Dating Systemic Financial Stress Episodes in the EU … · Dating Systemic Financial Stress...
Transcript of Dating Systemic Financial Stress Episodes in the EU … · Dating Systemic Financial Stress...
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Dating Systemic Financial Stress Episodes inthe EU Countries
Thibaut DUPREY1
Benjamin KLAUS2
Tuomas PELTONEN3
1Bank of Canada2European Central Bank
3European Systemic Risk Board
The views are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Bank of Canada,
the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem or the European Systemic Risk Board.
Central Bank of Brazil, 9 August 2017
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Classifying events for a better analysis of macropru
The analysis of macroprudential policies requires a chronology ofsystemic crises
• 2008 can be safely ( ?) regarded as a systemic financial crisis
• But the classification of all other events rely on expertjudgement...
We provide a mechanistic identification of systemic financial stress
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Aim = identify systemic financial stress
Low financial stressHigh financial stress
Hig
hgr
owth
Low
grow
th
tranquil regime financial stress
recession systemic stress
1
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Overview
1 Construct 27 financial stress indices for all EU countries
I Financial cycle research : financial stress index literature
2 Identify systemic financial stress episodes
I Business cycle research : identifying business cycle turning pointsusing a suite of non-linear models
• Method 1 : Univariate Markov switching with algorithm
• Method 2 : Markov switching vector autoregressive model
• Method 3 : Threshold vector autoregressive model
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
STEP 1 : Construct 27 financial stress indices(in the spirit of CISS : Hollo et al., 2012)
Equity sub-index
Bonds sub-index
FX sub-index
Pairwisecross-correlationsρofindices
I
Country-Level Index of
volatility stocks
cumulated drop in stocks
volatility of government bond
cumulated government bond spread
volatility effective exchange rate
cumulated change effective exchange rate
volatility idiosyncratic bank returns
cumulated drop bank stocks
mortgage lending spread
cumulated housing price drop
Bank sub-index
Housing sub-index
norm
alizedin
the[0;1]space
using
theem
piricalcumulativedensity
Financial Stress (CLIFS)
CLIFSt = It ∗ Ct ∗ I′
t
Ct =
1 . . . ρi,j,t...
. . ....
ρi,j,t . . . 1
5∗5
It = [Ii,t . . . Ij,t]1∗5
End of 2006 Dataset publicly available :http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9693347
End of 2007 Dataset publicly available :http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9693347
End of 2008 Dataset publicly available :http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9693347
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Country-Level Index of Financial Stress (CLIFS)
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Cou
ntry
Lev
el In
dex
of F
inan
cial
Str
ess
(CLI
FS
)
1 - first oil shock ; 2 - second oil shock ; 3 - Mexican debt crisis ; 4 - Black Monday ; 5 -crisis of the European exchange rate mechanism ; 6 - Peso crisis ; 7 - Asian crisis ; 8 -Russian crisis ; 9 - dot-com bubble ; 10 - subprime crisis ; 11 - Bankruptcy of LehmanBrothers ; 12 - 1st bailout Greece ; 13 - 2nd bailout Greece ; 14 - Election of AlexisTsipras in Greece ; 15 - Brexit vote.
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Contribution of the cross-correlations
-140
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1 2 3 4 5 67
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Con
trib
utio
n of
the
cros
s-co
rrel
atio
ns to
the
CLI
FS
1 - first oil shock ; 2 - second oil shock ; 3 - Mexican debt crisis ; 4 - Black Monday ; 5 -crisis of the European exchange rate mechanism ; 6 - Peso crisis ; 7 - Asian crisis ; 8 -Russian crisis ; 9 - dot-com bubble ; 10 - subprime crisis ; 11 - Bankruptcy of LehmanBrothers ; 12 - 1st bailout Greece ; 13 - 2nd bailout Greece ; 14 - Election of AlexisTsipras in Greece ; 15 - Brexit vote.
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Does financial stress matter ?Industrial production growth per quantiles of CLIFS
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0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Average annual industrial production growth on the y-axis.Quantiles of the country-specific financial stress indices on the x-axis.
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
STEP 2 : How to identify systemic financial stressepisodes ?
Low financial stressHigh financial stress
Hig
hgr
owth
Low
grow
th
tranquil regime financial stress
recession systemic stress
1
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Method 1 : Markov-Switching with selection algorithmHamilton (1989) Markov-Switching framework
1 Identify periods of high financial stress :
CLIFSt = µSt + βCLIFSt−1 + σSt εt
Transition probability across regimes St ∈ {L,H} driven by ahidden two-state Markov chain :
P (St |St−1 ) =
[p =
exp(θp)1+exp(θp)
1− p
1− q q =exp(θq)
1+exp(θq)
]
regime H when µH > µL, and financial stress period when :
1financialstress = {P (St = H) > 0.5}
2 Overlap with at least six consecutive months of real economicstress (drop in industrial production and GDP correction)
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Method 2 : Markov switching vector autoregressionbuilds on toolbox of Haroon Mumtaz
Bivariate model to capture joint change in dynamics of industrialproduction growth (gIPI) and CLIFS
gIPIt = µSt1 +
n∑p=1
(βSt
1,1,pgIPIt−p + βSt1,2,pCLIFSt−p
)+ εt,1
CLIFSt = µSt2 +
n∑p=1
(βSt
2,1,pCLIFSt−p + βSt2,2,pgIPIt−p
)+ εt,2
The tranquil or systemic financial stress state St ∈ {L;H} isunobservable : same hidden two-state Markov chain as before.
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Method 3 : Threshold vector autoregressive modelbuilds on toolbox of Gabriel Bruneau
Different joint dynamics above (H) or below (L) an estimatedpercentile of the CLIFS
CLIFSt = µSt1 +
n∑p=1
(βSt
1,1,pCLIFSt−p + βSt1,2,pgIPIt−p
)+ εt,1
gIPIt = µSt2 +
n∑p=1
(βSt
2,1,pgIPIt−p + βSt2,2,pCLIFSt−p
)+ εt,2
The observed regime is given by :
St =
{H if CLIFSt−1 ≥ τL if CLIFSt−1 < τ
where τ is estimated.
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Robustly identifying systemic financial stress events
For each 27 countries we have up to 12 models• different framework, with different specifications, using CLIFS or
the banking and housing extensions
For each country, combine dummies Sm,t for periods of systemicfinancial stress over all models m
• robust to model uncertainty
Systemic Stress Index SSIt =∑
m Sm,t∑m 1m
∈ [0;1]
Definition of systemic financial stress :• starts when SSIt > 0.5• ends when SSIt < 0.25
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Zoom-in : Systemic Stress Indices, selected countries
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rises
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l
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Sys
tem
ic C
rises
Inde
x
Spa
in
(b) Spain
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Zoom out : Timing of systemic financial stress in 2008
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IEBEUKDKIT
NLATESPTHUCZDEFRSEGRHRLUROSILTFI
LVMTCYBGPLSK
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Zoom out further : Financial market stress andintensity of real economic stress
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IEBEUKDKIT
NLATESPTHUCZDEFRSEGRHRLUROSILTFI
LVMTCYBGPLSK
-30%
-20%
-10%
No stress
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
No zoom : Systemic financial stress is costlyBi-product of the Threshold VAR
Response of industrial production to a shock of 1% on CLIFS(black : VAR without regime change ; red : high stress ; blue : tranquil)
Weighted average IRF - Shock to CLIFS in low (blue) or high (red) stress, or VAR in dashed black
Months
0 6 12 18 24
y-o
-y g
row
th r
ate
, %
-6
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-1
0Industrial Production Index
Months
0 6 12 18 24
level, fro
m 0
(m
in)
to 1
00 (
max)
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1CLIFS
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
What are systemic financial stress episodes ? Notordinary recessions
Number Length GDP CLIFS mean
Definition of recession : events loss pcent corr
Ordinary recessions
Two quarters 76 11 -0.79 50 -7
Two consecutive quarters 45 7 -1.52 50 -18
Before 2008, two quarters 57 10 -0.77 51 -16
Recessions with
financial market stress
Two quarters 74 18 -4.10 66 28
Two consecutive quarters 42 13 -4.17 70 31
Before 2008, two quarters 39 14 -1.71 72 28
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
What are systemic financial stress episodes ? Sectoraldecomposition for selected countriesBi-product of the Markov-switching model
Syst fin stress
Equity crash
Sovereign stress
Foreign exchange
Banking stress
Housing stress
IPI drop
GDP drop
(c) Portugal
Syst fin stress
Equity crash
Sovereign stress
Foreign exchange
Banking stress
Housing stress
IPI drop
GDP drop
(d) Spain
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Comparison of continuous stress measures withexpert-based crises : AUROC
CLIFS SSI
panel average panel average
Detken et al. (2014)Banking 0.71 0.76 0.82 0.83
Babecky et al. (2012)Banking 0.66 0.72 0.80 0.83Currency 0.71 0.68 0.82 0.74Debt 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.95
Leaven and Valencia (2013)Banking 0.75 0.77 0.87 0.88
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)Banking 0.70 0.75 0.84 0.87Currency 0.53 0.51 0.67 0.69Equity 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.77
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Comparison of model-based systemic financial stressepisodes with expert-based crises
Share of model Share of expertidentified events also identified crises alsocaptured by experts captured by models
Spain 1.00 0.43Portugal 1.00 0.14
Total 0.81 0.43Mean 0.83 0.55
In particular, we capture 96% of the systemic banking crises ofLeaven and Valencia (2012)
Motivation Step 1 Step 2 Results Benchmarking Conclusion
Wrap-up
Paper combines measurement of financial stress with detectionof turning points for a mechanistic dating of systemic financialstress episodes
Upsides :• Get model-implied systemic financial stress periods• Integrate real and financial cycle dynamics (=systemic)• Consistent with most expert-based datasets• Robust to alternative measures of financial stress• Robust to model uncertainty• Robust to event reclassification once new data arrive
Downsides :• Hard to capture causal relation between financial stress and real
economic stress
Follow up work : "A new database for financial crises in Europeancountries", ECB Occasional Paper No. 194, July 2017.