Deepwater Horizon COMMUNICATION AND FAILURE WITHIN BP Annie Dai Jonathan Pearson Boiar Qin Victoria...

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  • Deepwater Horizon COMMUNICATION AND FAILURE WITHIN BP Annie Dai Jonathan Pearson Boiar Qin Victoria Wong Jason Zeng
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  • Did you know? Deepwater Horizon left 11 men dead and spilled millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexicothe worst oil spill of all time. 2
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  • BP has had 3 CEOs in the last decade John BrowneTony HaywardBob Dudley 1989-20072007-20102010-??? Wall of Shame 3
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  • All levels of BP were responsible for disaster CEO Misguided safety regulations No accountability for accidents Managers Narrow, profit-oriented mindset Information loss and corruption Bad decisions on project changes Engineers and Operators Failure to interpret data Lack of communication with managers 4
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  • A HISTORY OF RISKY BEHAVIOR Background 5
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  • For bigger oil deposits and greater profits oil companies move further offshore and deeper into the ocean. Depth increase in oil wells from 1940 to 2010 6
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  • BP finds success in the Gulf of Mexico BP drilling sites in the Gulf 7
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  • BP disregards safety and proper protocol Texas City Refinery, 2005Alaska Oil Spill, 2006 8
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  • LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY The CEO 9
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  • Personnel safety vs. Process safety [We will] renew our commitment to safety. (2000) [There will be] no stone left unturned [in the Texas City investigation] (2005) John Browne, CEO 1989-2007 10
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  • [We will focus] like a laser [on safety] Tony Hayward, CEO 2007-2010 11
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  • Haywards testimony to Congress Its an accident still under investigation. No one is yet accountable. This could happen to any oil company in the industry. 12
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  • Haywards Priorities http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EIA_sL4cSlo 13
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  • Tony Hayward faces public backlash 14
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  • Change in CEO; no change in attitude If you put aside this Macondo, 2009 was the best year wed had, and 2010 was also heading in that direction. Bob Dudley, CEO 2010-??? 15
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  • INFORMATION LOSS AND CORRUPTION The Managers 16
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  • BP commissioned Halliburton for cement expertise Cement samples 17
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  • Halliburton BP February March 8 th April 13 th April 18 th -20 th Severe Failure Success! ? April 26 th April 20 th BP pours cement Tweaks Parameters 18
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  • BP is behind schedule First Macondo oil rig overturns 19
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  • Centralizers ensure even cementing One Piece model Slip On model 20
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  • Poorly Cemented Well 21
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  • Centralizers ensure even cementing One Piece model Slip On model 22
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  • 15 missing centralizers who cares, its done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and well get a good cement job. 23
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  • Underwater view of the well 24
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  • FAILURE TO INTERPRET DATA The Engineers and Operators 25
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  • First Negative Pressure Test 26 Uneven pressures before test Ideal pressure with open valve Actual test: uneven pressure with open valve
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  • Second Negative Pressure Test Manual Pressure Bleed Unknown Pressure Build-up 27 Manual bleed lowers pressure Pressure builds up almost immediately
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  • Third Negative Pressure Test Manual pressure bleed on kill line Pressure inside pump remains 28
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  • Bladder Effect 29
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  • Response from BP manager Mike, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Regards, Pat 30
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  • UNCERTAINTY Assumption: Successful Negative Pressure Test! Fear? Ignorance? Misinterpreted Data? Lack of Feedback 31
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  • Kicks Drill pipe pressure log shows that when the pump (black) was off the pressure inside the well (red) increased 32
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  • FINAL THOUGHTS Conclusions 33
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  • BP engineer recalling the Deepwater Horizon disaster "[a]t the end of the well sometimes they think about speeding up. This may be because everybody goes to the mindset that were through, this job is done...everythings going to be okay." 34
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  • Conclusions All Companies Dont just fire the CEO after disaster Investigate internal communications Management Sustainability before profit Facilitate open communication Engineers Take responsibility for your work Be honest about your limits Focus on doing the job correctly 35
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  • Questions? 36