Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan

7/28/2019 Decoding Pakistans Strategic Shift in Afghanistan

1/36

DECODING PAKISTANS

STRATEGIC SHIFT IN

AFGHANISTANmoeed yusuf

DECODING PAKISTANS

STRATEGIC SHIFT IN

AFGHANISTANmoeed yusuf


2/36

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into

conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966,

SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources,

to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

The Governing Board is not responsible or the views expressed in the

publications o the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD

Gran Lennmarker, Chairman (Sweden)

Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia)

Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia)Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)

Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

Susan Eisenhower (United States)

Ambassador Wolgang Ischinger (Germany)

Proessor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)

The Director

DIRECTOR

Proessor Tilman Brck (Germany)

Signalistgatan 9

SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden

Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00Fax: +46 8 655 97 33

Email: [email protected]

Internet: www.sipri.org


3/36

Decoding Pakistans

Strategic Shift inAfghanistan

MOEED YUSUF

May 2013


4/36

SIPRI 2013

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in

writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law.

Printed in Sweden

ISBN 9789185114764


5/36

Contents

Preface iv

Summary vAbbreviations vii

1. Introduction 1

The Pakistani establishment 2

Structure o the paper 3

2. The strategic shift: from what, to where? 4

Pakistani policy up to 2001 4

Responding to the new realities ater September 2001 6

Pakistans Aghan policy 200112: new aims, old behaviour 9

3. The logic behind Pakistans paradoxical behaviour in the endgame 13Mixed messages on reconciliation 13

Leaving the sanctuaries alone 14

The flip side: good aith and cooperation with the USA 16

4. Approaching the ISAF withdrawal: what has Pakistan achieved? 17

Announcing the strategic shit 17

Will desperation make reconciliation happen ater all? 18

5. Conclusions and the way forward 22

The way orward 23


6/36

Preface

With barely a year and a hal to go, Aghanistans neighbours are understandably

nervous about what will happen to security and stability in the region ater theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leaves Aghanistan in December

2014.

There is a clear need or cooperative policy approaches based on better under-

standing o the interests and worries o Aghanistan and its neighbours. SIPRI

launched the Wider Central Asia (WCA) initiative in January 2012 with the

express purpose o promoting and acilitating dialogue on security in Aghani-

stans neighbourhood. It has brought together experts and ofcials rom Iran,

Pakistan and five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-

menistan and Uzbekistan, as well as rom Europe and the United States. It has

also sought to complement structured dialogues with independent analysis.

Pakistan has played a crucial role in shaping contemporary Aghanistan, and it

is recognized that no sustainable solution to Aghanistans current security prob-

lems is possible without Pakistans involvement. This is what makes Pakistans

purported strategic shit towards Aghanistan so intriguing. In this SIPRI

report, Moeed Yusu, one o the most prominent experts on Pakistani policy-

making processes, sets out clearly and persuasively the thinking that has guided

Pakistans policy on Aghanistan. In particular, he unpicks the so-called strategic

shit and what opportunities it really oers or greater cooperation.

I would like to thank Mr Yusu, along with Chalinda Dilesh Weerasinghe andShehzad Atta, who provided background and research assistance. Gratitude is

also due to the numerous regional ofcials and experts who have contributed

their insights and energy to the WCA initiative. I would also like to thank the

Swedish Ministry or Foreign Aairs, which generously unds the initiative.

Finally, thanks are due to all those within SIPRI who helped in the development

o this report, in particular Dr Neil Melvin, Dr Bruce Koepke, Theresa

Hghammar and the SIPRI editors, especially Caspar Trimmer.

Proessor Tilman BrckDirector, SIPRI

Stockholm, May 2013


7/36

Summary

Pakistan is seen by the international community, particularly the United States,

as both a ormal ally and a major obstacle to peace in Aghanistan. Pakistansrecently touted strategic shit towards more positive and cooperative engage-

ment on Aghanistan was thereore cautiously welcomed. Having treated

Aghanistan as its backyard and pursued exceptionally intrusive policies or years

beore the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Pakistans approach to

Aghanistan has moderated gradually since the resurgence o the Aghan Taliban

insurgency in 2006 and the spectacular rise in violence within Pakistan the year

ater. The shit in strategy has, however, only been actively highlighted by the

Pakistani state since early 2012. It is primarily marked by a strong push to achieve

an inclusive reconciliation process in which the Taliban are key negotiating

parties, leading to a power-sharing arrangement. Over the past ew months,

Pakistan has taken some steps to acilitate talks with the Taliban and broaden its

relationships among Aghan political actors.

Pakistans recent actionsup to and including the strategic shitare all part

o an attempt by Pakistans strategic elite to saeguard what it sees as Pakistans

best interests. This elites policy thinking on Aghanistan is driven by three

undamental considerations: the rise o domestic instability and terrorism, which

is now its top priority; its longstanding rivalry with, and suspicion o, India; and

its desire to avoid a surge in Pashtun nationalism among its own large Pashtun

population. An inclusive Aghan reconciliation process is Pakistani plannerssilver bullet or satisying all three policy drivers. In the end game phase in

Aghanistanthe period rom December 2009, when US President Barack

Obama announced his plans or a surge in international orces in Aghanistan, to

December 2014Pakistan has consistently pursued this objective and opposed

any developments that would interere with it.

Pakistan neither wants chaos and civil war in Aghanistan nor outright Taliban

rule, both o which it believes would eed its own domestic militancy problem

as well as having a number o other negative impacts. At the same time, however,

it does not wish to conront the Aghan Taliban sanctuaries, despite the tensionthis causes with Aghanistan and the USA, because it ears a domestic militant

backlash, especially i the Pakistani and Aghan Taliban were to join orces; and it

hopes a still-riendly Aghan Taliban will promote its interests in post-2014

Aghanistan, either as part o a stable political dispensation orin the worst

caseas a proxy in an Aghan civil war.

With regard to the IndianPakistani rivalry, Pakistan no longer wishes to keep

India out o Aghanistan entirely. It recognizes the popular and useul con-

tribution India has made to development in Aghanistan. However, both coun-

tries still harbour a great deal o mutual mistrust. Pakistans priority is to ensure

India does not use its presence in Aghanistan to pursue an anti-Pakistan

strategy.


8/36

vi DECODING PAKISTANS STRATEGIC SHIFT IN AFGHANISTAN

The way forward

International and Aghan orces cannot weaken the Taliban insurgency irrevers-

ibly beore December 2014. There is thereore no option but to push orward the

agenda o reconciliation with the Aghan Taliban in a manner close to the inclu-sive process advocated by Pakistan. To make this happen, all o the main actors

the Aghan Government, Pakistan, the USA and the Aghan political actions

including the Talibanneed to agree a single, unified ormula or reconciliation.

The process should be truly Aghan-led and Aghan-owned. External actors

should keep their involvement and conditions to a minimum. In particular, Paki-

stans role should be limited to acilitation and prodding Taliban hardliners to

accept a power-sharing arrangement. I such an arrangement is worked out, in

uture Pakistan should use its influence with the Taliban leadership to encourage

moderation o its positions. Pakistan should also continue to build bridges withmoderate (non-Taliban) Pashtun and non-Pashtun political actors in Aghani-

stan, including members o the ormer Northern Alliance actions.

In order to address their current impasse over the presence in Pakistan

o Aghan Taliban sanctuaries, Pakistan and the USA should consider a deal

whereby Pakistan pressures the Aghan Taliban operating rom its territory to

cease attacks during any peace talks, while the USA reciprocates with a con-

ditional localized ceasefire.

India and Pakistan should start bilateral dialogues on intelligence and develop-

ment matters in Aghanistan, in order to allay mutual suspicions and ensure

peaceul coexistence in Aghanistan. India could consider moving its develop-

ment presence urther away rom the Pakistani border areas.

Pakistan should also seek to expand its economic ootprint in Aghanistan.

The international community should modiy its approach to Pakistan based on

a better understanding o Pakistani interests and concerns, and ensure that Paki-

stan is heard in uture decisions relating to Aghanistan.


9/36

Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

FATA Federally Administered Tribal AreasISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan


10/36


11/36

1. Introduction

The United States-led military campaign in Aghanistan ollowing the 11 Septem-

ber 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA not only transormed Aghanistan but alsomade Pakistan a vital cog in the struggle against terrorism. It has become con-

ventional wisdom that no solution to the problems o Aghanistan can come

without Pakistans support. At the same time, however, Western powers and the

international media have put Pakistan under the scanner more requently than

any other state or the ailures to achieve peace and stability in Aghanistan.

This paper discusses Pakistans engagement with Aghanistan rom the period

o Taliban rule through to the present, and its perspective on the impending

drawdown o the international presence at the end o 2014.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan supported Sunni Islamist Pashtun ele-

ments in Aghanistanincluding most notably the Taliban, beore and during

their rule o Aghanistan in 19962001and exploited Aghan territory as part o

its inamous strategic depth policy against India.1 Throughout the years o inter-

national presence in Aghanistan since September 2001 Pakistan has been seen

by the West as both an ally and a villain, allowing key elements o the Taliban

insurgent movement to operate rom Pakistani territory and undermining moves

to negotiate with them. Since early 2012, Pakistani leaders have sought to convey

to the world that they have adopted a more hands-o approach towards Aghani-

stan. This strategic shit has been touted with repeated claims o greater

willingness to support Aghan reconciliation talks; moves to engage in regionaloutreach, including with countries Pakistan has not traditionally seen as partners

in Aghanistan; the release o a number o mid-level Aghan Taliban prisoners

rom Pakistani custody in late 2012; and public calls on the Taliban to negotiate

sincerely.

In tracing Pakistans thinking about the endgame in Aghanistanthe period

rom December 2009, when US President Barack Obama announced his plans or

a surge in international orces in Aghanistan to December 2014this paper

argues that Pakistans objective has been consistent: to ensure a political

reconciliation process takes place in Aghanistan that gives significant weight tothe Talibans demands.2 The Pakistani state apparatus sees such a process as

oering the best chance o limiting uture domestic Islamist violence, now its

oremost source o concern, and o saeguarding against the emergence o a

hostile government in Aghanistan overly sympathetic to India, without allowing

1 Designed to ofset Indian superiority, 3 aspects o Pakistan militarys strategic depth policy that are

most relevant to the discussion here are (a) a physical concept seeking to incorporate use o Aghan territoryas part o Pakistans war-fighting plans vis--vis India; (b) treating Aghanistan as Pakistans backyard in

order to keep all Indian influence out o Aghanistan; and (c) using Aghan territory as the orward base orPakistans sub-conventional pro-militancy strategy in Indian Kashmir during the 1990s. See Pande, A.,

Explaining Pakistans Foreign Policy: Escaping India (Routledge: London, 2011), pp. 187.2 The term endgame has become popular shorthand or the security, political and economic transitions

in Aghanistan set or completion by the end o 2014 and marked by the planned drawdown o internationaltroops, the hope or a political settlement among Aghan political actors, and an economic model driven

much more by internal Aghan responsibility than by external assistance.


12/36

2 DECODING PAKISTANS STRATEGIC SHIFT IN AFGHANISTAN

Aghanistan to descend into chaos. Virtually all Pakistani actions in the endgame

have been dictated by the overriding objective o bringing about this inclusive

reconciliation process.

One o the central questions or this paper is how ar the strategic shit marks

a genuine change in policy, rather than rhetoric. The main argument proposed isthat the shit is real insoar as it signifies a move away rom the strategic depth

policy. However, it can most accurately be depicted as a moderation o Pakistans

traditional position. Also, while the ostensible shit in policy objectives resulted

in visibly changed Pakistani behaviour only in 2012, in reality it began ater the

resurgence o the Aghan Taliban insurgency in 2006 and the spectacular rise in

violence within Pakistan the ollowing year.3 Pakistans conciliatory overtures

since early 2012 are best understood as actions in pursuit o its goal o an inclu-

sive Aghan reconciliation process. Their real significance is in their timing:

Pakistans new-ound enthusiasm to support an Aghan settlement indicates thatit senses an opening and believes that its proactive support between now and

2014 is likely to push the negotiation process in the direction it desires.

The Pakistani establishment

It is important to note at this stage that this paper does not seek to represent the

breadth o Pakistani opinion on the countrys Aghan strategy. Rather, it ocuses

primarily on explaining, as the author sees it, the thinking and positioning o the

Pakistani strategic elite and its supporterspopularly dubbed the establishment.

While this paper occasionally notes prominent critiques rom Pakistani civil

society, it does not do so systematically. The narrative thus expounds on a very

narrowyet crucialelement o the Aghan conundrum. Such a ocus is tenable

given the objective outlined or this undertaking: to analyse the Pakistani states

engagement with Aghanistan.

Throughout Pakistans history, a small militaryintelligence-led clique has

operated as a rather opaque and insular conglomerate dictating Pakistans oreign

policy direction. The establishment consists o the armys top leadership along

with a section o the intelligence community, the civilian bureaucracy, amenable

politicians (whose strength and make-up have varied over time), and a chorus ointellectuals willing to underwrite their worldview.4 The establishment has

maintained its stranglehold on Pakistans Aghan policy or much o Pakistans

post-partition history.

3 On the Talibans resurgence see International Crisis Group (ICG), The Insurgency in Aghanistans

Heartland, Asia Report no. 207 (ICG: Brussels, 27 June 2011), pp. 57; and Giustozzi, A. (ed.), Decoding theNew Taliban: Insights rom the Aghan Field(Columbia University Press: New York, 2012). Terrorism-related

deaths in Pakistan rose rom 1471 in 2006 to 3598 in 2007 and 6715 in 2008. They peaked at 11 704 in 2009.See South Asia Terrorism Portal, Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan 20032013, .4 For 2 prominent definitions o the establishment see Cohen, S. P., The Idea o Pakistan, (Brookings

Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2006), p. 4; and Syed, M. H., Media barons,Friday Times, 18 Aug. 2006.


13/36

INTRODUCTION 3

Structure of the paper

Chapter 2 o this paper examines the main concerns that have driven Pakistans

Aghan policy over the years, and how these have translated into policy action. It

discusses the changes that took place ollowing the US-led invasion oAghanistan in 2001, and the more recent strategic shit. Chapter 3 seeks to

explain the thinking behind Pakistans apparently paradoxical behaviour in the

endgame up to early 2012. Chapter 4 looks in more detail at Pakistans actions

since 2012 and how ar these have advanced its aim o promoting inclusive

reconciliation talks. Chapter 5 oers conclusions and discusses the way orward.


14/36

2. The strategic shift: from what, to where?

Any positive shit in Pakistans Aghanistan policy is seen as critical to Aghani-

stans uture given the influenceand indeed the spoiling powerPakistan hasexhibited in Aghanistan in the past. To understand Pakistans actions in the

Aghanistan endgameand to assess how ar the touted strategic shit represents

a genuine change in policyit is important to establish the baseline; that is, what

the shit proesses to be a move away rom.

Pakistani policy up to 2001

The Pakistani establishments traditional thinking on Aghanistan was dominated

by two actors: the division o the ethnic Pashtun heartland between Pakistan and

Aghanistan; and Pakistans competition with India, which has persisted since

the two countries independence in 1947. Up until at least the all o the Taliban

regime in Aghanistan, these were the main drivers shaping its Aghan policy.

The spectre of Pashtun nationalism

Pakistan and Aghanistan are together home to approximately 43 million ethnic

Pashtuns.5 The Durand Line, the 2640-kilometre demarcation separating the two

countries, is not recognized by Aghanistan, which lays claims to the Pashtun-

majority areas o Pakistan.6 Successive Pakistani governments have worried

about the possibility o Pashtun nationalismonce a potent orceengulfingPakistans north-west.7

This concern is part o a broader aversion to ethno-nationalism that has

aected the core o Pakistans identity. Beset by irredentist claimsincluding

rom Aghanistanthroughout Pakistans history and driven by the necessity o

holding the country together despite its multiple ethnic cleavages, the Pakistani

state has sought, with limited success, to promote a united Muslim identity to

subsume its ault lines and subdue ethno-nationalism.8 In line with this, the

establishment has always hoped or a dispensation in Aghanistan that would not

5 The exact size o the total Pashtun population is unclear as recent census data is unavailable in both

Aghanistan and Pakistan. The estimate provided is based on population figures and ethnic breakdownestimates given in the CIA World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, online version,

.6 Ramin, A. and Siddiqui, N., Blood line: Aghanistan and Pakistans unspoken border dispute, World

Policy blog, 2 Jan. 2013, .

7 On Pashtun nationalism and related interstate tensions see Qureshi, S. M. M., Pakhtunistan: the rontierdispute between Aghanistan and Pakistan,Pacific Afairs, vol. 39, no. 1, (springsummer 1966), p. 101; Saikal,

A., Aghanistan and Pakistan: the question o Pashtun nationalism?,Journal o Muslim Minority Afairs, vol.30, no. 1 (Mar. 2010), pp. 517; and Khan, A., Politics o Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan

(SAGE Publications: New York, 6 Jan. 2005), pp. 83109.8 See Wilder, A., Islam and political legitimacy in Pakistan, ed. M. A. Syed, Islam and Democracy in Paki-

stan (National Institute o Historical and Cultural Research: Islamabad, 2005), pp. 3188. On the origins andpersistence o the tension between Pakistans various identities see Jafrelot, C., Islamic identity and ethnic

tensions, ed. C. Jafrelot,A History o Pakistan and its Origins (Anthem Press: London, 2002), pp. 938.


15/36

TH E STRATEGIC SHIFT: FROM WHAT, TO WHERE? 5

use the Pashtun card against Pakistan by actively laying claims to its Pashtun-

dominated territories. The Pakistani establishment also wishes to avoid any

circumstances that might inflame the sensitivities o Pakistani Pashtuns, be it

internal developments in Aghanistan that alienate Aghan Pashtuns, or any

action by the Pakistani state.The establishment has held on to these ways o thinking despite significant

opposition, both inside and outside Pakistan, to the idea o religion as a basis or

Pakistani unity. There are also signs that this strategy has enhanced, not checked,

resentment among Pakistans minority ethnicities at the perceived political and

economic dominance o ethnic Punjabis and o Punjab province.9 More

importantly, nationalism among Pakistani Pashtuns long ago gave way to a

preerence or integration and mainstreaming within Pakistan.10

The two-front threat

The Pakistani establishments fixation on rivalry with India has come at great

cost. It has diverted much o Pakistans productive energy and created a siege

mentality among its citizens. It has bloated deence needs at the cost o social and

economic development and orced it to abandon regional economic integration.

Pakistan is now acing massive allout rom decades o support to Islamist

militants in a quest to continue challenging India.11

Aghanistan plays into this rivalry as the Pakistani military wants to avoid at all

costs simultaneous active threats on its eastern (Indian) and western (Aghan)

bordersthe two ront situation as Pakistani strategists call it.12 This has trans-

lated into a quest to seek a dispensation in Aghanistan that is not sympathetic to

India.

From priorities to policy actions, 19802001

The desired outcome o Pakistans traditional Aghan policy was (and remains)

an unchallenging and riendly Aghanistan with a dispensation in Kabul that is

not eager to exploit Pashtun nationalism or to support India ahead o Pakistan.

This policy was most obviously on display ater the December 1979 Soviet

invasion o Aghanistan. For nearly a decade thereater, the Pakistani spy agency,

the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in collaboration with the US CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA), backed the Mujahideen insurgency to drive out the

Soviet orces.13 In the mid-1990s, the ISI backed the Aghan Talibans rise to

9 See Jafrelot, C., The Punjabization o Pakistan: Myth or reality?, ed. C. Jafrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism

without a Nation (Zed Books: London, 2002), pp. 5163.10 Khan (note 7).11 Yusu, M., The intersection among development, politics, and security, eds A. Weiss and S. G. Khattak,

Development Challenges Conronting Pakistan (Kumarian Press: Sterling, VA, 2013), pp. 23967.12

Agha, A. S., Pakistans security perceptions, ed. I. Alam, Security and Nuclear Stabilization in SouthAsia (Free Media Association: Lahore, 2006), pp. 201216.13 On developments in Aghanistan during this period, including Pakistans role, see Coll, S., Ghost Wars:

The Secret History o the CIA, Aghanistan, and Bin Laden, rom the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001

(Penguin Books: London, 2004).


16/36


power.14 For the Pakistani establishment, the Taliban under Mullah Mohammad

Omar had the advantage o being Islamists. The establishment believed that this

would make them uninterested in raising the issue o Pashtun nationalism.15

During the 1990s Pakistan took its Aghan strategy to the extreme by

incorporating the use o Aghan territory into its war-fighting plans against Indiaand utilizing Aghan soil to train and launch militants fighting Indian rule in

Jammu and Kashmir, in the quest or strategic depth.16 Pakistans policy during

these decades gained it a reputation o being excessively interering and o sup-

porting only amenableultra-conservativePashtuns to the detriment o all

other political actors in Aghanistan.17 As a result, it alienated the Northern

Alliance, an umbrella politico-military ront led by various northern Aghan

actions who came together to oppose the Talibans rise. 18

On the eve o the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Pakistan was globally

isolated on the Aghanistan question as the chie patron o Mullah OmarsTaliban regime, which had hosted al-Qaeda and an assortment o other Islamist

militants such as the Islamic Movement o Uzbekistan, Chechen Islamist

militants, and Uighur separatists rom China. It was also extremely unpopular

with the anti-Taliban elements that would soon enter the corridors o power in

Kabul.

Responding to the new realities after September 2001

The vastly changed dynamics in Aghanistan since the international presence

arrived in the country in October 2001, and Pakistans trajectory over the past

decade, have challenged the traditional drivers o Pakistans Aghanistan policy.

While rivalry with India and the suppression o Pashtun nationalism have not

been abandoned as drivers, they have been moderated, and at least one new

actordomestic instabilityhas taken priority.

The USAs original sin in Afghanistan

Fundamentally, the Pakistani state has viewed Aghanistan since September 2001

in terms o the US presence on its border. Pakistans Aghanistan policy has

14 For more on the Taliban movement and its conduct in power see Gohari, M. J., The Taliban: Ascent to

Power (Oxord University Press: Oxord, 27 Sep. 2001), pp. 26133.15 Rashid, A., Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2nd edn (Yale University

Press: New Haven, CT, 2010), p. 187.16 Rashid (note 15), p. 186.17 Rubin, B. R. and Siddique, A., Resolving the PakistanAghanistan stalemate, US Institute o Peace

Special Report no. 176, Oct. 2006, . Liberally oriented

Pashtuns in Aghanistan and Pakistan have taken serious issue with the Pakistani establishments tendencyto present hard-line Sunni Islamist elements like the Taliban as representatives o the Aghan Pashtuns. See

the series o articles by Farhat Taj starting with Taj, F., Taliban are Pak Army proxies, not Pashtun national-istsI,Friday Times, 30 Mar. 2012.

18

The Northern Alliance, ormally the United Islamic Front or the Salvation o Aghanistan, was ormedin opposition to the Taliban in 1996, and on the eve o the 2001 invasion o Aghanistan controlled 1015% o

Aghan territory. The group included the amous Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Masoud, Uzbek com-mander Abdul Rashid Dostum, Hazara leaders, and anti-Taliban Pashtuns. Pashtun commander Gulbadeen

Hikmatyar, once close to the ISI, also allied at some periods with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.


17/36


thereore been aected more by developments in the PakistaniUS relationship

and less by those in AghanPakistani ties. This has oered little comort vis--

vis the two traditional drivers o Pakistans Aghan policy. From the Pakistani

establishments perspective, the USAs post-2001 Aghanistan policy, and its

broader approach to South Asia, have orced Pakistan to deal with both anunriendly government in Kabul and a growing regional imbalance in avour o

India.

Immediately ater the 11 September 2001 attacks, the military-led Pakistani

Government o the time advised the USA to deal with the moderates among Tali-

ban ranks in order to isolate al-Qaeda ater a short military campaign in Aghani-

stan.19 Instead, the USA committed what the Pakistani establishment has ever

since considered the original sin: co-opting members o the erstwhile Northern

Alliance to take charge in Kabul. Even though the representation o the northern

actions in Kabul was subsequently reduced, the Pakistani establishment saw theouster o the Talibans regime as ushering in a new era in which the dice were

loaded against it.20

Pakistan would thereater be highly suspicious o the US agenda in Aghanistan

and Pakistanand the USA would be equally suspicious o Pakistans motives

even as the two continued to be ormal allies in the war on terrorism. Moreover,

the Pakistani establishment saw a direct connection between the US presence in

Aghanistan and the increase in Indian leverage with the Aghan Government.21

This ed Pakistans worries about a two-ront threat.

The rise of domestic terrorism

The actor that has aected Pakistans thinking since 2001 even more than these

traditional concerns is the rise in domestic terrorism. Pakistan has seen a

remarkable deterioration in its internal security situation with almost 47 500

people killed since 2003 in terrorist incidents perpetrated largely by, or at the

behest o, al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. The latter is a conglomerate whose

roots can be traced back to the post-September 2001 uprising among the anti-US

tribal Pashtuns on the Pakistani side o the Durand Line.22

The Pakistani Taliban coalesced under an umbrella organization, the Tehrik-i-

Taliban Pakistan (TTP), only in 2007. However, the TTPs ormation was thelogical conclusion o the return o a culture o militancy in the Federally

19 Pervez Musharra, the Pakistani military ruler at the time, had provided unsolicited council to USPresident George W. Bush. There were 3 pillars to the suggested course: (a) deal with the moderate Taliban

to isolate the hardliners and al-Qaeda; (b) do not allow the Northern Alliance to take control o Kabul; and(c) make the military campaign swit, targeted and limited in scope. Hussain, Z., Frontline Pakistan: The

Struggle with Militant Islam (Columbia University Press: New York, 2008), p. 48.20 Hussain (note 19), pp. 4849.21 Yusu, M., Rational institutional design, perverse incentives, and the USPakistan relationship post-

9/11,Deence Against Terrorism Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (spring 2009).22

South Asia Terrorism Portal (note 3). On the origins o the Pakistani Taliban see Qazi, S. H. Anextended profile o the Pakistani Taliban, Institute or Social Policy and Understanding Policy Brie no. 44,

Aug. 2011, . On the TTP and militancy in FATA see Qazi,S. H., Rebels o the rontier: origins, organization, and recruitment o the Pakistani Taliban,Small Wars and

Insurgencies, vol. 22, no. 4 (Oct. 2011).


18/36


Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a mainly Pashtun semi-autonomous region o

north-west Pakistan that shares a long border with Aghanistan.23 This militancy

was driven by the mobilization o thousands o Pakistani tribal Pashtuns to fight

against the oreign presence in Aghanistan ater 2001 and by violent resentment

o the Pakistani Armys orays into the semi-autonomous FATA rom 2002onwards to tackle oreign militants fleeing the US military campaign across the

Durand Line.

The Pakistani Talibans justification or targeting the Pakistani state all along

has been that the countrys military is supporting the USAthe infidel oreign

occupying orce in Aghanistanagainst ellow Muslims. The crux o their

message is most aptly captured by Eamon Murphy: The Pakistan Taliban

claimed that, as proud Pashtuns, they were only deending themselves against the

Pakistani military which had become nothing other than the servant o the US. 24

This narrative conveniently conflated their realmilitant Islamistagenda withanti-US sentiment that was already rie in Pakistan and caused much ambi-

valence among Pakistanis in terms o the threat they posed.25

The Taliban sanctuaries as a complicating factor

Moreover, the most prominent Aghan Taliban actionsthe Haqqani network

and Mullah Omars Taliban group (hereater reerred to collectively as the

Aghan Taliban)fighting the international presence in Aghanistan have ound

sanctuary in Pakistan: the Haqqani network in the North Waziristan agency o

FATA and Mullah Omars group urther south in the city o Quetta in Baluchistan

provincethus the popularly used name Quetta Shura. The Quetta Shura is the

same Taliban group that ruled Aghanistan beore September 2001 and has its

strongholds in southern Aghanistan. The Haqqani network is a ormer Muja-

hideen group that ought the Soviets and thereater retained its dominance over

strongholds in Khost, Paktika and Paktia provinces in eastern Aghanistan.26 Both

groups crossed over into Pakistan to escape the US-led military campaign ater

September 2001. Pakistan has been under tremendous external pressure to act

against them militarily.

The Aghan Taliban have been careul not to target the Pakistani state directly.

The Quetta Shura, and to a lesser extent the Haqqani network, have sought todistance themselves rom the Pakistani Talibans actions against the state.27

Nonetheless, several actors link the Aghan and Pakistani groups, beyond the

ideological connection. For example, the Pakistani Taliban has provided the

Haqqani network with sae havens in FATA and acilitated the groups recruit-23 Qazi, An extended profile o the Pakistani Taliban (note 22)24 Murphy, E., The Making o Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots o Extremism (Routledge:

London, 2012), p. 146.25 Yusu, M., Taliban have been ooling us all along,Friday Times, 8 May 2009.26 On the Quetta Shura Taliban see Rashid (note 15), pp. 1781; and Nojumi, N., The rise and all o the

Taliban, eds R. Crews and A. Tarzi, The Taliban and the Crisis o Aghanistan (Harvard University Press:Cambridge, MA, 2008), pp. 90117. On the Haqqani network see Brown, V. B. and Rassler, D., Fountainhead

o Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 19732012 (Columbia University Press: New York, 2013).27 Basit, A., Militant landscape ater Miranshah agreement, M. A. Rana, S. Sial and A. Basit, Dynamics o

Taliban Insurgency in FATA (Pak Institute or Peace Studies: Islamabad, 2010), p. 103.


19/36


ment.28 Both groups are closely linked to al-Qaeda. The Pakistani Taliban also

ormally pledge allegiance to the Aghan Talibans supreme leader, Mullah

Omar.29 Moreover, the Pakistani Taliban have used their ideological afnity with

the Aghan Taliban movement to win recruits and sympathy.30

The Pakistani ofcial narrative blames the regional context or Pakistansinternal security woes. In reality, while the trigger or the onslaught o domestic

violence ater September 2001 was the tribal uprising in support o the ousted

Aghan Taliban regime and against the Pakistani militarys ingress into FATA,

there is little question that it was the Pakistani establishments nurturing o

domestic militants since the 1980s, and a lingering sense that some o them could

be used as strategic assets, that explains the spread and sustainability o the

Islamist groups operating against the Pakistani state today.31 Even since Septem-

ber 2001, Pakistan has continued to pick and choose avourites among Islamist

outfits and has only selectively targeted some while sparing, and even supporting,others.It has gone ater groups like the Pakistani Taliban and oreign groups like

al-Qaeda but has spared anti-Indian militant outfits and Aghan insurgent groups

on its soil.32 It ofcially pleads lack o capacity to broaden its counterterrorism

campaign, although international observers accuse the Pakistani establishment o

lacking the will to go ater elements it may still consider its strategic assets.

Pakistans Afghan policy 200112: new aims, old behaviour

Operationally, the emergence o domestic terrorism as the top priority has led to

acute unwillingness among Pakistani policymakers to sanction any action they

believe will urther energize violent domestic opposition. Perhaps most import-

antly or Pakistans relations with Aghanistan and the international community,

especially in the endgame phase, this has made Pakistan even more reluctant to

conront the Aghan Taliban sanctuaries. Pakistani planners believe that going

ater them militarily would not only turn them against the Pakistani state

thereby orcing them to shed their restraint on this countbut also earn extra

support or domestic militants. Meanwhile, the Aghan Government and inter-

national actors see the sanctuaries as one o the biggest, i not the biggest, con-

tributors to Aghanistans domestic instability.While Pakistan still wants to retain riendly, or at least not hostile, relations

with the Aghan Taliban, it no longer believes an outright Taliban victory is pos-

28 International Crisis Group (note 3), pp. 1415.29 See Basit (note 27), pp. 103, 12930.30 On the recruitment messages o the Pakistani Taliban and other rebel groups in FATA see Qazi, Rebels

o the rontier . . . (note 22).31 Rana, M. A., Post-9/11 developments and emergence o local Taliban groups, Rana, Sial and Basit

(note 27), pp. 6996. On the spread o violence in Pakistan since Sep. 2001 see Murphy (note 24), pp. 13759.32 See Siddiqa, A., Pakistans counterterrorism strategy: separating riends rom enemies, Washington

Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 1 (Feb. 2011), pp. 14962; and Tankel, S., Lashkar-e-Taiba in perspective: an evolvingthreat, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, Feb. 2010, pp. 34. On

Pakistans selective approach to militant groups see Yusu, M., A society on the precipice? examining theprospects o youth radicalization in Pakistan, M. Kugelman and R. M. Hathaway, Reaping the Dividend:

Overcoming Pakistans Demographic Challenges (Woodrow Wilson Press: Washington, DC, 2011), p. 94.


20/36


sible in Aghanistannor would it wish to see one. It ears that the Taliban taking

power once again in Aghanistan would give the Pakistani Talibans campaign a

moral and psychological boost, thereby acilitating the urther spread o their

ideology within Pakistan.33 In this regard, the establishment considers the Paki-

stani policy o the 1990s that actively backed the Talibans rise to power ablunder. 34

Furthermore, the change in power dynamics in Aghanistan and improved

ortunes o minority ethnic groups in the country have gradually convinced

Pakistani planners over the past decade that outright Taliban rule o Aghanistan

would not be tolerated. Supporting the Taliban in this aim would be tantamount

to uelling a resh civil war, and perhaps ensuring outright chaos in Aghanistan.

Fear o Aghanistans descent into chaos is a major actor in Pakistani planners

calculus. I the situation in Aghanistan breaks down into civil war they oresee

many dierent types o negative spillover, including (a) continuing unrest andinstability in Pakistans tribal border regions; (b) the Pakistani Taliban being

increasingly able to exploit the security vacuum and find reuge in Aghan border

areas (as they already have in the past year);35 (c) continued traction or the

Pakistani Talibans eorts to link themselves, at least ideologically, to the Aghan

Taliban; (d) a resh reugee influx rom Aghanistan adding to the already

1.7 million-strong Aghan reugee population in Pakistan;36 and (e) heightened

tensions between India and Pakistan as they back rival proxies in the fighting

that would ensue in Aghanistan in this scenario.

Once again, Pakistans vision o how such an outcome is to be avoided and

which actors have the most to contribute is very dierentand in act oten

opposedto that o the USA and the international community. The Pakistani

establishment believes that the most prudent way orward is an even-handed

Aghan reconciliation process inclusive o the Taliban actions present on its soil,

which would bring about a negotiated power-sharing arrangement in Aghani-

stan.37 The USA and much o the current ruling elite in Kabul, however, preerred

to weaken the Aghan Taliban insurgents and only reconcile with the remnants

who are amenable to the US vision or Aghanistans political uture.38

33 Weinbaum, M., What Pakistan seeks in Aghanistan, Foreign Policy Association blog, Middle EastInstitute, 20 Dec. 2012, .

34 Yusu, M., Yusu, H, and Zaidi, S., Pakistan, the United States, and the endgame in Aghanistan:perceptions o Pakistans oreign policy elite, Jinnah Institute and US Institute o Peace, 2011, , pp. 2123, 3035.35 Khan, T., TTP admits to having sae haven in Aghanistan,Express Tribune, 26 June 2012.36 UN High Commissioner or Reugees (UNHCR), Pakistan, UNHCR Global Appeal 20122013,

.37 Yusu, Yusu and Zaidi (note 34), pp. 23, 3032.38 This position was ormally elucidated by US Secretary o State Hillary Clinton in Feb. 2011. In what was

seen as a sotening in the US position, she suggested to the Taliban: Break ties with al-Qaida, renounce

violence, and abide by the Aghan constitution, and you can rejoin Aghan society; reuse and you willcontinue to ace the consequences o being tied to al-Qaida as an enemy o the international community. US

Department o State, Secretary o State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at the launch o the Asia Societysseries o Richard C. Holbrooke memorial addresses, New York, 18 Feb. 2011, .


21/36


The rivalry with India has aected Pakistans current Aghan policy in two

ways. Pakistan is concerned that the current power balance in Aghanistanwith

elements o the erstwhile Northern Alliance and Pashtun elements opposed to

the Taliban and unavourable to Pakistan in the ascendantis tipped in Indias

avour. The establishments recourse has been to maintain ties with the AghanTaliban actions on its soil. However, Pakistans goal is no longer to entirely

exclude India rom Aghanistan and to use Aghan territory to prick its rival

through subconventional warare. Rather, Pakistan seems reconciled with an

Indian development presence, exceptionally popular in Aghanistan as it is, but

wants to ensure that the Aghan context does not provide India the space to

pursue security-driven agendas against Pakistan.39

Even as this amounts to a moderation o Pakistans traditional goals, the policy

actions to achieve this remain security-centric. The establishment still seems to

be driven by what Pakistans liberally inclined intelligentsia has condemned assheer paranoia about regional developments.40 This suggests that Pakistan will

continue orgoing regional economic integration and the benefit rom potential

cooperation with India on investment ventures in Aghanistan. To be sure,

Indias Aghanistan strategy has also sought to undercut Pakistans influence; in

act, many in India would like to see their country take a more aggressive

approach to Aghanistan.41 There has thereore been little scope or cooperation

amid outright competition perpetuated by both sides.

As ar as the 2014 Aghan transition goes, then, Pakistan has been seeking to

retain ties and avoid hostility with the Aghan Talibanallowing them to con-

tinue operating rom Pakistan in the processbut without backing their outright

victory against the international troop presence and the Aghan authorities. The

Pakistani establishment has sought to operationalize this balance by pushing,

above all else, a vision o Aghan reconciliation that is heavily ocused on the

Taliban s inclusion as a significant player in Aghan politics.

The Aghan Government and Western countries, in particular, would preer a

political settlement in which the Taliban are just one o many groups that must

agree to play by democratic rules without any preerential treatment, and where

the current Aghan democratic process is central to any uture political tran-

sition. Pakistan does not oppose the continuity o Aghanistans democratictransitions. However, it has been seeking what it calls an inclusive reconciliation

process that allows or a meaningulas opposed to cosmeticTaliban presence.

It believes that in light o the military stalemate on the ground, the impending

drawdown o international orces, and the desire o the Aghan Talibans

39 Yusu, Yusu and Zaidi (note 34), pp. 3839.40 For the liberal critique o Pakistans ocial policy see e.g. Sirmed, M., Liberalization o strategic

depthI, Daily Times, 12 Sep. 2011; Sirmed, M., Liberalization o strategic depthII, Daily Times, 19 Sep.

2011; Taqi, M., Pakistans little Great Game, DailyTimes, 15 Sep. 2011; and Shafi, K., Pakistan is ours too,Express Tribune, 22 Sep. 2011.41 See Dasgupta, S., Post-2014 Aghanistan: Regional politics and the prospects or stability, US Institute

or Peace Special Report, orthcoming 2013; and Pant, H. V., Indias APak conundrum: South Asia in

flux, Orbis, vol. 57, no. 2 (winter 2012).


22/36


Pakistan-based leadership to gain political legitimacy, such a process would

naturally lead to a power-sharing arrangement.

Pakistani planners hope that this outcome would, in order o priority,

(a) prompt the Aghan Taliban to give up their sanctuaries in Pakistan without

Pakistan having to fight them; (b) keep the Aghan Taliban rom joining handswith the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban rom receiving a resh boost

rom a Taliban military victory in Aghanistan; (c) end or at least reduce the vio-

lence in Aghanistan and thereby prevent excessive spillover into Pakistan; and

(d) give Pakistan a non-hostile actor, i not a powerul partner, in Aghan politics

to buer against any troubling Indian ingress in Aghanistans southern and

eastern regions close to Pakistan. An inclusive reconciliation process, then, is

Pakistani planners silver bullet or satisying all o its three main policy drivers.


23/36

3. The logic behind Pakistans paradoxicalbehaviour in the endgame

Pakistans changed priorities and moderated objectives notwithstanding, its

approach achieved little in the first two years o the endgame. Until the summer

o 2012, the international community continued to question Pakistans sincerity

in opposing the insurgency in Aghanistan. Pakistan seemed to be holding out

against virtually all other important players in the Aghan endgame; it was

reviled, cornered and made acutely aware o the prospects o international isol-

ation.

A puzzling aspect o Pakistani strategy was the apparent mismatch between its

moderated objectives and policy actions that oten seemed aggressive, destabil-

izing and at times very similar to the Pakistani tactics o yesteryear. At least roma Western point o view, Pakistan continued to come across as a spoiler in

Aghanistan. Two aspects o its policy during this period stand out as seeming

contradictions to the moderated Pakistani vision.

First, i Pakistan desired a political reconciliation processeven i it had very

specific and narrow ideas about what such a process ought to look likeit might

have been expected to eagerly assist in bringing the Taliban leaders on its soil to

the negotiating table. In reality, until the latter part o 2012, Pakistani eorts in

this direction were ew and ar between. Much more requent, in act, were

reports o Pakistan undermining other stakeholders eorts to establish contactwith the Aghan Taliban.

Second, there was an inherent tension between Pakistans desire to avoid

lingering instability and chaos in Aghanistan and its reluctance to tackle the

Aghan Taliban sanctuaries that are the cause o much violence across the

Durand Line. In reality, both o these apparently paradoxical aspects o Pakistani

behaviour were deliberate policy choices in pursuit o an inclusive reconciliation

in Aghanistanwithin the constraints o post-2011 realities.

Mixed messages on reconciliation

Pakistans reluctance to proactively support negotiations with the Taliban can be

best explained by the centrality o the US presence in Aghanistan in the minds o

Pakistani policymakers and the disconnect between the Pakistani and US posi-

tions on the way orward. Both the USA and Pakistan, like other external actors,

have wanted an end to the Aghan insurgency or some time. However, Pakistan

has long believed that that the situation on the ground is unlikely to move beyond

a military stalemate. At the start o the endgame, Pakistani planners postulated

that the longer the military campaign continued without a clear plan to negotiate

politically, the longer the instability in Aghanistan would persist and the moreboxed in Pakistan would become. The US position at the time was undamentally

dierent: while the idea o talking to the Taliban was integral to the USAs


24/36


endgame strategycontacts were made starting in 201042the troop surge was

essentially meant to weaken the Aghan Taliban leadership and wean o their

middle- and lower-ranking cadres. I the surge had succeeded in irreversibly

weakening the Taliban, it would have orced the Taliban to negotiate rom a

position o weakness.This disconnect meant that the Pakistani establishment never trusted the

USAs commitment to the cause o even-handed and meaningul reconciliation

with the Taliban. The establishment responded by holding back its own cards in

terms o acilitating US contacts with the Taliban. What Pakistan sought was a

clear and detailed road map rom the USA on how the military and political

tracks o its strategy would complement each other. Pakistan also wanted a

central role in any negotiation process; it saw this as the only way to saeguard its

interests among actors who may otherwise, it elt, try to minimize its role and

ignore its concerns in an Aghan settlement. The USA was equally distrustul oPakistan. As a result, it wanted to explore any possibilities o talking to the

Taliban directly (even as it wished to convince the Taliban to overcome their

reluctance to talk to the Aghan Government directly), not through or with

Pakistan.43

Pakistan and the USA ended up playing a game o chicken between 2010 and

2012. Every time the USA was unable to deliver the road map or its fight-and-

talk strategy or established direct contacts with any Taliban actions based in

Pakistan, Pakistans suspicions only grew and it became even less cooperative.44

For the USA, this was proo that Pakistan was still only interested in using the

Taliban as proxies or its traditional agendas. The end result was that both sides

continued their policiesthe USA with its poorly defined fight-and-talk strategy,

led by the military surge, and Pakistan arguing or its vision o reconciliation. As

one leading American expert put it, Pakistans decision makers never did see

reason to rush into endgame talks that they cannot control or predict.45

Leaving the sanctuaries alone

Pakistans policy on the Aghan Taliban sanctuaries remains unaltered even

today. Three actors explain Pakistans tolerance and support or the Aghan Tali-ban sanctuaries despite their obvious role in destabilizing Aghanistan.

42 There were contacts between US and Taliban interlocutors in 2010 and then through German-sponsored talks in 201011. Rashid, A., The truth behind Americas Taliban talks, A-list blog, 29 June 2011,

. See also Hossal, R.,Talking with the Taliban: a timeline, 20 Jan. 2012, .43 Bajoria, J., Gauging USTaliban talks, interview with Steve Coll, President o the New America

Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 Feb. 2011, .

44

US Secretary o State Clintons Feb. 2011 Asia Society speech (note 38) is considered the first ormalmention o the so-called fight-and-talk strategy towards the Taliban. The terms talk, fight, and build were

used subsequently. Yusuzai, R., US looking to negotiate with the Taliban, Newsline, 30 Jan.2012, .

45 Coll, S. What does Pakistan want?,New Yorker, 29 Mar. 2012.


25/36

THE LOGIC BEHIND PAKISTAN S PARADOXICAL BEHAVIOUR 15

First, and most important, is the perceived link between the sanctuaries and

domestic militancy. The authors conversations with a wide spectrum o

Pakistani stakeholders have confirmed that there is a genuine belie within the

establishment that the state does not have the capacity to tackle the militancy

problem in a comprehensive manner. Besides the Pakistani Taliban, domesticmilitants include a plethora o sectarian and anti-Indian militant groups, some o

which have splintered and turned against the state while others are allowed to

operate relatively reely as long as they do not attack the state.46 In this context,

the Aghan Taliban sanctuaries are seen as a hornets nest, disturbing which

could bring a major backlash within Pakistan. The militarys constant pleas o its

inability to root out the sanctuaries by orce, then, are more than mere blu. 47

The second consideration in Pakistans policy on the sanctuaries is fiercely

Machiavellian. The predominant tactic seems to be turning a blind eye to Aghan

Taliban activitiesan I dont touch youyou dont touch me policy. In the past,the Pakistani military has even concluded ormal peace deals with anti-US

groups afliated with the Haqqani network.48 In addition, however, the intelli-

gence complex has been repeatedly accused o supporting targeted attacks

against Aghan, Western and Indian targets in Aghanistan.49 US ofcials have

even openly berated the ISI or providing operational guidance to the Haqqani

network.50

Finally, avoiding actions that may turn the Aghan Taliban against the Pakistani

state is also part o a classic hedging strategy. Aghanistans descent into chaos

remains a possibility and a potent threat. Pakistan does not want to alienate the

Taliban actions as in the last resort both might need to cooperate in a potential

civil war scenario in Aghanistan.

Pakistans approach to the sanctuaries to date has urthered its primary

interest in an inclusive negotiation process in Aghanistan. De acto and de jure,

it has kept US costs in Aghanistan high enough that the USA would ultimately

46 Siddiqa (note 32).47 Pakistani Army, Ten years since 9/11: our collective experience (Pakistans perspective), reproduced in

Coll (note 45). For an analysis reflective o the ocial thinking on this issue see Azal, S. N., NorthWaziristan: the death trap, Spearhead Research, 29 Dec. 2010, .

48 Perhaps the most prominent o these is the Muqami Taliban, a group ounded by Hafiz Gulabadur andMaulvi Nazir, pro-Aghan Taliban militants who ought against US orces in Aghanistan but struck a deal

with the Pakistani state, first to oust the Uzbek and Arab fighters rom their FATA strongholds and then tochallenge the Pakistani Taliban. Maulvi Nazir was recently killed in a US drone attack in FATA. Wazir, H.,

U.S. drone strike kills key Pakistan Taliban commander: sources, Reuters, 3 Jan. 2013.49 See e.g. Roggio, B., ISI supported attack on US embassy, ISAF HQ in Kabul, Long War Journal, Threat

Matrix blog, 22 Sep. 2011, .

50 The most prominent o these statements came rom Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman o the USJoint Chies o Staf, when he called the Haqqani network a veritable arm o the ISI in a hearing beore the

US Congress. Haqqani network is a veritable arm o ISI: Mullen, Dawn, 22 Sep. 2011. See also Waldman,M., The Sun in the Sky: the relationship between Pakistans ISI and Aghan insurgents, Crisis States

Research Centre, Discussion Paper no. 18, June 2010, ; and the BBC documentary series Secret Pakistan, first

aired in Oct. 2011.


26/36


have to give up any hope o military domination and consider it necessary to

negotiate with the Taliban relatively even-handedly.

The flip side: good faith and cooperation with the USA

Some aspects o Pakistani behaviour suggest, however, that its planners are being

careul not to overplay their hand with regard to the sanctuaries lest the USA

turn against Pakistan or abandon Aghanistan altogether without any prospect o

a political deal. Pakistani interlocutors have repeatedly warned the USA not to

leave Aghanistan without setting in motion a process leading to a sustainable

political and security structure.51

This is perhaps why the ISI, in parallel to allowing the sanctuaries to remain

operational, has also orced the Aghan Taliban in the sanctuaries to curb their

activities, especially at times when external pressure to do so has increased orone reason or another. It has also arrested a significant number o Aghan

Taliban, including some key figures, over the years.52 In what may be urther

evidence o sensitivity to US red lines, Pakistan has emphasized its all-out

support or the USA against the al-Qaeda presence in Pakistan. It has allowed the

USA considerable leeway or direct action against al-Qaeda and Aghan Taliban

actions through special orces operations and drone strikes in FATA (even i

Pakistans public stance has been unequivocal disapproval o drone strikes);53 and

it has provided intelligence cooperation on targets in FATA and on any leads

dealing with threats to Western homelands.54

In sum, Pakistans paradoxical behaviour could be seen as a undamentally

high-risk approach aimed at prioritizing the establishments preerred vision o

an Aghan reconciliation process without Pakistan having to act against the

Aghan Taliban or to cope with an even greater domestic militancy problem.

Since the Pakistani establishment believes that this will move Aghanistan

beyond its current impasse while protecting Pakistans sel-defined interests, it

has opposed, and its actions have undermined, any developments during the end-

game that could interere with this primary objective.

51 Hussain (note 19), p. 5.52 Syed, B., Pakistan to consult Aghans beore reeing Taliban,Dawn, 9 Feb. 2013.53 It must be noted that much o the Pakistani cooperation in terms o allowing US direct action on

Pakistani soil has been clandestine and limited to targets in FATA or Quetta and its vicinity. This is why thepublicly acknowledged US raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on 2 May 2011 created such a

major uproar in Pakistan.54 Based on the authors of-the-record conversations with Pakistani military ocials and experts privy to

closed-door briefings. In 1 inormal meeting in 2011, a military ocial presented to a private gathering ojournalists a list o joint operations conducted by Pakistan and the USA against the Quetta Shura presence in

and around Quetta.


27/36

4. Approaching the ISAF withdrawal: what hasPakistan achieved?

Even i the paradoxes in the Pakistani position in the endgame are based on some

kind o logic, the strategy seemed to have brought it no closer to achieving its

desired end state in Aghanistan by the beginning o 2012. Not only was Pakistan

singled out as a major problem in Aghanistan by the international media, but it

also became amply clear that the appetite among Western governments and

publics to continue investing in a heavy physical ootprint to stabilize Aghani-

stan had all but disappeared. In act, support or a precipitous withdrawal began

to grow.55 This could hardly be acceptable to Pakistani planners. They see the

current Aghan leadership as a clique who are not only unavourable towards

Pakistan but will continue to be resisted violentlyto the detriment o Aghani-stan, Pakistan and the USAunless there is a political deal involving the Taliban.

Announcing the strategic shift

Fearing such an outcome, in early 2012 the Pakistani establishment began to

publicly claim a strategic shit in its thinking on Aghanistan. Rather remarkably

by Pakistani standards, the Foreign Ofce took the lead on public presentation o

this claimed shit, with the military staying in the background.56

Perhaps driven by the obvious realization o the impasse with the USA,Pakistan attempted to convince regional actors and the Aghan Government that

it was no longer pursuing strategic depth in Aghanistan. It also began explaining

its rationale or an inclusive reconciliation process. Pakistan made diplomatic

eorts to win appreciation and support or its stance rom countries like Iran, the

Central Asian republics, China, Russia and Turkey.57

Perhaps the most extraordinary move in terms o regional outreach, one that

helped lend credibility to Pakistans appeals, was its eort to directly engage with

political actors o the ormer Northern Alliance actions, despite their long-

standing enmity. The move was prompted by Pakistans realization that it stood

isolated on the Aghan question and needed to broaden its narrow set o contacts

in the country i it was to have any chance o being accepted as an interlocutor by

the Aghans. Also, since Pakistans ideal outcome was a power-sharing arrange-

ment in Kabul, it needed to at least signal its willingness to open up to major

Aghan political actors who would likely be part o the post-2014 set-up.

55 Not only is there public support or a rapid exit in many Western countries but even institutions likethe US Congress have spoken in avour o a precipitous end to the war. As recently as Nov. 2012 the US

Senate passed a resolution calling or an accelerated withdrawal rom Aghanistan. Cassata, D., Senate backsaster US withdrawal rom Aghanistan, Associated Press, 30 Nov. 2012.

56

Pakistans oreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, took the lead in promoting Pakistans new outlook byconducting high-profile visits to India and Aghanistan. The Foreign Oce, however, remained unable to

assert a vision that difered rom that o the establishment. See Gul, I., Missed opportunities, Friday Times,22 Mar. 2013.

57 Yusu, Yusu and Zaidi (note 34), p. 36.


28/36


While low-key contacts had been made or some time between Pakistani

military figures and diplomats and the northern actions, Pakistan made it a point

to publicize its outreach on the occasion o a visit to Kabul by its oreign minister,

Hina Rabbani Khar, in February 2012.58 Special note was made o a number o

meetings with non-Pashtun Aghan opposition leaders during the visit. Thisdiplomacy was kept up in a ollow-up trip by the Pakistani prime minister, Raja

Pervaiz Ashra, later in the year.59 There has been little public inormation about

these contacts since then, but they seem to be continuing.60 The mistrust between

Pakistan and non-Pashtun Aghan leaders is too deep to be overcome by a ew

meetings. More important rom Pakistans perspective, perhaps, was the symbol-

ism and the signal that it was willing to move beyond its strictly ethno-centric

approach to Aghanistan and work with a broader set o actors in the uture.

Will desperation make reconciliation happen after all?

For the most part, Pakistans moves rom early 2012 attracted appreciation and

cautious optimism rom the international community, including the USA. How-

ever, the act still remained that no robust reconciliation process was in place.

Crucial time was lost in 2011 and much o 2012 due to the ragility o Pakistani

US relations and increasing tensions between Aghanistan and Pakistan and

between Aghanistan and the USA.61 The AghanUS troubles were predomin-

antly over US counterinsurgency tactics and the USAs dissatisaction with the

Karzai administrations governance and corruption scandals.

Nevertheless, even as the impasse continued, the persistence o the Aghan

Taliban-led insurgency led to a virtual consensus among the key players that a

military victory in Aghanistan is impossible and that the Aghan Taliban actions

in Pakistan have to be brought into a political solution. While the role o policy

ailures and negative developments within Aghanistan has been centraland

has oten been downplayed by Western media and observersthe violence

originating rom the sanctuaries has been significant in denting the prospects o a

military victory in Aghanistan. It is amply clear that the Taliban will be entering

the negotiations on an even ooting, i not rom a position o relative strength.

58 Vogt, H. and Abbot, S., New Pakistan outreach could aid Aghan peace deal, Associated Press, 27 Oct.

2012.59 Vogt and Abbot (note 58).60 Pakistans continued outreach to the northern action leaders was confirmed in a recent of-the-record

briefing to journalists by a senior Pakistani military ocer, Rawal Pindi, Mar. 2013.61 In addition to the impasse over the way orward on Aghanistan, the PakistaniUS relationship was hit

by a series o crises in 2011. A US contractor killed 2 Pakistani citizens in Lahore in Jan.; the US conducted

the unilateral raid that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad on 2 May; Admiral Mullens accusation aboutthe Haqqani network being the veritable arm o the ISI came in Sep. (see note 50); and a US attack on a

Pakistani border post at Salala killed 24 Pakistani security personnel in Nov. For a timeline o tension-inducing developments see Pak-US timeline 2011present, Jinnah Institute, , accessed 30 Apr. 2013.


29/36

AP PR OACH IN G TH E IS AF WI TH DR AWAL 19

Inclusive reconciliation gains support

Recent events suggest that the Pakistani establishment may have waited out

everyone long enough to see its version o reconciliation being entertained. As

Pakistan has rushed to find regional support or its position, others have been justas eager to break the impasse blocking an overarching Aghan settlement. With

desperation only increasing among all o the key actors, including Pakistan, there

are renewed eorts to re-energize the reconciliation track.

In December 2012 there were publicly acknowledged meetings between Tali-

ban interlocutors and representatives o the Aghan Government. This was a

departure or the Taliban, whose ormal position was that it would not negotiate

with the Karzai administration.62 The stalled Qatar process initiated in 2011 by

the USA, in which the Taliban would be allowed to maintain an ofce in Doha or

reconciliation talks, has also ound renewed support.63

Unlike in 2011, when theAghan Government and Pakistan had shown reservations about the Qatar pro-

cess, both have now publicly called on the Taliban to negotiate sincerely through

the Doha ofce.64

Moreover, the USA and Pakistan have set up a contact group to work

specifically on arranging sae passage or the Taliban interlocutors to participate

in talks with the Aghan Government in Kabul. Linked to this eort, the United

Nations Security Council allowed exemptions to its long-standing travel restric-

tions on Taliban members in December 2012.65 In February 2013 the Aghan,

British and Pakistani premiers also met and agreed on an ambitiousand quite

obviously unrealisticsix-month deadline to reach a peace deal with the Tali-

ban.66 The USA has been vocal in its backing o such decisions. It seems content

with deerring a lead role to others and has continuously stressed its goal o

putting the Aghan Government in the lead in any negotiations with the

Taliban.67

Pakistan has responded with conciliatory measures o its own. A flurry o visits

and contacts between Aghan and Pakistani ofcials was ollowed by the release

o 18 Aghan Taliban prisoners in Pakistani custody in November 2012 and

another 8 in December.68 The prisoner release is no minor development. These

prisoners were potential Taliban interlocutors who had been jealously guardedby Pakistan as bargaining chips to ensure its relevance in any peace process. As a

62 Adeel, M., Aghan peace council meets Taliban in Paris Conerence, Khaama Press, 17 Dec. 2012,.

63 US mum over reported Taliban oce in Qatar Fox News, 12 Sep. 2011, ; and Taliban opens oce in Qatar,

United Press International, 16 Jan. 2013, .64 Agence France-Presse, Pakistan, Aghan, UK leaders urge Taliban to enter into dialogue Dawn,

4 Feb. 2013.65 UN Security Council Resolution 2082, 17 Dec. 2012; and U.N. makes it easier or blacklisted Taliban to

travel or peace talks, Reuters, 17 Dec. 2012.66 Agence France-Presse (note 64).67 US supports PakAghan deadline or Taliban deal,Dawn, 6 Feb. 2013.68 Gray, D. D. and Shah, A., Aghan negotiator hopes release o 8 Taliban prisoners by Pakistan will

urther peace process, Associated Press, 1 Jan. 2013.


30/36


ollow-up, Pakistan has promised uture releases and agreed to give the Aghan

Government a say in their timing and manner.69

Interestingly, the international community has taken a much more conciliatory

tone towards Pakistan in recent months, praising it or its assistance to urther

the peace process, even though there have been parallel calls or greater actionagainst Aghan militants and finger pointing between Aghanistan and Pakistan

has continued. Reportedly, Western ofcials have also assured Pakistan in recent

negotiations that its concerns will not be overlooked i it supports the negotiation

process. Pakistani ofcials are now openly calling or a quick peace deal with the

Aghan Taliban insurgents.70

Perhaps most instructive is the change in tone and substance o some o the

reconciliation plans that have been worked out behind the scenes over the past

ew months. There seems to be a growing convergence on handling Aghanistans

political uture in a manner that is much closer to the Pakistani vision than theinternational community was willing to consider at the beginning o the

endgame.

One example is the Peace Process Roadmap to 2015 plan produced by the

Aghan High Peace Council, a body tasked by President Karzai with urthering

the political reconciliation agenda in Aghanistan. Even though it was only a drat

document, the plan did give significant insight into the shit in thinking on

reconciliation within the Aghan Government. Leaked in November 2012, it

aorded Pakistan its much desired role as the principal party responsible or

arranging talks with the Taliban.71 The plan called or a proactive reconciliation

process in 2013 and or the Taliban to have a say in the ISAF withdrawal rom

Aghanistan. While the Aghan Taliban insurgents would join the political main-

stream, including contesting elections, they would be accorded a share in the

power structure o the state, to include non-elected positions at dierent levels.72

The importance o this plan is not necessarily the probability o its successit

was greeted with extreme scepticism among Western observers and little has

been heard o it sincebut the change in mindset it represents in Kabul and

other capitals.73 Ater years o maximalist bargaining, intransigence and ailure to

converge on strategies by all sides, it is the overall reocusing on reconciliation in

Aghanistan in the past ew months that is undamentally dierent.

The challenge ahead

None o this is to gloss over the very real difculties that continue to ace eorts

to build political bridges in Aghanistan. Despite all sides attempting to find

69 Syed (note 52).70 Yousa, K., Push or Aghan peace: Ankara summit to look aresh at Taliban oce plan, Express

Tribune, 10 Dec. 2012.71 For the available details o the plan see Landay, J. S., Aghanistan peace plan would increase Pakistans

role, McClatchy Newspapers, 8 Dec. 2012, .72 Landay (note 71).73 For a Western perspective on the plan see Chayes, S., Aghanistan's roadmap to the past, Carnegie

Endowment or International Peace, 31 Dec. 2012, .


31/36

AP PR OACH IN G TH E IS AF WI TH DR AWAL 21

common ground, relations between Aghanistan and Pakistan and between

Aghanistan and the USA remain tense. President Karzai has adopted an

extremely nationalist tone and has repeatedly accused the USA o exacerbating

his countrys problems.74 He also insists that his government should be seen as

the sole representative o the Aghan people in negotiations with the Taliban, notas an equal party.75 Ironically, even Pakistani Foreign Ofce ofcials have publicly

described Karzai as an obstacle to reconciliation in recent months.76 The end

result is that serious reconciliation talks are still not underway and the Talibans

Qatar presence remains underutilized.77

However divided the main stakeholders still seem to be, the Aghan endgame

has reached a stage where any hope o a peaceul transition depends on them

abandoning their more Machiavellian aims. All key actors now seem to agree on

some key points: that the 2014 drawdown is inevitable; that Aghanistan risks

much greater instability i this deadline passes with no political reconciliationprocess in place; that Aghanistans descent into chaos would have negative spill-

over eects or its neighbours and a revival o proxy conrontation; and that the

interested parties have hardly anything to show or past eorts at reconciliation.

It is only natural, thereore, that their respective positions should begin to soten.

It is this common desperationor, to put it bluntly, the ear o total ailure in

Aghanistanthat makes the recent developments more hopeul than those o

the past. To be sure, there is still no guarantee that a successul reconciliation

process will be put in place and seen through to its conclusion; there is, however,

greater convergence on the need to sincerely attempt this than ever beore.

74 Knox, O., Karzai blames NATO, U.S. or violence, corruption in Aghanistan, Yahoo News, The Ticket

blog, 6 Dec. 2012, . Recent outbursts and allegations by President Karzai have rustrated the USA. For an appreciation o

the rustration in Washington see Gelb, L., To hell with Karzai, Daily Beast, 12 Mar. 2013, .

75

Ruttig, T., The Qatar oce conundrum: Karzais quest or control over Taleban talks, AghanistanAnalysts Network blog, 5 Apr. 2013, .76 Zahra-Malik, M., Pakistan sees Aghanistans Karzai as obstacle to peace with Taliban, Reuters,

24 Mar. 2013.77 Nordland, R., Peace envoys rom Taliban at loose ends in Qatar,New York Times, 9 Apr. 2013.


32/36

5. Conclusions and the way forward

Assessing how genuine Pakistans strategic shit is depends on the baseline

against which Pakistans current behaviour is compared. I it is Pakistans aggres-sive push or strategic depth and its purely ethno-centric approach, the shit is

real and tangible. Pakistan no longer wishes or outright Taliban rule in Aghani-

stan. It does, however, want the Taliban to be given meaningul representation in

a political reconciliation process that would allow them post-2014 political space.

This implies that Pakistan accepts that it must work with a broader set o Aghan

stakeholdersboth Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The Pakistani establishment has

also moderated its goal rom shutting India out o Aghanistan altogether to one

o ensuring that India is not able to stir up trouble within Pakistan or help create

a hostile Aghan dispensation.

The real change, however, has not been in Pakistans actionswhich still seem

highly destabilizing to an outside observerbut in the principal driver o Paki-

stans behaviour: domestic instability. The act that Pakistans policies remain

troubling to the Aghan Government and the West, and its ailure to act

decisively against the Aghan Taliban presence in Pakistan, are primarily because

o the domestic repercussions it ears rom going ater the sanctuaries, and its

desire to create a scenario whereby the Taliban are willing to return to

Aghanistan through a political deal.

Overall, Pakistans shit is more accurately represented as a moderation, rather

than a transormation, o its mindset. Its most recent overtures and claims o astrategic shit are simply what it sees as the most eective way to pursue its

objectives in a somewhat changedeven desperatecontext as ar as the Aghan

endgame in concerned.

There is little reason or Pakistani planners to congratulate themselves on the

situation today. The Pakistani establishments stakes have been kept alive in the

Aghan endgame, but it can hardly be comortable with the strategic repercus-

sions o its moves. The 1990s saw an outright tactical victory or Pakistan, only to

be ollowed by a massive strategic blowback rom its actions. The onus is on the

Pakistani establishment to avoid a repeat o this. The good news is that there is aclearly discernible dierence between the Pakistani establishments body

language today and that in the pre-September 2001 days: it now seems to be more

worried about the threat o chaos in Aghanistan than excited about the

prospects o a tactical victory.78

78 Authors impression based on conversations with Pakistan military and oreign oce ocials betweenMar. 2012 and Mar. 2013.


33/36

CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD 23

The way forward

ISAF cannot weaken the Taliban insurgency irreversibly in the months let

beore its scheduled withdrawal. There is thereore no option but to push

orward the agenda o reconciliation with the Aghan Taliban.All o the main actorsthe Aghan Government; Aghan political actions

including the Taliban; Pakistan; and the USAnow need to agree and accept a

ormula to move ahead with reconciliation. The multiple, competing eorts to

woo the Taliban into talks that have been pursued or too long have only

increased suspicions among these actors. Whatever process is ultimately chosen

must have the blessing o all actors and must be allowed to unction reely within

the parameters laid out.

The greatest possibility or success will be through a truly Aghan-led and

Aghan-owned process. Pakistan, the USA and other external actors should onlyput orth their absolute non-negotiablesand these should be minimalas they

allow Aghan representatives to negotiate directly.

Pakistan has traditionally been the most aggressive o the regional actors; now

that the Talibans presence in talks is likely to be meaningul, it must accept that

its role is no more than a acilitator that constantly prods the hardliners among

the Taliban to accept power sharing as the optimal outcome. The world, too,

must not expect Pakistan to deliver more than this.

I the Taliban do find political space in post-2014 Aghanistan, Pakistans most

important service would be to apply constant pressure on the Taliban leadership

to moderate its views. A moderated Aghan Taliban will not only benefit Aghan

politics but will also have a desirable spin-o eect in terms o denting support

or the Pakistani Taliban, who continue to cite their ideological afnity with their

Aghan counterparts to gain traction.

To achieve this, Pakistan must accept moderate Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in

Aghanistan as its partners. It must continue expanding its nascent contacts with

the ormer Northern Alliance actions in Aghanistan. This is all the more

important given that Pakistan is vying or an inclusive set-up in Aghanistan that

will necessarily involve representation rom all major actions.

Pakistan and the USA must come to some agreement on the issue o Aghanmilitant sanctuaries on Pakistani soil. As long as Pakistan does not conront the

Aghan Taliban actions using the sanctuaries, but denies the USA a ree hand to

do so, this divergence will be irreconcilable. Common ground may be ound with

an understanding under which Pakistan agrees to pressure the Aghan Taliban to

cease their attacks on Aghan and international orces and civilians while peace

talks are happening. Presumably, this would also involve a commitment rom the

USA to reciprocate with a localized ceasefire. Tools such as drone strikes would

then only be used against Taliban actions i they breached their commitment.

On India, there is a need to transorm the current IndianPakistani com-petition into cooperation in the Aghan context. Specifically, two dialogues need

to be initiated between the two sides: on intelligence and on development. The

intelligence dialogue could allay mutual ears o the rationales and motives


34/36


behind their political and security activities in Aghanistan. The two intelligence

communities could institute a verifiable mechanism to address each others con-

cerns.79 The development dialogue could seek ways to cooperate on or readjust

development activities in Aghanistan. Concentrating Indian investment activity

in the north and west o the country could help to allay Pakistani suspicionsabout Indian projects near its border. Given Indias post-2014 vulnerability in

Pashtun-dominated areas close to the Pakistani border, India may be willing to

accept this.80

Pakistan must continue exploring avenues to expand its economic ootprint in

Aghanistan, even as security concerns dominate its approach in the run-up to

December 2014. Commendably, AghanPakistani trade has risen sharply in

recent years.81 However, there is still huge untapped potential or these two

geographically contiguous and intricately connected countries, with relative

reedom o movement across their shared border. The Aghan Government isalready pitching to attract resh investment ater 2014 and the Pakistani private

sector would do well to explore aordable options. As economic activity in

Aghanistan increases, the country also remains a highly attractive destination

or Pakistani services and labour.82

Finally, the international community cannot be satisfied with merely blaming

Pakistan or the ailure in Aghanistan. Its approach to Pakistan has defied one o

the undamentals o realpolitik: it has conflated the doable with the desirable.

Rather than internalizing Pakistans sel-defined outlook towards the region and

its establishments vision or Aghanistan, and then crating appropriate and rele-

vant incentives to mould its behaviour in a desirable direction, external actors

have sought to redirect Pakistani thinking through means they believe should

appeal to its leaders, not what would actually be attractive to a Pakistani strategic

calculus.83 Monetary rewards and promises o long-term support have been

prioritized over actions to address Pakistans regional insecurities. It is too late to

go back to the drawing board on these. In the next two years, however, the

international community should at least avoid any developments that may orce

Pakistani planners to reverse their recent enthusiasm towards supporting recon-

ciliation eorts in Aghanistan.

79 Yusu, M. and Lynch, T., IndiaPakistan dynamic holds key to Aghanistans uture, CNN World,

29 Nov. 2012, .

80 Yusu and Lynch (note 79).81 PakistaniAghan bilateral trade increased rom $170 million in 20002001 to $1.49 billion in 2008

2009 and to approximately $2.5 billion in 201011. Pakistan Institute

Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan

Documents

Transcript of Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan