre Levy Collective Intelligence –Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace,Plenum Press, 1997.

[Covey, 1990] Stephen Covey The Seven Habits ofHighly Effective People: Powerful Lessons inPersonal Change.

[Arnold et al, 2000] David Arnold, Bill Segall, JulianBoot, Andy Bond, Melfyn Lloyd, Simon KaplanDiscourse with Disposable Computers: How andWhy You Will Talk With Your Tomatoes, draftpaper, available from: http://www.dstc.edu.au/Elvin/

[Hawthorne et al. 2000] ?????? Something on CDEIS/ MANIFOLD – see Phillip Hawthorne.

[Jagiello, 2000] Jerzy Jagiello, Nicholas Tay, BrettBiddington, Mobile Functionality in a PervasiveWorld To appear in the International Commandand Control Research and TechnologySymposium (ICCRTS) 2000, Canberra, October2000.

Dr Jason Scholz is Research Leader for the Military Information Enterprise in the Defence Science and TechnologyOrganisation. He gained his PhD in Electrical Engineering at the University of Adelaide in 1992. Over 15 years atDSTO he has conducted and led research and development in military wireless communications, and informationnetworking. He is responsible for R&D in organisational change, middleware, pervasive and trusted computing, andenterprise information management supporting the design of the Defence Information Environment.

The Defence Science and Technology

Organisation (DSTO) invites registrations of

interest from the Australian Defence Organisation

for attendance at the annual

Takari SeminarTheme: Experimentation for Capability

Development

Wednesday, 14 March, 2001, 9 am - 4 pm,including lunch

Russell 1 Theatrette, Russell Offices, Canberra

The seminar will include:

• Takari Executive presentation and review of highlights

• A structured panel session - Experimentation for Force Development

• Demonstrations ofDSTO’s C4ISREWresearch

http://web-sa.dsto.defence.gov.au/DSTO/divisions/takari/ by 16 Feb 2001

For informationand registration

form go to,

78

Icould, of course, be describing the UnitedStates and its armed forces in 2000 but I am

not; I am describing Great Britain and itsarmed forces in 1927. While no comparisonbetween the Britain of the 1920s and theUnited States of the 2000s can be exact – forone thing the Britain of the 1920s was not asole superpower – there are sufficientsimilarities between the two situations tojustify an analogy.

During the 1930s, British interest inmilitary modernisation lost impetus inimportant areas such as mechanised andcombined arms warfare. At the same time,Nazi Germany rapidly emerged as a dangeroustotalitarian rival with a military establishmentthat was encouraged to embrace modern“machine warfare”. Britain’s militarymodernisation faltered partly because itneglected one of the most critical aspects ofinnovation: that of organisation. It is areceptive organisation that provides thecrucible for successful military innovation andthis is particularly true when change isattempted under stringent fiscal conditions.Ultimately, it is in the interaction of

organisation, doctrine and technology that amilitary revolution begins its march tomaturity.

This article argues that exploiting theemergent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)or information age revolution in warfare willrequire a substantial change in the Servicecultures of advanced armed forces and thatthis is likely to provide a greater challengethan new technology. Four areas are explored:first, the role of organisational factors in theprocess of military innovation is brieflysurveyed. Second, an attempt is made todemonstrate the complexity of achievingmilitary organisational change by analysingseveral historical case studies of institutionalreaction to the challenge of moderntechnology. Third, perspectives from thehistory of military organisational change areemployed in order to examine themanagement of problems within structures ofthe current US armed forces. Fourth, some ofthe future implications for the organisationand structure of armed forces confronted bythe environment of RMA-style technology arediscussed.

Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Changeand the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate1

By Michael Evans, Australia’s Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon

If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, The Leopard

There was once a great country whose armed forces, supported by those of its allies, won amilitary victory that changed the balance of world power. In the peace that followed, this nation’sarmed forces had to uphold operational commitments on a global basis against a background ofshrinking human resources, reduced budgets and indifferent public support. Despite thesedifficulties, the armed forces attempted to keep themselves focused on new technology and thefuture of war. The Army created an experimental force to test new military techniques; there werefield trials and a vigorous debate on future concepts occurred. In the first post-war decade, then,the future looked healthy for this country: there was general peace; the international system wasrelatively benign; there were no threatening great power enemies on the horizon.

79

The Importance of Military OrganisationAdvances in military technology cannot be

applied successfully without correspondingorganisational innovation and flexibilitywithin armed forces establishments. It isthrough organisational responsiveness thattechnology is translated into superior strategicperformance. Once technology moves from thepristine setting of laboratory testing into thepractical world of military acquisition, it isshaped by the institutional values and skills ofits users. Effectiveness in exploiting technologyis thus heavily dependent on the compatiblebehaviour of organisations.

Some developing nations have purchasedthe latest military technology only to lack theessential corporate skills to maintainequipment or manage it successfully. Forinstance, since the 1970s Libya may have spentin the region of US $28 billion acquiring anarsenal of advanced tanks and missiles.However, because of lack of maintenanceskills, most of this materiel has been destinedto lie rusting in giant junk yards. In the Libyansituation, the nexus between exploitingadvanced technology and good organisationalmanagement would appear to be almost non-existent.

In contrast, American forces in the 1991Gulf War used the technological-organisationnexus to great effect. While most of theplatforms used in Desert Storm dated from the1960s and 1970s, what was new in the conflictwas the US military’s ability to combine themeffectively with new weapons systems in anintegrated operational plan. Organisationaladaptation and new operational conceptsallowed American and Coalition commandersto optimise new technology to achieve decisivebattlefield results.

Technological superiority, then, means littlewithout organisational effectiveness. In somesituations, organisational strength can act likea form of operational art and reducetechnology to only tactical significance.Ulysses S. Grant in the American Civil War

and Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil Warwere, in many ways, practitioners oforganisational warfare. In the 1860s, Grantwas the first commander to master theinstitutional complexities of industrialisedwarfare based on massed armies, the railways,telegraph and rifled weapons. In the 1930s,Mao Zedong developed the strategy of people’swar by fusing age-old guerrilla tactics withrevolutionary political organisation to imposeprotracted war on superior-armed opponents.

One of the most important lessons in thehistory of military revolution is thatorganisational dynamics will determine thesetting in which technological innovation willeither succeed or fail. However, the role oforganisational dynamics is sometimes obscuredby a powerful mythology of radicalism thatsurrounds military revolution. In thismythology, mavericks such as Major General J.F. C. Fuller and Captain Basil Liddell Hart areoften portrayed as lone advocates of future warlocked in a struggle with reactionary militaryestablishments dominated by assorted ColonelBlimps.

Both Fuller and Liddell Hart, the apostles ofarmoured mobility, used their formidable pensto portray their struggle to modernise theBritish Army between the two world wars as aclash between radical visionaries and blindreactionaries. Yet as the leading Americanhistorian of technology, Elting E. Morison haswritten, it is simply not enough to attributeresistance to technological change withinarmed forces establishments to the allegedworkings of what he terms a “causelessBourbon distemper that invades the militarymind”.2

Historically, the success of militaryinnovation has never been so clear cut, nor hasit ever been the special preserve of radicalreformers at the expense of militaryconservatives. In military thought, radicals arenot always right and conservatives are notalways wrong. Radicals, by their very nature,act as evangelists of new ideas. They fire the

FABRIZIO’S CHOICE: ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS DEBATE


silver bullets that puncture the glass houses ofoutmoded thinking and they often hope thatthe power of the pen will give themadvantages over their adversaries. However, aspolicy-makers, radicals and mavericks haveoften had limited institutional impact as can beseen from a glimpse of the careers of Fullerand Liddell Hart.

Fuller was an irascible mystic to whomcriticising senior military officers was grist tothe mill. His outspoken views about the mentalstrangulation of “stockyard generalship” in theBritish Army were bound to limit severely hisinfluence. Liddell Hart has been called theToscanini of military thinkers – a prima donnawhose desire for public recognition diminishedhis capacity to act as an effective policyadviser in the late 1930s. The fate of mostmilitary radicals is a reminder of PierreVergniaud’s famous saying that revolutionstend to devour their own children.

Just as radicals are not always successful inpromoting military innovation so it is thatmilitary officers are not always incapable offostering military change. Nowhere is this truerthan in the German Army between the twoworld wars. In the 1920s, it was under GeneralHans von Seeckt, a conservative Junkeraristocrat, that the German Reichswehr laid theintellectual roots for the blitzkrieg. Byemploying the talents of a highly educatedofficer corps, an efficient military bureaucracyand a system of extensive field trials, VonSeeckt provided the framework in whichinnovation would later flourish in theWehrmacht. Significantly, in 1940 when theblitzkrieg was used in France, German tankswere superior neither in numbers nor in qualityto those of the French and British. The keyfactors in German victory were superiororganisation and better doctrine.

The point to grasp is that successfulmilitary innovation must, at critical points, beorganised internally and from the apex ofgreat institutions. Change is only successful ifthe military accepts it in a corporate manner.

This is not to deny that there may beimportant, even crucial contributions fromcommanders and policy-makers. In thisrespect, one thinks of the role of Lord Haldanein British military reform in the early 1900s; ofthe influence of Generals John A. Lejeune andJohn Russell in reorganising the US MarineCorps’ for amphibious warfare in the 1920sand 1930s; of Admiral Hyman Rickover’stireless advocacy of the US Navy’stransformation into a nuclear force in the1960s; and of General Donn A. Starry’spromotion of the US Army’s AirLand Battledoctrine in the late 1970s. However, theseindividuals had one feature in common: theyall sought to reform or innovate by harnessingorganisational power.

Successful change and innovation inmilitary organisations usually requires thesteady harnessing of human resources in aninstitutional framework. This reality dictatesthat peacetime military change is usuallyevolutionary in nature. The technical aspects ofinnovation have to be matched by anunderstanding of corresponding doctrinal andforce structure demands. In 1927, FieldMarshal Lord Milne the British Chief of theImperial General Staff (CIGS) attempted to setthe technological parameters for “the army ofthe future” by creating a British ExperimentalMilitary Force. However, he neglectedconceptual and doctrinal issues – the vitalprocesses by which an officer corps learnsabout future warfare. Only in 1932 was acommittee established to study the basicmilitary lessons of World War I. Milne’sinitiative proved to be largely personal innature and, when he left office in 1933, therewas no institutional constituency in the BritishArmy to carry forward the cause of armouredwarfare.

In contrast, Hans von Seeckt’s influencewas of much more lasting value because hesucceeded in leaving behind him an officercorps dedicated to the study of future warfare.In the 1920s, Von Seeckt established no less

81

than 57 committees to try to deduce thelessons of World War I. Consequently, theGerman Army’s approach to future warfarewas far more institutionalised than that of itsBritish counterpart and resulted indevelopment of panzer forces in the 1930s.

The point to grasp is that militaryinnovation does not occur because of the workof a few military radicals or maverick officers;it occurs when coalitions of actors in anorganisation are mobilised behind the cause ofchange. Knowledge of organisational dynamicsand culture is essential to the ability toinnovate. New thinking is likely to beinstitutionalised in policy only if innovatorscan back up their ideas with organisationalpower.

Individual reformers only succeed if theycan garner support and develop aninstitutional ethos of change whilesimultaneously mastering the process ofsecurity policy and bureaucratic politics.General Donn Starry has argued that there areseven essential conditions for changing amilitary organisation. First, there must be amechanism to identify the need for change.Second, innovators and reformers must sharean educational background that promotes“cultural commonality of intellectualendeavour”. Third, there must be an effectivespokesperson for change. Fourth, thatspokesperson must forge a philosophicalconsensus that will give new ideas a wideaudience. Fifth, there must be continuity ofservice among the architects of change; Sixth,a champion of change, a patron and aprotector, must be found at the apex of theorganisation. Seventh, all proposed changesmust be subjected to rigorous trials and theirrelevance must be convincingly demonstratedto the military establishment by experimentand experience.3 It goes without saying thatfulfilling such conditions takes time, patienceand intimate knowledge of organisationalpolitics and interests.

Military Organisations and the Challenge ofTechnological Revolution

Because rapid technological developmentdisrupts long-standing norms and structures, itis not surprising that organisational factors arecritical to the process of military change. Howthen have military institutions reacted to ideasabout military innovation and technicalrevolution?

The measured inter-war German responsethat fused organisation, doctrine andtechnology together in the form of theblitzkrieg is a relatively rare achievement.Historically, there are other paradigms ofresponse to military technological revolution.Some military organisations indulge in areactionary impulse clinging to what theyknow and in the process risking defeat in war.At the other extreme there are instances ofmilitary establishments that engage in a radicalembrace of change. While this approachrepresents a bold response, it is by no means aguarantee of success. Much depends onwhether a military institution has interpretedthe trend of revolutionary technologycorrectly. If it has not, then a dramatic “leapahead” may fail simply because theorganisation moves in the wrong direction andmay take years to recover from its mistake.

These models are by no means mutuallyexclusive or definitive; their ingredientsoverlap and infuse various aspects of adaptingto new technological and political conditions.As a general rule, it is those military forces thatsucceed in integrating a reformed organisationwith new doctrine, operational concepts andtechnology in a coherent strategic frameworkthat seem to succeed. However, specific casesemphasise different combinations of variables.For instance the 16th century Europeangunpowder revolution was both technologicaland organisational; muskets created volley fire;volley fire created new infantry formations. Incontrast, the Napoleonic military revolution of1792-1815 was essentially organisational anddoctrinal. The nuclear weapons revolution of



the 1940s and 1950s was, on the other handmainly technical in nature – at least in itsbeginnings.

The Reactionary Impulse: The Case of SteamPropulsion and Radio in the United StatesNavy

An interesting example of the reactionaryimpulse at work in a military organisation isthe case of the United States Navy. TheAmerican naval establishment rejected theconcept of steam propulsion in the 1860s andin the early 1900s became ambivalent towardsradio communications. In both instances,overcoming institutional resistance to newtechnology took over 20 years.

In 1868, the US Navy produced the USSWampanoag, a steam warship that was thefastest fighting ship in the world. Yet inSeptember 1869, the Wampanoag’s design wascondemned by a special Naval Board on SteamMachinery as “scarcely more than naval trash”.The vessel was abruptly decommissioned and aseries of executive orders directed that allnaval ships were to proceed under sail only.These measures represented a sweepingrejection of over half a century of steamengineering and the US Navy entered a periodof stagnation that was to last for a generation.

Why did the US Navy reject the advantagesof steam propulsion? There appear to be threemain reasons. First, American line officersbelieved that the requirements of steam interms of the costs in machinery and coal fuelcompromised naval armament requirements;steam made ships faster but less efficient asfighting vessels. In reality the US Navy was ina transitional period between the age of sailand the age of steam, and few line officerscould bring themselves to accept that the stateof steam propulsion justified the need todevelop a radically new US Navy.

Second, many line officers feared the socialthreat posed to their traditional status from therise of a new class of naval engineers. A “line-staff” struggle developed in which the line

officers became determined not to cede theirprofessional authority over seamanship toengineering officers. A third factor thatexacerbated the “line-staff” dispute over steampropulsion was the drastic reduction of the USNavy’s size and strength after the end of theCivil War in 1865. This “downsizing” was feltkeenly by many veteran line officers concernedabout their future in a smaller, peacetime navy.In effect, steam technology became the catalystfor two naval sub-groups to engage in astruggle for social supremacy and hierarchicalpower within the US Navy. As a result the fullbenefits of an important new technology werenot realised for years to come. Not until the1890s was the US Navy to break free from theoutmoded sailing concepts embraced in the1860s.

Similarly, the introduction of radio in theUS Navy was delayed for 20 years between1899 and 1919 largely for reasons ofinstitutional conservatism. Although the USNavy had by 1900 shifted to steam and steel,changes in organisation, administration andcommunications lagged far behind technology.The Service was decentralised and dividedbetween autonomous naval commanders thatran the ship-based Navy and independent-minded bureaucrats that ran the shore-basedNavy. The emergence of radio communicationthreatened to end this comfortable world ofseparate cultures.

As a result, the new communicationssystem was merely grafted on to the existingnaval system with operators usually beinginexperienced and junior enlisted men. It tookyears before senior officers realised the valueof creating a professional fleet radioorganisation – only in 1913 did the USAtlantic Fleet use radio communication duringfleet manoeuvres. Ultimately, it was only afterthe United States entered World War I in 1917,that a structural revolution allowing radiooperators to be integrated into a central navalcommand system finally occurred.

83

The Radical Embrace: The PentomicVisionaries, 1955-61

Like conservatives, radicals are just aslikely to mistake the meaning of militarytechnology. The US Army’s adoption of thePentomic division in the 1950s is a goodexample of technology, organisation anddoctrine combining in theory yet failing inpractice. Between 1953 and 1961, at the heightof the nuclear revolution, the US Army wasreduced from 20 to 14 combat divisions. Underthe strategy of massive retaliation, manypolitical commentators believed that the era oflarge-scale conventional land warfare wasover.

The Army responded to the nuclearchallenge by restructuring its warfighting rolearound the use of low-yield atomic missilesand rockets. Tactical nuclear weapons wereregarded by some Army theoreticians not somuch as revolutionary devices, but as artilleryprojectiles of unprecedented destructive power.By the late 1950s, US Army doctrine declaredthe atomic battlefield to be of paramountimportance in ground operations with theconventional battlefield portrayed assubsidiary. By 1957, the US Army wasspending 43 per cent of its budget on short-range divisional and battalion atomic missiles.

In order to match atomic technology withorganisational structure and doctrine thePentomic Division was introduced in 1956.This new structure was designed to allowtroops to operate on a non-linear atomicbattlefield, and to do this, the US Armydispensed with an intermediate brigade orregimental echelon. Few Army plannersforesaw that the structure of the new divisionwould present commanders with acutecommand and control problems in the field.Doctrinally, manoeuvre was declared to beobsolete in favour of attrition through atomicfirepower. In the words of West Point scholarRobert A. Doughty, “the [US] Army probablyhas never experienced a more radical changeduring peacetime in its thought, doctrine andorganisation”.4

The US Army fundamentally misinterpretedthe balance between nuclear technology,doctrine and organisation. Doctrine leapt toofar ahead of a technical understanding of therealities of an atomic battlefield. When thePentomic Army exercises were held inLouisiana in 1958 using tactical atomicdevices, umpires declared that all life in thestate had “ceased to exist”. To its discomfort,the Army discovered that it could not surviveon the very nuclear battlefield its weapons,doctrine and organisation had consigned it tofight on. The Pentomic experiment served onlyto distract the Army from developing acoherent rationale for the use of conventionalland forces in the nuclear age. By 1961 thenew divisional system had been abandonedand the US Army was facing the prospect ofmajor operations in South-East Asia.

The RMA and Military Organisation: RecentChallenges

The historical cases described suggest that,while force structure and organisationalchanges must be expected in advanced armedforces faced by technological innovation, theactual process will be uneven, lengthy andabove all, unpredictable. In examining thechallenge of a transition towards aninformation-age/RMA environment, it is veryimportant to remember that change must takeaccount of context, institutional politics andthe reality of the overlay of older practices andcapabilities. So-called “legacy systems” ofaircraft, tanks and other armoured vehiclesdating from the Cold War era will notdisappear quickly in Western armed forces. Inthe information age, as in previous eras ofrapid technological change, discontinuities arelikely to be common.

Thus, while it seems that over time sometechnological systems have the potential tostimulate important RMA-style shifts inadvanced Western military establishments,there is little evidence to date to suggest thatthis process will be smooth or easy in



organisational terms. Indeed, evidence fromthe United States suggests that institutionalrestructuring in response to technologicalchange is likely to be protracted no matter howskilfully it is introduced. Suggestions that tanksand aircraft carriers are now “sunset systems”doomed to perish in favour of “sunrisesystems” such as deep precision-strike weaponsand uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) areexaggerated and appear to have created abacklash within the Services.

Resistance to Digitisation in the US Army

In the current US Army there appears to beconsiderable resistance to modernisationthrough digitisation. The problem has becomeone of convincing the victorious Army ofDesert Storm – a force preoccupied with highlevels of operational commitment – of the needto “overthrow success”. In a recent study, themilitary theorist Robert Leonhard has warnedthat the digitisation of the US Army hasbecome as much a cultural revolution as atechnological one. He argues that there is “asustained insurgency within the [US] Armyagainst digitisation”.5 This insurgency has beenfomented ironically by the power of e-mail –which has allowed officers from all over theUS Army to build information networks todiscuss the implications of digitisation in thecreation of a 21st century land force.

The main reasons for the groundswell ofopposition to digitisation appear to be culturaland organisational. The conjunction of post-Cold War downsizing and the simultaneousmove towards digitisation has created asituation in which US Army modernisation isoften perceived as being synonymous withforce cuts and job losses. The view thatdigitisation and new technology threaten thetraditional status of heavy divisions as thecentrepiece of ground combat has gainedmomentum in US Army ranks.

Within the US Army there are considerablefears that the priority given to informationtechnology overlooks its vulnerability to

enemy disruption. Some US Army scepticspoint out that the theory of dominantbattlespace knowledge (DBK) is like viewingthe play on a chess board – it may betransparent but situational awareness does notnecessarily mean situational understanding.Like chess players, the Roman Consuls at thebattle of Cannae in 216 BC could see Hannibaland the Russian and Austrian generals at thebattle of Austerlitz in 1805 could see Napoleon– yet in both encounters, surprise wasachieved. Critics have also pointed out that thedigitisation of the Army may have theunwelcome effect of creating a land forcecharacterised by an “information warfareMaginot Line” mentality that emphasisesattrition over manoeuvre.

The US Navy and Modernisation for LittoralWarfare

In the post-Cold War era, the US Navy’stransformation from blue-water operations tothe littoral has also been troubled. Forexample, the US Navy’s semi-submersiblearsenal ship which combined a small crew withhigh-firepower, has been resisted inside theService by a coalition of surface warfareofficers, naval aviators and submariners often.The basis of naval opposition has been that thevessel is little more than a seagoing ordnancetruck. As Thomas G. Mahnken of the US NavalWar College has recently suggested, very fewUS naval officers want to become truckdrivers. In November 1997, concertedopposition to the arsenal ship led to the USNavy abandoning the project altogether.6

Another interesting case of institutionaldisagreement has been the reaction to ViceAdmiral Arthur K. Cebrowski’s “streetfighter”concept of assured access in the littoral – aconcept based on small platforms to overcomearea-denial. The streetfighter concept has, insome quarters, been seen as a threat to thesupremacy of traditional naval platforms. Forinstance, Admiral Daniel Murphy, Commanderof the 6th Fleet called Cebrowski’s concept a“wild idea… a bumper sticker” devoid of

85

intellectual analysis. It was not for nothingthat Admiral Cebrowski ruefully told anAustralian audience that, “[naval] culturetrumps technology every time”.7

The United States Air Force (USAF) and theChallenge of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles

The US Air Force has not been immune tothe challenge posed by new technology. Thepilot culture, the so-called “fighter Mafia” thatis central to Air Force identity, appears to be amajor reason why the US Air Force currentlyhas only two UAV squadrons whileUninhabited Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) areyet to be fully developed. Although Air Forceoperators of UAVs must be pilots, tours of dutywith UAV squadrons are designated as non-flying assignments. As an incentive to try toattract pilots, the USAF offers UAV operators atwo-year tour of duty with a Predatorsquadron.

To date only $US 2 billion has been spenton UAVs – roughly the cost of one B-2bomber – and one tenth of the money that willbe spent on manned air combat planes in2000. It is also useful to remember that it wasthe US Congress rather than the US Air Forcethat stimulated the formation of the DefenceAirborne Reconnaissance Office in 1993 tomanage the UAV/UCAV programs. With theexception of the US Marine Corps, which iscommitted to “institutionalising innovation”,the American armed forces’ approach to RMA-style developments has remained hostage tomany organisational and cultural normsdeveloped during the Cold War.

What the above examples suggest is that inthe United States, the birthplace of the RMA,the organisational-doctrinal changes that maybe needed to realise new technologicalpotential are impeded by a combination ofscepticism, anxiety and conservatism frommany inside the military. At the heart of thisresistance seems to be a general dislike of theidea that modernisation must be promoted atthe expense of continuities in readiness and

force structure. This position is likely to bebolstered by the recent work of the Americanscholars Stephen Biddle and MichaelO’Hanlon.8 Both writers are sceptical of radicalideas that advocate sweeping changes in USmilitary organisation and force structure tomeet the needs of an RMA.

According to Biddle, the key issue to beaddressed in the RMA debate is not so muchradical change but deductive rigour to ensurethat military institutions come to the rightconclusions about new trends in warfare basedon a careful assessment of available evidence.Michael O’Hanlon argues that in the currentRMA debate the adjective, “revolutionary”, canonly be applied to specific realms of defencetechnology such as electronics, computers,communications and precision munitions.Sensor technology has yet to match the rapidadvances in computers while developments inpropulsion systems, aerodynamics andhydrodynamics remain incremental.Consequently, platform technologies from theCold War era will continue to be found in largequantities on the battlefield of 2020. Despitethe pro-RMA rhetoric of the Pentagon’smodernisation program, Joint Vision 2010,O’Hanlon suggests there is little hard evidenceto suggest that the American defenceestablishment has embraced an RMA-styletransformation strategy.

Information Technology and MilitaryOrganisation: Influences from the World ofBusiness

How should modern militaries react to theorganisational challenges presented bytechnological innovation and the RMA debate?If information technologies represent the heartof a potential RMA, should advanced militariesconcentrate on embracing the networkedsystems that have helped transform the worldof corporate business? And can thetransformation of business organisationalstructure and practice over the last decadeprovide a model for developing new forms of



military structure that might be better suited toconducting military operations in theinformation age?

It is clear that some contemporary RMAideas about information age warfare are partlyinspired by cutting-edge business practice.Information technology has had an effect on alarge number of civilian business organisationsin three ways. First, the phenomenon of theflattening of hierarchies has created a broader,decentralised participatory base for corporatebusiness practice. Second, the digitisation ofbusiness practice has increased self-management and, third, an emphasis ondeveloping core competencies has led to higherefficiency. The question arises: to what extentdo these processes translate realistically fromcorporate to military culture?

The Military Relevance of FlattenedHierarchies:

“Flattening” an organisation usuallyinvolves decentralising responsibility byreducing the number of layers in a hierarchy.The advantage of decentralisation in an age ofcomputer-driven business practice is that ithelps maximise the use of relevantinformation. However, the corporate world’suse of flatness can only be applied to themilitary environment with a clear recognitionof the unique nature of combat operations. Theunpredictability of battle has often made themilitary “flatter” and far more flexible thanmost civilian organisations. It is arguable thatmany recent corporate changes imitate modernmilitary experience in the use of teamwork,group cohesion and the notion of“empowerment”.

Military operations create an environmentof chaos that is outside the realm of corporatebusiness theory. The business managementnotion of a “span of control” in which anumber of subordinates report to a givensupervisor is not a military leadership model.As Field Marshal Sir William Slim oncepointed out organisational management is a

science that consists of accurate calculation,statistics, methods and timetables. Militaryleadership, on the other hand, emanates fromthe human spirit; it is compounded ofpersonality and vision, and its practice is anart. Commanding a military formation in thefield is not the same as managing the localMicrosoft branch. For this reason, eliminatingentire echelons in military organisations in thename of “flattening hierarchies” may onlydestroy an entire training ground for officers.

A radical approach to military commandand control is probably incompatible with therange and complexity of potential missionsthat contemporary military forces may have toconfront. In the future, while there is likely tobe a strong emphasis on mission commandand a blurring of functions in the field, flatterhierarchies are not necessarily well suited tofighting structures and operational command.In military terms, flatter organisation isprobably most relevant in the areas ofprocurement, logistics and combat service –areas where the move from mass to precisionfavours such structures.

This is not to suggest that major changes inforce structure and organisation are unlikely.In the future, advanced armies are likely tofield modular and task-force orientedformations with smaller high-tempo, lethal andagile units able to attack from many directions.Under modular organisation, formations maybecome more self-contained with a “golf bagof capabilities” to draw upon. However, thesetypes of formations will still require structuredcommand from grouped headquarters tocoordinate operations. Smaller forceheadquarters may assume many of theresponsibilities of corps and divisions; but theyardstick will not be information managementtheory, but good operational practice.

The Military Relevance of Digitisation

In many business corporations, digitisation(or networking) has served to improveinformation flow and to maximise efficient

87

practice. However, the translation ofdigitisation from corporate culture to militaryorganisation is not automatic. The process ofdigitisation may come to meandecentralisation at the operational base or itmay come to mean more centralisation fromthe operational apex. Easy availability ofinformation may tempt senior militarycommanders to intervene in operations and todelay decisions by “searching for certainty”– anotion that is alien to the nature of war.

A proliferation of information combinedwith a dislike of taking casualties may alsocontribute to a sense of caution that reducesmilitary tempo and mission command infavour of highly structured and methodicaloperations that recall the geometric spirit ofJomini. In an information-rich, but stilluncertain operational environment,micromanagement of missions in the style ofField Marshal Haig and the World War 1chateau generals is not inconceivable.

Developed incorrectly, digitisation willprobably create information overload throughthe generation of routine transmission fromcollecting systems. Developed properly, theprocess of digitisation will probably serve toreinforce a commander’s judgment andcontribute to military decisiveness in the field.In advanced militaries, digitisation will have tobe carefully designed to enable filtering byskilled intelligence staff so deliveringaggregated information to the commander. Inshort, successful digitisation is likely toproduce greater combat power only if acommander is able to use situationalawareness to manoeuvre successfully and massforces and effects throughout the battlespace.However, because military digitisation is stillevolving, there is no optimal structureavailable at present. The need is therefore forrigorous trials and experimentation usingsimulation.

The Military Relevance of Corporate CoreCompetencies

In modern corporate culture, changerequires risk-taking and rigorous training todevelop core competencies. The notion of “avirtual corporation” stripped down toconcentrate on cutting-edge functions seems topresent an attractive model for modernmilitaries. However, the corporate business ideaof “freedom to fail” and risk-taking cannot bereplicated indiscriminately in militaryorganisations. In the corporate world peoplemay get fired when managers fail; in themilitary field people may lose their lives whenofficers fail.

The point is that, unlike civiliancorporations that engage in their core businessdaily in real-world conditions, peacetimemilitary organisations can only engage in theircore competency – warfighting – occasionally.The workings of the marketplace are constant;the dynamics of the battlefield may onlyappear in rare circumstances. Preparing forwarfighting takes place against conditions thatare unique to the military profession. Amilitary establishment must prepare for futureoperations in unpredictable political factors;against an unknown opponent; and in anarena of combat whose chaos and uncertaintyhave no counterpart in civilian life. To preparefor the core competency of warfighting,military organisations must therefore placemuch emphasis on training. This preparationrequires that armed forces establishments mustfoster an environment of constant learningthat embodies rigorous intellectual analysis ofpolitics, society, strategy and operations.

The intellectual approach of the armedforces needs to be far broader than thatemployed by business corporations concernedwith narrow profit and loss. Since the militaryis vitally concerned with national security itsmembers must embrace lessons learned frommilitary history and social science as well asfrom technology and modern managementtechniques. In addition, all innovation must be



tested in a realistic framework of trials thatcontain concrete scenarios at all levels of war.

Fabrizio’s Choice: Military Leaders and theDilemma of Change in the Information Age

Advanced armed forces can learn about theintellectual and philosophical challenges ofchange from the literary past as well from thecorporate future. In The Leopard, hismagnificent novel about the nature of radicalchange, the Italian writer Giuseppe Tomasi diLampedusa portrays a traditional way of life atthe point of decline.9 The central character DonFabrizio, Prince of Selina, is a figure steeped inthe ancient ways of the Sicilian aristocracy. Hepersonifies a basic dynamic of the humancondition: that intellectually, change must berecognised as irresistible yet emotionally thereis always a powerful yearning for the familiarpast.

As the revolutionary forces of Garibaldiand the Italian Risorgimento menace all that heholds dear, Don Fabrizio seems doomed tohave to choose between resisting the winds ofchange or capitulating to them. Instead, heskilfully fashions a response that satisfies theintellectual demands of change withoutsacrificing his identity. To secure the future ofhis ancient line, the Prince compromises withthe forces of nationalist revolution byconsenting to marry his beloved nephew to thedaughter of an arriviste enriched by the neworder. He justifies this sacrifice with the coolobservation, “we live in a changing reality towhich we try to adapt ourselves like seaweedbending under the pressure of water”.10 Yet trueto his aristocratic code, Don Fabrizio refuses toendorse a new revolutionary order he despises– an action that puts an end to his politicalinfluence but preserves his sense of honour.

Fabrizio’s choice is a metaphor for leadersof advanced armed organisations confrontedby the perplexities of change. Military leadersmay not always care for the uncertain world ofthe information age, but they must be wiseenough to develop an intellectual response toits demands. As this article has endeavoured todemonstrate, the choice in times of rapid

military change is seldom between the red ofrevolution and the white of reaction. Rather itis Fabrizio’s choice: that of steering a balancebetween the siren call of conservative traditionwith all its certainties and the temptation torush headlong into the uncertain world ofradical change with its attendant dangers offaddism and loss of identity.

ConclusionForging an organisational response to the

process of technological innovation is nevereasy because the raw material of change is afallible humanity. The paradox that has facedmilitary reformers since the time of Philip ofMacedon is likely to continue, namely that thepromotion of essential organisational changesmay well threaten traditions and methods dearto the very military personnel whose heartsand minds must be won over. Advocates ofrapid change in the military all too oftenignore the vital social setting in which atechnology must be introduced. Too littleattention is paid to the hopes and fears,ambitions and frustrations of the individualsthat have an important role in the acceptanceof change.

In the quest to balance the network againstthe hierarchy and the platform against thesystem, 21st century military institutions mustrespond with a considered transformationstrategy that blends continuity with change.Such a strategy is epitomised by what might bestyled the “Reichswehr model”. The Reichswehrof the 1920s and early 1930s possessed aconservative leadership, but one that was notaverse to change provided progress was basedon evidence. The German Army moved intothe future by testing ideas about technologicalinnovation against careful experimentationand field trials in order to demonstrate whatdid and did not work in practice. TheReichswehr operated on the premise that newtechnology had to be within practical reach ofcurrent abilities as well as being achievablewith reasonable expenditures.

The Reichswehr model provides a usefulexample of how abstract ideas can be

89

translated into concrete practices byevidentiary methods. The lesson is clear: theneeds and benefits of innovation and changeneed to be clearly demonstrated to a militaryorganisation. Only by this approach canmilitary organisations avoid false prophecyand fool’s gold, as well as myopia andconservative reaction. A commitment tosweeping military technological change that isnot matched by a corresponding strategy fororganisational transformation will ultimatelyprove counterproductive. Evidence from thepost-Cold War American military suggests thatradicalism results only in the rhetoric, asopposed to the reality, of change.

Finally, it is important to note that analysisof future warfare should never be viewedmerely as a form of prediction like weatherforecasting or reduced to a military checklist ofNostradamus-like utterances. The true measureof acumen in the study of future warfare lies inestablishing certain core concepts that are ofintrinsic value in studying the phenomenon ofhuman conflict and defining its likelydirections under new and changing conditions.Like the labour of Sisyphus in Greekmythology, this is an unending and oftenthankless task. Grappling with the RMA debateand the future of warfare offers much toilwithout prospect of reward, recognition oreven understanding. However, withoutindividuals and institutions committed to suchintellectual endeavour no nation can movetowards the future in either confidence orsafety. We can perhaps find comfort in thewisdom of the Renaissance Commonwealth of

Venice – tiny, rich and independent for almostone thousand years – which engraved upon itsarmoury the famous words: “Happy is the citywhich in time of peace thinks of war”.

NOTES

1. This article is based on a paper delivered by theauthor to the Experimentation Division, UnitedStates Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM),Norfolk, Virginia on 26 July 2000.

2. Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines, and ModernTimes, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass-achusetts, 1966, p. 35.

3. General Donn A. Starry, “To Change an Army”,Military Review, March 1983, vol. LXIII, no. 3,p. 23.

4. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US ArmyTactical Doctrine, 1946-76, Leavenworth PaperNo. 1, Combat Studies Institute, FortLeavenworth, Kansas, 1979, pp. 18

5. Robert Leonhard, “The Culture of Velocity”, inRobert L. Bateman III, ed, Digital War:, PresidioPress, Novato, California, 1999, p. 140.

6. Thomas G. Mahnken, “War and Culture in theInformation Age’, Strategic Review, Winter2000, vol. XXCIII, no. 1, p. 45.

7. Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski, “NetworkCentric Warfare”. Presentation at the AustralianDefence Force Academy, Canberra, 21 March2000. Notes taken by author.

8. Stephen Biddle, “Past as Prologue: AssessingTheories of Future Warfare”, Security Studies,Autumn 1998, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-74; MichaelO’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Futureof Warfare, Brookings Institution Press,Washington, DC, 2000.

9. Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, The Leopard,Harvill, London, 1992 edn, trans. by ArchibaldColquhoun.

10. ibid., p. 49.

Dr Michael Evans is a Senior Research Fellow in the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon. Hehas served on the staff of Land Headquarters, Sydney and in the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis inCanberra. Dr Evans is a graduate in history and war studies of the universities of Rhodesia, London and WesternAustralia. He has been a Sir Alfredo Bit Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, University ofLondon and a Visiting Fellow at the University of York in England. He was a regular officer in the Zimbabwe Army where, with the rank of Major, he headed that Army’s war studiesprogram. His most recent publications include an 85th anniversary essay on Gallipoli entitled From Legend toLearning: Gallipoli and the Military Revolution of World War 1 (2000) and the monograph Developing Australia’sMaritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942 (2000).


90

Ido not know why the RMA discussion paperhas been shelved, although I could hazard a

guess. Australia’s policy-makers have alreadydecided how we need to respond to ourchanging defence and security environment: inthe way laid out in ASP97 and theforthcoming Defence White Paper (which, ifrecent ministerial speeches are any guide, willrehearse the basic approach contained in theformer document). The role of the RMAdiscussion paper, then, is not so much todiscuss the RMA itself but to inform theAustralian public about how the RMA can beused to support the Government’s new policyof “forward response”, and to explain why it isnecessary to spend more money acquiringRMA weapons and support systems.

Australia’s position on the RMA, in otherwords, is being driven more by such things asalliance considerations, the views of particularpolicy-makers or interests within Russell Hill,and narrow defence-industrial concerns, thanby any frank or detailed assessment of thenature of the RMA itself and its potentialimplications for our current or future defenceand security posture. Indeed, just as Australia’sdefence policy-makers tend to constitute thecountry’s changing security circumstances inways that support existing or planned defencepolicies and structures, so they may beinterpreting the RMA itself in a way that suitsor at least does not threaten existing interestsor “core competencies”.

What do I mean by this last point? Thereare a range of different views on what theRMA is and the implications it has for thefuture role of military force(s).

Some consider that there is no RMA inprogress, just a series of continuingtechnological changes which can beincorporated into existing organisationalstructures and cultures. According to this view,military organisations and capabilities willsimply evolve over time into enhanced, moretechnologically proficient, versions of earliertypes (producing “next militaries” rather thanso-called “militaries-after-next”).1

Some suggest that the RMA is essentially atechnological revolution which is altering orwill alter, in quite fundamental respects, theway traditional, inter-state wars can be fought.According to this view, which underpins theofficial American position on the RMA, thebasic patterns of world politics will remainlargely unchanged, but the capacity of states touse military force to protect or pursue theirinterests is or will change radically (like someof the earlier “breakthrough technologies”, thepresent RMA might, for example, be usheringin a further period of offensive orClausewitzian ascendancy).2

Still others argue that the technological andother “revolutions” that are driving the RMAare also fundamentally altering the political,social, economic and security contexts withinwhich military force(s) operate. We are

Revolutionising Australia's Approach toRevolutionary Times

By Graeme Cheeseman, School of Politics, University College, UNSW

My original intention was to offer some comments on the Defence Department's publicdiscussion paper on “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Australian Defence Force”. TheMinister for Defence had directed that this paper be released in 1999. A draft was accordinglyprepared by the Office of the Revolution in Military Affairs and circulated for comment inSeptember of that year. It has proceeded no further and it now looks as if the paper might not bereleased at all.

91

witnessing, in short, a broader revolution instrategic or security affairs, or the emergenceof “new times” (or a “runaway world”) inwhich everything is changing or will change.3

This last view of the RMA – which I thinkis what is actually happening – seems to bebeing either ignored or downplayed by defenceplanners in most industrialised countries infavour of the first and especially secondmodels. This is certainly the case in the UnitedStates where, in line with the objectives firstraised in its 1997 Quadrennial Defense Reviewand later outlined in the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2010, its defenceplanners are hellbent on making the transitionfrom a modern to an RMA-based force (atwhatever the cost or consequences). Asdescribed by Hundley (1999: 76-9), the USdefence establishment has already undertakena number of “force transformation activities”including: the “establishment of a number oflaboratories dedicated to exploring new waysof warfare”; wargaming and associated fieldexperiments; and trialing of neworganisational arrangements such as the USArmy’s brigade-sized Experimental Force, andAir Force’s Air Expeditionary Forces. It hasalso identified certain concepts as potentialRMA drivers. These include the notions of:“long-range precision fire”, “informationwarfare”, Admiral Owens’ “system of systems”,and so-called “network centric warfare”.

Defence planners in most otherindustrialised states are generally following thelead of the United States although becausethey do not have the means to “go all the waywith the RMA”, they will probably be forced toadopt some kind of “middle course”. Britain’s1997 Strategic Defence Review argued, forexample, that it was important to try to keepabreast of new advances in science andtechnology because military advantage in thefuture would rest with those who mosteffectively identify and exploit battle winningtechnology. This required an ability to generateand identify technological opportunities; adapt

them for military use; and integrate themrapidly into platforms” (MOD, SupportingEssays, p.3-1). Maintaining broadtechnological parity with the United Statesand other Western allies was also seen tobe important both operationally andprofessionally:

... there is potential for multinationaloperations to become more difficult ifcompatible capabilities are not preserved.This could lead to political as well asmilitary problems. Our priority musttherefore be to ensure that we maintain theability to make a high quality contributionto multinational operations and to operateclosely with US forces throughout thespectrum of potential operations(Supporting Essays, p. 3-2). The review accepted that the high cost and

rate of change of technology posed Britain’sdefence policy-makers with a number ofdifficult choices and dilemmas. “How muchshould we invest in improving “enabling”technologies at the expense of weaponsnumbers? How can our equipment plans keepup with the pace of change? How do we andour allies retain interoperability with US forcesgiven the radical changes they envisage? Andwill technological changes also require radicalchanges in the way our forces are organisedand fight?” (SDR, p. 10). It also acknowledgedthat continuing social and technologicalchange were likely to “open up broaderpossibilities which will have a profound effecton our future security”, and bring “newvulnerabilities as well as opportunities”. Thesefuture possibilities and prospects were seen toinclude:

... new ways of fighting such as informationwarfare (which attacks through thecomputer systems on which both our forcesand civil society increasingly depend);greater pressures on operational decisions(instant media reporting from both sides ofthe front line); the wider spread oftechnologies which may be used against us

REVOLUTIONISING AUSTRALIA ’S APPROACH TO REVOLUTIONARY TIMES


(such as biological weapons); and highlysophisticated civil capabilities that will bereadily available both for us and potentialadversaries. And where we (and our allies)exploit technology to strengthen our existingsuperiority in conventional weapons, ourpotential adversaries may choose to adoptalternative weapons and unconventional (or“asymmetric”) strategies, perhaps attackingus through vulnerabilities in our open civilsocieties (SDR, p. 10). Rather than seek to answer the questions

that were being raised, or examine how someof the more radical possibilities, and theirconsequences, might be accommodated, thereview simply stated that they would beaddressed “in the coming years”. In themeantime, “we have taken a hard look at howwe can make the most of emerging[technological] trends, including how to adaptour requirements and procurement processesso that we are not left behind by the speed ofchange” (SDR, p. 10).

Canada has taken a similar position. ItsDefence Strategy 2020 – which was released inJune 1999 and provides the strategicframework for future DND defence planningand decision-making – declared that the RMAand related changes in business managementwere “the harbingers of necessary change inthe information age”. The RMA itself – definedas “a major change in the nature of warfarebrought about by the innovative application ofnew technologies” – was seen to befundamentally altering “the character andconduct of military operations”. The documentdid note that a parallel “revolution in StrategicAffairs calls attention to the concomitantchanges in international behaviour and henceto the spectrum of security challenges, risks orthreats for which a nation must be prepared”.As in the British case, however, thesecontextual changes figured less in its detailedrecommendations for preparing for the futurethan the need to target and utilise those“leading edge doctrine and technologies [that

are] relevant to the battlespace of the 21stcentury”. Thus Canada’s RMA Concept Paper,Canadian Defence Beyond 2010: The WayAhead (NDHQ, 1999) recommended that DND:1) establish a working group to ensure that acoherent well-defined approach to the RMAwas followed; 2) keep abreast of how the RMAmight threaten existing forces and capabilities(including from so-called “asymmetricthreats”); 3) seek to cooperate with the UnitedStates on RMA related R&D andexperimentation; 4) study the use of leading-edge technologies in the development ofspace-based capabilities; 5) improve ties withindustry; and 6) modernise Canada’s existinghuman resources practices.

It seems fairly clear that Australia willfollow the example of its British and Canadiancounterparts. While this makes sense at onelevel – it is an easier and potentially lessconflictual strategy to follow – it does raisesome important questions and dilemmas notleast those raised in Britain’s 1997 StrategicDefence Review.

What if the defence establishment is wrongand the RMA is of the third type?

It can be reasonably argued, I think, thatthere is an RMA of the first or second kindeither in progress or in prospect. Continuingadvances in military and associatedtechnologies are revolutionising the conduct oftraditional warfare and, in combination withthe end of the Cold War, are serving toreinforce the Clausewitzian notion that war, orthe use of military force, can be readilyemployed to protect or extend nationalinterests. But this trend may be only a smallpart of the story. The same basic forces that areserving to increase the capacity forconventional military forces to fight and wintraditional military conflicts may also becontributing to: – a decline in the likelihood of inter-state

wars – at least between industrialised states– and the growing incidence of “uncivilwars” or “complex emergencies” which can

93

neither be understood nor easily dealt within traditional Clausewitzian terms;

– the emergence of a range of “new” forms ofinsecurity against which traditional militaryforce(s) are either irrelevant orinappropriate; and

– an increasing preparedness on the part ofthe international community to usemilitarily forces to intervene in the affairsof failed or failing states or to protectcommunities from human rights and otherforms of abuse.4

As in other countries, these changes areserving to expand the existing and forecastroles, functions and operational doctrines ofthe ADF to take into account of: – such things as media exposure and casualty

avoidance; and – the expansion in what Anthony Giddens

(1999) describes as “manufactured risks” –those that stem from our own actions anddecisions. National armed forces are nowincreasingly expected to help:

– deal with a range of new sources of threator insecurity such as terrorism and drug-smuggling and other international criminalactivities; and

– manage the risks stemming from theincreasing competition for resources,uncontrolled population movements,pandemics and continuing environmentaldegradation (military forces everywhere arebecoming security rather than purelydefence forces). The same changes are also affecting in

quite significant ways the working practices ofmilitary and defence establishments, and theexpectations of many of their members: – the activities and value-structures of

national defence and securityestablishments are having to respond togrowing global norms and expectations –on human rights, economic rationalism andthe environment for example – as well asthe agendas of various social movements

concerned with questions of justice, equityand gender (see, for example, Smith 1995);

– military and defence establishments arehaving to deal with the tendency of Servicemen and women to place their owninterests, or those of their families or localcommunities, above those of their Serviceor country. Like all citizens, members of themilitary are now experiencing multiple andoften conflicting identities – warfightersand peacekeepers, members of a regiment,a single Service or a unified, joint Serviceorganisation, national and global citizens,and so on – and are often finding theexperience difficult and unsettling; and

– military personnel. like citizens everywhere,are less prepared blindly to follow orders orto accept unquestioningly the admonitionsof those in control. Authority is becomingincreasingly based on the “performance”rather than the constitutional or legalpower of those in charge, requiring newmeans of motivating, disciplining andrewarding. These kinds of developments are also

serving to raise, in the minds of somecommentators at least, a range of more specificquestions and concerns over how developedworld militaries might best fit in with, or beadapted to, the “new” security structures andapproaches we are seeing emerge in Europeand elsewhere, and how they might best bestructured, equipped, trained, employed andmotivated for their new roles and functions.Are existing war-fighting structures anddoctrines and the high-technology weaponsand forces flowing from the RMA the mostrelevant or appropriate for dealing with theinsecurities of a post-Cold War and post-industrial age? Should much more emphasis begiven, in national defence force planning, tosuch areas as combat support, special forcesand special operations, and the projection ofcivil infrastructure – encompassing transport,communications, humanitarian assistance, civilemergency, policing and security functions –



rather than power? Are military forces that aredeveloped and maintained for the defence ofthe state against external military attack themost appropriate for carrying out national andinternational peace and security operations?And are existing personnel policies andapproaches the most suitable for our post-industrial or postmodern times (see, forexample, Burk 1994, Cheeseman 2000b, Segalet al 1999, Snow 1995, van Creveld 1990).

How well prepared is the ADF and itsleaders for meeting the challenges andopportunities of the “new times”?

American scholars such as Gompert andLachow (2000) and Hundley (1999) havesuggested that in order to recognise and adaptto change, especially those changes associatedwith revolutionary times, organisations must: 1 adopt new styles of leadership.

Organisations in revolutionary times aresaid to need leaders who can cultivate theknowledge that already exists within theirorganisation, are “purposeful but notcontrolling, impatient but not intrusive,and confident and trusting but not blasé”.They must, in short, be visionaries,navigators, integrators and motivatorswho: – are able to identify the problems to be

confronted, set overall organisationalobjectives, and monitor and adjust theresponses being developed;

– institute and encourage new ways ofexamining and solving these problemsor of meeting the organisation’s overallobjectives; and

– foster a new, more open, morequestioning and more innovativeorganisational culture or climate.

2 establishment of an overall organisationalculture or climate which:– is open to outside ideas and debates; – fosters diversity, innovation and new

approaches to problem-solving; – is critically self-reflective especially of

its foundational disciplines and

assumptions (the role of military force(s)in international affairs, militaryprofessionalism, strategic andoperational doctrine, military ethics,etc.); and

– encourages intellectual ferment,iconoclasm, and vigorous debate about,among other things, the future of theorganisation itself and its roles andfunctions.

3 new organisational structures andapproaches to problem-solving andlearning. These might include: – networks of “experts” rather than

committees or traditional staffingprocesses;

– integrated approaches to problem-solving;

– specific mechanisms for ex-perimentation.

How does the ADF and Australia’s DefenceDepartment measure up to these basicrequirements? I would suggest not very well.While there have been some attempts to reformexisting organisational and policy-makingprocesses, trial new unit structures andoperational concepts, and introduce newmanagement tools, these have been done on alargely ad hoc basis. This is in part becausethere has, until very recently, been littleinterest shown in changing the style and basicapproach of those who run the Defenceestablishment (of identifying and promoting orprocuring visionaries, navigators andmotivators). The prevailing organisationalcultures of both the Defence Department andthe ADF tend to be the antithesis of the modeldescribed above. Both organisations areessentially closed to outside access and ideas(see Cheeseman 1999 and Sullivan 1996).Junior officers are frequently unwilling tospeak candidly or critically about their work.The military in particular tends to eschewdiversity in favour of conformity. Critical self-examination and iconoclasm are frownedupon. There is a strong anti-intellectual

95

sentiment within the three Services inparticular. To the extent it occurs at all,internal debate operates at a functional ratherthan a conceptual level. And rather than beingquestioned, “core competencies” andtraditional ways of doing things are vigorouslydefended and asserted.

Some of these tendencies, moreover, andthe barriers to undergoing the kinds oftransformations being countenanced in theUnited States, may have actually increased inrecent times as a result of: – the increasing politicisation of the senior

echelons of the Defence establishment (andthe public service generally);

– continuing budget pressures and theDefence establishment’s expanding“commitment-capability gap”;

– the continuing pursuit of economic andorganisational efficiency (which limits thescope for experimentation andinventiveness);

– the increasing emphasis being given tovocational rather than liberal educationand training within the armed forces; and

– the current emphasis being given totraditional, “warrior” cultures, a trendwhich is being enforced by theGovernment’s support of the Anzac andassociated military myths through suchactivities as Anzac Day, the 85thanniversary of the landing at Gallipoli, thebuilding of war memorials andcommemorative highways, and theexpansion of the size and programs of theAustralian War Memorial in Canberra. These developments are likely to see the

Defence establishments in Australia inparticular continuing to respond practically butnot conceptually or intellectually to thechallenges of the post-Cold War world. Suchmissions will be carried out professionally andwith good intentions but will run the riskof being increasingly ill-conceived,inappropriately resourced or supported, notproperly structured for the tasks at hand, and

potentially counterproductive. As evidenced bythe Canadian experience, such shortcomingsand failures could generate tensions within thearmed forces – between, say, peacekeepers onthe ground and their leaders at home –contribute to a loss of morale among theServices, and serve to undermine the peoples’confidence in its military leaders andinstitutions. It might also reinforce the viewthat military forces should only be used tofight wars and defend the state againstexternal aggression at a time when they aredesperately needed to help deal with thegathering problems and insecurities of our newtimes.

What might be done to encourage a newstyle of leadership and a more receptiveorganisational climate?

In seeking to reposition itself for RMAs ofthe second and third kinds, Australia’s Defenceestablishment could do worse than begin withits existing system of education anddevelopment. Here strategies for reform shouldbe informed by two related factors. The first isthat transformations of any kind, but especiallycultural ones, take considerable time to occuror enact so the sooner we start the better. Thesecond is that although Australia’s securityenvironment may be becoming more complexand uncertain, it is not necessarily moredangerous. We therefore have time to thinkbefore we start acting, to take a few risks, andto experiment with different ideas andapproaches.

Some preliminary suggestions, in noparticular order, could include: – completely revising the military structures

and curriculum at ADFA and using thesavings generated to: 1) offer scholarshipsto high quality military and civilianstudents; 2) attract the “best and thebrightest” faculty members and researchstaff; and 3) foster basic research intoRMA-related issues and topics (for moredetails, see Cheeseman and Hall 1997);



– reduce the numbers who attend the collegesat Weston Creek; make it harder for peopleto gain entry and harder still to graduate;staff the colleges with high qualityacademics and those officers who aredestined to be tomorrow’s leaders;restructure the courses and curriculumofferings to specifically foster debate,intellectual ferment and iconoclasm; anduse the colleges to help develop and testnew defence strategies, military structures,and operational concepts and doctrines;

– substitute certain graduate courses forexisting staff qualifications;

– Review the existing system of selection andappointment of officers and other ranks.Here the ADF could consider: 1) makinggreater use of lateral appointments; 2)reviewing the present nexus betweenposition and rank; 3) revising the existingrank structure within the ADF; 4) gettingrid of all uniforms other than fielduniforms; 5) allowing for more flexiblecareer paths and opportunities; and 6)encouraging flexible development.

– Overhaul and extend the ADF’s presenttraining systems by, for example: 1)establishing partnerships with otherGovernment agencies; 2) placing people inprivate corporations; 3) exchanges withother forces; and 4) making greater use ofoutside specialists and experts.

– Flatten existing, largely hierarchicalorganisational and command structures,examine the idea of “virtual” decision-making processes, and introduce means ofimproving channels of communication.

NOTES1. Bracken (1993) and Metz (1997) discuss the

notion of “militaries-after-next”. 2. Examples of this view of the RMA are contained

in Cohen (1996), Orme (1997/98), Shukman(1996) and Ullman and Wade (1998).

3. The suggestion that there is a broader revolutionin strategic or security affairs is made by,among others, Builder (1997), Freedman (1998)and Gray (1997). Useful discussions of some ofthe key characteristics of the “new times” into

which we are heading are contained in Baylisand Smith (1997), Booth (1998), Clark (1997)and Nossal (1998). It should be noted that whilethere is broad agreement that we are on thebrink of a new era in international politics, thereis much less consensus on what this era will (orshould) eventually look like. Recent overviewsof some of the alternative futures beingcanvassed are given in Buzan (1995), Harkavy(1997) and Kaufman (1999).

4. These and other possible implications of theemergence of “new times” for the future role ofmilitary force(s) are discussed in Burk (1994),Buzan and Herring (1998), Cheeseman (2000a),Holsti (1996), Kaldor (1999), Mackinlay andKent (1997), Snow (1996) and van Creveldamong others.

REFERENCES Baylis, John and Steve Smith eds 1997, The

Globalization of World Politics: An Introductionto International Relations, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Booth, Ken. ed 1998, Statecraft and Security: TheCold War and Beyond, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Burk, James. ed 1994, The Military in New Times:Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World,Boulder: Westview Press.

Bracken, Paul 1993, “The Military After Next”, TheWashington Quarterly, 16(4): 157-74.

Brown, Gary 1994, Australia’s Security: Issues forthe New Century, Canberra: Australian DefenceStudies Centre, Australian Defence ForceAcademy.

Buzan, Barry and Eric Herring 1998, The ArmsDynamic in World Politics Boulder, LynneRienner.

Cheeseman, Graeme 2000a, “Army’s Fundamentalsof Land Warfare: A Doctrine for ‘New Times’?”(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies WorkingPaper No. 58, Australian Defence ForceAcademy).

Cheeseman, Graeme 2000b, “Military Power andIn/Security” in Ken Booth (ed), Security,Community and Emancipation (Boulder CO:Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).

Cheeseman, Graeme 1999, “Defence decision making:process and influences”, in Mohan J. Malik (ed),Australia’s Security in the 21st Century, St.Leonards: Allen & Unwin, pp. 128-46.

Cheeseman, Graeme and Robert A. Hall 1997,Preparing for Australia’s “Military After Next”:The Price Report and a “New Model” ADFACanberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre,Australian Defence Force Academy.

97

Clark, Ian 1997, Globalization and Fragmentation:International relations in the twentieth century,Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Eliot A. 1996, “A Revolution in Warfare”,Foreign Affairs, 75(2): 37-54.

Freedman, Lawrence 1998, The Revolution inStrategic Affairs, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress Adelphi Paper No. 318.

Giddens, Anthony 1999, Runaway World: HowGlobalisation is Reshaping our Lives, London:Profile Books.

Gompert, David C. and Irving Lachow 2000,“Transforming US Forces: Lessons from theWider Revolution” Santa Monica: RANDNational Defense Research Institute Issue Paper<http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP193>.

Gray, Colin 1997, The American Revolution inMilitary Affairs: An Interim Assessment,Camberley: Strategic and Combat StudiesInstitute.

Harkavy, Robert 1997, “Images of the ComingInternational System”, Orbis, 41(4): 569-90.

Holsti, Kalevi J. 1996, The State, War and the Stateof War (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Hundley, Richard O. 1999, Past Revolutions FutureTransformations, Santa Monica: RANDNational Defense Institute.

Kaldor, Mary 1999, New & Old Wars: OrganizedViolence in a Global Era, Cambridge: PolityPress.

Kaufman, Stuart J. 1999, “Approaches to GlobalPolitics in the Twenty-first Century: A ReviewEssay”, in Davis B. Bobrow (ed), Prospects forInternational Relations: Conjectures about theNext Millennium, Maden MA: Blackwell, pp.193-221.

Mackinlay, John and Randolph Kent 1997, “A NewApproach to Complex Emergencies”,International Peacekeeping, 4(4): 31-49.

Metz, Steven 1997, “Which Army After next? TheStrategic Implications of Alternative Futures”,Parameters, 23(3): 15-26.

Ministry of Defence 1997, The Strategic DefenceReview, London: The Stationery Office.

Ministry of Defence 1997, The Strategic DefenceReview: Supporting Essays London: TheStationery Office.

Nossal, Kim Richard 1998, The Patterns of WorldPolitics Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn.

Orme, John 1997/98, “The Utility of Force in aWorld of Scarcity”, International Security,22(3): 138-67.

Segal, David R. 1999, Charles C. Moskos and JohnAllen Williams (eds), The postmodern military:armed forces after the Cold War, New Port:Oxford University Press.

Shukman, David 1996, Tomorrow’s War: The Threatof High-Technology Weapons, New York:Harcourt Brace.

Smith, Hugh 1995, “The Dynamics of Social Changeand the Australian Defence Force”, ArmedForces and Society, 21(4):

Snow, Donald 1995, National Security: DefensePolicy for a New International Order, Thirdedition, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Snow, Donald 1996, Uncivil Wars: InternationalSecurity and the New Internal Conflicts,Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Sullivan, David 1996, “Sipping a Thin Gruel:Academic and Policy Closure in Australia’sDefence and Security Discourse”, in GraemeCheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds), Discoursesof Danger and Dread Frontiers: AustralianDefence and Security Thinking After the ColdWar, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, pp. 49-107.

Ullman, Harlan K. and James P. Wade 1998, RapidDominance: A Force for all Seasons, London:Royal United Services Institute for DefenceStudies.

van Creveld, Martin 1990, The Transformation ofWar, New York: Free Press

Dr Cheeseman is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon (1968) and the University of New South Wales(where he obtained a BSc and PhD in physics) and studied politics at the Australian National University, obtaining aMA (Qual) in 1984. Before entering academe, he served in RASigs in the Australian Regular Army, in the Departmentof Defence as a communications engineer, and as Defence Adviser to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defenceand Trade. In 1988 he was appointed senior research fellow at the Peace Research Centre in the Australian NationalUniversity. He joined the School of Politics in 1992. Dr Cheeseman served as review editor of Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs between 1995 and 1998 and has published widely in the fields of Australian and regionaldefence and security.


98

ReviewsBooks

REMOTE CONTROL by Andy McNab, CorgiEdition, 1998, Fiction. Paperback.Reviewed by Bruce Turner

Many readers will have read Andy McNab’searlier books about action and life in Britain’selite Special Air Services (SAS) regiment. In hisearlier works, Bravo Two Zero (1993) andImmediate Action (1995) McNab painted athrilling portrait of the courage and dedicationrequired of SAS soldiers and gave a remarkableaccount of desert action and exploits in the GulfWar.

Now he has written a gripping account ofthe life of an ex-SAS soldier after his hero hasleft the Army and become an intelligence agent.Readers will not be disappointed at the amountof absorbing and gripping action, all presentedin a very readable and exciting form. McNabthe author writes extremely well and theexploits of his hero (Nick Stone) are quitebelievable, in fact alarmingly so. The book isbased around the actual incident of the shootingof three suspected IRA terrorists in Gibraltar in1998 and flows in fast-paced action from there.

An interesting aspect of this action novel isthe hero’s explanation of events in NorthernIreland and the likelihood of a lasting peace inUlster.

All in all, a great read. Highly recommended.

A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANNAND AMERICA IN VIETNAM by Neil Sheehan,published by Pimlico, Random House, firstpublished 1988, 790 pp + notes.Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope (Retired)

The words Hero, Epic and Tragic are sooverworked these days that anyone who cankick a ball 50 yards is a hero in an epic game. Ifthe team fails to reach the finals of a sportingseries it is a tragedy. How then can we find

words to describe “A Bright Shining Lie”, NeilSheehan’s Pulitzer Prize and National BookAward winning story of John Paul Vann andhis commitment to Vietnam? The story it tells isso overwhelming that it stuns the senses andconfuses the mind with extraordinarycontradictions. One can barely resist the urge to“will” the storyline to change course to analternative and different ending. However, thereis no parallel world with a happy ending andthe tragedy of Vann’s life (in the true sense ofthe word) unfolds with the inevitability andfinally terminates with his death.

Neil Sheehan knew John Paul Vann welland admired him over the many years of theirassociation. Vann was a brave, almost fearless,combat officer who epitomised the “can-do,can-win” derring-do enthusiasm of theAmerican military in the early years of theircommitment to the war in Vietnam. Vann waslarger than life. Yet his life parallels theAmerican involvement in Vietnam in that heleapt in with enthusiasm, felt disappointmentand disillusionment as he and his cohortsravaged Vietnam in order to save it. The end didnot justify the means, but once committedAmerica did not know how to withdraw without“victory”. Kissinger solved that by acontortionist act which allowed defeat to bedescribed as “peace with honour”. It was a plaindiplomatic lie, just as Vann’s whole life wasbased on a lie and, as he advanced in status, thelies grew with his power until he was livingmultiple lives. There is no simple rationalexplanation for his behaviour. It was just theuninhibited Vann as the Mr Hyde he really was.In a more normal existence the laws and socialbehaviours of society would have restrainedhim, but Vietnam imposed no such boundariesand the black side of Vann’s character wasunleashed with full force. This is where thereader’s confusion arises, in the contradiction

REVIEWS 99

and flawed character of a man who epitomisesall that is admirable on the one hand, yet hebehaves in such an abhorrent way that all whoknew the full story would despise him. It is hardto equate such a brave and admirable combatsoldier with the character of the man whoemerges from the pages of Sheehan’s book.

As described in Karnow’s comprehensiveVietnam: A History the politicians had decided“Vietnam is the place” for the final ideologicalconfrontation between East-West, Capitalism-Communism. American technology and theHarvard educated whiz-kids would show theworld how it was done. War became no longer“Politics by other means” as described byClausewitz, but an exercise in statisticalmanagement techniques – using real, butremote people to populate the charts andpresentations showing production line progressto victory. In an eerie return to the kill-ratioslaughterhouse battles of WWI, the body countand the destruction of assets (even napalmedbamboo huts!) became the obsessive measurefor managing the winning of the war. It workedin industry; it must work in war, mustn’t it?

To the journalists reporting the war, but notschooled in such management niceties, whatthey saw was wanton, indiscriminatedestruction of a sullen, unsophisticatedpeasantry, corruption by government officialsand those favoured by the Diem clan on astaggering scale and dishonest reporting by theirown military to please their political masters inWashington. Honesty, it was clear, was a careerinhibiting policy for a military officer.

Vann was popular among the journalists forhis forthright statements and his open andinformed criticism of the conduct of the war.However, Vann was also a well-trained andforward-thinking commander who thoroughlyanalysed the problem and devised the means todefeat the enemy. Unfortunately, as Sir RobertThompson had advised his Americancounterparts, the defeat of the insurgentMalaysian CT’s had required huge resources, clearand popular policies, the support of most of the

population and yet it had still taken 12 years todefeat the rebels. In an American society whichcould send men to the Moon on schedule and asadvertised, and in which most problems can befixed in a one-hour episode (less commercials)this news was not acceptable and Vann’s (andThompson’s) ideas were never explored.

Having set the scene in the first two books,Book 3, the Battle of Ap Bac in 1963 is hard toadequately describe. It is truly a Greek tragedywith a conveyor belt of opportunities to defeat, ifnot totally destroy a trapped Viet Cong battalionserved up to the heavily armed SouthVietnamese Army and its American advisers.These chances are squandered by a series ofincredibly inept decisions by the politicallyappointed Vietnamese Commander, General Cao,commanding the attacking forces. The readerwill find the scenario so unbelievable as to bealmost surrealistic. Unfortunately, it all happenedand many brave soldiers died futilely. Sheehan’smeticulous research spares no detail and nofeeling in his description of the first defeat of theSouth Vietnamese when advised and supportedby the Americans. Vann’s leadership and skillcaused the result to be less devastating than itmight have been, but a defeat by a smaller ill-equipped force it remains. The tragic pattern wasbeginning to form, but nobody saw or wanted toread the signs and the military and politicaljuggernaut rolled on to its catastrophic end.

Vann completed his tour as an adviser,miraculously unscathed considering the risks heconstantly took. In one case he narrowlyescaped a well-planned ambush by acombination of courage and good luck. Onanother occasion his deputy, Doug Ramsey, wasnot so lucky and was captured. The result wasthat Ramsey endured more than nine years as aprisoner in the jungle.

Vann left the Army in 1965 as a LieutenantColonel and a hero. He was highly regarded inmany circles, particularly by the media, as bothhonest in his appraisals of the war and in how itcould be won. He was apparently throwingaway his career and promotion to high rank as


a matter of principle so he could address theproblems unfettered by the restrictions of beingin the Army. Thus, regard for him, his integrityand his drive to win an increasingly unpopularwar rose accordingly in political and militaryspheres. Vann soon returned to Vietnam as asenior Provincial Adviser.

The book now enters the “dark side” ofVann’s character and it would be unfair to theauthor or the reader to say more. Having justlybuilt up his subject to a larger than lifecharacter, Sheehan now spent the next 16 yearsafter Vann’s death in a helicopter crash in 1972researching his life. For Sheehan the discoveryof the truth resulted in a very different picturefrom the one he knew. The outcome isdisturbing, to say the least. Read, enjoy – and bestunned by this story of one man whose lifealmost paralleled the whole Americanexperience in Vietnam. Like the war itself, Vannand the legacy he left behind damaged ordestroyed everyone who had been associatedwith him.

This book should be read by anyoneinterested in the Vietnam War, the nature andcomplexity of the people, the “dark side” ofhuman nature and those who simply want toread one of the finest pieces of literature I haveread. A Bright Shining Lie is a monumentalachievement and absolutely riveting.

VANGUARD AGAINST JAPAN: RAAF FIRSTTO STRIKE by Herbert C. Plenty, Len Books,Canberra, 183 pages, with maps, photos andappendices. Paperback.Reviewed by Group Captain Mark Lax

Vanguard Against Japan is the personalstory of one who witnessed the RAAF’sengagement of the Japanese forces at the verybeginning of the war in the Pacific. Describedalso, are the subsequent dramas as these andother Australian units were forced to withdrawfrom Malaya and later, the Netherlands’ EastIndies during World War II.

Plenty focuses on the air aspects of the FarEast Campaign as it eventually unfolded. Hestarts by describing the move to Singapore of theHudson squadrons in 1940, as part of Australia’scontribution to Imperial Defence under agrowing threat from Japan. Also putting theevents in context are Plenty’s descriptions aboutthe social life, work conditions, poor trainingregime and an astonishing lethargy on the partof the higher headquarters regarding mostaspects of military life.

It is not until halfway through the book thatthe first attacks by Japan are mentioned and theauthor is at pains to highlight the fact that No 1Squadron, RAAF was the first Allied unit toattack the Japanese, this some hours beforePearl Harbor. The sinking of the HMS Prince ofWales and HMS Repulse were witnessed by theauthor, and the making of this book is in hispersonal recounts of what is was like in thosechaotic days. Plenty was later to be shot down,reunited with his unit and escape to Australiajust prior to the collapse of resistance in Java inMarch 1942.

Plenty offers a campaign critique with thebenefit of the passing years. While he drawsheavily on two previous works (Glory in Chaosby Bob Hall and Bloody Shambles By ChrisShores et al), Plenty’s commentary on the poorleadership, indecisiveness, lack of preparationdespite intelligence warnings and the totaloutclassing of the Allies by the Japanese makesgood reading. His commentary is worthy ofserious study. The book comprises 183 pagesincluding some useful appendices, and six pagesof black and white photographs. Unfortunatelythe print quality is not good and the textalignment on some pages suffers from the printprocess. My review copy had page 103-104missing and the maps are all at the end of thebook when it would have been nicer to placethem within the text where relevant places arementioned. Nevertheless, Vanguard AgainstJapan is an easy read and although let downsomewhat by presentation, is highlyrecommended.

DEFENCE Force JOURNAL · Strategic Context The Enterprise Architecture Model Practical benefits to...

Documents

Transcript of DEFENCE Force JOURNAL · Strategic Context The Enterprise Architecture Model Practical benefits to...