Death in theCareer Fire Fighter Dies Searching For Fire In A Restaurant/Lounge - Missouri Fire...

Career Fire Fighter Dies Searching For Fire In A Restaurant/Lounge- Missouri

July 1, 2004A Summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

SUMMARYOn February 18, 2004, a 40-year-old male careerfire fighter (the victim) was fatally injured in acommercial restaurant/lounge structure fire. Thevictim, providing mutual aid, had been searching forthe seat of the fire with two volunteer fire fightersfrom another department, when one of these firefighters lost the seal on his self contained breathingapparatus (SCBA) face piece. The fire fighterimmediately abandoned the nozzle position andretreated out of the closest door. The backup firefighter also retreated out of the building when hispartner left. In the black smoke and zero visibility,the fire fighters were unaware that the victim was stillinside the structure. Soon after, the IncidentCommander (IC) ordered an emergency evacuationbecause of an imminent roof collapse, and an air hornsignal was sounded. Personnel accounting indicatedthat a missing fire fighter (the victim) was still insidethe building when the roof partially collapsed. Afterseveral search attempts, the victim was found in aface-down position with his mask and a thermalimaging camera cable entangled in a chair. Hisfacemask was dislodged and not over his mouth.He was pronounced dead on scene.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize therisk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

• conduct pre-incident planning andinspections to facilitate development of asafe fire ground strategy

• review, revise where appropriate, implement,and enforce written standard operatingguidelines (SOGs) that specifically address:incident command (IC) duties, emergencyevacuation procedures, personnelaccountability, rapid intervention teams(RIT) and mutual aid operations on thefireground

• train on the SOGs, the incident commandsystem, and lost fire fighter procedures withmutual aid departments to establishinteragency knowledge of equipment,procedures, and capabilities

• ensure that the IC maintains the role ofdirecting fireground operations for theduration of the incident or until the

The Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and PreventionProgram is conducted by the National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The purpose ofthe program is to determine factors that cause or contributeto fire fighter deaths suffered in the line of duty.Identification of causal and contributing factors enableresearchers and safety specialists to develop strategies forpreventing future similar incidents. The program does notseek to determine fault or place blame on fire departmentsor individual fire fighters. To request additional copies ofthis report (specify the case number shown in the shieldabove), other fatality investigation reports, or furtherinformation, visit the Program Website at

www.cdc.gov/niosh/firehome.htmlor call toll free 1-800-35-NIOSH

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

F2004 Death in the line of duty...10

Incident scene

Career Fire Fighter Dies Searching For Fire In A Restaurant/Lounge - Missouri

Investigative Report #F2004-10Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation And Prevention Program

command role is formally passed to anotherindividual

• ensure that the IC conducts a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing firefighters to the interior and continuallyassesses risk versus gain throughout theoperations

• consider appointing a separate, butsystematically integrated incident safetyofficer

• ensure that all fire fighters are equippedwith radios capable of communicating withthe IC

• ensure personnel accountability reports(PAR) are conducted in an efficient,organized manner and results are reporteddirectly to the IC

• revise and enforce policies and guidelinesregarding activation of personal alert safetysystems (PASS) devices

• ensure that fire fighters train with thermalimaging cameras (TIC) and they are awareof their proper use and limitations

• ensure that individual fire fighters aretrained and aware of the hazards ofexposure to carbon monoxide and othertoxic fire gases

INTRODUCTIONOn February 19, 2004, the U.S Fire Administration(USFA) notified the National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of thisfatality. On March 9 and 10, 2004, three Safetyand Occupational Health Specialists from the NIOSHFire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention

Program investigated the incident. The NIOSH teammet with three chiefs of the involved departmentsand visited the site of the fatality. Fire-related reports,photos, written witness statements, personnel lists,SOGs, site plans, videos, dispatch radio tapes andthe coroner’s report were reviewed by theinvestigators. The victim’s protective clothing,SCBA, PASS device, and the thermal imagingcamera were examined and photographed.

Fire Department and ApparatusThere were seven separate fire departments involvedin this incident operating under a mutual aidagreement. The victim’s department is a full careerdepartment with 21 uniformed fire fighters serving apopulation of about 12,700. At the time of theincident, they were providing mutual aid to aneighboring volunteer department that consisted of15 volunteer fire fighters serving a population ofapproximately 3,500. The victim responded onEngine 611 (E611). There were two other mutualaid engines (both designated Engine 1) on site and inoperation preceding the fatal event (see Diagram)and, ultimately, more than 20 units responded.

Training/ExperienceThe victim had completed National Fire ProtectionAssociation (NFPA) Fire Fighter Level I and IItraining and had attended a basic course in the useof the department’s model of thermal imaging camera.His records also indicated he had completed apersonal safety training class within his departmentin November of 2002. The victim was a career andpreviously volunteer fire fighter with a total of morethan 12 years fire fighting experience.

Building InformationThe building was a one story, non-sprinkleredcommercial restaurant/lounge that was constructedof sheet metal walls and roof over wood frame andlightweight wood trusses (see Photo). In addition,the interior ceiling was metal decking attached to the




bottom of the trusses, suspended from the bottomchord. The building was approximately 5,000 sq ft,built in 1995. The structure consisted of a café,kitchen, bathrooms, and a 2,500 sq ft bar with abandstand and dance floor. None of the respondingdepartments had inspected the building or developeda pre-incident plan. The building was not coveredby any building code jurisdiction since it was locatedin an unrestricted rural area.

WeatherWeather conditions at the time of the incident weresunny with a moderately strong wind of approximately21 - 26 mph from the south-southwest. Thetemperature was approximately 640 F and humiditywas about 30%.

INVESTIGATIONOn February 18, 2004, five units from three separatedepartments were dispatched to a commercialrestaurant/lounge fire. The initial alarm wasdispatched at 1331 hours. At 1342 hours, the victim’sengine arrived at the scene with three other careerfire fighters. The structure fire was located in a mutualaid district, and the first arriving units were alreadyon the scene for approximately one or two minuteswhen the victim’s unit arrived. The victim waswearing full protective turnouts including a hood anda SCBA with an integrated PASS and a portableVHF radio. While responding to the scene, theintegrated PASS had sounded in the jump seat ofEngine 611 (E611). The victim reportedly silencedand reset the alarm. He was also wearing an additionalPASS which was of the type that had to be manuallyturned on to operate. In addition, a thermal imagingcamera was mounted on his helmet and connectedto a side pouched battery pack.

When the victim’s engine arrived on the scene, therewere mutual aid units already in progress of organizingan interior attack. The substantial wind moved theheavy smoke in a general north and east direction.

No flames were visible from the front at that time.The IC was a local volunteer district Fire Chief whohad arrived prior to E611 and had maintained dutiesat an engine pump panel as the pump operator forthe duration of the incident. Due to limited radioground frequencies, the IC had no radiocommunications with E611. The IC also did notreceive any interior condition reports from any crewsfor the duration of the incident.

E-611’s crew leader, an acting officer (fire fighter#1), assigned the victim and another fire fighter (firefighter #2) to assist a two person, mutual aiddepartment crew that was getting ready to enter thefront of the building with an 1¾ inch attack line tosearch for the seat of the fire. Three fire fightersentered the building with the victim in the leadfollowed by in-district volunteer fire fighters (firefighters #3 and #4). Fire fighter #2 stayed at the doorto feed the hose line. Their entry time is estimated tobe 1343 hours. Since the fire was mostly confinedto the space above the metal drop ceiling, there waslight smoke and good visibility. Their initial entrywas into the north part of the structure toward thecafé, to locate the seat of the fire. With no visiblefire in this area, they reversed to the south part of thebuilding in the bar area. At about 1346 hours,firefighter #2 was diverted to the rear of the buildingto join an attack line at the back door. He informedthe victim of his reassignment and was given a “thumbsup” hand signal of acknowledgement. Fire fighter#2’s relocation to the rear left three original firefighters in the front door, the victim with the thermalimaging camera, and fire fighters #3 and #4 on thehoseline. When fire fighter #4 saw fire fighter #2leave the building through the front door he mistakenlybelieved it to be the victim leaving. As the fire fightersentered the structure deeper into the south part ofthe building, the smoke became thick and black.Visibility dropped to zero and heat conditionsworsened since the fire was rapidly spreading throughthe trusses above.




Fire fighter #3 was in the black smoke when he felt asharp tug on his mask. He later told investigators hewas unsure what caused the tug. He lost his facemaskseal, dropped the nozzle and left the building throughthe front door after inhaling acrid smoke. Fire fighter#4, thinking he was alone, also exited through thefront door.

In the meantime, fire fighter #1 entered the rear ofthe building with fire fighter #2 on an attack linearound 1349 hours. At 1352 hours, another mutualaid Fire Chief observed part of the metal roof saggingdown and advised the IC by radio of imminentstructural collapse. He also advised emergencyevacuation procedures. Almost simultaneously, thepump operator from E611, who was staged at thesouthwest corner of the building, noticed the sameroof sagging and, with concern for the interior crewin the rear, sounded repeated air horn blasts from hisengine until he could visibly see the rear attack crewexit the building.

The IC used his radio to order an “all out” emergencyevacuation and a personnel accountability report(PAR). Individual groups of mutual aid departmentstook visual head counts of their people. Before therewas a confirmation of all personnel outside andsecure, the attack line in the front door was draggedout of the building. The roof partially collapsed atthe south end of the structure around 1354 hours.

Soon, it was noticed that one of the fire fighters wasmissing. A couple of minutes later, there were severalorganized rapid intervention team (RIT) attempts toreenter the now partially collapsed building atdifferent locations. Since no one was sure wherethe victim’s last location was, initially the RIT enteredthrough the rear. The result was withdrawals,regrouping, and another air-horn series signalingemergency evacuation. Except for defensive

hoselines, the RIT brought no extra or specialequipment. They heard no PASS alarms and therewere no radio transmissions from the victim.

The victim was found along an east wall, about 25 ft.south of the front entrance at approximately 1437hours, about 56 minutes after his initial entry. Hewas in a face-down position with his face maskpartially removed and the cylinder to regulator hosetangled around a chair. A cable from the thermalimaging camera was also tangled in the chair. Itappears that the entanglement with the chair wouldhave inhibited exit but not trapped the victim. Hishelmet with the mounted thermal imaging camera wasin place. His turnouts, hood, gloves, and SCBA werealso in place. The integrated PASS alarm was notsounding, possibly due to the charred and meltedcondition of the unit. The other PASS unit was foundon the victim but did not appear to have beenactivated. Even in a melted condition, the secondarymanual PASS operated and alarmed at a low volumein a field test, post-incident.

A portable radio was found next to the victim. Noindividual traffic from the victim was recorded bycentral dispatch. The absence of a local fire groundchannel and different radio frequencies precludedradio communication between the victim and the IC.A dent in the helmet of the victim appears to havebeen caused by a ceiling mounted television that hadfallen post-mortem. It does not appear that the partialroof collapse directly struck the victim or obstructedhis exit path. The victim was left in place until thelocal coroner pronounced him dead at the scene.

CAUSE OF DEATHThe coroner listed cause of death as smoke inhalation.An independent toxicology report listed the victim’scarbon monoxide level at 51% saturation. Therewas no notable trauma.




RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONRecommendation #1: Conduct pre-incidentplanning and inspections to facilitatedevelopment of a safe fire ground strategy1-4

Discussion: Even though fire department inspectionsmay not be written into local ordinances, it could becritical to have prior knowledge of individual buildingconstruction and unique characteristics. NFPA 1500considers building assessment a necessarycomponent of a comprehensive risk management planand Klaene and Sanders consider the identificationof roof and floor trusses critical for developing a safefire ground strategy. Since truss construction iscommon and requires special consideration in firefighting operations, it is especially helpful to note theirlocation or operate under the assumption that trussesare there unless confirmed otherwise. Besides the inherent heat distribution properties of metal walls,roofs and ceilings, the weight of a hanging metal ceilingshould be a consideration when used in conjunctionwith light weight trusses.

In this case, the metal building, roof and ceiling, andlightweight wood roof truss construction created adangerous fire environment conducive to earlystructural collapse. Concealed spaces abovesuspended ceilings allow flame spread to goundetected. The presence of concealed spaces canbe noted in pre-incident visits and referenced. Also,a pre-incident inspection provides an opportunity totest radio transmission capabilities. In this case, it isunknown whether the metal building interfered withcommunications to the victim’s designated radiochannel. It was not tested before the building wasrazed. NFPA 1620 addresses the need for testingcommunications and interference of radio coverageduring the pre-incident planning process.

Recommendation #2: Review, revise whereappropriate, implement, and enforce writtenstandard operating guidelines (SOGs) that

specifically address: incident command (IC)duties, emergency evacuation procedures,personnel accountability, rapid interventionteams (RIT) and mutual aid operations on thefireground.1,2,7

Discussion: Written standard operating guidelines(SOGs) enable individual fire department membersan opportunity to read and maintain a level ofassumed understanding of operational procedures.Conversely, fire departments can suffer when thereis an absence of well developed SOGs. The NIOSHAlert: “Preventing Injuries and Deaths of FireFighters” identifies a need to follow and establishfire-fighting policies and procedures. Guidelinesshould be reviewed, revised and fully implementedto be effective and enforceable. “All Out” type ofemergency evacuations, personnel accountability,and rapid intervention teams are examples of criticaloperations that require specific written guidelines toassure mutual understanding. While SOGs shouldbe written specific to each department, there is alsoa need to have regional planning. The complexitiesof a large scale incident are already difficult withoutthe added confusion about differences in coordinatingcritical operations.

In an emergency evacuation, hoselines should notbe removed until there is a full PAR completed, withall personnel accounted for. This excludes hose linesthat are needed by interior crews to assist in theprocess of safe evacuation. In this situation, aninterior hoseline was pulled back out through the frontdoor before the PAR was completed. If the hoselinehad not been pulled out, it may have served as aguide to the RIT on where to focus rescue efforts.Also, the victim may have had more opportunity tofollow the hoseline out of the building. The victim’sabsence was eventually discovered and brought tothe attention of an officer and the IC. The departmentSOGs addressed crew integrity but not guidelinesor procedures for conducting a PAR .




Recommendation #3: Train on the SOGs, theincident command system, and lost fire fighterprocedures with mutual aid departments toestablish interagency knowledge of equipment,procedures and capabilities.1,5,7

Discussion: NFPA 1500 specifically refers to theimportance of training in emergency operations basedon standard operating procedures or guidelines.Training is the key to competency and is especiallyimportant when there is a gap in experience. Firefighters should train on activation of PASS alarmsand other life-saving activities when lost, trapped ordisoriented. Basic activities such as emergency radiotraffic, moving toward windows, breaching walls, andutilizing flashlights are just a few of the techniquesthat can save an individual or team. Fire fightersshould be provided with the proper tools and specialtraining to help facilitate search and rescue of lostfire fighters and individual or crew survivalprocedures. NFPA 1561 defines the essentialelements of an incident command system.

While there were varying amounts of training withinand between mutual aid departments, the victim’sdepartment had very little experience training withthe department they were assisting. Cross trainingon SOGs and the incident command system helps toestablish protocols or standards to maximizemanpower efficiency and safety of mixed mutual aidcrew assignments. Training for lost fire fighters isespecially critical when required to work with mutualaid departments that have different staffing, equipmentand procedures.

Recommendation #4: Ensure that the incidentcommander (IC) maintains the role of directingoperations for the duration of the incident oruntil the command role is formally passed toanother individual.5

Discussion: It is critical that a single individualassumes responsibility for overall control of anincident. While it is advisable to divide commandpositions into sectors or task groups, the authorityand unification of command is the foundation of thesystem outlined in NFPA 1561. Section 3-1.1 states:“There should be one, clearly identifiable incidentcommander for the duration of the incident, from thearrival of the first unit until the incident is terminated.”In this incident, the IC carried a dual role as pumpoperator for the duration of the fire operations. Manyof the mutual aid fire fighters were not aware whothe IC was and looked upon their regular chiefofficers as the unofficial commander of theirdepartment group actions.

Recommendation #5: Ensure that the ICconducts a risk-versus-gain analysis prior tocommitting fire fighters to the interior andcontinually assesses risk versus gainthroughout the operations.1

Discussion: There was information provided by thebuilding owner that the building was evacuated andcompletely unoccupied. This type of informationshould be a factor in consideration of a full interiorattack or search for the seat of a fire. If an IC isdirecting the fire fighters to focus on aggressive interioroffensive operations, there should also be additionalparameters that include an organized retreat planbecause of the high risk. An unknown layout,unknown construction, or an unknown source of thefire should be considered in all situations beforecommitting interior crews deep into a structure.NFPA 1500 states in section 6-2.1.1: “No risk tothe safety of the members shall be acceptable whenthere is no possibility to save lives or property.”

A lack of preplanning and interior constructioninformation created an environment of unknown,




potentially dangerous conditions. Interior crews didnot pull ceilings or identify truss construction to theIC. Such information may have been critical for ICassessment of interior conditions and a decision ofwhether to go into defensive operations.

Recommendation #6: Consider appointing aseparate, but systematically integrated incidentsafety officer 1,7

Discussion: One of the key duties of an incidentsafety officer should be to assist the IC with riskmanagement during emergency operations. Whilethe IC continues to have ultimate responsibility forthe safety of all fire department members operatingat an incident, a designated safety officer can assistthe IC in the analysis of critical risk factors. It isadvisable that the IC appoints a safety officer that isnot just playing a separate role, but rather is a part ofthe safety system that is an integral part of the wholeincident management system. The appointment of asafety officer does not relieve the IC of safety functionsbut acts as a delegation of authority for scene safetymanagement. In this sense, all fire fighters are partof that system and have a responsibility to reportunsafe conditions to the designated safety officer orcommand. Safety officer duties are outlined in NFPA1500 and NFPA 1521.

Recommendation #7: Ensure that all firefighters are equipped with radios capable ofcommunicating with the IC.8,9

Discussion: There were multiple radios utilizingmultiple channels at this incident. While there wasalso a designated fire ground tactical channel assignedto units on the scene, the victim’s department wasincapable of using this channel because of technicallimitations. It should be noted, however, that thevictim was capable of communicating with his own

department and the central dispatch. It is vital thatan interior fire fighter have unrestrictedcommunication with the IC for their own personalsafety as well as the ability to advise command ofinterior conditions and special hazards. A designatedemergency traffic channel or a procedure to takecontrol of the assigned channel communications inan emergency situation should also be considered.NFPA 1221 addresses emergency communicationsneeds.

Recommendation #8: Ensure that PersonnelAccountability Reports (PAR) are conducted inan efficient, organized manner and results arereported directly to the IC.5,9

Discussion: While there may be varying methods ofaccomplishing a PAR it is critical that all membersreport directly to the IC or an officer that reportsdirectly to the IC. Officers should maintain a constantawareness of the position and function of all personnelassigned to operate under their supervision.Likewise, it is important for assigned teams tomaintain integrity and awareness of each other’slocation and accountability unless reassigned. Then,if reassignment occurs, it should be understood bythe whole team. In this situation, there was confusionabout whether a fire fighter was actually missing ornot.

When a PAR indicates a fire fighter is missing,directives by the IC become extremely critical andshould encompass guidelines to the individuals introuble as well as the coordination of other firefighters, especially the rapid intervention team (RIT).An IC can also direct the RIT to bring specialequipment, such as thermal imaging cameras, asneeded for each unique situation. NFPA 1561discusses the need for rapid and efficient personnelaccounting.




Recommendation #9: Revise and enforcepolicies and guidelines regarding activation ofpersonal alert safety systems (PASS) devices .9,10

Discussion: The operation of all PASS devices shouldbe checked on a daily basis. When a PASS deviceis integrated into the SCBA, as in this situation, itshould not preclude a need to activate the secondarydevice. In this case, however, the victim likely didnot turn on his secondary PASS device. The SCBAintegrated PASS was automatically activated whenair was turned on. It is unknown whether theintegrated PASS properly activated or alarmed.Interior rescue team fire fighters and other outsidefire fighters were in positions where they probablyshould have heard the PASS alarm, if it was alarming.Yet, with the exception of an accidental activation inthe jump seat of E611, neither PASS was heard forthe duration of the incident.

Fire departments should maintain a policy ofactivation of all PASS devices on the fire groundand especially when conducting interior operations.Recognizing the problem of individuals not activatingtheir PASS, many fire departments are utilizingautomatic activating models. Because of the severelyburned, deteriorated and melted condition of theintegrated PASS when the victim was found, it willprobably be undetermined whether the PASS wasproperly functioning. When investigators conducteda field test on the secondary PASS, it activated andalarmed, in spite of its melted condition.NFPA 1982 outlines PASS standards.

Recommendation #10: Ensure that fire fighterstrain with thermal imaging cameras (TIC) andthey are aware of their proper use andlimitations.1 1

A thermal imaging device is a valuable tool, especiallyfor size-up. However, fire fighters should be cautiousabout a false sense of security when using a TIC.

Malfunctions may occur and sole reliance on thecamera is not advisable. Fire fighters also need totrain in the use of thermal imaging cameras so thatthey are able to recognize the key features of theirproper use in locating the seat of a fire. In this case,the thermal image camera holder could have beenbehind the nozzle man to direct routes of entry andstream application. If the thermal image cameraholder is in the lead, he or she may not recognize thepoor visibility conditions of those that follow. In thiscase, the use of the second thermal imaging cameraon scene may have helped the RIT locate the victimsooner.

Recommendation #11: Ensure that fire fightersare aware of the hazards of exposure to carbonmonoxide and other fire gases.12

It is likely that the dislocation of the victim’s mask,whether forced or voluntary, resulted in exposure totoxic gases that quickly overcame his ability to thinkor speak clearly. The effects of toxic smoke andcarbon monoxide are frequently underestimated andmay have rapidly affected the victim’s judgmentcapabilities, muscular control or state ofconsciousness. In other words, because of hisexposure to fire gases, he might not have had theopportunity to call for help on the radio, or activatehis PASS alarm. Even moderate levels of carbonmonoxide can produce symptoms like confusion,disorientation and physical incapacitation of muscularcontrol. It is important for all fire fighters tounderstand that symptoms can appear in less than aminute and that they may have no time to react whena problem occurs. The victim’s carboxyhemoglobinlevel was found to be 51% by official autopsy.

REFERENCES1. NFPA [2002]. NFPA 1500: Standard on fire

department occupational safety and healthprogram. Quincy, MA: National Fire ProtectionAssociation.




2. NIOSH [1999]. NIOSH alert: preventinginjuries and deaths of fire fighters due to structuralcollapse. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services, Public HealthService, Centers for Disease Control andPrevention, National Institute for OccupationalSafety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) PublicationNo. 99-146.

3. Klaene B. and Sanders R. [2002]. Structuralfire fighting. Quincy, MA: National FireProtection Association.

4. NFPA [2003]. NFPA 1620: Recommendedpractice for pre-incident planning. Quincy, MA:National Fire Protection Association.

5. NFPA [2002]. NFPA 1561: Standard on firedepartment incident management system. Quincy,MA: National Fire Protection Association.

6. NIOSH [1994]. NIOSH alert: preventinginjuries and deaths of fire fighters. Cincinnati,OH: U.S. Department of Health and HumanServices, Public Health Service, Centers forDisease Control and Prevention, NationalInstitute for Occupational Safety and Health,DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 94-125.

7. NFPA [2002]. NFPA 1521: Standard for firedepartment safety officer. Quincy, MA: NationalFire Protection Association.

8. NFPA [2002]. NFPA 1221: Standard for theinstallation, maintenance, and useof emergency services communication systems.Quincy, MA: National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

9. Dunn V. [1999]. Command and control of firesand emergencies. Saddle Brook, NJ. FireEngineering publishing.

10. NFPA [1998]. NFPA 1982: Standard onpersonal alert safety systems (PASS). Quincy,MA: National Fire Protection Association.

11. Anonymous [2004]. Thermal imaging cameradeployment: Phoenix Regional StandardOperating Procedures. Phoenix, AZ: PhoenixFire Department.

12. Allen S. and Berkman B. [2002]. CO Rx : ASafety Prescription, WNYF (FDNY) magazine4TH Edition, New York City, NY: FDNY FireZone.

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATIONThis incident was investigated by Bruce Oerter, MarkMcFall and Steve Berardinelli, Safety andOccupational Health Specialists with the Fire FighterFatality Investigation and Prevention Program,Division of Safety Research at NIOSH.




Photo. Front view (East side) of building




Diagram. Aerial view of incident scene

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