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volume19,no.45 october2019

Normative Perfectionism

and the Kantian Tradition

David O. BrinkUniversity of California San Diego

© 2019 DavidO.BrinkThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019045/>

P erfectionistethicaltheoriesgroundmoraldemandsintheper-fectionorfullrealizationofone’sessentialnature.1Perfection-ismhasarichhistory.PerfectionistideascanbefoundinAristo-

tle,theStoics,Maimonides,Aquinas,Malebranche,Spinoza,Leibniz,vonHumboldt,J.S.Mill,F.H.Bradley,T.H.Green,Nietzsche,andMarx,amongothers.Thoughindividualperfectionistfigureshavereceivedsignificantattention, theirperfectionismhasnotalwaysenjoyedthesame focus.Perfectionismhasnotbeenstudied thoroughlyasadis-tinctivetradition,anditremainsaneglectedoptionincontemporarymoralandpoliticalphilosophy.2Thisneglectmayreflectdoubtsaboutthejustification,content,andimplicationsofperfectionistideals. Differentconceptionsofperfectionismresult fromdifferentcon-ceptions of human nature. Some perfectionists and their critics un-derstandhumannatureasabiologicalkind.However,thatconceptionof perfectionism gives rise to legitimate foundational doubts aboutwhether there isanythingsubstantive that isessential tohumanna-tureandwhether, if there is, itwouldbenormativelycompelling.Adifferentstrandintheperfectionisttraditiongroundsperfectionistide-als inanormative conceptionofhumannatureas involvingpersonal-ityoragency.Normative perfectionismisadistinctiveconceptionwithin

1. Anearlierversionof thismaterialwaspresentedatSheffieldUniversityaspartofa2014conferenceonPost-KantianPerfectionism;a2015UniversityofPennsylvaniaconferenceonAncientandModernConceptionsofHappiness;Ohio and St. Louis Universities; a 2016 UCSD conference, Perfectionism:AncientandModern; theChineseUniversityofHongKong;and the2019PacificDivisionMeetingsoftheAPA.IwouldliketothankmembersofthoseaudiencesandespeciallyKarlAmeriks,AnneMargaretBaxley,ChrisBennett,Alyssa Bernstein, Gwen Bradford, Rosalind Chaplin, Andrew Chitty, Gor-donFinlayson,DanHaybron,TomHurka,Terence Irwin,David James, JanKandiyali,JonathanKnutzen,CharlieKurth,HonLamLi,KathrynLindeman,HendrikLorenz,J.P.Messina,SusanSauvéMeyer,DougMoggach,StephenPalmquist,AndrewPayne,RobertStern,JohnSkorupski,AlanThomas,andEricWatkinsforhelpfulcommentsandinput.Revisionsbenefitedfromtheinputofthreeanonymousreaders.SpecialthanksgotoDonRutherford,withwhomIco-taughtagraduateseminaronancientandmodernperfectionismin2016andfromwhomIhavelearnedmuchabouttheperfectionisttradition.

2. AnimportantexceptiontothisgeneralneglectisThomasHurka,Perfectionism (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1993).ThoughHurka’sprimaryfocusissystematic,hemakesanumberof interestinghistorical claimsabout theperfectionisttradition.

davido.brink Normative Perfectionism and the Kantian Tradition

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.19,no.45(october2019)

andKantianethical traditions.Second, the importanceofautonomyin normative perfection explains why there are special constraintsonhowwecanpromotetheperfectionofanother.ThisperfectionistrecognitionofKantianconcernsisnicelyillustratedinGreen’sbrandofliberalismandinMill’sdefenseofautonomyandskepticismaboutpaternalism.

Seeing how normative perfectionism can answer these Kantianworriesbyappealtomoralpersonalitypavesthewayforseeingper-fectionist strands in Kant’s own ethical theory. Despite his doubtsaboutotherformsofperfectionism,Kantappealstomoralpersonalityasbothgroundandcontentofmoralrequirements,whichisreflectedintheUniversalityandHumanityformulationsoftheCategoricalIm-perative.ThisallowsustoidentifyapossibleperfectionistreadingofKant’sownethicaltheory.

However,becausethenormativeperfectionist,likeKant,groundsmoral requirements in rationalnature, she toomust face theworrythatKantians faceabout the incompleteness of theappeal to rationalnature.HegeliansandothershavecomplainedthatKant’sappeal torational nature to groundmoral requirements is formal and empty.Likewise, ifwe conceiveofmoralpersonality, as thenormativeper-fectionistsdo,intermsofreasons-responsiveness,wemayworrythatthe perfectionist appeal to rational naturemust be incomplete andrequires supplementation with a list of objective goods or reasonsthat can guide rational choice. A radical version of the incomplete-nessworrytreatstheappealtorationalnatureasemptyandwithoutcontent.Bycontrast,amoderateversionoftheincompletenessworrygrantsthattheappealtorationalnaturehascontentbutinsiststhatitprovides incompleteethicalguidanceunlesssupplementedbya listofnon-perfectionistgoodsor reasons.However, theappeal to ratio-nalnaturehascontent,whichmeansthat it is themoderateversionoftheincompletenessworrythatweneedtotakeseriously.Iexploremoreandlessconcessiveperfectionistrepliesthatassignperfectionistelementssmallerandlargerroleswithinthepersonalgood.ThoughIamsympatheticwiththelessconcessivepositionstakedoutbypure

theperfectionisttradition,anditisarguablymorerobustnormativelythanconceptionsappealingtoabiologicalconceptionofhumanna-ture.Aristotle,J.S.Mill,andT.H.Greenarenormativeperfectionistsandmakedistinctivecontributionstothattradition.3 Wecanbegintoredresstheneglectoftheperfectionisttraditionbyreconstructingandassessingtheessentialsof thisnormativeper-fectionisttradition.PartofthattaskinvolvesengagingKantiandoubtsaboutperfectionism.Kantwasacriticofperfectionism,anditisworthconsideringtheprospectsofnormativeperfectionismtoaddresshisconcerns.4Kantmakestwokindsofcriticismofperfectionismthatde-serveourattention.First,thereishisworry,especiallyintheGround-work and the Critique of Practical Reason, that the perfectionist andeudaimonist traditions must be heteronomous and cannot expressrequirements of practical reason.Groundingmoral requirements inperfectionistideals,Kantclaims,generateshypothetical, rather than cat-egorical, imperatives.Second,thereisKant’sclaimintheMetaphysics of Moralsthatwemustacceptamoral asymmetryinwhichweaimatourownperfectionbutatthehappiness,ratherthantheperfection,ofoth-ers. Indefenseof thisasymmetry,heargues thatperfectinganothersubvertstheother’sstatusasarationalagent.Iwanttoexplorethehistoricalandsystematicresourcesofnormativeperfectionismtoaddresstheseworries.First,insofarasthenormativeperfectionistgroundsperfectionistidealsinthenormativecategoryofpersonalityoragency,ratherthanabiologicalcategoryofhumanity,itcanrepresentperfectionistdemandsascategoricalimperatives.Thisis clearest inGreen,who self-consciously tries to synthesizeGreek

3. IfocusonAristotle,Mill,andGreenasexemplarsofnormativeperfectionismbothbecausetheirnormativeperfectionismisreasonablyclearandbecauseI know thembest,notbecause I assume that they are theonlynormativeperfectionists.

4. PartofmyagendaoverlapswiththediscussioninRobertStern,“BritishIdeal-ism”inThe Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy,ed.SachaGolobandJensTimmermann(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2017).Sterndiscuss-esthecontributionsofGreenandBradleyundertheguiseofpost-Kantianperfectionism.



claims about the human function, and onemight think that he un-derstandsthehumanfunctioninbiologicalterms.ThomasHurkaisacontemporaryperfectionistwhounderstandstheperfectionistappealtohumannatureasanappealtoabiologicalessenceforhumanbeings,groundingperfectionistgoodssuchasknowledge,creativity,achieve-ment, and athleticism in our biological essence.5 However, ground-ingperfectionistidealsinabiologicalconceptionofhumannatureisproblematicinatleasttwoways.

First,on familiarconceptionsofspeciesmembership, there isnosubstantivehumanessence.6For instance,acommonconceptionofspeciesmembership is reproductive closureor the capacity to inter-breed.Buttheorganismslinkedbyreproductiveclosuredonotpickout aparticular set of phenotypic traits or capacities as essential tohuman beings. Alternatively, speciesmembership is sometimes un-derstoodintermsofcommonlineagewithmembersofthesamespe-ciesallbeingorganismswithacommonancestorwhoaresufficientlysimilargenetically.Butcommonlineagedoesnotpickoutaparticularsetofphenotypictraitsorcapacitiesasessentialtohumanbeings.

Second, neither conception ofHomo sapiens is likely to pick outallandonly thecapacities thatwe thinkofasdistinctlyvaluableornormative.Admirabletraitssuchasrationality,creativity,andsocialityneednotbepossessedtoahighdegreebyallhumanbeingsonrepro-ductiveclosureorcommonlineageconceptionsofourspecies.

Biological conceptionsofhumannaturemight eschewappeal toasubstantiveconceptionofspeciesmembershipandinsteadappealtocharacteristicactivitiesof the species.7However, thechallenge istoidentifyvaluabletraitsthathaveabiologicalbasis.Therearemany

5. Hurka,Perfectionism,esp.chs.2−4.

6. SeePhilipKitcher,“EssenceandPerfection”Ethics110(1999):59−83.Where-asKitcher takes skepticismabout a substantivebiological essence to raisedoubts about perfectionism, I take it tomotivate a form of perfectionismgrounded in a normative, rather than a biological, conception of humannature.

7. Foroneexampleof thisapproach,seePhilippaFoot,Natural Goodness (Ox-ford:ClarendonPress,2001).

perfectionisttheories,eventhemoreconcessiverepliesbymixedthe-ories assignperfectionist ideals an important role.Defending theseclaims takes thenormative perfectionist beyond explicitKantian re-sources,butprovidesadefenseoftheimportanceofrationalnaturethatboththenormativeperfectionistandtheKantianneed.

Finally,it’sworthnotingtheresourcesofnormativeperfectionismtoexplaintherationalauthorityofitsdemands.LikeKant,thenorma-tiveperfectionistgroundsnormativedemandsinournatureasratio-nalagents,whichpromisestodefendtherationalistclaimthatagentshavecategoricalreasonstosatisfyperfectionistdemands.

This discussion of normative perfectionism addresses the inter-sectionof anormativeperfectionist tradition that includesAristotle,Mill,andGreenandtheKantiantradition.Assuch,itinvolvesmanymovingparts,eachofwhichispotentiallyquitecomplex.EveniftheperfectionistreadingofAristotleisreasonablyfamiliar,aperfectionistreadingofMillmay seemheterodox, andGreen’sethicsof self-real-izationisnotfamiliartomanyreaders.GiventhecomplexityofKant’sownethical theory, sucha comparative studymay seemmisguided.However,itispossibletoisolatetheessentialsofthesetwotraditionswithoutsignificantdistortionforcomparativepurposes.Thevalueofcomparingthetwotraditionsandassessingtheirdifferencescompen-satesfortheneedtobeselectiveinthecoverageofeachtradition,orsoIshallargue.Thiscomparativestudyispartofassessingthepros-pectsofnormativeperfectionism.

1. The Essentials of Normative Perfectionism

Thoughtheperfectionisttraditionisheterogeneous,mostperfection-ist theories understand the fundamental ethical demand to be therealizationandperfectionofone’snature.Inthisway,perfectionismrestsonclaimsabouthumannature.Differentperfectionisttheoriesunderstandhumannatureanditsperfectiondifferently.

Itiscommontounderstandclaimsabouthumannatureasinvolv-ingabiological kind—humanbeing.Aristotledefendsaconceptionofeudaimoniaorhappinessthatisaformofperfectionismbyappealto



onunderstandinghumannatureasabiologicalkind,thefoundationsofperfectionismappearproblematic.

Amorepromisingwaytogroundperfectionistidealsisbyappealtohumannatureunderstoodasanormative kind,ratherthanasabio-logicalkind.Onthiskindofview,perfectionistidealsarerelative,nottoournatureashumanbeings,buttoournatureaspersonsoragents.Aristotle,Mill,andGreen,Ibelieve,areallnormativeperfectionists.10 Spaceconstraintsprecludereconstructionsofthedetailsoftheirethi-caltheories,butwecanhighlightsomerelevantaspectsoftheirver-sionsofnormativeperfectionismthatbearonthearticulationandde-fenseofnormativeperfectionistessentials.

Aristotle.LikeotherGreekethicists,Aristotleisaeudaimonist,treat-ingtheagent’sowneudaimoniaorhappinessasthecentralorfoun-dationalelementinethics.11 InthefirstbookoftheNicomachean Eth-ics,Aristotle identifiesthefinalgoodwitheudaimoniaorhappinessand recognizes threemain formal constraintsoneudaimonia—thatitmustbe completeor lackingonnothing, that itmustbe suitableforthesortofbeingsweare,andthatitmustbecomparativelystableandwithinourcontrol.12Eudaimonismimpliesperfectionisminsofaras the content of eudaimonia is constrained by assumptions abouthuman nature. Aristotle’s eudaimonism makes him a perfectionistinsofar as he explicitly develops the suitability constraint on eudai-moniabyappeal to thehumanfunction(NE I.7).The functionargu-mentdrawsonthetaxonomyofcharacteristicactivitiesandsoulsinDe Anima.Thoughsometimesinterpretedinbiologicalterms,thattax-

10.AlsoseeDavidO.Brink,“TheSignificanceofDesire”Oxford Studies in Meta-ethics3(2008):5−45.

11. On the eudaimonist assumption, see Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1991),203.AlsoseeTer-enceIrwin,Plato’s Moral Theory(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1977),esp.51−54,249−80 and Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995),§§36−37,142.

12. Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics,trs.TerenceIrwin,2ded.(Indianapolis:Hackett,1999)[NE].IalsodrawselectivelyontheEudemian Ethics,theMagna Moralia, andthePoliticsinThe Revised Oxford Translation of the Complete Works of Aristo-tle,2vols.,ed.JonathanBarnes(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984).

traits characteristic of humanity, such as deviousness, cruelty, andschadenfreude,whichdonotseemnormativelysignificant.Toavoidthis problem,wemight appeal instead to valuable or attractive hu-mantraits,suchascooperation,creativity,andfriendship.Butwithoutsomebiologicalgroundforselectingthesetraits,theresultingtheorydoesnotinvolveabiologicalconceptionofhumannature,andtheap-pealtohumannatureseemstodonoexplanatorywork.8

Onepossibility is toappeal tocharacteristiccapacitiesandactivi-tiesof the species thatare theproductofnatural selection.Compli-ance with familiar other-regarding norms of cooperation, honesty,fidelity, fair play, and non-aggression ismutually beneficial, and sothereisacaseforthinkingthatthesecooperativevirtuesmighthavebeen selected forgeneticallyor culturally.But therearemany traitsthatwehavebecause theyconferredselectiveadvantageonouran-cestors inhunter-gatherer tribes that itwouldbeproblematic to re-gardasgoodforusnoworasprovidinguswithreasonsforaction.Forinstance, there issomeevidence thatautomaticaffectivediscrimina-toryattitudestowardoutsidershaveahereditablebasisintheamyg-dalaorprefrontalcortexandlikelyprovedtobeadaptivetraitsforourancestorswholivedinsmallhomogeneoustribalcommunities.9Butthebiologicalbasisofracismandxenophobiadoesnotprovideanor-mativegroundforthosetraits.Ahistoryofselectiveadvantageseemsneithernecessarynorsufficientfornormativesignificance.Ifweinsist

8. AlsoseeDaleDorsey,“ThreeArgumentsforPerfectionism”Noûs44(2010):64−68.

9. See,e.g.,LisaM.Brown,MargaretM.Bradley,andPeter J.Lang,“AffectiveReactionstoPicturesofIngroupandOutgroupMembers”Biological Psychol-ogy71(2006):303−11;MatteoForgiarini,MarcelloGalluci,andAngeloMara-vita,“RacismandtheEmpathyforPainonourSkin”Frontiers in Psychology2(2011):1−7;andMelissaM.McDonald,CarlosDavidNavarrette,andMarkVanVugt, “Evolutionand thePsychologyof IntergroupConflict:TheMaleWarriorHypothesis”Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B367(2012):670−79.Forevidenceofthemalleabilityofstereotypingandprejudicialaffect,seeIreneV.Blair,“TheMalleabilityofAutomaticStereotypesandPrejudice”Personality and Social Psychology Review6(2002):242−61.



InOn Liberty, he defends individual rights to basic liberties, but hetellsusthattheseindividualrightshaveautilitarianfoundationbasedon“utilityinthelargestsense,groundedonthepermanentinterestsofmanasaprogressivebeing”(OLI11;CWXVIII224).Thisprogres-siveconceptionofhappiness is reflected in thedistinctionbetweenhigherandlowerpleasuresinUtilitarianism,inwhichhearguesthata lifeexercisingone’s rationalanddeliberativecapacities—Socratesdissatisfied—isdiscontinuously betterthanalifecontainingonlylowerpleasures—thepigor foolsatisfied(U II3–6;CW210−12).Aperfec-tionist readingof thehigherpleasuresdoctrinereceives furthersup-portfromthedignitypassage,inwhichMillexplainsthepreferenceofcompetentjudgesforhigherpleasuresbyappealtotheirsenseofthedignityofalifeofcomplexandhigheractivities(UII6;CWX212).Here,Millclaimsthatitistheperceptionofthevalueoftheseactivitiesthatexplainsthecategoricalpreferencesofcompetentjudges.Aper-fectionistcommitmenttoself-realizationinformsOn Liberty’sdefenseofindividualautonomyandexperimentationinlifestyleasnecessaryand importantaspectsofself-development.This isanormativecon-ceptionofhumannatureandhappiness,because itdependsonourcapacitiesforself-governmentthatMillsaysarerequisiteforourbe-ingresponsibleand,hence,moralagents(A System of LogicVI.ii.3;CW 839−42).Itisthesecapacitiesthatmarkusasprogressivebeings.Mill’sappealstotheseclaimsabouthumannatureandhappinessmakehimanormativeperfectionist, andhisperfectionist conceptionofhappi-nessshapesagreatdealofwhatisdistinctiveinhiscontributionstotheutilitarianandliberaltraditions.15

Green. In theProlegomena to Ethics, Green aims to synthesize thebestelementsinancientandmodernethicaltraditions,inparticularAristotelianandKantianclaims.16Hecriticizeshedonistconceptions

15. See David O. Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press,2013).

16. T.H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. David O. Brink (Oxford: ClarendonPress,2003) [PE].AlsoseeThe Collected Works of T. H. Green, 5vols.,ed.Pe-terNicholson(Bristol:ThoemmesPress,1997)[Works].Ofspecialinterestin

onomyisreally functional incharacter, inasmuchas itdistinguishesthesoulsofplants,animals,humans,andgodsintermsoftheircapaci-tiesandactivities.Inparticular,animals,rationalanimals,andgodsaredistinguishedbytheirdifferentialcapacitiesforintentionalactionandrationalthoughtandcontrol.Aristotleconceivesofusasrationalani-malswithnormativecapacitiestoregulateourpassionsandactionsinaccordancewithpracticalreason.Thismakeshistaxonomygroundedinphilosophicalandmoralpsychology,notbiology,whichmeansthathisuseofthefunctionargumenttoconstrainhiseudaimonismmakeshimanormativeperfectionist.Aristotle’sconstraintsoneudaimoniasupportacomprehensiveconceptionofeudaimoniainwhichvirtue,conceivedofasalifeinwhichthepassionsanddesiresareregulatedbytherationalpartofthesoul,isthedominantcomponent.Thevir-tuesareregulatedbythecommongood,whichwecanseeclearlyinthecaseofgeneraljustice,whichinvolvescompletevirtueinrelationtoanother (NE 1129b15−30).Wecanbegin toseehowthecommongood contributes to the agent’s own eudaimonia by reconstructingtherelationshipbetweenjusticeandfriendshipandthewayinwhichfriendshipcompletesandperfectsarationalbeingwithfinitecapaci-ties(NE booksVIII–IX).Thoughvirtueisthecontrollingelementinanagent’shappiness,suchthatitisalwaysbesttochoosevirtuewhateveritsopportunitycosts,acompletegoodnonethelessincludesfortuitousgoods(externals)andpleasure,whichexplainswhyvirtueisnotsuf-ficientforhappiness.13

Mill.14Asautilitarian,Millembracesateleologicalethicaltheoryinwhichthefundamentaldemandistopromotehappinessimpartially.

13. IassumeacomprehensiveconceptionofeudaimoniabestcapturesthefirstninebooksoftheNicomachean Ethics,evenifbookXintroducesanalternativestrictintellectualistconception.

14. ThedefinitiveeditionofMill’swritingsisCollected Works of John Stuart Mill,33volumes,ed.JohnM.Robson(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1963−91)[CW].TofacilitatecommonreferenceamongreadersusingdifferenteditionsofMill’smostpopularworks—forinstance,Utilitarianism (U)andOn Liberty (OL)—Iwillrefertothoseworksusingnaturaldivisionsinhistexts,suchaschapter,section,and/orparagraph.ButIwillalsorefertoMill’sworksusingvolumeandpagenumberinhisCollected Works.



requiresmoralresponsibility,whichrequiresoneformofreasons-re-sponsiveness.Butrationalagencyalsorequiresepistemicresponsibil-ity,whichrequiresaparallelformofreasons-responsiveness(PE§§84,120,125).19Tobeepistemicallyresponsible,onemustbeself-consciousandabletodistinguishappearanceandfact,reasonaboutthecreden-tials of one’s appearances, and regulate one’s beliefs and epistemicbehavior inaccordancewith thisreasoning.Epistemicandmoral re-sponsibilityarebothpartsofagencyorpersonality,andsoaunifiedconceptionofagencyrequiresbothformsofreasons-responsiveness.

Thesearetheessentialsofnormativeperfectionism,andtherearemanydifferentwaysofdeveloping theseessentials, reflected, for in-stance,insomeofthedifferencesonefindsamongAristotle,Mill,andGreen.Ineffect,therearedifferentchoicepointsinthearchitectureofnormativeperfectionism.Someofthosechoicepointsarenotdirectlyrelevanttothecomparativeagendainthisessay.However,threesuchchoicepointsdeservebriefdiscussionnowandwillbesignificantlater.

First,perfectionismhasoftenbeenunderstoodasaclaimaboutthegood,typicallyaboutthepersonalgood—thatis,whatinitselfmakessomeone’slifebetterforhisorherownsake.Butitcouldalsobeun-derstoodasaclaimaboutpracticalreason—that is,whatconstrainsand regulates an agent’s reasons for action. Perfectionismmight beunderstoodasconcerningboththegoodandpracticalreasonifweac-ceptabroadlyteleologicalconceptionofpracticalreason.ThisseemstobeapointofnormativearchitectureonwhichAristotle,Mill,andGreenallagree.Theyofferperfectionistconceptionsofthepersonalgoodthatinformstheirconceptionsofpracticalreason.

Second, perfectionismmight be understood in agent-relative orin agent-neutral terms. Aristotle and Green are perfectionist eudai-monists,whounderstandthefundamentalperfectionistdemandtobefortheagenttopromoteherowngood.Theirperfectionismtakesa

19. ThisreversesGreen’sactualorderofexposition,sinceheintroducestheroleofself-consciousnessinepistemicresponsibilityattheendofBookI(PE§84;cf.§§120,125),whichsetsthestageforhisintroductionofself-consciousnessinmoralresponsibilityinBookII(PE§§85−86,92,96,103,107,220).

ofdesire,thewill,andthegood.FollowingButlerandKant,hearguesthatagentshavecapacitiesforpracticalreasonthatallowthemtodis-tinguishbetweenthe intensityandauthorityofdesire, todeliberateabouttheirends,andtoregulatetheiractionsaccordingtothesedelib-erations.Indoingso,heexplicitlycriticizesKant’sappealtotranscen-dentalfreedomanddefendsacompatibilistunderstandingofthewill.Greenunderstandsactingonsuperiorprinciplesintermsofactingonaconceptionofone’sownoverallgoodandinterpretstheagent’sowngoodintermsofself-realization.Becausethedemandforself-realiza-tionisgroundedinfeaturesofmoralpersonalityoragency,Greenre-gardsitsdictatesascategorical,ratherthanhypothetical,imperatives.Properself-realizationrequiresaconstitutiveconcernforothersthatshouldbegenuinelycosmopolitanincharacter,involvingrespectforallotherrationalagents.Hence,GreenacceptsKant’sHumanityFor-mulaof theCategorical Imperative,butheunderstandsthesemoraldemandsasgroundedinself-realization.17

Inallthreecases,butmostclearlyinGreen,perfectionistidealsaregroundedinaconceptionofmoral personality,understoodinButleriantermsasthecapacitytodistinguishbetweenthepowerandauthorityofpassionanddesire(SermonsII14).18Thisinvolvescapacitiestodistin-guishoneselffromone’sdesires,framethequestionofwhatoneoughttodo,deliberateabout themeritsofalternatives,andregulateone’sactionsinaccordancewithone’sdeliberations.Moralpersonality,onthisview,involvesaformofreasons-responsiveness.

Interestingly, Green thinks that moral personality or agency in-volvesjustoneformofreasons-responsiveness.Hethinksthatwearerationalagentsengagedinboththoughtandaction.Rationalagency

thepresentcontextareGreen’slecturesonKant’smetaphysicsandethicsinWorksII.

17. IreconstructandassesssomemainelementsofGreen’sperfectionisminDa-vidO.Brink,Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2003).

18. Bishop JosephButler,Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel and A Disserta-tion on the Nature of Virtue,ed.W.R.Matthews(London:G.Bell&Sons,1953),referencesbychapter/sermonandparagraphnumber.



andpromotion.Forinstance,considertwodifferentanti-paternalismprinciplesandtheirattitudetowardsellingoneselfintoslavery.Thisinvolvestheuseofone’snormativepowerstoabdicatepermanentlyone’sfutureuseofthosenormativepowers.Honoringanagent’snor-mativepowerswouldrequirepermittingself-slavery,butpromotingan agent’s normative powerswould permit a policy forbidding self-slavery.Aswewillsee in§3,Milldiscusses this issue(OLV11;CW XVIII299)andendorsestheprohibitiononself-slavery,claimingthatthisisaprincipledexceptiontotheusualprohibitiononpaternalism,becausetheverysamevaluesthatnormallyspeakagainstpaternalismherespeakinfavorofit.Here,Milladvocatespromotingrationalna-tureaspartofitsfullrealization,atleastintrapersonally.

Giventhisbriefsummaryoftheessentialsofnormativeperfection-ism,weare inaposition toexplorehow thatdoctrinecan respondtoworriesaboutthejustification,content,andimplicationsofperfec-tionism,especiallyasweencounterthosedoubtswithintheKantianethicaltradition.21

2. Are Perfectionist Ideals Requirements of Reason?

WemightbeginwithKant’sdoubtsaboutthegroundorjustificationof perfectionist ideals. Famously, he thinks that all previous moralphilosophiesareheteronomous insofaras theybasemoralityonhu-mannature,sentiment,inclination,interest,orperfection(G4:432−33,

21. MydiscussionoftheKantianethicaltraditiondrawsprimarilyonKant’sthreemainethicalworks:Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals [G], Critique of Practical Reason[KpV],andMetaphysics of Morals[MM].IrefertotheseworksusingPrussianAcademypagination in the translationsbyMaryGregor inImmanuelKant,Practical Philosophy(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).However,IalsodrawmoreselectivelyonKant’sessay,“OntheCom-monSaying:ThatMayBeCorrectinTheory,ButitisofNoUseinPractice”inPractical Philosophytrs.MaryGregor(PrussianAcademypagination);Kant’slecturesonethics (CollinsandMrongovius) in ImmanuelKant,Lectures on Ethics,trs.PeterHeath(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997)(Prus-sian Academy pagination) [Lectures]; Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,trs.AllenWoodandGeorgediGiovanni(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)(PrussianAcademypagination)[Religion];and ImmanuelKant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,trs.LewisWhiteBeck(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1963)[History].

fundamentallyegocentricoragent-relativeform.Bycontrast,Millisaperfectionistutilitarian,whounderstandsthefundamentalperfection-istdemandtobefortheagenttopromotethegeneralhappiness,un-derstoodintermsofthenatureofprogressivebeings.Thisisanagent-neutralconceptionofperfectionism.This isan importantdifferenceinnormativearchitecture.Butitmayturnouttobesubstantivelylessimportantthanitfirstappearsiftheeudaimonistrecognizesthecom-mongood as a constitutive commitmentof self-realization, as bothAristotleandGreendo,andtheutilitarianrecognizestheimportanceofvariousformsofpartialityinthepromotionofhumanperfection,asMilldoes.

Third,cuttingacrossthedistinctionbetweenegocentricandimpar-tialconcernisadistinctioninhowoneshouldbeorientedtowardthevalueofrationalnature,whetherone’sownoranother’s.Oneoptionis topromote rationalnatureoverall,whetherwithina lifeor acrosslives;anotheroption is tohonor itoneachoccasion. 20Honoring ra-tionalnaturemayrequirethatoneforegopromotingitiftheonlyorbestway topromote rationalnaturewould require failing tohonoritonaparticularoccasion.Onecould treat thevalueof rationalna-turesymmetricallyinintrapersonalandinterpersonalcontexts,eitherpromotingorhonoringitbothwithinlivesandacrosslives.Alterna-tively,onecouldtreatrationalnatureasymmetricallyinintrapersonalandinterpersonalcontexts,forinstance,promotingitwithinlivesbuthonoringitacrosslives.Presumably,anysuchasymmetricaltreatmentofrationalnaturerequiressomekindofspecialrationaleorjustifica-tion.Normativeperfectionism,assuch,mightremainagnosticaboutwhetherrationalnatureshouldbepromotedorhonored,treatingthisissueasachoicepointwithinnormativeperfectionism.

However, normative perfectionists have tended to favor promot-ing rationalnature,at least intrapersonally.Afterall, the full realiza-tion of one’s essential nature seems to involve itsmaximal pursuit

20.Forthedistinctionbetweenhonoringandpromotingvalues,seePhilipPettit,“Consequentialism” reprinted inConsequentialism, ed. StephenDarwall (Ox-ford:Blackwell,2003).



empiricalmotivation,whichheregardsasprudentialandultimatelyhedonistic, insofar as inclination aims at pleasure (KpV 5: 21−23).22 This helps explain his concerns about both Epicureanism and Sto-icism.KantthinksthatboththeEpicureansandStoicsidentifyvirtueand happiness, but that they recognize different explanatory asym-metries between these concepts. He regards the Epicureans as ex-plainingvirtueintermsofhappiness,hedonisticallyconceived.Soheunderstandsthemasdefendingvirtueasinstrumentallyvaluableforproducingpleasureandtreatingmoralrequirementsashypotheticalimperatives.Bycontrast,heunderstandstheStoicsasexplaininghap-pinessintermsofvirtue,whichheregardsasanimprovementontheEpicureanview(KpV5:111−12).However,heunderstandstheStoicsasidentifyinghappinesswiththepleasurableconsciousnessofvirtuousaction,andsohethinkstheStoicsstillmistakenlyidentifyrationalandempiricalconcepts.

ThoughKant’sunderstandingofEpicureanethicsislargelycorrect,hisunderstandingofStoicethicsismistaken.TheStoicsidentifyhap-pinesswithvirtue,understoodastheexpressionofourrationalnature(DLvii84−89;Finiii11,20−21,26−28).23Inidentifyingvirtueandhap-piness,theyinsistthatvirtueissufficientforhappinessanddenythatfortunate outcomes and circumstances are genuine goods, treatingthemaspreferredindifferents(DLvii102−108;Finiii53−54,iv20,69).

22. For a non-hedonistic interpretationofKant’s conceptionof happiness, seeAndrewsReath,“Hedonism,Heteronomy,andKant’sPrincipleofHappiness”Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 42−72. Reath reads Kant as under-standinghappiness in termsof the satisfactionof desire, but I don’t thinkthatthisdoesjusticetoKant’sinsistencethatdesireaimsatpleasure.Inanycase,theresolutionofthisdebatewouldnotmuchaffectthemeritsofKant’sownconceptionofhappinessorhisunderstandingofGreekconceptions,asbothhedonisticanddesire-satisfactionconceptionsofhappinessrepresentdemandsofprudenceashypotheticalimperatives.

23.DiogenesLaertius,The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2vols., trs.R.D.Hicks(Cambridge:Loeb,1925)[DL]andCicero,De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum,trs.H.Rackham(Cambridge:Loeb,1914)[Fin].ForusefulcomparisonsofAris-totelian andStoic conceptionsof happiness, seeTerence Irwin, “Stoic andAristotelianConceptionsofHappiness”inThe Norms of Nature,ed.MalcolmSchofieldandGiselaStriker(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986)andJuliaAnnas,The Morality of Happiness(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1993).

442−44;KpV5:20−28,35−36,39−41,111−12).Assuch,suchconceptionsgenerateonlyhypothetical,notcategorical,imperatives:

Wherever anobject of thewill has tobe laiddownonthebasisforprescribingtherulethatdeterminesthewill,theretheruleisnoneotherthanheteronomy;theimper-ativeisconditional,namely:iforbecauseonewillstheob-ject,oneoughttoactinsuchorsuchaway;henceitcannever commandmorally, that is, categorically.Whetherthe object determines thewill bymeans of inclination,asintheprincipleofone’sownhappiness,orbymeansof reasondirected toobjectsofourpossiblevolition ingeneral,as in theprincipleofperfection, thewillneverdeterminesitselfimmediately ….[G 4:444]

ThoughKantdistinguisheshappinessandperfectionasendshereandelsewhere (G 4:442−43;KpV 5: 39−41), it is significant thathis criti-cismtreatsthemtogether.Moreover,someofhisactualandpotentialeudaimonist targets provide perfectionist conceptions of happiness.ThisisclearlytrueofbothAristotle,whomKantdoesnotdiscus,andtheStoics,whomhedoes.Indeed,aslongastheeudaimonistgroundshisconceptionofeudaimoniainhumannature,heisaperfectionist,andaslongashegroundshisconceptionofeudaimoniainanagent’srationalnatureasanagent,heisanormativeperfectionist.

Kant’sdiscussionofeudaimonismfocusesontheEpicureansandStoics,curiouslyomittingSocrates,Plato,andAristotle.Heiscriticalofeudaimonisttheoriesforidentifyingvirtueandhappinessandconse-quentlytreatingmoralityasasystemofhypotheticalimperatives(G4:425,441−45;KpV5:20−28,35−36,111−12).Insofarasnormativeperfec-tionistsbasemoralityonaconceptionofaperson’sgoodorhappiness,asAristotle,Mill,andGreendoindifferentways,theseperfectionisttheories shouldalsobeguiltyof conceivingmoralityasa systemofhypotheticalimperatives.

Kant conceives of happiness as consisting in the pleasure atten-danttothesatisfactionofdesire,andthis influenceshisviewabout



willandsocannotgeneratecategoricalimperatives(G4:444;KpV 5:41).

HisexactunderstandingoftheperfectionismsofLeibnizandWolffisunclear.Leibniz’sethicalwritingsarescatteredandtheymixperfec-tionismandeudaimonism:

Wisdom isnothingother than the scienceof thehappi-nessorperfectionofhumanbeings;andthemostgeneralandarchitectonicof thisknowledge is toshowhowhu-manbeingscanstrive for thatperfectionofwhich theyarecapablebynature.Thisshouldnotbeinterpretedasifahighestdegreeofhumanperfectioncanneverbeat-tained,sincethenatureofhappiness,rather,isnevertobeimpededinfurtherprogresstomoreorgreatergoods.26

Perfectioninvolvesunityamiddiversity,andGodrepresentsabsoluteperfection.ForLeibniz,anagent’sperfectionisexplainedintermsofheractinginaccordancewiththesameprinciplethatgovernsGod’swill—therealizationinunderstandingandactionofthegreatestpos-sibleobjectiveharmonyorperfection.27Wolffalsomixesperfection-ismandeudaimonism:

Thelawofnatureisthemeansbywhichmanattainsthehappinessofwhichheiscapablethroughhisnaturalpow-ers inthis life.Now,becausethe lawofnaturerequirestheperfectionofusandourconditionandbecausethisperfectionisthefinalgoalofallfreeaction,man,wantingthehappinesshecanachievethroughhisnaturalpowers

26.G.W.Leibniz,Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe,Reihe6,Band4,975,ed.DeutscheAkadamie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1999) [Complete Writings and Letters,series6,vol.4,Akademiepage975].ThankstoDonRuth-erford,whobroughtthispassagetomyattentionandprovidedatranslation.

27. SeeG.W.Leibniz,Discourse on Metaphysics§36andLeibniz’sletterstoWolffof4May1715and18May1715inG.W.Leibniz,Philosophical Essays,ed.RogerAriewandDanielGarber(Indianapolis:Hackett,1989).

WhiletheStoicsmaybelievethatthevirtuouspersonwillexperiencepleasureinthecourseofpracticingvirtue,thisisaby-productofvirtueandnottobeconfusedwithit(DLvii86;Finiii17).TheStoicsiden-tifyhappinesswithvirtue,conceivedasaliferealizingone’srationalnature,notwithpleasurableconsciousnessofone’svirtue.ItisKant’sownhedonisticconceptionofhappinessthatleadshimtomisunder-standStoichappiness.

Kant’s criticisms of a morality of happiness reflect mistaken as-sumptionsabout thehedonisticcharacterofhappiness.Though theEpicureanswerehedonistsabouthappiness,theStoicswerenot.PlatoandAristotle,whomhedoesnotdiscuss,alsorejecthedonism.24Un-liketheStoics,theydonotidentifyhappinessandvirtue,denyingthatvirtueissufficientforhappiness,becausetheyrecognizethevalueofexternals.However,liketheStoics,theyregardvirtueasthecontrol-lingelementofhappiness,suchthatoneisalwaysbetteroffchoosingvirtue,whateveritsopportunitycosts(RepublicII,esp.357b−367e;NE I.7−I.13).Also,liketheStoics,theythinkthatvirtuenormallyaffordspleasure, so that pleasure is a typical by-product of virtue (Philebus 63e3−6, Laws 662b1−663d5, 734b8−e1; NE 1153b15−18, 1174b20−33,1176a16−19).Thismeans thatKant’s criticismsofperfectionisteudai-monismrestonamistakenunderstandingoftheirconceptionsofhap-piness,reflectingKant’sownhedonisticconceptionofhappiness.25

Thougheudaimonistscanbeperfectionists,Kantdistinguishesper-fectionismandeudaimonism,associatingperfectionismwithLeibnizandWolff(G 4:442−43;KpV5:40−41).Whenhedistinguishesthem,hesuggests thatperfectionism involvesa lessermistake thaneudai-monism, but amistake nonetheless (G 4: 443;KpV 5: 40−41). Kantclaimsthataperfectionisa“materialprinciple”externaltotheagent’s

24.ReferencestoPlatonictextsaretodialoguesinPlato Complete Works,ed.JohnM.CooperandD.S.Hutchinson(Indianapolis:Hackett,1997).

25. AlsoseeTerenceIrwin,“Kant’sCriticismsofEudaemonism”inAristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty,ed.StephenEngstromandJen-niferWhiting(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).



otherthanthefeelingofanincreaseinperfection.”31Onthisreading,pleasureisconsequentialonvirtue,understoodastheexpressionofone’srationalnature,notthegroundofit.

Wolffisevenclearerthathappiness,whichheunderstandsintermsof pleasure, is consequential on the highest good,which he under-standstoconsistinperfection:

[T]hehighestgoodofmanorhisblessedness is rightlyexplained as an unhindered progress to greater perfec-tions.…Hewhoprogressesunhamperedfromoneper-fectiontoanotherandavoidsimperfection,andisawareofthis,hasanintuitiveawarenessofperfection.Intuitiveknowledgeofperfectionaffordspleasureorenjoyment;so he has continuous pleasure. So the highest good orblessednessofmanisconnectedwithhappiness.32

BecauseLeibnizandWolfftreatpleasureasconsequentialontheper-ceptionofperfectionandhenceasaby-productratherthangroundofduty,theimportancetheyattachtopleasureshouldnotrendertheirviewsheteronomous.

However,Kantmaythinkit istheir formofperfectionism,ratherthananyapparentcommitmenttohedonism,thatrenderstheirviewsheteronomous. For he sees them as perfectionistswho conceive ofperfectionasametaphysicalprincipleconcernedwithunityandhar-monyinnaturethatdeterminesthecontentoftherationalwill(Lec-tures Mrongovius29:622).Heregardsthisasmakingtherationalwilldependentonsomethingotherthanitself,whichresultsinheterono-my.Onlymoral perfection—understoodasthefullrealizationofone’scapacities in rationalwilling—can serveas thegroundofduty (Lec-tures Collins27:265−66,470).

Here,Kantassumesboth thatLeibnizandWolffconceiveofper-fectionasametaphysicalprincipleofunity,order,orfittingnessand

31. “AphorismsConcerningHappiness,Wisdom,Charity,andJustice”inLeibniz on God and Religion,ed.LloydStrickland(London:Bloomsbury,2016),138.

32.Wolff,Reasonable Thoughts,338.

inthislife,mustsetasthefinalgoalofallhisfreeactionstheperfectionofhisinnerandouterconditions.28

AlsolikeLeibniz,Wolffregardsperfectionasakindofunity—“agree-ment of themanifold”—and treats human perfection as awill thatmaximizes internalandexternalharmony.29BothLeibnizandWolffseemtoconceiveofperfectionintermsofmetaphysicalrelationsoforder, harmony, and agreement. Kant objects to these perfectionistclaims, claiming that they make morality dependent on a materialprinciple,whichrendersmoralityheteronomous.Theworryseemstobeaboutmakingmoralityconditionalonanidealthatisexternaltorationalagencyitself.

KantmayseetheperfectionismsofLeibnizandWolffasmakingmorality dependon anobjectionablematerial principle, because oftheroletheygivetopleasure.Forinstance,Leibnizrecognizestheendashappiness,whichhetreatsasenduringjoyorpleasure:“InmoralsI setupourhappiness [felicitas]asanend; this Idefineasa stateofenduringjoy[laetitia].JoyIdefineasanextraordinarypredominanceofpleasure[voluptas]….”30However,thecontextofthispassagesug-geststhemoreStoicconceptionofhappinessinwhichpleasureisun-derstoodasconsequentialonandaby-productoftheperfectionofone’srationalnature.After identifyingperfectionwithakindofharmony,Leibnizclaimsthatfromthis“senseofharmony,thatis,observationofagreement[consensus]mightbringforthpleasure.”Andaftertheap-parentcommitmenttohedonism(quotedabove),heinsiststhat“plea-sureisthesensationofperfection.”Elsewhere,Leibnizmakesasimilarperfectionistclaimaboutpleasure,claimingthat“pleasureisnothing

28.ChristianWolff,Reasonable Thoughts about the Actions of Men, for the Promotion of their HappinessinMoral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant,ed.J.B.Schnee-wind(CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),vol.I,pp.340−41.

29.Wolff,Reasonable Thoughts,341.AlsoseeChristianWolff,German Metaphysics, Reasonable Thoughts about God, the World, and the Human Soul,§157,quotedinSchneewind,349.

30.Leibniz’slettertoWolffof18May1715inPhilosophical Essays.



himself …. [Self-realization] will express itself in [the]imposition…ofrulesrequiringsomethingtobedoneir-respectivelyofany inclination todo it, irrespectivelyofanydesiredendtowhichitisameans,other than this end, which is desired because conceived as absolutely desirable.[PE §193]

Because thedemandsof self-realizationdependonlyon those verycapacitiesthatmakeoneanagentanddonotdependonconditionsextraneoustorationalagency,theyarecategorical,ratherthanhypo-thetical,imperatives.

Wemight considerhowGreen’s conceptionof normativeperfec-tionismcanrespondtoadilemmathatKantposesfortheperfectionistinthePrefacetothefirsteditionofReligion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.34Afterrejectingattemptstogrounddutyinahedonisticver-sionofself-love,Kantconsiderstwoalternativegrounds:

Butthenthereareonlytwodetermininggroundsleft:onethatisrational,namelyone’sownperfection;andanotherthat isempirical, thehappinessofothers.Now, ifby thefirst they do not already understand moral perfection,whichcanonlybeonething(namelyawilluncondition-allyobedienttothelaw),inwhichcasetheywouldhow-everbedefininginacircle,thentheymustmeanthehu-manbeing’snaturalperfectioninasmuchasitiscapableofenhancement;andofthisperfectiontherecanbemanyaspects(suchasskillintheartsandsciences,taste,physi-calagility,etc.).But thesearealwaysonlyconditionallygood,thatis,goodonlyonconditionthattheirusedoesnotconflictwiththemorallaw(whichalonecommandsunconditionally); hence natural perfection cannot be,whenmadeintoanend,theprincipleoftheconceptsofduty.[Religion6:4n]

34. ThankstoRosalindChaplinfordrawingthispassagetomyattention.

thata rationalwill cannotbedeterminedbyanyprinciples—goodsorreasons—outside itself,nomatterhowobjectivetheseprinciplesare.Later,in§5,wewillexaminehowmuchethicalcontentrationalagencyitselfcanprovidewithoutappealtoobjectivegoodsorexter-nalreasons.Ifthenormativeperfectionistmusteschewanyappealtoprinciplesexternaltomoralpersonalityitself,LeibnizandWolffmightnotbenormativeperfectionists.33

ButGreenisanormativeperfectionistwhobasesmoralityontheverycapacitiesforreasons-responsivenessthatmakeusagents,whichallowshimtomeetKant’sstricturesoncategoricalrequirements.Be-causeGreenseeshimselfaspreservingwhatisdefensibleinKantianethics and reconciling itwithGreek eudaimonism, it is no surprisethatheisclearestabouthowtheperfectionistcanrecognizecategori-calimperatives:

Atthesametime,becauseit[self-realization]isthefulfil-mentofhimself[asanagent],ofthatwhichhehasinhimtobe,itwillexciteaninterestinhimlikenootherinter-est,differentinkindfromanyofhisdesiresandaversionsexceptsuchasarederivedfromit.Itwillbeaninterestasinanobjectconceivedtobeofunconditionalvalue;oneofwhich thevaluedoesnotdependonanydesire thattheindividualmayatanytimefeelforitorforanythingelse, or on any pleasure that… hemay experience…. [T]hedesirefortheobjectwillbefoundedonaconcep-tionofitsdesirablenessasthefulfilmentofthecapabili-ties ofwhich aman is conscious inbeing consciousof

33.Ononereading,LeibnizandWolffaremetaphysical,ratherthannormative,perfectionists, because they conceive of perfection as ametaphysical prin-cipleofunity,order,orfittingness, rather thanasanormativeprincipleofmoralpersonalityorrationalagency.Thiswouldmaketheirperfectionismsin somewaysmore akin to the rational intuitionist tradition that includesSamuelClarke,JohnBalguy,andRichardPrice.Fordiscussion,seeTerenceIrwin,The Development of Ethics,3vols.(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2007−09),vol.II,ch.43andStefanoBacin,“RationalismandPerfectionism”inThe Cam-bridge History of Moral Philosophy.



Mill,orifitrecognizesthecommongoodasanimportantpartofself-realization,asitdoesforAristotleandGreen,thenanagentalsohasreasontopromotethenormativeperfectionofothers.

This limitedclaimaboutthecontentof theperfectionistdemandtoperfectone’sownrationalnatureandthatofothersissufficienttoposeaconflictwithKant’sinsistenceintheMetaphysics of Moralsonafundamentalself/other moral asymmetryinwhichweaimatourownperfectionbutatthehappiness,ratherthantheperfection,ofothers.IntheDoctrineofVirtue,Kantdescribesthebasicendsthatareourmost fundamentalduties as “one’s own perfection and the happiness of others”(MM6:385).Incommentingonthisasymmetry,Kantinsistsondistinguishingtheendsofperfectionandhappinessanddefendstwoclaims.First,heclaimsthatonecan’tbeunderadutytopromoteone’sownhappiness,becauseeachagentnecessarilydesireshisownhap-piness,andonecanonlybeunderadutyifonecanhavecontra-moralmotivation(MM6:386;cf.KpV5:20,37).Second,Kantclaimsthatthedutyofperfectionistomakeone’sfreechoicesconformtoduty,butwhileone canmakeone’s own choices freely conform toduty, onecannotmakeanother’schoicesfreelyconformtoduty(MM 6:386–87).

Thisself/otherasymmetryispuzzlinginseveralrespects.First,it’spuzzlinginsofarasitgrantsthatone’smostfundamentaldutytoone-selfistoperfectoneself.It’shardtoseehowthathalfoftheasymme-try is compatiblewithhis critiqueofperfectionismasyieldingonlyhypothetical imperatives,unlessheunderstandsperfection in termsofpersonalityorrationalnature,asthenormativeperfectionistdoes.Second,wemightquestionKant’sgroundsforrecognizingthisasym-metrybetweendutiestoselfandtoothers.Here,wemightquestionthefirstprongofKant’sasymmetry,viz.thatwecan’taimatourownhappiness.35 However, it is the second prong that threatens perfec-

35. Even if all agentsdesire their ownhappiness, that doesn’t show that theydesireonlytheirownhappiness.Butthenagentsmaywellbemotivatedcon-trarytoadutytopromotetheirownhappiness.Moreover,wemightwonderifit’struethatyoucan’tbeobligatedtodosomethingyouaredisposedtodo.IamobligatedtonurtureandcareformychildreneventhoughIamdisposedtodoso.IwouldstillbeobligatedtodosoevenifIcouldn’thelpbutdoso.

Ifperfectionisunderstoodasmoralperfection,thengroundingdutyinperfectioniscircular.Ifperfectionisunderstoodasnaturalperfection,thengroundingdutyinperfectionisheteronomous,becausenaturalperfectionisempiricalandonlyconditionallygood.Butthisisafalsedilemma,becauseKant’salternativeconceptualizationsofperfectionarenotexhaustive.Ifperfectionisunderstoodaspersonalityorratio-nalnature,asthenormativeperfectionistconceivesit,thenperfectioncangroundthegoodorduty inadistinctnormativeconcept that isnotempiricalinKant’ssense.Indeed,aswewillseeshortly(§4below),Kant’sownethical theorygives rationalnaturean important role ingroundingtheCategoricalImperative.Ifso,Kant’sownethicaltheoryshowsthepossibilityofaformofnormativeperfectionismthatisnei-thercircularnorempirical.

Kant’scriticaltargetistheattempttofoundmoralityonanempiricist conceptionofhumannaturethat ispriortoandindependentofrea-son.Buthehasnoreasontorejectattemptstofoundmoralityonanor-mativeconceptionofhumannaturethatunderstandshumannatureintermsofrationalagencyorreason-responsiveness.ButthenitseemsthatKant’scriticismsofperfectionismaremisplacedwhenappliedtonormativeperfectionism.

3. Can We Aim at the Perfection of Another?

Turningtoissuesaboutthecontentofperfectionistideals,wemightaskwhatconceptionofmoraldemandsnormativeperfectionismsup-ports.Thatisalargetopic,thedetailsofwhicharebeyondthescopeof thisessay.But itseemsfair tosaythatanagenthasreasontode-velopherownnormativecompetence,inwhichheragencyconsists,andtopursuealifethatexercisesherrationalagencywellinactivitiesthatembodydeliberativecontrolandreasons-responsiveness.Forin-stance,wemightagreewithAristotleandMillthatwehavereasontopursueactivelivesthatexerciseourdistinctivecapacitiesforpracticalreason,ratherthanlivesofmerecontentmentoranimalsatisfaction.Amongotherthings,suchalifewillassignprioritytohigherpleasures.Ifnormativeperfectionismtakesanagent-neutralform,asitdoesfor



FormulaoftheCategoricalImperative:“Actsothatyoutreathumanity[personality],whetherinyourownpersonorthatofanother,alwaysasanendandnevermerelyasameans”(G4:428–29).IncommentingontheHumanityFormula,inbothitsapplicationtodutiestooneselfandtoothers,Kantinsiststhatouractionsmustnotonlynotconflictwithhumanitybutalsoharmonizewithit(G 4:430).Inthecaseofdu-tiestoothers,thisrequiresmakingtheirendsourown:

Now,humanitymightindeedsubsistifnoonecontribut-edtothehappinessofothersbutyetdidnotintentionallywithdrawanythingfromit;butthereisstillonlynegativeandnotapositiveagreementwithhumanity as an end in itselfunlesseveryonetries,asfarashecan,tofurthertheendsofothers.For,theendsofasubjectwhoisanendinitselfmustasfaraspossiblebealsomyends,ifthatrepre-sentationistohaveitsfulleffectinme.[G 4:430]

But ifanotheragent’send ishisownperfection, thentheHumanityFormula implies that I shouldmakehisperfectionmyend.Yet, thisconflictswiththeself/othermoralasymmetryKantrecognizesintheMetaphysics of Morals.

Interestingly,GreenagreeswithKant,bothinacceptingthemoralsymmetryoftheHumanityFormulaoftheCategoricalImperative,anditsinjunctiontoaimattheperfectionofothers,andinhavingdoubtsaboutwhetheronepersoncanpromotetheperfectionistgoodofan-otherdirectly.Heexpressesthissecondpointinhisessay“LiberalLeg-islationandFreedomofContract:”

[I]tisthebusinessofthestate,notindeeddirectlytopro-motemoral goodness, for that, from theverynatureofmoralgoodness,itcannotdo,buttomaintainthecondi-tionswithoutwhichafreeexerciseofthehumanfacultiesisimpossible.[WorksIII374]

InGreen’sview,aliberalstatenotonlyhasnegativedutiesnottointer-ferewiththebasiclibertiesandopportunitiesofitscitizens,butalso

tionism,inasmuchasitclaimsthatIcannothaveadutytoaimattheperfectionofothers.Kantclaimsthatyourperfectionconsistsinyourmakingyourfreechoicesconformtoduty,andIcannotdothisforyou:

Sotoo,itisacontradictionformetomakeanother’sper-fectionmyendandconsidermyselfunderanobligationtopromotethis.Fortheperfectionofanotherhumanbeing,as aperson, consists just in this: thathehimself is abletosethisendinaccordancewithhisownconceptionofduty;anditisself-contradictorytorequirethatIdo(makeitmydutytodo)somethingthatonlytheotherhimselfcando.[MM 6:386]

Here, Kant associates perfection with moral personality, which hethinksexplainswhyonecannotmakeanother’sperfectionone’send.Heseemstoreasonasfollows.

1. Moral personality implies that an agent’s perfectionconsists inher freelychoosing toconformto themorallaw.

2.Icanfreelychoosetoconformtothemorallawinmyownactions.

3.Hence,Icanaimatmyownperfection.

4.Icannotmakeanotherfreelychoosetoconformtothemorallaw;thatwouldbypassthatperson’sagency.

5.Hence,Icannotaimattheperfectionofanother.

Thisargumentbeginsfromapremiseabouttheconnectionbetweenmoralpersonalityandfreedomorautonomyandreachesananti-per-fectionistconclusion.

However,thismoralasymmetrybetweenselfandothersshouldbesurprisinginlightofthemoralsymmetrycontainedintheHumanity

Perhaps inthatcase, Iwouldn’tperceive itasaburdenorconstraint,but Iwouldstillhaveadutytodoso.



assumptions about happiness provide him with a more robust de-fenseofautonomyandcritiqueofpaternalism.Ifaperson’shappinessconsists in the exercise of her normative powers and capacities forpracticalreason,thenaprincipalingredientofherowngoodmustin-cludeopportunitiesforresponsiblechoiceanddecision-making.MilldevelopsthisperfectionistargumentagainstpaternalisminChapterIIIofOn Liberty:

Hewholetstheworld,orhisownportionofit,choosehisplanoflifeforhimhasnoneedofanyotherfacultythantheape-likeoneofimitation.Hewhochooseshisplanforhimself employs all his faculties. Hemust use observa-tion to see, reasoningand judgment to foresee, activitytogathermaterialsfordecision,discriminationtodecide,andwhen he has decided, firmness and self-control tohold his deliberate decision. And these qualities he re-quiresandexercisesexactlyinproportionasthepartofhis conductwhichhedeterminesaccording tohisownjudgmentand feelings isa largeone. It ispossible thathemightbeguidedinsomegoodpath,andkeptoutofharm’sway,withoutanyofthesethings.Butwhatwillbehiscomparativeworthasahumanbeing?[OLIII4;CW XVIII262−63]

Here,Mill’snormativeconceptionofhumannatureexplainswhyself-determinationisanimportantpartofaperson’sgoodthatpaternalismnecessarilyundercuts.

However,Mill’sperfectionismdoesnotendorseablanketprohibi-tiononpaternalism.Aswenotedearlier,oneexceptiontotheusualprohibition on paternalism thatMill recognizes concerns a prohibi-tiononsellingoneselfintoslavery:

Thegroundforthuslimitinghispowerofvoluntarilydis-posingofhisownlotisapparent,andisveryclearlyseenin this extreme case.… [B]y sellinghimself for a slave,

positivedutiestoitscitizenstoeducatethem,developtheircapacities,andprovideopportunitiesinsocialandpoliticallifethatenablethemtorealizetheircapacitiesasagents.

Here,GreenmakessenseofKant’sadmonitionsagainstaimingattheperfectionofanotherbyinterpretingthemasconstraintsonhow wecanpromotetheperfectionofothers.Giventheroleofone’sownagencyinone’sperfection,Ican’tperfectothersanymorethanIcanwincompetitiveracesforthem.ButjustasIcanhelpanothertowinaracebytrainingwithher,discussingstrategy,andsharingnutritionaltips,sotoocanIhelpothersperfectthemselvesbyhelpingthemde-veloptheirnormativecompetenceanddeliberatingwiththem,identi-fyingoptions,discussingthecomparativemeritsoftheseoptions,andprovidingthemwithopportunitiestoexercisetheirnormativepowers.Icanhelpothersperfectthemselves,justnotinwaysthatbypasstheiragency.Ifso,(5)doesnotfollowfrom(4).

Ineffect, this is to insiston the importanceofautonomy inanor-mativeperfectionist conceptionof thegoodand theways inwhichautonomyconstrainspaternalistic interventioninthelivesofothers.Inthisconnection,Mill’sperfectionistcritiqueofconventionalformsofpaternalisminOn Libertyandhisdefenseofsociety’sroleindevel-opingthenormativecompetenceofindividualsareinstructiveabouthowanormativeperfectionistmighttrytoaccommodatewhatisde-fensibleinKant’smoralasymmetry.

Mill offers some consequentialist arguments that paternalistic li-cense is liable tobeunsuccessful, failingtoadvancethe interestsofthosewhoselibertyisrestricted.Somepaternalismisinbadfaith,de-signedtobenefitthosewhorestrictliberty,ratherthanthosewhoselibertyisrestricted(OLV20−23;CWXVIII306−10).Evenwhenpater-nalismisingoodfaith,itislikelytomissitsmark,becauseagentsaregenerallymorereliablejudgesoftheirownintereststhanothers(OL IV12;CWXVIII283).Importantastheseargumentsare,theyprovidenoprincipledobjectiontopaternalism—noobjectiontosuccessful pa-ternalism thatgenuinelyadvances the interestsof thepersonwhoseliberty is restricted by paternalism. However, Mill’s perfectionist



reasontoaimattheirperfectioninawaythatrequiresustoconsultandengage,ratherthanbypass,theiragency.

4. Kantian Perfectionism

The normative perfectionist who appeals to moral personality, un-derstoodintermsofrationalnatureandreasons-responsiveness,cananswerKant’sexplicitconcernsaboutperfectionisminawaythatre-spectsKant’sowncommitmentstotheconnectionsamongagency,ra-tionalnature, andmoral requirements.Thisgivesus reason to takeseriouslyanormativeperfectionistreadingofKantianessentials.Aswenoted,Kant’scriticaltargetistheattempttofoundmoralityonanempiricistconceptionofhumannature that isprior toand indepen-dentofreason.Butthenhehasnoreasontorejectattemptstofoundmoralityonanormativeconceptionofhumannaturethatunderstandshumannatureintermsofrationalagency.Indeed,Kanthimselfclearlywantstofoundmoralityonanappealtorationalnature.38ThoughhefrequentlyassociatesmoralitywithhumanityandevenformulatestheCategoricalImperativeatonepointintermsofrespectforhumanity,itisclearthathemustunderstandhumanity,inthiscontext,intermsofmoralpersonalityandtheabilitytosetandactforthesakeofends(G 4:428,430−31;KpV5:87).39Kanttreatsrationalnatureasbothground andcontentofduty.

38.ThisisacentralthemeinIrwin’sconceptionofKant’splaceinthehistoryofethics.SeeIrwin,The Development of Ethics,vol.III,chs.66−72.

39. In the Religion, Kant recognizes three “predispositions”—to animality, hu-manity,andpersonality (6:26−28).Animality involves instinctual self-love,humanityinvolvesreflectiveself-love,andpersonalityinvolvesthecapacitytobemotivatedbythemorallaw.Heconcludes:“Ifweconsiderthethreedis-positions…accordingtotheconditionsoftheirpossibility,wefindthatthefirstdoesnothavereasonatitsrootatall;thatthesecondisrootedinareasonwhich is indeedpractical,butonlyas subservient toother incentives; andthatthethirdaloneisrootedinreasonpracticalofitself,i.e.inreasonlegislat-ingunconditionally”(6:28).TheReligiondistinguisheshumanityandperson-ality,astheGroundworkdoesnot.ButtheReligionislaterthantheGroundwork, anditseemsthatwemustreadtheGroundworkasidentifyinghumanitywithpersonality,at least forpurposesof theHumanityFormulaof theCategori-calImperative,ifonlybecausetheUniversalityandHumanityFormulasareonly equivalent, asKantbelieves (G 4: 436), if humanity is understood as

heabdicateshisliberty;heforegoesanyfutureuseofitbeyondthatsingleact.He,therefore,defeatsinhisowncase,theverypurposewhichisthejustificationofallow-inghimtodisposeofhimself.[OLV11;CWXVIII299]

Millrepresentsthisasaprincipledexceptiontotheusualprohibitionon paternalism, because the very same values that normally speakagainstpaternalismherespeak in favorof it. If theusual reasonweopposepaternalismisoutofrespectforthenormativepowersoftheagent,thenrespectforthosenormativepowersgivesusspecialreasontoprohibittheuseofthosenormativepowerstopermanentlyunder-mineallfutureuseofthosesamepowers.ThisrequiresMilltotreatautonomyasavaluetobepromoted,ratherthanhonored,andtorec-ognizethepermissibilityofautonomy-enhancing forms of paternalism.36

It’sinterestingtocompareMill’sextendedcritiqueofpaternalismwithKant’sbrief remarks in“OntheCommonSaying:ThatMayBeCorrectinTheory,ButitisofNoUseinPractice,”wherehedescribesagovernmentthatpaternalisticallycoercescitizenstobehappyas“thegreatestdespotismthinkable”(8:290−91).GivenKant’sownsubjectiveconceptionof happiness, his critiqueof paternalism targetswhat iswrongwithaimingatanother’shappinessinwaysthatbypassherownagency.Whatexplainsthesereservationsisrespectforherautonomyandagency.37Butthentheproblematiccharacterofpaternalismwouldseemtogiveusreasontotreateachotherasmoralpersons.That’sa

36.Millnotesthatthereasonsforallowingpaternalismin“thisextremecase”are“evidentlyoffarwiderapplication”(OLV11;CWXVIII300).Thatmakesthisprincipledexceptiontotheusualprohibitiononpaternalismthetipofanor-mativeiceberg.Thecontoursoftheicebergarenotimmediatelyclear,thoughthereisreasontoseeMillasanticipatinghislaterargumentsinThe Subjection of Women, inwhichheargues thatVictorianmarriage lawwith its require-mentsthatwomenunilaterallysurrendertheirnormativepowers,includingtheirrightsofself-ownership,isaformofslaverythatcannotbedefendedbyappealtoawoman’sconsenttobemarried(CW XXI270−71,323).

37. FordiscussionofdifferentstrandsinKant’sconceptionofautonomy,seeKarlAmeriks,“OntheManySensesof‘Self-Determination’”inKant on Freedom and Spontaneity,ed.KateA.Moran(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2018).



1.Becausemoral requirementsare inescapable, theyex-presscategoricalimperatives.

2. Hence, moral requirements must apply to ratio-nal agents as such, independently of their empiricalmotivations.

3.Hence,moralrequirementsmustbeuniversal.

4.Hence, themaximsorprinciplesunderlyingmoralre-quirementsmustbecapableofservingasuniversallaws.

ThisyieldsthefirstofKant’sthreemainformulationsoftheCategori-calImperative—theFormulaofUniversality.40

F1:Actonlymaximsthatyoucanwill tobeauniversallawofnature(G 4:421).

WeshouldinterpretF1asaskingwhatrationalbeingscanconsistentlywill.But this claim is ambiguous. F1mightbe interpretedasaskingwhatrationalbeingscanconsistentlywill,thatis,whatsomeonewhois rationalcanconsistentlywill.This test candependon thecontin-gentinterestsanddesirespossessedbyrationalbeings.ButthismakesitdifficulttodistinguishF1fromtheGoldenRule,whichKantclearlywishestodo(G 4:431n).Alternatively,wecanunderstandwhatara-tionalbeingcanconsistentlywillaswhatsomeonecanwillinsofarasshe is rational.Onthis interpretation,F1askswhatwecanwill,notinsofaraswehaveparticularcontingentwantsandinterests,butwhatwecanwillinsofaraswearerationalbeings.

40. IalludetotheUniversality,Humanity,andKingdomofEndsformulae.Thistripartition simplifies amore fine-grained taxonomy. Some commentatorsidentify six formulae: (1) universal law (G 4: 421), (2) universal law of na-ture (G 4: 421), (3) theend in itself (G 4: 429), (4)universal legislationbyeveryrationalbeing(G 4:431),(5)thekingdomofends(G 4:438),and(6)autonomy(G 4:440).SeeH.J.Paton,The Categorical Imperative,5thed.(Lon-don:Hutchinson,1947),129andIrwin,The Development of Ethics,vol.III§917.However,thetripartitetaxonomydoesnotoversimplifyinasmuchas(1)and(2)areequivalentversionsofUniversality,(3)correspondstoHumanity,and(4)−(6)representdifferentaspectsoftheKingdomofEnds.Here,IfocusonUniversalityandHumanity.

Kanttreatsrationalnatureasthegroundofdutywhenheinsiststhatdutymustbeknowableapriori.Thismayseemstrange. Surely,my duties—for instance, my contractual duty to sell you my wid-gets—depend upon empirical facts aboutwhat I have done, for in-stancethatIsignedacontracttosellyoumywidgets. Kantdoesnotdenythis.Buthewantstomaketwoclaims.First,hethinksthatmydutiesapplyindependentlyofmywillingnesstocomply.Ican’tdefeatanascriptionofanobligationsimplybypleadingdisinclination.Sec-ond,healsothinksthatthederivationofourdutieshasanimportantapriorielement.Itmighthelptothinkofderivingsuchdutiesviaasyllogism.

1. It is a (pro tanto) duty to keep one’s voluntaryagreements.

2.Ivoluntarilyagreedtosellyoumywidgets.

3.Hence,itismy(protanto)dutytosellyoumywidgets.

Thedutyin(3)isderivedfromthemajorpremisein(1)aboutfidelityplustheminorpremisein(2)whichiscontingentandknownempiri-cally.Presumably,Kant’sclaimisnotthatallduties,includingdutieslike(3),areknowableapriori.Hisclaimisthatthegroundsofourdu-ties,includingmoralprinciples,suchas(1),areknowableapriori.

Moral requirements, Kant thinks, must depend upon essential,ratherthancontingentandvariable,featuresofagents,whichexplainswhymoralrequirementsmustexpresscategorical, rather thanhypo-thetical,imperatives(G4:416,425).Ifmoralrequirementsarenottobebasedonvariableempiricalconditions,thentheymustbeuniver-sal.Toachievethissortofuniversality,Kantrequiresanagenttobeable towillhermaximsorprinciples tobeuniversal.His reasoningseemstobesomethinglikethefollowing.

personality.Here, I disagreewithAllenWood,Kant’s Ethical Thought (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),118−21.



against normative perfectionism. If normative perfectionism is anethicaltheorythatgroundsethicalrequirementsinmoralpersonalityorthereasons-responsivecapacitytosetandactforthesakeofends,thentheessentialsofKant’sownethicaltheoryadmitofanormativeperfectionist reading. For he regards both the grounds and contentofmoralrequirementsasconsisting inmoralpersonalityorrationalnature.42

ThisnormativeperfectionistreadingofKant’sethicssuggestssometentative and partial verdicts on the choice pointswithin the archi-tecture of normative perfectionism. It is common to readKant as adeontologistforwhomtherightispriortothegoodinvariousways,butifwethinkofperfectionismasateleologicaldoctrine,wemaybeskepticalofperfectionistreadingsofKant.Butwehavereasontoques-tiontheseorthodoxies.

First,thenormativeperfectionistreadingofKantstressesthewayinwhich the requirements of themoral law depend on the uncon-ditionedvalueof rationalnature. It’s true that themoral law issuesdemandsandrequirementsthatconstrainourpursuitofcertaingoods.Thisisclear,forinstance,inKant’sdiscussionthehighestgood.KantdiscussesthehighestgoodmostfullyintheCritique of Practical Reason (KpV 5: 108−10), just prior tohis criticismsof eudaimonism.Hede-scribesthehighestgoodasacomplexwholeconsistingofvirtueandhappiness inwhich thevalueofhappiness is conditionedbyvirtue(KpV5:109−11).Onthisconception,thehighestgoodincludeshappi-ness,buthappinessonlyhasvaluewhenconditionedbyandinpro-portiontovirtue.Sohappinessisagoodwhosevalueisconditionedbyduty.43Butaswesaw,Kant’sconceptionofhappinessissubjective,

interpretationofKantandhisrelationtoAristoteliannaturalism,thoughIr-windoesnotconceptualizehis readingofKantasaperfectionistone.SeeIrwin,The Development of Ethics,vol.III,chs.66−72.

42. Moreover,Kanttreatsmoralperfectionasthegoalofhumanhistoryinhisprogressiveviewofhistoryasthequesttoperfecthumanity’srationalnature(History;Lectures Collins27:470).

43. Forausefuldiscussion,seeStephenEngstrom,“HappinessandtheHighestGoodinAristotleandinKant”inAristotle, Kant and the Stoics.

What,ifanything,wouldwewilljustinsofaraswearerationalbe-ings?Kant thinks that insofarasone is rationalonewillmakeratio-nalnatureone’send(G 4:428). Happiness,heclaims,canhaveonlyconditionedorinstrumentalvalue;rationalnaturealonehasintrinsicvaluethatdoesnotdependoncontingentandvariablecircumstances.Soonlyrationalnaturecouldbevaluedregardlessofone’scontingentcircumstancesandsentiments.Rationalnature is thecapacity tosetendsandact for thesakeofends(G4:428,430−31;KpV5:87).Butthenarationalagentwillvalueactivitiesandlivesthatexpressratio-nalnature.AndKantmightarguethatarationalagenthasnootherbasisforfindinganythingintrinsicallyvaluable.Moreover,ifIchooserationalagencysolelyinsofarasIamarationalbeing—solelyinvirtueofthepropertiesofrationalagentsassuch—thenitseemsIchoosetodeveloprationalagencyassuch,andnottherationalagencyof thisorthatparticularrationalbeing(G4:427).Ifso,thenF1directsmetobeconcernedaboutotherrationalagents,asrationalagents,fortheirownsakes.ThisisKant’ssecondmainformulaoftheCategoricalIm-perative—theFormulaofHumanity.

F2:Treathumanity,whetherinyourownpersonorthatofanyrationalagent,alwaysasanendinitselfandnevermerelyasameans(G 4:429).

ThisishowhegetsfromgroundtocontentandfromUniversalitytoHumanity.

Perfectionist readings of Kant’s ethics are uncommon, partly be-causeofhiscritiqueofperfectionismandrelateddoctrines, suchaseudaimonism. 41Butwesaidthatthosecriticismsdonotgettraction

41. PaulGuyer explores aperfectionist readingofKant in “KantianPerfection-ism”inPerfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics,ed.Law-renceJostandJulianWuerth(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2011).HecontrastsWolff’sconceptionofperfectionismasperfectingone’srationalpowers,whichKantcriticizes,andaKantianconceptionofperfectionismthatappealstotheunconditionalvalueofautonomy.IamsympatheticwiththeroleofautonomyinGuyer’sinterpretationofKant,thoughIthinkthevalueofautonomyisitselfgroundedinmoralpersonality.Therearealsobroadaffini-tiesbetweenmynormativeperfectionistreadingofKant’sethicsandIrwin’s



Consider theappropriateattitude towardrationalnature in inter-personal contexts.Onemight treat theHumanityFormulaas recog-nizing rational nature as a side-constraint on action—never act soastotreatrationalagentsasmeremeans.Suchaside-constraintmayseemtoimposeadutytohonor,ratherthanpromote,rationalnatureinothers.ButnoticethattheHumanityFormuladoesn’tprohibittreat-ingpeopleasmeans—thatwouldbeaveryrestrictiveinjunction.Weregularlytreatpeopleasmeansincivilsociety,makingcontractsandavailingourselvesof theservicesofothers.Rather, itprohibits treat-ingpeopleasmeremeans.SotheHumanityFormulaprohibitstreatingothersasiftheyweremeretools,withnowell-beingoragencyoftheirown.Wemust treat theminwaysthatreflectconcernfor theirwell-beingoragency.Butthatdoesnotmeanthatwemaynevertreatthemasmeanstopromotetheagencyofothers.ThatpossibilitydoesnotseemtoberuledoutbytheHumanityFormula.

Finally,onemightinvokeKant’sclaimsaboutthedignityofrationalnaturetoshowthathethinksitisavaluethatmustbehonored,ratherthanpromoted,inbothintrapersonalandinterpersonalcontexts. 44IntheGroundwork,Kantcontraststhingshavingapriceandthingshav-ingdignity:

Inthekingdomofends,everythinghaseitherapriceordignity.Whateverhasaprice canbe replacedby some-thingelseasitsequivalent;ontheotherhand,whateverisaboveallprice,andthereforeadmitsofnoequivalent,hasadignity.[G 4:434]

Kantgoesontosaythathappinessandthingsthatproducehappinesshaveaprice,butthathumanity,understoodaspersonalityorrationalnature,hasdignity(G 4:435−36).Thingsthathaveapricearefungible,whereasthingsthatdisplaydignityare“infinitelybeyondallprice”(G 4:435).Wemightthinkofdignityas asuitthattrumpsallothersuits.Withnon-trump suits, it is always thehighest value card that takes

44. Forusefuldiscussion,seeThomasE.Hill,“HumanityasanEndinItself”Eth-ics91(1980):84−99.

consistinginthesatisfactionofdesireswhoseultimateobjectisplea-sure.Thegoodsof(Kantian)happinessandnormativeperfectionarevery different. Crucially, moral personality is unconditionally good,whereas(Kantian)happinessisgoodonlyconditionally.Insofarasthegroundofdutyrestsontheunconditionalvalueofrationalnature,aperfectionistgoodisarguablypriortotheright.

Second,insofarasKantcanbereadasanormativeperfectionist,itwouldappearthathisperfectionismisimpartial,ratherthanegocen-tric.AstheHumanityFormulamakesclear,thefundamentalmoralde-mandistorespectthevalueofrationalagencyineveryperson.Con-cernfortherationalagencyofothersisnotderivativeinthewayitisforegocentricformsofnormativeperfectionismthatweencounterinAristotleandGreen.Inthisrespect,Kant’sperfectionismhasmoreincommonwithMill’sperfectionistutilitarianism,howevermuch theymaydifferinotherrespects.

Third,we can askwhetherKantianperfectionism instructs us tohonororpromoterationalnatureinourselvesandothers.Manyread-erswillassumethatKantiandeontologyimpliesthatthecorrectori-entationtowardthevalueofrationalnature is tohonor,ratherthanpromote,it.Evenifthisistrue,itdoesn’tblockaperfectionistreadingofKant,becausewesaidthatwhethertohonororpromoterationalnaturewasachoicepointwithinnormativeperfectionism.

However, thisdeontological readingofKant’s attitude toward ra-tionalnaturedeservesscrutiny.Promotingrationalnatureseemsplau-sibleintheintrapersonalcase.AswesawinMill’sdiscussionofself-slavery,theprohibitiononsellingoneselfintoslaveryrequiresthatwepromote,ratherthanhonor,rationalagency.InhisdiscussionofdutiestooneselfintheGroundwork,Kantsaysthatrationalnatureisnotjustaconstraintonhowoneleadsone’sownlife,butthatouractions“mustharmonize [zusammenstimmen] with it,”seeking“thefurtherance”(Beför-derung)ofthisend(G 4:430).Furtheringanendinvolvespromotingit,whichmightrequireforegoingsomeopportunitiestohonorit,forthesakeofitsbetterrealization.



conclusions of interest to the perfectionist reading of Kant’s ethics.First,because thequestionwhether topromoteorhonormoralper-sonalityisachoicepointwithinnormativeperfectionism,thepossibil-ityofanormativeperfectionistreadingofKantdoesnotturnonhowhethinksweshouldbeorientedtowardrationalnature.Second,uponcloserinspection,severalclaimsthatKantiscommittedtohonoring,ratherthanpromoting,rationalnatureappearproblematic.Moreover,there is someevidence thatKant thinks that the correct attitude to-wardrationalnatureinbothintrapersonalandinterpersonalcontextsrequiresthatitbepromoted.Third,evenifKantisnotcommittedtopromotingrationalnature,wecanconstructaformofnormativeper-fectionismthatisotherwiselikeKant’sethicaltheorybutiscommittedtopromoting,ratherthanhonoring,rationalnature.

5. Is the Appeal to Rational Nature Incomplete?

So far, normative perfectionism seems well positioned to addresssomeofKant’sexplicitworriesaboutperfectionismandrelateddoc-trines,suchaseudaimonism,andtoaccommodatewhatisreasonableinKant’s concerns. Indeed,wehaveseen reason to takeseriouslyanormativeperfectionistreadingofsomecentralaspectsofKant’sownethicaltheory.

ThismakesitappropriatetoaddressaworrythathasbeenraisedabouttheadequacyofKant’sownappealstorationalnature,becausenormative perfectionism appeals to rational nature in many of thewaysthatKantdoes.Thegeneralworryisthattheidealsofrationalityandperfectiondonotthemselvesprovidecompleteethicalguidance.Rationalityisamatterofrecognizingandrespondingtoreasons,butthen rationality does not provide adequate guidancewithout somespecificationofthesubstantivereasonsforactionthatarationalagentwouldrecognizeandweigh.Similarly,perfection,understoodintermsof thedevelopment and exercise ofmoral personality andpracticalreason,doesnotseemtoprovideadequateguidance.Wedeliberateby recognizing and weighing goods and reasons. But then practi-calreasonordeliberationseemstobean incompleteguidewithout

thetrick.Butthelowestvaluecardinatrumpsuitbeatsthehighestvaluecardinanynon-trumpsuit.WemightinterpretKantassaying,ineffect,thatrationalnatureisatrumpsuitandthatitisneverpermis-sibletoviolateorcompromiserationalnatureasameansofpromotingothergoods,suchashappiness,thathavemereprice.

Wecanthinkofthisclaimthatrationalnaturehasdignityasclaimaboutvalue that recognizesdiscontinuitiesbetween thevalueof ra-tional agencyandothergoods. In thisway,Kant’s claimsabout thesupremevalueofdignityinrelationtoothergoodscouldbelikenedtoMill’sclaimsinChapterIIofUtilitarianism aboutthevalueofhigherpleasuresinrelationtolowerpleasureswhenhesaysthatacompetentjudgewouldpreferthesmallestamountofhigherpleasuretothelarg-estamountoflowerpleasure(UII5;CWX211).Justaspromotinghap-pinessforMillwillnotallowtrade-offsofhigherandlowerpleasures,sotoocouldKantclaimthatpromotingrationalnaturewillnotallowtrade-offsbetweenrationalnatureandhappinessbecausetheformerisdiscontinuouslybetterthanthelatter.

But even if rationalnature trumpsother goods, there canbeun-avoidableconflictsinthedemandsofrationalnature.Evenifthelow-estvaluecard ina trumpsuitbeats thehighestvaluecard inanon-trumpsuit,within the trumpsuit, thehighest cardinalitywins.Thiswouldimplythatinsituationswheretheclaimsofrationalnaturecon-flict,Kantmayhavereasontopromoteormaximizerationalnature.Aswe saw in§3, he thinks theHumanity Formula requires thatweharmonizepositively,andnotjustnegatively,withrationalnature,fur-theringtheagencyofothers(G 4:430).Thissuggeststhatweshouldtakerationalnature,whereverwefindit,asavaluetobepromoted.Atleast,itdoesn’trulethisout.45

This discussion of whether Kant thinks that rational nature is avaluetobepromotedorhonoredinintrapersonalandinterpersonalcontextshasbeeninconclusive.Butitissufficienttoestablishseveral

45. Kant’sviewcouldbenotthatwepromoterationalnatureevenifthismeansharmingindividualrationalagents,butratherthatwehaveadutytopromoterationalagencybutonlyinwaysthatneverviolaterationalagency.



recognizing a diversity of good lives exercising practical reason incomparablygoodbutdifferentways,butitisnotcontent-neutral.

By contrast, the moderate critique needs to be takenmore seri-ously.Accordingtothemoderatecritique,evenifperfectionistvaluesarenotempty,theyprovideanincompleteethicalguideandneedtobe supplemented by additional non-perfectionist kinds of value orreasons.Differentmoderate critiquesmight appeal todifferentnon-perfectionistvalues.Presumably,anyconceptionofethicalguidancethat recognizesasetofperfectionistgoodsas incompletewouldbepluralistincharacter.Somefamiliarpluralistconceptionsofthegoodinclude knowledge, achievement, pleasure, beauty, friendship, andmoralgoods.48Themoderatecritiqueisthatadequateethicalcontentpresupposessomesuchpluralistconceptionthatisnotexhaustedbyperfectionistgoods.

Adequatelyaddressingthemoderatecritiqueisbeyondthescopeofthisessay.Butwecanframehowthatdiscussionmightproceedbydistinguishingdifferentkindsofresponsetothatcritique.Inparticular,wecandistinguishmoreandlessconcessiveresponses,dependingonhowmanynon-perfectionistvalueswerecognizeandhowimportanttheyare.

Perhapsthemostconcessiveresponsewouldbetodefendaformofpartial perfectionismthatisbasedonamixedconceptionofthegoodthat includes perfectionist elements. Even if perfectionismprovidesincompleteguidanceandmustbesupplementedbyalistofindepen-dentobjectivegoods,evenaverylonglist,itwouldstillbetruethatourconceptionofthegoodwouldbeincompleteifitdidnotrecognizeperfectionistgoods.

Alessconcessiveresponsewouldbetoembraceaformofdominant perfectionismthatrecognizesamixedconceptionofthegoodinwhichperfectionist goods aremost important.There aredifferentways inwhich perfectionist goodsmight dominate others. First, even if we

48. See,e.g.,W.D.Ross,The Right and the Good(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1930),27,102,140andDerekParfit,Reasons and Persons(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),499−502.

somespecificationoftheobjectivegoodsandsubstantivereasonsthatshouldguidedeliberation.

We can distinguish radical andmoderate versions of this worryabouttheadequacyofperfectionism’sguidance.Theradical critique,fa-miliarfromHegeliancriticismsofKant,isthatrationalityisaformalorproceduralconceptand,hence,isemptyorwithoutcontent.46Bycon-trast,themoderate critiqueisthatrationalnaturehascontentandpro-videssomeguidancebutdoesnotprovidecompleteguidancewithoutaspecificationofsubstantivereasonsorobjectivegoods.47

Wecanrejecttheradicalcritiqueinsofarasmoralpersonalitypro-videsboththegroundandcontentofmorality.Aswesaw,Kantarguesthatmoralrequirementsapply invirtueofournatureasagentsandthatwhatwecanvalue insofarasweare rationalagents is rationalnature,whichcommitsustotherequirementtotreatrationalnaturealwaysasanendandnotmerelyasameans.ThisishowhegetsfromgroundtocontentandUniversalitytoHumanity.Similarly,thenorma-tiveperfectionistidentifiesnormativeidealswithactivitiesandlivesthat realize our capacities as agents. Content is a function ofwhatis ruledout, and thepre-eminent valueof rationalnature rules outsomekindsoflives.Thereareavarietyofkindsoflivesandactivitiesinwhichonecanexerciseone’srationalcapacitieswell.Butrationalnature speaks against selling oneself into slavery anddiscriminatesbetweenhigherandlowerpleasures,betweentheexaminedlifeandthelifeofsensorycontentment,betweenaself-directedlifeinwhichonemeetsandcopeswithvariouschallengesandashallowandun-demanding life, andbetween the lifeof anartisanwhohas controloverthenatureofherworkandthedistributionofherproductsandthelifeofacouchpotato.Normativeperfectionismcanbepluralistic,

46. SeeG.W.F.Hegel,The Philosophy of Right, trs.T.Knox (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1952)§135R.BradleydevelopstheHegeliancritiqueinFrancisHerbertBradley,Ethical Studies,2d.ed.(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1927),145−63.

47. See, e.g.,DonaldRegan, “TheValueofRationalNature”Ethics 112 (2002):267−91.



terms.Where accommodation is not possible, reform recommendsdenyingthattheallegedgoodsaregenuinegoods.Themeritsofac-commodationandreformdependonhowmuchtheperfectionistcanaccommodate,howmuchrequiresreform,andwhethertheresultingreformsseemreflectivelyacceptable.Thisstrategywouldhavetobeassessedon a case-by-casebasis by considering allegednon-perfec-tionistgoodsandevaluatingstrategiesforaccommodationandreform.Here,Icanonlysketchwhatsuchadiscussionmightlooklike.

Knowledge and Achievement.Itisnothardtounderstandhowknowl-edge or achievement might be understood as perfectionist values.Knowledgeisarguablythestateatwhichourcapacitiesfortheoreti-cal reasonaim,andcertainkindsofachievementsarewhatweaimat inourpracticaldeliberations.Wecanunderstandhowanappealtopracticalagencymightexplaintheperfectionistvalueofpracticalachievements, andwe can understand how an appeal to epistemicagencymight explain the perfectionist value of knowledge, butwemightdoubt that either conceptionof agency canexplainboth.Thisworryraisesinterestingquestionsabouttheabilitytoexplaintheoreti-calachievementsintermsofpracticaldeliberationaboutourmentalactsandtheabilitytoexplainpracticalaccomplishmentsintermsoftheoreticalreasoningaboutpracticalmatters.Butthereisnoneedforreductive explanations of either kind, provided that normative per-fectionismisgrounded,asGreenbelieves,inaunifiedconceptionofagency—onethatseesrationalagentsasreasons-responsiveinwaysthatmakethembothpracticallyandepistemicallyresponsible.

Pleasure.Itiscommontoregardhedonicvaluesasnon-perfectionistvalues.Pleasureistobesoughtandpaintobeavoidedinthemselves,independentlyoftheirrelationtoperfection.Painisoftenextrinsicallybadinsofarasitisaninsistentformofconsciousnessthatdistractsonefromthepursuitofone’sactivitiesand,hence,impedesthepursuitofperfectionistgoods.Indeed,ifthenatureofpainistobeinsistentanddisruptiveinthisway,thentheperfectionistcanevenrecognizepainas beingnon-instrumentally bad. The interesting anddifficult ques-tioniswhetherpleasureisinherentlygoodandpainisinherentlybad

mustacceptamixedconceptionofthegood,itmightstillbetruethatperfectionistgoodsareindividually the most important goodsinsofarastheyexercisethemostgeneralandimportantconstraintonthecon-tentofanethicallife.Second,perfectionistgoodsmightconditionthevalueofothergoods,sothattheotherelementsonlycountasgenuinegoodswhentheydonotoffendagainstorcompromiseperfectionistelements.49Onsuchaview,perfectionistdemandstodevelopandex-erciseone’sownnormativepowersandthoseofotherrationalagentsconstrainwhatotherthingsmightbegood.Third,whetherornotper-fectionistgoodsarethemostimportantindividualgoodsortheonlyunconditionalgoods,theymightbesuperordinate goods.Onemightdis-tinguishbetweenprimaryandsecondarygoods.Thoughperfectionistgoodsareamongtheprimarygoods,theymayalsobeimportantsec-ondarygoodsinsofaraspracticalreasonisexercisedinthecompari-sonofprimarygoods,thecorrectorderingofprimarygoods,andtheresolutionofconflictsamongprimarygoods.Ifso,practicalreasonisanimportantsecondaryorsuperordinategood.Ifperfectionistgoodsarebothprimaryandsuperordinategoods,thenourconceptionofthegoodisarguablyaformofdominantperfectionism.Thecasefordomi-nantperfectionismwillbeevenstrongerifperfectionistgoodsaretheindividuallymostimportantprimarygoodsortheonlyunconditionalgoods.

Bothoftheseresponsestothemoderatecritiqueconcedethatthecorrectconceptionof thegoodmustbemixed,containingbothper-fectionist and non-perfectionist elements. A still less concessive re-sponsewouldbetodefendpure perfectionism.Here,theideawouldbetocombine twopureperfectioniststrategies—accommodationandre-form.Accommodationbringsapparentlynon-perfectionistgoodsun-dertheperfectionistumbrella,explainingtheirvalueinperfectionist

49. ThissortofviewmightbestructurallysimilartoKorsgaard’sideathatrationalnatureconditionsorconstrainsthereasonsthatreflectiveendorsementandpracticalidentityprovide.SeeChristineKorsgaard,The Sources of Normativity (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996)andChristineKorsgaard,Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2009).



atedbyintelligentbeingswouldstillbebeautifulandcontributetothevalueoftheworldsinwhichtheyoccurevenwhentheywereneitherthe product of creative activity nor the object of aesthetic apprecia-tion.Butthisisnotclear.Infact,therearetwoclaimsthatMooremustestablish—first,thatthereisbeautyinaworldwithnosentientcrea-tures,andsecond,thatbeautyinsuchaworldisanintrinsicgood.Butbothclaimsareopen todoubt.WemayregardDaVinci’sVenusdeMiloasbeautiful.ButthemethodofisolationrequiresustoimagineaworldcontainingapieceofstonewiththesamequalitativepropertiesastheVenusbutthatwasneithertheproductofcreativedesignnortheobjectofaestheticappreciation—perhapsoccurring ina lifelessworldastheresultoferosion.Itissimplynotclearthatthestoneinthatworldisbeautiful.PerhapsthebestcaseforMoore’sclaimaboutbeauty is natural beauty.Would a landscape containing the GrandCanyonbemorebeautifulthanasparelunarlandscapeevenifnosen-tientcreatureeverappreciatedit?Onecandoubtthatthereisbeautyin worlds without sentient creatures, and even if we do recognizebeautyinworldsinwhichsentientcreaturesareneitherproducersnorconsumersofbeauty,wemaywonderifthoseworldsarebetterasaresult.Ifso,wemightthinkthatbeautyisarelationalgoodandthatitsvalueliesinitsrelationtoperfectionistvalues.

Friendship.Friendshipmightseemtobeanon-perfectionistgoodthatnonethelessoughttoguidechoice.However,allthreeofourpara-digmaticnormativeperfectionistsbelievethatcertain formsof inter-personalassociationextendandcompletetheagent’srationalnature.

Aristotlebelieves that in the right sortof friendship,one’s friendprovides a kindofmirror ononeself and soprovides aperspectivethatmakes self-understanding and self-criticismpossible, providingakindofcompletionorperfectionforcognitivelylimitedbeings(NE 1162a20−24,1169b4−6,1170a5−7;EE1244b1−12;MM1212b24−1213b2;Politics1261b10−15).Moreover,hethinksthatinthebestsortoffriend-ships,friendsshareexperiencesanddiscussioninawaythatprovidesinterpersonal psychic unity that is relevantly like intrapersonal uni-ty.Thisunity,hethinks,isthebasisforeachregardingtheotherasa

independentlyof their effectsonone’s valuable activities.Comparethelivesoftwoartistswhoareeachengagedincreativework,produc-ingbeautifulart,andexercisingcontrolovertheirprofessionallives.Oneofthemappreciatesthevalueshecreatesandtakesdelightinherart,whiletheotherisdepressedandtakesnojoyinherart.Clearly,itmightseem,thefirstlifeisbetterthanthesecond,eventhoughtheyseemtorealize thesameamountofperfectionistvalue.Thenaturalexplanationforthisdifferenceinvalueisthatpleasureisanindepen-dent,non-perfectionist value.But in this case, thepleasure that theoneartisthasthattheotherlacksappearstobeadelight in her creative activity.FollowingtheleadofAristotle,theStoics,Leibniz,andWolff,wemight treat suchdelight as anappreciation of perfectionist value,andthisappreciationmightseemtobeafurtherperfectionistvalue.50 Whetherallgenuinehedonicgoodscanbefitundertheperfectionistumbrellainthiswayisanopenquestion.

Beauty.Itissometimessaidthatbeautyisanobjectivegood,whichcanandshouldguidechoice.Onsomeviews,beautymightwellbeanindependentnon-perfectionistgood.G.E.Moorethoughtthatifoneappliedhismethodofisolation,inwhichoneimaginessomethinginisolationfromsentientbeingstoseeifithasvalueinthosesituations,onewouldseethatbeautywasanobjectivegood.51Ifwecompareabarelunarlandscapewithasimilarlandscapecontainingourfavoriteworkofart,wewillseethatthesecondworldisbetterthanthefirst.Thisfactatteststotheobjectivevalueofbeauty,orsoMoorethought.Butworksofartareartifacts,createdbyartistsandtypicallyconsumedandappreciatedbyaudiences.Forthemethodofisolationtoevidencethatbeautyisanobjectivevalue,wewouldhavetoimaginethatob-jectsthatarebeautifulandchoiceworthywhenproducedandappreci-

50.Cf.RobertAdams,Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),93−101.Adamsproposestounderstandthepersonalgoodastheenjoymentoftheexcellent.Iwouldadd,first,thattheexcellentisgoodevenwhenitisnotenjoyed(evenifitisbetterstillwhenitisenjoyed),andsecond,thattheenjoymentoftheexcellentisitselfexcellent.

51. G.E.Moore,Principia Ethica(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1903),83−84,90−91.



become tohimashimself and inproviding forhimselfheprovides for them.Projectinghimself intothefutureas a permanent subject of possiblewell-being or ill-be-ing—andhemustsoprojecthimselfinseekingforaper-manentgood—heassociateshiskindredwithhimself.Itisthisassociationthatneutralisestheeffectwhichthean-ticipationofdeathmustotherwisehaveonthedemandforapermanentgood.[§231]

Greenclaimsthatinterpersonalpermanenceisanextensionofintrap-ersonalpermanence,implyingthattherightsortofinterpersonalasso-ciationmakesthegoodofone’sassociatepartofone’sown.Interper-sonalassociationunderminesthepopularcontrastbetweenself-loveandloveofothers(§232)andgiveseachassociateareasontopursueacommongood(§202).

Ofcourse,thedetailsoftheseperfectionistrationalesforfriendshipneedtobefilledinanddefended,butsuchclaimspromisetobringthegoodoffriendshipundertheperfectionistumbrella.

Moral Goods.Wemightconcedethepromiseofpureperfectionismasanaccountofprudentialvaluebutharbordoubtsaboutitsadequa-cytoexplaintheimportanceofother-regardingmoralvirtues,suchasjustice.Differentformsofnormativeperfectionismhavedifferentcom-mitmentshere.Anyagent-neutralorotherwiseimpartialconcernforrationalagentswillbuildconcernforothersinatafoundationallevel.SoaperfectionistlikeMillorKantseemstohavenospecialproblemaccommodatinganagent’sconcernforthegoodofothers.Bycontrast,eudaimonistperfectionistshaveagent-relativeoregocentricconcernfortheagent’sownrationalagency.SoperfectionistssuchasAristotleorGreenneed toexplainhowaconcern forothersemergeswithinaeudaimonist frameworkbyexplaininghow the rationalagencyofotherscontributestotheagent’sownrationalagency.However,bothAristotleandGreendobelievethatanagent’sownperfectionrequirespursuitofacommongood.Myremarksaboveabouthowtheyprovideaperfectionistexplanationoffriendshipandotherassociationalgoods

second self,whoseinterestsarepartofhisandforwhomhecaresfortheother’sownsake(NE 1166a1−2,10,1166a30−32,1168b1−1169a12).52

Mill believes that friends enhance each other’s higher facultiesbyhelpingeachotherenlargethemenuofdeliberativeoptionsandbetter assess themerits of the options on themenu. This is an im-portantpartofhisperfectionistdefenseoffreedomofexpressionandassociation(OLII20−33,III1;CWXVIII242−52,260−61).ButitalsoexplainstheuniquevalueheassignstofriendshipsamongequalsinhiscritiqueofVictoriansexualinequality(SWinCWXXI293−95,326,334−36).Equalstandingmakespossibleformsofpersonalassociationthatfosterdiscussionandcooperation,makeeachaccountabletotheother,andenableeachtorealizeherhighernature.53

Greeninsiststhatproperself-realizationshouldaimatacommongood,whichincludesthegoodofotherrationalagents.Aself-realizingagentdoesnotactonpassingwhimsorpassionsbutactsforthesakeofendsperceivedasvaluableandperseveresontheirbehalf,makingshort-terminvestmentsandsacrificesforthesakeoftheseends.ThisistovaluegoalsandprojectsinwhichIaminvolvedthathavesomedegreeofpermanence.Greenthinksthattherightsortofassociationwithothersextends thispermanence inanaturalway (PE §199). In-deed,Greenregardsinterpersonalpermanenceasakindofcounter-balancetomortalityorsurrogateforimmortality:

Thatdeterminationofananimalorganismbyaself-con-sciousprinciple,whichmakesamanandispresupposedby the interest inpermanentgood,carrieswith itacer-tain appropriationby theman tohimself of thebeingswithwhomheisconnectedbynaturalties,sothatthey

52. FordiscussionsofGreekeudaimonistconceptionsoffriendshipthatempha-sizethesethemes,seeIrwin,Plato’s Ethics,ch.18;TerenceIrwin,Aristotle’s First Principles(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1988),ch.18;DavidO.Brink,“Self-loveandAltruism”Social Philosophy & Policy14(1997):122−57;andDavidO.Brink,“Eudaimonism,LoveandFriendship,andPoliticalCommunity”Social Philoso-phy & Policy16(1999):252−89.

53. IdiscusstheroleofperfectionistvaluesinMill’sdiscussionofliberalassocia-tionsandfriendshipsamongequalsinMill’s Progressive Principles,chs.6−11.



supportcosmopolitanconcernforothersmayseemclosertotheStoicthantheAristotelianview.54

Thoughthediscussionofpureperfectionismanditsresourceshasnecessarily been abstract and suggestive, it shows promise for theprojectofextendingthedomainofthenormativeperfectionistempire.Whetherallgenuinegoodsadmitofperfectionistanalysisremainsanopenquestion,worthfurtherinvestigation.Evenifwecannotextendtheperfectionistdomainas faras thepureperfectionistmust, thereremainmoreconcessiverepliesthatrecognizetheimportanceofper-fectionist goods within mixed or pluralist conceptions. DefendingtheseclaimstakesthenormativeperfectionistbeyondexplicitKantianresourcesbutprovidesadefenseoftheimportanceofrationalnaturethatboththenormativeperfectionistandtheKantianneed.

Moreover, we can now appreciate a connection between theseworriesaboutthecompletenessoftheappealtorationalnatureandKant’sfirstcriticismthatperfectionismyieldshypothetical,ratherthancategorical,imperatives.Recallfrom§2thatKantthinksLeibnizandWolffaremetaphysicalperfectionistswhomakearationalwilldepen-dentonmetaphysical principlesof unity, order, andfittingness thatareexternal to thewill itself.Greenpromises to avoidKant’sobjec-tion insofar as he thinks the imperatives of self-realization dependonlyonaspectsofmoralpersonality. In thisrespect,Green’snorma-tiveperfectionismappearsmorefullyKantianthantheperfectionismsofLeibnizandWolff.Butinthissection,wehaveseenthatthereisaquestionforbothKantiansandnormativeperfectionistswhethertheappealtomoralpersonalityorrationalnatureprovidescompleteguid-ancewithoutsupplementationbymaterialprinciplesaboutobjectivegoods and external reasons. If thenormativeperfectionist canbe a54. I discussGreen’s perfectionist justification of friendship and the common

good inPerfectionism and the Common Good, §§XV−XX andDavidO. Brink,“ThreeDualisms:Sidgwick,Green,andBradley”Collingwood and British Ideal-ism Studies25(2019):161−87.IdiscussAristotelianandStoiccommitmentsaboutthescopeofthecommongoodinDavidO.Brink,“EudaimonismandCosmopolitanConcern” inVirtue, Happiness, and Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin,ed.DavidO.Brink,SusanSauvéMeyer,andChristopherShields(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2018).

indicatehowtheycouldbegintoexplaintheemergentvalueofmoralconcernfortheperfectionofotherswithinaeudaimonistframework.

Inthecontextofdiscussinganegocentricperfectionistjustificationofmoralconcern,it isworthmentioningGreen’sdisagreementwithAristotle about the scope of the common good. Both Aristotle andGreen think that interpersonal association provides a kind of inter-personalunityakintointrapersonalunityandforgesacommongoodamongassociatesthatgiveseachegocentricreasontocareabouttheassociate forhisownsake.Greenbelieves thatAristotlerecognizedtheway inwhich justice isconnectedwithacommongood,buthethinkstheGreekshadtoonarrowaconceptionofthecommongood.Green thinks agents have egocentric reasons to seek interpersonalpermanencewithwide scope:

The idea of a society of free and law-abiding persons,eachhisownmasteryeteachhisbrother’skeeper,wasfirstdefinitely formedamongtheGreeks,andits forma-tionwastheconditionofallsubsequentprogressinthedirectiondescribed;butwiththem…itwaslimitedinitsapplicationtoselectgroupsofmensurroundedbypopu-lationsofaliensandslaves.Initsuniversality,ascapableofapplicationtothewholehumanrace,anattempthasfirst beenmade to act upon it inmodernChristendom[PE §271].

Greenseesmoralprogressasconsisting inthegradualextensionofthe scopeof thecommongood,which isonlycompletewheneachrespectstheclaimsmadebyothermembersofamaximallyinclusivecommunityof ends (§§214, 216, 244, 332). Indeed,Green thinks theHumanityFormulaoftheCategoricalImperativeprovidesthecorrectinterpretationofthecommongood(§§202−17).Inthisrespect,Green’sbeliefthatanegocentricconcernwithself-realizationcanandshould



onour rationalnature, theypromise tobedemandsof reason.TherationalisminKant’sethicsisasourceofitspersistentattractions,andinvirtueofitsappealtomoralpersonalityandrationalagency,norma-tiveperfectionismenjoysasimilarpromisetoexplainthenormativeauthorityofitsdemands.

Some writers doubt that ethical claims derived from the condi-tionsthatareconstitutiveofagencyenjoyrationalauthority,becauseitisalwaysopentorationalagentsnottocareaboutthedemandsofagency.Onthisview,rationalagentsarealwaysfreetorejectdemandsofagency.55Ofcourse,rationalagentsaremetaphysicallyfreetoresistwhat theyhave reason todo.But if therearedemands thatdependonlyonourrationalnatureasagents, thenagentsdisplay irrational-itywhentheyexercisethisfreedom.Itisrationaltocareaboutwhatrationalityconsistsin,andthereissomethingself-defeatingabouttheagentwhoasksforareasonwhysheshouldconformtothedemandsof rational agency. If there are lives that exercise those rational ca-pacitiesthatmakeusresponsibleagents,subjecttoreasonsforaction,thenwehavereasontocareaboutandpursuethosekindsoflives.

If so, there is something illegitimateabout thequestionwhetherrational agentshave reason todoas rationality requires.There is alegitimate question aboutwhether rational agency imposes any de-mands.Butthisisthedifferentquestionwhethertheappealtoratio-nalnaturehascontent.Weaddressed thatquestionearlier (§5)andarguedthatKantiansandnormativeperfectionistshavepromisingac-countsofhowrationalnatureprovidesnormativecontent.Whetherthenormativeguidance that rationalnatureprovides is complete isanothermatter.

There isa furtherquestionabout thenormativeauthorityofper-fectionist ideals that isworthaddressing.This is a challengenot tonormativeperfectionismperse,buttoitseudaimonistoregocentricversions. As we noted earlier (§1), nearly all of Greek ethics is eu-daimonist, treatingtheagent’sowneudaimoniaorhappinessasthe

55. See,e.g.,DavidEnoch,“Agency,Shmagency:WhyNormativityWon’tComefromWhatisConstitutiveofAgency”Philosophical Review115(2006):169−98.

pureperfectionist,explainingallethicalcontentintermsofmoralper-sonalityand itsexpression, then thenormativeperfectionistcanan-swerKant’sfirstcriticismofperfectionismonitsownterms.However,ifwemustacceptapluralistethicaltheory,inwhichrationalnatureissupplementedwithobjectivegoodsandexternalreasonsthatshouldguiderationalagency, thenwehavereasontorejectKant’sdemandthatmoralrequirementsdependonlyonrationalnature.

6. The Normative Authority of Perfection

A plausible ethical conception should be extensionally adequate. It shouldaccommodatemostofourconsideredjudgmentsaboutwhatsortsofactionsandlivesaregoodorbadandrightorwrongor,failingthat,provideuswithprincipled reasons for revisingourconsideredjudgments.Onthisscore,normativeperfectionismlookspromising.Itprovidessubstantialaccommodationandprincipledreform.Ifneces-sary,wecanachievegreateraccommodationbytreatingperfectionistgoodsasthedominantcomponentsinamixedconception.

Inadditiontoextensionaladequacy,aplausibleethicalconceptionalsoowesusanaccountofitsnormative authority.Whyshouldwecareabout conforming to its requirements?Once formulated, that ques-tionisnoteasytoanswer,andmanyfamiliarconceptionsdonotad-dressthatquestionorhaveunsatisfyinganswers.Forinstance,itisnotclearwhyweshouldcareaboutpleasureassuch,independentlyofitssources,objects,orconsequences.Equally,givenvariouspathologiesofdesire, it isnotclearwhyweshouldcareaboutsatisfyingdesiresindependentlyoftheirsources,objects,orconsequences.

Bycontrast,normativeperfectionismhasamorepromisinganswertoquestionsabout itsnormativeauthority.Bygroundingperfection-ist ideals inanormativeconceptionofhumannatureaspersonsoragents,normativeperfectionismexplainswhyweshouldcareabouttherealizationofperfectionistidealsbyappealingtotheverycapaci-tiesthatmakeusreasons-responsiverationalagentsinthefirstplace.In this respect, normative perfectionism enjoys the same appeal asKantianethics.Preciselybecausecategoricalimperativesdependonly



forprovidingthewrongsortofreasontobejust.56Prichard’sessayiscomplexandnodoubtamenabletodifferentinterpretations.Butonecentralstranddeservesourattention.Inthe Republic, Platoasks“Whybejust?”whichwemightgeneralizetothequestion“Whybemoral?”Platoanswersthatjusticeisprofitablefortheagentbecauseitcontrib-utestohishavingawell-orderedsoul.Prichardinterpretsthisasade-mandforaninstrumentaljustificationofjustice.But,hethinks,moraldemandsoughttobedonefortheirownsakes.Ifso,Plato’squestionismisconceivedandhisanswerprovidesthewrongsortofreasontobejust.Plato’smistake,itmightbeclaimed,generalizestoanyegocentricversionofnormativeperfectionism.

One response to thisworry about egocentric versions of norma-tive perfectionism would be to adopt a non-egocentric version in-stead.A fundamentally impartial concernwith rationalnaturedoesnotfilter concern forothers through the lensof concernwithone’sownrationalnature.KantorMillmightbethemodelforthissortofnon-egocentricnormativeperfectionism.Alternatively,onemightre-jectPrichard’sclaimaboutPlato’smistake.InRepublicII, Platocananddoesdistinguishbetweensomething’sextrinsicconsequences,whichdependonmorethanthemerepresenceofthatthing,anditsintrin-sic consequences,whichdependonlyon thenatureof the thing inquestion.Withthisdistinctioninhand,GlauconandAdeimantuscanbe interpretedasconcedingthat justice isbeneficial for itsextrinsicconsequencesandaskingSocratestoshowthatjusticeisgoodforitsintrinsicconsequencestoo.Thatis,theydemandthatSocratesshowthat justice isalwayschoiceworthy invirtueof thebeneficial conse-quencesof justice itself.That is a coherent challenge,whichPlato’sSocratesaddresses,arguingthatjusticeisapsychicconditionwhoseintrinsicconsequencesarebeneficial.Ifso,justiceisgoodforitsownsakeoritsownreward,therebybenefittingthejustagent.

56.SeeH.A.Prichard,“DoesMoralPhilosophyRestonaMistake?reprintedinH.A.Prichard,Moral Obligation: Essays and Lectures(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1949).Acontemporaryworryaboutegocentricrationalesforother-regardingconcernwithsomeaffinitiestoPrichard’sworryabouteudaimonismisJen-niferWhiting,“ImpersonalFriends”The Monist74(1991):3−29.

centralor foundationalelement inethics.Eudaimonism takesaper-fectionistformprovidedthecontentoftheagent’shappinessdependsonhernature,andittakesaspecificallynormativeperfectionistformprovideditdependsonhermoralpersonalityorrationalnature.Plato,Aristotle,theStoics,andGreenareeudaimonistswhoarenormativeperfectionists. Eudaimonism implies that the virtues, including themoralvirtues,mustcontributetotheagent’sownhappinessinsomeway.Forthisreason,eudaimonistjustificationsofother-regardingcon-cernareegocentricandmusthaveaninside-outstructure,groundingother-regardingconcernintheagent’sowneudaimoniaorperfection.Thisegocentricconstraintgivesrisetotwoworries.

The first worry concerns the scope of ethical concern. If ethicalconcernmustbejustifiedfromtheinsideout,wemayworrythatthescopeofethicalconcernwillbelimitedandparochial.Theinside-outstrategylooksmostpromisingamongfriendsorothermembersofanassociationthathavesharedhistory.Butthenitmayseemasifanego-centricversionofnormativeperfectionismcouldnotjustifygenuinelycosmopolitanconcern.Thisisaworryabouttheextensionaladequacyof egocentricnormativeperfectionism. It couldbemetbyadoptinganon-egocentric versionofnormativeperfectionismof the sortwefindinKantorMillthatmakesconcernfortherationalnatureofoth-ersjustasfundamentalasconcernwithone’sownrationalnature.Al-ternatively,wemighttrytovindicatetheextensionaladequacyofanegocentricversionofnormativeperfectionismbyshowingthatitcaninfactdefendethicalconcernwithwidescope.Aswesawin§6,Greenthinkswecanreconcileeudaimonismandcosmopolitanconcern.

Asecondworryaboutegocentricversionsofnormativeperfection-ismconcernsthenormativeauthorityoftheiraccountofconcernforothers. An inside-out rationale for other-regarding concern claimsthat concern for others is awayof contributing to one’s owngood.Thismayseemlikethewrong sort of reasonforethicalconcernforoth-ers. In his essay “DoesMoral Philosophy Rest on aMistake?”H.A.PrichardfamouslyobjectedtoPlato’seudaimonistdefenseofjustice



whyeachofusshouldbeconcernedwithherownrationalnature.Butwhyshouldweeachbeconcernedabouttherationalnatureofothers?PerhapsIshouldbeconcernedaboutrationalnatureassuch,whetherinmyownpersonorthatofanother.ThisiswhatKantandMillbe-lieve.Butitmightseemthatthegroundofmoralrequirementsmustlieintherationalagencyofeach.Ifso,wemightpreferanexplanationofconcernforotherrationalagentsthatisgroundedinanegocentricconcernforone’sownrationalagency.GreenthinksIshouldidentifywithmyrationalselfbecausethis istheself thatgroundsmoralper-sonality.Buthealsothinksthatsomeonecommittedtohisownratio-nalselfshouldbeinvestedinotherrationalselves;whiletheformerachievesintrapersonalpermanence,thelatterachievesinterpersonalpermanence. If so, egocentric normative perfectionism promises toprovideanexplanationoftheauthorityofcosmopolitanconcernthatimpartialformsofperfectionismdonot.

Thoughegocentricandimpartialformsofnormativeperfectionismhavedifferentresources,bothofferpromisingconceptionsofthenor-mativeauthorityofperfectionistdemands.57

7. The Prospects for Normative Perfectionism

Bycontrastwithformsofperfectionismthatappealtoabiologicalcon-ception of human nature, normative perfectionism grounds perfec-tionistidealsinanormativeconceptionofhumannature,understoodintermsofmoralpersonalityoragency.Thereisanimportanttradi-tionofnormativeperfectionism that includes theviewsofAristotle,Mill,andGreen.Inassessingtheprospectsfornormativeperfection-ism,wedowelltoconsideritsrelationtotheKantiantradition.Onemotivationfor thiscomparison is thatKant isan influentialcriticof

57.Wemightdistinguishbetweentheweakrationalistthesisthatmoralrequire-mentsenjoycategoricalauthorityandthestrongrationalistthesisthatmoralrequirements enjoy supreme or overriding authority. See David O. Brink,“KantianRationalism:Inescapability,Authority,andSupremacy”inEthics and Practical Reason,ed.GarrettCullityandBerysGaut(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1997).WhatIamdefendinghereistheweakerrationalistthesis,makingnocommitmentsaboutsupremacy.

Similarly, Aristotle offers an egocentric justification of other-re-gardingvirtues,suchas friendshipandjustice, that isderivativebutnon-instrumental(NE 1097a26−b7).Incompletegoodsarenotchosenfortheirownsakes;theyarechosenonlyforthesakeofsomethingelseandaremereinstrumentalgoods. Bycontrast,completegoodsarechosenfortheirownsakes;theyarenon-instrumentalgoods. Uncondi-tionally completegoodsarechosenfortheirownsakesandnotchosenforthesakeofanythingelse. Eudaimoniaistheonlyunconditionallycompletegood. Thismeansthatmerelycompletegoodsaregoodsinthemselvesbutarealsochosenforthesakeofeudaimonia,aspartsarechosenforthesakesofthewholesofwhichtheyareparts. Here,xisvaluableasconstituentofy;ithascontributoryvalueandisnon-instrumentally good. Aristotle claims that the virtues are complete,but not unconditionally complete, goods (1097a35−b7, 1100b8−11,1176b1−8). Theyarechoiceworthyinthemselvesaspartsofhappiness.Inmakingthisclaim,hemakesexplicitthesortofassumptionsPlatomakesabouttherelationshipbetweenjusticeandeudaimoniainRe-public II,wherehe(Plato)values justice for itsownsakeand for itsconstitutivecontributiontotheagent’sowneudaimonia.

Greenaccepts theseeudaimonist claims.He thinks thata self-re-alizingagentseeks interpersonal,andnot just intrapersonal,perma-nenceandthatthisrequirespursuitofacosmopolitanconceptionofthecommongood.Withinacommongood,Greenclaims,eachcaresaboutothersfortheirownsakesinthesamewayhecaresabouthim-self(PE §§232,236).ThoughGreentreatsthedemandforself-realiza-tionasanegocentricdemand,hethinksitnecessarilyrequirespursuitofacommongoodthatinvolvesnon-instrumentalconcernforothers.

Forthesereasons,weshouldbeskepticalthategocentricversionsofnormativeperfectionismprovidethewrongsortofreasonforother-regardingconcern.Theirjustificationofconcernforothersisderiva-tive, but non-instrumental. If so, then egocentrismneednot supplythewrongsortofreasontobemoral.Indeed,egocentrismmightbeanassetinaddressingthenormativeauthorityofperfectionistdemands.Aswehave seen, thenormativeperfectionisthasanexplanationof



goodsorreasonsthatcanguiderationalagency.Inresponse,thenor-mative perfectionist has availablemore and less concessive replies.Eventhemostconcessiveresponseimpliestheimportanceofperfec-tionistgoods,withoutwhichaconceptionofthegoodwouldbeseri-ously incomplete.Thenormativeperfectionistmightbe lessconces-sive,arguingthatperfectionistgoodsdominateapluralistconceptionofthegood.Finally,theleastconcessivereplywouldbetobringalleg-edlynon-perfectionistvaluesundertheperfectionistumbrella.Whichisthebestresponsetothechargeofincompletenessdependsoncom-plexmattersofprincipledaccommodationandreformofourethicalassumptions.

Moreover,thenormativeperfectionist,liketheKantian,hasaprom-isingaccountofthenormativeauthorityofitsdemands,preciselybe-cause thesedemandsaregrounded inournatureas rationalagents.Thisgivesuscategoricalreasontoactonperfectionistdemands.More-over,wecandefend thenormativeauthorityof egocentricversionsofnormativeperfectionismagainstPrichard’sworrythattheyprovidethewrong sort of reason to care about others and their perfection.Egocentricnormativeperfectionismprovidesanagentwithderivativebutnon-instrumentalreasonforconcernfortheperfectionofothers.

GiventhebreadthandcomplexityoftheissuesassociatedwiththiscomparisonofthenormativeperfectionistandKantiantraditions,thisdiscussion has necessarily been selective and programmatic. None-theless,Ithinkitdemonstratestheinterestandresourcesofthenor-mativeperfectionisttraditionanditsdeepaffinitieswiththeKantiantradition,despiteKant’scriticismsofperfectionism.Moreover, thesetwotraditionshavetheresourcestorespondtoworriesthattheguid-anceprovidedbytheappealtorationalnatureisseriouslyincomplete.Theseconclusionsgiveusreasontoregardtheprospectsofnormativeperfectionismaspromisingandworthfurtherexploration.

perfectionism, claiming that it cannot generate categoricalmoral re-quirementsandthatwemustacceptaself/otherasymmetryinwhichweaimatourownperfectionbutatthehappiness,ratherthantheper-fection,ofothers.However,oncloserinspection,neitherobjectioniscompellingasappliedtonormativeperfectionism.Becauseitgroundsmoral requirements in rationalnature,normativeperfectionismcanrepresent moral requirements as categorical imperatives.Moreover,the role of autonomy inmoral personality shows that we can aimattheperfectionofanother,providedwedosoinwaysthatengage,ratherthanbypass,heragency.Sothenormativeperfectionistcanan-swerKantiandoubtsaboutperfectionismwhilerespectingKant’sowncommitmentstotheconnectionsamongagency,rationalnature,andmoralrequirements.Kant’scriticaltargetistheattempttofoundmo-ralityonanempiricistconceptionofhumannature.Butthenhehasnoreasontorejectattemptstofoundmoralityonanormativeconceptionofhumannaturethatunderstandshumannatureintermsofrationalagency.Indeed,Kanthimselfclearlywantstofoundmoralityonanap-pealtorationalnature,whichopensupthepossibilityofanormativeperfectionistreadingofKant’sownethicaltheory.ThatreadingmakesgoodsenseofKantianessentials,includingKant’sclaimthatrationalnatureprovidesboththegroundandcontentofmoralduty.

BecausebothKantandthenormativeperfectionistappealtoratio-nalnature,thenormativeperfectionisthasreasontotakeseriouslythecriticismofKantianethicsthatitsappealtorationalnatureisemptyorincomplete.Wehavegoodreasontorejecttheradicalversionofthiscriticism that theappeal to rationalnature is empty insofaras ratio-nalnaturesuppliesboththegroundandcontentofmoralduty.KantcanarguefromUniversalitytoHumanity,andtheHumanityformulahascontent,excludingsomeconductasimmoral.Aristotle,Mill,andGreenallrecognizewaysinwhichrationalnatureconstrainstheper-sonalgoodandethicaldemands.Even ifwereject theradicalclaimthattheappealtorationalnatureisempty,weshouldtakeseriouslythemoremoderate criticism that theappeal to rationalnature is in-completeandrequiressupplementationwithasetofnon-perfectionist

David O. Brink...% "vi brino. Normative Perectionism and the Kantian Tradition philosophers’...

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