ELSEVIER Journal of Pragmatics 22 (1994) 251-264

Involvement with language and in language*

FrantiSek DaneH

ceskoslovenskci akademie vPd, ristav pro jazyk Ees& LetensM 4, Praha I, Maid Strana, Czech Republic

Abstract

In section 1, the ways in which people are involved with their own language are dealt with. The Prague School functional concept of experiencing ones language (being a parallel to involvement) is presented, and the following points discussed: different attitudes of users toward language, characteristic features of their involvement with the text processes of speak- ing-writing and listening-reading, and the range of different experiential modes implied in the users involvement. Section 2 is devoted to emotion as the most typical and natural man- ifestation of peoples involvement in language. Emotion is treated as a specific dimension of the human mind and experience; its vast field is surveyed and contrasted with the dimension of cognition. The two dimensions (or, rather, aspects) are interwoven and mutually condi- tioned, both in our life and in linguistic expression. Further, the ways emotion enters dis- course, and various types and means of its manifestation in communication are examined. Moreover, different functional positions of emotion in communication are discussed, and also a brief comparison of the emotional content of speech and music is sketched.

1. The ways in which people are involved with their own language

I .I. Experiencing (actual living through) ones language - A Prague School equiv- alent to involvement with language

The phenomenon of language (understood here as a system as well as discourse processes) is an object of a special kind, since, in contradistinction to the majority of other objects in the world, and to other instruments or tools used by people, it is internal to our mind and personality. It forms an integral part of our private and social life. We are immersed in it; it represents the environment and space in which we live and move; it belongs, so to speak, to our very being. Language is not alien or indifferent for us, but we are attached to it, though in a different way from our attachment to most things external to our beings. Consequently, the object of

* The present discussion is based, in parts, on two earlier papers by the same author, DaneS 1987 and 1991. Additionally I found a closely related approach in Amdt and Janney 1991.

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252 F. Dane? I Journal of Pragmatics 22 (1994) 251-264

linguistics is not only language as structure referring to denotated reality, but also language in its relation to man (cf. Cmejrkova, 1992: 57).

Such an approach to language was peculiar to the founder of the Prague Linguis- tic Circle, Mathesius (1971, 1975), who characterized the new, functionalist trend in linguistics as follows: it understands language as something living; behind the words, it feels the speaker or writer, whose intention prompted these words, and it is aware of the fact that in the majority of cases, these words aim at a hearer or reader (1971:2).

A younger colleague of his, Trnka, in his significant lecture Linguistics and the ideological structure of the period (1966 [1940]), elaborated this view by postulat- ing the concept of experiencing language (original Czech wording proiivcini jazyka; literally translated, actual living through ones language), which is, in his opinion, an indispensable counterpart of language that permeates all levels of a lan- guage system (1966: 162). It is only by being experienced that the logically struc- tured mechanism of language, for the most part very complex, becomes a functional totality, which is satisfactorily verifiable, being immediately given (1966: 163). Further, Tmka points to the importance of language experience for the explication of certain linguistic phenomena. His revealing formulation deserves to be quoted here:

Unequal degrees of language experience give rise to zones of different depths, which also have different structural developments. Differences in experiencing lan- guage are responsible, for instance, for the different developments of the dialect and the standard language, or, for that matter, of domestic and foreign elements of the vocabulary. Without considering language experience, one could not imagine how a certain language system could, to different degrees, influence other systems, or why that system could not only take over some items of some other language, in the qual- ity of intentional foreignisms, structurally differentiated from the native elements in the background, but even, on other occasions, regard as preferable a complete assim- ilation of such elements (1966: 163).

Echoing Ballys concern for emotional aspects of language, Tmka states that his concept of experiencing language has a broader meaning, because it includes the experiencing not only of affective but also of intellectual elements of language (1966: 163). He also reminds us of the fact - a typical one - that some scholars are more inclined to analyze system and lay particular stress on the postulate of absolute regularity of language phenomena, while others (e.g. Bally and Mathesius) prefer to observe language experience and speak only of trends and tendencies (1966: 164).

The above-mentioned Prague functionalist approach (a pragmatic one, in recent wording) of Mathesius and Trnka could be briefly characterized by the modified Latin dictum, Expel/as hominem lingua, tamen usque recurret.

1.2. General aspects of language-users involvement with language

Experiencing language might possibily be regarded as involvement with lan- guage. There is scarcely en exact equivalent for the English term involvement (with). The German Erlebnis, erleben, fully corresponds to Trnkas Czech term

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proiivcini (cf. also Websters definition of experience as an actual living through an event). In French, we have to translate the (originally French) expression involve- ment as engagement - and, again, one of the meanings of the English engage is involve (in) or take part (in) (cf. Webster).

Interestingly enough, Katriel and Dascal (1989: 276) characterize involvement in discourse by saying that it relates to the speakers mode of participation in the exchange. This can range from very casual to very intense engagement (1989: 276, italics mine). Thus, it is possible to express periphrastically what, in fact, is meant by involvement, although it is difficult to capture this notion in a determinate way. This indeterminacy, however, probably belongs to the intrinsic characteristic features of the meaning of lexical items outside a context (cf. de Beaugrande, 1988).

In any case, involvement, as an absolutely fundamental aspect of our linguistic awareness and conduct, concerns: (1) knowledge of the language system and of communicative abilities; (2) the actual use of this knowledge in the communicative processes of text production and text reception (as well as texts themselves, as results and points of departure, respectively, of those processes); (3) the whole range of our mental faculties and processes.

I .2.1. Different users attitudes towards language The most conspicuous feature of language-users involvement with language may

be seen in the different attitudes they take towards language and its use. By atti- tude, I understand here the system of mental biases and dispositions of a person, or a group of persons, to feel, think, and behave in a certain manner, which programs their responses to certain kinds of objects or types of situations. Two major opposite classes of attitudes can be ascertained, that of indifference and that of concern (with various orientations), and it may be maintained that only the latter represents instances of involvement. Nevertheless, because the two classes may be viewed as constituting a simple system of opposition, we are prompted to interpret even indif- ference (or detachment) as an extreme pole of concern (i.e., a lack of it), and treat it as a kind of involvement as well. The attitude of indifference or detachment would appear then as a marked case against the background of the normal or expected users concern for the phenomena of language (cf. Dane& 1986).

People - individuals or groups - take, and often show and express, their attitudes towards a certain language as a whole: They often show particular fondness for their mother tongue, and hold other languages in lesser regard, or even feel antagonism towards them; todays unfortunate language quarrels (or even wars) offer a conspic- uous example of the possible disasters which result from an ill-disposed involvement with language. Attitudes are also often adopted towards particular varieties of a lan- guage (substandards, dialects), and towards certain development processes or trends in a language, and, of course, towards individual means of expression at different levels of language structure (forms, constructions, etc.). Different ways of using lan- guage, stylistic phenomena, or even whole texts or text sorts (genres), appear as objects of attitudinal evaluation too.

The variety of different attitudes can be roughly divided into four groups: instru- mental (aiming at economy and effectiveness), ethical (implying adherence to social

254 F. DaneS I Journal of Pragmatics 22 (1994) 251-264

norms), affective (emotional), and customary (habitual, traditionalistic). The first two groups can be characterized as having a rational orientation, the other two as non-rational (though not necessarily as anti-rational; such would be a chauvinistic attitude). To be sure, these hypothetical types do not occur in pure forms, and there are certain relationships between them. Thus, the ethical attitude will mostly be accompanied by the emotional one, the latter often being associated with a tradition- alist posture as well. Strictly speaking, what people show, in fact, are attitudinal complexes in which the individual attitudes may acquire a positive or a negative value (of different degrees), and in which a certain type of attitude is dominant, with the emotional component being mostly omnipresent (this fact has a bearing on expe- riential involvement as such). In general, the collections (complexes) of attitudes shared by individuals and groups are, in fact, not only intricate, but also internally inconsistent and variable sets. In this respect, involvement with language appears to be a rather diversified, unhomogeneous, and somewhat protean phenomenon, dynamic in its nature.

1.2.2. Diverse characteristic features uj the users involvement with the text processes of speaking-writing and listening-reading

Language users are able speakers/writers and hearers/readers (though not at the same time). Therefore, we have to expect that their experiencing of these two funda- mental text processes will show diverse characteristics, and that the secondary dichotomies, speaking-writing and hearing-reading, will be associated with differ- ing involvement features, too. Various moments of speech situations are also to be regarded as relevant facts. Thus, for example, the direct, immediate contact of par- ticipants engaged in a dialoge entails a different character, or, at least, a different degree of involvement, than the same dialogue experienced by an incidental listener to the radio, or, again, to the television. The diversity of involvement of the writer of a novel, on the one hand, and of the reader of it, on the other, is evidently of a deep and principal character. The same holds with the difference between a speaker who is concentrating on the formulation of his or her thought, seeking an adequate lin- guistic expression for it with respect to the addressee, and in expectation of a possi- ble response, and the hearer, who, starting with the acoustic perception of the phonic form of the message, tries to decipher its semantic content and sense, simultaneously taking into account the speakers individual features and contribution. These and other, more or less conspicuous, differences of involvement might appear evident; but they really deserve a detailed psycholinguistic examination.

So far as I know, a promising attempt in this direction is that of Tannen (1984), who introduced the distinction between high involvement and low involvement styles (though such a dichotomy seems to be rather simplifying). In the high involve- ment style, she identifies four relevant domains: topic, pacing, narrative strategies, and expressive paralinguistics (a somewhat heterogeneous set, though), and in each of them she finds several particular involvement features. A predecessor of Tannen, Chafe (1982), again makes a strict distinction between written language, which is characterized by the general feature of detachment and evidenced in the use of passives and nominalizations (1982: 48), and spoken language, which shows a

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variety of manifestations of the involvement which the speaker has with his or her audience (1982: 48). Chafes conception is evidently narrow and one-sided; the characteristic features he adduces, appear as more or less incidental and heteroge- neous (due to his rather limited material basis). Moreover, his detachment features might preferably be treated as devices of a condensed style (cf. the notion of com- plex condensation, suggested by Mathesius, 1975, and elaborated by Vachek, 1961).

As I have mentioned above, involvement should preferably be treated as a field of gradience between two poles. This old claim of mine is supported by Katriel and Dascal (1989), who, moreover, propose two general types of speaker-involvement, namely topical involvement and interactional involvement, both related to the speakers attentional orientation (1989: 285ff.). I find this conception plausible (though the recourse only to attention seems somewhat narrow to me), and one has to agree that involvement is usually a behaviorally complex phenomenon combin- ing indicators related to a number of communicative channels. At times, much of the burden of the display can rest with the language used (1989: 289).

Nevertheless, all the above-mentioned approaches to involvement one-sidedly account for the speaker (producer) only, leaving the hearers (recipients) side unconsidered. This default (unfortunately, not a rare one) is at variance with a basic postulate of text linguistics, viz. to take into account both of the discourse partici- pants, and both in the same measure, as well as to distinguish the position of the third element, namely the linguistic analyst and interpreter (who appears as a specific kind of recipient, equipped with expert knowledge and following certain specific goals). Any statement in text linguistics should be relativized to these participants.

It is evident that the recipients involvement does not represent a simple mirror image of the producers. Let us imagine, for instance, a poet writing a poem, and a reader of it or a hearer of it (in which latter case, a third participant, the reciting per- son, appears as a mediator, and complicates the situation; cf. the musical performer mentioned in section 3). Without doubt, the processes of experiencing a poem going on in the writer and reader (hearer), respectively, are different in many respects; they follow, in part, different particular experiential courses. And also the global experi- ential content, especially the emotional purport of a poem on the side of the reader, will certainly not be identical with that of the author-this follows, after all, from the hermeneutic approach to text interpretation.

The reason why the study of involvement usually starts from the text producer is only that the analyst is convinced that it can be more easily deduced from certain lin- guistic properties of the text (as indicators of the text-producers involvement processes). There is an old tradition in stylistics of approaching a text by questioning why the author employed this or that means of expression. Nevertheless, the ques- tion of how the recipient processes the text, and what interpretation she or he makes, is equally legitimate, though less evident and more difficult (in spite of the fact that we perform as interpreters no less frequently than as producers). But we can hardly dispense here with psycholinguistic research, in which our introspective observations may also be accounted for.

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12.3. The range of different experiential modes implied in the users involvement People experience language in a number of different ways, at different depths, and

with varying intensity, not only because of their individual characters and biases, but also, as a rule, in response to different aspects and parts of the phenomenon of lan- guage, perceived in different situations, in different momentary personal states. According to Hermans (1974: 14), the notion of experiencing implicitly comprises numerous more specific experiential modes, referred to under such labels as per- ception, imagination, fantasy, intuition, thought, etc. Thus, we may assume that the whole range of such modes takes part in language involvement, too. Due to the omnipresence of emotion (for any stimulus is said to have an emotional value, see further below), involvement will often be more or less identified with emotion. Nevertheless, volitional and conative elements play an important part in involvement as well. Thus, the very process of verbal communication is, in fact, based on the speakers intention (decision, will) to convey something to an addressee, as well as on the addressees wish (desire, will, conation) to listen to the speaker and to learn what he or she is going to convey. And in a number of illocutionary and perlocu- tionary forces or functions of utterances associated with speakers intentions and modifying them, volition and conation are implied (cf. also Dascal, 1991: 39; as for the cognitive mode, see section 2 below).

2. Emotion as the most typical manifestation of peoples involvement in language

2.1. Emotion and cognition; their psycholinguistic aspects - The ubiquity of emotion

In this section I will focus on the linguistic aspect of emotion (feeling, affect) as the most typical, natural, and important manifestation of the speakers involvement. Let us start with Hermans (1974: 14, 25) general phenomenological statement that we are always in a process of experiencing something, and that the essential charac- ter of experiencing is affective involvement with the object being experienced. The object of our cognitive intentionality is something that we value to a certain degree. In this way, feelings provide information about the things we are confronted with. (Information not in the sense of a certain amount of factual knowledge, but in that of information experienced as important or relevant for people with regard to the needs, plans or preferences of a person at a particular moment.)

As for cognition, which will, as a rule, be opposed to emotion (though these two major dimensions or faculties of the human mind in no case represent separate domains), it will mostly be treated in the narrow and one-sided sense of abstract con- ceptual entities and structures. But the assumed propositional mode of cognitive structures is, in fact, not the only issue in the question of human cognizance, and it is not the only content of language signs and speech utterances. As Dascal (1991: 37) duly points out, this mode of language use should not even be regarded as the dominant or primary one: in fact, it derives from a more basic use, since an utter- ance is naturally embedded in the wholeness of concrete experience and it is unprob- lematically and immediately understood as such. He argues for a pragmatic con-

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ception of knowledge and cognition, where the relevant criterion is not accuracy of representation, but the ability of the knower to play sucessfully the social game of justification (1991: 39). Moreover, some philosophers (e.g., the outstanding Czech thinker Jan PatoEka) remind us that there exist more profound and secret contents of the mind, which either lack the necessary minimum of generality, or are not capable of being symbolized or grasped in a figurative way. It may be that the complex suprasegmental phonic (vocal) component of speech utterances contains, in certain instances, just some signals of these secret contents of the mind - an inmost and pure experiencing, something in which one is deeply involved.

From the statement that any stimulus has both factually informative and emotional values, we may deduce the ubiquity of emotion, with due consequences for the domain of language use, be it communicative use or mental use (cf. Dascal and Francozo, 1988/89).

On the one hand, emotion represents one major linguistic function and, seen from the other side, it finds in language specific means of manifestation (though not only in language, to be sure; cf. extralinguistic devices such as gesturing, facial expressions, gaze, etc.). Primarily, emotion is manifested in acoustically produced and received utterances, which combine an old, phylogenetically continuous system of non-verbal affect signalling and a linguistic system capable of expressing affective meaning (Scherer and Bergmann, 1984: 72). This vast domain of non-verbal vocal signals com- prises, in fact, a broad transitional zone between the sign system of a language and the more or less universal world of nonlinguistic vocal features. And it is just the old con- tinuous vocal system (the linguistic component of which is often vaguely labelled intonation) that is primarily and mainly subservient to emotional manifestation.

This phenomenon represents the most elementary (primitive), least specified, and most natural linguistic means of expression. It is relatively widespread and rel- atively resistant to language changes; it is acquired by the child relatively early, and is relatively less affected by aphasic disturbances (sometimes it is the last language feature that remains preserved with an aphatic) (cf. also the notion of naturalness suggested and developed by Dressler, Wurzel, and Mayerthaler in Dressler, 1989).

Let us add that Scherers statement points to the so-called dichotic explanation of speech production and reception, based on the functional asymmetry of the human brain. Another important assumption is that our brain functions as a hybrid mecha- nism, with both digital (yes-no) and analog (more-less) coding. Thus, every- thing in speech that is in connection with articulated (segmental) speech on the lev- els of phonemes, syllables, words, and sentences will be coded digitally, whereas everything that is connected with music, mood, and emotion will be coded in the analog way. Now, from the dichotic and hybrid character of speech processes, we get, on the one hand, the very rich employment of suprasegmental features in the domain of emotion, and, on the other hand, the graded character of intonational and other suprasegmental vocal devices which multiply the functional possibilities of this means of expression (often functioning in an iconic manner). Moreover, the fact that the suprasegmental domain represents a field of gradience bears directly on the phe- nomenon of involvement, which genuinely implies degrees, i.e., is a degree-con- cept (cf. Katriel and Dascal, 1989: 286).

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The fact that grammarians have, in the main, not paid systematic attention to this second, but integral, semiotic domain of language, is one of the reasons why the omnipresence of emotion in discourse has not been fully reflected in linguistic description. Further causes of this negligence may be adduced: the prevailing inter- est in graphic monological texts (more precisely, isolated sentences out of a concrete context); the focus on la langue; the primary concern with cognitive (conceptual) elements, as well as the negligence of pragmatics.

From the fact of the ubiquity of emotion, it further follows that the traditional assumption of the emotional neutrality of normal speech utterances, and the treat- ment of emotionally colored items as something special or marked (if not deviant from the norm), should be abandoned. We must rather assume that any utterance or higher discourse unit has an emotional value in its communicative situation, both on the producers and the receivers side (though not necessarily for both of them in a given case, or in the same measure). Thus, even the alleged absence of emotional involvement represents, in fact, an instance of the category of emotional state, and an utterance of this nature may carry - in certain contexts - a high emotional value. To be sure, human communication has a plurichannel nature, so that extralinguistic features relevant to the signaling of emotion should also be accounted for, as long as they are synchronized with the linguistic component proper, which, together with them, forms a complex, functional totality. Language is not a self-contained system, and its structure reckons with non-linguistic components of communication (cf. also Uhlenbeck, 1973).

2.2. Characteristic features of emotion

Since there is no commonly accepted determination and classification of the vast and vague field of emotion, it appears appropriate to include in it not only short- time arousals and not acute and interruptive states (moods and feelings) (cf. Simon, 1982: 334), but also more cognitive emotions (cf. Scherer, 1986), eval- uative/emotional attitudes (cf. Van Dijk, 1982: 35), and perhaps also some aspects of personal traits. Emotions accompanying, or even implied by, opinions and by var- ious kinds of illocutionary acts also deserve to be mentioned here.

Our decision to treat this whole gamut of related phenomena as a unique category is substantiated by certain facts concerning their phonic manifestations: by means of rather complex phonic signals, whole functional complexes may be manifested, in which there will be amalgamated features of emotionality proper, emotional atti- tudes, and personality traits, together with the social categories of discourse partici- pants, interpersonal relations, and some other pragmatic features (cf. DaneS, 1985).

Emotions will be experienced, shown (manifested), and also named (so that peo- ple can talk about them). There are labels for particular emotions in any natural lan- guage (a contrastive linguistic analysis of them could be rewarding). But they are rather imprecise and do not map emotional states very systematically (Scherer, 1986: 146). Thus, it is advisable to work preferably with a small number of differ- ent dimensions; Osgoods (and Wundts) well-known triad - evaluation, activation, and potency - represents one such possibility. It is rather an empirical question how

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many dimensions we need. It is possible to choose and specify them in accordance with the particular aim or specific subdomain of research. In any analytical experi- ence, it is mostly convenient to work with several polar dimensions, with distinctive positions on the scale between their poles, and with different degrees of intensity. Sometimes one general dimension positive-negative would be sufficient.

Should we briefly characterize emotion (in contradistinction to cognition), we could do it by reminding ourselves of the following points: Emotions are diffuse and variable, hard to describe and harder to differentiate and classify (Simon, 1982: 336); they permeate the other realms of human experiencing; they change, for the most part, continuously, and are susceptible to continuous gradation. This gradual, more-less nature of emotion bears upon the fact that they are coded in analog terms (iconically); consequently, they are primarily manifested in speech non-ver- bally, and this fact calls for the existence of specific decoding and inferencing processes on the hearers side. Emotions are experienced (lived through) much more immediately and intensively than are cognitive processes; the former have a per- sonal character, and in their essence, they are spontaneous and unintentional. In dif- ferent societies or cultures, there are different norms regulating the expression and manifestation of emotion; to what degree there are also socio-cultural differences in emotions themselves needs to be investigated (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985).

2.3. The correlation of emotion and cognition from a semiotic viewpoint

The above discussion prompts several questions about how the two very different spheres can be simultaneously communicated in a speech event, and how emotion functions in discourse and interacts with cognitive components.

The first, semiotic, question is resolved by a certain division of labor between segmental (verbal) and suprasegmental (also paralinguistic) devices, as well as by their ingenious coordination and cooperation. According to Johnson-Laird (1983) mental processing on each level of organization takes context into account, and pro- cessing at different levels is not autonomous, but interactive. Mental processes occur in parallel (1983 : 45 I-453). Thus, for example, the emotional information conveyed by an intonation unit appears as a variable: on the one hand, the particular value specification of it in a speech event is context-sensitive and depends on the semantic content of the underlying lexical (segmental) base, as well as on various concomitant vocal features; but on the other hand, the semantic-pragmatic specification of a cer- tain lexical base may vary according to different suprasegmental features carried by it (cf., e.g., the intonation of irony). In other words, the functional nexus between the segmental and suprasegmental layers is, in principle, bidirectional: what appears rel- evant is their interplay (cf. Dane& 1960, 1985). We meet here with the general prin- ciples of uncertainty or indeterminacy. De Beaugrande (1988) duly points out that the axis determinacy/indeterminacy has been regrettably neglected in linguistics at large, and maintains that meaning only achieves determinacy in context. It is not without interest that the musicologist Karbusicky (1987: 245) characterizes the notion of sound, in which all possible nuances of expression are encoded, as the indexical factor of uncertainty (indeterminacy) in the system of music as well as of language.

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2.4. The ways and means of the manifestation of emotion in discourse

The issue of the functions of emotion in discourse, and of the interaction of dis- course emotion with the cognitive component, is of great relevance to our problems. But before bringing this up for discussion, it appears needful to insert a remark on the ways and means of expressing or showing emotions. (A comprehensive discus- sion of these issues may be found in Fiehler, 1990.)

They are either conceptually descriptive (when talking about emotions we name them) or signal-like (verbal, e.g. expressive words, or non-verbal). Non-verbal sig- nals may be linguistic, paralinguistic, or extralinguistic, with no clear-cut boundaries between the three domaines (cf., e.g., Posner, 1985). Vocal features may also be reflected in graphic texts, especially in those written by hand (punctuation; features disclosing the productors mental state; etc.).

What we find described by grammarians in discussions of emotion, is mostly the domain of certain verbal means (cf. especially Stankiewicz, 1964) which are found to be either context-independent (systemic) or contextually conditioned. Neverthe- less, it should be stressed that, from our point of view, any language form can be endowed with emotive connotations in an appropriate verbal cotext and/or situation. Moreover, the notion of verbal has to be taken very broadly, to include not only lexical, grammatical, and phonemic phenomena, but also phenomena that would be treated as stylistic or rhetorical, or pertaining to the ways of building up a text. Let us add that in particular speech events, emotional means of different kinds are often combined.

From the semiotic viewpoint, we should differentiate between symbolic, sympto- matic, and partly also iconic, signs of emotion. From the communicative point of view, however, another distinction appears relevant. Posner (1985) suggests that we differentiate between communication (in a narrow sense) and interaction. A dis- course sign is used communicatively, if produced with the intention of conveying something to the addressee, and if it is received as such; and it has an interactive effect if it directly and immediately influences the response of the other partner. Thus, behavior can be interactive without being intended as such. With regard to emotion, any unintended or involuntary show of an emotional state can have (and mostly has) an interactive effect.

2.5. Functions of emotion in discourse

Let us now return to the phenomenon of the functions of emotion and its interac- tion with cognition. In my opinion, two distinctions appear essentially relevant here.

The first of them is the pair informative vs. catalytic functions of emotion. By catalysis, I mean the well-known fact that emotional states may promote or inhibit cognitive and other discourse processes, both on the recipients (comprehenders) side and on the producers side; this includes also nonlinguistic and non-vocal com- ponents of communicative activity. Perhaps in all languages, one finds locutions telling that emotion such as fear or joy can paralyze a persons tongue or speech, etc. After all, the influence of emotion on the speech behavior of participants in any kind

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of dialogue (e.g., between teacher and student, patient and doctor), debate, or con- versation, is evident, and is often of significance; the same holds for contact between a speaker or actor and his audience, and the like, In all such cases, we have to do with mutual influence, with feedback - and let us add that these two emotional func- tions often occur simultaneously (though in different dominance relations).

Secondly, we have to distinguish spontaneous manifestations of emotion, and the strategic employment of them.

Seen from the producers side, we might (according to Mathesius) reckon with the following possibilities. First, the speaker manifests (or, more adequately, reveals, shows) his/her emotion automatically, fully spontaneously. Second, the speaker wants to canceal his/her emotion, and tries to suppress it, but nevertheless involun- tarily lets it out (the emotion will then be revealed by various features of the speakers utterance and/or other communicative behavior). Third, emotion is mani- fested by the speaker intentionally (communicated in the true sense). In this last case, the emotion may be either genuine, really experienced by the producer, or merely performed; i.e., the speaker may want to influence the hearer or a third per- son, to achieve a desired effect, or to present him/herself in a certain light. A special and typical emotional strategy is the producers endeavor to elicit a certain emotional state or attitude in the recipient, or to change the recipients current state. In any lan- guage there is a set of expressions labelling such changes (enrage, horrify, soothe, etc.). Of course, the performance of emotions is based on the presupposition that there is a more or less stable correlation between the given emotion and a set of means for its manifestation. To what measure such correlations are really conven- tionalized (especially in the vocal domain), is an open question,

As we have already mentioned above, the demonstration (or even experiencing) of emotion is controlled by differing socio-cultural norms. There are societies where the demonstration of emotions is rather damped by the norms, while in other com- munities, a clear expression of emotion (especially on specific occasions) is flatly required; there are differences according to various emotional spheres or types of communication, and there may also be certain emotional taboos; we also find psy- chological and idiosyncratic differences among individuals or groups, differences on the sexual and age axes, etc.

2.6. The emotional course of a discourse

The cognitive aspect of discourse reveals a multilevel, hierarchical structuring, inter- preted in terms of concepts, propositions, and their mutual relations. Should we now assume an analogical organization of emotion in discourse? In view of the specific nature of emotions, such a structural organization is hardly to be expected. It would probably be more plausible to assume an emotional course of discourse (its emotional profile), involving two kinds of nexuses between particular emotional states/processes - namely, progressive and regressive - as well as processes such as those of augmen- tation, amplification/diminution, cumulation, and emotional state transition or leap.

An analogy to music might appear revealing. The content of works of music is considered emotional in essence. The emotional experiencing (involvement) on the

262 F. DaneS I Journal of Pragmatics 22 (1994) 2.51-264

side of the composer and of the recipient (as well as of the mediating musical per- former) represent the core and sense of any music. Undoubtedly, musical works show special structural patterning of their own, created and expressed by means of purely musical features and forms. Now, even though the suprasegmental vocal fea- tures of natural languages are, in essence, similar (and therefore sometimes called musical, especially intonation, rhythm, dynamics, movement, coloring of voice, sound), their actual shape, structuring, and especially their semiotic position is dif- ferent in several respects (even though the semiotic character of music, now often discussed, has not yet been fully clarified). The most relevant difference may be seen in the segmental verbal base, on the level of both form and function. The supraseg- mental second semiotic system of language exists, in fact, as a parasitic, or, more precisely, a symbiotic, component. It is not independent and self-determined, in contradistinction to the systemic core of non-vocal music. If this is so, we may expect that the emotional aspect of the overall content of discourse will also evolve in correspondence with notional structures in a symbiotic manner, that is, in func- tional cooperation, complementation, and mutual interaction.

Taking into consideration the structures of that special kind of music which con- tains natural language as its integral component, namely vocal music, we may ascer- tain evident similarities between these musical works and natural language dis- courses. Also in vocal music we find two parallel, though not mutually indifferent, semiotic systems, and, as McClleland (1990: 199) truly states, the analysis of vocal music will show how the music alters the way we grasp the words, and the way the words have determined some part of the shape of music. In fact, music will often be regarded as a kind of cultivation, idealization, systematization, or styliza- tion of the musical substance of speech.

At the end of our discussion of emotion, a warning remark should be added. The metaphorical spatial labels suprasegmental and (segmental) base might wrongly suggest that emotion, conveyed by suprasegmental features, is an additional element to the message - being located somewhere supra/over its notional substance. Emo- tion, however, does not constitute a level or layer (once more spatial metaphors!), but an aspect - and a substantial and omnipresent one - of the message conveyed by an utterance. It is a specific aspect of the overall linguistic behavior of speech par- ticipants, that permeates the whole discourse, which is thus imbued with it. And it belongs to the specificity of emotion that it is experiential and interactional, rather than communicative.

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