DADRIAN, Vahakn N. Armenian Massacres 1WW

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The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of theTurkish Military TribunalAuthor(s): Vahakn N. DadrianReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 549-576Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163884 .

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 23 (1991), 549-576. Printed in the UnitedStates of America

Vahakn N. DadrianTHE DOCUMENTATION OF THE WORLD WAR IARMENIAN MASSACRES IN THE PROCEEDINGSOF THE TURKISH MILITARY TRIBUNAL

The deportation of the majority of the Armenian population from the OttomanEmpire during World War I and the massacres that accompanied it are of com-manding interest. The paucity of scholarly contributionsin this area,however, hasimpeded the development of interest in the subject, thereby contributing to thenebulous state surroundingthe conditions that led to the disappearanceof an en-tire nation from its ancestral territories. Some maintain that this nebulousness iscompounded by the intrusion of political calculation.1 At issue is whether or notthe disaster was intentionally organized by the Ottoman authorities, and whetheror not the scope of Armenian losses bore any relationshipto that intention.Scholars relying on Ottoman sources and data have disputed that it was inten-tional and have attributedArmenian losses mainly to the exigencies of the war andto the resulting privations, although they do admit to certain massacres, beyondthe control of the central authorities.2This view is not, however, supported by thevast corpus of documentary material found in the archives of the United States.The thrust of this material is that large-scale massacres, carried out under thecloak of deportation,were centrally planned and organized.3Even more incriminating are the authoritative documents found in the state ar-chives of Germanyand Austria whose political and military alliance with TurkeyduringWorld WarI afforded the diplomatic, military, and consular representativesof the two countries stationed in Turkeyan invaluable vantage point, including ac-cess to high-level decision-makers.4 It is difficult to overestimate the importanceof these sources, which cast in stark relief the dubious aspects of official docu-mentationupon which the Turkishpoint of view is predicated.5The value of the documentarymaterial marshaledby the Turkish Military Tri-bunal largely derives from the problems that plague the Ottoman archives thatdeal with the Armenian question. Several considerations raise serious questionsabout the completeness and reliability of these archives that recently have beenofficially opened to public perusal. The overall thrust of the sources and data con-tained in them is contradictedby the set of Ottoman documents assembled by theTurkish Military Tribunal,which constitute the central topic of the present study.It is, therefore, appropriate o describe what these problems are.The Ba?bakanlik Ar?ivi contain the wartime records of the Ottoman cabinetcouncil deliberations and decisions. The absence in them of any governmental? 1991 Cambridge UniversityPress 0020-7438/91 $5.00 + .00


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550 Vahakn N. Dadrianorders to massacre has been the basis for the revisionist school's claim that noscheme to annihilate the Armenians ever existed. Stanford Shaw and Ezel KuralShaw, for example, assert that "careful examination of the secret records of theOttoman cabinet at the time reveals no evidence that any of the CUP [Committeeof Union and Progress] leaders, or anyone else in the central government orderedmassacres."6 StanfordShaw's former student Justin McCarthystates, "To date, noevidence of any central government plot to annihilate the Armenians hassurfaced."7In an effort to reinforce these views, West Virginia Senator RobertByrd, duringthe February1990 U.S. Senate debate, declared, "Among the catego-ries of cataloged documents now available are the records of the deliberations anddecisions of the Ottoman Council of Ministers. ... Now, for the first time, all thedeliberations and actions of the Council of Ministers for the period of World War Iare available to scholars. This obviously includes all decisions relatingto the relo-cation of the OttomanArmenians during the war."8What is overlooked or ignored in these statements, however, is the fact that themassacres were secretly decided and handled by the top leaders of Ittihad,i.e., theCUP. Most cabinet ministers representing the government were either not in-formed or were ill-informed about these party initiatives. The statements of GrandVizier Said Halim and wartime cabinet ministers (uruiksulu Mahmud (PublicWorks), Ahmed ?ukru (Education), and Pirizade Ibrahim(Justice), testifying be-fore the Fifth Committee of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies investigating thewartime crimes of the ministers, as well as that of Special Organization ChiefE,ref Ku?cubasli,attest to this.9That this was the case is confirmedby none otherthan Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, the late dean of Turkishhistorians, who wrote: "Actu-ally, the most importantdecisions were secretly made among two or three people.It is therefore natural that they do not show up in the transcriptsof the cabinetcouncil. However, in cases of extreme importance,or when it was deemed desir-able to implicate the responsibility of some people, written records were kept onthe respective decisions of the Cabinet Council."10Anotherproblem is caused by the government'srestrictionsand the attendant s-sue of arbitrary nterpretations nvolved. The Turkishauthorities reserve the rightto deny access to material in the Ba?bakanhlk rchive, on three grounds:(1) risk tonational defense, (2) risk to public order, (3) danger to Turkey's relations withother states, or to the need for maintaining normal relations between two foreigncountries." Perhaps most critical is the general attitude, past and present, thatstate secrets are involved in matters pertaining to the Turko-Armenian conflict.Accordingly, the principle of overriding national interest is invoked when han-dling incriminating evidence related to the wartime treatmentof the Armenians.Leading public figures in Turkeyare on record as insisting that such incriminatingevidence should be concealed ratherthan revealed. This attitudebecame manifestwhen Cemal, the Ottoman interior minister at the time of the Armistice, publiclydisclosed that "800,000 Armenians were actually killed" in the course of the de-portations.12 Suleyman Nazif, a prominent poet and publicist and former governorof the provinces of Basra (1909), Kastamonu (1910), Trabzon (1911), Mosul(1913), and Baghdad (1914), angry that non-Muslims had been told a state secret,inveighed against Minister Cemal with the words: "This act is not worthy of a


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TheDocumentationof the WWIArmenianMassacres 551Muslim minister."'3At the twenty-eighth secret session of the Grand National As-sembly (April 3, 1924) of the newly established Republic of Turkey, former inte-rior minister Cemal was repeatedly castigated for admitting to the massacre of800,000 Armenians. Interior Minister Ahmed Ferit, reporting to the assembly,added insult to injury by appendingto Cemal's name the Armenian name Artin, atthe same time calling him "herif," a pejorative meaning a contemptible person.14The noted historian Bayur likewise criticized the minister for supplying "to ourenemies proof and weapons" (kanit ve silah).'5 Mahmud Celal Bayar, word-for-word repeated Bayur's denunciation, attributingInteriorMinister Cemal's eager-ness to disclose Armeniancasualty figures to a desire not only to appease the greatpowers, but to enable them to crush defeated Turkey. Accordingly, President Ba-yar (in the 1950-60 period he served as president of the Republic of Turkey), likehistorian Bayur before him, characterized Interior Minister Cemal's disclosure as"a most unnecessary and ugly manifestation of this mentality" (en liizumsuz veCirkinbir belirtisi).'6 During the war Bayar, aged 30, was Ittihad's "responsiblesecretary"(katibi mesul) in Izmir, which next to Istanbulwas the largest partydis-trict. This ratherharmless sounding title, which correspondedto the Nazi designa-tion Gauleiter, was deliberatelychosen to cover up the extensive powers vested inthese provincial commissars of Ittihad (for more details, see n. 51). As indicatedin note 12, however, the disclosure of 800,000 Armenians killed in the course ofthe wartime deportationswas the result of compilations conducted by the InteriorMinistry during the preceding months. They have been reconfirmedby historianBayur who, in the last volume of his 10-volume study of the TurkishRevolution,declares these figures to be "consonant with the figures supplied by our officialsources" (bizim resmi kaynaklaragore de dogru saymak gerektir). For this act ofcorroboration,Bayur adoptedthe adjustedfigures of Colonel Nihad, Turkish Gen-eral Staff historian, who compiled a statistical survey of wartime Turkishlosses.17The significance of the remonstrances mentioned earlier is exceeded only by theabsence in them of any effort to contest either the interior minister'scompetence,his reliability as a source, or the veracity of what he said.In a moment of candor, Mustafa Kemal Atatuirkevidently admitted that whatCemal said was true, an admission that lends special credence to the set of Otto-man documents compiled by the TurkishMilitary Tribunal. In a two and one-halfhour exchange on September 22, 1919, with Major General Harbord,the head ofthe American Military Mission to Armenia, who prepared a report on that ex-change, Kemal used the 800,000 figure to describe the numberof Armenian vic-tims. As quoted by Rauf Orbay, Mustafa Kemal "disapproved of the Armenianmassacres" (Ermeni kitalni o da takbih ediyordu). The context in which this ad-mission was made was defensive; Kemal was arguing that "the crime of killingpeople and other assorted crimes are occurring in America, France, and Englandas well, but only Turkey is being held accountable for the massacre of 800,000 ofits citizens."18Seven months later, on April 24, 1920, the day after the inaugura-tion of the new parliament of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal alluded to"the massacres against the Armenians" (Ermenilere karpi katliam), describingthem as "a shameful act" (fazahat).19


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552 Vahakn N. DadrianAtatiirkinveighed against the Ittihadistchiefs, whom he blamed for the crime,and "their accomplices who deserve the gallows. Why do the Allies delay havingall these rascals hung?" (Qu'attendent les Allies poor faire pendre toute cette ca-naille?)20 As will be described later, it will be incumbent upon the Turkish court-martialjudicially to take up this challenge soon thereafter,as the Allies had nei-therjurisdiction in the matter nor the requisite prosecutorialpowers.21 n Atatuirk'sspeech there is no trace of the excuses contemporaryrevisionists indulge in, suchas injecting into the picture references to "civil war," "intercommunalclashes,"and "wartime privations."The special courts-martial,institutedby the postwar Ottomanauthorities for thetrial of Ittihadist leaders and cabinet ministers, meant that for the first time inOttomanTurkish history civilian and military officials of the highest rank wouldbe tried for criminal offenses against the Armenians. The non-Muslim faith of theArmenians had for centuries served to confer upon them a de facto inferior status,despite the repeated introductionsof a host of de jure statutes proclaiming equal-ity for all subjects of the OttomanEmpire.Prejudicesand repressive measures fol-lowed conflict, and intermittentmassacres were the byproductof this situation. Asfar as it is known, for the first time in internationallegal history a domestic courtset out to try and punish its own nationals for a crime that for all practical pur-poses had international scope,22but for which the court applied municipal penalcodes. The might of the victors, mainly the British and French, served to impel, ifnot compel, the Ottomans,the losers in the war, to disclose incriminatingevidencethat was presumedto be in their possession. Despite external pressures and inter-nal posturing meant to mollify the victors, in the end a capital crime was exposedand established through probative evidence.Of the three courts-martial formed, one was to investigate "deportations andmassacres" (tehcir ve taktil); one was to investigate economic crimes; the preciseduties of the third cannot be determined, though it did prosecute some militarypersonnel. The impetus to legal action against the Ittihadists was the escape fromthe Ottoman capital of seven of its top leaders-Mehmed Talat, Ismail Enver,Ahmed Cemal, Drs. Mehmed Nazim and Behaeddin $akir, and police and securitychiefs Osman Bedri and Hiiseyin Azmi-on the night of November 1, 1918. Theirflight, 48 hours after the signing of the Armistice,23to escape responsibility for"the Armeniandeportations,"as conceded by Talat and Ittihad'ssecretary-generalM. Uiikrui,24ouched off a public clamor demandingtheir captureand punishment.On November 23, 1918, the administration's nquirycommission was formedandcharged with investigating "the misdeeds" (seyyiat) of governmentalofficials, "ir-respective of rank."Headed by Hasan Mazhar,25he commission was vested withbroadpowers, including the power to subpoena, searchand seize, detain andarrest;for the exercise of these powers it relied on thejudicial police and the agency of themilitarygovernor. In a period of some two months the commission secured, coded,and decoded telegraphicordersfrom twenty-eight provincial locations identified ascenters of deportationsand massacres in Asiatic as well as EuropeanTurkey, in-cluding Tekirdag (Rodosto), Edirne (Adrianopolis), and Istanbul.26From Ankaraprovince alone the commission obtained a batch of forty-two ciphers that includedtelegraphicexchanges between militarycommandersinvolved in Armeniandepor-


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TheDocumentationof the WWIArmenian Massacres 553tations. In addition, it compiled a mass of pre-trial interrogatoryevidence throughinterrogatoriesadministeredorally and in writing to primafacie suspects. Amongthem were twenty-six chamberdeputies who were denied permits to travel to theirelectoral districts to avert their possible escape.27Beside the MazharInquiryCommission, the Ottoman Chamberof Deputies con-stituted its own inquiry commission (Besinci 3ube TahkikatKomisyonu). In No-vember and December 1918, it conducted fourteen hearings, interrogatingthirteenministers and, throughwrittenstatements, two seyhulislams.It too was able to se-curesome top secret documentsthat were eventually turnedover to the court-martialas the MazharCommission haddone sometime in January1919. Furthermore,n De-cember 1918, throughthe instance of the Ministries of Warand Justice, provincialauthoritiesreceived the vizier's directives to establish local inquirycommissions toserve as the investigative arms of the regional courts-martial. The latter werecharged to prosecute, under the terms of Article 25 of the Law of Brigandage, theCetes,as the principaltools of the massacres.Finally, the firstIstanbulcourt-martial,investigating the circumstancessurrounding he Armenianmassacres, set up its owninquirycommission afteradjudgingthe workof theMazharInquiryCommission un-satisfactoryandincomplete; as a result it located andsecured additionaldocuments,supplementaryto the evidence gatheredby the latter.Within three weeks after the start of its investigations, the MazharCommissiondeterminedthat there was enough evidence to warranta trial, a decision in confor-mity with the OttomanCode of Criminal Procedure(Usulu MuhakematiCezaiye).The bitter debate that ensued in the parliament,in the press, and in the first two sit-tings of the military tribunal, revolved around whether the offenders should betried before the High Court (Divani Ali) or before the military tribunal. At issuewere several provisions of the Ottomanconstitution. Article 31 provides, for ex-ample, for the trial before the High Court of ministers accused of official miscon-duct. Article 92 of the Constitution mandates that of the thirty members of theHigh Court, ten must be senators, ten must be chosen from among the presidentsand members of the Court of Cassation (MahkemeiTemyiz)and Court of Appeals(MahkemeiIstinaf), and ten from the Council of State (?urayi Devlet). The minis-ters in the dock were pleading an "act of state" (umurumemure)defense; accord-ingly, they would be answerable to the High Court. Should this plea be rejected,they argued, they should be tried before regularcriminal courts. Rejecting the pleaof "act of state," the prosecution arguedthat the propervenue of the trials was thecourt-martial inasmuch as the defendants had committed common-law crimes(ceraimi adiye) not as ministers but as conspiratorialIttihadists. The prosecutionlikewise rejectedthe defense's claim thatpursuant o Article 33 of the Constitution,regularcriminal courts should try the defendants. Article 33 stipulates that in caseministers are chargedwith common offenses, not connected with official duties, theprosecution of this type of offense reverts to "ordinary jurisdiction" (mehakimiadiye). The prosecution's rejection was firstbased on the fact thatthe state of siegethat the Ittihadists had instituted on April 12/25, 1909, and which, except for abrief interval (July 23-October 5, 1912), it had maintained ever since, was still inforce.28Second, reference was made to Article 113 of the Ottoman Constitution.Covering martiallaw, that law declares, "The effects of the state of siege consist in


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554 VahaknN. Dadrianthe temporary suspension of the civil laws."29Relying on this provision in framingthe key indictment, the procuror-generaldeclared that "wherever martial law is inforce, civil and judicial laws are entirely muted" (kavanini mulkiye ve adliyetamamile sakin), and that courts-martialbecome the only final recourse (merciiceraim).30The formation of the court-martialwas authorizedthroughan imperial irade (re-script) on December 16, 1918. Another irade (of December 25, 1918), involvingofficials suspected of complicity in the atrocities, declared that trialcompetence forareas not under siege by martial law will devolve upon existing criminal courts soas not to vitiate the terms of Article 88 of the Constitutionsetting forth the condi-tions of jurisdiction and venue.31A third irade (on January8, 1919) renderedthespecial court-martialoperational for the trial of the perpetratorsof "deportationsand massacres" (tehcir ve taktil).32The military panel of judges included a presid-ing judge (or chief justice) with the rank of divisional general (in the presentcase,MahmudHayret Pasa, who in March 1919 was replaced by Mustafa Nazim Pasa)and two associate judges with the rank of general, brigadier general, or colonel.These were supplied by the Defense Ministry. The procuror-generaland his depu-ties were provided by the Ministry of Justice.The turmoil in defeated Turkey in the months following the Armistice inevita-bly imposed constraintsupon the court. The pressureson it were many. The victo-rious Allies, while concerned with punitive justice against the perpetratorsof theArmenianmassacres,33were most eager to punish those who drove Turkeyinto thewar on the side of the CentralPowers, Germanyand Austria. The general feelingwas that unless the war criminals were swiftly broughtto justice and severely pun-ished, Turkey could expect the Allies to dictate very stiff peace terms. The prob-lem was compounded by growing domestic tensions. Even though the Ittihadhadnominally vanished from the scene, many special organization(teqkilatimahsusa)operatives went undergroundand began to form a network of action cells in manywards of the Ottomancapital. The pressures reached a high point in the wake ofthe May 1919 occupation by Greek forces of Smyrna(Izmir). Througha series ofmass demonstrationsinvolving tens of thousands of participantsthe public outcryagainst the Allies, and indirectly against the trials, was raised to a crescendo. As agoodwill gesture, the government set free forty-one suspects. The fear that theBekiraga military prison, where the high-rankingIttihadists, including the minis-ters, were being held, might be stormed and the inmates liberated, promptedtheBritish, with the tacit approval of then Grand Vizier Damad Ferit, to transfersixty-seven of the prison inmates to Malta at the end of May 1919.34 Despite this,the trials of the remainingIttihadists, as well as those of cabinet members-nota-bly Enver, Talat, Cemal, Nazim, and ?akir, who were brandedby the court as "fu-gitives of justice"-continued.The treatmentof those held in Bekiraga, the War Ministry's prison, included aset of privileges rarelyaccordedprimafacie suspects chargedwith capital crimes.The following two British passages summarize the picture:35 1) "prisoners hadfriends in almost every departmentof State and had been allowed the utmost lib-erty of communication with their friends and sympathizers";and (2) "All prison-ers of whom there are 112 are allowed to walk about the prison and mix freely


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The Documentation of the WWIArmenianMassacres 555during the day. Except for a casual glance at their passes, individuals are not sub-jected to any inspection on entering the prison, and large packets are often to beseen being carried in by individuals, stated to be food, but might be anything.Women are allowed in all times during the day, and are never inspected." Aspointed out in the memoirs of Grand Vizier Izzet Pasa, "All the police officers"were, and acted as, Ittihadist cohorts.36The defendants were not assembled at se-cure locations or held in the close confinement ordinarily imposed in such cases.In his memoirs, one inmate relates how the cabinet ministers were allowed to meetin a large room and discuss defense strategy. They even invited Osman, the legalcouncellor of the InteriorMinistry, for consultation; Osman and the author of thebook describing this procedure happenedto be incarcerated n a nearbyroom.37Civil servants who were either Ittihad partisans or sympathizers availed them-selves of every opportunityto obstruct the efforts of the court. They withheld cru-cial documents, impeded communication with provincial authorities,and stalled incomplying with court orders to hinder the proceedings.38Thanks to this and theoverall permissive atmosphere, a number of top Ittihadists were able to organizetheir escapes from the prison; for example, Diyarbekir governorDr. Mehmed Resit($ahingiray), the Sixth Army CommanderHalil (Kut), and KiiuiikTalat (Muskara),implicated in the Armenian massacres, were able to escape from prison,39and oth-ers managed to avoid arrest and detention by using vesikas (travel identity cards)from the government that allowed them to leave Turkey. In the latter group wereTrabzon's responsible secretary Yenibahqeli Nail, Erzurum'sdelegate-inspectorFilibeli Ahmed Hilmi, and the region's Special Organizationleader Cafer.40The court did, however, continue with the trials, performingits tasks as well asit could, considering that the secret pre-trial investigation had been supplantedbyan accusatorial presiding judge, who had considerable latitude in the applicationof the law of evidence. That law, which was inherent in the Ottoman-Turkish le-gal tradition,relied on what is called kanaati vicdaniye or hukuku akdiriye:in theattribution of credence to evidence that is presented, the maxim of "intimateconviction," an intuitively judicial sense or assessment, is broughtinto play to thebest of a judge's conscience.

In his opening remarks,the presiding judge addressed the ministers in the dockas follows: "Itis not customary,nor is thereany legal obligation, for a court-martialto allow the proceedings to be public.... In order to demonstrate the intent of thecourt to conduct the trials impartiallyand in a spiritof lofty justice (kemali adil vebitaraf) I am going to use judicial discretion and conduct public trials. The courtis simply trying to help the defendants and facilitate their defense (teshil veistiane)."41'The defense that had been agreed upon during the consultations in Bekiragaprison alluded to earlier-which Ahmed Emin Yalman, the above-cited author,sardonically calls the prison's "cabinet council" sessions-was that all the princi-pal defendants would deny the charge that there had been Armenian massacres.This prompted Aka GunduiizEnis Avni), the celebrated writer, to poke fun atthem in an article imitating their defense style, "Oh alas, oh alas, oh alas, oh alas.We didn't see, we didn't know, we didn't hear" (Vah, vah, vah, vah. gormuiiyor-duk, bilmiyorduk,isitmiyorduk).42


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556 Vahakn N. DadrianTo counter this defense, the MilitaryTribunal used two principalmethods: (1) itsprang one surprise after another by introducing as evidence coded telegramsbearing the names of the defendants; and (2) it underminedtheir denials by intro-ducing statements and confessions from the pre-trial interrogatories signed bythem. As a result, some but not all of the defendants amended their testimony, in-cluding Central Committee member Yusuf Riza, as well as top Ittihadists KuiiukTalat, and Special OrganizationDirector "Kambur"Atif (Kamcil).After Ferit's third cabinet fell on October 2, 1919, the prosecutorialzeal of thecourt slackened considerably. About a year later, when Ferit's fifth and final cabi-net was virtually forced out by the sweeping tide of Kemalism (October21, 1920),the courts-martial ceased functioning.

The criminal offenses committed against the Armenians during World War I arespelled out in the indictment handed down by the TurkishMilitary Tribunal. Theparticularsof this indictment, or the bill of charges, can also be found in the sub-sidiary indictments drawnup for the series of trials of less prominentIttihadists.The key indictment warrantsattentionbecause it is the only available prosecu-torial statement that refers to evidence with proof of certification, indicating thenatureof the arrayof documents lodged with the indictment.43Many of these doc-uments are top secret orders and coded telegrams. Others are admissions of guiltand related confessions from the accused who were subjected to pre-trial interrog-atories administeredby examining magistrates. Still others are written statementsand depositions from a number of civilian and military officials supplying testi-mony on the complicity of the defendants. Except for the Armeniandeputy, OnnikIhsan-who was allegedly sparedthe fate of his co-nationals because he belongedto Ittihad-the indictment is based on evidence furnished by Muslim Turks. Nei-ther the indictment nor the court-martialproceedings are generally accessible toscholars, and no Turkish author to date has produced any work examining the tri-als. There are rare and scattered references to some individual issues of TakvimiVekayi (the official organ of the Ottoman government whose supplements irregu-larly covered the proceedings), but no comprehensive index of this gazette thatcover the proceedings.In all its subsequent verdicts, the tribunal sustained the charges relating to thedestruction of the Armenians, pointing to evidence on "the organization and im-plementationof the crime of murder(taktil cinayeti) by the leaders of Ittihad.Thisfact has been proven and verified (tahakkuk)."44The trial for the wartime cabinet ministers and top Ittihadists, for which the in-dictment was prepared, began on April 28, 1919. Following the identification ofthe defendants and their defense counsels, the presiding judge asked ?efik, thecourt clerk, to read into the record the indictment (iddianame). After that, MajorGeneral (Ferik) Mustafa Nazim, the presiding judge, and Mustafa Nazmi, theprocuror-general,made their observations.45At the beginning and at the end of the indictment, reference is made to "thetragedy" resulting from "the Armenian deportations"(p. 5), and the court iden-tifies its "principaltask" (ciimlei vazife) as the probingof wartime"massacres and


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The Documentation of the WWIArmenian Massacres 557profiteering" (taktil ve ihtikar), "crimes which the perpetratorsdared to commit"(ceraime miicaseret) (p. 8).After declaring that "an important portion"of the documentarymaterialbelong-ing to the Central Committee and to the Special Organizationhad been "stolen"(asirildigi), the court described the evidence in its possession. Included in it are"pre-trial documentarymaterial"(istintak) (p. 4), usually assembled by examiningmagistrates, "documents and proofs" (delail ve berahin), "depositions" (beyanatitahririye), and other valid accounts (p. 5). In addition, the court had special filescontaining "the residual papers of the Special Organization,"the "Talat file," ob-tained from the Fifth Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, and a long, detaileddeposition from the Third Army Commander Vehib Pasa (p. 6). The ensemble ofthe evidence in the possession of the court-martialencompassed documents ob-tained from, or implicating, army commanders Mahmud Kamil, Ahmed Cemal,Yanyali Vehib, and Halil Kutand, additionally,Halil Recayi, deputycommander ofAnkara'sFifth Army Corps, and ?ahabeddin,deputy commander of Kayseri's 15thDivision in Ankaraprovince.Outstandingin this collection of evidence were the documents implicating Spe-cial Organizationchiefs Drs. Nazim and *akir, MajorYusuf Riza, Colonel Cevad,Halil's successor in the post of Military Governor of Istanbul (Muhafiz),"Kambur"Atif, and famous Special Organization field operations chief, MajorYakub Cemil. The indictment places Interior Minister Talat in the forefront of allthe initiatives directed against the Armenians. Seven governors-Mazhar (An-kara), Celal (Aleppo, Konya), Hasan Tahsin (Uzer) (Erzurum,Damascus), ResitPasa (Kastamonu),Dr. Resit (Diyarbekir), Suleyman Nazif (Baghdad), and Miinir(Akkaya [post-war Erzurum])-are also mentioned as sources of legal evidence.These sources are supplemented with documents relating to mutasarrifs SaburSami (Antalya), Ali Suat (Der Zor), and Mufit. Among the sets of documentslodged with the indictment are twelve coded telegrams, four telegrams, and ninestatements obtained from governors through pre-trialinterrogatories.Before beingintroduced as exhibits by the prosecution, the documents were authenticatedbycompetent ministerial officials with the notation, "It conforms to the original"(aslina muafik or mutabik).The task of substantiatingthe charges in the indictment was difficult for severalreasons. The Ittihadists, particularly Dr. Nazim and Security Chief ErzurumluAziz (Emniyeti UmumiMudurii), had carried off loads of documents in the daysprior to the Armistice. The court had to make do with what was left and anythingbeyond the reach of the agents of Ittihad,who were bent on removing as much in-criminating evidence as they could. But the main impediment was that the anti-Armenian scheme had been secret, and records and written orders therefore keptto the barest minimum. The Ittihad maintained "an external and public" facade(zahiri ve aleni), but it engaged in "covert and secretive" operations, relying onthe use of "oral and secret instructions" (talimatiifahiye ve mahremaniyemubteni mestur ve hafi iki mahiyeti ...) (p. 4), and carried out "through oral andsecret orders and instructions" (icraatinin sifahi ve hafi evamir ve talimat itasisuretiile) (p. 5). These criminal actions (harekati cinayetkarelerine) were madepossible by the creation of a "secret network"(sebekei hafiye) (p. 5).


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558 VahaknN. DadrianAnotheraspect of the conspiracycharged by the prosecutionhad a Nurembergiantouch as Ittihad was accused of aggression46as partof its conspiracy to exploit thewar for its own ends.47"The intervention in World War I was rendered an accom-

plished fact by resort to a number of vile tricks and deceitful means (bir takimhiyelve desais istimallyle) ... the idea was to take advantageof the fact thatEuropewaspreoccupiedwith the general war"(p. 5). Hiringbrigands(fetes) for massacredutywas partof this conspiracy. "The idea was broadcastthatthese fetes were to be as-signed war duties. An effort was made to persuade well-intentioned and gulliblepeople of this. Taken together the documents and other pieces of evidence demon-strate, however, that subsequently [these fetes] were employed for the massacreand destruction of the convoys subjected to deportation (bilcahara . . . tehcire tutu-lan kafilelerin katl ve ifnasi ... olbapdaki delail ve berahin ve vesaikin heyetiumumiyesindenmusteban olmaktadir)(p. 6).Conspiracies require appropriatedecision-making by the conspirators regardingthe course of action being contemplated.That point is underlinedin the statement,"Themassacre and destructionof the Armenians were the resultsof decisions48 akenby the Central Committee of Ittihad" (Ermenilerin katl ve imhasi . .. neticei mukar-rerati olup ... ) (p. 7). These decisions were the result of "extensive and profounddeliberations"(ariz ve amik duiiunuilerekarar verilmi^)(p. 8). By the same token,the covert aspects of the conspiratorial ntentare evidenced in the actualoutcome ofthe conspiracyitself.49When it alludes to the implementationof anti-Armenianmea-sures, the indictmentrefers to "carryingout in a secret way the intent of the lead-ership of Ittihad"(ruesasinin mekasidini gizli bir usul dairesinde tenfiz ve icrayakoyulmu?) p. 5). Speaking of InteriorMinister Talat as the archconspirator,the in-dictment cites a particularcoded telegram betrayingTalat's "secret intent"(maksadihifz) about the Armeniandeportations.Der Zor mutasarrifAli Suat, the recipientofthe cipher, is instructedto "destroy"(iptal) the evidence afterreadingit (p. 6). In an-otherinstance,the indictmentadduces evidence of a case in which a high-rankingde-portation official, AbdulahadNuri, admits to having been told by Talat that "thepurpose of the deportationwas destruction"(tehcirin imha manasina muiistenit u-lundugunu). He is quoted as saying, "I... personally received the orders ofdestruction"(imha emirlerini bizzat aldim) (p. 5). The entire undertakingwas ex-pected"tosolve the Easternquestion"(butezebbusun?arkmeselesini halledecegini)(p. 8). In fact, Ittihadis accused of having tried a kind of final solution on accountof its propensityto seek remedies that "could solve lingeringproblemsonce and forall" (ilkai dehsetle hall vefasi sevdasina duierek) (p. 4).The chargesclaimed thatthe massacrewas accomplished with the cooperationofthe central authorities.The indictmentdismisses argumentsthat the anti-Armenianmeasures were a reaction to certain incidents, or were limited to certain localities,and states that the measures were sweeping and were organized and directed "by aunanimously acting central body" (bir kuvai muttehidenmerkeziyetarafindan ter-tip ve icraatinin) (p. 5). The indictment asserts that the deportationshad very littleto do with wartimeexigencies, citing the case of Bolu, a city located 72 miles inlandon the Istanbul-Adapazar-Ankara main road, thus far removed from "the warzone."50They represented"the goals and desires of the Cemiyet; they were a mea-sure of neithermilitary necessity nor for discipline or punishment(ne tedbiriaskeri,


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The Documentation of the WWIArmenianMassacres 559ne de tedbiri inzibati ciimlesinden olmayip, Cemiyetin emel ve arzusundan miin-bais) (p. 6).That there was an overall scheme of destructionis assertedby the statementthat"the use of the method of massacres is only a part of the activities and actions ofthe leaders of the Cemiyet involving what appearto be operations subsidiary to acentrally attached plan" (sureti katllarn. . . cemiyetin manzumei merkeziyesinemuzaf... ) (p. 7). The repeatedreferences to Talat and his InteriorMinistry por-tray him as the mastermind who devised the plan carried out by the ministry andparty in cooperation. This joint involvement is "indicated,"for example, in the re-cruitmentof "the cete" cadres (Dahiliye nezareti ile Cemiyetinbu cetelerle mesgulolduklarini iraye eder) (p. 6). Talat is furthersingled out as being in secret com-munication with ?akir, the director of the Special Organizationoperations in theeastern provinces; the court obtained a cipher telegram sent by ?akir to Ittihad'sCentral Committee via Talat (p. 8). In another document Talat shelves a reportin-forming him of the massacres, and in anotherpiece of evidence his ministry is de-picted as having hidden the notorious massacrerthroughadministrative fiat (p. 7).Two groups organized and supervisedthe details of the killings. One was com-prisedof the Ittihadist eaders, who were in chargeof the Special Organizationunitswho did the massacring. Halil Kut, the military governor of Istanbul (January-December 1914), his successor, Colonel Cevad, Security Chief Aziz, fedayi execu-tionerAtlf (Kamqil),ArtilleryMajorRiza, and Drs. ?akirandNazim were mentionedby name. Colonel Cevad is described as "having supplied" Dr. ?akir with "codekeys, automobiles, explosives and ample cash" (tevdi ve tahsis) (p. 5). The othergroupwas a coterie of Ittihadistex-officerswho hadresignedfrom the militaryto un-dertakespecial missions in the provinceson behalf of Ittihad.Whethercalled respon-sible secretary kdtibimesul), delegate (murahhas),or inspector (muiifettis),hey werevested with enormouspowers,51ncludingpowerto veto governors(vali). These pro-vincial commissars were the authorityrunningthe units. The indictmentgenerallydescribes them as functionaries that Ittihad "deployed in the provinces" (tasrayadagittigi) to facilitate "the massacres" (taktil) (p. 5). It cites Inspector Musa(Balikesir), and responsible secretaries Midhat(Bursa), Riisdu (Samsun) (p. 6), Ce-mal Oguz ((ankiri), Necati (Ankara),Hasan Fehmi (Kastamonu)(p. 7), and Yeni-bahceli Nail (Trabzon)(p. 8).Three overlapping groups of perpetratorsare mentioned in this connection. Thefirst are the gendarmes or provincial police. According to a July 15, 1915, ciphertelegram from Erzurum Governor Tahsin to the InteriorMinistry, cited in the in-dictment, "the gendarmes, attached to the Special Organizationforces," engagedin "criminal attacks and atrocities against the Armenians" in Erzurumprovince(Ermenilereolan taaddiydtve tecaviizatini) (p. 6). The second group are the brig-ands (Cetes)52who operated under the name of Special Organization (TekilatiMahsusa nami altinda tureyen ceteler). Their objective was "the destruction" ofthe deportees for which purposethe Special Organizationmaintained close contactwith Ittihad (imha vazifesiyle mesgul olarak Cemiyetle irtibati muekkid vesaik-dendir) (p. 6). The means used were massacre and plunder, as evidenced in thefete operations organized by Behaeddin ?akir (B.3. beyin tertip etmiz oldugu feteefradi ... kati ve garete maruz kaldiklari) (p. 7).


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560 Vahakn N. DadrianThe thirdgroupwere convicts fromimperialprisonsusedto carryout the massacre.The indictment identifiedSpecial Organization eadersHalil, Nazim, Atif, and Azizwho "emptied the prisons"53 (mahpuslari tahliye ettirdiklerine) of gangs of criminals(caniler, yakiler)(p. 6) and integrated hem into the command and controlsystem ofthe Special Organization p. 5). Elsewherethey aredescribed as "butchersof humanbeings, consortinggallowsbirds,and gendarmeswith bloody handsandeyes" (iptenve kazikdan kurtulmu? yaraninl ... eli goizu kanli jandarmalar) (p. 7).In organized mass murder,the organizershave to reckon with a certain amountof reluctance, or resistance, from ordinary people. Success required its removal.The indictment cites several instances of officials who resisted their orders beingremoved from office or, in some instances, put to deathto ensure compliance fromothers. The evidence supplied by Hamit, the director-generalof the Civil ServiceInspectorate, mentions the murder of two kaymakamswho had "objected to theatrocities and executions [by hanging] perpetratedagainst the Arabs, andhad takenissue with the Diyarbekir governor's method of handling the Armenian depor-tations" (Araplara icra kilinan mezalim ve idamlarla ... ) (p. 8). Two governors,Celal from Aleppo province and Mazhar from Ankaraprovince, were dismissed forobjecting to the massacre (p. 8). The court, relying on evidence it had obtainedthrough investigation (neticei tahkikatanazaran), declared that those who "vehe-mently rejected, andrefused to get involved" in these operationswere regarded"astraitors to the fatherland"(vatan haini). The threat of these sanctions played nosmall role in securing "docile and submissive officials" (muti ve miinkad) as evi-denced in the operationalzone of Dr. Behaeddin ?akir where "governmentofficialssubmitted to his orders and directives" (emir ve i?arina inkiyad etmiElerdir) (p. 7).The same severity was applied to ordinary Muslims who might have beentempted to help imperiled Armenians by providing them refuge. The indictmentcites the order of Third Army commander, General Mahmud Kamil, threateningMuslims with death by hanging in front of any house in which an Armenianmightbe sheltered and the house itself torched. If the offender is an official or belongs tothe military, the orderprovides for court-martial(Bir Ermeniyitesahuipedecek birMusliimanin hanesi onunde idam ve hanesi ihrak) (p. 7).The indictmentreproducesthe text of a June 21, 1915, cipher telegram in which

?akir inquires of Harput'sresponsible secretaryResneli Nazim whether the Arme-nians being deported from that province are being "liquidated" (tasfiye). "Arethey being destroyed, or are they merely being deported and exiled?" (Imha edil-iyor mu yoksa yalnizca sevk ve izammi olnuyor?) (p. 6).54The indictment also refers to large-scale massacres (pp. 5, 6, 7, 8) and mas?drownings, particularly in the coastal areas of the Black Sea where "the Arme-nians were being put on board caiques and drowned"55 Karadeniz sahillerindeErmenilerin kayiklara . . . irkdp ve gark edildikleri), according to the testimony ofTrabzondeputy, Hafiz Mehmed (p. 7). The indictment also spells out a numberofancillary offenses that might have eventually hastened death such as "guttinghouses" (ihraki mebani) (p. 5), "rape" (hetki irz),56 and "all sorts of tortures andshameful acts" (i?kence ve ezafezaihini ika eyledikleri) (p. 5).Following the transfer of the sixty-nine suspects to Malta at the end of May1919, the Turkish Military Tribunal on June 3 initiated a new series of cabinet


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TheDocumentationof the WWIArmenianMassacres 561minister trials that included the prosecution of two ministers, Rifat (Finance, andSenate president) and Hiiseyin Ha?im (Post) and one ?eyhulislam, Musa Kazim.The charges of massacre and personal enrichmentthroughthe plunderof the prop-erties of the deportee victims are repeatedin this supplementary ndictment, whichwas read at the June 3, 1919, sitting of the court. This indictment was framed inaccordance with the terms of paragraph311 of the OttomanCode of Criminal Pro-cedures providing for the amendment of the bill of charges (iddianame) in theevent that new crimes should come to light during a trial.57On May 3, 1919, the procuror-general'soffice formally notified the court thatnew offenses had been discovered in the course of the investigation conducted bythe examining magistrates. The amended version of the indictment, published inTakvimiVekayi No. 3571 (pp. 128-32), refers to the crimes of "massacre"(taktinufus), "plunderof properties"(nehbi emval), "torchingof corpses and buildings"(ihraki mebani ve eczad), "rape"(hetki irz), and "tortureand torment"(iskence veeza). Furthermore, he amendment also charges that these crimes were committed"in a particularly organized way" (teskilati miirettebeile), when the deportee con-voys were set upon and destroyed. They were perpetrated"in the capital and in theprovinces." The preambleto the new indictment also speaks of "the exterminationof an entire people constituting a distinct community,"and of the existence in theevidentiary material secured by the court of "the admission and confession" of thedefendants (kabul ve itiraf) (pp. 130, 131). The original indictmentmaintained thatthese measures were neither due to specific incidents, nor were they limited to cer-tain localities only (TakvimiVekayi, no. 3540, p. 5). The court also asserted thatthe deportationswere dictated neitherby militarynecessity, nor did they constitutea disciplinary measure (p. 6). The amended text of the indictment is even more ex-plicit on this point. These deportations,"were conceived and decided upon by It-tihad's Central Committee"; "[their] tragic consequences . . . were felt in almostevery corner of the Ottoman Empire" (Memaliki Osmaniyenin hemen hertarafinda) (TakvimiVekayi,no. 3571, p. 130).Using location (ratione loci) as a majorcriterion for its organization, the courtclustered the trials around those cities that served as principal sites for the massmurder:Yozgat, Trabzon,Harput,Bayburt,Erzincan,and Mosul. In addition werethe Buyukdere series, dealing almost exclusively with charges of plunderand pil-lage; and a series that tried the responsible secretaries and delegates, and the min-isters of the two wartimecabinets. All these trials took place in the edifice housingthe OttomanParliament n Istanbul.The first,the Yozgat series, began on February5, 1919; the rest stretched over eighteen months to July 1920. Several of the seriesoverlapped. The startof the Trabzon series, for example, coincided with the 14thsitting of the Yozgat series (March 26, 1919), with the latter ending at the 18th(April 7, 1919). Between the 14th and 15th sittings of the Trabzon trials (April 26and 30, 1919), the majorcabinet trial series was started(April 28). The Trabzonse-ries ended at the 20th sitting (May 17, 1919), and that of the cabinet ministers onJuly 5, 1919, after several interruptions,mainly caused by the transfer to Malta ofmost of the Ittihadistministers.In the cabinet trials verdict (TakvimiVekayi,no. 3604, pp. 217-20), Enver, Ce-mal, Talat, and Dr. Nazim were convicted and condemned to death; in the Harput


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562 Vahakn N. Dadriantrials, Dr. ?akir was likewise found guilty and condemned to death (TakvimiVekayi,no. 3771, pp. 1-2); both sentences were imposed in absentia. Rear Admi-ral and British Acting High Commissioner at Istanbul RichardWebb, when relay-ing to Foreign SecretaryCurzon the text of the verdict, remarked,"It is interestingto see . .. the manner in which the sentences have been apportioned among the ab-sent and the present so as to effect a minimum of real bloodshed."58Several lesserfunctionaries were condemned to death in absentia. From among those who werepresent at their trials, only three were convicted and hanged in Istanbul.59The most distinguishing feature of the verdicts resulting from those trials is theconsistency with which the main charges of the key verdict concerning the Arme-nian massacres were substantiated. A brief review of the proceedings of theseother trials and the findings, which are incorporatedin the ancillary verdicts, istherefore warranted.60No court, including a court-martial,can adjudicatea case solely on the basis ofevidence marshaledby the prosecution. It has to make allowance for evidence andargumentsfurnished by the defendant. The Turkish Military Tribunal did attemptto accommodate the defendants, and in doing so, it disposed of a number of con-tentions raised by the defense.One of these contentions was that the Armenians had provoked the attacks. Inthe Yozgat verdict, the court refuted this argumentby asserting that "the majorityof the Armenians had acted with dedication and loyalty" to the state (isbatisadakat ve merbutiyet etmi?) (Takvimi Vekayi, no. 3617, p. 2). Throughout theYozgat trial series, the defendants and their counsel made Armenianprovocation acentral issue. At the 15th sitting (March 27, 1919), for example, the presidingjudge, after a rigorous examination, got GendarmeryCommanderTevfik to admitthe inaccuracy of his claim of "Armenian insurgency";Tevfik then amended hischaracterizationto "an act of resistance." At the 8th sitting (February20, 1919),Colonel ?ahabeddin, the deputy commanderof Kayseri's 15th Division in chargeof handling this "resistance," stated that the word "rebellion" was inappropriatein describing the escape to the mountains of "5 or 6 Armenians."At the 11th sit-ting (March 5, 1919), Cemal, formermutasarrifof Yozgat, was asked to commenton the use of "a cannon" by "insurgent"Armenians. Directing his answer to thepresidingjudge, Cemal declared,You are a militaryman,yourHonor,Mr.President.Letus be reasonableinsafedinReisPa?a).Howcan men about he mountains,leeing, ducking,anddesperately rying o stayalive,carrya cannon n theircontinuous unningromonehidingplaceto another?Thisisnotsomething oucanputin yourpocketand movearound.The entireaffairwas aninsig-nificantmatter s a few Armenianugitiveshadclashedwith thegendarmes ursuinghem.It is an absoluteie that he Armenians adorganized ninsurgency.Therewasnoneof thatand therewas no cannon.This point came up again duringthe Trabzontrial series. At the 12th sitting (April16, 1919), the presiding judge noted that the anti-Armenianmeasures were dic-tated neither by military necessity nor as punitive measures. Addressing TrabzonDeputy Naci on the witness stand, he said: "Does it not follow that neither secu-


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The Documentation of the WWIArmenianMassacres 563rity, nor retaliation, but some other consideration" impelled the defendants tocommit the offenses with which they are charged?At the 11th sitting (March 5, 1919) of the Yozgat trial series, mutasarrlfCemaltestified that an informal, secret order to exterminate the Armenians was given tohim by Necati, Ankara'sresponsible secretary, who called it "the will of Ittihad'sCentral Committee"; he showed the paper that allegedly contained the order, butwould not permit Cemal to read it. When Cemal refused to take orders under suchcircumstances, denouncing the idea of massacring innocent people, he was dis-missed within two weeks.What is significant about all these trials is that the verdicts depended almost en-tirely on Muslim testimony supporting existing documentaryevidence. The court-room testimony of dozens of Armenian survivors was summarily dispensed within this regard.This procedurewas foretold by the procuror-generalnear the end ofthe Yozgat trials, the 16th sitting on March29, 1919; at the 9th, 12th, and 16th sit-tings of the same trial series the procuror-general emphasized that all the docu-ments being introduced as evidence were validated by competent ministerialofficials with the notation, "it conforms to the original," as required(February22,March6, 29, 1919, respectively).The tribunal n its ancillaryverdicts also came to gripswith the most abidingissuepunctuatingthe controversy about the nature of the anti-Armenian measures. Theperpetrators andtheirpastandpresent apologists) maintained that "relocation"wasthe sole purpose of the deportations.In the Yozgat verdict this claim was refuted.Instead, it was concluded that the deportationswere a cloak for the organizationofmassacres. "There can be no doubt and no hesitation" about this (uiphe ve tereddutbirakmadigindan) (TakvimiVekayi,no. 3617, p. 2).Finally, there is the argumentof "civil war" and its twin appendage, "intercom-munal clashes," put forth by those identified with "the Turkish point of view,"throughwhich victims and victimizers are confounded. In refusing to invoke Arti-cle 56 of the OttomanPenal Code, which the procuror-generalhad insisted upon,the military tribunal in its Yozgat verdict rejected the contention of a civil war,subsumed in Article 56 with reference to acts of "mutualslaughter" by communalgroups, armed for combat "against each other." Instead, it applied Article 45, forconviction and sentence rendition, thereby singling out the perpetratorsand iden-tifying the natureof their deeds.The charge of the complicity of Ittihad'sprovincial commissars was upheld inthe responsible secretaries' verdict in which the role of the defendants was de-scribed as having been "the organizationand engagement (tertib ve ihzar) of cetegangs carrying out the massacre and destruction of the Armenians" (TakvimiVekayi,no. 3772, p. 2). Nearly all the verdicts confirmedthat the massacres wereintentional. In the Harputverdict, for example, the court focused on the role of theSpecial Organizationand its director, ?akir, as involving "the extermination anddestruction of the Armenians"(ifna ve imha) (TakvimiVekayi,no. 3771, p. 1).The indictment underscored premeditation by quoting Dr. Nazim's statementthat the anti-Armenianmeasureswere not hasty decisions, but the result of "exten-sive and profound deliberations." In the verdicts of the trials of Yozgat (TakvimiVekayi, no. 3617, p. 2), Trabzon (Takvimi Vekayi, no. 3616, p. 3), and Erzincan


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564 VahaknN. Dadrian(TakvimiVekayi,no. 3917, p. 5), the court invoked Article 170 of the Ottoman Pe-nal Code, which prescribesdeath for the crime of premeditatedmurder.Article 169of the code defines premeditationusing the Arabic word taammuden,derived fromthe root word amd, which means "intent based on prior deliberation." In compos-ing its verdicts, the military tribunalused, however, the synonym in Turkish(kas-den) to convey premeditation.The main purpose of this study was to try to ascertainthe nature and purpose ofthe World War I anti-Armenianmeasures, often described as "deportations,"be-cause of the disparity between their stated purposes ("wartime relocation") andthe actual consequences, the almost total obliteration of the Turkish Armenianpopulation. "The Turkishpoint of view" denies any intent, using the Ottomanar-chives as its source. The opposite side questions the reliability of official Ottomandocuments, and turns instead to the vast corpus of American, German, and Aus-trian official material to document a deliberate scheme of extermination carriedout under the guise of deportations, a course of action beyond the realm of feasi-bility without the complicity of the central authorities.Though not all projected trials for which preparationswere completed wereheld, the court assembled sufficient evidence and renderedenough verdicts essen-tially to resolve the question of intent. By invoking the argument of a "victor'sjustice," a few genuine skeptics, on the one hand, and many Turkishpartisans,onthe other, saw fit to call into question the judiciousness of the convictions, just asothers did after the Nurembergtrials. Their argumentis debatable. First of all, thevictors were not involved in any significant way. The tribunal,unlike the Nurem-berg Tribunal, was set up and maintained by a succession of postwar Ottomangovernments; it was run exclusively by Ottoman officials representing the judi-ciary and the Ministries of Interior,Defense and Justice. The main, if not the only,pressure from the victors, the British and French, was to insist on instituting thecriminal proceedings to begin with, a demand consistent with their May 24, 1915,proclamationin which they had warned Turkey of retributionfor the massacre ofthe Armenians, then in progress. Lacking jurisdiction, prosecutorial powers, andthe machineryto apply internationallaw andjustice, that was all the victors coulddo, but without it the tribunal would have faced massive efforts at concealmentrather than disclosure of evidence. Left to its own devices no government, least ofall one representinga defeated and totally exhausted country, would be likely tocooperate in an effort that might lead to self-condemnation as evidenced in thedismal results of the 1921-22 GermanLeipzig trials.This was precisely the meaning two former Ittihadist leaders gave to the Yozgatverdict. Party Secretary-GeneralMidhat *ukruii,or example, referred to that ver-dict as a "self-condemnationby the governmentand a condemnationof the Turkishnation."6'Reacting to the same verdict, Fethi Okyardescribed it as "a concessionand certification by our own government of the criminal charges" involved.62It isequally significant to observe that the Ankara government in its efforts to securethe release of the Ittihadist leaders, detained in Malta by the British for later trial,three times within a 6-month period in 1921 pledged to put on trial those accusedof crimes committed in connection with the deportations.63When subsequently setfree, however, not one of them was indicted, let alone tried. More significant, sev-


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TheDocumentationof the WWIArmenianMassacres 565eral of these prima facie suspects were either reinvested or installed for the firsttime as deputies of the new Grand National Assembly,64while still others cata-pulted themselves into ministerial posts.65 This development acquires addedsignificance in the light of the fact that on June21, 1919, the Kemalists at the SivasCongress had, with the sole exception of Mazhar Mufit (Kansu), sworn (vallahi,billdhi) to abjureany allegiance to or supportfor the Ittihad.66All this is portentousof the fate and outcome of such trialsas might have been conducted under the aegisof Ittihadists themselves, or their devoted partisans. In this sense it is fair to as-sume that a crime is more likely to be revealed andexposed by political opponentsthanby cohorts or sympathizers.Whereassuch revelations are more or less subjectto the test of legal evidence, by its very naturepartisanconcealment or reticenceremainsfree from the constraints of such a test. The conduct of a lone political op-ponent in the Ottoman Parliamentduringthe war, when the fate of the Armenianswas hanging in the balance, is illustrative of the point. The reference is to SenatorAhmed Riza, one of the principal-but subsequently disillusioned-architects ofthe Ittihadparty, who distinguished himself throughhis singular thrust of opposi-tion to the series of anti-Armenian measures that throughoutthe war were beingrailroadedthroughthe Parliamentby the Ittihadistpower-wielders. By such mani-fest opposition, Riza already during the war was attempting,albeit with little suc-cess, to expose the lethal aspects of the anti-Armenianmeasures. A brief review ofthis opposition is not only germaneto this study but has particularrelevance to thisconcluding segment of that study.When, in the fall of 1915, the draft bill for the expropriationand confiscation ofthe goods, assets, and properties of the Armenian deportees was being pushedthrough, Riza on four different occasions (September 21/October 4, October 19/November 1, November 24/December 7, and November 30/December 13, 1915)raised his voice against "the inhumanity of the deportations,"the unconstitution-ality of the proposed law, and the atrocious mannerin which the victims were be-ing dispossessed and ejected from their domiciles (zorla, cebren), only tosubsequently reclaim their possessions as "abandonedgoods."67When, in 1916, the draft bill to enlist in the Special Organization convictedmurdererswas being discussed, that organizationalreadyhad all but completed itsmission against the Armenians. In denouncing the rationaleof the bill, Riza statedthat "murderers and criminals do not belong in the army," inasmuch as the billwas framed in such a way as to convey the impression that the recruitment was forthe benefit of the army. However, Colonel Behic (Erkin) of the Supply Depart-ment of the War Ministry (Ikmal fubesi) proudly declared in the Parliamentthatthe majorityof the convicts was being recruitednot for the benefit of the armybutfor the Teskilati Mahsusa, the organization in which they had proven their useful-ness. Hence, he argued, it was impossible for these criminals to prove perniciousto the overall morality of the army soldiers. Angered by this admission, Riza re-torted:"We know about the nature of thatorganization.We shall call it to accountin the future"(0 teskilattn ne oldugunu biliyoruz. Ilerde hesabini soracagiz). Not-withstanding, the bill was declared as "lawful" by the undersecretaryof the Jus-tice Ministry who requested and secured its passage as "an emergency" bill(muiistaceliyet).68


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566 VahaknN. DadrianOn October 19, 1918, duringthe 2 P.M. sitting of the second session of the Otto-man Senate, Riza, as presidentof thatbody, delivered his opening speech in whichhe invoked the memory of "the Armenians who were savagely murdered..."(vahSiyane olduriiulenErmeniler). When two days later, he was challenged in thesame Senate on his statement, Riza went one step furtherby describing the massmurderof the Armenians as an "officially"sanctioned crime requiring"the specialintervention" of the government.69As in Nuremberg, so in Istanbul, the tribunal relied largely on authenticateddocuments in its possession rather than on courtroomtestimony. While the lattermay be susceptible to pressures of all kinds-political expediency, and opportun-ism-documents, especially those dating back to World WarI, and hence antedat-

ing the Armistice, duringwhich the trials took place, are immune to them. Second,one has to distinguish between prosecution and punishment. In the courts-martialthere was little retributivejustice. All the principal offenders escaped, or were al-lowed to escape, and only three minor officials were executed. Even they were li-onized subsequently, viewed by the public as "national martyrs"(milli gehid).Very few of those sentenced to light prison terms served out their sentences.From the standpointof legal analysis and historical scholarshipit is fair to statethat the only benefit the trials had was the compilation of sufficient legal evidenceto establish that the Armenian massacres had in fact occurred and that the centralgovernment had been involved in its organization and implementation.The stringof verdicts makes clear that the judges of the tribunalwere persuaded beyond rea-sonable doubt that it had been. For all these reasons, it may be asserted that thepurpose of the World War I anti-Armenianmeasures, especially the deportations,was the destructionof the victim population, in other words genocide.70CONESUS, NEW YORK

NOTES'In an essay dealing with this issue, the late Terrence des Pres deploredthe subservience of a grow-ing number of academics to the lures and rewards of "power," at the expense of "the integrity ofknowledge." He wondered whether the deliberate misuse of the maxim that "there are two sides to ev-ery issue" has not reduced it to "a gimmick"to undermine and distort,ratherthan to "foster truth."Hewent on to state: "We are told no genocide took place but only a vague unfortunatemishap determinedby imponderables like time and change, the hazardsof war, uncertaindemographics.There is a com-monsense sound to the Turkish proposal.... [However,] Turkey's denial of the Armenian disaster isbacked by something largerthan mere doubt ...., " Terrence des Pres, "OnGoverningNarratives:TheTurkish-ArmenianCase," The Yale Review, 75 (October 1986), 518-19. In a subsequent essay, hescorned the "increasingattemptsto suborn the academy. . . . The issue, then, is whether or not we wishto be menials, for at the very least scholars who spend their resources defending the honor of nation-states serve something other than truth."Idem, "Introduction.RememberingArmenia,"in Richard G.

Hovannisian, ed., The ArmenianGenocide in Perspective (New Brunswick,N.J., 1987), p. 15.2TalatPasanin Hatiralari, ed. E. Bolayir (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 16, 38, 65, 74-76; Esat Uras, TarihteErmeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi (Ankara, 1950), p. 683 (in 2nd ed. [Istanbul, 1976] p. 673); ibid., TheArmenians in History and the Armenian Question, English trans. (no translator indicated) of revisedand expanded original edition (Istanbul, 1988), p. 932; KamuranGuriin, Ermeni Dosyasi (Ankara,


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TheDocumentationof the WWIArmenianMassacres 5671983), p. 223; ibid., The Armenian File. TheMyth of Innocence Exposed, English translationof preced-ing (no translator indicated) (New York, 1985), pp. 214-15; Dr. Mim Kemal Oke, Ermeni Meselesi1914-1923 (Istanbul, 1986), pp. 148-49; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel KuralShaw, History of the Otto-man Empire and Modern Turkey,2 vols. (Cambridge, 1976-77), vol. 2, Reform,Revolution, and Re-public: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975, pp. 316, 325; Justin McCarthy, Muslims andMinorities: The Population of OttomanAnatolia and the End of the Empire (New York, 1983), pp.117-19, 121, 133, 136-39.3TheUnited States duringthe warhad consuls functioning in such cities of the interior of TurkeyasHarput,Trabzon, Aleppo, Mersin (Adana), and at different times consular agents in Urfa, Samsun, andErzurum. Subsumed under the overall category of Race Problems, denoting the persecution of the Ar-menians in the 1915-21 period, the reportssent by these consuls add up to sixty. In addition, the StateDepartmentreceived seventy-eight similar reportsfrom its ambassadorsat Constantinople(Istanbul) theOttoman capital, including Henry Morgenthau, Abram Elkus, and Charge Hoffman Philip. Beyondthese, the State Departmentsent forty-nine communications, instructions, and orders on the same topicto U.S. diplomats, inside and outside Turkey. Finally, the departmenthas seven pieces of correspon-dence with foreign embassies, and 132 with private individuals in the United States-all dealing withthe wartime anti-Armenian measuresof Ottomanauthorities. Some experts, sympathetic to the Turkishpoint of view, ascribe bias to AmbassadorMorgenthauwho throughouthis wartimedispatches, and sub-sequently in his book, maintained that there was a centrallyauthorized and executed plan of destruction,disguised as deportation. See his following dispatches. United States National Archives, RG 59,867.4016/74 (July 10, 1914); ibid., /90 (August 11, 1915); ibid., /117 (September3, 1915); ibid., /162(October9, 1915); ibid., /797.5 (November 4, 1915); ibid., /799.5 (December 1, 1915). See also HenryMorgenthau,Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden City, N.Y., 1918). Notwithstanding, his twowartimesuccessors likewise testified to "the horrorsof the anti-Armeniancampaign"for which the em-bassy was "in receipt of ample details." In a dispatchof October 1, 1916, Charge Hoffman Philip, re-sponding to an inquiry by Secretary of State Robert Lansing as to what policy the U.S. governmentshould follow, declared "the most efficacious method . . . from an internationalstandpointwould be toflatly threaten to withdrawour diplomatic representativefrom a countrywhere such barbarousmethodsare not only toleratedbut actually carried out by order of the existing government"(RG 59, 867.4016/297). The next ambassador,Abram Elkus, in an October 17, 1916, telegram reported as follows toWashington: " .. . deportationsaccompanied by studied cruelties continue . . . forced conversions to Is-lam [are] perseveringly pushed, children and girls from deportedfamilies kidnapped. In order to avoidopprobriumof the civilized world, which the continuation of massacres would arouse, Turkish officialshave now adoptedand are executing the uncheckedpolicy of extermination throughstarvation,exhaus-tion, and brutalityof treatmenthardly surpassedeven in Turkishhistory"(RG 59, 867.4016/299). A re-cent publication provides evidence of the scrupulousness with which the American consuls, relyingmostly on Turkishsources, gatheredtheir materialbefore reportingto Washington. It contains the de-tailed reportof an Americandiplomat, U.S. Consul Leslie Davis, who narrates he lethal mechanisms ofthe Armeniandeportationsas personallyobserved and verified by him in the 1915-17 period in Harputprovince, his consular district. Located in eastern Anatolia, Harput encompassed a population of some100,000 Armenians, clustered around"150 Armenianagricultural villages," and an additional 12,000-15,000 quasi-urbanArmenians living in the Harput-Mezretwin cities. Consul Davis recounts that hepersonally visited massacre sites and saw the bodies of murderedArmenians whom he had previouslyseen alive, " . . . gaping bayonet wounds on most of the bodies, usually in the abdomen or chest, some-times in the throat. Few persons had been shot, as bullets were too precious. It was cheaper to kill withbayonets and knives. Anotherremarkable hing was thatnearly all the women lay flat on their backs andshowed signs of barbarousmutilation by the bayonets of the gendarmes... my Turkcompanion pointsto a valley alongside of the path and said a great many Armenianshad been killed in that valley withintwo or three hundred feet of the spot where we were standing.... We arrived home about nine o'clockin the evening andI felt that I understood better thanever what the 'deportation'of the Armeniansreallymeant. I felt also that I had not been wrong in speakingof Mamouret-ul-Aziz [Harputprovince] in someof my reportsas the 'Slaughter-house Vilayet' of Turkey."Davis wrote this account of 132 typed pagesat the requestof his superior,WilburJ. Carr,director of the Consular Bureauof the U.S. DepartmentofState. Leslie Davis, The Slaughterhouse Province. An American Diplomat's Report on the ArmenianGenocide, 1915-1917, ed. Susan K. Blair (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1989), p. 83. "Few localities could be


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568 VahaknN. Dadrianbetter suited to the fiendish purposesof the Turksin theirplan to exterminate the Armenianpopulationthan this peaceful lake in the interiorof Asiatic Turkey, with its precipitousbanks and pocket-like val-leys. . .. That which took place around beautiful Lake Goeljuk (renamedHazargolii) in the summer of1915 is almost inconceivable. Thousands and thousands of Armenians, mostly innocent and helplesswomen and children, were butchered on its shores and barbarouslymutilated"(p. 87).4The German consular network in the provinces encompassed the areas of Adana, Alexandretta(Iskenderun),Beirut, Damascus, Erzurum, Mosul, Samsun, Sivas, Smyrna (Izmir) and Trabzon. Ger-man AmbassadorWangenheimandhis successors Metternich and Kuhlmann n the 1915-17 period re-layed to Berlin a series of reports. Here are some samples from Wangenheim: "Deportations are notdeterminedexclusively by military considerations.... All deportees on their route to Mosul from Di-yarbekir were slaughtered," German Foreign Ministry Archives, Turkei 183/37, A19744, June 17,1915; "The deporteeconvoys from Erzurumand Diyarbekir were set upon by brigands [Special Orga-nization details] and even by escorting [gendarmes],ibid., Botschaft Konstantinopel, K169, no. (3876),June 25, 1915; "Turksbegan deportationsfrom areasnow not threatenedby invasion. This fact and themanner in which the relocation is being carried out demonstrate that the governmentis really pursuingthe aim of destroying the Armenian race in Turkey,"ibid., 183/37, A21257, July 17, 1915; with refer-ence to InteriorMinister Talat's denial of massacres in Turkey, "This denial should lead to the conclu-sion that massacres did in fact take place," ibid., 183/39, A303634, October 15, 1915. FromMetternich: "The soul of the persecutionof the Armenians is Talat," ibid., 183/40, A36184, December17, 1915; "I don't think much of a clique which boasts of such slogans as liberty, civil rights for all,and a constitution but allows the slaughterof hundreds of thousandsof innocent people," ibid., 134/35,A36980, December 23, 1915; "The slackening of deportations is not due to a Turkish decision to stopthe extermination but to the fact that, except for scant remnants,the expulsion of the Armenians hasended," ibid., 183/40, A175, December 27, 1915; "It looks as if Turkeynow is proceedingto finish offthe Armenian people before peace is restored," ibid., 183/41, 18373, March 27, 1916; "The Turkishgovernment inexorably carriedout her plans namely, the resolution of the Armenianquestion throughthe destruction of the Armenianrace," ibid., 183/43, A17310 and A18548, July 10, 1916. From Kuhl-mann: "The policy of exterminationhas been largely achieved; the current eaders of Turkeyfully sub-scribe to this policy," ibid., 183/46, A2615, January 20, 1917; "The destruction of the Armenianswhich was carried out on a large scale, the policy of extermination(Ausrottungs-politik)will for a longtime continue to stain the name of Turkey,"ibid., 183/46, A5919, February16, 1917. From AustrianAmbassador Pallavicini: "The total extermination of the Armeniansis at stake."Austrian Foreign Min-istry Archives, P.A. 12, Karton209, no. 50, June 27, 1915; "The mannerin which the Armenians arebeing deported is almost tantamountto a death verdict," ibid., no. 51, July 1, 1915; "Day before yes-terday I directed the Grand Vizier's attention to the fact that therewill come a time when Turkey willbe held responsible for this policy of extermination," bid., no. 66, August 13, 1915; "It is generally be-lieved that now the Armenianquestion has been resolved," ibid., no. 71, August 31, 1915; "The treat-ment of the Armenians will forever remain a stain on the reputationof the Turkishgovernment,"ibid.,Karton463, no. 21/P.B. March 10, 1916; "The anti-Armenianmeasures aim at the extermination of theArmenian population," ibid., no. 6, January 20, 1917. From Trautmansdorff,Interim Ambassador,Charge: "It appearsthat the plan to exterminatethe Armenian race has largely succeeded. Talat glee-fully told me recently that there are no more Armenians in Erzurum,for example. Turkeytoday is in amaniacal state for having implemented with impunity the extermination of the Armenian race," ibid.,Karton209, no. 79, September30, 1915.

5Relying mainly on Turkish-Ottomansources and data, sixty-nine American and Turkishscholars,representing such wide-ranging and disparate fields as medieval and modern Ottoman history, lan-guage, and anthropology, placed a large ad in the New York Times and WashingtonPost on May 19,1985. They offered in it for consideration the standardTurkishargument.Accordingly, "The Armeniansuffering" was largely due to "inter-communalwarfare,"involving "Muslim and Christian irregularforces," and that this warfare was "not unlike the tragedy ... of Lebanon."Includedamong the cosign-ers were also specialists of Arab affairs, Islamic carpets, and patrons of architecture!6Shaws,History, p. 316.7JustinMcCarthyand Carolyn McCarthy,Turks and Armenians.A Manual on the Armenian Ques-tion (Washington, D.C., 1989), p. 54.8Congressional Record-Senate,February20, 1990, S. 1216.


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TheDocumentationof the WWIArmenianMassacres 5699Hereare some samples of their statements. GrandVizier Said Halim: "I heard about this tragedy[the massacres] when it was all over, just like about everything else. You can't interpretthe order to

'deport'as an order for 'killing'." Harb Kabinelerinin Isticvabi. A special supplement of Vakit, no. 2(Istanbul, 1933), pp. 290-91, 295, 325-26. Justice Minister Ibrahim: "The excesses [the massacres]were committed without the knowledge of the government. . . ," ibid., p. 519. Public Works MinisterGeneralCuriiksulu Mahmud: "There are no transcriptson this because no records were being kept [inthe Cabinet Council]," ibid., p. 203. Education Minister Ahmed $ukrii: "Depending on the degree ofimportanceof a given matter,decisions were either kept off the record or were recorded," bid., p. 347.Special Organization Chief Esref Kuscubasi:"It is a fact that the Special Organization performedser-vices which the forces at the disposal of the government and the law-and-order outfits absolutelycouldn't and which were directed against non-Muslim races andnationalities for being suspect in termsof their bonds and loyalty to the central authorities. These services were kept so very 'secret'that evenCabinet ministers were unawareof them.... When I think about it today I too find this plan 'exceed-ingly courageous' (amlricesaretli).... I had assumed duties [relative to] the covert aspects of [the Ar-menian deportations] (Ermeni tehciriyle aldkadar. . . hadiselerin if yiiziinde vazife almt? bir insanolarak)." Cemal Kutay, Birinci Dunya HarbindeTeskilatiMahsusa (Istanbul, 1962), pp. 18, 36. He ex-pressed indignation at the news of the assassination in Rome by an Armenian "avenger"of GrandVi-zier Said Halim, declaring the latter totally innocent. The real nature of the scheme of anti-Armenianmeasureswas known only to two or three ministers, accordingto Kuscubasi, who stated:"It is a singu-lar crime and injustice to make a martyrout of him on charges of complicity in crimes associated withthe Armenian deportations. As a man deeply involved in this matter I firmly reject this falseaccusation," ibid., p. 78.'0Yusuf HikmetBayur, TurkInkildbiTarihi, 10 vols. (Ankara, 1964-83), 3, 1, p. 484. Another confir-mation comes from American educated(Ph.D., Columbia) publicistAhmedEmin Yalman who wrote, It-tihad "ruled wartime Turkey, largely in secret for not even the party knew many of its Council'sdecisions." Turkeyin My Time (Norman, 1956), pp. 34-35. For more details on this aspect of secrecysee note 37. As to the deliberations of the highly secretive CentralCommittee of Ittihad, Ziya Gokalpin his testimony at the fifth sitting (May 12, 1919) of the court-martialstatedthat "no recordsin any de-tail or order were kept but that sometimes signatureswere required" TakvimiVekayi,no. 3553, p. 80)."Resmi Gazete, no. 20163, May 12, 1989; Cabinet Council's No. 89/14028 decision, pp. 1-6. Thethree stipulations are contained in article 10, subsections a and b.'2The December announcementwarningof the InteriorMinistry's intention to study and release thefigureon Armenian losses was made by then Interior Minister Mustafa Arif (Deymer), Nor Giank, De-cember 13, 1918. Cemal's announcement some three months later was published in many newspapers,appearingduring the armistice in Istanbul, Le Moniteur Oriental, March 13; Alemdar, Ikdam, Vakit,March 15, 1919. In an editorial entitled "The Courageof Owning Up to Mistakes" (Hatadan DonmekCesareti), the latternewspaper praised the minister for his forthrightness.Cemal himself stated: "Don'tdeny the nation the right to call [the perpetrators] o account. . . . The government is bent on cleaningup the bloody past" (kanli maziyi temizliyecektir). Quoted with misgivings by M. Tayyib Gokbilgin,Milli Mucadele Baslarken, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1959), vol. 1, p. 55.3Hadisat, March 17, 1919. Cemal's figures on Armenian victims, as compiled by the Interior Min-istry, is recorded in TakvimiVekayi, no. 3909, publishedJuly 21, 1920, pp. 3-4.4T.B.M.M.Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 4 vols. (Ankara, 1985), vol. 4, pp. 439-40.'5Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Atatiirk,Hayati ve Eseri (Ankara, 1963), p. 268.'6CelalBayar, Ben de Yazdim:Milli Mucadeleye Giri?, 8 vols. (Istanbul, 1969), vol. 7, p. 2114.7Bayur,TurkInkildibi,10 vols. (Ankara, 1983), vol. 3,4, p. 787, n. 99.8"RaufOrbayinHatiralari"YakinTarihimiz3, 32 (October4, 1962), 179.'9Atatuirkuiinoylev ve Demefleri 1919-1938. (Istanbul, 1945), p. 49. In a May 6, 1920, communica-tion, marked"personaland urgent,"Mustafa Kemal in Ankara advises Kazim Karabekir n Erzurum orefrain from attacking Armenia lest "the entire Christianworld and especially America, turn againstus" as any such action would be tantamount o "a new Armenian massacre"(yeniden bir Ermeni kitalidemek olan bu hareket ... ) Kazim Karabekir, stiklal Harbimiz(Istanbul, 1969), p. 663. Six years laterMustafa Kemal is described as reiteratinghis decrial of the Armenian massacres when castigating theIttihadists who "should have been made to account for the lives of millions of our Christiansubjectswho were ruthlessly driven en masse from their homes and massacred." Emile Hildebrand,"Kemal


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570 VahaknN. DadrianPromises More Hangings of Political Antagonists on Turkey"Los Angeles Examiner, Sunday edition,section VI, August 1, 1926.

20MauricePrax, "Constantinople,"Lectures pour tous (March 1920), 829. Prax was the correspon-dent of the French newspaperPetit Parisien. For the English translation of portions of the interview,see CurrentHistory 12 (May 1920), 334-36.21VahaknN. Dadrian, "Genocide as a Problem of National and InternationalLaw: The World War IArmenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications,"Yale Journal of International Law 14, 2(Summer 1989), 291-315.22JosephKunz, "The United Nations Convention of Genocide," The American Journal of Interna-tional Law, 43 (1949), 745; Raphael Lemkin, "Genocide as a Crime under InternationalLaw,"Ameri-can Journal of InternationalLaw, 41 (January1947), 150.23Turkish ources indicate that the escape was organized and facilitated by General Bronsart vonSchellendorf, the 1914-17 chief of the Ottoman General Staff. Cemal Kutay, Talat Pasanin GurbetHa-tiralari, 3 vols. (Istanbul, 1983), vol. 3, p. 1103; Fethi Okyar, Uc Devirde Bir Adam (Istanbul, 1980),p. 251. The details of the escape are provided by Galib Vardar,Ittihad ve TerakkiICindeDonenler, ed.S. N. Tansu (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 386-88. The most accuratedescriptionis provided by a young officerof the German Naval War Staff who volunteered to organize and execute the mission. The German de-stroyerRl was the vehicle of escape to Sevastopol, Russia. Kapitanleutnant Baltzer, "Das romantisheEnde der drei grossen Tiirken der Kriegszeit, Talaat, Enver and Dschemal Pascha. Eine Erinnerunganden 1. November 1918," Orient-Rundschau11 (November 10, 1933), pp. 120-21.24MidhatS,ukruBleda, Imparatorlugun(okiisii (Istanbul, 1979), p. 124. In a subsequent exchangewith Hiiseyin Cahit Yalin, Bleda concurred with the view that such an escape would mean an admis-sion of guilt. HuiiseyinCahit Yalmin,Siyasal Anilar (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 258-59.250f Albanianextraction,Mazhar had a long careerof civil service in Macedonia. After the Ittihadistrevolution he became police chief in Smyrna (Izmir), and until April 1914, he was governor of Bitlis

province when Ittihadreplaced him with Talat's brother-in-law, Mustafa Abdulhalik (Renda). In 1916,Talat appointedMazhar to one of the four inquirycommissions which went to the provinces ostensiblyto investigate atrocities against the Armenians. But these commissions in the main confined themselvesto investigating economic abuses involving the embezzlement by officials of large amounts of moneyand other spoils taken from the Armenian victims; their offense was that, instead of handing over theriches to the state, they appropriated hem for themselves.26Contrary o a general belief that Istanbul Armenians, like most of the Armenians of Smyrna(Izmir), were spareddeportation,a host of secret documentsreveal the cautious but systematic decima-tion of this partof the Armenianpopulation, involving mainly the leaders of Istanbul Armenians, and"the provincials," who had families in the interior. On November 12, 1915, Konstantin FreiherrvonNeurath,the GermanCharge at Istanbul, informed his Chancellor in Berlin thataccordingto "a reliablesource" the Turkishgovernmenthas, despite promises to the contrary,decided to deportthe Armenianpopulation of Istanbul against which decision he warned Foreign Affairs Minister Halil; German For-eign OfficeArchives, Bonn, Turkei 183/40, A33705. German AmbassadorWolff-Metternich on Decem-ber 7, 1915, confirmedthis confidentially obtained information, at the same time disclosing that 30,000Istanbul Armenians alreadyhave been deported,4,000 of them only recently; his source was the chiefof police. In urging his chancellor to keep this information secret, he pleaded with him not to put upany more with Turkish atrocities and to try to deter them. Turkei183/40, A36184.27BritishForeign OfficeArchives, Public Records Office, Kew, F0371/4141/49194. The Committeeof Union and Progress. PartII, p. 4, G.H.Q. Intelligence Report.28For he 1909 text of the martiallaw, see A. Biliotti and Ahmed Sedad, Legislation ottoman depuisle retablissementde la constitution, 2 vols. (Paris, 1912), vol. 1, pp. 194-97; for the September 1, 1910(August 19, old style) addendum,dealing with the laws to combat brigands,see pp. 482-97.29"TheOttoman Constitution, Promulgatedthe 7th Zilbridje [sic], 1293 (11/23 December 1876),"The American Journal of InternationalLaw, 2 (1908), 386.30TakvimiVekayi,no. 3540.31TakvimiVekayi. The December 16, 1918, rescript is in no. 3424, the December 25, 1918, one inno. 3430.32TakvimiVekayi,no. 3445.


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The Documentation of the WWIArmenianMassacres 57133TheAllies on May 24, 1915, issued a joint declarationpointing to "the connivance and often assis-tance of Ottomanauthorities" n the mass murderof the Armenians.They furtherdeclared:"In view of

these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied governments announce pub-licly . . that they will hold personally responsible ... all members of the Ottoman government andthose of their agents who are implicated in such massacres," Archives du Ministere des AffairsEtrangeres (Paris), Guerre 1914-1918, Turquie, 887, I. Armenie, April 26, 1915; Foreign Office Ar-chives, Public Records Office, Class 371, vol. 2488, Registry no. 501010, or briefly, F0371/2488/501010, April 28, 1915; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 Supplement, p. 981, File no. 867,4016/67.34BilalSimnir,Malta Surgunleri (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 113, 114.35The irst citation is in F0371/4173/84878, folio 487; the second is in F0371/4174, folio 149.36IbniileminM. K. Inal, Son Sadrazamlar, 4 vols. (Istanbul, 1982), vol. 4, p. 1983. See also F0371/4141/49194; p. 4; A. A. Cruickshank, "The Young Turk Challenge in Postwar Turkey,"Middle EastJournal 22, 1 (Winter 1968), 17; Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres (Columbus, Oh., 1974),p. 107. According to the Adjudant of Sultan Vahdettin, the Ministry of War at one time in the Armi-stice was filled with Ittihadist advisers and aides-de-camp.Tarlk Miimtaz Goztepe, OsmanogullartninSon Padisahl Sultan Vahdeddin MiitarekeGayyasinda (Istanbul, 1969), p. 89.37AhmedEmin Yalman, Yakin Tarihte Gorduklerim ve 4Iittiklerim,(1888-1918), 4 vols. (Istanbul,1970), vol. 1, pp. 339-41. Speaking of the distribution of power among the top Ittihadist leaders, theauthor maintainsthat theirpower in some respects exceeded the authorityof the ministers,especially inconditions of "urgentbusiness." He singles out Drs. Nazim and ?akir, and Ziya Gokalp, as the mostpowerful membersof the Central Committee (ibid., p. 265).38Djagadamard,August 29, 1919, carryingthe commentsof formerDeputy Procuror-GeneralFeridun.39Huiisameddinrtuiirk,ki Devrin Perde Arkas,, ed. S. Tansu (Istanbul, 1957), pp. 213, 326-27.40NorGiank, November 13, 1918.

4lTakvimi Vekayi,no. 3540.42Alemdar,May 10, 1919.43VahaknN. Dadrian,"The Naim-AndonianDocuments on the WorldWarI Destructionof OttomanArmenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide," InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, 18, 3 (August1986), 311-60.44TakvimiVekayi,no. 3604.45The pecifics of the indictment detailed here are excerpted from the supplementary ssue (ildve) ofTakvimiVekayi,no. 3540 which, along with other supplementary ssues, served as a quasi-judicial jour-nal irregularly covering the court-martialproceedings involved. Pages 4-8 of that issue (in which April27 is a misprintfor April 28, the opening day of the trial)comprise the text of the indictment,and page9, the supplementarycomments mentioned a

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