Database State

9
Database State

description

Presented at 2nd Privacy Open Space, Berlin, 3 Apr 2009

Transcript of Database State

Page 1: Database State

Database State

Page 2: Database State

Outline

UK government systems for identity, health, criminal justice, social security

Data protection and human rights standards

Designing privacy-friendly e-government systems

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Scale of DWP systems

System Cases Fields

Customer Management System

480,000 1,300

Pensions Transformation Programme

6.5m 15,500

Customer Information System

92m 9,800

Income Support Computer system

8m 700

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Identity management Central National Identity Register of all

those over 16 living in UK longer than 3 months with biometrics, biographical data and audit trail

ContactPoint database of all 11m children in England and Wales with biographical data and links to services used

National Identity Registration Number can be used to link up other databases

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National Programme for IT

Central Summary Care Records with biographical data, allergies and prescriptions

Regional Detailed Care Records Central Secondary Uses Service for

administration and research

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Criminal justice National DNA Database with 5.1m profiles ONSET system attempts to identify

potential young offenders National Fraud Initiative collects much

sensitive information but absolved from liability for any confidentiality breaches

National ANPR system keeps up to 18bn records pa for up to 5 years

Communications database proposed

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DP and human rights standards Interference with private life must be based on

detailed, clear, precise, foreseeable law (Copland v UK)

Systems must limit access to data to those who have a proportionate requirement for access (I v Finland)

Bleeding-edge states have a particular duty to consider impact of databases upon privacy (S & Marper v UK)

Only 5 of 46 databases reviewed met these standards

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Privacy-friendly e-government

Privacy Impact Assessments are needed much earlier in policy cycle, and include ECHR compliance checks

Sensitive personal information should be kept on local systems and shared only with the subject’s consent or for a specific lawful purpose

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Final thoughts

The UK is a model for how not to do e-government, as the ECtHR is recognising

It is dangerous to allow these large centralised databases to proceed in the hope they will later be ruled illegal

Governments need to build privacy into systems by design at a much earlier stage