Darvin v Court of Appeals

7/27/2019 Darvin v Court of Appeals

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Darvin v Court of Appeals

Facts:

Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed

from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to

recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of thispromise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

Held:

Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:

...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers andincludes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether

for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a

fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor

Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and

punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be

shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the

said person does not have a license or authority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private

respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private

respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-

appellant P150,000.

By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more,

can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is

nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant

probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of

evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the Peoples evidence fail to indubitably prove the

accuseds authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Courts duty, and the

accuseds right, to proclaim his innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately

released from her confinement.


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Chavez vs. Bonto-Perez

FACTS:

Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation to perform in

Japan for 6 months. The contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by POEA. After the

approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her salary with her Japanese

employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion). The salary was reduced to $500and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In February 1991 (two years after the expiration of her contract),

Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for underpayment of wages before the POEA.

The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by Chavez with her

Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no knowledge of

such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for sleeping on her right for two

years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.

HELD:

Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez to authorize her

Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public

policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract approved by the POEA with the following

stipulation appended thereto:

It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance with

the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular

No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval

by the POEA shall be null and void;

The side agreement which reduced Chavezs basic wage is null and void for violating the POEAs

minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Here, both Centrum

Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.

Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the three-year

prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. For this

reason, laches is not applicable.


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JMM Promotions & Management, Inc.vs.National Labor Relations Commissionand Ulpiano L. De

Los Santos

Facts:

1. Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a recruiting agency,

made the following:

a. Paid the license fee(Sec. 4)b. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)

c. Placed money in escrowworth 200k (Sec. 17)

2. The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of

the petitioner to post an appeal bondrequired by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules. The

decision being appealed involved a monetary award.

3. The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond andsurety bond,

and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary. According toSec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the

conditions for thegrant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. On the

other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers

as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.

4. Sec. 6 reads:

In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall

be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond The bonds required here are different

from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue:

Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted bonds

of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?

Held:

Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of

350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that

overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure more

care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will be sent.

Doctrine: Construction:It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this

case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as

an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam

pereat. That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.

The rule is that aconstruction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided;

instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a


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coordinated and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when

the Court found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.

In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in Sec. 17

Rule 2, Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.

The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limitedto monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The

escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.

On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary

award. Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award. Also, it

is possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previously and the money placed in

escrow. If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced? To solve such a dilemma, an appeal

bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988

MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY, petitioners,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES, respondents.

CORTES, J .:

Petitioner, in this special civil action for certiorari, alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of theNational Labor Relations Commission in an effort to nullify the latters resolution and thus free petitionerfrom liability for the disability suffered by a Filipino worker it recruited to work in Saudi Arabia. This Court,however, is not persuaded that such an abuse of discretion was committed. This petition must fail.

The facts of the case are quite simple.

Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a SaudiArabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a steelman.

The term of the contract was for one year, from May 15,1981 to May 14, 1982. However, the contractprovided for its automatic renewal:

FIFTH: The validity of this Contract is for ONE YEAR commencing from the date theSECOND PARTY assumes hill port. This Contract is renewable automatically if neither ofthe PARTIES notifies the other PARTY of his wishes to terminate the Contract by at least

ONE MONTH prior to the expiration of the contractual period. [Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp.7-8].

The contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudiemployer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator. On March 30, 1983, while he wasworking as a crusher plant operator, private respondent's right ankle was crushed under the machine hewas operating.

On May 15, 1983, after the expiration of the renewed term, private respondent returned to the Philippines.His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he incurred expenses.

On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work. On May 15,1984, he wasrepatriated.

Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.

On the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate theemployee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment, private respondent filed aclaim, docketed as POEA Case No. 84-09847, against petitioner with respondent Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration. On April 10, 1986, the POEA rendered judgment in favor of privaterespondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:


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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against therespondent, ordering the latter to pay to the complainant:

1. SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS and 60/100(P7,985.60), Philippine currency, representing disability benefits;

2. TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX Philippine pesos and 20/100 (29,096.20)representing reimbursement for medical expenses;

3. Ten percent (10%) of the abovementioned amounts as and for attorney's fees. [NLRCResolution, p. 1; Rollo, p. 16].

On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA in a resolution dated December 12,1986.

Not satisfied with the resolution of the POEA, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action forcertiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.

1. Petitioner claims that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner was liable toprivate respondent for disability benefits since at the time he was injured his original employmentcontract, which petitioner facilitated, had already expired. Further, petitioner disclaims liability on theground that its agency agreement with the Saudi principal had already expired when the injury wassustained.

There is no merit in petitioner's contention.

Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it wasautomatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by either or both of the parties at leasta month before its expiration, as so provided in the contract itself. Therefore, private respondent's injurywas sustained during the lifetime of the contract.

A private employment agency may be sued jointly and solidarily with its foreign principal for violations ofthe recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment:

Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment.Before recruiting any worker, the privateemployment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:

(a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer infavor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former ...

xxx xxx xxx

2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with theprincipal or foreign-based employer for any of the violations of therecruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. [Section 10(a)(2) Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code].

Thus, in the recent case ofAmbraque International Placement & Services v. NLRC[G.R. No. 77970,January 28,1988], the Court ruled that a recruitment agency was solidarily liable for the unpaid salaries ofa worker it recruited for employment in Saudi Arabia.


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Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement at the timeprivate respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the employment contractbecause no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private respondent:

Art 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contra with specifiedpersons, its revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice thereof.

[Civil Code].

In this connection the NLRC elaborated:

Suffice it to state that albeit local respondent M. S. Catan Agency was at the time ofcomplainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial disability was (sic) no longer theaccredited agent of its foreign principal, foreign respondent herein, yet its responsibilityover the proper implementation of complainant's employment/service contract and thewelfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still existed, the contract ofemployment in question not having expired yet. This must be so, because the obligationscovenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agentand its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that ifeither or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such

parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but thesame extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of theemployees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing theemployment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.[NLRC Resolution, p. 4;Rollo, p. 18]. (Emphasis supplied).

2. Petitioner contends that even if it is liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely abused its discretionwhen it affirmed the award of medical expenses when the said expenses were the consequence ofprivate respondent's negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia when he knew that he was not yetmedically fit to do so.

Again, there is no merit in this contention.

No evidence was introduced to prove that private respondent was not medically fit to work when hereturned to Saudi Arabia. Exhibit "B", a certificate issued by Dr. Shafquat Niazi, the camp doctor, onNovember 1, 1983, merely stated that private respondent was "unable to walk properly, moreover he isstill complaining [of] pain during walking and different lower limbs movement" [Annex "B", Reply; Rollo, p.51]. Nowhere does it say that he was not medically fit to work.

Further, since petitioner even assisted private respondent in returning to work in Saudi Arabia bypurchasing his ticket for him [Exhibit "E"; Annex "A", Reply to Respondents' Comments], it is as ifpetitioner had certified his fitness to work. Thus, the NLRC found:

Furthermore, it has remained unrefuted by respondent that complainant's subsequentdeparture or return to Saudi Arabia on September 9, 1983 was with the full knowledge,consent and assistance of the former. As shown in Exhibit "E" of the record, it wasrespondent who facilitated the travel papers of complainant. [NLRC Resolution, p. 5;Rollo, p. 19].

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs againstpetitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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Royal Crowne International vs. NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private respondent

Virgilio for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. Service agreement

was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the former was to receive per month a salaryof US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one year commencing from the date of his

arrival in Saudi Arabia. However, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground

that his performance was below par. For three successive days thereafter, he was detained at his

quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he

was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines. Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal

termination against Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale and ZAMEL with the POEA.

Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules

implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an employment agency or

recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement performed abroad, or designates it as the

agent of the foreign-based employer for purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of an

employment agreement. Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable withZAMEL for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agencymay be held jointly and severally liable

with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of

the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad.

HELD:

Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability

under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In

applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement,

petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed

all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment

with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It was also required to file with the

Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to

recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued

jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and

the contracts of employment. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as

determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures,

rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate.

These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other privateemployment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-based

employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with the implementation

of the service agreements or employment contracts.


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Facilities Management Corporation vs. De La Osa

Facts:

Facilities Management Corporation and J. S. Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island while J. V.

Catuira is an employee of FMC stationed in Manila. Leonardo dela Osa was employed by FMC in Manila,

but rendered work in Wake Island, with the approval of the Department of Labor of the Philippines. De laOsa was employed as (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1.25 from March 1964 to November 1964,

inclusive; (2) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.26 from December 1964 to November 1965, inclusive;

(3) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.33 from December 1965 to August 1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier

with an hourly rate of $1.40 from August 1966 to March 27 1967, inclusive. He further averred that from

December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered overtime services daily, and that this entire

period was divided into swing and graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he was not paid both

overtime and night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from FMC, et al. In a petition filed on 1

July 1967, dela Osa sought his reinstatement with full backwages, as well as the recovery of his overtime

compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials.

Subsequently on 3 May 1968, FMC, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the subject petition on the

ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case, and on 24 May 1968, de la Osa interposed an

opposition thereto. Said motion was denied by the Court in its Order issued on 12 July 1968.

Subsequently, after trial, the Court of Industrial Relations, in a decision dated 14 February 1972, ordered

FMC, et al. to pay de la Osa his overtime compensation, as well as his swing shift and graveyard shift

premiums at the rate of 50% per cent of his basic salary. FMC, et al. filed the petition for review on

certiorari.

Issue:

1. Whether the mere act by a non-resident foreign corporation of recruiting Filipino workers

for its own use abroad, in law doing business in the Philippines.2. Whether FMC has been "doing business in the Philippines" so that the service of

summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of Manila with

jurisdiction.

Held:

1. In its motion to dismiss, FMC admits that Mr. Catuira represented it in the Philippines "for the

purpose of making arrangements for the approval by the Department of Labor of the employment of

Filipinos who are recruited by the Company as its own employees for assignment abroad." In effect, Mr.

Catuira was alleged to be a liaison officer representing FMC in the Philippines. Under the rules and

regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments which took effect 3 February 1969, implementingRA 5455, which took effect 30 September 1968, the phrase "doing business" has been exemplified with

illustrations, among them being as follows: ""(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts.

Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm,

amounting to negotiation or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of

whether the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the

enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines; (2) appointing a representative or

distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an


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independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and not in the name or

for the account of the principal; xxx (4) Opening offices, whether called 'liaison' offices, agencies or

branches, unless proved otherwise. xxx (10) Any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial

dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the

exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial

gain or of the purpose and objective of the business organization."

2. FMC may be considered as "doing business in the Philippines" within the scope of Section 14

(Service upon private foreign corporations), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provides that "If the

defendant is a foreign corporation, or a non-resident joint stock company or association, doing business

in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that

purpose or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on

any of its officers or agents within the Philippines." Indeed, FMC, in compliance with Act 2486 as

implemented by Department of Labor Order IV dated 20 May 1968 had to appoint Jaime V. Catuira, 1322

A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila "as agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment Contracts and receive,

in behalf of that corporation, legal services from and be bound by processes of the Philippine Courts of

Justice, for as long as he remains an employee of FMC." It is a fact that when the summons for FMC was

served on Catuira he was still in the employ of the FMC. Hence, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in

business in the Philippines, is not barred from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines (such as in

earlier cases of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, vs. Pacific Star Line, etc. [GR L-26809], In

Mentholatum vs. Mangaliman, and Eastboard Navigation vs. Juan Ysmael & Co.), a fortiori, that same

corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person

or persons in the Philippines.


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Patricia Sto Tomas vs. Salac

This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No. 152710, G.R. No.

167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.

G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710

In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to

enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities

of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant

Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from

the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was

passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government

agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers

abroad.

Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.

HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case in 2007,

RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed

Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

G.R. 167590

In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the

following provisions of RA 8042:

a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is

vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties for simple

violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection are already

punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that

such is unreasonable;

c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file the criminal

case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this

provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which provides that criminal cases must be

prosecuted in the placed where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed;

d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of

RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the

aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officersand directors is void for being violative of due process.

RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declraed the said provisions of RA

8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 are void.

HELD: No, they are valid provisions.


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a. Section 6:The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-licensed

recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,

hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal

recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand,

recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate

government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongfulacts enumerated in Section 6.

b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said penalties.

Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.

c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that

the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing

arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.

d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly and

solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of

that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99

In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents received

insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But when they found out

based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her

parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the

recruitment and placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion,

Inc.).

The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen was negligent

in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin (a violation of RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages.

The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of

Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.

Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene. They aver thatSection 10 is invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.

HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic.

However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with

Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that they were personally involved in their

companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.


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Salazar vs. Achacoso

Facts:Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with

illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him toappear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitionerhad no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issueda Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documentsand paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, ithaving verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor andEmployment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing actsprohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team wasthen tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by media men and Mandaluyongpolicemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who letthem in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for thereturn of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Orderviolated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties wereconfiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue:Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)

can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held:Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searchedand the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizureor arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Courtheld, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrestwarrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article

38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of thePresident to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to orderarrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the soledomain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant.The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to beseized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seizedas a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

Darvin v Court of Appeals

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