Decision Markets With Good Incentives
description
Transcript of Decision Markets With Good Incentives
![Page 1: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
DECISION MARKETS WITH GOOD INCENTIVES
Yiling Chen (Harvard), Ian Kash (Harvard), Internet and Network Economics,2011.
![Page 2: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Prediction Markets
Project Manager
• Markets used for prediction the outcome of an event
?
![Page 3: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Decision Markets• Using (prediction) markets for decision making.• For example: Deciding between hiring Alice or Bob.
Project Manager
?
![Page 4: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Decision Markets• Decision maker creates two conditional prediction
markets: #1: Will we complete testing on time ?| Alice is hired --- 0.66 #2: Will we complete testing on time ?| Bob is hired --- 0.44
Project Manager
?0.660.44
![Page 5: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Decision Markets• DM considers the final prediction (0.44,0.66), then
chooses action according to a decision rule :• For example: MAX Decision Rule – choose the Action with greater
probability to achieve the desired outcome
Project Manager
?0.660.44
![Page 6: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Decision Markets• DM waits for the outcome.• DM pays the experts according to:
• Final prediction (0.44,0.66)• Action (Hiring Alice)• Outcome (Testing completed on time )
Testing completed on time Testing delayed project DD
![Page 7: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Decision Market - Definition• Prediction market is a special case of decision market.• Both use the same sequential market structure.• Decision market uses a decision rule to pick from a set of
actions before the outcome is observed.• Which action is chosen may affect the likelihood an
outcome occurs.
Testing completed on time ? 0.660.44
Sequential Market yields final prediction
Decision Maker chooses an action
An outcome occurs Scoring the experts
![Page 8: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
OutlineWhat are Decision Markets
explanationModel: notations and definitionsProblem with myopic incentives
Incentive in Decision MarketsDecision Scoring rules Existence of a strictly proper decision marketNecessity of full support in decision scoring rules
Optimal Decision Markets Suggestions
![Page 9: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Model: Assumptions • About experts and the market:
• Experts can only observe prior predictions before making their own.
• After the market ends, a final, consensus prediction is made.• Experts are utility driven – no extern incentives.
• About Decision making:• Decision maker chooses only one action.• *Decision maker can draw an action stochastically.• The method of decision can be described as a function
![Page 10: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Model: Notations and DefinitionsFrom prediction markets:• O – set of possible outcomes.
{finished on time, did not finish on time}• ∆(O) – set of probability distribution over outcomes.• pt ∆(O) –prediction made at round t.
• Scoring Rule: A function for scoring a prediction p ∆(O) ,according to outcome o* O .• a shorthand:
![Page 11: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Model: Notations and Definitions (2)For Decision Market: new!• A - finite set of actions
{Hiring Alice, Hiring Bob}• ∆(O) |A | - set of conditional distributions, one for each action.
• Each expert predicts outcome for each and every action.• The market is being held simultaneously for all actions.
• Pt ∆(O) |A | – prediction made at round t (for all actions).• ∆(O) |A | - final report.
![Page 12: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Model: Notations and Definitions (3)• Decision Rule: A function
• D() - Applied to the final report • ∆(A) – is a set of distributions: drawing an action a* from A• Shorthands:
• d – the distribution over all actions• da
– the likelihood action a is drawn from the set A• Examples:
• MAX:
Note that D() is a distribution. We will show that it is necessary for creating myopic incentive compatibility.
![Page 13: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Decision Market Model1) The market opens.• P0
∆(O) |A| – Initial Prediction in the market.• Pt
∆(O) |A| –Prediction at round t.2) The market closes at round , last prediction is .3) Decision maker applies the decision rule: D( 4) Decision maker draws a single action a* according to d.5) The outcome o* is revealed.6) Decision maker pays the experts. How?
![Page 14: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
OutlineWhat are Decision Markets
explanationModel: notations and definitionsProblem with myopic incentives
Incentive in Decision MarketsDecision Scoring rules Existence of a strictly proper decision marketNecessity of full support in decision scoring rules
Optimal Decision Markets Suggestions
![Page 15: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Decision Market Model1) The market opens.• P0
∆(O) |A| – Initial Prediction in the market.• Pt
∆(O) |A| –Prediction at round t.2) The market closes at round , last prediction is .3) Decision maker applies the decision rule: D( 4) Decision maker draws a single action a* according to d.5) The outcome o* is revealed.6) Decision maker pays the experts. How?
Apply a scoring rule for the selected action
![Page 16: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
So, What Is the Problem? Consider the following scenario:• Decision maker creates a Decision market for choosing
Alice or Bob.• Decision rule: MAX (i.e., market maker hires the
candidate with better predicted probability)• Payment method: experts are paid after the candidate is
hired, and the outcome is revealed , according to the scoring rule.
Testing completed on time ? 0.660.44
Sequential Market yields final prediction
Decision Maker chooses an action
An outcome occurs Scoring the experts
![Page 17: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
So, What Is the Problem? (2) • Current Market values at some round t:
• Alice: 0.2• Bob: 0.8
• An expert with belief (Alice: 0.75,Bob: 0.8) enters the market.
• What will be the expert’s prediction?A. (Alice:0.75,Bob:0.8) raise Alice’s market value to 0.75.B. (Alice:0.81,Bob:0.8) Raise Alice’s market value to 0.81.C. (Alice:0.75,Bob:0.74) Lower Bob’s market value to 0.74 and
raise Alice’s to 0.75
![Page 18: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
So, What Is the Problem? (2) • Current Market values:
• Alice: 0.2• Bob: 0.8
• An expert with belief (Alice: 0.75,Bob: 0.8) enters the market.
• What will be the expert’s prediction?A. raise Alice’s market value to 0.75.B. Raise Alice’s market value to 0.81.C. Lower Bob’s market value to 0.74 and raise Alice’s to 0.75.D. Do not participate.
![Page 19: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
So, What Is the Problem? (3)A. Truthful reporting:
• The expert raises Alice’s market value to 0.75• Decision maker chooses Bob (has prob. 0.8)• Expert get nothing (he doesn’t own Bob shares)
B. Overbuying Alice:• The expert raises Alice’s market value to 0.81• Decision maker chooses Alice (has prob. 0.81)• Expert’s payment:
• Raising from 0.2 to 0.75: Positive• Raising from 0.75 to 0.81: Negative• Overall: Positive
![Page 20: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
So, What Is the Problem? (4)C. Leveling Alice and Artificially Lowering Bob:
• The expert raises Alice’s market value to 0.75• The expert lowers Bob’s market value to 0.74• Decision maker chooses Alice (has prob. 0.75)• Expert’s payment:
• Raising from 0.2 to 0.75: Positive
![Page 21: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
So, What Is the Problem? (5)Is C better than B? Consider then 2nd expert (with the same belief [Alice:0.75,Bob:0.8]):• case C:
• Market value is: Alice – 0.75, Bob- 0.74• Expert #2 will raise Bob’s value back to 0.8!
• case B: • Market value is: Alice – 0.81, Bob- 0.8• Expert #2:
• Buying short on Alice will result in no payoff• Thus, Expert #2 do nothing!!
![Page 22: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
OutlineWhat are Decision Markets
explanationModel: notations and definitionsProblem with myopic incentives
Incentive in Decision MarketsDecision Scoring rules Existence of a strictly proper decision marketNecessity of full support in decision scoring rulesWith Strictly properness, preferred action can be chosen W.P close
to (but not) 1.Optimal Decision Markets Suggestions
![Page 23: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Scoring Experts: Decision Scoring Rule
• Instead of scoring by a scoring rule ( ), with respect only to the outcome and the prediction for the chosen action, we use a decision scoring rule.
• Decision scoring rule:
• Written • Mapping an action, outcome, decision policy and
prediction to the extended reals.
![Page 24: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
• Decision Rule: d(P) • Decision Scoring rule:
• so- is a logarithmic scoring rule :1+logx
• So if Alice is hired, and final prediction is• Alice:0.25, Bob:0.75
• dAlice= 0.2, dBob=0.8• SAlice,finished on time,=5*(1+log(0.25))• SBob,finished on time,=1.25*(1+log(0.75))
Decision Scoring Rule: Example
![Page 25: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
• Expected score:• Q – the expert’s personal belief• P – the expert’s prediction
This is the sum of possible scores weighted by how likely each score: to be realized
• (Strictly) Properness:
• For all beliefs Q, distributions d and d’ and prediction P• Strictly properness: the inequality is strict unless P=Q
Decision Scoring Rule:
![Page 26: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Myopic Incentives in Prediction Vs. Decision Markets
Decision Markets Prediction MarketsExpected payment of a single expert
(strictly*) Proper scoring rule
*inequality is strict unless q=p
da- porbability for choosing action a Qa,o – (vector) belief of ouctome o for each action a Sa,o – Decision scoring rule with respect to the final
prediction P and the probability vector d for choosing an action
![Page 27: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
OutlineWhat are Decision Markets
explanationModel: notations and definitionsProblem with myopic incentives
Incentive in Decision MarketsDecision Scoring rules Existence of a strictly proper decision marketNecessity of full support in decision scoring rulesWith Strictly properness, preferred action can be chosen W.P close
to (but not) 1.Optimal Decision Markets Suggestions
![Page 28: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Strictly Proper Decision MarketExistence of a strictly proper decision market
• Theorem 1: let D be a decision rule (with full support *). Then there exists a decision rule S such that (D,S) is strictly proper
![Page 29: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Strictly Proper Decision Market (2)• Existence of a strictly proper decision market• Proof:for any strictly proper scoring rule s:
Then the expected payment is:
Prediction Market Scoring rule
Linearity of Expectation
![Page 30: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Strictly Proper Decision Market (3)Necessity of full-support• Full support decision rule: if
![Page 31: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
This Model is Still Not Optimal• We proved that MAX decision rule can not be used in
myopic incentive compatible decision market• A stochastic decision rule with full support is crucial for
obtaining myopic incentive compatibility• In practice, no decision maker will knowingly choose the
wrong decision, even with small probability
![Page 32: Decision Markets With Good Incentives](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062315/56816693550346895dda72f0/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Optimal Decision Markets• Right Action Rules (Chen[2012])• Compensation function: (Boutilier [2012])• Fool the agents (TA example)