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Death

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Steven Luper

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DeathFirst published Wed May 22, 2002; substantive revision Tue May 26, 2009

This article considers several questions concerning death and itsramifications.

First, what constitutes death? It is clear enough that people die when theirlives end, but less clear what constitutes the ending of a person's life.

Second, in what sense might death or posthumous events harm us? Toanswer this question, we will need to know what it is for something to bein our interests.

Third, what is the case for and the case against the harm thesis, the claimthat death can harm the individual who dies, and the posthumous harmthesis, according to which events that occur after an individual dies canstill harm that individual?

Fourth, how might we solve the timing puzzle? This puzzle is theproblem of locating the time during which we incur harm for which deathand posthumous events are responsible.

A fifth controversy concerns whether all deaths are misfortunes or onlysome. Of particular interest here is a dispute between Thomas Nagel, whosays that death is always an evil, since continued life always makes goodthings accessible, and Bernard Williams, who argues that, whilepremature death is a misfortune, it is a good thing that we are notimmortal, since we cannot continue to be who we are now and remainmeaningfully attached to life forever.

A final controversy concerns whether or not the harmfulness of death canbe reduced. It may be that, by adjusting our conception of our well-being,and by altering our attitudes, we can reduce or eliminate the threat death

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and by altering our attitudes, we can reduce or eliminate the threat deathposes us. But there is a case to be made that such efforts backfire if takento extremes.

1. Death2. Misfortune3. The Harm Theses4. The Timing Puzzle5. Is Death Always a Misfortune?6. Can Death's Harmfulness be Reduced?BibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries

1. Death

Death is life's ending. Let us say that vital processes are those by whichorganisms develop or maintain themselves. These processes includechemosynthesis, photosynthesis, cellular respiration, cell generation, andmaintenance of homeostasis. Then death is the ending of the vitalprocesses by which an organism sustains itself. However, life's ending isone thing, and the condition of having life over is another. ‘Death’ canrefer to either.

Let us add that ‘the ending of life’ is itself potentially ambiguous. On onehand it might be a process wherein our lives are progressivelyextinguished, until finally they are gone. On the other it might be amomentary event. This event might be understood in three ways. First, itmight be the ending of the dying process—the loss of the very last traceof life. Call this ‘denouement death’. Second, it might be the point in thedying process when extinction is assured, no matter what is done to stopit. Call this moment ‘threshold death’. A third possibility is that life ends

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it. Call this moment ‘threshold death’. A third possibility is that life endswhen the physiological systems of the body irreversibly cease to functionas an integrated whole (defended, for example, by Belshaw 2009). Callthis ‘integration death’.

Thus death can be a state (being dead), the process of extinction (dying),or one of three events that occur during the dying process. Death in all ofthese senses can be further distinguished from events—such as being shotwith an arrow—that cause death.

1.1 The Permanence of Death

‘Death’ is also unclear in at least two ways. First, the concept of life isnot entirely clear. For example, suppose we could construct a machine,the HAL 1.01, with (nearly) all of the psychological attributes of persons:would HAL 1.01 be alive? To the extent that we are puzzled about whatlife entails, we will be puzzled about what is entailed by the ending oflife, that is, death. (For accounts of life, see Van Inwagen 1990 or Luper2009.) Second, it seems somewhat indeterminate whether a temporaryending of life suffices for death, or whether death entails a permanent lossof life. Usually, whenever a creature's life stops, the condition ispermanent; so ‘death’, as commonly used, need not be sensitive to thedistinction between the temporary and permanent ending of life. Yet lifemay stop temporarily: a life might be suspended then revived. Or it mightbe restored. Life in the case of seeds and spores is suspended indefinitely.Freezing frogs and human embryos suspends their lives, too. Suppose thatI were frozen and later revived: it is tempting to say that my life stopswhile I am frozen —I am in a state of suspended animation. But I am notdead. Now imagine a futuristic device, the Disassembler-Reassembler,that reduces me to small cubes, or individual cells, or disconnected atoms,which it stores and later reassembles just as they were before. Many of uswill say that I would survive—my life would continue—afterReassembly, but it is quite clear that I would not live during intervals

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Reassembly, but it is quite clear that I would not live during intervalswhen my atoms are stacked in storage. I would not even exist during suchintervals; Disassembly kills me. After I cease to exist, presumably Icannot be revived; nor can my vital processes be revived. If I can beReassembled, my life would be restored, not revived. Restoration, notrevival, is a way of bringing a creature back from the dead.

Assuming that creatures whose lives are suspended are not dead, butcreatures who are Disassembled are dead even if later Reassembled, itmight be best to say that a creature has died just when its vital processesare irreversibly discontinued, that is, when its vital processes can nolonger be revived.

1.2 Death and What We Are

Death for you and me is constituted by the irreversible discontinuation ofthe vital processes by which we are sustained. This characterization ofdeath could be sharpened if we had a clearer idea of what we are, and theconditions under which we persist. However, the latter is a matter ofcontroversy.

There are three main views: animalism, which says that we are humanbeings (Snowdon 1990, Olson 1997, 2007); personism, which says thatwe are creatures with the capacity for self-awareness; and mindism, whichsays that we are minds (which may or may not have the capacity for self-awareness) (McMahan 2002). Animalism suggests that we persist overtime just in case we remain the same animal; mindism suggests that wepersist just when we remain the same mind. Personism is usually pairedwith the view that our persistence is determined by our psychologicalfeatures and the relations among them (Locke 1689, Parfit 1984).

If we are animals, with the persistence conditions of animals, our deathsare constituted by the irreversible cessation of the vital processes thatsustain our existence as human beings. If we are minds, our deaths are

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sustain our existence as human beings. If we are minds, our deaths areconstituted by the irreversible extinction of the vital processes that sustainour existence as minds. And if persistence is determined by our retainingcertain psychological features, then the loss of those features willconstitute death.

These three ways of understanding death have very different implications.Severe dementia can destroy a great many psychological features withoutdestroying the mind, which suggests that death as understood bypersonists can occur even though death as understood by mindists has not.Moreover, human beings sometimes survive the destruction of the mind,as when the cerebrum dies, leaving an individual in a persistent vegetativestate. It is also conceivable that the mind can survive the extinction of thehuman being: this might occur if the brain is removed from the body, keptalive artificially, and the remainder of the body is destroyed (assumingthat a bare brain is not a human being). These possibilities suggest thatdeath as understood by mindists can occur even though death asunderstood by animalists has not (and also that the latter sort of deathneed not be accompanied by the former.)

1.3 Death and Existence

What is the relationship between existence and death? May people andother creatures continue to exist after dying, or cease to exist withoutdying?

Take the first question: may you and I and other creatures continue toexist for some time after our lives end? The view that death entails ourannihilation has been called the termination thesis (Feldman 2000). Theposition that we can indeed survive death we might call the deadsurvivors view. The dead survivors view might be defended on thegrounds that we commonly refer to ‘dead animals’ (and ‘dead plants’)which may suggest that we believe that animals continue to exist, as

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which may suggest that we believe that animals continue to exist, asanimals, while no longer alive. The idea might be that an animalcontinues to count as the same animal if enough of its originalcomponents remain in much the same order, and animals continue to meetthis condition for a time following death (Mackie 1997). On this view, ifyou and I are animals (as animalists say) then we could survive for a timeafter we are dead, albeit as corpses. In fact, we could survive indefinitely,by arranging to have our corpses preserved.

However, this way of defending the dead survivors view may not bedecisive. The terms ‘dead animal’ and ‘dead person’ seem ambiguous.Normally, when we use ‘dead people’ or ‘dead animal’ we mean to speakof persons or animals who lived in the past. One dead person I can nameis Socrates; he is now a ‘dead person’ even though his corpse surely hasceased to exist. However, in certain contexts, such as in morgues, weseem to use the terms ‘dead animal’ and ‘dead person’ to mean “remainsof something that was an animal” or “remains of something that was aperson.” On this interpretation, even in morgues calling something a deadperson does not imply that it is a person.

What about the second question: can creatures cease to exist withoutdying? Certainly things that never were alive, such as bubbles and statues,can be deathlessly annihilated. Arguably, there are also ways that livingcreatures can be deathlessly annihilated. It is plausible to say that anamoeba's existence ends when it splits, replacing itself with two amoebas.Yet when amoebas split, the vital processes that sustain them do notcease. If people could divide like amoebas, perhaps they, too could ceaseto exist without dying. (For a famous discussion of division and itsimplications, see Parfit 1981.)

1.4 Criteria for Death

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Defining death is one thing; providing criteria by which it can be readilydetected or verified is another. A definition is an account of what death is;when, and only when its definition is met, death has necessarily occurred.The definition offered above was that a creature is dead just when thevital processes by which it is sustained have irreversibly ceased. Acriterion for death, by contrast, lays out conditions by which all and onlyactual deaths may be readily identified. Such a criterion falls short of adefinition, but plays a practical role. For example, it would helpphysicians and jurists determine when death has occurred.

In the United States, the states have adopted criteria for death modeled onthe Uniform Determination of Death Act (developed by the President'sCommission, 1981), which says that “an individual who has sustainedeither (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or(2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including thebrain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordancewith accepted medical standards.” In the United Kingdom, the acceptedcriterion is brain stem death, or the “permanent functional death of thebrain stem” (Pallis 1982).

These current criteria are subject to criticism. Animalists might resist thecriteria since the vital processes of human beings whose entire brainshave ceased irreversibly to function can be sustained artificially usingcardiopulmonary assistance. Mindists and personists might also resist thecriteria, on the grounds that minds and all psychological features can beirretrievably destroyed in human beings whose brain stems are intact. Forexample, cerebral death can leave its victim with an intact brain stem, yetmindless and devoid of self-awareness.

2. Misfortune

May death or posthumous events harm us? Might they benefit us?Perhaps; in order to decide, we will need an analysis of welfare, which

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Perhaps; in order to decide, we will need an analysis of welfare, whichtells us what well-being is and how well off we are. We will also need anaccount of personal interests, which tells us what it is for something to bein our interests or against our interests.

2.1 Comparativism

The most widely accepted account of our interests is comparativism. Inorder to clarify comparativism, it is best to distinguish different senses inwhich an event can have value.

Some events are intrinsically good (or bad) for a subject; such events aregood (bad) for their own sakes, rather than in virtue of their contingenteffects. By contrast, some events are extrinsically good (bad) for asubject; they are good (bad) because of their contingent effects. Forexample, many people count their pleasure as intrinsically good and theirpain as intrinsically bad; aspirin would be extrinsically good, since iteliminates pain, and really bad puns would be extrinsically bad in thatthey are painful.

Events can have value in a different way: they can be overall good (bad)for a subject; that is, they can be good (bad) all things considered. Eventsare overall good (bad) for me when (and to the extent that) they make mylife better (worse) than it would be if those events had not occurred.Contrast events that are partially good (bad) for me: these make my lifebetter (worse) only in some respects. Partial goods may be overall bad forme. For example, playing video games every day gives me pleasure, andis hence partially good for me, but if it also causes me to neglect my job,health and family, it might well be overall bad for me.

According to comparativism, the value an event E has for me is roughlyE's overall value for me. But let us attempt to formulate the comparativistaccount a bit more precisely.

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To assess the value for me of an event E, we begin by distinguishing twopossible situations, or possible worlds. One of these is the actual world,which is the world as it actually is, past present and future. The other isthe possible world that is the way things would be if E had not occurred.We can assume that this is the world that is as similar to the actual worldas possible, and in that way ‘closest’ to the actual world, except that Edoes not occur, and various other things are different because of E'snonoccurrence. We can call the actual world WE, in this way remindingourselves that E actually occurred. And by W~E we can indicate theclosest world to the actual world in which E does not occur. Here thetilde, ‘~’, stands for ‘not’.

The next step is to assess my welfare level in WE and my welfare level inW~E. My welfare level in WE is the intrinsic value for me of my life inWE; it is the value my life actually has for me, measured in terms ofintrinsic goods and intrinsic evils. To calculate my welfare level in WE,we start by assigning a value to my intrinsic goods in WE. This will be apositive value representing the sum of these goods. Next we assign avalue to my intrinsic evils in WE; this will be a negative value. Next wesum these values; the goods will raise this sum, while the evils will lowerit. Some symbolism might help fix ideas (although it may give the falseimpression that our subject matter admits of more precision that isactually possible). Let G(S,W) stand for the sum of the values of S'sintrinsic goods in world W, and let B(S,W) stand for the sum of the valuesof S's intrinsic evils in W. So far we have said that S's welfare level in WEequals G(S,WE) + B(S,WE). If we let IV(S,W) stand for the intrinsic valueof world W for subject S, the claim is that

My welfare level in W~E is assessed similarly; it is the sum of myintrinsic goods and evils in W~E.

IV(S,WE) = G(S,WE) + B(S,WE).

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Finally, we subtract the value for me of my life in W~E from the value forme of my life in WE. According to comparativism, this is the value E hasfor me. Letting V(S,E) stand for the value of E for subject S,comparativism says that

This value determines whether an event is overall bad (good) for a subjectS. If E's value for S is negative, that is, if V(S,E) < 0, then E is overall badfor S. If E's value is positive, then E is overall good for S. The morenegative (positive) E's value is, the worse (better) E is for S.

Consider an example. Suppose that we are looking to identify the valuefor me of drinking this cup of coffee. Call this event Drink. Then the firststep is to distinguish the actual world, WDrink, in which I drank thecoffee, from the closest world in which I did not, W~Drink. Then wecalculate my welfare level in WDrink, IV(Luper,WDrink) and in W~Drink,IV(Luper,W~Drink). The former, IV(Luper,WDrink), equals the value ofthe intrinsic goods I will enjoy in my life plus the value of the intrinsicevils I will endure. For simplicity, let us pull a number out of the hat toindicate the value of the goods I will enjoy in my life before I drink thecoffee, say 100, and another number to indicate the value of the evils Iwill endure in my life before I drink the coffee, say −50. Let us alsoassume that drinking the coffee will give me some pleasure for one hour,which has a value of 10, and drinking the coffee will not cause me toendure any evils. Finally, let us assume that after that hour of savoring mycoffee, I will go on to enjoy goods with a value of 50, and evils with avalue of −10. Then IV(Luper,WDrink) = 100 + 10 + 50 + −50 + 0 + −10 =100. Assuming that my life one hour after drinking my coffee would bejust like my life would have been were I not to drink my coffee, more orless, so that drinking my coffee benefits me only during the hour I savorit, we can say that IV(Luper,W~Drink) = 100 + 0 + 50 + −50 + 0 + −10 =

V(S,E) = IV(S,WE) − IV(S,W~E).

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it, we can say that IV(Luper,W~Drink) = 100 + 0 + 50 + −50 + 0 + −10 =90. Given these assumptions, V(Luper,WDrink) = IV(Luper,WDrink) −IV(Luper,W~Drink) = 100 − 90 = 10. Drinking the coffee, then, was goodfor me, as 10 is a positive value.

We can now offer a rough statement of the comparativist account ofinterests.

In order to refine the comparativist account, we will need to distinguishbetween event tokens and event types. Event tokens are concrete events,such as the bombing of the World Trade Center. Event types are abstractentities such as bombings, leapings and burials. One token of the typebombing is the bombing of the World Trade Center. Earlier we used theletter ‘E’ to refer to event tokens rather than event types. What is more,we assumed that the event tokens to which ‘E’ referred were actualevents, not merely possible events. But perhaps we can also offer acomparativist account of the value of the occurrence of an E-type event;that is, a comparativist account of how valuable it would be for a subjectS if an event of type E were to occur.

To this end, we might assess the value for S of the occurrence of an E-type event by working out S's welfare level in the actual world (wherepresumably an E-type event did not occur) then S's welfare level in theclosest world in which an E-type event does occur, and subtracting the

An event E is in S's interests just in case E overall benefits (isgood for) S, making S's life better than it would have been if E hadnot occurred, which E does just when its value for S is positive.An event E is against S's interests just in case E overall harms (isbad for) S, making S's life worse than it would have been if E hadnot occurred, which E does just when its value for S is negative.How much E benefits (harms) S depends on how much better(worse) S's life is in the actual world than it would have been if Ehad not occurred: the better (worse) S's life is, the more beneficial(harmful) E is.

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closest world in which an E-type event does occur, and subtracting thefirst from the second. When the result is a positive value, the occurrenceof an E-type event would be good for S; when negative, the occurrencewould be bad for S.

In sum, the comparativist view may be stated as follows:

Comparativist Account of Interests:

1. An event E is in S's interests just in case E overall benefits (isgood for) S, making S's life better than it would have been ifE did not occur, which E does just when its value for S ispositive.

2. An event E is against S's interests just in case E overall harms(is bad for) S, making S's life worse than it would have beenif E did not occur, which E does just when its value for S isnegative.

3. The occurrence of an E-type event is in S's interests just incase it would overall benefit (be good for) S. The occurrenceof an E-type event would benefit S if and only if its value forS is positive.

4. The occurrence of an E-type event is against S's interests justin case it would overall harm (be bad for) S. The occurrenceof an E-type event would harm S if and only if its value for Sis negative.

5. How much E benefits (harms) S depends on how much better(worse) S's life is in the actual world than it would have beenif E had not occurred: the better (worse) S's life is, the morebeneficial (harmful) E is. Similarly, how much theoccurrence of an E-type event would benefit (harm) Sdepends on how much worse (better) S's life is in the actualworld than it would have been if an E-type event hadoccurred: the worse (better) S's life is, the more beneficial

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We sometimes say things that suggest that we can have interests atparticular times which we lack at others. For example, we might say thathaving a tooth drilled by a dentist is not in our interests while we areundergoing the procedure, even though it is in our long-term interests.The idea seems to be that what makes a subject S better off at time t is inS's interests-at-time-t. But it is important to distinguish interests-at-t frominterests. What is in our interests-at-time-t1 need not be in our interests-at-time-t2. This is not true of our interests. Whatever interests we have wehave at all times. If something is in our interests, it is timelessly in ourinterests.

2.2 Welfare

Comparativism analyses our interests in terms of our welfare, and iscompatible with any number of views of welfare. There are three mainways of understanding welfare itself: positive hedonism, preferentialism,and pluralism. Let us briefly consider each of these three views.

Positive hedonism is the following position:

Positive hedonism has been defended (by J.S.Mill 1863) on the groundsthat it resolves the problem of commensurability. The difficulty ariseswhen we attempt to equate units of different sorts of goods. For example,how do we decide when one unit of love is worth one unit of

occurred: the worse (better) S's life is, the more beneficial(harmful) the occurrence of an E-type event would havebeen.

Positive Hedonism: for any subject S, experiencing pleasure at t isthe one and only thing that is intrinsically good for S at t, whileexperiencing pain at t is the one and only thing that is intrinsicallybad for S at t. The more pleasure (pain) S experiences at t, thegreater the intrinsic good (evil) for S at t.

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how do we decide when one unit of love is worth one unit ofachievements, assuming that both love and achievements are intrinsicallygood? The problem does not arise for hedonists, who evaluate all thingsin terms of the pleasure and pain that they give us.

However, most theorists consider positive hedonism to be implausible.Nagel argues that I would harm you if I were to cause you to revert to apleasant infantile state for the rest of your life, yet by hedonist standards Ihave not harmed you at all. Similarly, it would be a grave misfortune foryou if your spouse came to despise you, but for some reason pretended tolove you, so that you underwent no loss of pleasure. And Nozick notesthat we would refuse to attach ourselves to an Experience Machine thatwould give us extremely pleasant experiences for the rest of our lives. Byhypothesis, the Machine would give us far more pleasure (and less pain)than is otherwise possible. Our reluctance to use the Machine suggeststhat things other than pleasure are intrinsically good: it is because we donot wish to miss out on these other goods that we refuse to use theMachine.

Preferentialism assesses welfare in terms of desire fulfillment. To desireis to desire that some proposition P hold; when we desire P, P is theobject of our desire. According to preferentialism, our welfare turns onwhether the objects of our desires hold:

In this, its unrefined form, preferentialism is implausible. Many of thethings we desire do not appear to contribute to our welfare. Consider, forexample, Rawls' famous example of the man whose main desire is tocount blades of grass. In response to the grass counter case, Rawls (1971)adopts critical preferentialism, which says that welfare is advanced by the

Preferentialism: for any subject S, it is intrinsically good for S at tthat, at t, S desires P and P holds; it is intrinsically bad for S at tthat, at t, S desires P and ~P holds. The stronger S's desire for Pis, the better (worse) it is for S that P holds (~P holds).

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adopts critical preferentialism, which says that welfare is advanced by thefulfillment of rational aims. Assuming that counting grass blades isirrational because it is pointless, fulfilling the desire to count grass bladesis not intrinsically good. However, even critical preferentialism seemsvulnerable to attack, since the fulfillment even of rational desires need notadvance one's welfare. Parfit (1984) illustrates the point by supposing thatyou have the (rational) desire that a stranger's disease be overcome: thefulfilment of this desire advances the stranger's welfare, not yours. Thisexample can be handled by egocentric preferentialism, which says thatonly desires that make essential reference to the self can advance ourwelfare when fulfilled (Overvold 1980). Thus the fulfilment of my desirethat I be happy is intrinsically good for me, but the fulfilment of mydesire that somebody or other be happy is not. A further variant ofpreferentialism might be called achievement preferentialism. This viewsays that subject S's accomplishing one of S's goals (or ends) isintrinsically good for S, and that being thwarted from accomplishing sucha goal is intrinsically bad for S (Scanlon 1998; Keller 2004; Portmore2007).

Pluralism is the third main account of welfare. Pluralists can agree withthe hedonist position that a person's pleasure is intrinsically good for thatperson, and with the preferentialist's view that the fulfilment of a person'sdesire is intrinsically good for that person. However, pluralism says thatvarious other sorts of things are intrinsically good, too. Some traditionalexamples are wisdom, friendship and love, and honor. Another examplemight be engaging in self-determination (Luper 2009).

3. The Harm Theses

Typically, those who value life accept the harm thesis: death is, at leastsometimes, bad for those who die, and in this sense something that‘harms’ them. It is important to know what to make of this thesis, sinceour response itself can be harmful. This might happen as follows: suppose

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our response itself can be harmful. This might happen as follows: supposethat we love life, and reason that since it is good, more would be better.Our thoughts then turn to death, and we decide it is bad: the better life is,we think, the better more life would be, and the worse death is. At thispoint, we are in danger of condemning the human condition, whichembraces life and death, on the grounds that it has a tragic side, namelydeath. It will help some if we remind ourselves that our situation also hasa good side. Indeed, our condemnation of death is here based on theassumption that more life would be good. But such consolations are notfor everyone. (They are unavailable if we crave immortality on the basisof demanding standards by which the only worthwhile projects areendless in duration, for then we will condemn the condition of meremortals as tragic through and through, and may, as Unamuno (1913)points out, end up suicidal, fearing that the only life available is not worthhaving.) And a favorable assessment of life may be a limited consolation,since it leaves open the possibility that, viewing the human condition as awhole, the bad cancels much of the good. In any case it is grim enough toconclude that, given the harm thesis, the human condition has a tragicside. It is no wonder that theorists over the millennia have sought todefeat the harm thesis. We will examine their efforts, as well as thechallenges to the posthumous harm thesis, according to which eventsoccurring after we die can harm us. First, however, let us see how theharm theses might be defended.

3.1 The Main Defense

Those theorists who defend the harm theses typically draw upon someversion of comparativism (e.g., Nagel 1970, Quinn 1984, Feldman 1991).According to comparativism, a person's death may well harm that person.Death may also be harmless. To decide whether a person's death is badfor that person, we must compare her actual welfare level to the welfarelevel she would have had if she had not died. Suppose, for example, thatHilda died on December 1, 2008 at age 25 and that, had she not died, she

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Hilda died on December 1, 2008 at age 25 and that, had she not died, shewould have prospered for 25 years and suffered during her final fiveyears. To apply comparativism, we must first select an account of welfarewith which to assess Hilda's well-being. For simplicity, let us adoptpositive hedonism. The next step is to sum the pleasure and pain she hadover her lifetime. Suppose that she had considerably more pleasure thanpain. We can stipulate that her lifetime welfare level came to a value of250. Next we sum the pleasure and pain she would have had if she hadnot died on December 1, 2008. The first 25 years of her life would be justas they actually were, so the value of these would be 250. We cansuppose that her next 25 years would also receive the value of 250. Andlet us stipulate that her final 5 years, spent mostly suffering, carry a valueof −50. Then, had she not died, her lifetime welfare level would havebeen 250 + 250 − 50 = 450. Subtracting this value from her actuallifetime welfare level of 250 gives us −200. This is the value for her ofdying on December 1, 2008. According to comparativism, then, her deathwas quite bad for her. Things would have been different if the last 30years of her life would have been spent in unrelenting agony. On thatassumption, her death would have been good for her.

Our example concerned a particular death at a specific time.Comparativism also has implications concerning whether dying young isbad for the one who dies, and whether it is bad for us that we die at all. Inboth cases the answer depends on how our lives would have gone had wenot died. Usually dying young deprives us of many years of good life, sousually dying young is bad for us. As for whether or not it is bad to bemortal, that depends on whether the life we would lead as an immortalbeing would be a good one or not.

According to comparativism, when death is bad for us, it is bad for usbecause it precludes our coming to have various intrinsic goods which wewould have had if we had not died. We might say that death is bad for usbecause of the goods it deprives us of, and not, or at least not always,

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because of the goods it deprives us of, and not, or at least not always,because of any intrinsic evils for which it is responsible.

So much for the harm thesis. Now let us ask how the posthumous harmthesis might be defended.

Note first that we must reject the posthumous harm thesis if we adoptpositive hedonism and combine it with comparativism, for nothing thathappens after we die can boost or reduce the amounts of pleasure or painin our lives.

However, posthumous events might well be bad for us on other accountsof welfare. Suppose that I want to be remembered after I die. Givenpreferentialism, something could happen after I die that might be bad forme, namely my being forgotten, because it thwarts my desire.

These ways of defending the harm theses seem quite plausible.Nevertheless, there are several strategies for criticizing the harm theses.Let us turn to these criticisms now, starting with some strategiesdeveloped in the ancient world by Epicurus and his follower Lucretius.

3.2 The Symmetry Argument

One challenge to the harm thesis is an attempt to show that the state deathputs us in, nonexistence, is not bad. According to the symmetry argument,posed by Lucretius, a follower of Epicurus, we can prove this to ourselvesby thinking about our state before we were born:

The idea is clear to a point: it is irrational to object to death, since we donot object to pre-vital nonexistence (the state of nonexistence thatpreceded our lives), and the two are alike in all relevant respects, so that

Look back at time … before our birth. In this way Nature holdsbefore our eyes the mirror of our future after death. Is this so grim,so gloomy? (Lucretius 1951)

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preceded our lives), and the two are alike in all relevant respects, so thatany objection to the one would apply to the other. However, Lucretius'argument admits of more than one interpretation, depending on whether itis supposed to address death understood as the ending of life or deathunderstood as the state we are in after life is ended (or both).

On the first interpretation, the ending of life is not bad, since the onlything we could hold against it is the fact that it is followed by ournonexistence, yet the latter is not objectionable, as is shown by the factthat we do not object to our nonexistence before birth. So understood, thesymmetry argument is weak. Our complaint about death need not be thatthe state of nonexistence is ghastly. Instead, our complaint might be thatdeath brings life, which is a good thing, to an end, and, all things beingequal, what ends good things is bad. Notice that the mirror image of deathis birth (or, more precisely, becoming alive), and the two affect us in verydifferent ways: birth makes life possible; it starts a good thing going.Death makes life impossible; it brings a good thing to a close. As FrancesKamm (1998) emphasizes, we do not want our lives to be all over with.

Perhaps Lucretius only meant to argue that the death state is not bad,since the only thing we could hold against the death state is that it isnonexistence, which is not really objectionable, as witness our attitudeabout pre-vital nonexistence. So interpreted, there is a kernel of truth inLucretius' argument. Truly, our pre-vital nonexistence does not concernus much. But that is because pre-vital nonexistence is followed byexistence. Nor would we worry overly about post-vital nonexistence if it,too, were followed by existence. If we could move in and out ofexistence, say with the help of futuristic machines that could dismantle us,then rebuild us, molecule by molecule, after a period of nonexistence, wewould not be overly upset about the intervening gaps, and, rather likehibernating bears, we might enjoy taking occasional breaks from lifewhile the world gets more interesting. But undergoing temporarynonexistence is not the same as undergoing permanent nonexistence.

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nonexistence is not the same as undergoing permanent nonexistence.Unlike the former, the latter entails death in the fullest sense. What isupsetting is the death that precedes post-vital nonexistence — or, whatcomes to the same thing, the permanence of post-vital nonexistence —not nonexistence per se.

There is another way to use considerations of symmetry to argue againstthe harm thesis: we want to die later, or not at all, because it is a way ofextending life, but this attitude is irrational, Lucretius might say, since wedo not want to be born earlier (we do not want to have always existed),which is also a way to extend life. As this argument suggests, we aremore concerned about the indefinite continuation of our lives than abouttheir indefinite extension. (Be careful when you rub the magic lamp: ifyou wish that your life be extended, the genie might make you older!) Alife can be extended by adding to its future or to its past. Some of usmight welcome the prospect of having lived a life stretching indefinitelyinto the past, given fortuitous circumstances. But we would prefer a lifestretching indefinitely into the future.

Is it irrational to want future life more than past life? No; it is notsurprising to find ourselves with no desire to extend life into the past,since the structure of the world permits life extension only into the future,and that is good enough. But what if life extension were possible in eitherdirection? Would we still be indifferent about a lengthier past? Andshould our attitude about future life match our attitude about past life?

Our attitude about future life should match our attitude about past life ifour interests and attitudes are limited in certain ways. If quantity of life isthe only concern, a preference for future life is irrational. Similarly, thepreference is irrational if our only concern is to maximize how muchpleasure we experience over the course of our lives without regard to itstemporal distribution. But our attitude is not that of the life- or pleasure-gourmand.

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gourmand.

According to Parfit, we have a far-reaching bias extending to goods ingeneral: we prefer that any good things, not just pleasures, be in ourfuture, and that bad things, if they happen at all, be in our past. He arguesthat if we take this extensive bias for granted, and assume that, because ofit, it is better for us to have goods in the future than in the past, we canexplain why it is rational to deplore death more than we do our nothaving always existed: the former, not the latter, deprives us of goodthings in the future (he need not say that it is because it is in the past thatwe worry about the life-limiting event at the beginning of our lives lessthan the life-limiting event at the end). This preference for future goods isunfortunate, however, according to Parfit. If cultivated, the temporalinsensitivity of the life- or pleasure-gourmand could lower our sensitivityto death: towards the end of life, we would find it unsettling that oursupply of pleasures cannot be increased in the future, but we would becomforted by the pleasures we have accumulated.

Whether or not we have the extensive bias described by Parfit, it is truethat the accumulation of life and pleasure, and the passive contemplationthereof, are not our only interests. We also have active, forward-lookinggoals and concerns. Engaging in such pursuits has its own value; formany of us, these pursuits, and not passive interests, are central to ouridentities. However, we cannot make and pursue plans for our past. Wemust project our plans (our self-realization) into the future, whichexplains our forward bias. (We could have been devising and pursuingplans in the past, but these plans will not, I assume, be extensions of ourpresent concerns.) It is not irrational to prefer that our lives be extendedinto the future rather than the past, if for no other reason than this: onlythe former makes our existing forward-looking pursuits possible. It is notirrational to prefer not to be at the end of our lives, unable to shape themfurther, and limited to reminiscing about days gone by.

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Nevertheless, it does not follow that we should be indifferent about theextent of our pasts. Being in the grip of forward-looking pursuits isimportant, but we have passive interests as well, which make a moreextensive past preferable. Moreover, having been devising and pursuingplans in the past is worthwhile. If fated to die tomorrow, most of uswould prefer to have a thousand years of glory behind us rather than fifty.

3.3 Epicurean Challenges: Death Cannot Affect Us

Further challenges to the harm theses are offered by Epicurus (341-270)in his Letter to Menoeceus:

We might restate Epicurus' brief argument as follows: if death harms theindividual who dies, there must exist a subject who is harmed by death, aclear harm that is received, and a time when that harm is received. As tothe timing issue, there seems to be two possible solutions, given that deathfollows immediately upon life: either death harms its victims while theyare alive or later. If we opt for the second solution we appear to run headon into the problem of the subject, for assuming that we do not exist afterwe are alive, no one is left to incur harm. We also encounter the problemof specifying a harm that might be accrued by a nonexistent person. If weopt for the first solution — death harms its victims while they are alive —we have a ready solution to the problem of the subject but we face theproblem of supplying a clear way in which death is bad: death seemsunable to have any ill effect on us while we are living since it will not yethave occurred. Seeing that there is no coherent solution to all three issues,Epicurus rejects the harm thesis.

Death …, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that,when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we arenot.

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Epicurus focuses on death, but if his argument is good, it applies moregenerally, to include all events that follow death.

In some respects Epicurus's argument is not clear. One problem is thatwhat he means by ‘death’ is unclear. For now let us assume that he meantto refer to the process by which our lives are ended. Another interpretiveproblem arises as well: his intent might be to show that neither death norposthumous events can affect us at all. From this claim it would followthat death and posthumous events are harmless, assuming that an eventharms us only if it somehow affects us at some time (perhaps well after itoccurs).

Let us see if it is possible to show that death and posthumous events donot affect us. Then we can try out (in the next section) a weaker thesis:that death and posthumous events cannot affect us in a way that is bad forus. This weaker claim is easier to defend, but the stronger claim is worthexploring.

We can start with some assumptions about when an event can affect us.To this end, let us adopt the causal account of responsibility:

a. An event (or state of affairs) can affect some subject (person orthing) S only by having a causal effect on S (the causal impactthesis).

b. A subject S cannot be causally affected by an event while S isnonexistent.

c. A subject cannot be causally affected by an event before the eventoccurs (the ban on backwards causation).

From the causal account, together with some plausible assumptions, itfollows that a post-mortem event, such as the burning of one's corpse,cannot affect us after we are dead, since, by (a), to be affected is to beaffected causally, but, by (b), nonexistent people cannot be causallyaffected by any event. It also follows that the state of being dead cannot

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affected by any event. It also follows that the state of being dead cannotaffect us while we are dead. Here we are assuming that people cease toexist when they die (the termination thesis). From the causal account italso follows that neither being dead, nor any events that follow, can affectus while we are alive, given the ban on backwards causation:

1. An event can affect us only by causally affecting us (the causalimpact thesis).

2. We cannot be causally affected by an event while we arenonexistent.

3. We do not exist while dead (the termination thesis).4. So neither being dead, nor any posthumous event, can affect us while

we are dead (by 1–3).5. We cannot be causally affected by an event before the event occurs

(the ban on backwards causation).6. So neither being dead, nor any posthumous event, can affect us while

we are alive (by 1 and 5).7. So neither being dead, nor any posthumous event, can ever affect us

(by 4 and 6).

So far so good: neither the state of being dead nor any post-mortem eventcan ever affect us. However, it has not been shown that we cannot beaffected by the dying process. Of course, the thesis that we must exist tobe affected, together with the termination thesis, rule out the possibilitythat death affects us after it occurs (after we are nonexistent). And the banon backwards causation rules out the possibility that death affects usbefore it occurs. Thus:

8. Death cannot affect us after it occurs (by 1–3).9. Death cannot affect us before it occurs (by 1 and 5).

10. So death can affect us, if at all, only when it occurs (by 8 and 9).

But nothing said so far rules out the possibility that death affects usexactly when it occurs. In particular, the problem of the subject does not

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exactly when it occurs. In particular, the problem of the subject does notarise since it is a living, existing person who is harmed by death while itoccurs. Is there any way to establish that death cannot affect us even atthe time it occurs? There might be two ways. First, we might claim thatdeath occurs only after we are nonexistent. This assumption has the oddconsequence that death can affect us only if posthumous events can. Itwill follow from (7) that death cannot ever affect us. Second, we mightclaim that death is instantaneous; it happens too quickly to affect us.

Some theorists have indeed defined ‘death’ — the ending of life — insuch a way as to imply that it occurs only after we are nonexistent. Forexample, Feinberg (1984), following Levenbook (1984), defines death as“the first moment of the subject's nonexistence.” Perhaps this definition ismotivated by the awkwardness of attaching ‘death’ to a moment in thedying process when a spark of life persists. However, it is at least asawkward to attach ‘death’ to a moment after the dying process is over —to suggest that the ending of life occurs while we are in a state of death. Itis also to concede too much to the Epicurean, who could then establishthat death is no evil merely by showing that posthumous events areinnocuous.

What about the suggestion that death happens too quickly to affect us?

Recall that ‘death’ can be used in the process as well as the denouementsense (Section 1). Death, in the process sense, unfolds over a period oftime, and it obviously affects us while it occurs. — even if instantly.

What if we opt for the denouement sense of ‘death’? Is it plausible to saythat losing the very last of life can have no affect on us? It is difficult tosee why. If we were correct when we said that the complete destruction ofour vital capacities affects us, surely we are also affected, albeit less, bylosing the very last of the vital capacities that sustain us.

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Let's review. Granting them some leeway, Epicureans can show:

11. Neither being dead, nor any posthumous event, can ever affect us,and the dying process itself can affect us, if at all, only while itoccurs (by 7 and 10).

They can then argue as follows:

12. An event harms us only if it somehow affects us at some time.13. So neither being dead, nor any posthumous event, can harm us, and

the dying process can harm us, if at all, only while it occurs (by 11and 12).

For a more rigorous presentation of the above argument, see thesupplementary document:

But Epicureans lack a convincing argument against the possibility that thedying process and some of its effects overlap in time; hence they cannotrefute the harm thesis. We have a subject, harm, and time: the subject ofdeath is a live creature who endures its effects at the very time thecreature dies.

3.4 Epicurean Challenges: Death Is Harmless

Instead of trying to establish that death cannot affect us at all, Epicureansmight argue that death cannot affect us in a way that is bad for us. To thatend, they can provide a condition for something's being bad for us andargue that death fails to meet it.

The condition which Epicurus himself supplied is this: an event (or stateof affairs) harms us only if it causes in us the presence of some conditionwe find unpleasant. For simplicity, we can call all such conditions pain orsuffering. That condition, the suffering, need not occur at the same time

The Argument: Death and Posthumous Events Don't Affect Us

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suffering. That condition, the suffering, need not occur at the same timeas the event that causes its presence in us. An event may occur longbefore it has any direct impact on us; it may occur even before we exist,as when someone times a bomb to go off 150 years later, killing everyonearound. Epicurus himself did not spell out a complete view of welfare. Hedid not make it entirely clear when things are, overall, beneficial orharmful to a person. But he surely did think that something harms us onlyif it causes us to suffer.

On the Epicurean view, clearly neither the state nor process of death isinherently harmful — it is, in itself, not bad for us. For death is notnecessarily painful. One can die painlessly, as when one dies whileunconscious. But Epicurus did not say merely that death need not beharmful; he claimed that death was never harmful; on his criterion, thismeans that death never causes the subject to suffer.

To show that death can have no salient effect on us, Epicureans mightargue that death cannot be responsible for any condition's presence in us,salient or otherwise. It can only be responsible for our ceasing to be in acondition. However, this thesis is clearly false on the process sense of‘death:’ moving from being wholly alive to completely lacking life mightwell introduce the presence of some bad condition in us, such as pain. Nodoubt Epicureans gravitate to the denouement sense of death since theending of the final trace of life might occur extremely quickly, perhaps soquickly that it has no salient effect on us while it happens. Nevertheless,Epicureans may argue, with some degree of plausibility, that denouementdeath cannot harm us:

14. Denouement death occurs too quickly to be responsible for thepresence of any unpleasant condition in us at the time it occurs.

15. Only something responsible for the presence of an unpleasantcondition in us is harmful to us.

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16. So denouement death cannot harm us at the time it occurs (by 14 and15).

By combining 16 with 13, established earlier, Epicureans may concludethat:

17. Neither posthumous events nor the state of death nor denouementdeath may ever harm us, and process death may harm us only whileit occurs.

However, this conclusion will disappoint people who wonder whetherdying is a misfortune: they want to know whether losing their lives is abad thing, not just whether, having nearly completely lost life, it is bad tolose the very last of it (Luper 2004). Even for Epicurus himself thisconclusion is not entirely adequate. For it leaves in place the possibilitythat the dying process can be harmful.

So why did Epicurus say that death is nothing to us? He surely knew thatthe dying process can be harmful to us. One possibility is that he did notreally intend to show that death is innocuous. Many commentators insistthat he wanted only to show that being dead, that is, the state of death, isnothing to us, and that he realized that dying is often a misfortune. It isalso possible that Epicurus did not believe that what we have called‘process death’ is part of death; instead, death is what we have called‘denouement death’. This line of thought would position him to admit that‘process death’ is bad for us, but it is only the precursor to death.

However, if Epicurus meant to show only that denouement death isharmless, or that the state of being dead is harmless, his efforts aredisappointing given his own goal, which was to enable us to achieveataraxia, or complete tranquility. He cannot reach this goal if he does notfree us from our concern about the dying process or the events leading upto the dying process.

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The best Epicurus could do is to downplay the painfulness of processdeath and its cause, and this he appears to do:

Unfortunately, Epicurus was wrong; the dying process and its cause canbe excruciating.

There are things other than death that seem bad for us. To prepare us forcomplete tranquility in the fact of these things, Epicurus would need toaddress them as well. Let us consider some examples, and what Epicurusmight say about them.

One example is obvious: we suffer when we anticipate death. Epicuruswould probably admit that anticipating death is a bad thing if it upsets us.But he emphasizes that our (present) anticipatory fear is not caused by our(future) death, since future events are powerless to affect the past. Hence,by the painfulness criterion, the fear of death is not grounds for sayingthat death is harmful. Moreover, fear is irrational unless its object isgenuinely evil in some way, which death is not:

Something else that is related to death seems bad for us: namely, the griefothers experience when we die. But Epicurus would urge us to distinguishwhat is bad for us from what is bad for others. At most, the fact that yourfamily grieves at your death supports the claim that your demise harmsthem, not that it harms you. (Too, your distress at anticipating your

Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh; on the contrary,pain, if extreme, is present a very short time. … Illnesses of longduration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in theflesh (Principal Doctrines, Doctrine 4)

He speaks idly who says the he fears death, not because it will bepainful when present but because it is painful in anticipation. Forif something causes no distress when present, it is fruitless to bepained by the expectation of it (Letter to Menoeceus).

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them, not that it harms you. (Too, your distress at anticipating yourfamily's grief over your death is not grounds for you to regard your deathas a bad thing: the suffering your death brings them cannot affect you, andyour anticipatory grief is irrational.) Furthermore, their grief should bemitigated by the fact that your death is not bad for you. Their grief isentirely self-centered, exactly like the self-pity a stamp collector mightfeel at the destruction of a treasured stamp, in that the stamp is notharmed by its own destruction.

These examples illustrate that Epicurus can address some death-relatedconcerns by showing that they are misguided, if we grant him his claimthat we can be harmed only by what causes us to suffer. However, somedeath-related concerns cannot be handled this way. For example, the factthat everyone dies causes us distress and is therefore harmful to us evenon Epicurus' criterion. At most Epicurus can say that mortality need notbe harmful to us, and that it will not be if we can manage not to bedistressed by it (Luper 2009).

3.5 Further Objections to the Harm Theses

Epicurus' case against the harm theses hinged on the assumption that wecan be harmed only by what causes us to suffer. However, in section 3.1we supported the harm theses by combining comparativism with one ofthe three leading accounts of welfare. We noted that death andposthumous events seem harmful because they deprive us of goods wewould otherwise have had. If our argument was correct, then Epicurus'assumption must be mistaken. It must be false that harm requiresincurring pain. Instead, harm can consist in being deprived of goods.

Are there ways Epicureans could resist the view that being deprived ofgoods can be bad for us? Perhaps. Epicureans could criticizecomparativism. They could also defend some view of welfare that is morecongenial to their position. Let us consider each strategy, starting with the

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congenial to their position. Let us consider each strategy, starting with thesecond.

Epicurus may have accepted the following view of welfare:

When paired with comparativism, this view has implications that Epicuruswould have welcomed. It implies that harm is limited to what increasesour pain, and benefit is limited to what reduces it. Consequently death isharmless to those who die painlessly, no matter how good the life theywould have had would have been. Moreover, death can be beneficial: itcan preclude our suffering.

However, the implications of negative hedonism are quite absurd. Forexample, it implies that we never have reason to endure pain for the sakeof pleasure or any other good. It also implies that we should end our livesas quickly and painlessly as we can since living on will harm us andcannot possibly benefit us. The negative hedonist account of welfare isclearly false.

Perhaps Epicureans would have better success if they were to rejectcomparativism itself. To that end, they might adopt one of four strategieswhich we will discuss in turn.

Bifurcated Comparativism

It is quite possible that Epicurus himself rejected comparativism, asformulated above. Perhaps he thought that the harmfulness of an event Eis not a matter of the good it deprives us of, but rather a matter of howmuch intrinsic harm it causes, and the goodness of E is a matter of howmuch intrinsic good it causes. Earlier we let B(S,W) stand for the sum of

Negative Hedonism: for any subject S, S's experiencing pain is theone and only thing that is intrinsically bad for S, and nothing isintrinsically good for S.

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much intrinsic good it causes. Earlier we let B(S,W) stand for the sum ofthe values of the things which are intrinsically bad for S in world W, andwe let G(S,W) stand for the sum of the values of the things which areintrinsically good for S in world W. Using this symbolism, we can statethe following alternative to comparativism:

Bifurcated comparativism implies that goods do not offset evils, but mighteliminate them: that is, the goods E brings do not reduce the harmfulnessof E unless they cause us to have less pain or less of some other evil.Similarly, evils do not offset goods. Combined with positive hedonism,bifurcated comparativism implies that we are harmed only by whatincreases our suffering, and benefitted only by what increases ourpleasure; all else is a matter of indifference. Epicurus might have beendrawn to this combination because it implies that death can neither harmnor benefit us, ignoring the pain it can cause while it occurs.

However, bifurcated comparativism is implausible. One problem is itsimplication that that goods and evils do not offset each other. Anotherworry is that surely some events or states of affairs harm us withoutcausing us pain or some other intrinsic evil, and benefit us without givingus pleasure or some other intrinsic good. It is better to be anaethetizedbefore surgery, but not if bifurcated comparativism is true. Moreover, if Islip into a temporary coma, which precludes my suffering from injuriesinflicted upon me in a car crash, the coma benefits me, even though itdoes not give me pleasure or other goods. Similarly, a coma thatprecludes my enjoying a week's worth of good life harms me, yet givesme no pain or other evils.

Surely death is capable of benefitting us the same way thatanesthetization and unconsciousness can. It can preclude our enduringgreat suffering. Similarly, like anesthetization and unconsciousness, death

Bifurcated Comparativism: E harms S if and only if B(S,WE) <B(S,W~E); E benefits S if and only if G(S, WE) > G(S,W~E).

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great suffering. Similarly, like anesthetization and unconsciousness, deathcan harm us by precluding our living well. Comparativism gets thingsright and bifurcated comparativism gets things wrong in all of theseexamples.

Temporal Relativism

Comparativism assesses our interests in a temporally neutral way. Itimplies that, at each point in my life, it is in my interests that my welfarebe as high as possible across my entire life, so that it is prudent for menow to do what will boost my welfare later, other things being equal.Famously, Derek Parfit (compare McMahan 2002) supplies grounds forassessing our interests in a temporally relative way instead of a temporallyneutral way. Assessing our interests in a temporally relative way mayhelp Epicureans to undermine the harm theses.

Consider that sometimes we have no reason whatever to satisfy a desire.Parfit gives two examples. First, a desire might be implicitly conditionalon its own persistence, in the sense that we want to satisfy it only oncondition that we still have it. The desire to play cards is like this. Welose all reason to satisfy such desires as soon as we cease to have them.Compare desires, mentioned earlier, that are conditional on ourpersistence. We might have reason to satisfy these right up until our lastday, even if we cease to have them much earlier. Second, Parfit notes, wemight change our values or ideals, which might lead us to condemn someof our desires. In this case it is reasonable to forego any opportunity tosatisfy them. When a property, such as conditionality, undermines theimportance of satisfying a desire for P, so that P's holding is notintrinsically good for us (and ~P's holding is not intrinsically bad for us),let us say that it is an undermining feature.

When we no longer want something, we may speak of a past desire.Perhaps a desire is undermined by being past, as Parfit has claimed

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Perhaps a desire is undermined by being past, as Parfit has claimed(compare Suits 2001). Then Epicureans may be able to revive their attackon the posthumous harm thesis: dying ensures that we cannot be harmedby posthumous events, since we are without desires long before theseoccur (Vorobej, 1998). This strategy does not seem to vindicate deathitself, since death may preclude the fulfillment of some of the very desiresit destroys. However, the die-hard Epicurean might suggest that a desireis undermined, in passing, at the very moment of its destruction; if it islater thwarted, no harm is done.

In any case, it is far from clear that our interests should be assessed in atemporally relative way. The matter is quite controversial. ConsiderParfit's claim that our desires are undermined by their pastness:neutralists, who assess our interests in the temporally neutral wayprescribed by comparativism, can resist Parfit's claim by finding a featureother than pastness that tends to undermine desires that we no longerhave. One possibility becomes evident once we notice that most of ouraims are tentative in the sense that we adopt them in the expectation thatwe may later revise them. An extreme way to revise a desire for P is tostop wanting P altogether — to end the desire for P, say on the groundsthat it conflicts with other, more pressing interests. We defer to futureexercises of our own autonomy, realizing that we may reassess ourpriorities, until our life plan matures. In particular, we are alwaysprepared to revise desires in light of the projects and commitments withwhich we identify, and loath to abandon projects and commitments whichhave become parts of our identities. We favor some of the ways ourdesires change, and take what steps we can to coax them in preferreddirections. As a rough approximation, we may say that, unless our desireschange in ways we (do or) would oppose, the changes are voluntary (Cf.Harry Frankfurt 1971). For our purposes we can even count, as voluntary,the intentional elimination of a desire using artificial means, as when wetake pills to remove the desire to smoke cigarettes. If we voluntarily stopwanting P, ~P can no longer harm us. It will not harm us during the time

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wanting P, ~P can no longer harm us. It will not harm us during the timewe wanted P, or later, when our desire is thwarted. So we undermine adesire when we voluntarily abandon it (Luper 1987). On this view,Epicureans cannot show that desires are harmlessly thwarted by death andposthumous events on the grounds that such desires are past at the timedeath or posthumous events thwart them.

Actualist Comparativism

Comparativism says that the value of my dying at time t depends on theintrinsic goods (and evils) I would have accrued after t had I not died,even though I am actually dead after t. Being dead, I am incapable ofaccruing any intrinsic goods or evils after t, and in that sense I amunresponsive after t. Interest actualism denies that the value of my dyingat t can depend on these goods. It says that the value for S of event E isnot affected by the intrinsic goods or evils S would have accrued had Enot occurred, if S would have accrued them after S has actually becomeunresponsive.

Accepting interest actualism would force us to modify comparativism.The actualist view would be this:

However, actualist comparativism does not appear to be more plausiblethan standard comparativism. If I die at t, accruing goods after t is not inmy interests-after-t, but it does not follow that it is not in my interests. Ifdeveloping and fulfilling certain desires is entailed in making my life as awhole as good as possible, then it is in my interests to develop and fulfillthose desires. Even though I will die before I develop and fulfill the

Actualist Comparativism: E's value for S equals the intrinsic valuefor S of S's life in WE, the actual world in which E occurs, minusthe intrinsic value for S of S's life in the closest world, W~E, inwhich E does not occur excluding any intrinsic value S wouldaccrue in W~E after S ceases to be responsive in WE.

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those desires. Even though I will die before I develop and fulfill thedesires, it is in my interests to develop and fulfill them, and bad for menot to develop and fulfill them.

Moot Preclusion

One other line of thought might be pressed against the comparativistaccount of interests. Comparativism says that something harms me whenit makes my life worse than it would have been. However, there seem tobe events and states of affairs that do not harm me even though theirvalue for me is negative. I am not harmed, it seems, by failing to be agenius, or rich and beautiful. But compare my life as it is, with myunimpressive IQ, income and looks, to my life as it would be were Ibrilliant or rich or beautiful: the former is considerably worse than thelatter. By failing to be brilliant, rich and beautiful, I am precluded fromhaving many goods, but we might say that the preclusion is moot, in thesense that it is harmless to me. Epicureans might renew their attack on theharm thesis by exploiting examples like these. The examples appear toshow that things can have enormous negative value for me withoutharming me. Similarly, Epicureans might insist, the preclusion of goodsby death is moot: cut short, my life is worse than it would be were I not todie, but this comparative difference does not show that I am harmed.

It seems that the comparative criteria work well when we evaluate losses,such as the loss of my arms, and also when we evaluate some lacks, suchas the inability to see or to feel pleasure. But the criteria have worrisomeimplications when we evaluate certain other lacks, such as my lack ofgenius. It is relatively clear that a person is harmed by the inability to seebut less clear that he is harmed by the lack of genius. Why is that?

There are various responses to the problem of moot preclusion. One is todeny that it makes any sense to speak of ‘negativities', or events thatconsist in things not happening. This does not stop us from evaluating the

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consist in things not happening. This does not stop us from evaluating theevent or process of dying (as opposed to the state of death) which is not a‘negativity’. Comparativists are right to claim that things harm us bymaking our lives worse than they would have been otherwise; negativitiesare not counterexamples, since they do not exist. Another response is thatmoot preclusion involves cases in which the events or states of affairs thatwould be good for us if they held are highly improbable (Draper 1999). Afurther explanation involves the relative importance of having some goodsrather than others. In some moods, we may consider it harmful to bedeprived of a good just when it is important for us to have it. Thetroublesome lacks we have been discussing might be lacks of goods it isunimportant to have; such lacks would not be harmful even though wewould be better off without them.

4. The Timing Puzzle

In section 3 we showed that the harm theses can be defended on the basisof comparativism together with a plausible view of welfare. We alsoconsidered ways of attacking this defense, and some possible responses.In this section we consider another worry about the view that death mayharm its victims by depriving them of goods (or benefit them byprecluding their incurring evils). Roughly, the worry is this: suppose weaccept the presumption that something can harm a subject only if there isa (period of) time when it does so. Let us call this the Epicureanpresumption. Then death can harm us by depriving us of goods only ifthere is a time during which we are harmfully deprived. However, it is notclear that there is such a time. If the Epicurean presumption is really true,then proponents of the harm thesis will need to clarify when it is thatbeing deprived of goods harms a victim. In this section we will considerseveral possibilities. First, however, we will examine the Epicureanpresumption itself.

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4.1 The Epicurean Presumption

There is more than one way to understand the Epicurean presumption. Itmight mean this:

On this reading, the presumption is surely true. But it is also quite easy tosupply the time when something such as death is against the interests ofits victim. All it takes for an event to be against my interests is that itmakes my life as a whole worse than it would have been had the event notoccurred. Suppose, for example, that I will be infected tomorrow and,because of its effects on me during next week, the infection will worsenmy life as a whole. Then being infected is against my interests, period.That means it is against my interests now and at all other times I exist.This may seem mysterious, unless we notice that something's beingagainst my interests, according to the terms of comparativism, is not anevent, and hence not an event occurring at some time.

There is another way to understand the Epicurean presumption. Recall thedistinction made earlier (at the end of 2.1) between my interests, on onehand, and my interests-at-time-t, or what makes me better or worse off attime t, on the other. The Epicurean presumption might be that harmaffects my interests-at-t, at some time t, rather than my interests. That is,the presumption might be understood as follows:

Now, if comparativism is true, this version of the Epicurean presumptionis false. To see why, let us distinguish between two ways in whichsomething might be bad for me. On the one hand, something might bringit about that, for a while, I am worse off than I would have been. For

P1: An event E harms a subject S only if there is a time when E isagainst S's interests.

P2: E harms S only if at some time t, E is against S's interests-at-time-t.

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it about that, for a while, I am worse off than I would have been. Forexample, a coma might prevent me from enjoying a week's worth ofpleasant activities, so that, while comatose, my welfare level would belower than it would have been had I not fallen into a coma. On the otherhand, something might cause it to be the case that my life as a whole isworse than it would have been. Usually, things that make our lives aswholes worse (such as comas) do so by making us worse off for a while.However, what makes our lives worse need not make us worse off for anyperiod of time. Death can prevent me from enjoying years of pleasantactivities, making my life as a whole worse than it would have been had Inot died, even if I am not worse off at any time during my life. Death isan injury to my life as a whole.

The Epicurean presumption can be sustained if it is equated with P1, butit is easy to point to the time when death is against the interests of itsvictims: if it is against their interests at all, it is timelessly against theirinterests, according to comparativism. If, by contrast, we equate thepresumption with P2, we will look for the time during which we areworse off because of death than we would have been had we not died, andworry about the fact that it is difficult to supply that time. However, thereis good reason to reject P2. We have already seen that comparativism isextremely plausible, and P2 is false if comparativism is true.

Even if P2 is false, and death can harm us without leaving us worse off,there might still be times when, due to death or posthumous events, weare worse off. Many theorists have offered explanations of when it is thatwe incur such harm. There seem to be five possibilities (and variouscombinations thereof):

a. at all times (eternalism)b. after they occur (subsequentism)c. before they occur (priorism)

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d. at the time they (the mortem events) occur (concurrentism)e. at an indeterminate time (indefinitism).

Let us consider each of the five.

4.2 Eternalism

Feldman (1991) seems to argue for the eternalist view that my death isalways bad for me if bad for me at all. If my death harms me, it harms mewhile I am alive, while I am dead, and even before I came into existence.However, theorists (among them Lamont 1998, Silverstein 2000 and Feit2002) who interpret Feldman this way argue that he is wrong to accepteternalism. Suppose I stubbed my toe, and we ask ‘when was the stubbingbad for me?’ What exactly do we want to know? Perhaps we want toknow when it is true that the stubbing was bad for me. If so, the answeris: ‘eternally, if ever.’ However, our question might be: ‘at which timesdo I incur harm for which the stubbing was responsible?’ If so, theanswer is: ‘I incur that harm at all and only those times when my toe isthrobbing as a result of the stubbing.’ A question concerning the timing ofdeath's harmfulness might be similarly ambiguous. In asking, ‘when isLincoln's death bad for him?’ we might want to know when it is true thathis death is bad for him. The answer is presumably that it is an eternaltruth. Feldman appears to answer this first question. But his critics arelooking for an answer to a second question, namely this: ‘at which timesdoes Lincoln incur the harm for which his death is responsible?’ To thislatter question it is absurd to reply that Lincoln is always incurring harm.

4.3 Subsequentism

The termination thesis poses a significant obstacle to the subsequentistview that death and posthumous events harm us after they occur, for itimplies that death annihilates its victims, from which it appears to followthat there is no subject who is a candidate for further harm. How can wemake sense of the idea that death or posthumous events can harm an

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make sense of the idea that death or posthumous events can harm anindividual after she has died?

Subsequentists might adopt a metaphysical view that is sometimes calledmetaphysical eternalism (defended by Nagel 1970 and Silverstein 1980,among others). On this view, past and future objects are ontologically ona par with present objects. Existing things are spread out in both spaceand time. Lincoln and Socrates and other dead people may be said to‘exist,’ where ‘exist’ is used tenselessly. Given metaphysical eternalism,we can still refer to Socrates even though ‘Socrates’ refers to somethingtemporally located wholly in the past, and say of him that he is not alive.Perhaps, then, we can also make sense of the idea that people undergoharm while dead, assuming that harm can consist in the absence of somesalient good: we can interpret “Socrates' death harmed him while his lifewas over” as “The living Socrates lacked various salient goods during atime following his death.”

Palle Yourgrau offers a (Meinongian) alternative to metaphysicaleternalism. He suggests that we speak of the dead (meaning dead people),as well as the unborn, as objects, where an object has a kind of realityeven if it does not exist. He speaks of two modes of reality: the mode hecalls ‘being,’ enjoyed by ‘objects’ such as Socrates, you, and your futuregrandchildren's possessions, and the mode he calls ‘existing,’ enjoyedonly by some beings, such as live creatures and the array of thingssurrounding them. Thus Socrates, who once existed, no longer does, buthe is a being as fully as you and I. You and I enjoy both modes of reality;the dead (and unborn) have only being. Even if the dead are in somesense real, it is difficult to imagine a condition, such as pain, whosepresence in them constitutes a state of harm. But it seems possible forYourgrau to say, of the (nonexistent but real) object Socrates, that he washarmed while dead, in that he lacked various salient goods (such asexistence) while dead. Indeed, Yourgrau suggests that the unborn, like thedead, are unfortunate in having endured “the deprivation of nonexistence”

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dead, are unfortunate in having endured “the deprivation of nonexistence”(Yourgrau 1987, p. 149).

Is it plausible to argue that dead people can incur harm on the groundsthat they have some mode of reality and hence can be subjects of harm?There remain significant obstacles to this line of thought. Here are somerelevant considerations:

Many kinds of things — boulders, numbers, and my shoe, for example —cannot be harmed yet lack goods. Also, it would be strange to say that acorpse, or the dust left when it decomposes, is harmed by lacking life. Letus say that a creature is responsive at t just in case it has the capacity toaccrue at t the intrinsic goods or evils in which welfare consists. Because(living) people are responsive, and shoes are not, the former and not thelatter can be deprived of goods, and hence can be harmed. Yourgrau'sdead and “unborn” objects are not responsive; why, then, should we thinkthey are the sort of things that can be deprived of (as opposed to lacking)goods?

Recent defenses of subsequentism seem vulnerable to the charge fromunresponsiveness. According to Neil Feit (2002), Lincoln's death was badfor him, if at all, throughout the period he was deprived of life. Todetermine whether, and when, dying at time t harms me, we compare thesituation in which I die at t to the situation (the nearest possible world W)I would be in were I not to die at t. If I would fare better in W, my dyingat t harms me; roughly, it begins to harm me at the time when I begin tofare better in W, and ends at the time when I cease to fare better in W.Ben Bradley (2004, 2009) refines Feit's version of subsequentism.According to Bradley, “death is bad for the person who dies at all andonly those times when the person would have been living well, or living alife worth living, had she not died when she did.” Is subsequentismdefensible on the Feit-Bradley approach? Perhaps, but they owe us anexplanation of how it is that we can incur harm, albeit by deprivation,

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explanation of how it is that we can incur harm, albeit by deprivation,during a stretch of time when we are unresponsive.

4.4 Concurrentism

Concurrentism says we incur mortal harm precisely when death occurs. Italso says that those posthumous events that are bad for us harm usprecisely when they occur. One concurrentist, Julian Lamont (1998), putsthe view this way: we incur deprivation harm at the time some eventensures that we will not retain or attain some good that is otherwiseavailable. Call such an event an ensuring event. Death may itself be anensuring event, so death and at least many deprivation harms may occursimultaneously. Similar reasoning might support the concurrentist storyabout when posthumous events harm us, for, like death, posthumousevents ensure that we will not attain some goods we otherwise wouldhave had, such as our not being slandered posthumously. The upshot is aunified story about when death and posthumous events harm us.

However, the concurrentist story about when posthumous events harmtheir victims seems worrisome. The view is that posthumous events thatare bad for us harm us precisely when they occur. The problem, ofcourse, is that by the time posthumous events occur nothing remaining ofus is capable of incurring harm. This is the point that was just pressedagainst subsequentism. Nevertheless, concurrentists could be correctabout when death harms us even if they are wrong about the time weincur harm from posthumous events. Indeed, they could say that whiledeath can harm us, posthumous events cannot.

4.5 Priorism

To solve the timing puzzle, we might try rejecting one or more elementsof the Epicurean's causal account of responsibility, and see if there is away to defend the priorist claim that death and posthumous events canharm the living. To defend priorism, we will need to deny the assumption

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harm the living. To defend priorism, we will need to deny the assumptionthat a thing can affect us only causally. For that assumption, together withthe ban on backwards causation, forces us to dismiss the idea that harmcan occur before the event that precipitates it takes place. Yet, as GeorgePitcher (1984) says, this is precisely the idea we need in order tounderstand the harmfulness of post-mortem events. They can harm us bybeing responsible for truths that affect our interests. For example, beingslandered while I am dead makes it true that my reputation is to bedamaged, and this harms me at all and only those times when I desire thatmy reputation be untarnished. It is while I am alive that I care about myreputation's always being intact, and it is while I am alive that my well-being is brought lower by posthumous slander. The posthumous eventsthemselves harm me only indirectly; directly I am harmed by theirmaking things true that bear on my interests.

Pitcher's idea can be applied to death as well as post-mortem events.Death can harm us by making things true that negatively affect ourinterests, in which case we incur harm during such time as our well-beingis lower than it otherwise would have been. For example, dying before Icomplete some treasured project ensures that “I shall never complete myproject” is true of me; because of this, my well-being is lower than itwould have been, at such times as I am interested in the success of myproject.

Assuming that comparativism is correct, priorism is not a completeaccount of the harmfulness of death and posthumous events, forcomparativism, supplemented with some form of the preferentialistaccount of welfare, implies that death can be objectionable, in part,because it thwarts desires which we would have had and fulfilled had wenot died. Because we never actually will have such desires, we can neverbe worse off if they are thwarted. Comparativism also suggests that deathis objectionable insofar as it precludes the pleasure which we would haveenjoyed had we not died, even if we never desired the pleasure of which

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enjoyed had we not died, even if we never desired the pleasure of whichdeath deprives us.

There is another way to extend priorism. We might object to the state ofdeath, since coming to be dead makes it true of us that we have desiresthat will be unfulfilled. But instead of saying that being dead isobjectionable, it seems better to say something else, once we notice thatthe state of death is simply the state of nonexistence initiated by the eventof death. Perhaps being dead is powerless to harm us since any harm thatmight be associated with it is entailed in, and brought about by, deathitself, which is responsible for limiting the duration of our lives, and allthat that entails.

4.6 Indefinitism

The last possibility — that death and posthumous events harm us but atno determinate time (Nagel 1979; Silverstein 1980) — is criticized byJulian Lamont (1998) on the grounds that it implies that some events takeplace but at no particular time. But William Grey (1999) counters thatLamont has misunderstood Nagel's (and Grey's) indefinitist position,which is that the harm death causes is incurred during a stretch of timethat has blurry boundaries (compare: the time of the onset of baldness).

As Grey understands it, indefinitism is correct only if subsequentism,priorism or concurrentism is true (Grey opts for subsequentism), for evena period of time with blurry edges must occur before, after or at the sametime as a mortem event (eternalism is an exception since an infiniteperiod has no boundaries to blur).

4.7 Summing Up

Eternalism, the position that those who are harmed by death are alwaysincurring harm, is surely wrong. Subsequentism is more plausible, but itis hard to make sense of the idea of incurring harm posthumously, since

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is hard to make sense of the idea of incurring harm posthumously, sincewe are not responsive while dead. The indefinitist view, as we haveunderstood it, is also unhelpful; it tells us that the boundaries of the timedeath harms us are blurry, yet fails to say when that time is.Concurrentism or priorism, or some combination of the two, seem toprovide the most promising answers to the timing problem (the problemof specifying when a victim incurs the harm for which death andposthumous events are responsible). It does seem reasonable to say thatdeath may harm us while it occurs. It is far less plausible to say thatposthumous events may harm us while they occur, since we are notresponsive then. It is also plausible to say that both death and posthumousevents may harm us while we are alive, for living people may haveinterests that depend on what happens in the future.

At this time it is worth repeating what was stated in section 4.1:proponents of the harm theses do not need a solution to the timing puzzle,for something can harm us timelessly; that is, it can be against ourinterests even if there is no time t at which, because of it, we are worseoff at t than we would have been otherwise. As comparativism says,anything that makes our lives worse than they otherwise would have beenis against our interests. This death usually does. But at no time after deathare we worse off than we would have been had we not died, for thesimple reason that we do not exist. Death might make us worse off whileit occurs; however, it, and a posthumous event, might also make us worseoff before it occurs, since it may be against the interests we once had.

5. Is Death Always a Misfortune?

Are all deaths misfortunes? Perhaps, but there is a strong case to thecontrary.

5.1 Only Premature Death Is a Misfortune

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To support the conclusion that death is not always a misfortune, we mightadopt some version of preferentialism. Perhaps it is not bad to die at anadvanced enough age, for people who live long enough may be grounddown by life until they give up many of their goals. Also, they will haveattained many of their aspirations. If already satisfied, or given up, adesire cannot be thwarted, even by death, so as we lose our motivation forliving, death ceases to be objectionable to us. Perhaps death is bad for usonly if premature in the sense that it comes when we still have interestssuch as salient desires that propel us forward in life, and only if meetingthese interests is a real prospect.

5.2 Immortality Is a Misfortune

We are left to wonder whether death would ever cease to be objectionablewere we not ravaged by bad health and other hardships. Bernard Williamsargues that it would be bad to live forever, even under the best ofcircumstances. His view is based on an assumption about the relationshipbetween our identities and the desires that motivate us to live.

Consider a woman who wants to die. She might still take the view that ifshe is to live on, then she should be well fed and clothed. She wants foodand clothing on condition she remain alive. In this sense her desires areconditional, and do not give her reason to live. Contrast a father who iscommitted to rearing a beloved daughter: he desires unconditionally thatthe child do well, and his desire gives him reason to live, because he canrear his child only if he survives. In this sense, his desire is categorical, orunconditional. Williams thinks that categorical desires are essential toidentity, and give meaning to life. Through categorical desires, we areattached to projects or relationships that are definitive of the self; facedwith their destruction, we would feel our lives are meaningless, and that inan important sense we cannot survive as the persons we once were.

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The bearing on death, according to Williams, is, first, that people havegood reason to condemn a death that is premature in the sense that itthwarts their categorical desires. Second, mortality is good, since peoplewho live long enough eventually will lose the categorical desires withwhich they identify. Life will lose its novelty, and oppressive boredomwill set in. To avoid ennui, superseniors would have to replace theirfundamental desires, again and again. But this is to abandon theiridentities; it is tantamount to death.

As Williams says, lives of unimaginative routine will eventually growstale if extended long enough. Of course, this is not supposed to comfortordinary mortals, most of whom will die long before routine underminesthe joy in living. However, as several theorists, including Nagel (1986, p.224, n. 3) Glover (1977, p. 57), and Fischer (1994) have suggested, it isnot obvious that life must become dull. Williams may have overlookedhow rich and complex life can be, especially for superseniors who pursuemultiple open-ended projects in the company of other superseniors. Hisresponse to this kind of criticism is that even rich and open-ended projectseventually will become routine (say after a few billion years), so ourpursuits must be replaced periodically if we are to remain interested inlife. But to phase in wholly new projects is to lose our identity.

Williams's response faces objections. First, we might avoid boredom byadding to our pursuits, and varying the way we approach them, withoutabandoning certain core interests that define us. Second, Williams isworking with a view of identity that may be too narrow. Many of uswould welcome a possibility that he downplays: gradually transformingour interests and projects over time. Transformation is not death. It isdistinct from, and preferable to, annihilation. Transformation would bedeath only if identity were wholly a matter of retaining (most of) ourpsychological features over time. However, it is questionable thatpersistence requires this kind of connectedness. Even if our persistencehinges on our psychological features, transformation need not be death,

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hinges on our psychological features, transformation need not be death,since transformation is consistent with the gradual, continuous change ofour psychological features. If we could live endlessly, the stages of ourlives would display reduced connectedness, yet they could be continuous,which is a property that is important in the kind of survival most of usprize. Even after drinking at the fountain of eternal youth, we would tendto focus on relatively short stretches of our indefinitely extensive lives,and over these periods we would prize connectedness, since we areanimated by specific projects and relationships that can be developed onlyif there are strong interconnections among the temporal stages of ourlives. However, sometimes we would turn our attention to relatively longstretches of life, and then, prizing continuity, we would phase in new andworthwhile undertakings that build upon, and do not wholly replace, theold.

6. Can Death's Harmfulness be Reduced

Even if death is usually bad for those who die, it is possible that deathneed not be bad for us, if we prepare ourselves suitably. This might bepossible if some form of preferentialism is true, and if, by altering ourdesires, we could cease to have any interests that dying would impair. Forthen we might be able to thanatize our desires, in this sense: abandon alldesires that death might thwart. Among these are desires we can satisfyonly if we live on for a few days, but also desires we cannot possiblysatisfy within the span of a normal lifetime, and the desire for immortalityitself.

Thanatizing would insulate us from harm from death by leaving us withno interests with which dying interferes. Unfortunately, our desires maynot be malleable enough to fully thanatize them. Moreover, even if wecould fully thanatize, doing so would have a significant drawback: itwould leave us with an impoverished conception of our interests. Forexample, we could not have an unconditional desire that some project of

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example, we could not have an unconditional desire that some project ofours succeed, or an unconditional desire that a loved one flourish. Wecould retain conditionalized versions of these desires, namely: should Ilive on, let my wife flourish, and my project succeed. But limiting myselfto a conditionalized regard for my wife's well-being precludes my lovingher: if I love her, I cannot be indifferent about the way an event willaffect her so long as I will not live through it. Moreover, conditionalizeddesires cannot motivate us to live. It is unconditional desires that promptus to live on. Hence in avoiding all desires that would leave us vulnerableto death, we must give up the view that life is worth living, as well as theprojects and concerns that constitute grounds for thinking that life is good.Any reason to (want to) live is an excellent reason to want not to die; toavoid the latter, we must avoid the former.

However, the core idea of adapting our desires is useful, if not taken to anextreme. It is prudent to avoid taking on goals we cannot possibly attain,and hence prudent to eschew projects that cannot possibly be completedduring the course of a normal lifetime.

Bibliography

Belshaw, C., 2009, Annihilation: The Sense and Significance ofDeath, Dublin: Acumen Press.Braddock, G., 2000. “Epicureanism, Death, and the Good Life,”Philosophical Inquiry, 22 (1-2): 47-66.Bradley, B., 2004. “When Is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?”Noûs, 38: 1-28.Bradley, B., 2009. Well Being and Death, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.Draper, K., 1999. “Disappointment, Sadness, and Death,”Philosophical Review, 108: 387-414.Epicurus, 1966a. Principal Doctrines, in J. Saunders (ed.), Greekand Roman Philosophy after Aristotle, New York: Free Press.

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Philosophical Studies, 121 (1): 27-41.Lamont, J., 1998. “A Solution to the Puzzle of When Death Harmsits Victims,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 198-212.Levenbook, Barbara, 1984. “Harming Someone After His Death,”Ethics, 94 (3): 407-419.Locke, J., 1689. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.Lucretius, 1951. On the Nature of the Universe. Latham, reg. trans.,Penguin Classics.Luper(-Foy), S., 1987. “Annihilation,” The Philosophical Quarterly,37 (148): 233-52; reprinted in Fischer 1993; [Preprint available fromthe author (in Word)].–––, 1996. Invulnerability: On Securing Happiness, Chicago: OpenCourt.–––, 2004. "Posthumous Harm," American Philosophical Quarterly,41: 63-72; [Preprint available from the author (in Word)].–––, 2005. “Past Desires and the Dead,” in Philosophical Studies,126 (3): 331-345; [Preprint available from the author (in Word].–––, 2009. The Philosophy of Death, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.McMahan, J., 1988. “Death and the Value of Life,” Ethics, 99 (1):32-61; reprinted in Fischer 1993, 233-266.–––, 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life,New York: Oxford University Press.Mill, J.S., 1863. Utilitarianism, London: Parker, Son, and Bourn.Nagel, T., 1979. “Death,” in Nagel, T., Mortal Questions,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.–––, 1986. The View From Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.Nozick, R., 1971. “On the Randian Argument,” The Personalist,reprinted in J. Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick, Totowa, NJ: Rowman &Littlefield, 1981.

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Olson, E., 1997. The Human Animal, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.–––, 2007. What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Oxford:Oxford University Press.Overvold, M. C, 1980. “Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-Sacrifice,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10: 105-118.–––, 1982. “Self-Interest and Getting What You Want,” in TheLimits of Utilitarianism, H. Miller and W. Williams (eds.),Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 185-194.Pallis, C., 1982. “ABC of Brain Stem Death,” British MedicalJournal, 285: 1487-1490.Parfit, D., 1984. Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.Perry, J., ed., 1975. Personal Identity, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.Portmore, D., 2007. “Desire Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm,”American Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 227-38.President's Commission, 1981. Defining Death: Medical, Legal, andEthical Issues in the Determination of Death, Washington, D.C.Pitcher, G., 1984. “The Misfortunes of the Dead,” in AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, 21 (2): 217-225; reprinted in Fischer 1993,119-134.Quinn, W., 1984. “Abortion: Identity and Loss,” Philosophy andPublic Affairs, 13 (1): 24-54.Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress.Rosenbaum, S., 1986. “How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense ofEpicurus,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 23 (2): 217-25;reprinted in Fischer 1993, 119-134.–––, 1989. “Epicurus and Annihilation,” Philosophical Quarterly, 39(154): 81-90; reprinted in Fischer 1993, 293-304.Rosenberg, J., 1983. Thinking Clearly About Death, EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

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Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Scanlon, T., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.Silverstein, H., 1980. “The Evil of Death,” Journal of Philosophy, 77(7): 401-424; reprinted in Fischer 1993, 95-116.–––, 2000. “The Evil of Death Revisited,” Midwest Studies inPhilosophy, 24: 116-135.Snowdon, P.F., 1990. “Persons, Animals, and Ourselves,” in C. Gill,ed., The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and ModernPhilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Suits, D., 2001. “Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died,”American Philosophical Quarterly, 38 (1): 269-84.Unamuno, M., 1913. Kerrigan, A., Trans., The Tragic Sense of Lifein Men and Nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.Van Inwagen, P., 1990. Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress.Vorobej, M., 1998. “Past Desires,” Philosophical Studies, 90: 305-318.Warren, James, 2004.. Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics,Oxford: Oxford University Press.Williams, B., 1973. “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on theTedium of Immortality,” in B. Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Yourgrau, P., 1987. “The Dead,” Journal of Philosophy, 86 (2): 84-101; reprinted in Fischer 1993, 137-156.

Other Internet Resources

Partridge, E., 1981. “Posthumous Interest and Posthumous Respect,”Ethics 91, no. 2. Reprint made available by the author.

Related Entries

Death


Epicurus | identity | well-being

Supplement to Death

The Argument: Death and Posthumous Events Don'tAffect Us

Here is a more explicit version of 1-13 (with thanks to Curtis Brown):

Let s,s′, … range over subjects; v,v′, … over events and states; and t,t′, …over times. We can use the following abbreviations:

We can use the following function symbols:

Next come axioms:

Then premises:

SD(v,s,t): v is the state of s being dead at tharm2(v,s): v harms sharm3(v,s,t): v harms s at tt > t’: t is after t’t ≥ t’: t is after t’ or t = t’

For any subject s, ED(s) is the event of s’s death

For any event or state v, T(v) is the time v occurs or holds

A1:∀v∀s(harm2(v,s) iff ∃tharm3(v,s,t))A2:∀v∀s(v is posthumous for s iff T(v) > T(ED(s)))A3:∀v∀s∀t(If SD(v,s), then t > T(ED(s)))

Steven Luper


Here are the conclusions to be reached:

Argument for C1:

Let v1 be any event or state, s1 any subject and t1 any time.

1. v1 is posthumous for s1(assumption for conditionalintroduction)

2. harm2(v1, s1)(assumption for reductio adabsurdum)

3. T(v1) > T(ED(s1))(1, A2, UI, biconditionalelimination)

4. harm3(v1, s1,t)(2, A1, UI, biconditionalelimination, MP)

5. harm3(v1, s1, t1) (4, EI)6. v1 affects s1 at t1 (5, P3, UI, MP)7. v1 causally affects s1 at t1 (6, P1, UI, MP)

P1: ∀v∀s∀t(If v affects s at t, then v causally affects s at t)P2: ∀v∀s∀t(If v causally affects s at t, then s exists at t)P3: ∀v∀s∀t(If harm3(v,s,t), then v affects s at t)P4: ∀v∀s∀t(If v causally affects s at t, then t ≥ T(v))P5: ∀v∀s(If t > T(ED(s)), then it is not the case that s exists at t)

C1: No posthumous event harms us; i.e., ∀v∀s(If v is posthumous for s, then ~harm2(v,s))

C2: We are not harmed by the state of our being dead; i.e., ∀v∀s∀t(If SD(v,s,t), then ~harm2(v,s))

C3: The event of death harms us, if at all, only when it occurs;i.e.,∀v∀s∀t(If v=ED(s) & harm3(v,s,t), then t = T(ED(s)))

Death


8. t1 > T(v1) (7, P4, UI, MP)9. t1 > T(ED(s1)) (8, 3, transitivity of >)10. ~s1 exists at t1 (9, P5, UI, MP)11. s1 exists at t1 (7, P2, UI, MP)12. ~harm2(v1, s1) (2, 10,11, reductio ad absurdum13. If v1 is posthumous for s1, then

~harm2(v1, s1)(1, 13, conditional introduction)

14. ∀v∀s(If v is posthumous for s, then~harm2(v,s))

(13 UG)

Argument for C2:

Let v1 be any event or state, s1 any subject and t1 any time.

1. SD(v1, s1, t1)(assumption for conditionalintroduction)

2. t1 > T(ED(s1)) (1, A3, UI, MP))3. v1 is posthumous for s1 (2, A2, biconditional elimination)4. ~harm2(v1, s1) (3, C1, UI, MP)5. If SD(v1, s1, t1), then

~harm2(v1, s1)(1, 4, CI)

6. ∀v∀s∀t(If SD(v,s,t), then~harm2(v,s))

(5, UG)

Argument for C3:

Let v1 be any event or state, s1any subject and t1 any time.

1. v1 = ED(s1) & harm3(v1, s1, t1) (assumption for conditionalintroduction)

2. harm3(ED(s1), s1, t1) (1, simplication, substitution)

Steven Luper


3. ED(s1) affects s1 at t1 (2, P3, UI, MP)4. ED(s1) causally affects s1 at t1 (3, P1, UI, MP)5. t1 ≥ T(ED(s1)) (4, P4, UI, MP)

6. t1 > T(ED(s1))(assumption for reductio adabsurdum)

7. ~s1 exists at t1 (6, P5, UI, MP)8. s1 exists at t1 (4, P2, UI, MP)9. ~t1 > T(ED(s1)) (6, 8, reductio ad absurdum)10. t1 = T(ED(s1)) (5, 9, disjunctive syllogism)11. If v1=ED(s1) & harm3(v1,s1,t1), then

t1 = T(ED(s1))(1, 10, conditionalintroduction)

12. ∀v∀s∀t(If v=ED(s) & harm3(v,s,t),then t = T(ED(s))

(11, UG)

Copyright © 2009 by the author Steven Luper

Death


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