ddw09.wikispaces.comddw09.wikispaces.com/file/view/DDW States CP.doc/80520023... · Web...

States CPDDW 2009 All the Cool Kids

States CP States CP ..................................................................................................................................................... 1

States 1NC .................................................................................................................................................. 3

States Solve: Education ............................................................................................................................. 4

States Solve: Feminism .............................................................................................................................. 5

States Solvency: General ........................................................................................................................... 6



States Solve: Healthcare ............................................................................................................................ 9

States Solve: Healthcare .......................................................................................................................... 10

States Solve: Healthcare .......................................................................................................................... 11

States Solve: Immigration ....................................................................................................................... 12

States Solve: Innovation .......................................................................................................................... 13

States Solve: International Cooperation ................................................................................................ 14

States Solve: Medicaid ............................................................................................................................. 15

States Solve: Medicare ............................................................................................................................ 16

States Solve: Military .............................................................................................................................. 17

States Solve: Reform ................................................................................................................................ 18

States Solve: Social Security ................................................................................................................... 19

Race to the Top—General ....................................................................................................................... 20

Race to the Top—Education ................................................................................................................... 21

AT: Perm .................................................................................................................................................. 22

AT: Race to the bottom ........................................................................................................................... 23

AT: No Money .......................................................................................................................................... 24

Federal Government Models States ....................................................................................................... 25

Federal Government Models States ....................................................................................................... 26

State Policies Better ................................................................................................................................. 27

States—AT: Obama Blamed for DC ...................................................................................................... 28

States Don’t Link to Politics ................................................................................................................... 29

Uniform State Action ............................................................................................................................... 30

***Aff Answers*** .................................................................................................................................. 31

AT: States Solve Childcare ..................................................................................................................... 32 1


AT: States Solve Immigration ................................................................................................................ 33

AT: States Solve Mental Health ............................................................................................................. 34

Race to the Bottom ................................................................................................................................... 35



Perm Shields Politics Link ...................................................................................................................... 38

Perm Solves .............................................................................................................................................. 39

States Bad—Lack Resources .................................................................................................................. 40

States Bad—Creativity ............................................................................................................................ 41

States Bad—Discrimination .................................................................................................................... 42

States Bad—Diversion ............................................................................................................................. 43

States Bad—Social Services Trade-off ................................................................................................... 44

States Bad—Social Services Trade-off ................................................................................................... 45

Aff—Obama Linked to DC Action ........................................................................................................ 46

Aff—Theory—No Uniform State Action ............................................................................................... 47

***Federalism DA Aff Answers*** ....................................................................................................... 48

Federalism Dead ...................................................................................................................................... 49

Federalism Terminally Dead .................................................................................................................. 50

Federalism Not Needed ........................................................................................................................... 51

Federalism Not Modeled ......................................................................................................................... 52

Federalism Not Modeled ......................................................................................................................... 53

Federalism Bad: Laundry List ............................................................................................................... 54

Federalism Bad: Environment ............................................................................................................... 55

Federalism Bad: Corruption .................................................................................................................. 56

Federalism Bad—Nigeria ........................................................................................................................ 57

Federalism Fails ....................................................................................................................................... 58

Federalism Fails ....................................................................................................................................... 59

***Federalism DA*** ............................................................................................................................. 60

Federalism 1NC ....................................................................................................................................... 61

Federalism 1NC ....................................................................................................................................... 62

Uniqueness ................................................................................................................................................ 63

2


States 1NC Contention One—Text: The fifty states and territories of the United States should

3


States Solve: Education States already fund education(Princeton-Brookings, , “The Future of Children”, http://www.futureofchildren.org/information2827/information_show.htm?doc_id=79247)

Briefly, the education funding sources that can be most useful for financing school-linked services include:State and local general-education support, which continues to be the major part of education funding. Only a small portion of these funds, however, has ever been dedicated to social supports in schools—supports such as school psychologists, counselors, and other social or health services. Even this small amount of funding is thought to be diminishing.

States key to education of all ages. (State and local governments.net, directory of official state service websites, 2005, http://www.statelocalgov.net/50states-education.cfm)

State departments and boards of education are generally responsible for supporting public early childhood, K-12 secondary, higher education, technical and community educational institutions. Usually they: Manage state and federal grant funds Maintain educational standards through uniform testing and professional certification

Develop curricula Coordinate statewide planning

Promote excellence in education

4


States Solve: Feminism States solve feminist social services best(Dana Neacsu, Head of Public Services at Columbia Law School Library, 2008, THE RED BOOKLET ON FEMINIST EQUALITY. INSTEAD OF A MANIFESTO.)

Empirical social sciences have been exploring how states' commitment to the disempowered works and they suggest that often states do not address inequality effectively without working alongside different movements. Feminist activists have already held states accountable for how they address gender inequalities. It will be interesting whether feminists can further address those issues by demanding stronger state partners which are endowed with more social, economic, and financial resources to distribute among the disempowered Other.

5


States Solvency: General States solve social service concerns.Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 6 [Aug 2006, "Arizona's Proposition 200 and the Supremacy of Federal Law: Elements of Law, Politics, and Faith"]

Let us commence by assuming the best-case scenario: The substantive and rhetorical federal objectives of welfare reform can be met through state implementation. Essentially most states and municipalities support the aims of federal welfare reform, n78 and, after [*601] decades of jointly administering AFDC with the federal government, these states will craft their welfare policies in ways quite congruous with Congress's intentions. n79 States, we must remember, helped transform the world of welfare through their extensive use of waivers in the early 1990s as well as through their advocacy for passage of PRWORA. And, before that, states under the AFDC model of cooperative federalism, have long occupied a pivotal role in welfare policy and administration. n80 Having invested a good deal of political [*602] capital in the design (and success) of this brand of welfare reform, states moreover have incentives to fulfill its mandate accordingly. n81The explicit substantive federal goals of reducing dependency and increasing personal responsibility can hardly be disregarded by states implementing PRWORA; political, legal, and economic expediency converge to limit the horizon of possible variations or distortions within the paradigm of federal welfare reform. Simply put, states must begin the process of facilitating the transition from welfare to work and take steps to root out long-term dependency by preparing individuals, both materially and psychologically, for the onset of TANF's stringent time limits. Thus, ostensibly there is little room and incentive for states to undertake any frolics or detours when they are hard at work complying with and thus furthering the federal aims.Discretion, under this scenario, is limited to ways that comport with popular impressions of cooperative federalism: States are given leeway and flexibility to determine how best to carry out these federal imperatives. n82 Indeed, under what I consider to be these idealized circumstances, the dual narratives of anti-dependency and greater local responsibility and authority can actually be reconciled. To reduce dependency, states can experiment with policies to address particular needs; they can, for instance, institute family caps, require drug testing and counseling, promote marriage, and/or offer child-care allowances. States can tailor the relative mix of carrots and sticks to suit the local needs (and treat pathologies) that prevail in particular communities. n83 Given welfare reform's imminent time limits, n84 strict work requirements, n85 and conditional benefit [*603] structures, n86 all welfare agencies have little choice but to become more demanding and intrusive. n87 Thus, an argument can easily be made that the federal goal that caseworkers closely monitor recipients of public assistance to ensure they attend training workshops and actively seek work will be achieved through local administration. n88

6


States Solvency: General States Key to ALL successful programs(Education resources information center, 1989, http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED354089&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED354089)

The book offers suggestions to help solve the problems of cyclical poverty and chronic disadvantage by highlighting effective local and state programs that: (1) combat early and unplanned pregnancies; (2) improve prenatal care and child health services; (3) strengthen families; and (4) improve the care and education of young children. The need for national health care reform and intensive early intervention programs for high risk populations is also discussed. Three recommendations for breaking the cycle of disadvantage are offered. First, nationwide programs that are already operating effectively should be extended to all who are eligible. These programs include Head Start and the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children. Second, states and local communities must be helped to extend those successful programs that have heretofore operated only on a small scale.

States key to health social services.(The New York Times, November 14, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/14/nyregion/keeping-poor-children-healthy.html)

LAST July, Sarabeth Goslee gave birth to her daughter Makiah. If not for a program provided by the state , Makiah would not have had health insurance after her birth.The program, Health Insurance for Uninsured Kids and Youth, known as Husky, provides health insurance for an estimated 20,000 uninsured children up to age 19. Some estimate there may be up to 90,000 uninsured children in the state.The program is financed through federal and state funding authorized by the 1997 Congress through the Children's Health Insurance Program. It went into effect in Connecticut in July 1, 1998.''If it weren't for Husky,'' said Ms. Goslee, 19, of Danbury, ''she wouldn't have health insurance. I knew before she was born I wouldn't have the money to buy it to cover the new baby. That really worried me.''Ms. Goslee, who now works as a receptionist, had heard of the Husky program while still working at a data entry job that she knew she would have to leave after giving birth.

7


States Solvency: General All states fund social services for the poor, children, education, welfare, and rehab. (State and local governments.net, directory of official state service websites, 2005, http://www.statelocalgov.net/50states-health.cfm)

State departments of health promote public health through policy initiatives, research and service programs. Often, a state's public health administration is combined with the provision of social services. "Health" generally encompasses behavioral and environmental health as well as physical well-being, illness and communicable diseases.Visitors to state health sites may find directories of hospitals and nursing homes, listings of licensed health practitioners, health warnings, information about federally-funded programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, vital statistics, reports on specific health issues such as alcoholism or drug or tobacco addiction, mental health and disability programs, health insurance and long-term care, licensing boards, regulations as well as volunteer or employment opportunities.Social service websites may include information and programs dealing with welfare, early childhood development, foster parenting, poverty, juvenile deliquency, sex offenders, aging, public assistance, and rehabilitation. There may also be listings of private social service agencies.

Only states can do successful social services. (Dana Neacsu, Head of Public Services at Columbia Law School Library, 2008, THE RED BOOKLET ON FEMINIST EQUALITY. INSTEAD OF A MANIFESTO.)

Postmodernism has produced theories to assuage the elites' quest for meaning, but none of them can successfully promote the cause of the ignored Other: they are too many and much too hungry and ill to be happy with one supper or one band-aid or one pill to cure their many diseases. They do not need unreliable charity; they need social services that can be provided daily and relied upon daily. So far such services have only been [*137] provided consistently by state institutions. Where such state institutions have been denied, religious ones - such as those subsidized by Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood or our own faith-based initiatives - have taken over with their own theoretical attitudes

States have the most comparative data and are best able to allocate resources. (Lynn A. Blewett, et al.: Margaret Good, Kathleen Call, Michael Davern, Ph. D. 2004, “Monitoring the Uninsured: A State Policy Perspective”, As more responsibility for programs (such as SCHIP) shifts to the state level, there is an increasing need for better and more consistent comparative data to enable states to understand the dynamics of health insurance coverage. The national surveys provide valuable information on trends in health care coverage, as well as on access and use for the nation as a whole. But national data are not sufficient in the state policy arena. State-specific information is critical as state policy makers allocate scarce resources across programs and populations, develop and implement new programs, and evaluate existing programs and services.

8


States Solve: Healthcare States already play a significant role in Health Care.The Heritage Foundation, 09 (“Obama’s Health Care Reform: The Demise of Federalism,” 15 June 2009, http://www.heritage.org/Press/FactSheet/fs0032.cfm)

Flexibility in Name Only: States have played a significant role in developing unique and innovative approaches to address the health care needs of their citizens. During the 08 campaign, then-candidate Obama promoted the idea of state flexibility, but as President he replaced this embrace of flexibility with an embrace of federal standards. Obama has already taken numerous steps to roll back many of the flexibilities extended to states in administering Medicaid and SCHIP.Federal Control over Health Insurance: Currently, states regulate the health insurance available in their states. Under the Obama plan, the federal government would take over the role of regulator, leaving governors and state insurance commissioners to merely implement the new federal framework.Unknown Costs to the States: The President's plan is estimated to cost close to $1.6 trillion over the next 10 years. There is no easy way to pay for this reform. New taxes on businesses and individuals during a time of economic recession would only hurt a state economy. Also, don't be surprised when the states themselves are left paying for part of the bill.More Medicaid: The Bottom Layer of Health Care ReformMore Expansions, More Expensive: A key part of Obama's proposal is an expansion of Medicaid, increasing the total number of people on Medicaid to about 80 million by adding between 11 million and 18 million people. The Lewin Group estimates this expansion could cost close to $900 billion over the next 10 years. In addition, if states were also required to increase their Medicaid payments to Medicare levels, the Federal Funds Information for States (FFIS) estimates it would cost between $168 billion and $213 billion in the first year alone.

States can do the plan—federal law is the only barrier.CSM, 07 (Christian Science Monitor, Ben Arnoldy, Staff Writer of the CSM, “State and city healthcare reforms collide with a U.S. law,” 27 September 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0927/p03s01-ussc.html)

The healthcare plans in California and Massachusetts have been crafted with an eye to previous ERISA rulings, and other states are watching to see if the innovations will hit upon a legally acceptable formula – or hit another brick wall in court."Many states are watching ... to see how this is panning out," says Joel Miller with the National Coalition on Health Care in Washington. "What a lot of ... people who follow this hope for is that the states will try to thread this needle."Twenty-one states have put forth universal coverage bills this year, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). But Maryland's court losses dealt a blow to these efforts. The state's plan targeted large employers – in effect, Wal-Mart only – and stipulated that their employees must be given health insurance or the state would assess a fee per worker.A federal appeals court found early this year that this so-called "play or pay" approach constituted a benefit mandate by the state of the sort outlawed by ERISA. Because Wal-Mart would be the only company in Maryland affected, the court found that the state was not really offering the company a choice to pay; it was simply creating a mechanism to force the retailer to extend health benefits.Tapping employers to cover more workers, or to contribute to a healthcare pool, is one of the most attractive means for cash-strapped cities and states to reduce the ranks of the uninsured. After the ruling in the Maryland case, adding businesses to the equation looked a lot harder.

9


States Solve: Healthcare Recession causes states to cut health care services(LAtimes, January 14, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/14/nation/na-health14)

Even as President-elect Barack Obama plans an ambitious push to expand health coverage nationwide, states are slashing health services to their poorest residents amid the economic downturn.The unprecedented cuts come as millions of Americans are losing their jobs and health insurance.In many cases, the cuts are so deep that even the massive federal rescue package being assembled on Capitol Hill may not be enough to restore services being eliminated in the burgeoning crisis, health officials warn.And the faltering economy has all but killed trailblazing state campaigns to expand coverage for the working poor -- once seen as hopeful signs for national healthcare reform.

States are already controlling health care to fix it(AFL-CIO, America’s union movement, 2009, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/healthcare/whatswrong/)

Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) has proposed legislation to require employers of more than 50 workers to provide employees with health insurance, and in 2003, California passed a state law (PDF) that requires employers to provide insurance for workers or pay into a state fund to insure workers. With little federal action on health care, more states are addressing health care issues.Beware of new “defined-contribution” health care coverage. Shifting health care costs onto working families already is creating hardship at the doctor's office and the bargaining table. Now, many employers are talking about passing most or all of the risk of rising health care costs onto employees by adopting "defined-contribution" plans

States already provide health care(IN.gov, Indiana State Department of Health, 2009, http://www.in.gov/isdh/19041.htm)

Welcome to the home page for the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) Health Care Regulatory Services Commission. The Health Care Regulatory Services Commission provides health care licensing and certification programs for acute care and long term care facilities and agencies. The Commission also provides health care engineering programs, medical radiology licensing programs, and state weights and measures programs.

Community health care centers do everything federal ones do(IN.gov, Indiana State Department of Health, 2009, http://www.in.gov/isdh/20544.htm)

A community health center is defined as consumer driven, providing primary health care services by state licensed professionals, which are also comprehensive in scope, coordinated within the community, acceptable, accessible, affordable, appropriate, and available. The Primary Care Office administers the State Community Health Center Operating Grant.

10


States Solve: Healthcare Federal Health Care fails, California proves(Wall Street Journal, 5/20/09, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124278806041537955.html)

California's experience, in fact, represented a kind of trial run for the health-care overhaul the president and Congress are about to attempt on the national level, offering useful lessons as well as warning signs about the potholes ahead.Above all, say those involved, the California example showed the importance of securing at least some bipartisan support, the need to reassure those who have insurance as well as those who don't, and the imperative of showing the public that health-care costs can be tamed.California's effort was launched by Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger in early 2007, a time when there was reason for optimism. Massachusetts, also with a GOP governor and Democratic legislature, had recently managed to enact its own broad health overhaul

Federal Health Care fails(The Daily Democrat, newspaper, 06/25/2009, http://www.dailydemocrat.com/editorial/ci_12686402)

When it comes to health care costs, the United States is far and away No. 1 in the world. Left as it is, our system will destroy the nation's fiscal as well as physical well-being -- and nowhere is that more obvious than in the Golden State.Skyrocketing health care costs are a major contributor to California's budget disaster. If the governor's proposed cuts are accepted, 2 million more Californians will join the ranks of the uninsured, bringing the total to about 8.5 million, or more than 20 percent of the population. The damage to the economy will be felt in many ways, not the least of which is the soaring cost to the public of emergency room visits, the only care left to families who can't otherwise see a doctor.

States take control of the healthcare of populations.(Jessica Yates, B.A. in journalism, M.A. in public policy, 2006, “States can and should seek Medicaid Reimbursement from big polluters”)

States routinely pay for medical expenses related to health problems sustained from pollution, but thus far have failed to pursue reimbursement from those responsible. The stakes are high. For example, recent analyses of the health impact of diesel and power plant emissions found that the resulting hospitalizations for cardiovascular and respiratory problems cost $ 664 million each [*424] year. n1 Since Medicaid, the primary government health care program for low-income individuals, pays about 15.7% of the country's health care costs, this would mean that the program pays roughly $ 104 million each year for hospital admissions related to diesel soot ($ 41.5 million) and power plant emissions ($ 62.8 million). n2 Pollutants such as dioxin that are discharged into water and soil undoubtedly can cause health problems as well. Moreover, state governments may be bearing a disproportionate share of that burden because they pay for the health care of low-income individuals who are exposed to more pollution than middle-and upper-income individuals. n3 This pattern suggests a need for states - which are struggling to fully fund their Medicaid programs - to recover some of those costs from the parties responsible for causing the pollution.

11


States Solve: Immigration States have been empirically been able to act on immigration. (Kiplinger.com, 2008, http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/summary/archive/2008/immigration-stateline.html)

With anger and worry rising over illegal immigration and Congress deadlocked over how to cope with it, states have been acting on their own for the past couple of years. But action is slowing down this year and some states are revisiting and softening legislation that was already approved, says Stateline.org, which tracks policy and legislative developments at the state level.One reason is that worries about how to deal with the economic downturn are dominating lawmakers' attention. Also, in an era of extremely tight budgets the cost of enforcing tough crackdowns on illegal immigrants is taking away from the appeal of some measures. Another is that the business community, fearful of being snarled in tough verification rules for checking on the background of employees and of losing much-needed workers, is much more assertive and organized in fighting proposals in both state legislatures and courts

States key to immigration benefits. (Associated Press, 1-4-08, “Bill would target benefits for illegal immigrants”. Lexis)

The proposal will be introduced as a bill in the Legislature, which begins its 2008 session next week. The bill is a cooperative effort with Attorney General Jon Bruning and the bill's sponsor, Sen. Mike Friend of Omaha.The proposal would help ensure that benefits available to U.S. citizens are preserved for those who truly qualify for assistance, Heineman said at a news conference in Lincoln on Friday.Heineman said state action is necessary because the federal government has failed to secure the nation's borders. That, in turn, has put a stress on state resources, he said."We know this is a difficult and emotional issue," Heineman said, "but it must be addressed."Illegal immigrants already are forbidden under a 1996 federal law from receiving most state benefits, but Bruning said some state agencies are better than others at verifying the status of benefit applicants.

12


States Solve: Innovation States provide best methods for testing policies. (The Regents of the University of California, environmental law and policy journal, Fall, 2008, "A Period of Consequences: Global Warming Legislation, Cooperative Federalism, and the Fight Between the EPA and the State of California”. Lexis)

In response to the claim that global problems require global - or at least national - attention, proponents of local initiatives believe states have the ability to significantly contribute to greenhouse gas reductions. Moreover, the United States government has not been particularly aggressive with global warming legislation. n17 Thus, states should be able to contribute to the worldwide effort to reduce greenhouse gases when the federal government declines to do so. As one proponent noted, "The global nature of climate change does not denigrate the importance of state efforts," but "as a practical matter ... states should not be held hostage to the United States' unwillingness to engage globally." n18

[*188] In addition, the federal government has embraced state action in the field of environmental legislation and policy. When Congress enacts environmental legislation, it often adopts state plans, demonstrating how states effectively serve as laboratories for national legislation. n19 Other states and the federal government can learn from the successes and failures of varying approaches, incorporating the most successful components into new legislation. When the government limits states to only one federal approach, the United States loses the opportunity to learn from different methods and, arguably, will enact less effective legislation.

13


States Solve: International Cooperation State governments can act internationally(Washburn Law Journal, 2009, “The Rule of Law and The Global War on Terrorism: Detainees, Interrogation, and Military Commissions Symposium: Note: Federal Framework for Regulating the Growing International Presence of the Several States”. Lexis)

Under the Medellin framework, questions remain as to the federal government's authority to preempt state action that reaches out into foreign affairs, including the federal government's ability to "mandate a state's compliance with an international obligation of the federal government." n24 The question becomes increasingly timely as the several states continue to reach out globally, forming compacts with other nations as well as adopting and implementing international treaties domestically, regardless of federal ratification. n25The current federal foreign affairs doctrine that governs state international activity is unequipped to address situations in which states fail to comply with the international obligations of the federal government. n26 However, the foreign affairs doctrine remains applicable to [*428] situations in which the states reach out impermissibly and interfere with existing federal obligations so long as there is a strong and precise federal interest at stake. n27

States key to solving genocide abroad.(Cornell Law Review, March, 2009, “GENOCIDE FUNDING: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE DIVESTMENT STATUTES”. Lexis)

Investment in Sudan "is a chain of cause and effect in which American money may finally objectively fund genocide - in which Americans may come to pay, through no fault or intention of their own, for crimes they abhor." n1 On December 31, 2007, in an effort to condemn the Sudanese government's funding of the genocide in Darfur, Congress enacted the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA), which authorizes states to divest any state assets from companies doing business in Sudan. n2 As of January 2009, twenty-seven states had adopted statutes that mandate that their state money and state pension funds divest holdings in companies that perpetuate the genocide. n3 Of those states, nineteen have adopted model legislation created by the Genocide Intervention Network's Sudan Divestment Task Force (SDTF Model), and eight have adopted their own legislation. n4

14


States Solve: Medicaid States already pay for half of Medicaid((Jessica Yates, B.A. in journalism, M.A. in public policy, 2006, “States can and should seek Medicaid Reimbursement from big polluters”)

Medicaid is especially focused on ensuring that low-income individuals and children get needed health care. Some 44.7 million individuals receive Medicaid benefits annually, with 49% being children under age twenty-one. n18 In fiscal year 2004, the states paid an estimated $ 119 billion to the Medicaid program, and the federal government paid $ 168 billion, for a total of $ 287 billion in Medicaid expenses. n19 Concentrated poverty is particularly expensive for the program. For example, in the District of Columbia, where 26% of the population qualifies for Medicaid, Medicaid health care costs were $ 1.02 billion in fiscal year 2002.

The federal government is already reliant on the states for action on Medicaid.(Jessica Yates, B.A. in journalism, M.A. in public policy, 2006, “States can and should seek Medicaid Reimbursement from big polluters”)

Congress has not been blind to the sizeable costs of the Medicaid program, and therefore has required states to recover from third parties any Medicaid expenses for which those parties are liable. n21 States have enacted specific statutes toward this end. Individuals [*429] participating in the Medicaid program must assign to the state their right to recover medical expenses from a third party. n22 Whenever a state recovers Medicaid costs from a third party under such an assignment, it must first cover the state's actual expenses, and then distribute to the federal government its share of the recovery. The state must pay any remainder to the Medicaid recipient whose illness prompted the Medicaid expenditure. n23 Under this legal regime, the federal government depends on states to pursue these Medicaid recoveries, and cannot unilaterally seek them from third parties.

15


States Solve: Medicare States provide a model for Medicare.(The New York Times, 7-4-05, “States Rejecting Demand To Pay for Medicare Cost”. Lexis)

'For the first time,'' Mr. Perry said, ''state governments would be expected to directly finance federal Medicare benefits with state tax dollars. In effect, states will be billed on a monthly basis for the cost of federal services.''Bush administration officials say the federal Medicare law clearly requires states to make the payments, starting in January. One purpose of the 2003 Medicare law was to relieve states of prescription drug costs for low-income elderly people. But as states do the arithmetic, many have concluded that they will lose money because they must give back most of the savings and will incur new administrative costs.The confrontation comes as governors, state legislators, Congress and the Bush administration search for ways to rein in Medicaid costs, which have been growing 10 percent a year since 1999 -- much faster than federal or state revenues. The tussle with state officials is potentially awkward for the Bush administration, which often points to the states as models for federal policy makers.

16


States Solve: Military States fund armies, and military education.

State departments of military affairs operate the forces and facilities the state needs to defend itself, handle community emergencies and contribute to the defense of the United States. The forces are trained, maintained in a readiness mode, and mobilized in the event of local or national disasters or federal military needs.State veterans affairs agencies administer benefits programs for military service veterans and their families.As a combined department or in separate agencies, they may operate cemeteries, veterans' homes, military academies, scholarship programs, armories and museums, and mount educational or historical programs for citizens. In some cases, they are also involved with land management and environmental services.Visitors to these websites may find information on army, air and naval guard or militia programs, veterans' benefits, emergency preparedness and alerts.

17


States Solve: Reform States are moving towards reformLipka 5 [Mitch Lipka, The Philadelphia Inquirer staff writer, Oct 12, 2005, “Children's welfare in N.J. faces new fight;Advocates and a state panel say the system has foundered. A rights group has invoked a 10-day mediation process.”]

Davy defended the state's progress, noting that while the pace isn't what everyone hoped for, a lot of good changes have taken place."It is important to remember where we were - to appreciate how far we have come," Davy told Chesler. "And, although we readily acknowledge that we have a long way to go, we have come very far indeed," he said. "unwavering commitment to the principles of this historic reform effort will deliver us to our ultimate goal - a child welfare system that consistently keeps children safe and families whole."Cohen, the panel chairman, acknowledged that the state has made significant progress in many areas, including increasing its staff, recruiting more foster families, and securing more than $200 million in extra funding."The work of repairing a system of this size is difficult," Cohen said. But, he noted, the momentum and support for the overhaul are flagging and the state is experiencing "a significant amount of disorder in the field.""The plan that New Jersey put together is an ambitious one," Cohen said. "It is inevitable in the course of implementation some things will turn out to be hard to do. The fact that something is hard to do should not mean the state retreats from it."

State leadership key to reformMatthews 5 [Merrill Matthews Executive Director, The Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Sep 8, 2005, “MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES”]

Mr. Chairman, the Medicaid program is growing at unsustainable rates, and has been for more than a decade. The country needs leadership both at the state and federal levels to find a way to transform the program so that it can continue to be the safety net the country wants and needs, provide quality care in a timely fashion and yet remain affordable. I commend you for your leadership in beginning this dialogue at the federal level. However, comments today focus on the need for state leadership, and for creating an environment of flexibility that will allow the states to take on that leadership role.

18


States Solve: Social Security Social Security is successful at the state level.(University of Illinois Law Review, 2004, “SYMPOSIUM: THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: AN ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIMENT IN FEDERALISM”, lexis)

The authors describe Title XXI of the Social Security Act as a funding scheme for children's health insurance that represents an "experiment in federalism," a new cooperative model under which state and federal governments interact on an equal basis. Under this scheme, the federal government provides funding and the states remain free to establish administrative details. The authors compare the advantages and disadvantages of this new approach with older approaches, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The authors argue that Title XXI has proven successful in allowing state governments without fiscal or administrative capacity the flexibility to aid children in need of medical care. Finally, the authors urge continued study of Title XXI to determine the extent to which cooperative federalism can serve as a model for national health care.

19


Race to the Top—General States offer competition now (The American Review of Public Administration, 4/14/08, arp.sagepub.com, American Society for Public Administration)

Van Slyke (2003) interviews New York state and county public managers in social service programs and finds inconsistent use of competitive bidding among the agencies. Barriers to competition exist both inside and outside of the government and include such concerns as the public agencies’lack of staff and resources to develop competition, anticipated market unavailability and the resultant unwillingness to utilize competitive bidding, and political pressure from lawmakers elected and officials who are lobbied by nonprofit executives and advocacy groups (Van Slyke, 2003). Meanwhile, Smith and Lipsky (1993, p. 173) point out the common presence of “-mutual back-scratching”between nonprofits and government service agencies for advocating and developing programs. Social service agencies frequently perceive their nonprofit counterparts as goal sharing partners who influence legislators and elected officials to make favorable decisions for their programs (Kettl, 1993). Moreover, nonprofit executives are often invited into public agencies’rule- or policy-making processes to provide input (Smith & Lipsky, 1993).

States’ race to the top makes policies that rival the federal government. (Richard Rothstein, research associate of the Economic Policy Institute, 1998, “When States Spend More” lexis)

Liberals and progressives have generally believed that shifting federal authority for social programs to the states will typically lead to a "race to the bottom" as states try to attract business and keep taxes down by cutting expenditures and regulations [see Mary Graham, "Why States Can Do More," page 63]. But a common trend of the last quarter century has also been a race to the top in which state policies can become more generous over time and even rival those of the federal government.

20


Race to the Top—Education States in an education race to the top(Augusta Chronicle, 5-17-09, State strives to race to top in education, lexis)

For six years, Georgia has been focused on implementing a world-class curriculum, raising expectations and using quality data to make decisions. We have received high marks for the policies and standards we've put in place from groups across the nation.But the journey to "the top" is not always smooth and raising standards is not easy. The truth is that the material that Georgia students are learning today is more rigorous than it has ever been and, consequently, the assessments they are taking are more difficult.Over the past few years, we've seen the pass rates on our state tests - like the Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests and End of Course Tests - drop in the first year we've implemented our new curriculum and given the new state exams. This is to be expected: Whenever you raise the bar, there's going to be a temporary drop in the number of people that can reach that bar. That's true in any situation.

State race to the top in education. The federal government is not involved. (Richard Rothstein, research associate of the Economic Policy Institute, 1998, “When States Spend More” lexis)

Education is the social enterprise for which state and local governments have always had almost exclusive responsibility. Public education has never won much federal support (only 6 percent of spending comes from the federal government, and at the height of federal involvement in 1979, it was still less than 10 percent), so if there was an inevitable trend in our federal system for competitive inadequacy, we might expect to see it in the public schools. And we did see it in the South, until about 1970 when dual school systems were finally abolished. But since then, the race has been to the top, not the bottom, in public education. With California being the stark and sole exception, all states have spent more money on their schools. What is even more surprising is that historically lowspending states have played catch-up, increasing their expenditures on schools even more than the average.

21


AT: Perm Perm doesn’t solve.(Newsweek, 3-13-06, Let States Be Entrepreneurs; Competition between states concentrates their minds on this: Capital goes where it is welcome and stays where it is well treated, lexis)

Does the Supreme Court really want to inundate itself with cases requiring it to make thousands of rulings about which state laws and actions do and do not violate some standard--which the court has yet to devise--for permissible state actions that affect commercial practices? Does Ralph Nader, who favors the taxpayers' suit, really want states' differences in environmental and other policies, with their different impacts on commerce, to become constitutionally problematic?Well, actually, some liberals do want that: They think it would prevent what they consider a "race to the bottom" and conservatives consider a "race to rationality"--competition between the states to reduce taxes and other costs borne by businesses.Ohio, like almost all states, is practicing "entrepreneurial federalism." One state--Nevada--is a monument to that. In 1903, with the Comstock Lode's silver exhausted, Nevada, with a dwindling population and desperate for commerce, passed a law exempting corporations from taxes and most supervision of business practices. Other states blunted Nevada's appeal by moving in the same direction, so Nevada found a new niche for uniqueness--divorce law.

22


AT: Race to the bottom Race to the bottom empirically denied—social services have thrived under state control.

Kay S. Hymowitz, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a Contributing Editor of City Journal, Spring 2006. [City Journal, "How Welfare Reform Worked," lexis] As for the anti-reformer's final concern--the states' "race to the bottom"-- that dog didn't bark , either. True, the enemies of reform might point at the 20-odd states that introduced a "family cap," which sought to stem illegitimacy by denying any increase in benefits to women who had another child while on welfare, and whose efficacy remains uncertain. But there's little question that the unreformed were wrong here as well--for the fourth time. The states were, if anything, nicer than the feds. No state barred cash benefits to teen mothers, though TANF permitted them to do so. Forty-seven states made it easier than the old system for leavers to keep some of their cash benefits when they first went to work. Many states, including New York, did away with TANF's five-year time limit for all intents and purposes by using state dollars to pick up the tab for those still on the dole at the time and deemed unable to work.As caseloads declined, the states moved the federal money they would have spent on welfare benefits into work support--transportation, child care, and the like. In fact, under the states' management, welfare has morphed into an unprecedentedly generous work-support program. The real proof that the states were not the scoundrels that opponents had warned they would be came as Congress debated reauthorization after TANF expired in 2002. Reformers argued for even stricter federally mandated work requirements, while those who once warned that the states would engage in a race to the bottom demanded more state control.

Evidence contradicts race to the bottom.Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr, Joe Soss, Professor, Cowles Chair for the Study of Public Service, U. of Minnesota, 6-22-1998. [Publius, Making something out of nothing: welfare reform and a new race to the bottom, p. lexis]We also raise critical questions for the rival race-to-the-bottom metaphor. In an increasingly common tale, it is predicted that the new discretion under the 1996 law will enhance benefit variation, whichwill produce welfare migration, which in turn will push states into a race to the bottom. First, we offer a reminder that states always had substantial discretion to set benefits under the old AFDC system, and that state attempts to repel poor outsiders have a long history in the United States. These are hardly new creations of the 1996 law. Second, we challenge the key assumption of welfare migration in the race-to-the-bottom metaphor. There is very little empirical support for the existence of welfare migration. Furthermore, new evidence indicates that the value of welfare benefits to recipients does not vary nearly as much in reality as it appears to in common portrayals of theincentives for migration.

23


AT: No Money State costs are lower, increasing enforcement.Calabresi, 95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, 1995, Lexis)In addition and just as importantly, governmental agency costs often may be lower at the state level than at the national level be- [*778] cause monitoring costs may be lower where fewer programs, employees, and amounts of tax revenue are involved. The smaller size of the state governmental jurisdictions thus makes it far easier for citizens to exercise a greater and more effective degree of control over their government officials. 75 For this reason, it often makes sense to lodge dangerous and intrusive police powers over crime and over controversial social issues in the states where government officials may be monitored more easily by the citizenry. Conversely, state governments also may find that they are able to enforce criminal laws and regulations of social mores less coercively than the national government because of the lower costs and greater ease of monitoring citizen behavior in a smaller jurisdiction. 76 Indeed, ideally small jurisdictional size will lead to less populous state legislative districts, thus producing a greater congruence between the mores of the legislators and of the people than can exist in a continental-sized national republic that necessarily must have enormously large legislative districts and other units of representation. 77 The greater congruence of mores between citizens and representatives in state governments in turn may produce greater civic mindedness and community spirit at the state level. 78 This might ameliorate the highly corrosive decline of public spiritedness at the national level that has occurred as a result of the current perception that there exists a discongruence of mores between members of Congress and the public..

24


Federal Government Models States State policies are a model for the Federal government. (Policy Today, 2007, “Reasserting the States' Role in the Federal Model“http://www.policytoday.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=240&Itemid=148)

Largely unnoticed by the media and the electorate, though, political momentum has shifted to the states. Congressional gridlock and a self-absorbed Oval Office have thrown the national government into reverse, while the states have found their political gear.Despite unending budget battles in several larger states, state legislatures have generally been major innovators in health care, the environment, and economic development. They have passed immigration laws where Congress has stalled, and funded K-12 education despite the structural deficiencies of No Child Left Behind.

States send a model of national policy. Raymond C. Scheppach, Ph.D., National Governors Association, 7-9-2008. [Stateline.org, Will the 2008 election improve state-federal relations?, p. lexis]Here's a crucial question for the presumed presidential nominees - Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama-and all the candidates for the next Congress. Are you happy with the status quo in federal-state relations?States have long served as laboratories for creating and testing policies and programs that drive positive change nationally. Yet for more than a decade, the federal-state relationship has been under stress. Looking forward, the nation faces many challenges, and states can play a key role in providing leadership. However, whether governors and states provide separate, independent leadership or leadership within a stronger federal-state partnership will depend on which brand of federalism the next administration and Congress adopt.

25


Federal Government Models States The federal government empirically models state welfare programs. Robert W. Adler, Associate Professor, University of Utah College of Law, Oct. 1997. [50 Vand. L. Rev. 1137, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, p. lexis]

n507 See Shapiro, Federalism at 77, 85-88 (cited in note 1) (citing workers' compensation, public education, welfare reform, health care, tax systems, penology, and environmental protection as areas in which state programs later were adopted nationally); Derthick, The Brookings Review at 34-35 (cited in note 11) (proclaiming state experiments as models for subsequent national action); Lester, A New Federalism?, in Vig and Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy in the 1990s at 59, 62 (cited in note 439) (concluding that state environmental programs should serve as models for national action).

State social service and poverty programs directly influence federal policy. Deborah Jones Merritt, J.D. (Harvard) Professor of Law and Women's Studies, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Illinois College of Law, 1994. [47 Vand. L. Rev. 1563, ARTICLE: Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, p. lexis]

[*1575] Finally, states offer the laboratories for social experimentation immortalized by Justice Brandeis's quotable words. n46 Those words proved so quotable that they have become a cliche; yet they retain substantial truth. Unemployment compensation, anti-discrimination laws, no-fault compensation schemes, and other social programs emerged from state experiments. n47 Echoes of Brandeis' statement can be heard today as state initiatives in health care policy and welfare reform influence national debates over those issues. n48

Successful state poverty programs provide a model for federal action. Micala Proesch, J.D. candidate 2007, Georgetown University Law Center, Winter 2007. [5 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 285, NOTE: No One Too Poor to Weather the Storm -- A Critique of Existing Welfare Policy, p. lexis]

The people who remain on welfare need "a variety of individual responses to help them make the transition to work . . . instead [of] a cookie-cutter work requirement that will hurt far more than it helps." n99 The federal and state governments can look to states like Minnesota that have been successful in helping people leave welfare and escape poverty for ways to give welfare recipients the individual help they need. Minnesota's focus on providing child care and health care benefits to welfare leavers upon exiting the system is an example of using resources to provide support beyond simple job placement. Louisiana's welfare system has kicked more than half of welfare beneficiaries out of the system since 1996, but more than eighty-seven percent of them continue to live in poverty. The state's harsh time limits, and lack of provision for child care, education and other supports, have not provided its poor people with the tools necessary to become successful. The federal government should penalize states for using time limits shorter than the five-year benchmark and mandate that certain percentages of federal funds be spent on education and child care.

The federal government models successful state policiesMatthews 5 [Merrill Matthews Executive Director, The Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Sep 8, 2005, “MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES”]

When Tommy Thompson was governor of Wisconsin, he experimented with welfare reform for a decade. While his actions were initially criticized by people concerned that he would hurt the poor, his efforts to move the welfare population into productive jobs proved to be so successful that states around the country followed and built on his lead. And in 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed a federal version of welfare reform that incorporated Gov. Thompson's principles and experience. Welfare reform has been one of the more successful legislative efforts undertaken by Congress and state governments; and it is important to note that governors, both Democrats and Republicans, were leading the reform efforts. They were the ones experimenting with welfare to find out what worked. Ideology wasn't driving their efforts; pragmatism was. They wanted a well-functioning welfare system that provided help to those who needed it most, but also helped the able-bodied find a job. Welfare needed to be a safety net, not a hammock.

26


State Policies Better States are better than the fed at poverty policies.

Candice Hoke, J.D. (Yale) Associate Professor of Law at Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, Winter 1998. [9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev 115, State Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge: The Act limits state's decision-making process so as to ensure that states must exercise discretion in accordance with policy norms embedded in the federal legislation, p. lexis]

State governments, ironically enough, are now the first line of defense against the incursion of simplistic, and potentially destructive, federal poverty policies. Due to disparities in their economies, the concentration of indigent advocacy groups, or the nature of political leadership, some states are now better positioned than others to mend the holes in federal welfare safety nets.

Congress looks to state welfare programsJeffrey D. Van Volkenburg, J.D. candidate, Spring 2007. [32 T. Marshall L. Rev. 237, WHAT PUBLIC EDUCATION SHOULD LEARN FROM MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL: SPENDING CAPS, LUXURY TAXES AND FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, p. lexis]

Congress and federal regulators routinely look to state and local governments to implement federal programs and regulatory goals. Often the federal government offers a 'carrot' for state or local compliance, providing funding for programs such as welfare, Medicaid, or public school standards and testing. States frequently take the silver, voluntarily acquiescing to federal programs or regulatory standards that bump up against state constitutional restrictions. n65

27


States—AT: Obama Blamed for DC Blago proves Obama can distance himself from local politics.

Washington Post 12-10-08 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/10/AR2008121001472.html?hpid=topnewsPresident-elect Barack Obama did his best to distance himself from the spectacular public drama playing out in his home town yesterday, refusing to talk about the arrest of Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich on corruption charges during his only public appearance outside his Chicago transition offices. Federal prosecutors said flatly that there is no evidence of involvement by the president-elect in allegations that Blagojevich (D) attempted to sell Obama's vacant Senate seat to the highest bidder. But the conspiracy allegedly dreamed up by Blagojevich was an unwelcome development in Obama's transition to power, threatening something Obama has avoided throughout his career -- the taint of Chicago politics. Obama was nurtured politically in the city, rising while scandal swirled around him but remaining largely untouched as governors, lawmakers and lobbyists went to jail. For years, rivals -- including Sen. John McCain and the GOP this year -- sought to tie him to Antoin "Tony" Rezko, a onetime friend and fundraiser who was convicted in June of fraud and bribery. "This man has managed to dodge many a near-corruption bullet," said Richard Epstein, a University of Chicago law professor who has clashed with Obama in the past. "My hope is that he will be vindicated, as I think he will be."

President is historically insulated from DC policy. Carol E. Lee, staff writer, 11-5-2008. [Politico.com, How will Obama relate to the District? P. lexis]The president's relationship with Washington, D.C., has always been a little arms-length.The District of Columbia has one of the highest poverty rates in the nation and ranks fifth for crime. Its population is more than 56 percent black. Its public schools came in dead last this year when compared with the 50 states, and about 17 percent of adults have no health insurance.Yet in the city's core lives the most powerful leader in the world - until now a white man - in the most famous home in the country.It's not often that the story lines of the city entwine. Democratic presidents tend to interact more with the overwhelmingly Democratic D.C. community than Republican presidents do, but no president in the 208 years since the federal government moved to Washington can claim to have made a significant impact on the city where he lived and served.

28


States Don’t Link to Politics State action is insulated from politics

Celli 1 – Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau, New York State Attorney General's Office (Andrew, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1091) I also saw that state enforcement officers, like me and like Peter Lehner, with our small and agile offices operating below the national political radar, that we can use these federal laws in creative and aggressive ways and perhaps in a way that is insulated from the kinds of political pressure that, say, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department faces.

States doesn’t link to politics. Jon Michaels, Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable Guido Calabresi, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (J.D., Yale Law School), 2004. [34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 573, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, lexis]

Simply put, in abdicating this responsibility, Congress has actually allowed one narrative to dominate the other. It has privileged the aims of devolution and privatization - at the expense of ensuring fidelity to the policy aims and objectives of welfare reform and, importantly, at the expense of ensuring fidelity to the concept of federalism itself. This capitulation to the forces of devolution, I need not add, may be politically expedient, n5 but otherwise incongruous from the perspective of prudent policymaking. n6 State and local governments, as well as private and faith-based providers, could be quite effective partners in designing and implementing welfare reform. But left to their own devices, they lack the institutional capacity and, oftentimes, the proper incentives to bear primary [*577] responsibility for ensuring the successful transition of America's dependent, welfare population to the world of work and personal responsibility. The shrinking of the federal government's responsibilities over social welfare, moreover, creates civic harms as well. n7 To abandon our national commitment to assist some of the most vulnerable among us, is to rend the very fabric of our collective identity.

29


Uniform State Action States CP is real world.Pryor, 01 (C. Scott, Associate Prof – Regent U. School of Law, American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review, Spring)

NCCUSL is a national organization of practicing lawyers, judges, law professors, and others appointed by the governors of each of the states. NCCUSL drafts uniform laws in various fields and then proposes them to the various state legislatures for adoption. See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 586 (1998) (describing problem of "capture" in drafting process); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 651 (1995) (stating that problems stemming from reliance on "ill-informed generalists" and influence of interest groups may be unavoidable for any official organization whose goal is to foster uniformity of state laws).

30

http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=ac2dac45d495ec7cbf7fbf59a67dee2c&_xfercite=%3Ccite%20cc%3D%22USA%22%3E%3C!%5BCDATA%5B9%20Am.%20Bankr.%20Inst.%20L.%20Rev.%20229%5D%5D%3E%3C%2Fcite%3E&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=348&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3Ccite%20cc%3D%22USA%22%3E%3C!%5BCDATA%5B143%20U.%20Pa.%20L.%20Rev.%20595%2Cat%20651%5D%5D%3E%3C%2Fcite%3E&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=33&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAW&_md5=5c9e91cdef8e27e492ff10431016c269

http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=ac2dac45d495ec7cbf7fbf59a67dee2c&_xfercite=%3Ccite%20cc%3D%22USA%22%3E%3C!%5BCDATA%5B9%20Am.%20Bankr.%20Inst.%20L.%20Rev.%20229%5D%5D%3E%3C%2Fcite%3E&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=347&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3Ccite%20cc%3D%22USA%22%3E%3C!%5BCDATA%5B83%20Iowa%20L.%20Rev.%20569%2Cat%20586%5D%5D%3E%3C%2Fcite%3E&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=33&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAW&_md5=ffae86c2bab38023e1ae756e5f1f7188


***Aff Answers***

31


AT: States Solve Childcare States failing in child support, resulting in the failure of leadershipLipka 5 [Mitch Lipka, The Philadelphia Inquirer staff writer, Oct 12, 2005, “Children's welfare in N.J. faces new fight;Advocates and a state panel say the system has foundered. A rights group has invoked a 10-day mediation process.”]

New Jersey is failing in more than a dozen key areas in its commitment to repair its disastrously broken child welfare system, a panel overseeing the effort told a federal judge yesterday. The state's leadership was faulted by both the New Jersey Child Welfare Panel and the advocacy group Children's Rights Inc.; a lawsuit by the latter led to the settlement that created the overhaul plan. Children's Rights said the failings are so profound that it exercised its right under the settlement to begin a 10-day mediation process to decide the direction of the overhaul. If that fails, the state could lose control of its child welfare system. Just months after the settlement was reached in 2003, the depths of the problems with that system were brought home by the plight of the four Jackson brothers from Collingswood. State child welfare workers repeatedly visited the home of their adoptive parents without noting their poor health conditions. The boys were seriously underweight and extraordinarily small for their ages. All gained weight and height soon after being removed from the home. The state, which yesterday defended its efforts, has until Friday to respond to Children's Rights' claims that it has failed to meet its obligations under the settlement before the mediation begins. The oversight panel chaired by Steven D. Cohen of the Annie E. Casey Foundation would serve as mediator. The problems with the state's progress cited by the panel include:Caseworkers not seeing children under the system's purview often enough.Sending children out of state for care.Putting youngsters in institutions.Leaving children in shelters.Failing to provide adequate medical care to children."We have lost confidence in the state's ability to get the job done," said Susan Lambiase, associate director of Children's Rights.

32


AT: States Solve Immigration State action on immigration is struck down by the court.(Columbia Law Review, June 2008, “PUNTING ON THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM IN THE IMMIGRATION ARENA? EVALUATING OPERATION LINEBACKER, A STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER”. Lexis)

Courts and policymakers must take notice of the values of federalism that the Supreme Court has articulated in the immigration arena. n224 While Supreme Court cases that establish the federal government's authority over federal immigration law and foreign affairs are over a hundred years old, n225 cases involving state interference with federal control over foreign affairs are not unfounded in modern times. While much of the academic literature tends to brush over the impact of state enforcement actions on foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has struck down state action in recent cases based on this concern. n226 In Zschernig v. Miller, the [*1261] Court invalidated a state law that impacted foreign affairs, holding that state actions have "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" and may have "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.'" n227 The Supreme Court has also deferred to the federal government over state action in recent years in the arena of foreign affairs. n228 Even when a state acts within an area of "traditional competence," n229 the likelihood that state action would have "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect'" on foreign affairs has come into play in evaluating whether the state action is preempted. n230 This conflict with foreign policy need not be limited to conflict with legislative action; it may occur with executive branch action regarding foreign affairs. n231

33


AT: States Solve Mental Health State mental health care fails(John H. Noble, Jr., Ph.D. 1998, http://www.ps.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/abstract/49/6/775)Recent evaluations by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill of reemployment efforts of the federal-state vocational rehabilitation program found that services offered by state vocational rehabilitation agencies do not produce long-term earnings for clients with emotional or physical disabilities. This paper examines reasons for these poor outcomes and the implications of recent policy reform recommendations. Congress must decide whether to take action at the federal level to upgrade programs affecting persons with severe mental illness

34


Race to the Bottom State social services provision causes race to the bottom.

Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr, Joe Soss, Professor, Cowles Chair for the Study of Public Service, U. of Minnesota, 6-22-1998. [Publius, Making something out of nothing: welfare reform and a new race to the bottom, p. lexis]

The pressures exerted by the threat of business disinvestment are exacerbated by a second (and far more widely discussed) fear that is equally likely to promote conformity and conservatism in state policymaking - the fear that any state that is too liberal in its approach will become a "welfare magnet" attracting the poor from other states.(22) The idea that more generous benefits will lead to the in-migration of poor people has become a mainstay in welfare policy debates over the past two decades, especially in states offering higher benefits.(23) It is precisely because this idea generates such fear among state officials that some observers have invoked the more unsettling metaphor of a "race to the bottom" to describe the ways states are likely to use their discretion over welfare policy.(24)

Fear of welfare migration decreases state provision of benefits for the poor. Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr, Joe Soss, Professor, Cowles Chair for the Study of Public Service, U. of Minnesota, 6-22-1998. [Publius, Making something out of nothing: welfare reform and a new race to the bottom, p. lexis]

These provisions, and the state demands that produced them, serve as testimony to the enduring power of migration anxieties in U.S. welfare politics. The irony is that the very same fears that helped bring new openings for discretion to the states now serve as an impetus toward conformity. The specter of welfare migration now casts a long shadow over post-reform deliberations, stifling the imagination of legislators and undercutting the discretion that welfare reform has given the states. Benefits and services that are too helpful or generous to the poor are resisted as an invitation to recipients from out of state; and fears of this magnet effect threaten to squander the broader potential for creativity promised by the new systemBy highlighting the issue of welfare migration, and by enhancing some forms of discretion for state officials, the devolution of 1996 has raised interstate policy comparisons to a far more prominent placein the policymaking process. Each state is at risk of being "left behind" by the others, yet cannot be too sure what the others are doing. In this environment, just tracking the activities of other states has become a full-time activity.(42) To the extent that states try to repel would-be migrants by mimicking the restrictive policies of their neighbors, they will retreat from the challenge of serving as innovative "laboratories" seeking out new ways to combat poverty. In this manner, one of the oldest fears in American welfare politics seems likely to undermine the ambitious hopes of contemporary reformers.Just as formal mandates from the federal government restrict the creativity of state officials to a relatively narrow field of policy goals, fears of business disinvestment and welfare migration also discourage policymakers from pursuing initiatives that might distinguish them from other states. From this perspective, states under the new system seem far less likely to serve as "laboratories of democracy" than to "race to the bottom."

35


Race to the Bottom Counterplan causes a race to the bottom—fear of welfare magnetism causes states to compete to cut benefits.

Scott W. Allard, Associate Professor in the University of Chicago's School of Social Service Administration, 12-1-2006. [Social Science Quarterly 782(9), A starting foul in the study of the Race to the Bottom: a comment on"measuring state TANF policy variations and change after reform"; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, p. lexis]

Scholars refer to a "race to the bottom " in social welfare program generosity, where states (and local) government gradually move to greater and greater underprovision of redistributive programs over time. The possibility of a race to the bottom exists because state governments have substantial programmatic and fiscal autonomy, yet must cope with highly mobile capital and labor. To maintain a favorable business climate and secure steady flows of tax revenue, state governmentscompete with each other to attract new economic growth opportunitiesand taxpaying residents. States remain competitive by keeping taxes and expenditures in line with their neighbors or competitors. A state that lags in competitiveness risks losing economic opportunity to other states, which in turn will lead to declines in tax revenue and anincrease in pressures for new taxation--both of which dampen the state's overall business climate.Given these interstate competitive pressures, state governments are expected to be less likely to pursue redistributive or social welfare programs that are out of step with their neighbors. Scholars and policymakers commonly argue that states with generous redistributive programs will be more likely to attract poor migrants seeking to take advantage of more generous welfare program benefits. A state that attracts poor migrants hazards becoming a "welfare magnet," which results in higher social welfare program expenditures and higher corresponding tax rates than neighboring states with less generous programs (Peterson and Rom, 1990). Combined, the necessity to compete for development opportunities and concerns about becoming a welfare magnet pressure states to pursue social welfare programs that are no more generous than those programs implemented by their neighbors. By restricting access or eligibility to programs, states can protect themselves frombecoming welfare magnets and limit the growth of welfare expenditures. Over time, such behavior can lead to a race to the bottom, where states repeatedly lower program generosity in response to similar actions by neighbors, substantially eroding the social welfare safety net.

Even if the CP solves the aff, race to the bottom causes states to shift funding for other social services from the poor. Scott W. Allard, Associate Professor in the University of Chicago's School of Social Service Administration, 12-1-2006. [Social Science Quarterly 782(9), A starting foul in the study of the Race to the Bottom: a comment on"measuring state TANF policy variations and change after reform"; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, p. lexis]

Racing to the bottom, however, may still occur in several other ways under the current system. In addition to lowering monthly benefit levels, states now have additional means of limiting the generosity and availability of welfare assistance. Today, cash assistance constitutes a very small percentage of all welfare spending, comprising roughly one-third of all welfare spending nationally and a much lower percentage of TANF expenditures in many states. Instead, states spend roughly 60 percent of all welfare dollars on social services and noncash types of assistance (e.g., childcare, job training, or literacy programs), which proves to be a very different type of welfare assistance (Allard, 2004b). Services supporting work are not fungible and require a participatory commitment from the recipient, so social service provision does not expose states to the same threat or perception of welfare migration as cash assistance. Because social services are less visible and not viewed as critical to immediate material needs, states can curtail funding for or access to social services without appearing to deny poor children basic needs. Further, federal regulationsregarding state TANF maintenance of effort require states to spend only 75 percent of their 1995 expenditure level. States can also shiftwelfare dollars to other programs such as the Social Service Block Grant (SSBG) or to other programs that serve poor people more broadly defined.

36


Race to the Bottom Economic decline causes race to the bottom(Pittsburgh Tribune, 4-15-02, “Race to the bottom” lexis)

The Commonwealth Foundation says the state can break free of the economic stranglehold it has created for itself: End compulsory unionism. Workers must not be forced to tithe to labor cartels for the right to work.Stop forcing state taxpayers to pay artificially high "prevailing (union) wage" labor rates for public projects such as road and bridge construction and maintenance.Eliminate the state "death tax" to prevent the state government's grave robbers from confiscating the wealth of deceased Pennsylvanians, which should rightfully go to their heirs.Reduce job-killing corporate taxes, which are among the nation's highest, to slow the state's race to the bottom.

States low education standards cause a race to the bottom(The New York Times, 3-12-09, “Ending the 'Race to the Bottom'” lexis)

Mr. Obama spoke in terms that everyone could understand when he noted that only a third of 13- and 14-year-olds read as well as they should and that this country's curriculum for eighth graders is two full years behind other top-performing nations. Part of the problem, he said, is that this nation's schools have recently been engaged in ''a race to the bottom'' -- most states have adopted abysmally low standards and weak tests so that students who are performing poorly in objective terms can look like high achievers come test time. The nation has a patchwork of standards that vary widely from state to state and a system under which he said ''fourth-grade readers in Mississippi are scoring nearly 70 points lower than students in Wyoming -- and they're getting the same grade.'' In addition, Mr. Obama said, several states have standards so low that students could end up on par with the bottom 40 percent of students around the globe.

States working together leads to a race to the bottom(CQ Transcriptions, 4-12-09, “HEARING ON THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET” lexis)

What we need to do is provide clear guidance and clear goalposts. Under No Child Left Behind, 50 different states set their own benchmarks, set their own goalposts, and what that led to -- I think maybe unintentionally, but what it led to is what I call a race to the bottom, states dumbing down their standards to hit some political goal. And so, while No Child Left Behind was very loose about the goals, it was very tight, very prescriptive, I would argue overly prescriptive, about how you get there. I want to try and flip that. I want to be much tighter on what the goal is. I want our states thinking about college ready, career ready, internationally benchmarked standards.

States can work together in a race to the top(National Review, 7-8-05, Clearing the Air - Saving Our Environment from Washington: How Congress Grabs Power, Shirks Responsibility, and Shortchanges the People, by David Schoenbrod, lexis)Schoenbrod embraces recent scholarship that documents environmental progress at the state and local levels predating the era of federal legislation in the 1970s. "The federal government," he concludes, "should step in only when states, left to their own devices, are likely to allow significant harm to be done beyond their own borders." Schoenbrod rejects claims that more devolution of power to the states would result in a "race to the bottom" in environmental quality. Citing recent studies, he maintains that there is little evidence for this claim; there is, in fact, some evidence of an actual race to the top. Today, states feel even less temptation to race to the bottom because "environmental protection has become a potent political force."

37


Perm Shields Politics Link Perm shields the link—Congress persons will escape political blame by blaming the states.

Wendy A. Bach, J.D., Faculty, CUNY School of Law, Winter 2009. [74 Brooklyn L. Rev. 275, Article: Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, lexis]

n14 Although there is no question that the PRA called for devolution of power on a much larger scale than earlier welfare programs, Joel Handler argued persuasively that throughout the twentieth century the United States has consistently delegated administration of social welfare programs to lower levels of government when the subjects of the program are socially categorized as "undeserving." HANDLER, supra note 5, at 49.When there is agreement on the deservingness of the category, the program is federally administered and fairly routine. On the other hand, when welfare is controversial, and when controversies boil up and demand upper-level attention . . . the preferred response, from the perspective of the legislature, is to try to escape political costs by granting symbolic victories and delegating the controversy back down to the local level.

38


Perm Solves The perm solves best, and avoids federalism net benefit. (The Regents of the University of California, environmental law and policy journal, Fall, 2008, "A Period of Consequences: Global Warming Legislation, Cooperative Federalism, and the Fight Between the EPA and the State of California”. Lexis)

The environmental legislative regime need not rely solely on either federal or state regulations. To the contrary, cooperative federalism addresses concerns raised by both sides of the federalism debate. Cooperative federalism takes into account the positives and negatives of each regime, integrating federal and state legislation to best serve the environment. Thus, "policy-makers do not have to choose between federal and state approaches; the two can complement one another." n20

One may broadly describe cooperative federalism as a hybrid system of "federal legislation positing cooperation through interacting state and federal consent." n21 The Supreme Court recognized cooperative federalism as a system "that rejects a nationally uniform approach to problem solving in which Congress preempts state authority, and that instead allows state and local authorities to make at least some decisions, subject to minimum federal standards." n22 Cooperative federalism thus allows states to create regulations to meet their own particular needs subject only to federally mandated minimum standards. n23

39


States Bad—Lack Resources States lack the resources and initiative to provide social services for the poor. Jon Michaels, Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable Guido Calabresi, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (J.D., Yale Law School), 2004. [34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 573, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, lexis]

Simply put, in abdicating this responsibility, Congress has actually allowed one narrative to dominate the other. It has privileged the aims of devolution and privatization - at the expense of ensuring fidelity to the policy aims and objectives of welfare reform and, importantly, at the expense of ensuring fidelity to the concept of federalism itself. This capitulation to the forces of devolution, I need not add, may be politically expedient, n5 but otherwise incongruous from the perspective of prudent policymaking. n6 State and local governments, as well as private and faith-based providers, could be quite effective partners in designing and implementing welfare reform. But left to their own devices, they lack the institutional capacity and, oftentimes, the proper incentives to bear primary [*577] responsibility for ensuring the successful transition of America's dependent, welfare population to the world of work and personal responsibility. The shrinking of the federal government's responsibilities over social welfare, moreover, creates civic harms as well. n7 To abandon our national commitment to assist some of the most vulnerable among us, is to rend the very fabric of our collective identity.

40


States Bad—Creativity States discourage creativity and experimentation for poverty services.

Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr, Joe Soss, Professor, Cowles Chair for the Study of Public Service, U. of Minnesota, 6-22-1998. [Publius, Making something out of nothing: welfare reform and a new race to the bottom, p. lexis]

In what follows, we raise critical questions for these two metaphors, and suggest that neither "laboratories of democracy" nor "race tothe bottom" do justice to the complexities of welfare reform. As a counter to images of free experimentation, we question whether the 1996 legislation actually promotes diversity or creativity in state policymaking. State officials are not nearly as autonomous in reality as they appear to be in political rhetoric. Along with the block grants that gave more authority to the states, the 1996 law also created newfederal mandates that limit state action. In addition to these formal constraints, states also face informal pressures to "keep up" with one another. As fears of becoming a welfare magnet combine with concerns about "falling behind," the new system of decentralization may discourage states from seeking new and creative ways to fight poverty.

State modeling discourages creativity. Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr, Joe Soss, Professor, Cowles Chair for the Study of Public Service, U. of Minnesota, 6-22-1998. [Publius, Making something out of nothing: welfare reform and a new race to the bottom, p. lexis]

Recognizing this strand of historical continuity is important for two reasons. First, it belies the idea that a "devolution revolution"has suddenly liberated 50 servants of the federal government. Second, by examining the history of state discretion before and during the AFDC system, it is possible to see that state policymakers are subject a variety of informal pressures that can limit the ways they use their discretion. Pressures that have little do with federal rules havetraditionally worked against innovations that deviate sharply from policies in other states. In particular, policymakers have tended to resist reforms that might make their states less attractive to businesses as well as those that might make their states more attractive to poor people. Through both of these mechanisms, states are pressured to compare their own policies with those of their neighbors - a form of"checking over the shoulder" that undermines each state's ability tobe creative in exercising its discretion.

41


States Bad—Discrimination States practice discrimination against minoritiesStanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 6 [Aug 2006, "Arizona's Proposition 200 and the Supremacy of Federal Law: Elements of Law, Politics, and Faith"]

Though not a major problem given the political legitimacy and responsiveness of state government vis-a-vis the federal government, I do pause here to flag one civic concern: the legacy of oppression and discrimination that particular minority communities associate with their state governments has not yet, unfortunately, been relegated to the annals of ancient history. Not only do segregationist policies, denial of the franchise, and ruthless state-sponsored violence come to mind for many poor black southerners when they think about their relationship to the state government; they may also have salient memories of King v. Smith types of intrusive, humiliating home visits related directly to welfare administration. n167 In light of PRWORA's abandonment of federal welfare entitlements, the oppressive and discriminatory policies and attitudes of the 1950s and 1960s, which had been reined in by the federal protections afforded by way of Goldberg and King, may potentially be revived.Indeed, institutional racism at the state and local level is alarmingly enduring. Professor Cashin, for one, devotes considerable attention to how states profoundly discriminate against their African-American welfare populations. n168 And another, Professor Susan Gooden, presents a particularly salient case study of Virginia welfare services. In her study, she documents and contrasts state administrators' disparaging and ungenerous treatment of black welfare recipients with their treatment of similarly situated white clients who were always given first notice of new jobs, offered the "newest" work clothes, and given access to automobiles. n169Understanding discrimination is not just an academic exercise, but also a visceral part of the welfare experience. The civic harms associated with returning power to the states cannot be disregarded as historically contingent. Such harms persist today.

42


States Bad—Diversion States divert people from receiving social servicesStanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 6 [Aug 2006, "Arizona's Proposition 200 and the Supremacy of Federal Law: Elements of Law, Politics, and Faith"]

For a variety of reasons, only one of which is cost-savings, states notoriously engage in tactics known as diversion. n141 They try to discourage would-be welfare recipients from obtaining assistance by making it difficult to schedule appointments; thus fewer would-be recipients actually have the tenacity (and resources) to follow through and successfully enroll. n142 As they return to the pre-Goldberg world without federal entitlements, states possess greater discretion in decisionmaking and can easily reject an individual applying for benefits, or effectively make it nearly impossible for that individual to maintain her eligibility. n143 For example, states can deny benefits to those who arrive at the welfare office after 11 a.m., n144 conduct invasive home visits, n145 move their offices beyond the reach of public [*618] transportation, n146 use disabled children's SSI payments as proof that the family is not poor, n147 or require weeks of job searches before allowing individuals to apply for welfare. n148 In this environment, welfare is intended to be understood as a last resort. This situation may work to motivate individuals to wake up early, secure day care, perhaps marry, and otherwise remain diligent with job searches. But it also represents the danger of diversion qua moneymaking - a windfall for states.Of course, diversion, as suggested above, comports moderately well with congressional intent; but states may take it too far. n149 There is a high - possibly exceedingly high - state interest in diversion because states may want to reallocate the resources they save on welfare to other projects. While the financial incentive to divert would-be clients is built into the system, there are many cases in which diversion takes on an overwhelming passion, which may not reflect, again, the intent of the federal government. n150

States shift funds altogetherStanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 6 [Aug 2006, "Arizona's Proposition 200 and the Supremacy of Federal Law: Elements of Law, Politics, and Faith"]

Second, the opportunity to implement welfare reform gives [*617] states the discretion to shift funds to alternative programs, possibly altogether unrelated to the provision of social welfare services. In 1998, Wisconsin spent $ 98 million less than it was given that year by the federal government. It kept the money and dispersed it around the state for, inter alia, drug-treatment programs, education, and tax relief. n139 Other states have decided to keep that unspent federal money in savings for a rainy day. n140

43


States Bad—Social Services Trade-off Expanding state welfare burdens forces tradeoffs with other social services provision.

Craig Volden, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, Ohio State U., 12-1-2006. [Social Science Quarterly 791(7), Experimenting with welfare reform: emulating success, cutting costs,or racing to the bottom?, p. lexis]

Yet the potential costs from devolution are also numerous, and canlikewise be classified as intra-state and interstate. One fear from devolution is that state policymakers may not necessarily seek out policies to best aid their welfare recipients. Instead, state-level policies may reflect racial biases, with stricter and less helpful policies in states with larger minority TANF populations. Moreover, state policymakers may be mainly interested in cutting the costs of their welfare-to-work programs, perhaps diverting funds to rising Medicaid costs. External to the states, policy diffusion pressures may be less benign than devolution supporters claim. Indeed, policymakers may fear becoming "welfare magnets" and may therefore engage in a race to the bottom in benefits and eligibility requirements to make their programs less attractive to the poor and unemployed in surrounding states. As a result of these considerations, devolution of policy control may lead to policies that are racially biased, inadequately funded, andunduly stringent.

44


States Bad—Social Services Trade-off Race to the bottom will force cuts in other state poverty programs.

Paul E. Peterson, Henry Shattuck Professor of Government and Director, Center for American Political Studies, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1996. [14 Yale J. on Reg. 111, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM: JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND COMPETITION: WELFARE POLICY: Devolution's Price, p. lexis]

Should Medicaid be incorporated into a block grant program, the race to the bottom could become deadly . Seventy percent of Medicaid funds are spent in providing services to a disabled and elderly population whose Medicare benefits have expired. The remaining 30% provide health care benefits to low income families. Both aspects of Medicaid have reduced inequities in the utilization of health care. Since Medicaid services have been available, low birth weight and infant mortality rates have fallen, children from poor families are more likely to use hospital facilities, and differential access between children from poor and nonpoor families has been noticeably reduced.Like AFDC, Medicaid is currently an entitlement program. A person or family is entitled to receive Medicaid benefits if income and resource eligibility requirements are met. These eligibility requirements are set by states, subject to certain federal guidelines. The federal government pays for at least one-half the cost of Medicaid services in all states. In states with low per capita [*119] incomes, the federal government pays a higher share of program costs. Increases in the cost of a state's Medicaid program are borne either equally by the state and the federal government or disproportionately by the federal government.The national framework for Medicaid has helped provide better coverage to needy groups, especially low-income pregnant women and their children. In 1986, Congress expanded coverage to all pregnant women and infants living in families with incomes below the poverty line. In 1990, Medicaid was expanded to cover all children living in poverty up to the age of nineteen. The impact of these new federal standards on state policy has been considerable. The uniform, minimum floor for coverage (for pregnant women and children) established in 1992 was two to three times higher than the coverage provided by the average state only four years earlier. As a result of both policy and demographic changes, the cost of Medicaid has increased rapidly, growing from $ 31 billion in 1975 to $ 73 billion in 1990. Today it is by far the largest of all safety net programs.Despite overall growth in Medicaid and generous federal assistance which helps alleviate state Medicaid costs, states are still sensitive to the likelihood they might become a Medicaid magnet. Following procedures similar to those used to estimate competitive effects on AFDC policy, Mark Rom, Ken Scheve, and I estimated the effects of per recipient expenditures of neighboring states on a state's own Medicaid expenditures for the years 1976 and 1989. Our estimate controlled for the composition of the Medicaid population, as well for tax capacity, poverty rates, and party strength. We found that Medicaid expenditures per recipient were reduced by $ 13 for every $ 100 a state's benefit level the previous year had exceeded that of the average contiguous state. n19 As with welfare, states take into account Medicaid benefits in neighboring states when setting their own.The race to the bottom can be expected to increase if proposed Medicaid policies are enacted. The proposed 4% increase in the Medicaid block grant is expected to be sufficient to cover only anticipated demographic changes, such as overall population growth and increases in the size of the elderly and disabled populations (whose services account for approximately 71% of Medicaid costs). But after two years, nothing is budgeted for inflation, despite the fact that in recent years overall inflation has averaged about 3% a year and health care costs have been rising at around 6%. After two years, any increase in the cost of the program beyond 4% would be borne entirely by the state government. [*120] States will be under great fiscal pressure to race to the bottom. Medicaid is already one of the fastest growing segments of state budgets. If states are asked to bear all additional costs beyond the federal 4% increment, the burden on many states is likely to be severe. Even if health care inflation can be limited to overall rates of inflation, this increase plus demographic changes will produce a natural increase in costs of 7%. States that experience a slowdown in economic growth will face even greater demands on their Medicaid budgets, as unemployed workers apply for coverage. Demands on the program can be expected to intensify further with the drop in employer-funded health care insurance. Under extreme fiscal pressure, some states will be forced to change eligibility requirements, provider payments, and the range of covered services. Poor people in need of costly medical services will have especially large incentives to locate in places where medical benefits are more generous. As the more generous states experience a rise in their low-income, medically needy population, they will come under increasing pressure to match cuts that have occurred elsewhere. The race to the bottom could become quite deadly.

45


Aff—Obama Linked to DC Action Obama will be linked with poverty policy in DC.

Carol E. Lee, staff writer, 11-5-2008. [Politico.com, How will Obama relate to the District? P. lexis]

The expectation of an Obama White House is different. Residents and community leaders anticipate more outreach from Barack and Michelle Obama both because they are black and because D.C. Mayor Adrian Fenty was a very early and enthusiastic supporter of the Obama campaign. "I do expect them to be extremely active, engaged members of the Washington, D.C., community - as they have been in Chicago," Fenty said. "I know he won't be a president who just happens to live in the White House. He will be a president who will see the issues of the city and want to do something about them."The White House's level of involvement in D.C. is particularly important to the city's black residents. They have the most to benefit from an active First Couple. They live in the city's most blighted neighborhoods and attend the city's worst schools - though Washington also has a large, long-established black middle-class. They are also 2½ times more likely to be uninsured than white D.C. residents, according to a study by the nonpartisan Urban Institute.

46


Aff—Theory—No Uniform State Action Uniform state action for poverty doesn’t exist.

Erin M. Loubier, Public Benefits Attorney for the Legal Services Department of the Whitman-Walker Clinic; J.D., 2001. [10 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 33, AN INSPIRATION FOR POLITICAL LAWERYING:WELFARE REFORM ACTIVISM IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, lexis]

I hope the picture that I paint of what is going on in the District of Columbia - which is just one example of what welfare reform looks like, because it has been implemented differently in every state n4 - motivates some students to want to come out and work on some of these issues. Due to the federal time limits, which will hit the District in 2002, n5 the need for your talents and legal skills is really great. The work we do helping people deal with welfare issues is very important.

47


***Federalism DA Aff Answers***

48


Federalism Dead Non-unique: Obama has already stripped the states of what little power they still possessed.The Heritage Foundation, 09 (“Obama’s Health Care Reform: The Demise of Federalism,” 15 June 2009, http://www.heritage.org/Press/FactSheet/fs0032.cfm)

Flexibility in Name Only: States have played a significant role in developing unique and innovative approaches to address the health care needs of their citizens. During the 08 campaign, then-candidate Obama promoted the idea of state flexibility, but as President he replaced this embrace of flexibility with an embrace of federal standards. Obama has already taken numerous steps to roll back many of the flexibilities extended to states in administering Medicaid and SCHIP.Federal Control over Health Insurance: Currently, states regulate the health insurance available in their states. Under the Obama plan, the federal government would take over the role of regulator, leaving governors and state insurance commissioners to merely implement the new federal framework.

49


Federalism Terminally Dead Over the past 30 years the federal government has been preempting states powers.Nivola, 00 (Pietro, Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institute, June 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2000/06governance_nivola.aspx)

In 1908 Woodrow Wilson observed that the proper relationship between the national government and the states "is the cardinal question of our constitutional system." The question would not be settled by "one generation," he added, but would preoccupy "every successive stage of our political and economic development."The latest round of this interminable debate centers on the propensity of federal authorities to preempt state powers. Articulate critics have entered the fray—not least Senator Fred D. Thompson, Republican from Tennessee, who has floated a Federalism Accountability Act to curb a profusion of preemptions. But what, precisely, are preemptions? Are they a problem? Why have they increased in the past thirty years? And how might answers to these questions help decide the merits of proposed reforms such as Senator Thompson's?

Federal power vastly expanding.WSJ, 09 (Wall Street Journal, Randy E. Barnett,

In response to an unprecedented expansion of federal power, citizens have held hundreds of "tea party" rallies around the country, and various states are considering "sovereignty resolutions" invoking the Constitution's Ninth and Tenth Amendments. For example, Michigan's proposal urges "the federal government to halt its practice of imposing mandates upon the states for purposes not enumerated by the Constitution of the United States."While well-intentioned, such symbolic resolutions are not likely to have the slightest impact on the federal courts, which long ago adopted a virtually unlimited construction of Congressional power. But state legislatures have a real power under the Constitution by which to resist the growth of federal power: They can petition Congress for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.Article V provides that, "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states," Congress "shall call a convention for proposing amendments." Before becoming law, any amendments produced by such a convention would then need to be ratified by three-quarters of the states.An amendments convention is feared because its scope cannot be limited in advance. The convention convened by Congress to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation produced instead the entirely different Constitution under which we now live. Yet it is precisely the fear of a runaway convention that states can exploit to bring Congress to heel.

50


Federalism Not Needed Federalism has proven to be a bad model of government.Daily Kos, 09 (“The Failure of the Philosophy of Federalism,” 16 June 2009, http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/6/16/743192/-Lawkos:The-Failure-of-the-Philosophy-of-Federalism)

Proponents of federalism, particularly former Chief Justice Reinquist, argued for more authority for states, against unfunded mandates, etc.But after the Civil War and now the impending bankruptcy of the State of California, where does that argument go?Do Conservatives argue that California is simply California, and the problem is the Constitution of the state and the problems are limited to it alone? But with so many other states whose budgets are in the red, this strawman is burning.So what becomes of the argument for states rights? Do they acknowledge another philosophical failure of the most basic elements of their politics?What becomes of federalism? Does California become the Federal District of California? There's some seriously interesting issues here to discuss.Fellow kossacks, what say you?

51


Federalism Not Modeled

U.S. federalism isn’t modeledAlfred Stepan, Wallace Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University, 1999, Journal of Democracy Volume 10, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v010/10.4stepan.html

The U.S. model of federalism, in terms of the analytical categories developed in this article, is "coming-together" in its origin, "constitutionally symmetrical" in its structure, and "demos-constraining" in its political consequences. Despite the prestige of this U.S. model of federalism, it would seem to hold greater historical interest than contemporary attraction for other democracies. Since the emergence of nation-states on the world stage in the after-math of the French Revolution, no sovereign democratic nation-states have ever "come together" in an enduring federation. Three largely unitary states, however (Belgium, Spain, and India) have constructed "holding-together" federations. In contrast to the United States, these federations are constitutionally asymmetrical and more "demos-enabling" than [End Page 32] "demos-constraining." Should the United Kingdom ever become a federation, it would also be "holding-together" in origin. Since it is extremely unlikely that Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland would have the same number of seats as England in the upper chamber of the new federation, or that the new upper chamber of the federation would be nearly equal in power to the lower chamber, the new federation would not be "demos-constraining" as I have defined that term. Finally, it would obviously defeat the purpose of such a new federation if it were constitutionally symmetrical. A U.K. federation, then, would not follow the U.S. model. The fact that since the French Revolution no fully independent nation-states have come together to pool their sovereignty in a new and more powerful polity constructed in the form of a federation would seem to have implications for the future evolution of the European Union. The European Union is composed of independent states, most of which are nation-states. These states are indeed increasingly becoming "functionally federal." Were there to be a prolonged recession (or a depression), however, and were some EU member states to experience very high unemployment rates in comparison to others, member states could vote to dismantle some of the economic federal structures of the federation that were perceived as being "politically dysfunctional." Unlike most classic federations, such as the United States, the European Union will most likely continue to be marked by the presumption of freedom of exit. Finally, many of the new federations that could emerge from the currently nondemocratic parts of the world would probably be territorially based, multilingual, and multinational. For the reasons spelled out in this article, very few, if any, such polities would attempt to consolidate democracy using the U.S. model of "coming-together," "demos-constraining," symmetrical federalism.

52


Federalism Not Modeled

No modelingGevork Ter-Gabrielian, Department of Political Science Bowling Green State University, Strategies in Ethnic Conflict, August 1999, Fourth World Journal http://www.cwis.org/fwj/41/fworld.html

Accommodation, if it is possible to achieve in a form of federation or consociation, is a solution. However, the cases of accommodation are rare, and there is no guarantee that accommodation in a society divided by ethnic conflict will result in a long-lasting peace. Moreover, state elites are reluctant to consider accommodation as an option because they believe that a federative arrangement would give ethnic groups an even more legitimate opportunity to break away. This happened in Czechoslovakia. Before 1992, it was only nominally federation. In the 1992 Constitution, it was re-named Czecho-Slovakia, and the federation comprised of two equal republics was constituted. Inless than a year Slovakia seceded. This was the only case of indeed peaceful ('velvet') divorce in the post-Soviet space. All other post-Soviet states, except for Russia and Romania, rather than enhancing the status of their ethnic groups have nominally discarded even the existing political autonomies (in the best case substituting them by a vague cultural autonomy), which, in turn, has become a cause for ethnic conflict escalation (Naumkin, 1994). If states are not liberal by their ideology, if they are not economically secure and politically well-established democracies, they tend to reject the option of accommodation to the demands of ethnic groups.

53


Federalism Bad: Laundry List

Federalism leads to ineffective responses to disease outbreaks, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters

Griffin, 07 (Stephen M., Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane School St. Johns Journal of Legal Commentary Spring- “Symposium: Federalism Past, Federalism Future: A Constitutional Law Symposium: Stop Federalism Before It Kills Again: Reflections On Hurricane Katrina, 2007)And so it is still the case that when natural disasters strike, the divided power of the federal structure presents a coordination problem. The kind of coordination that had to occur to avoid the Katrina disaster requires long-term planning before the event. The American constitutional system makes taking intergovernmental action difficult and complex. The process of coordinating governments can take years. In many ways, the government was just at the beginning of that process at the time of Katrina, n48 although we are now four years distant from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that set the latest round of disaster coordination in motion. Suppose, however, that we don't have the luxury of taking the time to satisfy every official with a veto. This is the key point of tension between what contemporary governance demands and what the Constitution permits. The kind of limited change that occurred in 1927 can take us only so far. What Hurricane Katrina showed was that even after decades of experience with natural disasters, the federal and state governments were still uncoordinated and unprepared. The reasons they were unprepared go to the heart of the constitutional order. Unless we learn some lessons, Katrina will happen again. It may be a massive earthquake, an influenza pandemic, a terrorist attack, or even another hurricane, but the same ill-coordinated response will indeed happen again unless some attention is paid to the constitutional and institutional lessons of Katrina. We need to "stop federalism " before it kills again. That is, we need to stop our customary thinking about what federalism requires in order to prevent another horrific loss of life and property.

54

http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.623515.1689064805&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1215280977638&returnToKey=20_T4099813154&parent=docview#n48%23n48


Federalism Bad: Environment Federalism sacrifices environmental protectiveness

Buzbee, Professor of Law at Emory, 2006(William. “CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM” http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/envtllaw/issues/vol14/1/v14_n1_buzbee.pdf)

The “contextual environmental federalism” analysis that I call for stands in contrast to many other scholars’ approaches to environmental federalism. In articulating how environmental regulation should be designed, an array of modes of argument and forms of proof are commonly used to support particular preferred mixes of federal, state and local roles. Much of this debate over environmental federalism seeks to resolve these issues through:• constitutional argument, • semi-historical normative arguments,• historical examples, • empirical data, or • theoretical analysis. The question typically boils down to whether federal environmental regulation, or sometimes federal environmental primacy, is appropriate or necessary. These various approaches reach a few somewhat predictable conclusions. While few argue that the federal environmental role is unconstitutional, one common strain among scholars and policymakers is the idea that, due either to constitutional presumptions or the diversity of circumstances among the states, the regulatory norm should be a limited federal role unless some compelling alternative rationale justifies federal leadership. Sometimes these arguments rely on a mix of theory and anecdotally based empiricism,3 but more often this is offered as an argument from first principles. No federal role is called for, unless a compelling justification is found.4This argument is often rooted in what is sometimes referred to as the “matching principle” or “subsidiarity” conceptions. Under this logic, matching the level of government most commensurate with the regulatory ill is the best way to ensure the correct amount and form of regulation. Typically, people espousing this position emphasize the geographical dimensions of an environmental ill to argue that it counsels for a primary state or local regulatory role.5 As I explored in a recent work on the implications of the “regulatory commons,” and will discuss more fully below, this literature in the environmental area makes fundamental conceptual errors in failing to consider the several dimensions in which regulatory challenges and effective regulatory responses exist.6Others see the federal government, at least since 1970 and the explosion of federal environmental legislation, as the most innovative and primary protector of the environment and are wary of federal surrender of that role.7 As with arguments for state and local primacy, proponents of federal environmental leadership also utilize theoretical political-economy arguments in support of a substantial, often primary, federal role. They note several reasons to be wary of significant or primary state environmental standard setting. They point to race-to-the-bottom risks, where jurisdictions competing for business and jobs and eager to keep taxes low will be tempted to sacrifice softer environmental concerns for the more immediate, tangible, monetary benefits of under-regulation.8 Even where two competing states share a preference for a clean and safe environment, interstate competition may lead both to sacrifice environmental protectiveness. Professor Engel’s work provides a powerful empirical and theoretical refutation of Dean Revesz’s contention that although interjurisdictional competition for business may sacrifice environmental protection, it will nevertheless enhance social welfare.9Critics of any reflexive allocation of regulatory power to states also point out that many environmental risks far outstrip any state or local government’s reach.10 This problem of scale links to the argument that economies of scale inherent in gathering environmental data and deriving effective pollution control techniques justify the current level of federal involvement.11 Furthermore, it has been argued that since larger units of government are less susceptible to regulatory surrender, the interest group dynamics and skewed resources at play in environmental regulation require federal level control.12 Some make the modest and less controversial point that if one desires a cleaner environment, then one may prefer a leading federal role because that is the level of government where environmental advocates have been most successful over the last thirty years of the environmental movement.

55


Federalism Bad: Corruption Federalism harbors corruption.CAPS Blog, 09 (“The Rise and Fall of California,” 01 July 2009, http://caps.fool.com/Blogs/ViewPost.aspx?bpid=221445&t=01001094457128408726)

You might say that Californian politicians will eventually come to their senses and find a way to balance their budget. That might be overestimating the capacity of Californian pols to do good, however. You see, one of my constant critiques of American Federalism is that it's broken at this point. Not completely so, but it's drifted so far from the Founders' original intent that it bears little resemblance to the system established in 1789. Federalism works alright for New Hampshire. And Vermont. And Maine. And maybe some other small states. It's a complete failure when applied to Goliath states like California, however. The problem is that democracy just doesn't work on a massive scale. It never has and it probably never will. James Madison understood this. He repeatedly brought up this issue in The Federalist Papers. The entire idea behind Madison's American system (i.e. "Federalism") was that political power would be decentralized into managable districts (we call them "states"). The problem is that when you take a massive "district" that is probably larger than France and includes over 10 million people; all of whom are governed by about a hundred legislators and a Governor, then you are asking for corruption. California's politicians are corrupt. They are not there to serve the interests of the voters. They are there for special interests. Part of pandering to special interests, however, includes pandering to the voters. What I'm suggesting is that California politicians are constantly on a quest to give away more things will promising lesser and lesser taxes.

56


Federalism Bad—Nigeria Nigeria models US federalism – empirically provenDefense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, 2005 (“Oil as Troubled Waters,” June 2005, lexis)

By contrast, he notes: "The most exemplary practice of federalism is to be found in the United States of America where the people of the constituent states maintain a near 100 percent control over their resources and pay taxes to sustain the central government."In the United States, the federalist thinking remains strong, and the US Senate remains the focus of the protection of states' rights within the federation. That principle also was emplaced in, for example, Australia and Nigeria, but in both those central parliamentary systems, the senates and senators have largely forgotten that their mandate is to uphold the rights of the states within the system. Similarly, in Britain, the House of Lords was established largely to protect the rights of the land; the dispersed rural identities of the counties. In Britain, too, that role has been forgotten, as the massive centralization in London has literally abandoned the traditional rights of the less-densely-populated rural areas.

Federalism in Nigeria leads to militarismAll Africa Global, 04 (Chuks Okocha, “Why True Federalism Failed in Nigeria,” 20 October 2004, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6901118997&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T6901120300&cisb=22_T6901118999&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=2)

Military misadventure into the Nigeria's body polity has been blamed for the failure of true federalism in the country. Eminent scholar and Pan-Africanist, Professor Ali Mazrui, has said.Mazrui, who delivered a special lecture "Mega-Nigeria from Lugard to Gowon: Between Exceptionalism and Typicality," yesterday in Abuja to mark the 70th birthday anniversary of former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon (rtd), said "Nigeria is almost the only African country which has consistently tried to maintain a federal system of government similar to the United States. It is true that federalism and military rule make very strange bedfellows. Nigerian federalism has been distorted by militarism."The guest lecturer explained that "federalism in USA is alive and well. Federalism in Nigeria is alive, but not well. Nigeria's exceptional need for federalism is partly because of the enlargementof the scale initiated by the amalgamation of 1914."He eulogised Gowon for inventing what he called true federalism, saying "Gowon abolished the original sub regions, he invented new federalism."Mazrui described Nigeria as a bundle of contradictions as a nation under military rule, yet sponsors democracy in other countries.

57


Federalism Fails Federalism fails to deliver on its promises of flexibility and liberty.Nivola, 05 (Pietro, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, October 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2005/10governance_nivola.aspx)

"What do we want from federalism?" asked the late Martin Diamond in a famous essay written thirty years ago. His answer was that federalism— a political system permitting a large measure of regional self-rule—presumably gives the rulers and the ruled a "school of their citizenship," "a preserver of their liberties," and "a vehicle for flexible response to their problems." These features, broadly construed, are said to reduce conflict between diverse communities, even as a federated polity affords inter-jurisdictional competition that encourages innovations and constrains the overall growth of government.Alas, as Professor Diamond and just about anyone else who has studied the subject would readily acknowledge, the promise and practice of federalism are frequently at odds. A federal republic does not always train citizens and their elected officials better than does a unitary democratic state. Nor are federations always better at preserving liberties, managing conflicts, innovating, or curbing "big" government.

58


Federalism Fails Federalism empirically has caused war and racism.Nivola, 05 (Pietro, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, October 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2005/10governance_nivola.aspx)

Where truly profound regional linguistic, religious, or cultural differences persist, however, federating is by no means a guarantee of national harmony. Canada, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia are wellknown cases of federations that either periodically faced secessionist movements (Quebec), or have had to struggle with them continually (the Basques), or collapsed in barbarous civil wars (the Balkans). Iraq seems headed for the same fate. The Sunni minority there is resisting a draft constitution that would grant regional autonomy not only to the Kurds in the north but to Shiite sectarians in the oil-rich south. So far, proposed federalism for Iraq is proving to be a recipe for disaccord, not accommodation.In much of America's own history, federalism did not ease this country's sectional tensions. On the contrary, a long sequence of compromises with the southern states in the first half of the nineteenth century failed to prevent the Civil War. Then, through the first half of the twentieth century, additional concessions to states' rights did little to dismantle the South's repulsive institution of racial apartheid. Southern separatism was subdued by a military defeat, not diplomatic give-and-take, and only further assertions of central power—starting with the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in 1954—began altering the region's corrosive racial policies.If we fast-forward to present day America, the thesis that federalism is what holds the country together seems no less questionable, though for a different reason. For all the hype about the country's "culture wars," the fact is that socially and culturally, the contemporary United States has become a remarkably integrated society, particularly when compared to other large nations such as India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, or even some smaller European states. Thanks largely to massive interregional migrations, economic dynamism, and ease of assimilation, contrasts between America's deep South and the rest of the country seem minor today compared to, say, the continuing cultural chasm between the north and south of Italy. In America, where examples of religiously or ethnically distinct jurisdictions are mild ones, like Utah and Hawaii, it seems hard to argue that the nation's fifty states represent keen territorial diversity, and that they are the secret to this country's cohesion. Put more generally, the sub-national entities of an increasingly mobile and assimilative society such as ours tend to demand less independence than they once did, and how much of it they get may not make as much difference for national unity.

59


***Federalism DA***

60


Federalism 1NC The wave of bailouts have revived the push for federalism.Politico, 09 (Michael Falcone, 09 June 2009, “States say to feds: Get off our turf,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23502.html)

The wave of government bailouts and the Obama administration’s economic stimulus package are reviving interest in an issue that’s largely been dormant since the mid-1990s: states’ rights.From Idaho to South Carolina and in dozens of other states, Republicans are sponsoring resolutions designed to call attention to what they view as a worrisome expansion of the federal government at the expense of the states. “What we have is a federal government that is exceeding its authority and blackmailing the states into submission through printed dollars,” said Pennsylvania Republican state Rep. Sam Rohrer. “We are trying to say to the federal government, ‘You have a role, but your role stops not too far outside Washington, D.C.’”Rohrer has been shepherding a bill that declares sovereignty for Pennsylvania “under the 10th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States over all powers not otherwise enumerated and granted to the federal government by the Constitution of the United States.”

Social services are a unique place where states should have power.Davies and Harles, 05 (Jamie and John, Canadian-American Public Policy, “Federalism matters: welfare rreform and the inter-governmental balance of power in Canada and the United States,” 01 January 2005, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-15152793_ITM)

"Perhaps the fact that is most important to me personally, by passing this bill we give the states flexibility to design programs that will work best for their residents." Senator Conrad Burns (R-Montana, August 1, 1996) (2) "(The) States should have more flexibility to design programs to meet the needs of their residents. I do not believe that detailed prescriptions from Washington, DC are the answer to the problems afflicting the current welfare system." Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin, August 1, 1996) (3) If Americans invented federalism, Canadians have long been among its most enthusiastic practitioners. At the turn of the 21st century Canada is one of the most decentralized countries among advanced industrial democracies, its provinces possessing a status and policy reach unrivaled by American states. (4) Canadians often speak of having eleven senior governments in recognition of the rough political parity between the provinces and Ottawa. There is no equivalent in the American lexicon to reference the relationship between Washington and the fifty states.

American federalism is the model for all other federalism.Dr. Hueglin, 06 (Thomas, Professor of Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University, “Comparative Fefderalism: A systematic Inquiry,” 2006, http://www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/federalism/comparativefederalism.htm#The%20American%20Model)

For obvious reasons, on the one hand, American federalism is the model of all federal models. As we shall see in chapter 3, federalist ideas and concepts had been developed well before the American invention of federalism as a modern form of government. But it was this invention nevertheless which gave the world a simple and practical blueprint to be followed in theory as well as in practice. On the other hand, and for just as obvious reasons, American federalism has remained an exceptional case. To treat it as the main model and principal yardstick, and to judge, as countless textbooks have done, all other federations as variations which either fulfill or fall short of the criteria established by the American model, bears the danger of shortchanging the significance of the other models in their own right.

61

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23502.html#


Federalism 1NC Global federalism ensures world peace—prevents racial and religious warfare.Calabresi, 95 (Steven, law prof, Northwestern, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752)

Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and Switzerland. It is a big part of the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque country or a Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem. 51 American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint historical anachronism. American-style federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by the Framers, partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document.

62


Uniqueness States taking steps to take power from the feds now.The US Report, 09 (Kay B. Day, “States Put the Feds on Notice,” 01 July 2009, http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2009/07/01/states-put-feds-on-notice/)

The Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution isn’t a daily news header, but it should be. More than 35 states have passed, or are considering, a resolution to remind the federal government there is a limit to central government power. That limit was set forth in the 10th amendment, part of the Bill of Rights Patrick Henry and others wanted added to the US Constitution.In an excellent essay at the Library of Congress, excerpted from the introduction to the book ‘A More Perfect Union,’ Roger A. Bruns wrote, “The anti-Federalists, demanding a more concise, unequivocal Constitution, one that laid out for all to see the right of the people and limitations of the power of government, claimed that the brevity of the document only revealed its inferior nature.” Bruns wrote, “By the fall of 1788 [James] Madison had been convinced that not only was a bill of rights necessary to ensure acceptance of the Constitution but that it would have positive effects.”Many Americans don’t realize the Bill of Rights came after the main body of the Constitution, a response to concerns about the scope of a government made possible by the Constitution.

63

http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html

ddw09.wikispaces.comddw09.wikispaces.com/file/view/DDW States CP.doc/80520023... · Web...

Documents

Transcript of ddw09.wikispaces.comddw09.wikispaces.com/file/view/DDW States CP.doc/80520023... · Web...