DANAHER Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom
Transcript of DANAHER Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom
MoralEnhancementandMoralFreedom:ACritiqueoftheLittleAlex
Problem
ByJohnDanaher
[ForthcominginHauskeller,M.andCoyne,L(eds)MoralEnhancement:Critical
Perspectives,PhilosophySupplement(CambridgeUniversityPress)]
Abstract:Acommonobjectiontomoralenhancementisthatitwouldundermine
ourmoralfreedomandthatthisisabadthingbecausemoralfreedomisagreat
good.MichaelHauskellerhasdefendedthisviewonacoupleofoccasionsusingan
arrestingthoughtexperimentcalledthe'LittleAlex'problem.Inthispaper,I
reconstructtheargumentHauskellerderivesfromthisthoughtexperimentand
subjectittocriticalscrutiny.Iclaimthattheargumentultimatelyfailsbecause(a)
itassumesthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgoodwhen,infact,itismorelikelyto
beanaxiologicalcatalyst;and(b)therearereasonstothinkthatmoral
enhancementdoesnotunderminemoralfreedom.
1.Introduction
Humanityfacesaseriesofexistentialchallengesoverthenextcentury:
climatechange,malevolentartificialintelligence,theproliferationofnuclearand
bio-weaponry,tonamebutafew.AccordingtoIngmarPerssonandJulian
Savulescu,oneofthereasonswhywefindourselvesontheexistentialprecipice
isbecauseourtechnologicalcapacitiesfarexceedourmoralones.1Theyargue
thatmoralbioenhancementtechnologiesmightbeneededtoredressthebalance
andpullusbackfromthebrink.
1Persson,I.andSavulescu,J.UnfitfortheFuture:TheNeedforMoralEnhancement(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2012)
Theirargumenthasattractedalotofcriticism.Oneofthemostpersistent
isthatusingdrugsandotherbiomedicalinterventionstoimprovemoral
behaviorwillundermineour‘freedomtofall’,i.e.ourfreedomtodogoodorevil
(whatIcall,fromhereonout,our‘moralfreedom’).JohnHarriswasthefirstto
launchthiscriticism2andheandPerssonandSavulescuhavesloggeditouton
thetopiceversince.3Othershaveoccasionallyenteredthefray(e.g.Sparrow
2014)topassjudgmentandoffernewinsights.4
Oneofthemoreinterestingcontributionstothe‘freedomtofall’-debate
hascomefromMichaelHauskeller.5Usinganarrestingthoughtexperiment
derivedfromAnthonyBurgess’snovelAClockworkOrange,Hauskellerdraws
ourattentiontotheaxiologicalintuitionsunderlyingthe‘freedomtofall’
objection,andmakesapassionatepleafortheviewthataworldwithmoral
freedomandtheoccasionalbaddeedisbetterthanaworldinwhichpeopledo
goodthingsbutlackthefreedomtofall.
Inthischapter,IcarefullyreconstructandevaluateHauskeller’s
arguments.Istartbydiscussinghis‘LittleAlex’thoughtexperimentand
formalizingtheargumentthathederivesfromit.Ithenproceedtocritically
2Harris,J.‘MoralEnhancementandFreedom’Bioethics25(2011):102-111.3Harris,HowtoBeGood:ThePossibilityofMoralEnhancement(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016)andHarris,J.‘MoralBlindness–TheGiftoftheGodMachine’9(2016):269-273;Persson,I.andSavulescu,J.‘Enharrisment:AReplytoJohnHarrisaboutMoralEnhancement’Neuroethics9(2016):275-77;andPersson,I.andSavulescu,J.‘MoralBioenhancement,FreedomandReason’Bioethics9(2016):263-268.4Sparrow,R.‘BetterLivingThroughChemistry?AReplytoSavulescuandPerssonon‘MoralEnhancement’’JournalofAppliedPhilosophy31(2014):23-32.5Hauskeller,M.‘The“LittleAlex”Problem’ThePhilosophers’Magazine,62(2013):74-78;andHauskeller,M.‘Isitdesirabletobeabletodotheundesirable?MoralBioenhancementandtheLittleAlexProblem’CambridgeQuarterlyofHealthcareEthics,forthcoming–availableat:https://www.academia.edu/18809315/Is_It_Desirable_to_Be_Able_to_Do_the_Undesirable_Moral_Bioenhancement_and_the_Little_Alex_Problem
evaluatethekeypremisesofthatargument.Ifirstevaluatethemoralintuition
thatHauskellerusestomotivatehisclaim,namely:thataworldwithgood
outcomesbutnomoralfreedomwouldbeworsethanaworldwithmoral
freedomandtheoccasionalbaddeed.Drawinguponlessonslearnedinthe
debateabouttheexistenceofGodandtheproblemofevil,Iarguethatmoral
freedomlacksintrinsicvalue:itsmerepresencedoesn’tmaketheworldbetter
orworse.Instead,moralfreedomisanaxiologicalcatalyst:somethingthat
makesgooddeedsbetterandbaddeedsworse.Ithenturntothequestionof
whethermoralenhancementwouldinfactundermineourmoralfreedom.
Lookingatcommontheoriesoffreewillandresponsibility,Iarguethatmoral
enhancementmaynotundermineourmoralfreedomandcouldevenonsome
occasionsincreaseourmoralfreedom.ThenIlookatthemorepolitical
dimensiontofreedom,whichHauskellerdrawsuponinhisargument,and
suggestthatmoralenhancementneednotunderminepoliticalfreedomandmay,
infact,increaseit.
BeforeIgetunderway,Ineedtosayawordortwoabouttheterminology
Iuseinthischapter.Aswillbecomeclearlateron,oneofthemajordisputesin
themoralenhancementdebateisaboutwhatexactlycountsasa‘moral’
enhancement.Ononeinterpretation,amoralenhancementwouldinvolve
improvinganindividual’smoralvirtueandmoralreasoning.Itwouldinvolve
creating“peoplewhoaregoodanddowhatisright,fortherightreasons”.6On
otherinterpretations,moralenhancementislargelyaboutsecuringpreferred
moraloutcomes,irrespectiveofthereasoningorvirtuesofthepeople
implicated.Inotherwords,itinvolvesensuringenhancedconformitywithmoral
norms,notnecessarilyenhancedmoralvirtueandreasoning.Inthischapter,I
willfavourthelatterinterpretationofmoralenhancement.Itismoreinclusive
andfitsbetterwiththeargumentHauskellerdefends.
6DeMeloMartin,I.andSalles,A.‘MoralBioenhancement:MuchAdoAboutNothing’Bioethics29(2014):223-232,224.
Ontopofthis,thereisalwayssomeuncertaintyintheenhancement
debateastowhatinterventionscountas‘enhancements’.Onabroad
interpretation,anenhancementisanyinterventionthatimprovesthehuman
conditionrelativetoitspre-existingstate.7Onthisview,theinventionofthe
wheel,literacy,politicalreform,andbetternutritionwouldallcountas
enhancements.Onanarrowinterpretation,anenhancementisabiomedicalor
technologicalinterventionthatdirectlytargetsandtriestoimprovesome
functionofthehumanbrainorbody.Onthisview,drugs,brainimplants,and
othertherapeuticinterventionswouldcountasenhancements.Proponentsof
enhancementfrequentlystressthebroaderinterpretation8inordertohighlight
thecontinuitybetweennewandoldformsofenhancement,andtoreduce
oppositiontonewerinterventions.Opponentstypicallyfavouranarrower
interpretation,tryingtodrawprincipleddistinctionsbetweennarrowandbroad
enhancements.Inthischapter,Iwillfavourthenarrowerinterpretation.The
primaryreasonforthisisthatifoneistounderstandthedebateaboutthe
freedomtofallobjectiononemustbewilling,ifonlyforthesakeofargument,to
drawadistinctionbetweenbiomedicalformsofmoralenhancementandmore
traditionalformssuchasmoraleducation.
Finally,Iwillusetheterm‘moralfreedom’intwodistinctsenses.Forthe
majorityofthearticle,Iwilluseittorefertoourcapacityforfreewillandmoral
responsibility.Inotherwords,Iwillassumethatinordertohavemoralfreedom
wemusthavethecapacitytoexerciseourfreewill(whateverthatrequires)and
beheldmorallyresponsibleforwhatwedo(whateverthatrequires).Inthe
penultimatesection,however,Iwilladoptamorepoliticizedsenseoftheterm
‘moralfreedom’,whichfocusesonliberalandrepublicanconceptionsof
freedom.9Inotherwords,Iwillholdthatwearemorallyfreeifwearefreefrom
7Buchanan,A.BeyondHumanity?TheEthicsofBiomedicalEnhancement.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2011).8SeeforexampleHarris,J.EnhancingEvolution(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007)andBuchanan,BeyondHumanity.9List,C.andVallentini,L.‘FreedomasIndependence’Ethics126(2016):1043:1074
interferenceand/ordominationbyothers.Thereissomeoverlapbetweenthese
conceptionsoffreedom,buttheyaredistinguishableincertaininstances.
2.UnderstandingtheLittleAlexProblem
Hauskellerusesathoughtexperimenttointroducehisversionofthe
freedomtofallobjection.ThethoughtexperimentcomesfromAnthony
Burgess’s(in)famousnovelAClockworkOrange.Thenovelissetinan
unspecified,dystopianfuture.Ittellsusthestoryof‘Little’Alex,ayoungman
pronetoexuberantactsofultraviolence.Capturedbytheauthorities,Alex
undergoesaformofaversiontherapyinanefforttoridhimofthistendency
towardsultraviolence(thetherapyisknownas‘Ludovico’sTechnique’inthe
novel).Heisgivenmedicationthatmakeshimfeelnauseousandthenrepeatedly
exposedtoviolentimagery.Hiseyesareheldopeninordertoforcehimtoview
theimagery.Thetherapyworks.Onceheleavescaptivity,hestillfeelsviolent
urgesbutthesearequicklyaccompaniedbyfeelingsofnausea.Asaresult,heno
longeractsoutinviolentways.Thetherapyhasenhancedhismoralconformity.
Thenoveltakesanambivalentattitudetowardsthisconformity(and
eventuallyAlexrelapsesintohisultraviolentexuberanceafterasuicideattempt).
Oneofthecharacters(aprisonchaplain)suggeststhatAlexisnottrulygoodasa
resultofthetherapy.Inordertobetrulygood,Alexwouldhavetochoosetodo
thegood.Butduetotheaversiontherapy,thischoiceistakenawayfromhim.
Theinducednauseaeverytimehehasaviolentthoughteffectivelycompelshim
todothegood.Indeed,thechaplaingoesfurtherandsuggeststhatAlex’s
inducedgoodnessisnotasvaluableashisnaturalbadness.Itisbetterifaperson
canchoosetodothebadthanbeforcedtodothegood.ThisiswhatHauskeller
callsthe‘LittleAlex’problem.Andhedescribesitlikethis:
ThisiswhatIcallthe“LittleAlex”problem…itinvitesustoshareacertain
moralintuition(namelythatitisinsomeunspecifiedwaybadorwrongor
inhumantoforcepeopleintogoodness)andthustoaccepttheensuing
paradoxthatundercertainconditionsthebadisbetterthanthegood—
becauseitisnotonlysuggestedthatitiswrongtoforcepeopletobegood
(whichisfairlyuncontroversial)butalsothattheresultinggoodnessis
somehowtaintedanddevaluatedbythewayithasbeenproduced.10
Thisdescriptionoftheproblemhintsatanargument,onethatcanbeexpressed
inmoreformalterms.Itstartswithapremisestatingthecoremoralintuition
andusesthistocritiquethepracticeofmoralenhancement.ThisishowIwould
reconstructthatargument:
(1)Itisbettertohavemoralfreedom,i.e.thefreedomtodothebad(and
tooccasionallyactonthatfreedom),thantobeforcedtodothegood.
(2)Moralenhancementtakesawayourmoralfreedom.
(3)Therefore,moralenhancementis,insomesense,amorallyinferior
wayofensuringmoralconformity.
Thisformulationisalittlebitloose(thederivationoftheconclusionfromthe
premisesisnotstraightforwardorwatertight),butIthinkitcapturesthegistof
Hauskeller’sinterpretationofthefreedomtofallobjection.Overtheremainder
ofthechapterIwillevaluatethetwopremisesofthisargument.
3.IsMoralFreedomIntrinsicallyValuable?
Thefirstpremiseoftheargumentisthemostinteresting.Itmakesa
seeminglyparadoxicalandcontentiousaxiologicalclaim.Itstatesthatthe10Hauskeller,The‘LittleAlex’Problem,75.
freedomtodobadissuchanimportantgoodthataworldwithoutitisworse
thanaworldwithit.Tobemoreprecise,itstatesthatonsomeoccasions,and
undercertainconditions,weshouldpreferitwhenpeopledobadthingsthan
whentheydogoodthings.
OneofthemoreimportantfeaturesofHauskeller’scontributiontothe
freedomtofalldebateisthewayinwhichhedrawsattentiontothisaxiological
claim.Now,IhappentothinkthatthisaxiologicalclaimisfalseandI’mgoingto
defendmyviewbyfirstshowingthatinordertoacceptpremise(1)you
probablyneedtobelievemoralfreedomisanintrinsicgood(i.e.thatitsmere
presenceaddsvaluetotheworld),andthenbyarguingthatitisimplausibleto
supposethatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgood.Instead,Iarguethatweshould
viewitasanaxiologicalcatalyst,i.e.somethingthataddstoboththemoralvalue
anddisvalueoftheworldandhencesomethingwhosevaluecannotbeassessed
independentlyfromthewayinwhichitisused.
Whythinkthattheargumentpresupposesthatmoralfreedomisan
intrinsicgood?Hauskellerhasaparticularconceptionofthevaluehierarchyof
differentpossibleworldsthatheusestoexplainhisview.Inhisoriginalarticle
onthetopic,Hauskellersuggeststhatanyproponentofthe‘freedomtofall’-
argumentmustacceptsomethinglikethefollowingvaluehierarchyasbetween
differentpossibleworlds:
BestWorld:Aworldinwhichwearefreetodobadbutchoosetodogood
(i.e.aworldinwhichthereisbothmoralconformityandmoralfreedom)
2ndBestWorld:Aworldinwhichwearefreetodobadand(sometimes)
choosetodobad(i.e.aworldinwhichthereismoralfreedombutnot,
necessarily,moralconformity)
3rdBestWorld:Aworldinwhichwealwaysdogoodbutarenotfreeto
dobad(i.e.aworldinwhichthereismoralconformitybutnomoral
freedom)
WorstWorld:Aworldinwhichwearenotfreeanddobad(i.e.aworldin
whichthereisneithermoralconformitynormoralfreedom).
Inhismorerecentpaper,heproposesasimilarbutmorecomplexhierarchy
featuringsixdifferentlevels(thetwoextralevelscapturedifferencesbetween
‘sometimes’and‘always’doinggood/bad).Inthatpaperhenotesthatalthough
theproponentofthe‘freedomtofall’argumentmustplaceaworldinwhich
thereismoralfreedomandsomebadaboveaworldinwhichthereisnomoral
freedom,thereisnocompelling,watertightargumentinfavourofthishierarchy
ofvalue.Itisreallyamatterofmoralintuitionsandweighingcompetingvalues.
Hauskeller’sintuitionsleadhimtofavourtheworldwiththefreedomto
(sometimes)dobadovertheworldofmoralconformity.
Canweunderstandthisintuitionatadeeperlevel?Itseemsthatthere
mightbemuchtolearnherefromthedebatebetweenatheistsandtheistsover
theproblemofevil.Asiswell-known,theproblemofevilisthemostfamous
atheologicalargument.Itcomesinavarietyofforms.Theseareusuallybroken
downintotwomainfamilies:(i)thelogicalproblemofeviland(ii)theevidential
problemofevil.11TheessenceofbothversionsisthattheexistenceofGodis
incompatiblewiththeexistenceofanygratuitousorunnecessaryevil.The
reasoningisasfollows:Godisamaximallypowerful,morallyperfectbeing.
Givenhismoralperfection,hewouldnotallowforeviltooccurunlessitwas
somehownecessaryforagreatergood.Givenhismaximalpower,itispossible
forhimtointervenetopreventunnecessaryevilfromoccurring.Atheiststhen
claimthatthereisevidence(certainorhighlyprobable,dependingonhow
strongtheywanttheargumenttobe)thatgratuitousevilsoccur.Theyconclude,
therefore,thatGodmustnot(orishighlyunlikelyto)exist.
11Onthedifferentproblemsofevil,seeMackie,J.L.(1955).EvilandOmnipotence.Mind64(1955):200-212;Plantinga,A.God,FreedomandEvil.(GrandRapids,MI:Eerdmans,1977);andRowe,W.‘TheProblemofEvilandSomeVarietiesofEvil’AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation16(1979):335-341.
Theistshaveavarietyofresponses.Theyoftenhighlightourepistemic
ignoranceaboutvalueonagrand,cosmicscale.12Theythentrytoconstruct
‘theodicies’or‘defences’thateitherjustifyhowGodmightallowaseemingly
gratuitousevilacttooccur,orintroduceprimafaciejustificationsthatcannotbe
easilysecond-guessedorchallenged,givenourepistemiclimitations.Themost
popularofthesetheodicies/defencesarethosethatfocusonfreewillandmoral
responsibility(i.e.moralfreedom).Theviewsharedbyproponentsofthese
theodiciesisthatfreewillandmoralresponsibilityaregreatgoodsandtheir
beinggreatgoodsiswhatjustifiesGodincreatingaworldwithsomeevilinit.
Accordingtooneofthemostinfluentialformulationsofthisview,itisnot
logicallypossibleforGodtocreateauniversewiththegreatgoodofmoral
freedomwithoutalsoallowingforthepossibilityofthatfreedomsometimes
(possiblymanytimes)beingusedforilleffect.13Theingenuityofthisisthatit
allowsfortheiststoremaincommittedtotheviewthattheyliveinauniverse
createdbyamorallyperfectbeing–i.e.inauniversethatis,ultimately,thebest
ofallpossiblewords–whiletoleratingevildeeds.Inessencethen,theyare
ascribingtoHauskeller’sintuitionthataworldwithmoralfreedominitis,
somehow,betterthanaworldwithout.
Iwouldsuggestthatthemostplausiblewaytomakesenseofthisshared
intuitionistobelievethatmoralfreedomis,somehow,intrinsicallyvaluable,i.e.
thatitsmerepresence(irrespectiveofhowitisused)addstothevalueofthe
universe.Butwhyisthisthemostplausiblewaytomakesenseoftheintuition?
Couldn’titsimplybethecasethatmoralfreedomisnecessaryforsomeother
goods?Perhaps,butIthinkitisdifficultforHauskelleroratheistproponentof
thefreewilltheodicytosustainthisviewalongsideaconsistentbiastowards
worldswithmoralfreedom.Sometheistshavetendedtoviewfreewillasa
12ForexampleBergmann,M.‘SkepticalTheismandRowe’sNewEvidentialArgumentfromEvil’Nous35(2001):278-296.13Plantinga,God,FreedomandEvil.
necessaryinstrumentalgoodformoralresponsibility,14butthisdoesnotgetus
awayfromthenotionthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgoodsinceresponsibility
ispartandparcelofmoralfreedom.Otherstendtobeabitcageyandsimply
suggestthat,forallweknow,itmightbelinkedtoothergoods.Butthisisa
difficultargumenttomakewhenyoudonotknowwhattheseothergoodsare
andyetstillbelievetheytrumpotherknowngoods.Ifyouaregoingto
consistentlyrankaworldinwhichthereismoralfreedom(andsomeevil)overa
worldinwhichthereisnomoralfreedom(andmuchgood)–inotherwords,if
youaregoingtoacceptthatthereissomegoodinaworldinwhichpeople
exercisetheirmoralfreedomtodotremendousevil–thenitseemslikeyou
simplymustbecommittedtotheviewthatthereissomeintrinsicmoralmagicto
moralfreedom:thatwhenitispresentitautomaticallyupsthevaluetothe
world.Tobeclear,thisdoesnotmeanthatadvocatesofmoralfreedomneedto
believethattheintrinsicgoodofmoralfreedomtrumpsallothergoods,orthat
therecouldbenootheroutweighingintrinsicgoods.Theymightstillbelievethat.
Butinordertomaintaintheirconsistentbiastowardworldsinwhichthereis
moralfreedom,itmostplausibletobelievethatitisbecausemoralfreedomhas
intrinsicvalue.
TheproblemIhavewiththisisthatmoralfreedomdoesn’tseemto
functionlikeanintrinsicgood.Thereareacoupleofwaystogettothis
conclusion.Somehavetriedtodosobyarguingthatitisintrinsicallyneutral.
DerkPereboom15hasdefendedthisviewintandemwithhisgeneralfreewill
skepticism,andSteveMaitzenhasdefendeditspecificallyinresponsetofreewill
theodicies.16Theessenceofbothoftheirclaimsisthatinmanycasesofmoral
evaluation,thefreedomtodobaddoesnotaddtotheassessedvalueofanaction.
Itseemstofunction,instead,asamorallyweightlessconsideration,andnotjusta
14Swinburne,R.TheExistenceofGod2ndEdition.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004).15Pereboom,D.,FreeWill,EvilandDivineProvidence.InDoleandChignell(eds).GodandtheEthicsofBelief(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.,2005)16Maitzen,S.‘OrdinaryMoralityImpliesAtheism’EuropeanJournalforPhilosophyofReligion2(2009):107-126.
morallyoutweighedone.Togiveanexample,supposethereisaviolentcriminal
whohasexercisedhismoralfreedomandsavagelymurderedtenpeople.Surely,
wedon’tthinkthatthefactthathemurderedthemfreelyspeaksinhisfavour?
Hisactisverybad,pureandsimple;itisnotslightlygoodandverybad.
Thereissomethingtothisargument.Itdefinitelyfeelsrighttosaythat
themurderer’sfreedomdoesn’taddanyintrinsicgoodtohisactions(itdoesn’t
counterbalancesomeofthedisvalue).Butitalsofeelswrongtosaythatitis
axiologicallyneutral.Comparetwocases:(i)amurderersavagelykillstenpeople
whileexercisinghismoralfreedom;and(ii)amurderersavagelykillstenpeople
withoutexercisingmoralfreedom(becausehehadsomebraintumourthat
underminedhismoralreasoning,orhewascompelledtodosobyothersat
gunpoint).Bothoutcomesarebad,butwhichcaseisworse?Ithinktheansweris
obviously(i)becausethereisnoexcusingfactorpresentinthatcase.This
suggestssomethinginteresting.Itsuggeststhatmoralfreedommakesabaddeed
muchworse.Thus,moralfreedomseemstobemakinganaxiologicaldifference;
itisnotneutral.Wecanseethishappeningintheotherdirectiontoo.Compare
thefollowing:(iii)amulti-millionairedonates90%ofhismoneytosomecharity
byexercisinghismoralfreedom;and(iv)amulti-millionairedonates90%ofhis
moneytosomecharitybecausehisaccountantmadeacalculationerror.The
outcomesarebothgood(assumethis,forthesakeofargument),butIam
confidentinsayingthatcase(iii)isclearlybetterthan(iv).Again,thepresenceof
moralfreedomseemstobemakingthedifference.
Thesethoughtexperimentssuggesttomethatmoralfreedomisneither
intrinsicallygood,norintrinsicallyneutral.Itis,instead,anaxiologicalcatalyst:it
makesgoodthingsbetterandbadthingsworse.Itexaggerateswhatevervalueis
alreadypresent(positiveornegative).This,inturn,leadstotheconclusionthat
premise(1)oftheLittleAlexArgumentisflawed.Aworldwithmoralfreedom
andoccasionalbadisnotnecessarilybetterthanaworldwithoutmoralfreedom.
Becauseitisanaxiologicalcatalyst,wecannotusemoralfreedomtorankand
orderworldsrelativetooneanother.Thevalueofmoralfreedomcanonlybe
determinedinconnectionwithhowitisexercised.Ifitisexercisedtogood
effect,thenaworldwithitis,indeed,abetterworld;butifitisexercisedtoill
effect,itmakesthingsworse.Thissignificantlyundercutsthe‘freedomtofall’
objection.Ifmoralenhancementtechniquesworkasadvertised,theywould
simplybepreventingmoralfreedomfrombeingexercisedinwickedways.They
would,consequently,bemakingtheworldabetterplace,withouttakingaway
somethingthatisintrinsicallygood.
Thisargumentmightnotbeplausibletoall.Fortunately,evenifyoucling
totheviewthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgood,itdoesnotfollowthatyou
oughttorejectallformsofmoralenhancementonthegroundsthatthey
underminemoralfreedom.Asmentionedearlier,moralfreedomcouldbean
intrinsicgoodanditcouldbeoutweighedorcountermandedbyother
goods/badsincertaincases.Thisis,again,somethingthathascometotheforein
thedebateabouttheproblemofevil.Whentheistspressthelineaboutmoral
freedomprovidingsomeGod-justifyingexcusefortheoccurrenceofevil,atheists
pushbackbypointingtoparticularlyegregiousformsofevilthatresultfrom
moralfreedom.Takethecaseofaremorselessserialkillerwhotorturesand
rapesyounginnocentchildren.Arewetosupposethattheirfreedomtodobad
outweighsthechild’srighttoliveatortureandrape-freelife?Istheworldin
whichtheserialkillerfreelydoesbadreallyabetterworldthantheoneinwhich
heisforcedtoconform?Itseemsprettyunlikely.Thisexamplehighlightsthefact
thatmoralfreedommightbeintrinsicallyvaluablebutthatincertain‘high
stakes’casesitsintrinsicvalueisoutweighedbyothermoralconsiderations,
particularlytheneedtoensuregreatermoralconformity.
Itisperfectlyopentothedefenderofmoralenhancementtoarguethatits
applicationshouldbelimitedtothose‘highstakes’cases.Thenitwillalldepend
onhowhighthestakesareandwhethermoralenhancementcanbeapplied
selectivelytoaddressthosehighstakescases.Thethingthatisnoticeableabout
PerssonandSavulescu’scaseformoralbioenhancementisthatitislinked
directlytohighstakescases.Theyarguethatthefutureofthehumanracecould
beonthelineunlessweenhanceourmoralconformity.Iftheyareright,thenthe
stakesmightbehighenoughtooutweightheputativeintrinsicvalueofmoral
freedom.Thatsaid,theburdentheyfacewhenmakingthiscaseissignificant
sincetheyarenotsimplyarguingthatweoccasionallyinterferewiththemoral
freedomofspecificindividuals;theyarearguingthatweinterferewithevery
agent’smoralfreedom.
4.IsMoralEnhancementReallyIncompatiblewithMoralFreedom?
WhataboutthesecondpremiseoftheLittleAlexArgument?Thispremise
claimsthatmoralfreedomisincompatiblewithmoralenhancement,i.e.thatif
weensuresomeone’sconformitythroughatechnologicalinterventionlikemoral
enhancement,thentheyarenotreallyfree.Howpersuasiveisthis?Italldepends
onwhatyouunderstandbymoralfreedomandhowyouthinkmoral
enhancementworks.
Let’sstickwithideathatmoralfreedomisthecapacitytoexercisefree
willandtobearesponsiblemoralagent.Therearemanydifferenttheoriesabout
whatthisrequires.Theyvarydependingonwhethertheythinkfreewilland
responsibilityarepossibleinacausallydeterministicuniverse,andwhetherthey
thinkweliveinsuchauniverse.Wecandividethemintotwomaincategories:(i)
libertariantheoriesoffreewill(whichholdthatfreewillisonlypossibleif
humansaresomehowexemptfromcausallydeterministiclaws)and(ii)
compatibilisttheoriesoffreewill(whichholdthatfreewillispossibleevenif
humansarenotexemptfromcausallydeterministiclaws).Thereisalsoa
positionknownas‘freewillskepticism’,butwecansafelyignorethatheresince
afreewillskepticwillhavenotruckwithargumentsaboutthegoodofmoral
freedom.Now,itisnotgoingtobepossibletorevieweverytheoryoffreewill
withinthetwomaincategoriesinthespaceofthischapter,butwecanreview
someofthem,andbydoingsowecanseethatmoralenhancementmaybeless
likelytounderminemoralfreedomthanyoumightfirstsuspect.
Letusstartwiththelibertarianaccountsoffreewill.Thesecanbefleshed
outinacoupleofdifferentways.Onecanadoptanagentcausalistapproach,
whichholdsthatthewayinwhichagentscausesomethingtohappenisdistinct
fromthewayinwhicheventscauseothereventstohappen.Agentsareprimary,
suigeneriscausesofeventsintherealworld.Theydonotsitdirectlywithinthe
ordinarychainofcausation.Humanbeingsareagentsandsocancausethingsto
happenwithoutbeingcausallydeterminedtodoso.Thisviewobviouslyfacesa
numberofconceptualandphilosophicalchallenges.Itisprettydifficultto
reconcilethefactthatcertainaspectsandfeaturesofhumanagencyareclearly
constitutedinanevent-causalistnetworkofbrainactivitywiththeclaimthat
humanagencycauseseventsinadistinctive,suigenerismanner.Consequently,
itisdifficulttoknowexactlywhatanagentcausalistwouldsayabouttheLittle
Alexcase.TheymightbeinclinedtoshareHauskeller’sviewthatAlexisbeing
forcedtobefree(perhapsbecausetheaversiontherapyblocksthepathwayto
agentcausation),buttheymightbemoreoptimistic.Afterall,ifallformsof
moralenhancementwilloperateonthecausalnetworksinsidethehumanbrain,
itispossiblethatthe‘agent’(whoisseparablefromthosenetworks)is
unaffectedbytheenhancementprocess.
Asimilaranalysisappliestoevent-causalistlibertarianviews,suchas
thoseadvocatedbyKane17andBalaguer.18Theseviewsdonotpositasuigeneris
agentwhositsoutsidetheordinarycausalflowoftheuniverse.Theyacceptthat
weare(toaconsiderableextent)constitutedbyourbrainsandthatourbrains
usuallyfollowdeterministicpatternsofcausation.Theysimplyarguethatthere
areoccasionalmomentsofindeterminism(whatBalaguercalls‘torndecisions’)
andthatourstatusasfreeandresponsibleagentsistiedtothesemomentsof
indeterminism.Balaguer’sview,forinstance,isthatoncertainoccasions,the
causalenvironmentinwhichthehumanagentoperates(whichincludestheir
brainandsurroundingcontext)isinastateofequilibriumatthemomentprior
tothechoice–noordinarycausalfactorcan‘makeadifference’towhetherone
optionischosenovertheother.Atthosemoments,thehuman‘will’operatesand
itisatthesemomentsthatweexercisefreechoice.
17Kane,R.TheSignificanceofFreeWill(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996).18Balaguer,M.FreeWillasanOpenScientificProblem(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2010)
Again,thisviewhascertainconceptualandphilosophicalproblems,but
letussetthosetothesideandconsiderwhatitmeansformoralenhancement.
Ontheonehand,aproponentofanevent-causalistlibertarianismmightremain
optimisticaboutmoralfreedom.Enhancementtechnologiesmightintervenein
thecausalnetworksofthebrainbuttheymayleaveopenthepossibilityofthere
being‘torndecisions’andourmoralfreedomcouldcontinuetobegroundedin
thosemoments.Ontheotherhand,theymightfearthatenhancement
technologieslikeLittleAlex’saversiontherapyreducethenumberoftorn
decisionsthetypicalhumanfaces.Itcouldbe,forallweknow,thatbeforehis
aversiontherapy,everytimeLittleAlexwasfacedwiththeoptionofcommitting
anactofultraviolencehewasfacingatorndecision:hisbrainwasperfectly
equilibratedbetweencommittingtheactandnot.Hewasexercisinghismoral
freedomoneachsuchoccasion.Theaversiontherapythenchangedthecausal
equilibrium,tippingthebalancedecisivelyinfavourofnotcommittingviolence.
Thiswouldeliminatefreewill.Thenagain,theoppositecouldalsobetrue.
Perhapsbeforetheaversiontherapythecausalnetworkwithinhisbrainwas
tippeddecisivelyinfavourofcommittingultraviolence.Theaversiontherapy
thenworkedbybringingitbacktoamoreequilibratedstatewherehiswillcould
makethecriticaldifferencebetweendoinggoodanddoingevil.Inotherwords,
perhapstheenhancementtherapyworksbyopeningupmoreopportunitiesfor
torndecisions.
Theoverallpointhereisthatitisverydifficulttosay,intheabstract,
whetherlibertarianmodelsoffreewillareunderminedorconstrainedbymoral
freedom.Becausetheyholdthatthewill(ortheagent)issomehowseparate
fromthecausalmechanismsoftheuniverse,itispossiblethattheyare
unaffectedbymoralenhancement.And,eveniftheyareaffected,theymightbe
affectedinapositiveway.Alotdependsontheparticularitiesoftheindividual
case.
Othertheoriesoffreewillandmoralresponsibilityarecompatibilistin
nature.Theyclaimthatmoralfreedomispossiblewithinadeterministiccausal
order.Deterministiccausationbyitselfdoesnotunderminefreedom.What
mattersiswhetheranagent’sactionsareproducedbytherightkindofcausal
mechanism.Therearemanydifferentaccountsofcompatibilistfreewill,but
someoftheleadingonesarguethatanagentcanactfreelyifthecausal
mechanismproducingtheirmoralchoicesisreasons-responsiveand/orproduces
actionsthatareconsistentwiththeircharacterandhigherorderpreferences
(FischerandRavizza1998;Dworkin1988;Frankfurt1972).19
Moralenhancementcouldunderminecompatibilistfreewillso
understood.Itmaychangethecausalsequenceofactionfromonethatis
compatiblewithmoralfreedomtoonethatisnotcompatiblewithmoral
freedom.IntheLittleAlexcase,theaversiontherapycauseshimtofeelnauseous
wheneverheentertainsviolentthoughts.Thisisdefinitelyinconsistentwith
someversionsofcompatibilism.Fromthedescription,itseemslikeAlex’s
characterisstillaviolentoneandthathehashigher-orderpreferencesfordoing
badthings,it’sjustthatheisunabletoexpressthoseaspectsofhischaracter
thankstohisnausea.Heisthusblockedfromactingfreelyaccordingtohigher-
orderpreferenceaccountsoffreedom.Similarly,itcouldbethattheaversion
therapymakeshimlessresponsivetocertainkindsofreasonsforaction.This
mightundermineareasons-responsiveaccountofmoralfreedom.
But,again,thedevilwillbeinthedetail.Themodalityoftheenhancement
willbeallimportant.Somemodalitiesmightbeperfectlyconsistentwith
compatibilisticmoralfreedom:theymightchangeanincompatiblecausal
sequenceintoacompatibleone.Inthisrespect,aversiontherapyishardlythe
onlygameintown.Someagentsmightdesirethegoodatahigher-orderlevel
19Dworkin,G.TheTheoryandPracticeofAutonomy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress1988)Fischer,JMandRavizza,M.ResponsibilityandControl(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).Frankfurt,H.Freedomofthewillandtheconceptofaperson.JournalofPhilosophy68(1971):5-20
andbethwartedfrompursuingitbylower-orderimpulses.Amoral
enhancementtechnologymightworkbyblockingtheselowerorderpreferences
andtherebyenablingmoralfreedom.Ifwebelievethatchemicalcastrationcan
countasatypeofmoralenhancement,thenthisisarguablyhowitworks:by
blockinglower-orderpreferencesforsexualmisdeeds.Othermodalitiesofmoral
enhancementmightworkbychanginganagent’sabilitytoappreciate,process
andrespondtodifferentreasonsforaction.Thiswouldimprovetheirreasons-
responsivity.Althoughnotwrittenwithmoralenhancementinmind,Maslen,
PughandSavulescu’spaper(2015)onusingDBStotreatAnorexiaNervosa
highlightssomeofthesepossibilities,showinghowneurointerventionsthatare
directlymediatedthroughhigher-orderbrainfunctionsmightbepreferableto
thosethatarenot.20
Ontopofthis,thosewhoclaimthatmoralfreedomisunderminedby
enhancementmustdealwiththecaseinwhichanagentfreelydecidesto
undergoanenhancementtreatmentatT1thatwillcompromisetheirmoral
freedomatT2.Mosttheoriesofmoralfreedomacceptthisasacaseinvolving
genuinemoralfreedom.Theyviewitasacaseinvolvingapre-commitmentto
beinggood.Tousetheclassicexample,theindividualwhochoosestoundergo
theprocessislikeOdysseustyinghimselftothemastofhisship:heislimiting
hisagencyatfuturemomentsintimethroughanactoffreedomatanearlier
momentintime.Themodalityofenhancementdoesn’tmatterthen:allthat
mattersisthatheisn’tforcedintoundergoingtheenhancementatT1.Hauskeller
acknowledgesthispossibilityinbothofhispapers,butgoesontosuggestthat
theymayinvolveadubiousformofself-enslavement.Atthispoint,the
metaphysicalaccountofmoralfreedombecomeslessimportant.Wemustturn,
instead,toamorepoliticalunderstandingoffreedom.
5.Freedom,DominationandSelf-Enslavement
20Maslen,H.,Pugh,J.andSavulescu,J.‘TheEthicsofDeepBrainStimulationforAnorexiaNervosa’8(2015):215-230.
Wheremetaphysicalfreedomisaboutourmoralagencyand
responsibility,politicalfreedomisabouthowothersrelatetoandexpresstheir
willsoverus.Itisaboutprotectingusfrominterferenceanddominationby
otherssoastomeettheconditionsforajustandmutuallyprosperouspolitical
community—onethatrespectsthefundamentalmoralequalityofitscitizens
(Gaus2010;Pettit2014).21Consequently,accountsofpoliticalfreedomarenot
somuchaboutensuringfreewillastheyareaboutensuringthatpeoplecan
developandexercisetheiragencywithoutbeingmanipulatedanddominatedby
others.So,forexample,ImightarguethatIampoliticallyunfreeinexercisingmy
vote,ifthelawrequiresmetovoteforaparticularparty.Inthatcase,others
havechosenforme.Theirwilldominatesmyown.Iamsubordinatetothem.
Althoughunderexploredintheenhancementdebate,22thispoliticized
accountoffreedommightprovideamorepromisingbasisforadefenceof
premise(2).Afterall,onecriticalproblemwithdebatesaboutmoral
enhancement–particularlythosethatappealto‘highstakes’riskssuchasthose
thatfigureinPerssonandSavulescu’saccount–isthattheyimplicitlyor
explicitlyendorsecasesinwhichothersdecideforuswhetherweshould
undergomoralenhancementtherapy.Thus,ourparentscouldgenetically
manipulateustobekinder;ourgovernmentsmayinsistonustakingacourseof
moralenhancementdrugstobecomesafercitizens;itmaybecomeaconditional
requirementforaccessingkeylegalrightsandentitlementsthatwebemorally
enhanced,andsoon.Themorallyenhancedpersonwould,consequently,beina
politicallydifferentpositionfromthenaturallygoodperson.That,atleast,ishow
Hauskellerseesit:
Themostconspicuousdifferencebetweenthenaturallygoodandthemorally
enhancedisthatthelatterhavebeenengineeredtofeel,think,andbehavein
acertainway.Someoneelsehasdecidedforthemwhatisevilandwhatisnot,
21Gaus,G.TheOrderofPublicReason.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010);andPettit,P.JustFreedom.(NewYork:WWNorton&Co,2014)22ThoughseeSparrow,‘Betterlivingthroughchemistry?’.
andhasprogrammedthemaccordingly,whichundermines,asJurgen
Habermashasargued,theirabilitytoseethemselvesasmoralagents,equal
tothosewhodecidedhowtheyweregoingtobe.Thepointisnotsomuch
thattheyhavelostcontroloverhowtheyfeelandthink(perhapswenever
hadsuchcontrolinthefirstplace),butratherthatothershavegainedcontrol
overthem.Theyhavechanged…fromsomethingthathasgrownandcometo
bebynature,unpredictably,uncontrolled,andbehind,asitwereaveilof
ignorance,intosomethingthathasbeendeliberatelymade,even
manufactured,thatis,aproduct.23
Thereisalotgoingoninthisquote.Butthegistofitisclear.Theproblem
withmoralenhancementisthatitcreatesanasymmetryofpower.Weare
supposedtolivetogetherasmoralequals:nooneindividualissupposedtobe
morallysuperiortoanother.Butmoralenhancementallowsoneindividualor
grouptoshapethemoralwillofanother.Butthiscomplaintdoesn’tquitegetat
thepre-commitmentsituation.Whatifthereisnootherindividualorgroup
makingthesedecisionsforyou?Whatifyouvoluntarilyundergomoral
enhancement?Hauskellerarguesthatthesameinequalityofpowerargument
appliestothiscase:
…wecaneasilyextend[this]argumenttocaseswherewevoluntarilychooseto
submittoamoralenhancementprocedurewhoseultimatepurposeisto
depriveusoftheverypossibilitytodowrong.Theasymmetrywouldthen
persistbetweenourpresent(andfuture)selfandourpreviousself,whichto
ourpresentselfisanother.Theeventwouldbesimilartothecasewhere
someonevoluntarilysignedacontractthatmadethemaslavefortherestof
theirlives.24
Whatshouldwemakeofthisargument?Itprivilegesthebeliefthatfreedom
fromtheyokeofothersiswhatmatterstomoralagency—thatweshouldbeleft
togrowanddevelopintomoralagentsthroughnaturalprocesses—notbe
23Hauskeller,‘The“LittleAlex”Problem’,78-7924Hauskeller,‘The“LittleAlex”Problem’,79
manipulatedandmanufacturedintomoralsaints(evenifthemanipulationand
manufacturingisdonebyourselves).ButI’mnotsureweshouldbeswayedby
theseclaims.Threecriticalpointsseemappositetome.
First,Ithinkweshouldbegenerallyskepticaloftheclaimthatitisbetter
tobefreefromthemanipulationofothersthanitistobefreefromothersortsof
manipulationorinterference.Therealityisthatourmoralbehaviouristhe
productofmanythings:ourgeneticendowment,oursocialcontext,our
education,ourenvironment,andvariouscontingentaccidentsofpersonal
history.Itisnotobvioustomewhyweshouldsingleoutcausalinfluencesthat
originateinotheragentsforparticularire.Inotherwords,thepresumptionthat
itisbetterthatwenaturallygrowanddevelopintomoralagentsseems
problematictome.Ournaturaldevelopmentandgrowth—assumingthereisa
coherentconceptofthe‘natural’atplayhere—isnotintrinsicallygood.Itisnot
somethingthatisnecessarilyworthsavingornecessarilybetterthanthe
alternatives.Attheveryleast,thebenefitsofmoralconformitywouldweigh
(perhapsheavily)againstthedesirabilityofnaturalgrowthanddevelopment.
Second,Idonotthinkthattheclaimthatinducedmoralenhancement
involvesproblematicasymmetriesofpowerholdsupunderscrutiny.Atthevery
least,itisnotaclaimthatisgenerallyorunquestionablytrue.Ifanything,Ithink
moralenhancementcouldbeusedtocorrectforasymmetriesofpower.Tosome
extentthiswilldependonthemodalityofenhancementandthebenefitsitreaps,
butthepointcanbemadeatanabstractlevel.Thinkaboutitthisway:Theentire
educationalsystemrestsuponasymmetriesofpower,particularlytheeducation
ofyoungchildren.Thiseducationofteninvolvesamoralcomponent.Dowerail
againstitbecauseoftheasymmetriesofpower?Notreally.Indeed,weoften
deemeducationnecessarybecauseitultimatelyhelpstocorrectforasymmetries
ofpower.Itallowschildrentodevelopthecapacitiestheyneedtobecomethe
truemoralequalsofothers.Ifmoralenhancementworksbyenhancingour
capacitiestoappreciateandrespondtomoralreasons,orbyalteringourdesires
todogood,thenitmighthelptobuildthecapacitiesthatcorrectforasymmetries
ofpower.Itmightactuallyenableeffectiveself-controlandautonomy.Being
morallyenhancedthendoesnotmeanthatyouareproblematicallyenslavedor
beholdentothewillofothers.
Third,andperhapsmostcontroversially,Iamnotconvincedthatself-
enslavementisabadthing.Everydecisionwemakeinthepresentenslavesour
futureselvesinatleastsomeminimalsense.Choosingtogotoschoolinone
place,ratherthananother,enslavesthechoicesyourfutureselfcanmakeabout
whatcoursestotakeandcareerpathstopursue.Isthatabadthing?Ifthe
choicesultimatelyshapeourdesires—iftheyresultinusreallywantingto
pursueaparticularfuturecourseofaction—thenI’mnotsurethatIseethe
problem.StevePetersenhasmadethispointinrelationtothecreationofrobot
slaves.25Hearguesthatifarobotisdesignedinsuchawaythatitreallyreally
wantstodotheironing,thenmaybegettingittodotheironingisnotsobadfrom
theperspectiveoftherobot(thislastbitisimportant—itmightbebadfroma
societalperspectivebecauseofhowitaffectsorexpressesourattitudestowards
others,butthat’snotrelevantheresincewearetalkingaboutself-enslavement).
Likewise,ifbychoosingtoundergomoralenhancementatonepointintime,I
turnmyselfintosomeonewhoreallyreallywantstodomorallygoodthingsata
latermomentintime,I’mnotconvincedthatI’mlivingsomeinferiorlifeasa
result.
6.Conclusion
Tosumup,the‘freedomtofall’objectionisoneofthemorepopular
objectionstothemoralenhancementproject.Hauskellerdefendsaninteresting
versionofthisobjection,onethatdrawsourattentiontocertainkeyaxiological
intuitions:thatitisbettertohavemoralfreedomanddobadthanitistobe
forcedintomoralconformity;thatitisbettertonaturallydevelopandgrowinto
amoralpersonthanitistobemanipulatedandmoldedbyothers(including
yourself).Inthischapter,Ihavecalledtheseaxiologicalintuitionsintoquestion.I
arguethattheyrestontheimplausiblebeliefthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsic25Petersen,S.‘DesigningPeopletoServe’inLin,AbneyandBekey(eds)RobotEthics:TheEthicalandSocialImplicationsofRobotics.(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2012)
goodandthatmanipulation/self-enslavementisanintrinsicbad.Neitherof
theseviewsiscorrectorsufficienttojustifytheargumentagainstmoral
enhancement.Moralfreedomisanaxiologicalcatalyst,notanintrinsicgood;
self-enslavementandmanipulationarenotobviouslyinferiortootherformsof
causaldeterminationorexternalmolding.Ontopofthis,itisnotevenobvious
thatmoralenhancementunderminesmoralfreedom.Italldependsonwhatyou
meanbymoralfreedomandthemodalityofthemoralenhancement.Allthe
leadingtheoriesallowforthepossibilitythatmoralenhancementincreases,
ratherthanundermines,moralfreedom.