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David Etkin · • “In responding to these rapidly ... Source: Bolton, M. J., & Stolcis, G. B....
Transcript of David Etkin · • “In responding to these rapidly ... Source: Bolton, M. J., & Stolcis, G. B....
David Etkin
York University
DISASTER AND COMPLEXITY
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“One water molecule is not fluid,
One gold atom is not metallic, One neuron is not conscious, One amino acid is not alive, One sound is not eloquent.”
Jochen Fromm,
The Emergence of Complexity
Fromm, J. (2004). The emergence of complexity. Kassel: Kassel university press. 2
TRADITIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
• Evolved from civil defence
• Ex-military/police/fire/EMS
• Command & control
• Works well when:
• Stakeholders agree
• Low uncertainty
• Well bounded
• Well understood
• Linear processes
Well-defined problem
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The System as a ‘Machine’
• People and organizations do as they are told
• Create stability, order and control
• Bureaucratic:
• Rules and regulations
• Chain of command
• Formal operating procedures
• Maintain power structures and policies
• Little capacity for creativity, innovation or improvisation
• A good place for people who are not comfortable with
ambiguity and uncertainty
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BUT WHAT ABOUT WHEN….
• Stakeholders don’t agree
• Conflicting interests
• High uncertainty
• Fuzzy boundaries
• Poorly understood
• Complex processes
Ill-defined problem
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WICKED PROBLEMS
• Difficult or impossible to solve
• incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to
recognize.
• Complex interdependencies
• efforts to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems
• ‘The Plan’ does not work
• we never planned for this!
• The problem changes over time
• Traditional approach leads to paralysis, rigidity, slow response, communication gaps,
decision-making divorced from on-ground information
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MISMATCH: NORMAL VS DISASTER MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES
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• “As these mega-disasters erupted, managerial confusion seriously delayed delivery of services, personnel, and other resources to people in need, exacerbating losses of life, injury, and property damage.”
• “In responding to these rapidly-developing situations, it appears that many managers inappropriately relied on slow, deliberative, incremental responses to events on the ground.”
• “Incremental administrative changes are adequate in addressing organizational problems and improving effectiveness during periods of stability and equilibrium.
• They are ineffective, however, when "wicked" problems alter the decision-making environment because there is little time to react to changing conditions.”
Source: Bolton, M. J., & Stolcis, G. B. (2008). Overcoming failure of imagination in crisis management: The complex adaptive system. The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 13(3), 1 -12.
DISASTERS ARE MORPHING
! ! "
Complexity
Impa
cts
Source: de Smit, H. (2012). A Significant Evolution of the Disaster Landscape. Proceedings of the 2012 Industrial and Systems Engineering Research
Conference. G. Lim and J.W. Herrmann, eds.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS
- SELF ORGANIZATION -
• As a balance to
randomness & chaos
• No single bird is in
charge
• Group intelligence
Flock of birds
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- SENSITIVITY TO INITIAL CONDITIONS -
THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT
• a small change at one
place in a can result in
large differences to a
later state
• Ball rolling down a
bumpy hill
• Weather
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“For want of a nail the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the message was lost.
For want of a message the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.”
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- EMERGENCE -
"the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of
self-organization in complex systems“ Jeffrey Goldstein
Example: Stampede
• The movements in a crowd before it breaks into a stampede appear chaotic.
• When the stampede itself occurs there is order:
• a strong, directional flow in which individuals can be trampled.
• immediate precursors to stampedes recognizable
• stop-and-go waves and turbulent motions
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- EMERGENCE IN DISASTERS -
Done by:
• Victims
• Volunteers
• EM workers
• Churches
• Businesses
• Government agencies
What they do:
• Search and rescue
• Damage assessment
• Coordinating groups
• Operations groups
• Relief supplies
• Providing shelter
• Emotional support
Does your emergency plan account for emergence?
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OTHER BEHAVIORS
• Threshold effects that can be irreversible
• Limited predictability
• Surprises
• Multiple states that shift from time-to-time
• Cascading effects across different scales
• There is a difference between managing a ‘complex system’ (nuclear plant) and a
‘complex adaptive system’ (society).
• Our problem requires dealing with complex adaptive systems.
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FOUR GOVERNANCE TYPES
Source: Duit, A., & Galaz, V. (2008). Governance and complexity—emerging issues for governance theory. Governance, 21(3), 311-335.
Exploration:
risk taking
experimentation
flexibility
innovation
Exploitation:
efficiency
production
implementation
execution
stability
Most institutions
Good for steady
state
Universities
Good for rapid change
Can be inefficient
Does well under
uncertainty and
rapid change
Failed states
Caught in social
traps
Trad
e-o
ffs
Where does your organization fit on this chart?
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TWO PARADIGMS
• High Reliability Theory (HRT)
• Normal Accident Theory (NAT)
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NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY
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(1) Linear & tight
o Centralized for tight
o Centralized for linear
(3) Linear & loose
o Centralized for linear
o Decentralized for loose
But – either works due to nature of the system
(2) Complex & tight
o Centralized for tight
o Decentralized for complex
An inherent contradiction exists
(4) Complex & loose
o Decentralized for loose
o Decentralized for complex
CENTRALIZATION / DECENTRALIZATION
OF AUTHORITY
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HOW DOES DISASTER MANAGEMENT
FIT IN THIS ANALYSIS?
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Disaster
Linear Complex
Loose
Tight
Co
uplin
g
1
3
2
4
Emergency
Catastrophe
WAYS TO THINK
• Improvisation
• The “Oh, crap” moment
• Predictability
• Think in terms of probabilities
• Become comfortable with uncertainty
• Control
• Influence, rather than control
• Explanation
• Multiple interacting causes.
• Ambiguity
• Surprising relationships
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WHAT DISASTER RESPONSE MANAGEMENT CAN
LEARN FROM CHAOS THEORY
• “… the planned emergency response system will probably not be the one that emerges.
• The one that does emerge will probably have a tendency to be locally self-organizing, somewhat unpredictable in its inter-organizational linkages, and have a tendency to succeed or fail in unpredictable ways.”
Source: Miller, R. L. (2001). What disaster response management can learn from chaos theory. Handbook of crisis and emergency management, 93, 293.
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END
Useful Readings:
• Miller, R. L. (2001). What disaster response management can learn from chaos theory. Handbook of crisis and emergency management, 93, 293.
• Thomas E. Drabek, David A. McEntire, (2003),"Emergent phenomena and the sociology of disaster: lessons, trends and opportunities from the research literature", Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 12 Iss: 2, pp. 97 – 112
• Duit, A. and Galaz, V. (2008). Governance and Complexity – Emerging Issues for Governance Theory. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 2008 (pp. 311–335).
• Perrow, C. (2008). Normal accidents: Living with high risk technologies. Princeton University Press.
• Marais, K., Dulac, N., & Leveson, N. (2004, March). Beyond normal accidents and high reliability organizations: The need for an alternative approach to safety in complex systems. In Engineering Systems Division Symposium. MIT, Cambridge, Mass.
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• OECD (2008). Applications of Complexity Science for Public Policy: New Tools for Finding
Unanticipated Consequences and Unrealized Opportunities. OECD Global Science
Forum. Ettore Majorana International Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice, Sicily
• Kendra, J., & Wachtendorf, T. (2007). Improvisation, Creativity, and the Art of Emergency
Management. Understanding and Responding to Terrorism, 19, 324.
• Bolton, M. J., & Stolcis, G. B. (2008). Overcoming failure of imagination in crisis
management: The complex adaptive system. The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector
Innovation Journal, 13(3), 1-12.
• Fromm, J. (2004). The emergence of complexity. Kassel: Kassel university press.
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