David Dixon- Is Density Dangerous?: The Architects' Obligations After the Towers Fell

8/3/2019 David Dixon- Is Density Dangerous?: The Architects' Obligations After the Towers Fell

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Executive Session onDomestic Preparedness

The Executive Session on Domestic Pre-

paredness (ESDP) is a standing task

force of leading practitioners and aca-demic specialists concerned with terror-

ism and emergency management. Spon-

sored by the John F. Kennedy School of

Government, Harvard University, and the

U.S. Department of Justice, the ESDP

brings together experts with operational

experience in diverse professional fields

that are essential to domestic prepared-

ness -- emergency management, law en-

forcement, fire protection, public health,

emergency medicine, national security

and defense, and elected office.

The Perspectives on Preparedness series

aims to provide useful information to the

concerned professional communities

about how the nation can enhance its abil-

ity to respond to the threat of terrorism with

weapons of mass destruction. The ESDP

also produces discussion papers and

case studies. Visit the ESDP website at:

WWW.ESDP.ORG

IS DENSITY DANGEROUS?THE ARCHITECTS OBLIGATIONS AFTERTHE TOWERS FELLDAVID DIXON

these threaten efforts to revitalize olderdowntowns and reverse sprawl. A strongsense of community in urban areas

seen in revived streets and squares thatare again drawing people together incitiesplays a critical role in building

vitality and reversing economic and socialfragmentation. The life of streets andsquares depends on a lively interplay

between buildings and the public realm,one that is undermined by closing entriesto major buildings and surrounding them

with security perimeters. Civic buildingsand spaces shaped in the interests ofsecurity become bunkers, not thesymbols of a democratic and open

society that ennoble and enrich cities.

To understand better the trade-offs

involved between fighting terrorism andthe health of American cities, it is criticalto examine four core questions: What

issues does the fight against terrorismraise? What new approaches toenhanced security are emerging? How

can steps to fight terrorism affect cities?Are there better approaches to achievinga balance between protecting Americans

against terrorism and promoting thelivability of American cities?

The war against terrorism threatens tobecome a war against the livability ofAmerican cities. In the rush to respond

to the threat of terrorism, a loose networkof public officials, architects, developers,engineers, lawyers, planners, security

consultants, and others who influencebuilding codes are creating a newgeneration of planning and design

regulations. Their purpose is to maketerrorism more difficult and to reduce itshuman and material toll. Unfortunately,

the broader, indirect impact of theseregulations, with their focus on isolatingpeople from buildings and shuttingbuildings off from streets, could

undermine the vitality, sense ofcommunity, and civic quality of much ofurban America.

In fact, the economic, social, and designdimensions of urban communities have

been largely ignored in most of theapproaches to fighting terrorism that haveemerged after September 11. The vitality

of many American cities hinges on publicinvestment in urban areas that have beenabandoned by the private sectorthe

very areas that will bear the brunt of newregulations that focus on decentralizingpotential targets, such as court houses

and other public buildings. Measures like

Perspectiveson Preparedness October 2002

No. 12

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

TAUBMAN CENTER FOR STATE AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

U.S. DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE

OFFICEOF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

David Dixon directs planning and urban design for Goody, Clancy and Associates,a Boston-based firm with a national practice in planning, urban design, and

architecture.


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PERSPECTIVESON PREPAREDNESS / NO. 12 / OCTOBER 2002

IS DENSITY DANGEROUS? TH E A RCHITECTS OBLIGATIONS A FTER TH E TOWERS FELL

Issues Raised by the Fight AgainstTerrorism

The 1973 oil embargo unleashed a profoundsense of vulnerability in America. A colleagueof mine recalls, without fondness, her quaint

Connecticut communitys response to theembargo: joining many other communities inbanishing windows from new schools. To a

society single-mindedly focused on conserv-ing energy, that windowless school symbol-ized patriotism and civic responsibility. In ret-

rospect, that school also symbolized an aber-ration, a sense that energy conservation re-quired doing away with the qualities that make

schools nurturing places for learning. As withany issue, measures that make sense fromone perspective can be disastrous from an-other.

The response to September 11 by the AmericanInstitute of Architects (AIA) provides an

informative glimpse into how securityapproaches are being shaped, and by whom.In the wake of tragedy, the AIA made a

fundamental commitment in taking aleadership role in shaping Americas responseto terrorism. AIA has also committed the

profession to respond quickly through a seriesof publications and conferences, which havefocused on three areas: increasing architects

awareness of security issues and relatedplanning and design tools; increasingawareness within the larger community of theprofessions role in enhancing security; and

participating with other disciplines in definingnew planning and design standards to createmore secure buildings and environments.

The AIA moved quickly to organize meetingsbetween leading design and building

professionals and public officials in Washingtonin December 2001, and a national conferenceon Building Security through Design, co-

sponsored by Sandia Laboratories.1The AIAproduced a pamphlet, Building Security byDesign, to suggest how the architectural

profession could contribute to fighting terrorism.Discussion at both the Washington meetingand Albuquerque conference was lively and

conveyed the AIAs deep commitment to thequality and character of American cities.However, professionals who showed the most

interest in this topicfor example, by preparingthe AIAs pamphletand who over the courseof 2001 and 2002 have shaped emergent policy

recommendations, have largely included thearchitects, engineers, security consultants,and otherspractitioners who have worked for

years to make embassies and courthousessafer. These practitioners, many of whom hadbecome deeply concerned about security

following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing,brought to the discussion a heightenedcommitment to enhancing security, but very

litt le focus on the impact theirrecommendations could have on larger issuesof urban development.

No one within the AIA and allied organizations(nor for that matter, our larger society)consciously sought to address the threats

associated with terrorism from a narrowperspective. A constricted viewpoint, however,naturally emerged from the resulting dialog,

which was largely confined to like-mindedarchitects, engineers, and security consultantswho got involved out of longstanding interest in

these concernsan interest that had stemmedfrom a shared history of dealing with theimpacts of terrorism on places like American

embassies.

The potential regulations under discussion at

local, state, and federal levels threaten toendow America with a new generation ofbuildings like the windowless school inConnecticut: civic structures hidden behind

blank, blast-resistant walls; important publicbuildings quarantined inside lifeless zones freeof vehicles or people; public employees

scattered to greenfield sites; downtowns inneed of revitalization, but deprived of newcourthouses or federal office buildings; and city

streets rendered more dangerous by theelimination of the windows and doorways thatpromote interaction between buildings and

streets. It is perhaps the greatest irony that inrecent decades much of our urban environmentwas rescued from fearand made cities and

society far saferby consciously creatingmore open buildings, blurring the separation ofpublic and private space, promoting community,

and drawing people back to our streets andsquares. A single-minded focus on defendingagainst terrorism threatens all of these hard-won gains.

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Forging approaches that better balance the

response to terrorism with the equally essentialneed for buildings and public spaces thatpromote vitality, community, and a civic spirit

in Americas cities, will require new participantsin the dialog. A broad range of people for whom

this is not a familiar issue must step forward toparticipate, including architects, planners,community leaders, elected officials, realestate professionals, and others with a direct

stake in the character and quality of cities.

Concerns about terrorism are here to stay, and

they have raised a heightened awareness aboutsecurity in the American psyche. The odds ofbeing harmed by terrorism may be dwarfed bythe odds of suffering from conventional hazards

like fires, sick building syndrome, andworkplace accidents. Nevertheless, the new

focus on terrorism means that unions will press

for safer places to work, insurers and lenderswill lobby to reduce risks, air travelers willdemand greater security, and a long list of

others in our society will continue to call fortangible responses to terrorism threats.

A very large part of our built environment willbe shaped by concerns about terrorism. Thisis true particularly in urban environments, where

the kinds of deep perimeter setbacks andwindowless ground floors that characterize the

counterterrorism approaches most oftendiscussed, are the most diff icult to

accommodate. All symbolic buildings andspaces can be perceived as potential targets.No one can predict where terrorists will strike,

because no one can determine precisely whichstructures have the desired symbolic value toa terrorist. The long list of targets begins with

emblems of economic and military power, suchas the office towers and government buildingsattacked on September 11. From there, the

list expands to include: symbols ofgovernmentcourthouses, embassies, federaloffice buildings, state houses, city halls, and

other public facilities; infrastructureairports,utilities, hospitals, power grids, water systems,and highways; reminders of Americas

educational and cultural influenceuniversities,research facilities, and museums; symbols ofAmerican history and valueshistoricmonuments and houses of worship; and places

where people gather in large numbers,

including theme parks and athletic events,

festivals, and concerts. Because the list isendless, the impact of new regulations can belimitless.

Post September 11 Approaches to

Enhanced Security

The new sense of American vulnerabilityunleashed by September 11 is leading to the

creation of a web of planning and designregulations intended to help defend againstterrorism. The potential regulations themselves

appear relatively straightforward. The followinglistnot exhaustiveincludes the planningand design tools most often recommended byarchitects, engineers, and security

consultants for enhancing security (and oftenused in combination; the tools are described

in order of decreasing impact on civic quality,

sense of community, and vitality of cities).

Protect Building Perimeters

Initially conceived to protect buildings againstvehicle-borne bombs, this concept has grownto account for pedestrian- and boat-borne

bombs. Protecting building perimeters isprimarily associated with significant publicbuildings, but the proliferation of Jersey barriers

and bollards around office buildings and otherpotential targets after September 11 suggests

potential wider applications. Proposedmeasures for protecting perimeters have taken

three principals forms.

The most pervasive measure, already

implemented by the federal governmentfollowing the Oklahoma City bombing, hasbeen to remove parking and servicing lots from

beneath buildings, where possible, and requirethat all new parking facilities be located insurface parking lots or in freestanding parking

garages. While federal agencies had alreadybegun to focus on creating deep setbacks toprotect buildings from bomb blasts following

Oklahoma City, this measure has received farmore focus following September 11. Adistance of 100 feet has generally been

suggested as the minimum setback to protecta building from a blast associated with a caror small truck, but hardened walls can reducethe distance. While security professionals

initially recommended vehicle-free setbacks,

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there have also been increasing calls for

pedestrian- and/or boat-free zones. Barriers,ranging from relatively unobtrusive installations(for example, well-designed bollards,streetscape elements, or even parked cars if

by permitall used in the Federal Triangle in

Washington, D.C.) to far more intrusiveinstallations such as the Jersey barriers placed

in front of the Sears Tower in Chicago followingSeptember 11, can be used to create deepsetbacks or to transform sidewalks or small

landscaped areas into shallow setbacks. Insome cases, public streets have been closedto protect buildings; the most notable example

is Pennsylvania Avenue at the White House.The third measure focuses on increased useof approaches associated with crime

prevention through environmental design,which focuses on observation zones, free of

plantings or other obstacles to surveillance,increased lighting for surveillance cameras,

increased security staff, and similar steps tomonitor activity around a building perimeter.

Harden BuildingsThe most dramatic example of a hardenedbuilding is probably the J. Edgar Hoover Federal

Bureau of Investigation building in Washington,D.C. The federal government became far moreinterested in hardening courthouses and other

potential federal targets after the Oklahoma

City bombing. The initial focus, which was onland-based bombings, has been expanded to

include air-borne bombs since September 11.The focus on resisting the impact of bombblasts has expanded from a buildings exteriorwalls to include its internal structural system

and finishes.

Proposed measures for hardening buildings

primarily fall into two broad areas. The mostvisible measure involves strengthening street-level walls to the point at which they can sustain

bomb blasts for defined levelsa standard that

has risen as the perceived power of potentialbombs has increasedor at least reduce

internal damage and harm to inhabitants.Eliminating or severely reducing the amount ofglass and the number of entryways at street

level represents an important aspect instrengthening street levels.

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A less visible, but just as important measure,

is strengthening structural systems to limitloss of life and property for defined blast levels,particularly by greatly increasing blast and fireresistance and incorporating emergency stairs

and exits capable of withstanding blast and

fire damage. Closely related steps includeincreasing fire suppression systems,

employing films and other technologiesdesigned to strengthen glass and minimizeshattering, and installing stronger window

frames and other structural elements intendedto reduce the risk of window systemsdetachment from building walls in the event of

an explosion.

Control Access

The most visible response to September 11for most people has been the introduction of

airport-like security measures at entrances tocity halls, major office buildings, and other

important buildings and spaces. Perhaps lessobvious has been the closing of many entrypoints to create single points of entry and exit

that can be monitored efficiently. Major sportingevents, theme parks, and other places wherepeople gather in large numbers have also

greatly increased their control at entry points.In addition, the many other points at which abomb could be introduced into a buildingmail

systems, utility corridors, and other less

obvious points of entryhave become subjectto much greater control. Proposed measures

for controlling access fall into three broadareas.

A sharp increase in the number of buildings

that limit entry points and monitor all entrantshas been the most visible change in accesscontrol since September 11. (A single entry is

usually suggested as a way of maximizing theability to monitor while minimizing related laborand other costs). Monitoring usually consists

of computerized identity checks and can also

include scanning peoples bodies and personaleffects, plus occasional searches. Efforts to

increase control of entry points have alsoextended to locking manholes and otherpotential entries to underground access points

and to controlling and monitoring non-frontdoor entries, such as loading docks, utilitycorridors, and other potential points of entry.


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(This monitoring can require additional staff forbuildings that receive frequent deliveries).

The second, less visible, but also widespreadmeasure, involves collecting more completeinformation about all employeespermanent

as well as temporary (including constructionand maintenance workers)who regularly staffa building. The proliferation of photo

identification cards worn by employees is themost evident sign of this trend. The thirdmeasure involves greatly increased monitoring

of mailrooms using observation cameras andsimilar devices. These mailrooms may alsoneed to be hardened to protect adjacent

building areas from potential blasts associatedwith mail-bombs.

Strengthen HVAC Systems

Perhaps the most difficult task ahead is toprevent biological and chemical hazards frombeing introduced into the air supply, drinking

water, or other systems within buildings orwithin larger communities. A closely relatedand equally difficult challenge involves limiting

the damage to human life once these hazardshave been introduced. Proposed measures tostrengthen HVAC systems primarily fall into

two broad areas.

The less expensive measures focus on: locating

air intakes where they are not readilyaccessible from the street, adjacent roofs, orby construction or similar workers; controllingaccess to utility rooms and monitoring them;

and providing triggers that immediately shutdown, or in other ways shift operation of air-handling systems once a threat has been

detected. To avoid significant loss of life, it isimportant to shut down ventilation systems or,in some cases, greatly increase air changes

within a minute or less. Far more expensivemeasures involve providing HEPA filters and/or irradiated air for buildings. Though highly

effective, such measures can add 20-40 percentor more to the cost of operating a typical officebuilding, taking into account full maintenance

and regular replacement of worn-out and costlyfilters. The chief problem to date with thesemeasures has been inadequate maintenance

and replacementwhich greatly diminisheseffectivenessdue to high costs.

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Enhance Emergency CapabilitiesThe emergency preparedness protocolsintroduced for the World Trade Center Towers

(WTC) following the 1993 bombing, whichincluded emergency drills, have been creditedwith saving many lives on September 11.

Proposed measures to further enhanceemergency capabilities primarily fall into threebroad areas.

The first set of measures includes: separatingemergency exit/access stairways and

emergency exits to enable fire department andother emergency personnel to enter a buildingwithout interference from building inhabitants

who are exiting; providing intermittent safefloorshardened and provided with enhancedfire and smoke suppressionfor tall buildings;and enhancing emergency preparedness for

individual buildings and public spaces withregular safety drills. The second set ofmeasures, which has received particular

attention following analysis of the structuralfailures that led to the WTC towers collapse,focuses on strengthening structural systems

protection from blast and heat, preventingcollapse altogether or delaying collapse longenough to shore up damaged structural

systems, and prolonging the period duringwhich people can be evacuated. The third setof measures focuses on increased

maintenance budgets to allow frequentreplacement of air filters, cameras, and otherequipment.

Create Designated Security ZonesThese zones, which normally include buildingsand public spaces adjacent to potential targets,

such as the blocks immediately surroundingcourthouses, require increased investment toharden buildings or undertake other measures

to limit damage and loss of life that might resultfrom an attack on a nearby target. Proposedmeasures to create designated security zones

involve extending the protective measures toapplied potential target buildings to nearbybuildings as well. Proposals for security zones

focus on combining perimeter protection andhardening efforts to buildings located close tocourthouses, federal office buildings, or other

potential targets, generally within 100 feet.These measures could significantly increase


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the construction and operating costs for

buildings that are not themselves consideredlikely targets. Buildings in these zones wouldalso be heavily impacted by street closures or

other measures to keep vehicles andpedestrians away from potential target

buildings.

The measures taken to fight terrorism will notbe static. One of the most significant

challenges will be to create performance-basedregulations for protecting buildings and publicspaces that will reflect changing technology

and increased experience. A number ofmeasures that could significantly reshapeapproaches to enhanced security are on thehorizon:

Protect building perimeters. Newtechnologies are becoming available to scan

vehicles or people and to detect bombs,possibly reducing the need to set back orharden buildings. Increased surveillance

capabilities, related to on-site cameras andeven to satellite photography, can provideincreased protection around high-profile

buildings.

Harden buildings. New materials and

construction practices are emerging thatsignificantly enhance fire protection and

suppression for structural systems. New glasscoatings and strengthened window framesreduce the dangers of shattered and flying glassassociated with bomb blasts.

Control access. One of the most controversialand far-reaching changes in technology is theincreased ability to verify personal identities

and associated personal historiesusinganalysis of facial images, identity cards, andrelated techniques. These techniques could

greatly diminish the need for time-consuming

monitoring of building entriesand even theneed to reduce the number of entriesbut they

also raise significant privacy and civil rightsissues.

Strengthen HVAC systems. Newtechnologies are becoming available to morerapidly detect hazards in air and watersystems.

How Can Steps to Fight TerrorismAffect Cities?

Approaches to fighting terrorism are already

beginning to tangibly affect the vitality, senseof community, and civic quality of urban

America. The impacts threaten to becomevisible in every major American city.

Vitality

Much of the economic strength has beendrained from Americas cities because of thetransition from an industrial economy to one

based on service delivery and technology.Closely relatedin fact, almost a ghostlytwinis the problem of sprawl. Many oldercities lost their economic base with the

departure of industrial jobs and the emergence

of new economic activity in suburbs. Forexample, the value of Detroits tax base, in

constant dollars, shrank by more than 75%between 1950 and 1990 as the citys economy,based on manufacturing, collapsed. At the

same time, sprawl continues to claim openspace (Massachusetts has lost half its farmlandsince 1950); boost congestion (total miles

driven in the Boston area have increased roughlyfifteen times faster than population since 1970);and increase social fragmentation (80% of

children living in poverty are concentrated in afew older urban areas in the Boston area and

cut off from their middle-class peers). How dopotential regulations to fight terrorismpotentially make it more difficult to revitalizeolder cities and fight sprawl?

Revitalizing Older CommunitiesFor years, the General Service Administration(GSA) brought the only significant new

investment to many older communities bylocating post offices on older main streets,courthouses and federal office buildings in older

downtowns, and federal office buildings in high-

unemployment communities. In Boston, thecreation of Government Center, which houses

federal, state, and city employees, sparkedrevitalization of Bostons Financial District;twenty years later, the ONeil Federal Office

Building led to a revitalization of the citysBullfinch Triangle area. Two decades after that,a new federal courthouse has opened the doorto redevelopment of Bostons Seaport District.

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themselves with its streets and squares

mixed-use environments where they canrediscover the forgotten pleasures of urban life.As a society, Americans are heavily invested

in rediscovering the common ground that thesestreets and squares provide in an era

dominated by economic and socialfragmentation. The alternative is even greaterisolation between city and suburb, poor andrich.

There are several key strategies for making citystreets and squares vibrant: promoting eyeson the streetfostering a sense of safety by

lining streets and squares with buildings thathave extensive windows; concentrating asmuch employment as possible along and near

these streets and squares to create theeconomic critical mass needed to supportshops and restaurants (in reviving cities, the

only option is often public employment); andopening streets and buildings onto each otherin ways that promote interaction, dissolving the

boundary between buildings and the publicrealm with shops, multiple entries, and othermethods that encourage interaction.

Regulations intended to fight terrorism threatento stifle rather than promote community inurban zones. The architect of Bostons new

federal courthouse, which occupies a

magnificent waterfront site at Fan Pier,designed a winter garden overlooking the harbor

and downtown to house public events. I wasasked at a conference of architects whetherthe events of September 11 had diminished

public use of this space. The immediate answerwas yes. The more important answer, however,was that the courthouse already represented

ways that security concerns can diminish alively public realm. Sitting on the principalpedestrian route between the Financial District

and the new Seaport District, the courthouseturns a blank wall to the street for an entireblock, placing the building in splendid isolation,dampening nearby public life, and severing the

two districts it was meant to connect. Duringplanning for the courthouse, the city and manyothers had asked the GSA to incorporate shops

and galleries into this blank wall to enliven thestreet and reflect the areas character as anarts district. The GSA responded that security

concerns precluded these uses.

In sharp contrast, Bostons State Transportation

Building, which opened in 1984, embodies acommunity-friendly design: a mix of uses,including shops, services, and restaurants to

revitalize Bostons Park Square; parking hiddenbelow the building; and a fully public interior

square, enlivened by cafs, entertainment,and steady pass-through traffic from multipleentrances.4 These qualities also happen tobe the hallmarks of defensible space, whichpromote safety by fostering a vital, people-filled

public realm.

Eli Naor, a California architect who grew up in

Israel, told me that throughout its years of crisisIsrael has remained committed to buildings andpublic spaces that promote community. Faced

with terrorist bombings, the great publicbuildings of cities like Madrid and Paris havenot closed important public buildings off from

streets and squares. America should considerthese approaches.

Civic QualityIn the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing,Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan urgedAmericans to commit themselves to continuing

to create buildings and public spaces thatconvey our values as an open and democraticsociety. He spoke following the Oklahoma City

tragedy, but his words resonate more strongly

today. American civic values are at stake inthis time of new regulations to fight terrorism.

The State Department and architects designingembassies and other federal buildings abroad

have long wrestled with the apparentcontradictions between a society that pridesitself on openness and freedom, and the

bunker-like architectural qualities that mostreadily meet security concerns. While both theState Department and these architects deserve

significant credit for keeping the debate aliveand for continuing to seek a balance betweensecurity and the expression of an open society,the results hold little promise as a model for

Americas cities. Although the StateDepartment has worked hard to enhance thearchitectural quality of its facilities abroad and

to minimize the intrusiveness of measuresintended to promote securitythe deepsetbacks, hardened street levels with visibly

heavy walls and few windows, fences, heavy

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security at limited entry points, and securitymeasuresrepresent disturbing models for thecourthouses, city halls, and other public

buildings that constitute civic architecture inAmerica. Yet these are the approaches beingpromoted to enhance security after September

11. Within the dense confines of many cities,architects will be challenged to create symbolicbuildings that, despite their reliance on obvious

security measures do not communicate asense of fear, isolation, discrimination amongdifferent groups of people, or other messagesinappropriate to a democratic society.

This concern extends to a broad range of valuesthat shape the civic quality of our cities. To the

extent that concerns about security supersedeother valuescommitment to historic

preservation, meeting the needs of people withdisabilities, energy conservation, preserving theenvironment, and life safetythese other valuesbecome more difficult to maintain. Creating

barriers around historic buildings alters theircharacter and diminishes a sense of connectionto our historic values and traditions.

Reconfiguring air handling to protect internalair supplies can significantly increase energyuse. Encouraging large zones of quarantinearound buildings may lead to the establishment

of more greenfield sites. Isolating buildings fromparking forces people with disabilities to walk

much longer distances. While a single point ofentry can still allow multiple points of exit forfire safety, there is the danger of complicatingfire safety. The list of potential contradictions

is very long.

Avenues to Resolution: Next Steps

There are no easy ways to balance securityand the livability of cities. America cannot afford

to ignore the threats of terrorism, but it caneven less afford to undermine its cities at a

time when they already face many criticaleconomic and social challenges. Five importantquestions emerge as starting points for furtherdialog.

Design: Are there good urban designmodels?Following Oklahoma City, the GSA organized

a panel of architects, planners, and others todevise an approach to protect federal buildings

in Washington that remained sensitive toSenator Moynihans admonition about creatingbuildings worthy of a democratic and open

society. The panel suggested approachesbased largely on protecting buildings with streetfurniture. Subsequently, architects designed

artful hardened streetscapes for the FederalTriangle in Washington, D.C., that madeinnovative use of benches, bollards, and

streetlights, together with more street trees (ahardened tree presumably is a larger tree) toprotect civic buildings and enhance the publicrealm, preempting far more drastic proposals

to ban vehicles and people and erect wallsaround public buildings. It is worth noting thatwithout the added rationale of security, these

streetscapes would never have benefited fromthe more generous budget, with accompanying

increases in quality of materials and design,which became available when enhancedsecurity became part of the program.

Risk Management: Are there ways toinsure investors against thecatastrophic costs of terrorism?

Unlike conventional disasters like fires orearthquakes, the potential costs associatedwith terrorism cannot be quantified, becausethe threat cannot be defined. This uncertainty

is translating into extraordinary insurancepremiums. Randall J. Larsen, director of the

ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, agovernment-funded think tank, was quoted byBusinessWeekin June 2002, as saying Theproblem with security spending is, how do you

define enough?5 In his early 2002 interviewwith Newsweek, Warren Buffett argued forgovernment-sponsored insurance programs for

terrorism that would enable the federalgovernment to mediate between the unknowablerisks associated with terrorism and the need

to establish insurance protection for those whowould become liable following acts of terrorism.

The alternative is insurance so expensive thatit becomes a brake on development, buying orselling, refinancing, or even continuedoccupancy of buildings perceived as possibletargets.

Priorities: How should one balancecosts and benefits?

Buffets concern needs to be broadened toaddress the challenge of creating new tools to

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balance the costs and benefits of respondingto the risks of terrorism. The costs of preventionare sometimes hard to see as well. Several

commentators have noted, for instance, thatby choosing to drive over the Thanksgivingholiday in 2001, large numbers of Americans

actually placed themselves in greater dangerthan they would have faced in an airplane, giventhe far lower mortality rate associated with flying

(even with terrorism factored in). It is clear thatour society cannot afford to harden everypotential targetand, far short of this goal, in a

world of finite resources, how much of ourbuilding dollars does society want to dedicateto security at the expense of design,

sustainability, durability, and other essentialqualities? BusinessWeek reported in June2002, that the Brookings Institute has projected

that improved major building security will cost$2.5 billion per year. Those dollars would besufficient to build enough homes to house50,000 Americans every year. 6 Worse, the

historic interplay between offensive anddefensive strategies suggests that the very stepstaken to counter terrorism will simply lead

terrorists to search for new targets or new meansto threaten current targets. Architects andplanners can play a leadership role in assessing

the real costs and benefits of fighting terrorism,given competing values and claims onresources.

Technology: How can finding newtools protect against terrorism?

Technology can play a larger role in enhancingsecurity. The first step is to establish aperformance-based approach to regulationsintended to reduce the threat of terrorism and

its impacts. Performance-based regulationswould, for example, specify the blast level thata building must withstand, rather than setting

the thickness of its walls, amount of glass, orother structural characteristics. In turn, the

entity charged with administering buildingregulations would need to certify that a proposeddesign meets the appropriate standards.Traditional building codes are not performance-

based. A new generation of codes, shaped tocounter terrorism, can now be crafted to takeadvantage of rapid technological progress. New

technologies will likely reduce the negativeimpacts on cities of many of the planning,design, and engineering-driven approaches toenhancing security discussed above.

The tools becoming available through advancingtechnology are already making a difference. Insome cases, new technologies obviate

undesirable physical design measures. Forexample, the widely reported photographing andscanning of faces of those attending the 2002

Super Bowl, while raising significant privacyconcerns, eliminated the need for highly visiblebarriers and elaborate checkpoints that, from

a design perspective, would have been far moredrastic and would also have conveyed a senseof fear. The extent to which security officials

can use technology to know who is entering abuilding or space can make it much easier toopen buildings onto public spaces and in other

ways to enliven the public realm.

Technology and design can also advance in

tandem. Films and other techniques forstrengthening glass and minimizing the hazardsof shattering represent a far more benign wayto harden the edges of buildings facing streets

than eliminating all windows. Similarly,hardening parking structures to resist anexplosion has already reduced the post-

September 11 separation required betweenparking facilities and airport terminals and offersflexibility in locating parking for potential target

buildings in urban settings. The principles ofgood urban design call for parking to be locatedbelow public buildings rather than in

freestanding structures. Similarly, hardeningstructural systems and improving emergency-exit and life-protection systems offer distinct

advantages over a moratorium on future towers.

Values: Should privacy be sacrificedto preserve community?

Woven into every aspect of the abovediscussion is the direct or indirect need to findthe right balance between values. Enhancing

security can diminish privacy, community,freedom of access, convenience, and other

values. However, in many cases, if Americansare willing to sacrifice privacy, the nation canpreserve other values and address securityconcerns. At the heart of this discussion lies

this trade-off: if authorities know the identity ofpeople entering a building or public space, andcan quickly gain sufficient information about

their histories, the public can operate with muchfreer and more convenient access to buildingsand spacesand much greater opennessbetween symbolic buildings spaces, and the

adjacent public environment.10


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American society is already choosing to makethese trade-offs. People tolerate the fact thatairlines make it quicker and easier for

passengers they knowthrough frequent flyerprograms in most casesto board airplanes.Most people tolerate cookies from Internet

sites that provide information about which sitesthey visit in return for greater convenience ingaining access to those sites. While many

commentators expressed concern atphotographing spectators at the Super Bowl,the practice was largely accepted with the

understanding that this allowed much moreconvenient and open access to the stadium.There is no need to keep pedestrians 100 feet

from a high-security office building if it ispossible to know who those pedestrians are.Architects can locate shops and cafs in

public buildings facing public sidewalks if it ispossible to know who is entering those shopsand cafs. There are privacy tradeoffs thatAmericans should and would never makefor

example, those that sacrifice freedom. It verywell may be, however, that gaining a newunderstanding of the balance between privacy

and other values may unlock the ability topromote security without sacrificing thoseother values.

Conclusion

No American city is faced more directly withthe dilemma of enhancing security while alsopromoting urban values than New York. As

Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated in his January2002 inaugural address, We will rebuild, renewand remain the capital of the free world NewYork is safe, strong, open for business and

ready to lead the world in the 21st century.We will continue to improve our quality of lifeand attract visitors, tourists and businesses

in record numbers. We will focus on publicsafety. We will work tirelessly to provide safe

streets and homes for all New Yorkers. Wewill go forward. We will never go back. 7 In thisaddress and in subsequent statements, MayorBloomberg stressed that the rebuilding of the

devastated World Trade Center site and oflower Manhattan should be focused aroundpeople, not fear, honoring the memory of the

victims by creating a plan that unites peopleand fosters renewed urban vitality. Echoing hiscall, a lead editorial in the New York Times

urged that proposals to rebuild the WTC siteincorporate features, which make an urbanarea live and breathe.8

Terrorism and enhanced security are concernsnow firmly planted in the American psyche. It

is difficult for most Americans to accept theneed to balance the risks associated withterrorism against the costs and benefits of

responding to these risks. In the absence ofquantitative measures for most riskassessments, Americans will need to

establish qualitative measures for decidingwhere and how to respond to terrorism.Architects, planners, and others who deal daily

with the qualitative issues of city building canplay an important leadership role in this effort,in part because the people who traditionally

make risk assessments cannot. This qualitativeassessment will need to address such issuesas competing claims for scarce dollars inbuilding projects, finding a balance between

enhanced security and lively public realmabalance that will probably be different in everycase, depending on the security and urban

contextand even determining which buildingsand spaces should be viewed as potentialtargets in the planning and design process.

As with the response to any crisis, a thoughtfulresponse will leave our society stronger and

our public realm more vital. Just as the initialnarrow responses to the energy crisis maturedinto much more complex thinking about

sustainability, which in turn has enriched largeaspects of our built environment, a fully nuancedresponse to concerns about terror can providenew understanding and resources to enrich our

ability to foster community. To date, the debateabout new policies and regulations to shapeour fight against terrorism has been dominated

by professionals with backgrounds in designingbuildings where security is the paramount

concern. The key to the Federal Triangleoutcome was participation by a far wider arrayof practitioners who focused on the quality,character, and vitality of cities. America needs

a similarly broad-based national dialog toensure that there is a commitment to buildinglivable communities and to avoid the kind of

single-minded responses that brought a smallConnecticut town its windowless school.

11


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on Preparedness November 2001No. 5

12

PERSPECTIVESON PREPAREDNESS / NO. 7 / AUGUST 2002

IS DESTINY DANGEROUS? TH ERCHITECTS OBLIGATI ON S AFTER TH E TOWERS FELL

This project was supported by Grant No. 1999-MU-CX-0008 awarded by the Office for Domestic Preparedness, Office of Justice

Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities

of the following program offices or bureaus: the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National

Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of

view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the

U.S. Department of Justice.

NOTES

1 The conference, Building Security Through Design took place in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on January 10-13, 2002. Fora summary of the keynote session and additional information please access

2 Steven Brill, Osamas Hidden Tax, Newsweek, Vol. 138, No.2 (January 14, 2002) p. 50-51.

3 Steven Johnson, Blueprint for a Better City, WiredArchive(September 12-December 2001) at

4 Paul McGinn and Theresa A. Mitton,10 Massachusetts State Transportation Building(Boston, MA: Massachusetts Port

Authority, 1990)

5 Lee Walczak et. al, Americas Biggest Job: Is the U.S. any less vulnerable to terror these days? Heres the good news

and the bad,BusinessWeek, Vol. 3786 (June 10, 2002) p. 34-36

6 Ibid.

7 Inaugural Address of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg (January 1, 2002). For the complete transcript, please access

8 The Downtown We Dont Want, The New York Times(July 17, 2002) p. A18


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Professor Graham T. AllisonProfessor of Government and DirectorBelfer Center for Science and International AffairsKennedy School of Government

Professor Alan AltshulerProfessor of Urban Policy and Planning and DirectorTaubman Center for State and Local Government

Kennedy School of Government

Mr. Thomas AntushSenior Program AnalystTransportation Security AdministrationU.S. Department of Transportation

Dr. Joseph BarberaClinical Associate Professor of Emergency MedicineGeorge Washington University

Mr. Bruce BaughmanDirector, Office of National PreparednessFederal Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Peter BeeringIndianapolis Terrorism Preparedness Coordinator

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Thomas N. Burnette, Jr.Former Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint ForcesCommand

Professor Ashton B. CarterProfessor of Science and International Affairs,Kennedy School of Government

Mr. Hank ChristenEmergency Response Consultant,Unconventional Concepts, Inc., FL

Chief Rebecca DenlingerChief, Cobb County Fire Department, GA

Major General (Ret.) John FenimoreFormer Adjutant General, New York National Guard

Ms. Ellen GordonAdministrator, Iowa Emergency Management Division

Dr. Margaret HamburgVice President for Biological ProgramsNuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC

Mayor Clarence HarmonFormer Mayor, City of St. Louis, MO

Mr. Francis X. HartmannExecutive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy/Management and Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy,Kennedy School of Government

Professor Philip HeymannProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School

Dr. Arnold M. HowittExecutive Director, Taubman Center for State andLocal Government, Kennedy School of Government

Ms. Juliette KayyemExecutive Director, Executive Session on DomesticPreparedness, Kennedy School of Government

Dr. Robert KnoussDirector, Office of Emergency PreparednessU.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Peter LaPorteDirector, District of Columbia Emergency ManagementAgency

Executive Session Members

Major General Bruce M. LawlorSenior Director for Protection and PreventionOffice of Homeland Security

Dr. Marcelle LaytonAssistant Commissioner, Bureau of CommunicableDisease, New York City Department of Health

Dr. Scott LillibridgeProfessor and Director, Center for BiosecurityUniversity of Texas Health Science CenterSchool of Public Health

Mr. John MagawFormer Undersecretary of Transporation for SecurityU.S. Department of Transportation

Chief Paul ManiscalcoDeputy Chief, New York City Emergency MedicalServices Command

Mr. Gary McConnellDirector, Georgia Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Stanley McKinneyVice President for Business Continuity ManagementBank of America

Professor Matthew S. MeselsonProfessor of the Natural Sciences, Harvard University

Dr. Steven MillerDirector, International Security Program,Kennedy School of Government

Mr. Andrew MitchellDeputy Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness,Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

Major General Paul D. Monroe, Jr.Adjutant General, California National Guard

Major General Phillip E. OatesAdjutant General, Alaska National Guard

Chief Charles RamseyChief, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, DC

Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Terry ScottPartner, Watson and Associates, TX

Ms. Leslee Stein-SpencerChief, Division of Emergency Medical Services andHighway Safety, Illinois Department of Public Health

Chief Darrel StephensChief, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, NC

Dr. Jessica SternLecturer in Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government

Chief Steve StormentAssistant Chief, Phoenix Fire Department, AZ

Sheriff Patrick J. Sullivan, Jr.Sheriff, Arapahoe County, CO

Mr. Ralph TimperiAssistant Commissioner, Massachusetts Department ofPublic Health and Director, Massachusetts Department ofPublic Health State Laboratory

Chief Alan D. Vickery

Deputy Chief, Special Operations,Seattle Fire Department, WA

Dr. Frances WinslowDirector, Office of Emergency Services, San Jose, CA

Executive Session Staff

Arnold M. HowittDirector

Juliette KayyemExecutive Director

Rebecca HorneProject Assistant

Rebecca StoroAssistant Director

Patricia ChangResearch Assistant

David Dixon- Is Density Dangerous?: The Architects' Obligations After the Towers Fell

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Transcript of David Dixon- Is Density Dangerous?: The Architects' Obligations After the Towers Fell