De Silva - MI5, An Phobcrap, Finucane et al

1. MI5s propaganda initiatives details cannot be made public because of sensitivities, Pat Finucane was included in these projects though so must address the issue:

15.5 Although many of the details underpinning this account cannot be disclosed in view of their sensitivity, this has not inhibited me from publishing an overview of these initiatives and their objectives; the fact of Patrick Finucane's inclusion in these projects; and my conclusions on the nature of the propaganda as a whole. I have been provided with access to all the relevant underlying documentation. Although he was not directly involved in these propaganda initiatives, I have had the opportunity of questioning a senior Security Service officer on this material.

2. Origin lay in government need to counter IRA propaganda. Called it Counter-Action:

15.9 It is clear that by the 1980s there was a widespread feeling across the security forces and the UK Government that such propaganda needed to be countered. My Review has had access to a range of internal Government documents outlining the discussions of the need for what was described as 'Counter-Action'. Counter-Action appears to have been described as the use of either overt or covert means to provide truthful rebuttals of terrorist propaganda or to expose the damaging effects of terrorism. A Northern Ireland Office (NIO) Information Strategy Group was tasked with co-ordinating the Government's presentational strategy. This group considered the Government's strategy in responding to specific controversial security incidents and the presentation of its wider political and economic message.

3.

Methods involved dissemination of information within Loyalist community with targets

being PIRA figures with goal of discrediting them - aim was to have an impact on the

target by the information being known in Loyalist circles - in practice they included

prominent figures in nationalist and republican community who werent Provos:

15.12 My Review has, however, established that some comparatively limited propaganda initiatives were taken forward by the Security Service in Northern Ireland in the 1980s. The initiatives focused on propaganda directed against PIRA. The methods used by the Security Service involved the dissemination of information within the broader loyalist community in a bid to counter republican propaganda. The initiatives of central interest

to my Review were taken forward by the Service of their own volition and without reference to the NIO Information Strategy Group.15.13 The Security Service used a variety of methods and conduits through which to disseminate the propaganda. The nature of the propaganda being disseminated varied. Some of the propaganda involved, for example, highlighted the damaging effect of PIRA murders and attacks. In other instances, the propaganda was targeted more directly at discrediting specific PIRA figures.15.14 Security Service officers later referred to the dissemination of information within the loyalist community, in such a way that it would be likely to become known by PIRA figures, as having the potential to make "an impact on the republican target." However, whilst the focus of the propaganda was aimed at PIRA, it is also clear that the initiatives were not particularly focused or controlled. The initiatives certainly came to include within their scope individuals who were not members of terrorist organisations but prominent figures in the broader nationalist and republican communities.

4.

Aim was to expose IRA members and to disrupt them; targets were individuals who had

resisted efforts to recruit them as agents or who were regarded as unrecruitable (presumably

didnt have anything on them); no evidence that motive was to incite attacks:

15.17 The second mechanism was described as follows:"... [the Security Service could exploit the use of] the extensive intelligence on PIRA players already available ... [to loyalist paramilitaries] to expose to the public the nature of the people organising and profiting from IRA terrorism." [7]15.18 In furtherance of the second aim - to expose 'PIRA players' - the officer proposed that the propaganda initiatives should be expanded to include the public circulation of details of "the structure, organisation and personnel of PIRA". Some PIRA figures had already been named and exposed as part of the propaganda initiatives in the late 1980s, though this had been done in an ad hoc and comparatively small-scale fashion. The Security Service officer referred to above was proposing a significant expansion of this aspect of the propaganda initiatives.

15.19 The note also provided an explanation as to how the public circulation of details of PIRA players would assist the intelligence agencies' wider strategy. It included the comment that:"It has been agreed that disruption is the alternative as recruitment of PIRA players has proved impossible, and this would provide an ideal opportunity for unnerving the unrecruitable." [8]15.20 The note thus implies that propaganda against specific PIRA figures was a tactic that could be used against individuals who were either assessed to be unrecruitable as agents or who had been approached and had refused to become agents.15.21 I should note that the "disruption" envisaged by the Security Service appears to have referred to the concern that such propaganda would prompt amongst PIRA players. There is no evidence that the Service were motivated by a desire to spread the propaganda in order to encourage and inspire loyalists to 'disrupt' PIRA figures by attacking them. I consider below, however, the highly pertinent concerns of the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) and others that, in practice, the propaganda could nonetheless be perceived as being incitement against such individuals.

5.

Undated documents cited by de Silva record reservations within upper reaches of MI5 at the

strategy:

15.22 The documents I have reviewed suggest that there was considerable unease amongst some Security Service officers with regard to the nature of the propaganda and the proposals for expanding the initiatives. At one stage, the Head of the Security Service's operational section had cautioned that the Service should be careful that the initiatives should not involve "anything which might be taken as incitement".[9]15.23 The Head of G8, the Service's Irish agent-running section based in London, provided the first internal critique of the propaganda initiatives. He advised that the Government had an:"... obligation to do nothing that intentionally or deliberately exacerbates religious sectarian tensions." [10]

15.24 However, despite these reservations the officer also referred in the same telegram to the initiatives as having been "talented and clearly successful ".

6.

Initiative wound up towards end of 1989 (after Finucane killing) amid reservations

expressed by new Chief Constable, Hugh Annesley; MI5 Operational Section wanted it to

continue so that republican players can experience same fear of assassination as security

forces (We should interview Annesley):

15.26 The propaganda initiatives appear to have only been terminated entirely towards the end of 1989. The minutes of the Targeting Policy Committee during September 1989 also show that the new Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Annesley, had expressed reservations about the intelligence agencies conducting any 'Counter-Action' type of propaganda activity (though there is no record to suggest that the Chief Constable had been made aware of these Security Service initiatives).15.27 However, it is clear that the Security Service's operational section viewed the ending of the initiatives with some regret. Whilst accepting that the Service's operational branch should not have a propaganda role, one officer expressed the view that there was nevertheless a continuing need for a project:"... which challenges republican assertions, which makes republican players feel that they, too, are as exposed as the members of the security forces who live daily under threat of the assassin's bomb or bullet."

7.

Although not the focus of the initiative, Pat Finucane became a target by virtue of

representing IRA clients and the propaganda linked him to the activities of his clients. Aim

was to unnerve him rather than incite attack but de Silva says he has to consider whether

effect was to legitimise him as a target:

Propaganda referring to Patrick Finucane prior to his murder15.30 The above analysis provides the background to the formulation and implementation of the Security Service's propaganda initiatives. This project is of particular relevance to my Review because I have established that in the late 1980s, prior to his murder, the initiatives encompassed the dissemination of information referring to Patrick Finucane within the loyalist community.

15.31 I should note that Patrick Finucane was not the focus of the propaganda initiatives in the late 1980s. The thrust of the propaganda rumours and innuendo was aimed at the republican movement and specific PIRA players, including individuals who would have been represented by Patrick Finucane. However, as a result of his work in defending these individuals, it is clear that Mr Finucane came to be included within the scope of the propaganda.15.32 The information relating to Patrick Finucane that was being circulated effectively involved fanning the rumours and speculation linking him to the IRA. The effect of the propaganda would certainly have been, in my view, to associate Patrick Finucane with the activities of his clients.15.33 I have found no evidence that the Security Service circulated Patrick Finucane's personal details, nor that they proposed that any individual or group attack him. In line with the broader objectives of the initiatives, the propaganda against Patrick Finucane appears to have been designed to discredit and 'unnerve' him rather than to incite loyalists or anyone else to target him. However, even if the propaganda was not intended to incite loyalists in that respect, I must consider the question as to whether it could have legitimised him as a target for loyalist paramilitaries.

8.

MI5 denied there was a direct link between propaganda and Finucanes murder:

15.39 I questioned Security Service officer G/07 on the propaganda initiative. He acknowledged that:"... the discussion that we saw [between the DCI, HAG and the Head of the Service's operational section] might more usefully have taken place before the [initiatives] took place." [15]15.40 However, he did express the view that, given the UDA's long-standing targeting of Patrick Finucane, he did not "see a direct linkage between the [propaganda] and the murder"

9.

De Silva does believe the effect was to help make Finucane a target for Loyalists:

In considering the background to this initiative, and taking account of the underlying material I have seen, I do believe that the propaganda could have had the effect of further legitimising Patrick Finucane as a target for loyalist paramilitaries.

10.

Both RUC Special Branch and the FRU knew and approved of the targeting of Pat

Finucane:

15.46 A Security Service telegram produced in the late 1980s also demonstrates that both the RUC SB and the FRU were aware of the propaganda that included Patrick Finucane. The RUC SB appear to have provided their endorsement for the propaganda, whilst the FRU were said to have been made aware of the propaganda intended for dissemination. The Security Service note stated that:"We have consulted [Assessments Group] (HAG) and RUC (SB Ch Insp.) who was enthusiastic about the concept and content [with the proposed nature of the propaganda]. FRU were [made aware of the proposed nature of the propaganda]."

11.

Oliver Kelly and Paddy McGrory were also targets:

Propaganda against Oliver Kelly and Paddy McGrory15.49 I have established that the propaganda initiatives also included the dissemination of rumours with respect to the solicitors Oliver Kelly and Paddy McGrory during the 1980s. As was the case in relation to Patrick Finucane, I am satisfied that the channels used for this propaganda meant that the information reached loyalist paramilitary groups.15.50 The Security Service were aware at the material time that these rumours would reach loyalist paramilitaries. The rumours would have added to and reinforced a variety of other conversations taking place within UDA circles at the time with regard to the supposed allegiances of these solicitors.15.51 I should note that there is no evidence that the Security Service intended such rumours to be circulated with a view to encouraging loyalists to attack these lawyers. However, even if the intention was to

'unnerve' such lawyers, there were obvious risks in acquiescing in the circulation of such information around the loyalist community. The propaganda was disseminated despite the fact that both lawyers were known to be under threat from loyalist paramilitaries.

12.

Targeting of Finucane undermined his ability to do his job as a lawyer as the British

government was bound by international agreement to protect and served to legitimise

Finucane as a target although the intent was to unnerve him rather than incite attacks:

15.53 I am entirely satisfied that, although he was not the focus of the initiatives, Patrick Finucane came to be included within their scope. In my view, his inclusion in this manner breached the obligations that should have been upheld by the State to ensure that lawyers could operate free from intimidation and not be identified with the causes of their clients.15.54 I am satisfied that the dissemination of this propaganda could have served to further legitimise Patrick Finucane as a target for loyalist paramilitaries. Whilst the aim of these initiatives was to 'unnerve' people such as Mr Finucane (rather than to incite loyalists to attack them), the fact that the propaganda could have such an effect was, in my view, a consequence that should have been foreseeable to the Security Service at the time.