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NOTE: ALPHABETICAL ARRANGMENT, NOT ACCORDING

TO THE SYLLABUS. Article 163 Angeles vs. Maglaya (2005) Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed a petition

for letters of administratix and her appointment as administratix

of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She claims that

she is the sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles and

Genoveva Mercado, and together with Belen Angeles, herein

petitioner and 2nd

wife of Francisco, they are the surviving heirs

of the decedent. Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leaving

behind 4 parcels of land and a building. Belen opposed this

petition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be

proclaimed the admistratrix of Francisco‘s estate. After

establishing the circumstances of her marriage to Francisco

(i.e. married before a Judge and ratified two months later in

religious rites; Francisco presented himself to be single that

time), Belen attacked the legitimacy of Corazon, saying that

her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. She has also

failed to present the marriage contract between her parents,

Francisco and Genoveva. Furthermore, Belen averred that she

and Francisco legally adopted Concesa Yamat during their

marriage.

Respondent‘s reply: (a) records of parents‘ marriage in the

Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga were destroyed. (b) She

has been in open and continuous possession of the status of

legitimate child as testified by 4 witnesses. (c) Her birth

certificate was presented containing a handwritten word ―Yes‖

under the question ―Legitimate?‖

Trial court dismissed petition for lack of proof of filiation as

legitimate child, but the Court of Appeals reversed this on the

grounds that petitioner‘s motion being a demurrer (under Sec 1

Rule 33) thereby waived her right to present opposing

evidence, and that respondent has sufficiently established her

filiation.

ISSUE: WON Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco and

Genoveva? NO.

RATIO:

Article 164: Children conceived or born during the marriage of

the parents are legitimate.

Tison vs. Court of Appeals: A legitimate child is a product of

and therefore implies a valid and lawful marriage. A child is

presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock.

The presumption of legitimacy in the FC actually fixes a status

for the child born in wedlock and that civil status cannot be

attacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the

legitimacy of a child born to his wife. The intent of the law is to

prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being

uncertain.

Presumption of legitimacy may only be availed upon proof of

the factual basis that child‘s parents were legally married and

that his/her conception of birth occurred during the marriage. In

the case at bar, there is no absolute proof of the decedent‘s

marriage to respondent‘s mother Genoveva. No marriage

certificate or contract was offered in evidence. No solemnizing

officer was called to witness. Also, respondent never

questioned what would necessarily be a bigamous marriage

between Belen and Francisco. In fact, in her petition, she

alleged that petitioner is the ―surviving spouse‖ of the

decedent.

Under Article 172, the court concedes that even in the absence

of direct evidence of marriage of parents, legitimate filiation of

the child can be established by the following modes: 1. Record

of birth in civil registry 2. Admission of legitimate filiation in a

public document or private handwritten instrument signed by

parent concerned. In the absence of these foregoing evidence,

filiation is proved by: 3. Open and continuous possession of

the status of legitimate child 4. Any other means allowed by the

Rules of Court.

Evidence that respondent showed: 1. Birth certificate 2. School

and government records 3. Photographs of her wedding and

testimonies. Although respondent was able to show a birth

certificate, this was not signed by Francisco or Genoveva. It

was signed only by the attending physician. This document is

only evidence of the birth of the child, and not conclusive proof

of her legitimate filiation. The signature of the father is a

necessary requirement in determining legitimate filiation and it

can not be made dependent on the declaration of the attending

physician or midwife or mother of the newborn child. The same

holds true for the school and government records which were

unsigned by Francisco and the execution of which he had no

part in. Lastly, photographs are not sufficient evidence of

filiation as settled in jurisprudence. However, due to these

evidences, court conceded that Corazon might be natural child

of Francisco and Genoveva. However this is not the issue in

this case, since the respondent predicated her petition for

administration on her being a legitimate child who was legally

married to her mother.

Respondent also filed a petition against the adoption of

Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the legitimate child of

Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption

proceedings. Since the lower court has ruled with finality that

she is not legitimate since no proof has been given as to the

marriage of her parents, this petition has become moot and

academic.

On the matter of administration, it should be noted that the

surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of decedent.

Next of kin refers to the heirs.

DECI: Decision of CA is REVERSED and the order of the

trial court REINSTATED.

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Arcaba vs. Vda. De Batocael Art. 87 Every donation or grant or gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between spouses during the marriage shall be void… The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. FACTS 1. Francisco Comille, a 75-year old widower, is the owner of a property in Zamboanga del Norte with a total area of 418 sq. meters. After the death of his wife, his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, wherein she waived ¼ of her share of the property to Francisco. 2. Francisco does not have children to take care of him, so he asked the ff to take care of his house: Leticia Bellosillo – his niece, Luzviminda Paghacian – Leticia‘s cousin, Cirila Acaba – petitioner 3. When Leticia and Luzviminda were married, Cirila was the only one left to take care of Francisco. 4. Before Francisco‘s death, he executed an instrument entitled ―Deed of Donation Inter Vivos‖ where he gave a portion of his lot, consisting of 150 sq. meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted it. Francisco left the rest in his name. The deed stated that the donation was made in consideration of the faithful services Cirila had rendered in the past 10 years. 5. In 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot Cirila received had a market value of P57, 105. 6. Francisco‘s nephews and nieces and heirs by intestate succession, herein respondents, filed a complaint pleading for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos. They contend that Francisco‘s donation is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code, since Cirila is Francisco‘s common-law wife. 7. Testimonies by Leticia and Erlinda, another niece of Francisco, claimed that Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same bedroom, and that Francisco had intimated that Cirila was his mistress. Erlinda added that Francisco did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he provided her family with food and lodging. Cirila contends that she was a mere helper and only entered his room when the old man asked her. She says Francisco is too old for her, and that she never had sexual intercourse with him. 8. Trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, holding the donation to Cirila void. They ordered her to deliver possession of the house and lot to the nieces and nephews. 9. Cirila appealed to the CA which affirmed trial court‘s decision. Their conclusion was based on (1) testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila (2) documents showing Cirila‘s use of Francisco‘s surname (3) pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco‘s common-law wife and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive regular cash wage. ISSUE: WON CA correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code in ruling the donation void on the ground that it was granted during marriage and that it applies to persons living as husband and wife without a valid marriage HELD/DECI: YES, application was correct. Decision of CA AFFIRMED. Donation is VOID. RATIO: (same reasons that CA gave)

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one party is no longer interested in sex due to old age. Cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife. (Bitangcor vs. Tan) Cirila and Francisco‘s public conduct indicated that their relationship was more than caregiver and patient, but that of husband and wife. (Cirila admitted that they lived under one roof for a long time. Cirila gave him therapeutic massage. Consummation is likely.) Documents with Cirila signing using Francisco‘s surname (Comilla) were presented proving she saw herself as his common-law wife. Cirila never demanded for a regular cash wage. Difficult to believe she stayed with him out of pure beneficence. Belcodero v Court of Appeals

FACTS:

1. Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and they

had 3 children. In 1946 he abandoned them and lived

with Josefa Rivera (whom he acknowledged as

common law wife Josefa Bosing). They had one child,

Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.

2. He married Josefa Bosing in 1958, while still married

to Juliana.

3. Alayo purchased parcel of land on installment basis in

1949 and his deed he named Josefina Bosing as his

wife and transferred lot in her name. Final deed

executed in 1959.

4. Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa and

Josephine executed a document of extra-judicial

partition and sale of the lot, which was described as

‗conjugal property‘. Josefa‘s share went to Josephine

for P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had full

ownership. Notice was published.

5. In October 1980 Juliana (real widow) and 3 children

filed for reconveyance of property. Trial Curt and

Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.

ISSUES:

1. The husband acquired ownership while living with a

paramour, after deserting his wife. Property bought

prior to effectivity of 1950 Civil Code but the final deed

was ensued after. And the Family Code took effect

1988.

a. Whether the property was acquired in 1949

when he first started paying installment or in

1959 when the deed was finalized, result is

the same. Property belongs to conjugal

partnership of Alayo and legal wife Juliana.

Under old and new Civil Code ―all property is

presumed to belong to conjugal partnership

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unless it is provided that it is exclusive to

either spouse‖

b. Property acquired by Alayo, he merely had

the title transferred to Josefa‘s name. She

implicitly recognized Alayo‘s ownership when

she and Josephine filed extrajudicial partition

of the said property—the partition would

have conformed with partition in intestancy

had they been sole and legitimate heirs of

Alayo.

2. Common law spouses

a. In Art 144 and in Maxey v. CA the co-

ownership rule had been repudiated when

either of the spouses had impediments to

marry

b. Art 147 and 148 of Family Code did not

deviate from old rules. Art 148 says that:

when one of the parties is validly married to

another, his or her share of the co-ownership

shall accrue to the conjugal property of the

valid marriage. But the provisions can‘t apply

to this case without interdicting prior vested

rights, so the provisions don‘t apply.

3. Constructive trust

a. Acc to Art 1456: If property is acquired by

mistake the person obtaining it is trustee for

implied trust

b. The applicable reconveyance period is ten

years. Under the Torrens System the

prescriptive period starts when transaction is

registered and a Certificate of Title is issued.

Josephine Belocdero got the Certificate in

1974 and Juliana filed the case in 1980.

4. New evidence

a. Juliana married again, but no legal

separation was brought to Alayo during his

lifetime si this holds no relevance

DECISION:

Affirmed, property goes to Juliana.

Bernabe v Alejo

FACTS

1. Fiscal Bernabe fathered son with secretary Carolina

Alejo. Son born in 1981, named Adrian Bernabe.

2. Fiscal Bernabe died Aug 1993, Wife Rosalina died.

Daughter Ernestina sole heir.

3. Carolina filed complaint saying Adrian should be

given share of Adrian‘s estate.

4. RTC dismissed complaint, father had not

acknowledged

5. CA ruled that Adrian should be allowed to prove he is

son of Bernabe, under Art 285 of CC action for

recognition can be filed within 4 years after child

reaches majority. FC does not take away that.

ISSUES:

1. Can the Civil Code Art 285 apply? Yes.

a. Petitioner says Art 285 CC has been omitted

by Art 172, 173, 175 of the Family Code

which outline hoe a child may establish

legitimacy.

b. Under new law the action for recognition

has to be brought within the lifetime of the

alleged parent, so punitive parent can

dispute claim. BUT the FC can‘t prejudice

rights that were already vested prior to

enactment of FC.

c. Adrian, born in 1981, already had vested

right before the enactment of the FC.

2. Natural children only? No.

a. Petitioner: Art 285 of CC refers to recognition

of natural children. Adrian is not a natural

child because at the time of his conception

his parents were impeded from marrying

each other.

b. SC: In the case of Aruego it was decided

that minors were allowed to file case even if

parents had impediments to marry. The case

of Divinagracia v Rovira says Art 285 also

applies to spurious children.

c. Illegitimate children who were still minors

when FC took effect and whose punitive

parent died during minority are given right to

seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years

after they reach majority. It is a vested right.

DECSISON:

CA decision affirmed, Adrian allowed to prove paternity.

Buenaventura v Court of Appeals

Date: 31 March 2005

Ponente: Justice Azcuna

Parties: Noel Buenaventura, petitioner, v Court of Appeals and

Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura, respondents

Action: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of Court of

Appeals

Facts:

This is actually a petition for certiorari on TWO of the

CA‘s decisions

12 July 1992 Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for

declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of the

psychological incapacity of both spouses

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Isabel filed an answer denying that she was

psychologically incapacitated

RTC found that:

o Noel deceived Isabel into marrying him

because he was under parental pressure to

marry; he wasn‘t actually ready to marry –his

career was and still is his first priority

o He couldn‘t related to Isabel or Javy as

husband and father respectively

o He had no inclination to make the marriage

work or any desire to keep Isabel and Javy

o He caused Isabel to suffer mental anguish,

anxiety, besmirched reputation, and

sleepless nights

RTC decision:

o Petition granted; Noel and Isabel‘s marriage

was declared null and void ab initio

o Noel must pay Isabel

Moral damages: 2.5 Million

Exemplary damages: 1 Million with

6% interest from date of decision

Attorney‘s fees: 100,000

Expenses of litigation: 50,000 plus

costs

Liquidation of conjugal partnership

property

50% of Noel‘s

separation/retirement

benefits

(Php1,837,667.89) plus

12% per annum interest

from date of decision

Half of outstanding stock

shares with Manila

Memorial Park and

Provident Group of

companies

Monthly support in favor of their

son, Javy Singh Buenaventura:

15,000

o Custody of Javy to Isabel

o Isabel is authorized to revert to the use of

her maiden name

Noel appealed the RTC‘s decision

o Assailed the RTC‘s decision on the ground

that damages arising as a consequence of

marriage may be awarded (unlike those

arising from a breach in ordinary contracts)

While Noel‘s appeal was pending, Isabel filed a

motion to increase the monthly support, which Noel

filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or

set for oral arguments

CA decision:

o Issued a Resolution to increase the support

pendent lite to Php20,000 (2 Sept 1996)

Noel filed a motion for

reconsideration questioning the

Decision (13 Nov 1996)

o Dismissed petitioner‘s appeal for lack of

merit and affirmed in toto RTC‘s decision

(Decision: 8 Oct 1996, Resolution: 10

December 1996)

Just because there has

not yet been any decision

in the Supreme Court

where damages for non

performance of marital

obligations has been

awarded, doesn‘t

necessarily mean that no

such award may be made

Noel filed a motion for

reconsideration

Motion was denied

Noel filed for petition for certiorari to question the two

resolutions; SC ordered the two cases consolidated

Issues:

WoN CA abused its discretion when it refused to set

Isabel‘s motion for increased support for hearing

WoN there is a need for CA to increase Javy‘s

monthly support

WoN CA should have examined the list of expenses

submitted by respondent

WoN Petitioner should have been given opportunity to

prove his income to show that he can‘t afford to

increase support

Ruling:

1. CA decision is MODIFIED so that:

o Decision dated 8 Oct 1996 and Resolution

dated 10 December 1996

Moral and exemplary damages,

attorneys‘s fees, and expenses of

litigation are deleted

Half of the petitioner‘s retirement

benefits and shares of stocks will

still be given to the respondent, but

on the basis of liquidation, partition

and distribution of the co-ownership

(not of the regime of conjugal

partnership of gains)

The rest of the Decision are

affirmed

2. Resolutions of 2 Sept 1996 and 13 Nov 1996 for

increased support is MOOT and DISMISSED

On decision #1:

o Division of conjugal assets doesn‘t involve

the annulment of a bigamous marriage

The provisions providing for the

dissolution of the absolute

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community of community or

conjugal partnership do not apply

Applicable property regime is that of

equal co-ownership

o Award of damages by trial court is based on

Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code

Art 2217: Moral damages (physical

suffering, mental anguish, fright,

anxiety, besmirched reputation,

etc.) can be recovered if they are

the ―proximate result of the

defendant‘s wrongful act or

omission‖

Art 21: ―Any person who willfully

causes loss or injury to another in a

manner contrary to morals, good

customs or public policy shall

compensate the latter for the

damage‖

There is a flaw in the

RTC‟s reasoning, since

the marriage was

declared void through

Art. 36, which states that

the party was

“psychologically

incapacitated to comply”

o Psychological

incapacity: “No

less than a

mental (not

physical)

incapacity that

causes a party

to be truly

incognitive of

the basic marital

covenants that

concomitantly

must be

assumed and

discharged by

the parties to

the marriage…

the intendment

of the law has

been to confine

the meaning of

“psychological

incapacity” to

the most

serious cases of

personality

disorders

clearly

demonstrative

of an utter

insensitivity or

inability to give

meaning and

significance to

the marriage”

(p.269-270)

i.e.

under

Art. 36,

the

party

really

CAN‟T

HELP IT

Contradiction: grounds

for moral

damages=willful act,

grounds for declaring

nullity of

marriage=psychological

INCAPACITY

o Incapacity

means that Noel

couldn‟t have

purposely

deceived Isabel

by willful acts;

he did not do it

ON PURPOSE

If the decision is to stand,

Noel should have been

aware of his disability and

yet willfully concealed it so

that Isabel‘s suffering

would have been ON

PURPOSE (done with

malice)

o There‘s no

evidence to

support this

o The award of moral damages has no basis in

law and in fact

o Award of exemplary damages can‘t stand

either, because the Civil Code provides that

they are imposed in addition to moral

damages

o Because award of moral and exemplary

damages aren‘t justified anymore, the award

of attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses

also doesn‘t have any basis

Cariño v Cariño

2 February 2001, Justice Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

- The deceased, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño (died 23

November 1992), married two women

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o 20 June 1969, Susan Nicdao (petitioner) – two

children (Sahlee and Sandee Cariño)

o 10 November 1992, Susan Yee (respondent) – no

children, ten years of cohabitation

- 1988: Santiago became bedridden due to diabetes

complicated by pulmonary tubercolosis and Yee took care of

him, and spent for medical and burial expenses

- When he died, both Yee and Nicdao filed for monetary

benefits and financial assistance

o Nicdao got PhP146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI,

Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig

o Yee got PhP21,000 from GSIS Life, Burial and

burial (SSS)

- RTC ruled in favor of Yee

o Yee filed for collection of at least half of the

PhP146,000 (―death benefits).

o Nicdao had to pay Yee PhP73,000 (half of the

PhP146,000 plus PhP5,000 attorney‘s fees and

costs of suit)

- Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling in toto

o Vda. De Consuegra v GSIS: Court gave half of the

deceased‘s retirement benefits to the first wife,

and the other half to the second wife

First marriage has not been dissolved, but even

though the second one is void ab initio, it still

needs a judicial declaration of nullity. Therefore,

the conjugal properties are split between the two

marriages.

Susan Nicdao (petitioner)‟s contention:

- CA gravely erred in:

o Affirming the findings of the lower court that Vda.

De Consuegra v. GSIS is applicable to the case

o Applying equity instead of the mandate of the

Family Code

o Not finding the Vda. De Consuegra case to have

been modified by the Family Code

Supreme Court‟s Ruling:

- Petition is GRANTED, CA decision reversed and set aside

and Yee‘s complaint is DISMISSED

- Article 40 of the Family Code says: absolute nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment

declaring such previous marriage void.

o Translation: To remarry, you need to show that

the court ruled the previous marriage void

o If you want to invoke the absolute nullity of the

last marriage so that you can remarry, the only

way for the remarriage to be “free from legal

infirmity” is through a final judgment that

declares the last marriage void

o If it isn‟t for remarriage (for example, if it‟s for

determining heirship or legitimacy of children,

settlement of an estate, a criminal case, etc.),

you don‟t need any judicial action to declare a

marriage an absolute nullity

In those cases, even if they haven‟t been

directly instituted to question the validity of

a marriage, evidence has to be adduced to

prove the existence of grounds for rendering

that marriage void.

- The Court has sufficient authority to decide whether or not

the two marriages are void; the decision is essential to

figuring out who is entitled to the death benefits

- Nicdao and Santiago were married under the Civil Code, and

under the Civil code, without a marriage license, their

marriage is void ab initio. The presumed validity of this

marriage has been overcome

- Just because Nicdao and Santiago‟s marriage was void,

doesn‟t mean that Yee‟s marriage with Santiago is valid

either

o There must be a prior judicial declaration of

the nullity of the previous marriage before one

can marry again

If there isn‟t one, the remarriage is void too.

This means that Yee and Santiago‟s

marriage is ALSO void ab initio.

- Applicable property regime for this case is Arts. 147 and

148, the ―Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage‖ of

the Family Code

- Yee and Santiago‘s marriage is bigamous and the applicable

regime is Family Code Art. 148 (bigamous

marriage/adulterous marriage/concubine

relationships/parties married to other persons/married man‘s

multiple alliances)

o Only properties acquired through joint contribution

belong to the co-ownership; salaries and wages

exclusively belong to each party

o Santiago earned the PhP146,000 on his own, so

Yee doesn‘t get any of it; it goes to his legal heirs.

- Nicdao and Santiago‘s marriage (legally capacitated but void

for other reasons) applicable property regime is Art. 147

o Properties acquired while they lived together are

joint property and governed by rules on co-

ownership

o The PhP146,000 that Santiago earned is co-

owned by Nicdao, the other half goes to his heirs,

the children.

- Domingo v CA: Court clarified that in Art. 40, a prior and

separate declaration of nullity is all important for

remarriage

- Niñal v Bayadog: Court also clarified that it may pass on the

validity of a marriage as long as it‘s essential to the case

o When necessary, final judgment of declaration

of nullity is needed even if it isn‟t for

remarriage

Articles 164, 166 (1) (b) and 167, Family Code Concepcion v CA (2005) FACTS

Theresa and Ma Theresa married in 1989 and they had a son after a year named Jose Gerardo. However, in 1991, Gerardo filed to have his marriage with Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He found out that in 1980, Theresa married a Mario

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Gopiao, which was still subsisting when they got married.

The RTC annulled Gerardo and Theresa‘s marriage on this ground and declared Jose Gerardo as illegitimate. Custody of the child was given to Theresa but Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

Theresa moved for a reconsideration of this decision to have Jose Gerardo‘s surname changed to Almonte, her maiden surname, because he is after all an illegitimate child and such children use the mother‘s surname. At the same time, she asked that Gerardo‘s visitation rights be taken from him because the father of an illegitimate child does not have the privilege to have such rights.

The RTC, by applying the ‗best interest of the child‘ rule found in Article 8 of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, retained the visitation rights of Gerardo.

CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. It also held that an illegitimate kid cannot use his mother‘s surname motu proprio, because he should file for a separate proceeding for a change of name.

On consideration, CA reversed its ruling and declared Jose Gerardo to be the legitimate child of Theresa and her estranged husband Mario. Gerardo was denied visitation rights.

ISSUE

Was the CA right in ruling that Jose Gerardo is the Theresa‘s legitimate child by her first marriage?

SC says yes, but it‘s an iffy decision. There is a strong presumption in favor of a child‘s legitimacy, and it can be impugned only by the husband or, in exceptional cases, the husband‘s heirs. Since Gerardo and Theresa‘s marriage is void ab initio, he did not acquire the status of being her husband and has no right to impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo. To overthrow presumption of legitimacy based on Art 166 (1) (b), it must be shown without reasonable doubt that the spouses cannot possibly have access to each other. In this case, Mario and Theresa lived within the same city, four kilometers away from each other. Theresa‘s claim that Jose Gerardo is illegitimate cannot affect the latter‘s legitimacy because he was born within a valid marriage. She is not permitted by law to disavow her child‘s legitimacy because maternity is never uncertain. Between Jose Gerardo‘s birth certificate and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law of his legitimacy, the latter should stand because it bears more weight and is in consonance with the purpose of the law. RULING Jose Gerardo is the legit child of Theresa by Mario, and he should use Mario‘s surname. Gerardo does not have any visitation rights to Jose Gerardo. Petition denied.

Articles 150 and 151, Family Code Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank v Judge Acuña and Moreno (2006)

FACTS

Private Alfredo Moreno filed a complaint against Hiyas, his wife Remedios, the spouses Owe and the Reigster of Deeds of Caloocan Cit y for cancellation of mortgage. He said that he did not secure any loan from the petitioner bank or execute any mortgage contract in its favor. He says that the petitioners were the only ones benefited by the mortgage and it‘s not possible for him to have signed the contract because he was working abroad at the time it was entered into.

Hiyas filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that no earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made because the parties involved here are family members. On the other hand, Moreno says that since three of the parties are not his family members, such compromise need not be made before the action is instituted. He also said that the defendants be declared in default for not filing an answer in time.

RTC ruled in favor of Moreno and denied the order to dismiss. It said that when one of the parties to a case is not a family member, there is no need to show that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.

ISSUE

Is the RTC correct? YES. The petition did not go through the CA so it ignored the hierarchy of courts. On this note, the petition is already dismissed. But even if it were given due course, the RTC is still correct. In Magbaleta v Gonong, the rule was already laid down that when a stranger becomes party to a suit between family members, the law no longer requires that earnest efforts towards a compromise have to be made before the action can prosper. Article 151 applies only when the suit is exclusively among family members, and it may be invoked only be a party who is the same member of that family. RULING Petition dismissed

Property relations between husband and wife

Articles 121 and 124, Family Code

Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v Dailo

petition for review on certiorari

FACTS

CA affirmed the RTC decision in favor of Miguela Dailo, respondent.

Miguela and Marcelino Dailo were married in 1967. They bought a house and lot during their marriage in San Pablo City, Laguna but the absolute deed of sale was executed only in favor of Marcelino and excluded

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his wife. In 1993, Marcelino executed a special power of

attorney to authorize a certain Lilibeth Gesmundo to obtain a loan from petitioner bank HSLB with the house and lot as security. The property was mortgaged and the loan was approved in the amount of P300,000. Miguela did not know about this at all.

When Gesmundo failed to pay the loan in full upon maturity, the spouses' property was extrajudicially foreclosed, sold, and bought by petitioner bank. Because it was not redeemed after one year, the bank consolidated their ownership over it.

Marcelino died and it was only then that Miguela knew of the mortgage, foreclosure and sale of their conjugal property.

The CA ruled that Art 124 of the Family Code is controlling in the case because it provided for the nullity of any encumbrance or disposition without the knowledge and consent of both spouses.

ISSUES

Which provision of law applies—article 493 of the Civil code or article 124 of the family code? Basically, art 493 provides for the co-owner of a property to have full ownership of his part and therefore he may dispose of it as he wants. Because Marcelino was such co-owner, he can do what he wants with the property, like mortgage it. On the other hand, art 124 provides for the joint administration of conjugal properties.

Petitioner says that the framers could not have intended that

the co-owner spouse cannot exercise his full rights because of

the bar in art 124.

There is no marriage settlement between Miguela and her

dead spouse, so their property regime is automatically

conjugal partnership of gains or CPG. If there is no consent

as to the action of one spouse with regards to the

administration of the property, the same is void. Art 124 is

contr

Payment of the principal obligation on the mortgage should be made by the conjugal partnership because the loan redounded to the benefit of the family under Art 121 of the Family Code.

Burden of proof is on the one who alleges that the mortgage

benefited the conjugal partnership. Petitioner bank alleges that

the loan was used to finance the construction of housing units

but it was not adequately proven. Also, since they kept on

saying that Marcelino owned the property in his individual

capacity, it cannot be admitted that the money was used for his

family.

RULING

Petition denied.

HONTIVEROS v RTC FACTS:

December 3, 1990 – spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros (petitioners), filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson.

Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate Appelate Court which modified the decision of the CoFI of Capiz, in a land registration case filed by Gregorio Hontiveros.

Petitioners were denied of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. Rentals lost: 1968-1987 66,000 per year; 595,000 per year after 1987.

Answer filed by the respondent denied that they were married and it also alleged the Gregorio Hontiveros was a widower and Ayson was single. They alleged that the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to the petitioners on August 7, 1985 by virtue of a writ of possession dated July 18, 1985. Since then, the petitioners have been receiving rentals from the tenants of the land. The answer also alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that the Agusto and Gregorio are brothers.

Respondent also contends that the petitioner‘s claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984, that there were no rentals due since Gregorio was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to Gregorio and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property.

May 16, 1991 – petitioners filed an amended complaint to insert therein the allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful.

Answer of the respondent: denied the earnest effort that had been made to reach a compromise agreement but the parties were unsuccessful.

July 19, 1995 – petitioners moved for a judgement on the pleadings on the ground that Gregorio‘s answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint.

November 23, 1995 – trial court denied petitioners‘ motion and dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by article 51 of the FC. o Art. 151. No suit between members of the same

family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be

the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

(222a)

ISSUES:

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1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to rule on the case. YES

2. WON after denying petitioners‘ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court could dismiss their complaint motu proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code. NO

3. WON Article 151 of the Family Code applies in this case. NO

RATIO:

1. Yes

Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation

vs. Court of Appeals – Supreme Court is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgements and orders of lower court in all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

When the appeal would involve purely questions of law or any of the other cases specified in Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the SC by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. No

Baja vs. Macandong – court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff‘s right to be heard, except in the following instances: o Plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial o Fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable

length of time o He fails to comply with rules or any order of the court o Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the suit. None of these exceptions appears in this case The trial court found that judgement on the pleadings in

inappropriate not only for the fact that respondent in their answer specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of the rule that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof – TRIAL MUST BE HELD

It is improper for the judge to render judgement based on the pleadings alone. Factual issues have to be resolved: o Ayson‘s participation and/or liability if any o Nature, extent and duration of Gregorio‘s possession

of the subject property Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground

that it was not verified for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.

Absence of verification required by Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. The court could have ordered the petitioners to verify them.

3. No

Art 151 does not apply because the suit is not exclusively among family members.

Ayson is a stranger to the Hontiveros family.

The phrase ―members of the same family‖ refers to husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sister whether full or half blood.

Guerrero v. RTC – brothers and sisters does not comprehend sisters-in-law

Ayson and Maria Hontiveros are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

Juaniza vs. Jose FACTS 1. Eugenio Jose is the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in accident with a freight train killing 7 and injuring 5 people. 2. At the time of accident, Eugenio was legally married to a certain Socorro Ramos, but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for 16 years in a relationship akin to husband and wife. 3. Trial court ordered Eugenio and Rosalia to jointly and severally pay Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,500 plus legal interest, as well as jointly and severally pay heirs of the deceased Josefa Leus, Fausto Retrita, Nestor Anonuevo, and Arceli dela Cueva in the sum of P12,000 for the life of each plus legal interest. 4. Rosalia filed for motion for reconsideration. She says she cannot be held liable under Art. 144 of the Civil Code because one of the parties (Eugenio) is incapacitated to marry. She also contends she is not a registered owner of the jeepney and cannot be held liable for damages. ISSUES/HELD 1. Is Art. 144 of the Civil Code applicable in this case where one party in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry? NO 2. Should Rosalia, a non-registered owner of a jeepney, be held jointly and severally liable for damages? NO DECI: Rosalia Arroyo is declared free from liability for damages. Decision is modified. RATIO Co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 requires that parties living together as husband and wife not be incapacitated to marry. Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, which is an impediment to marriage to Rosalia. Rosalia cannot be co-owner of the jeepney since this belongs to conjugal partnership of Eugenio with his legal wife. Rosalia is not a registered owner of the jeepney and cannot be liable for damages. Only registered owners of public service vehicles are responsible for damages arising from its operation. Persons: Family Code: A 176

Leonardo v CA (2003)

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Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was born July 14, 1993 to

common-law-spouses Eddie Fernandez and Gloria Leonardo.

In her birth certificate, her given surname is that of her mother,

Leonardo.

As petitioner‘s parents later wanted her to carry the surname of

her father, he executed an affidavit and wrote a letter to the

Local Civil Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of

petitioner‘s registered surname.

The Local Civil Registrar of Manila denied the request. Ann

Brigitt, being illegitimate, should carry her mother‟s

surname as provided under:

Article 176 of the Family Code

Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order

Petitioner‘s parents appealed, citing: Title XIII (Use of

Surnames), Book I of the New Civil Code:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.

Appeal denied on the ground that neither the Office of the

Civil Registrar General nor any of the Civil Registry Offices in

the country is given the power or discretion to effect an

administrative change of entry in the civil register.

They then went to CA, which held:

Title XIII, Book I of the New Civil Code on the Use of Surnames was not repealed by the Family Code

The Local Civil Registrar of Manila is not allowed to administratively correct the entry in the Civil Registry

Petitioner could change her surname by judicial action

ISSUES:

1. WON an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the

Family Code has the right to use her father‟s surname

NO, by virtue of Article 176 FC. The rule applies even if

petitioner‘s father admits paternity.

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

2. WON resort to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court requiring

judicial proceeding and publication, is the proper action to

be taken to enable the petitioner to use her natural father‟s

surname.

NO. There is no remedy. Article 176 of the Family

Code repealed Title XIII, Book I of the New Civil Code

regarding the Use of Surnames. Article 254 of the

Family Code reads:

Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of

Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natural

child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the

surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the

classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate,

eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and

natural children by legal fiction.

When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is

no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on

a substantive right. Since petitioner was born an illegitimate

child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use

her father‘s surname.

Petition denied.

Martinez vs. Martinez Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon. Daniel Sr. Executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots. He then gave the lots to each of his sons, Rodolfo, Manolo, and Daniel Jr. Manolo was designated as administrator. Natividad died on October 1996. Daniel, after suffering a stroke two years prior, died on October 1997. Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father where he appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2, which Rodolfo was occupying, to Manolo and his wife. The title was also issued to the spouses on the said deed of sale. Rodolfo filed for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of a public document. Spouses moved for cancellation of petition for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that trial court had no jurisdiction since it has not been alleged in the complaint that last will of Daniel Sr has been admitted to probate. Rodolfo then filed petition for probate of will. Spouses Martinez wrote a letter to Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the lot, which he ignored. They then filed complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. They allege that they were the owners of the lot in question and that pursuant to PD 1508,

11

the matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and amicable settlement, but none was reached. Rodolfo, in his answer, allege that complaint failed to state the condition that earnest efforts for settlement were made but that none was reached. He also said that dispute had not been referred to barangay before complaint was filed. Spouses filed an amended complaint. Trial court favored Spouses Martinez, holding that the spouses have sufficiently complied with Article151 of the Family Code . They ordered Rodolfo to vacate premises. Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and said the spouses have not complied with Article 151. They also held that the defect in their complaint was not cured by filing of an amended complaint because the latter pleading was not admitted by the trial court. ISSUES: WON (a) earnest efforts were made but the same have failed and that certification to file action and (b) allegations that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove earnest efforts WON CA erred in finding there was non-compliance with Article 151 given that one of the parties in the suit is not a member of the family RATIO Article 151 of the Family Code provides: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit: Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.

Also, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:"No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035."

It is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation which could breed hatred and passion between family members. This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which: "Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters."

Court holds that petitioners were able to comply with requirements of Article 151. Their actions of allegation in the complaint that they initiated proceeding of unlawful detainer against respondent, and that no amicable settlement has been reached , hence, resulting in barangay chairman‘s issuance of certification to file action, was found to be sufficient. DECI: petition GRANTED. Decision of CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Trial court decision REINSTATED.

Mercado v. Tan

FACTS

1. Dr. Vincent Mercado was married to Thelma Olivia in

April 1976 by a judge, with a completed marriage

certificate; religious rights followed in Cebu City on

Oct 10, 1976

2. Dr. Vincent Mercado and Consuelo Tan were married

on June 27, 1991 in front of a judge, marriage

contract duly executed and signed by the parties;

religious rights followed in Bacolod June 29, 1991.

3. Mercado had 2 children with Olivia and 1 child with

Tan

4. On October 1992 Tan filed a letter-complaint for

bigamy with the City Prosecutor in Bacolod

5. On November 1992 Mercado filed for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage against Olivia. On May 1993 the

marriage was declared null and void

6. Charged with bigamy (Art 349 Revised Penal Code).

All elements present.

a. Offender was previously legally married

b. First marriage not legally dissolved, or

absent spouse not yet presumed dead

c. He contracted subsequent marriage

d. Second marriage was valid

7. Mercado said his previous marriage was judicially

dissolved and Tan had knowledge of it

8. But there was no declaration of nullity before Mercado

contracted his second marriage, hence the bigamy

Court of Appeals Ruling

1. Bigamy. The nullity of marriage was declared AFTER

the contracting of the second marriage.

ISSUES

1. Effect of Nullity of previous marriage

a. All elements of bigamy were present.

b. However, Mercado contends that he

obtained judicial declaration of nullity under

Art 36 which means that his marriage is void

and deemed never to have taken place. So

there is no first marriage and no charge of

bigamy.

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c. Mercado quotes Reyes commentaries: if first

marriage is void, it is a defense against

bigamy. If it‘s simply voidable it is not a

defense

d. Respondent Tan counters that the

declaration of nullity came AFTER the crime

of bigamy had been consummated. A judicial

declaration of nullity must be obtained before

contracting a second marriage.

e. Court agrees with Respondent.

i. Jurisprudence regarding need for

judicial declaration of nullity is

conflicting. In some cases ( People

v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon)

marriage is so obviously void that

no declaration was needed.

However, some subsequent cases

had a need for judicial declaration

of nullity.

ii. In Mendoza and Aragon Court

relied on Sec 29 of Act No. 3613

(Marriage Law) which says

subsequent marriages contracted

by person whose spouse is still

alive is illegal and void from its

performance and no judicial decree

is necessary to establish invalidity

iii. Article 40 of Family Code (a

newer provision) expressly requires

a judicial declaration of nullity. It

changes the old rule which doesn‘t

require a judicial decree.

iv. In Domingo v. CA the court ruled

that a declaration of nullity is now

explicitly required either as a cause

for action or a ground for defense.

In Domingo it specifically states that

with such a declaration a person

who marries again cannot be liable

for bigamy. This case underlined

need for judicial declaration of

nullity, even of the case itself was

more about property.

v. Mendoza and Aragon have been

cast aside. Absent a declaration of

nullity, one may be charged with

bigamy.

vi. Justice Reyes changes his view

because of Article 40. He says a

judicial declaration of nullity is

essential

vii. Court Ruling: Petitioner contracted

second marriage without judicial

declaration of nullity. Even if he did

obtain a declaration, it was too late.

He is guilty of bigamy.

2. Damages

a. Tan wishes for claim of damages (of

reputation) and attorney‘s fees

b. No merit; she did not appeal CA ruling

against her so she cannot have affirmative

relief. This court agrees with CA.

c. CA also said: Tan is not innocent victim, she

was aware of previous marriage, she relied

on hope that 1st wife would not return to

Mercado. She cannot claim damages, her

own personal instigation of this case brought

her humiliation do the damages to her

reputation are her own fault.

DECISION:

Bigamy affirmed.

Concurring and Dissenting:

Vitug

1. Necessity of judicial declaration of nullity for purposes

of remarriage should only refer to cases where a

marriage has taken place. (none required for gay

―marriages‖ etc)

2. The complete nullity (void-ness) of a previous

marriage should be capable of being raised a a

defense against bigamy

Mercado-Fehr v Fehr

1. Bruce and Elna had a 2 year long-distance

relationship. Elna left Cebu and moved in with Bruce

in Manila. First child born in December of ‘83. They

were married March ‘85. They purchased LCG 204

condo unit in installment with Bruce as the buyer,

Elna was witness to contract and the title was issued

in her name.

2. The marriage between Elna Mercado-Fehr and Bruno

Fehr was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of

the Family Code. Bruno was psychologically

incapacitated. Court ordered dissolution of their

conjugal property.

3. Regime of complete separation of property between

spouses is established in accordance with Family

Code. Decision was given Jan 30, 1998.

4. Custody of children awarded to Elna, she was the

innocent spouse.

5. Aug 24, 1999 the trial court issued Order resolving

certain property issues. Cars and condo units were

split evenly. Monthly rentals of several LGC condo

units are to be split evenly after tax deduction. Child

support split evenly.

6. Petitioner has issues with

a. 204 LGC condo unit which was declared

exclusive property of Bruno because it was

acquired before marriage.

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i. Contends that it was purchased on

installment basis when couple was

living together as husband and wife

w/o benefit of marriage. So rules on

co-ownership should apply in

accordance with Art 147 of Family

Code.

b. Child support

i. Contends that it would not be in

children‘s best interests if she

demanded periodical support. She

proposes that 2 condo units be

adjudicated to her so she can use

income as support for children.

7. TC ruling: Article 147 applies but parties already

agreed to split property 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 Bruce and

1/3 for children. And it affirmed that 204 condo LCG

goes to Bruce because it was acquired before

marriage.

8. Appeal to CA for certiorari, they dismissed petition for

lack of merit. They said the errors she raised were

errors of judgment and she should have ordinary

appeal not certiorari.

ISSUES:

9. Petitioner says that certiorari was proper because of

the grave abuse of discretion the CA exhibited in it‘s

ruling about the 204 LCG condo and the 3-way divide

of property.

10. Respondent Bruce says Elna lost right to appeal as

soon as trial court decision became final. He also

says that dividing property into 3 is in accordance with

Family Code Art 50, 51, 147 and 148 which calls for

delivery of presumptive legitime of common children

upon dissolution of property regime. Also claims

condo unit in contention is his.

11. SC says: As a rule, certiorari is generally applied only

when there is abuse of discretion or jurisdiction and

not in errors of judgment. However, the rule is relaxed

if there is mischief, as in this case. Adherence to the

rule will prevent petitioner from significant source of

income.

12. Substantive issue: Ownership of 204 LCG condo unit

and how should the property be divided?

a. In view of the facts of how the 204 LCG unit

was bought court gives credence to Elna that

it was acquired during couple‘s cohabitation.

And so it should be governed by rules of co-

ownership.

b. Article 147 is for parties who are legally

allowed to marry, and not incapacitated

or legally barred to marry but who have a

void marriage. As is the case at bar. Their

provision creates co-ownership with respect

to their properties acquired during

cohabitation.

c. Vargas v RTC: the term „capacitated‟ in

first paragraph of Art. 147 means legal

capacity. Property acquired by both

spouses thru their work shall be governed by

rules on co-ownership. Any property

acquired during union presumably obtained

thru their joint efforts. Even housewives

contribute efforts through maintaining the

household and are entitled to property as a

co-owner.

d. For Art 147 to operate, man and woman

should

i. Be capacitated to marry each

other

ii. Live exclusively with each other

as husband and wife

iii. Their union is without benefit of

marriage or marriage is void

1. All these elements present

in this case.

2. The 204 LCG condo was

purchased on July 1983

when parties were already

living together. So it

should be considered

common property.

e. Common properties: No records support trial

court‘s decision that parties agreed to 3 way

split of property. Elna alleged she wanted a 4

way split.

DECISION

Petition granted, 204 LCG is common property and common

property should be divided in accordance with rules on co-

ownership. Petition granted.

Patricio v Dario III

FACTS:

1. On July 5, 1987 Marcelino Dario died intestate. Wife

Perla Patricio and 2 sons Marcelino Marc and

Marcelino Dario III survive him.

2. Among properties left behind was a parcel of land

with a residential house and a pre-school in Cubao.

3. The wife and 2 sons extra-judicially settled estate and

the title was issued in their names.

4. Then the sons told Perla that they wanted to partition

property and terminate co-ownership. But Perla

refused. So the sons went to the RTC of QC.

5. RTC ordered the partition Perla 4/6, Marcelino Marc

1/6, Marcelino D 1/6. Also ordered sale of property by

public auction so all parties may bid. In case of failure

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the property will be distributed in the aforestated

manner.

6. Sons petitioner to CA using Article 159, saying the

family home should continue despite death of one or

both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary

thereof (the grandson is included in the minor

beneficiaries). Unless court has a compelling reason

the heirs cannot partition property.

ISSUE

1. Is partition of a family home proper where one of the

co-owners rejects partition on the grounds that a

minor beneficiary still lives in the house?

a. Respondent claims his 12-yr old son is still

living in the family home and even after

death of his father the property is considered

the family home because a minor beneficiary

is living in it

b. Petitioner alleges the property was a family

home for the heirs only until 10th

year after

the death of the father. The sons were

already of age by the time the father died so

there are no more minor beneficiaries.

c. SC: The family home is constituted from the

time it is occupied as a family residence.

From time of constitution and so long as any

beneficiaries reside therein, the family home

continues as such and is exempt from

execution, forced sale or attachment except

as allowed by law.

i. Law provides that occupancy of

family home by beneficiaries must

be actual, not possible or

presumptive.

ii. Property may be occupied by

beneficiaries enumerated in Art

154: 1) husband and wife 2)

parents, ascendants, descendants,

bros & sis (legit or ill)

iii. 3 requisites to be a beneficiary:

1)among relationships in Art 154 2)

live in family home 3) dependent on

head of family for legal support

iv. Art 159 says family home shall

continue despite death of one or

both spouses

d. Tolentino says: No more beneficiaries at

death then family home dissolved. If there

are beneficiaries then family home continues

for 10 years unless there is a minor

beneficiary in which case the family home

continues until that beneficiary comes of

age. Tolentino also says he believes it will

cease to be a family home if it is partitioned.

e. Pineda says: as long as there is a minor

beneficiary residing in the home it is a family

home

f. Obviously, the intent of the law is to protect

the minor beneficiaries until he reaches legal

age and can support himself

2. Can the minor son of respondent be a minor

beneficiary?

a. He fulfills the first 2 requisites for

beneficiaries. He is a descendant, living in

the family home. However, he is not

dependent on his grandparents for support,

only his parents. Father has means to

support him and grandmother shows no

willingness to support him.

DECISION:

No legal impediment to partition. Remanded to RTC,

directed to make partition by commissioners. Court should

assign 3 disinterested commissioners to partition.

Badua v CA DATE: January 24, 1994 PONENTE: Puno PARTIES: Marissa Benitez-Badua (contested heir) vs. CA, Victoria Benitez Lirio (Vicente‘s Sister) and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (nephew) FACTS: 1. The spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian

owned various properties especially in Laguna. 2. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the

grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate. The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued.

3. Victoria Benitez-Lirio (sister) and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (nephew) filed before the RTC of San Pablo City for issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of Aguilar. Stating that: “The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives. Petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian were without descendants and that Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .”

4. Marissa Badua opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.

5. Badua: tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian by submitting documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth, (2) Baptismal Certificate, (3)Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (4) School Records. She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter.

6. Aguilar: proved mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage and despite treatment by a gynecologist, were unable to physically procreate.

7. RTC: decided in favor of Badua. Dismissed Aguilar‘s petition for letters and administration and declared Badua as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

15

The RTC relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

8. CA: overturned decision of RTC. Ruled that Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir. The CA held that the RTC erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

9. BADUA CONTENTION (SC):

- The CA erred when it failed to apply Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in upholding respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child;

- Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;

- CA decided the case in a way not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.

ISSUE:

1. Can Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code apply in this case?

2. WON Marissa Badua is the biological child of the deceased couple

RULING: 1. NO. The said articles can not be applied.

- A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.

- CA did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case since it is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. 2. No. Badua is not the biological child of the couple.

- The Certificate of Live Birth that Badua presented did not stand against testimonies of witnesses and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian made by her ―father‖ Vicente Benitez and ―uncle‖ Dr. Nilo Chipongian, which stated that Isabel Chipongian died without descendants or ascendants.

- Appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not. She may have been treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own child but without being legally adopted, she can not claim rights afforded to the legal heirs of the deceased

DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. NOTES:

EVIDENCE AGAINST BADUA a. Very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never

became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.

- Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or still could not bear a child. And he referred her Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist who treated his sister for a number of years.

- There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who said that her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child.

- Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in Parañaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness.

- Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the baby came from, and Isabel said Vicente brought the baby home.

b. Appellee's birth certificate with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife attending?

- The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

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c. If Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement when they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or ascendants?"

- Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he signed the same only because the latter told him to do so. Why would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant and, therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir?

- As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document without understanding completely the meaning of the words "descendant and ascendant" This we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to the United States. Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.

d. Before Isabel‘s death, she wrote a note to her husband pleading him to make Marissa their heir. Obviously, Isabel had to implore and supplicate her husband to give Marissa their properties since she knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be their legal heir unless Vincente makes her so.

e. Finally, Victoria Benitez Lirio testified that her brother Vicente gave the date December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother.

- The weight of these findings was not negated by documentary evidence presented by Marissa, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth purportedly showing that her parents were the late Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez.

- However, this Certificate is sufficiently rebutted by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian where Vicente Benitez and Dr. Nilo Chipongian, stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants".

- In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.

Manacop v CA DATE: August 11, 1997 PONENTE: Panganiban

FACTS: 1. Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli

purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-meter residential lot with a bungalow for P75,000.00.

2. On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent and agreed that defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit.

3. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.

4. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured as there was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected. They buttressed their motion with supplements and other pleadings.

5. On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the motion on the following grounds: (a) it was too late to question the September 23, 1986 Order considering that more than two years had elapsed; (b) the second alias writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c) petitioner and his company were in bad faith in refusing to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that from February 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had collected the total amount of P41,664,895.56.

6. On September 21, 1989, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner. It alleged that the property could not be considered a family home on the grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should have to have been judicially constituted as a family home for it to be exempt from execution.

7. RTC: denied the motion to quash the writ of execution. Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with CA.

8. CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari. Saying that: (a) the judgment based on the compromise agreement had become final and executory, stressing that petitioner and his company had collected the total amount of P57,224,319.75 but still failed to pay their indebtedness and

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(b) there was no showing that petitioner's residence had been duly constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution. It is the clear implication of Article 153 that the family home continues to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 actually resides therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue as such family home if none of its beneficiaries actually occupies it. There is no showing in evidence that any of its beneficiaries is actually residing therein. On the other hand, the unrefuted assertion of private respondent is that petitioner Florante Mañacop had already left the country and is now, together with all the members of his family, living in West Covina, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

9. Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied the motion. It anchored its ruling on Modequillo v. Breva, which held that "all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code." Both the debt and the judgment preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. So the case at bar does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided under Article 155 of the Family Code.

10. MANACOP: filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with SC arguing that the Court of Appeals misapplied Modequillo. He contends that there was no need for him to constitute his house and lot as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of the same property from the time "it was levied upon and up to this moment."

ISSUE: May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment

issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on

a house and lot constituted as a family home under the

provision of said Code?

RULING: YES. The CA committed no reversible error. Its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.

FAMILY HOME - Petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the

effectively of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Hence, petitioner's family home was not exempt from attachment

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. - Article 155 Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

- In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. True, under the Family Code the subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the law's protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.

OCCUPANTS OF FAMILY HOME - In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to

address the other arguments of petitioner other than to correct his misconception of the law. Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks merit.

- The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. 10 Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of the family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for lead support. This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit. This Decision is immediately executory. Double costs against petitioner.

Matabuena v Cervantes DATE: March 31, 1971

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PONENTE: Fernando PARTIES: Cornelia Matabuena v Petronila Cervantes ACTION: Appeal for decision of CFI of Sorsogon FACTS: 1. Felix Matabuena donated a parcel of land to his then

common law wife, Petronila, in 1956. 2. A few years after the donation, on March 1962, Felix and

Petronila got married. 3. A few months after, in September 1962, Felix died

intestate. 4. His sister and heir (being the only sister and nearest

collateral relative), Cornelia, is claiming the land as part of her inheritance. Alleging that the land donation was invalid because when her brother gave it to Petronila, they were already in a common law relationship.

ISSUE: WON the prohibition on donation during marriage, applies to common law marriages as well. RULING: YES donation during a common law marriage is also considered void.

Exempting common law marriages from the bar on donation is untenable since doing so would defeat the purpose of the law. The prohibition is in place because the law recognizes that there is a definite bias on the part of the donee to his or her spouse, to the detriment of his other heirs. The purpose of the law is to inhibit this undue influence. For all intents and purposes, a legal marriage and a common law one is essentially the same. The undue influence would still be present even if they are categorically not legally married, as is evident in the intimacy of living as husband and wife. Moreover, holding that the prohibition won‘t apply to a common law marriage would give more benefits and in essence, rewarding common law relationships over a legal marriage.

Mischief Rule of stat con was applied by the SC. The intent of the law, which is to prevent an undue influence over the donee, MUST prevail over the language.

BUT, the lack of validity of the donation does not mean that Cornelia is the only heir. Before his death, Felix and Petronila were married. This makes her the widow and a valid heir of Felix, entitling her to half of the inheritance. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, lower court decision is reversed. Donation is declared null and void. Case is remanded to lower court for the appropriate disposition.

Partosa – Jo v Court of Appeals DATE: December 18, 1992 PONENTE: Cruz PARTIES: Prima Partosa – Jo (legal wife) v CA and Jose Jo (philandering husband) ACTION: Petition to review decision of the CA FACTS: 1. Jose Jo admits cohabiting with three women and fathering

15 children. 2. Prima Partosa – Jo is the first of these women and had a

daughter (Monina Jo) with Jose. The other women and children are not parties of the case.

3. In 1980, Prima filed for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to her suit for support against Jose.

4. The Negros Oriental CFI granted her support but was silent on the separation of conjugal property. Prima filed the petition with the CA.

5. CA: Affirmed the support but dismissed the judicial separation complaint for lack of cause of action because separation by agreement was not covered by art 178 of CC.

6. Motion for reconsideration by both parties were denied and they filed with SC. Jose‘s SC case for certiorari was dismissed for tardiness. BUT the SC upheld the validity of the marriage between Prima and Jose and affirmed the obligation of Jose to support Prima and her daughter. The current case filed is now just about the judicial separation of the conjugal property.

ISSUE: 1. Can the decision of the trial court still be reviewed even if it was already final? - Jose: The decision of the CFI is already final and executory and can‘t be reviewed. Since the decretal portion made no disposition on the separation of properties case, it is impliedly dismissed. - Prima: The body of the decision will show that it decided in favor of her regarding the separation of the conjugal property. She thought this was enough and didn‘t feel she had to appeal since the decision was in favor of her. It was only when the CA dismissed the property separation case (thinking the RTC dismissed it since it wasn‘t in the dispositive) that she found it necessary. 2. WON a judicial separation of conjugal properties available to the parties. - Prima: Agreement with Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during her pregnancy with the understanding that he will support and visit her but she never agreed to permanently separate. She actually went back to Jose but he turned her away. She invokes Art 178 (3) of CC now Art. 128 of the FC (abandonment and failure to comply with obligation) RULING: 1. YES.

The dispositive portion of the CFI decision was lacking. Prima‘s lawyer should‘ve caught that and taken necessary action to make sure all the rulings on the text of the decision be embodied in the dispositive. Nevertheless, technicality should not prevail over substantive justice. In any case, technical defect is not insuperable. It was long settled that when a doubt results from an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, the SC by looking at the pleadings and the body of the decision, could amend the dispositive even if the decision was already final. 2. YES.

The CA dismissed the case on the ground that the separation was due to agreement and not on abandonment. But Prima claims that their agreement to separate was only temporary until she‘s able to give birth and it only became permanent when she was turned away by Jose when she came back to their conjugal house.

There was no abandonment on the part of Prima. Abandonment implies departure of a spouse with an intent never to return again, which is not the case with Prima. Jose, on the other hand, clearly showed no intention to resume a conjugal relationship when he turned Prima away when she tried to come home to their conjugal dwelling and when he

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refused to support her and their daughter. He also freely admitted to cohabiting with different women and fathering illegitimate children. These facts and their physical separation is enough to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their property.

The separation falls under Art 135 of FC and even though the amendment is new, the FC was still deemed applicable because it was viewed in Ramirez v CA that on reviewing a judgment on appeal, what is considered is not the law when the appealed judgment was finalized but on the law prevailing at the time of the rendition of the appealed judgment. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, petition is granted. CA decision is modified. The conjugal property is divided between them, share and share alike. Division shall be implemented by the trial court after determination of the properties.

Republic v CA and Bobiles DATE: Jan 24, 1992 PONENTE: Regalado FACTS: 1. On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles before the

RTC of Legaspi City filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, a 6 years old boy who had been living with her family since he was 4 months old.

2. The testimonies of Zenaida together with her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings.

3. RTC: On March 20, 1988, the trial court declared that ―the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.‖

4. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC decision of the court below.

5. PETITIONER CONTENTION: (I‘m assuming Sol Gen since it is RP vs CA) a) The CA erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be

applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; - It argues that the Family Code must be applied

retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption

b) CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. - the petition for adoption should be dismissed

outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses.

6. The petition for adoption was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them.

7. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the CA, the

Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

ISSUE: 1. What statute should apply in the case at bar? Child and

Youth Welfare Code or Family Code? Child and Youth Welfare Code

2. WON the husband is also party to the Adoption. YES RULING: 1. Child and Youth Welfare Code should be applied not

Family Code. - Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Zenaida had

the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

- The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

- A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time.

- As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.

- Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

- A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

2. Yes the granting of the adoption is not only in favor of Zenaida but her husband as well even if he wasn‘t expressly named as petitioner.

- Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The declarations he submitted and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner.

- The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.

- It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.

- The approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court and should be exercised in

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accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed.

- Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Saguid v Court of Appeals DATE: June 10, 2003 PONENTE: Ynares- Santiago PARTIES: Jacinto Saguid v CA, RTC of Marinduque and Gina S. Rey ACTION: Petition for review on Certiorari on the decision of the CA FACTS: 1. Gina was married but separated de facto from her husband when she met Jacinto. (She was 17) 2. After a brief courtship, they cohabited as husband and wife on a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto's dad. 3. Jacinto was a patron of a fishing vessel and Gina was a fish dealer. 4. Gina had a bad relationship with her in laws and decided to work in Japan as entertainer for 2 years. 5. When the conflict remained unresolved, they decided to end their 9 year cohabitation. 6. Gina then filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership in the RTC of Marinduque. 7. Gina: - contributed 70,000 to the construction of the house - acquired and accumulated appliances worth 111,375.00 - had 35,465 in the joint bank account 8. Jacinto: only his income was used on the construction of the house and Gina didn‘t work continuously in Japan only on 6 months increments for each year and her earnings was used for the daily needs and business of her parents. 9. RTC Decision: allowed Gina to present evidence ex parte since the petitioner, Jacinto, failed to file a pre-trial brief as required by an SC Circular. - Found for the respondent (Gina) and directed Jacinto to reimburse her 70,000 for her contribution in the construction of the house, instructing him to return the personal properties she claimed was hers and pay moral damages amounting 50,000. 10. CA Decision: affirmed decision of RTC but deleted, for lack of basis, the moral damages award of 50,000 ISSUE: 1. WON trial court erred in allowing respondent to present

evidence ex parte 2. WON trial court‘s decision is supported by evidence

RULING: 1. NO the trial court didn‘t err in allowing Gina to give

evidence ex parte (heard one side only). Rules of court are important and should be taken seriously. Non observance may result to in prejudice to a party‘s substantive rights. Jacinto argues that he didn‘t have a lawyer so he wasn‘t able to file a pre trial brief. This justification is not enough to relax the application of the rules. The assistance of lawyers, though desirable, is not indispensible in non-criminal proceedings. The legal profession is not engrafted in due process that the absence of participation of its members deems this safeguard violated. The petitioner could‘ve inquired from the court or filed for a motion to extend the filing of the brief, instead, he waited 14 days from the receipt of the ruling before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief.

2. The CA decision is affirmed with modification. - Since Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry

during their cohabitation, art 148 of the FC applies in their relationship (bigamous marriage): only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contribution and proof of the actual contribution is required.

- Although the adulterous cohabitation commenced before the affectivity of FC, Art 148 was meant to fill up the gap left by art 144 of CC that had no provision governing property relations of couples living in adultery, so art 148 applies.

- The burden of proof rests upon the party to prove their contribution in the acquisition of the property else it would be divided in half. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and must rely on the strength of party‘s own evidence not the weakness of the opponent‘s defense. This rule is more rigorously applied in this case since she was already allowed to produce evidence ex parte. Ex parte proceedings don‘t give automatic relief. To protect the other party, she must still prove her allegations and only when the court is convinced by her argument can she get the relief she wants.

- Though Gina alleges contributing 70,000 in the house, she produced no proof. The records she gave only show 11,413.00 worth of receipts in her name that was used to buy construction materials.

- Though they obviously both contributed to the joint bank account, she can‘t prove the exact amount of money she gave so it will be presumed they contributed equally to the account.

- This goes the same with the appliances. She will get half of the estimated value (111,375) so they‘ll get 55,687.50 each.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of the house to the extent of 11,413.00 and personal properties of 55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of 67,100.50 to the respondent and failing which, the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy respondent‘s claim.

Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun (June, 1984) J. Melencio-Herrera

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Art. 87/FC: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Article taken from A133/Old Civil Code- OCC) Facts:

1. Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas married Dec 12, 1962; five children. Lived in a small house on disputed residential land in Pangasinan. FC inherited land in 1965 when his father died.

2. 1978, FC abandoned family and lived with Corazon Daguines. During pendency of instant appeal, the two were convicted of concubinage (CFI final judgment, 1981).

3. Apr 1980, FC sold said property with the house thereon to CD for P2K. FC said in document sale that land was inheritance from parents.

4. Unable to take possession of land, CD filed complaint Jun, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against MCC.

a. MCC resisted: i. house and trees on land were built

with conjugal funds and through her industry.

ii. Sale of land together with house and improvements to CD was null and void (NV) bec they are conjugal properties and she had not given consent to sale.

b. CFI orig. decision: CD lawful owner of land and half of house thereon. NOTE HERE: CFI thinking was that land was FC‘s alone so he could sell it. House being conjugal property, half of which he could sell.

c. After MCC made MR, CFI amended decision:

i. CD true owner of land and the 10 coconut trees

ii. Sale of conjugal house to CD NV plus 3 coconut tree and other crops thereon during conjugal relation bet. FC and MCC.

NOTE HERE: CFI thinking was that land was FC‘s alone so he could sell it. House thereon was conjugal property so sale of which w/o wife consent was void.

Issue:

1. Was sale of land by FC to mistress valid even if he owned it prior to marriage with legal wife?

2. Was sale by FC to mistress of house, which was built on said land during said lawful marriage, valid?

Held: NO to both. CFI Judge Fortun‘s decision was set aside and sale of lot and improvements thereon NV. Land could not have been sold to the mistress given A133/OCC. In this case, even if sale of land was done legally, reimbursement which happens before conjugal partnership takes effect, goes to widow.

NOTE HERE: Whereas CFI thinking was that land was FC‘s alone so he could sell it, SC in correction says that sale of land was contrary to law, public morals and public interest. Meanwhile, both courts agree that house could not be sold. In sum, both land and house goes to widow (the lawful wife). Rationale:

1. A 158(2)/OCC: ―xxx ―Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.‖ Court says that pursuant to A 158(2)/OCC, both the land and building belong to conjugal partnership but conjugal partnership is indebted to husband for value of land. Spouse owning lot becomes creditor of conjugal partnership for value of the lot wc value should be reimbursed at liquidation of conjugal partnership.

2. CFI Judge Fortun relied on Maramba v. Lozano: land belonging to one of spouses becomes conjugal property only when conjugal partnership is liquidated and indemnity is paid to owner of land.

a. But Court followed Padilla v. Paterno (JBL Reyes; pp. 679) wherein reimbursement happens after liquidation of conjugal partnership and conjugal property happens at marriage. Court deemed it better ruling: FC could not have alienated house and lot to CD bec MCC had not given consent to said sale. Contract NV for being contrary to public morals and public policy. Sale made to a concubine after he left family and left conju home where wife and children support; subversive to stability of family.

3. A1409/OCC: contracts whose cause contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Same idea in A 1352/OCC.

4. A133/OCC: Law prohibits spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Also, donations bet spouses during marriage are prohibited. The reverse will destroy system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. Prohibition designed to prevent exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other as well as to protect marriage.

Prohibition applies to common-law relationship for same reason said in Matabuena v. Cervantes 1971. Case cites Buenaventura v. Bautista and Matabuena.

Maquilan v. Maquilan (June, 2007) J. Austria-Martinez Art. 134/FC: In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a) Facts:

1. Petitioner and respondent are spouses who were married and had a son.

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2. Husband Virgilio Maquilan (VM) discovered wife Dita Maquilan (DM) had a paramour. DM and paramour were sued by VM for adultery and the two were convicted.

3. After, DM filed for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages with RTC, imputing psychological incapacity on part of VM.

a. During pre-trial of said case, VM and DM entered into a Compromise Agreement (COMAG).

i. Therein, parties agreed to certain partition of their properties and savings between them, with some going to their common child.

ii. COMAG also said that such was only partial settlement, i.e., without prejudice to the litigation of other conjugal properties that have not been mentioned.

4. Said COMAG was given judicial imprimatur by respondent judge.

5. But VM filed Omnibus Motion, praying for repudiation of COMAG and the reconsideration of Judgment on COMAG on grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the COMAG.

a. Judge denied Omnibus Motion. b. VM filed for MR but same was denied.

6. VM filed for certiorari and prohibition with CA. Arguments: COMAG should have been repudiated since DM, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property.

7. CA dismissed petition for lack of merit, saying adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. Also, CA noted that spouses voluntarily separate their property through COMAG with court approval under A134/FC. Claim on lawyer not having informed VM of legal effects of COMAG is untenable in that simple language of the COMAG was not difficult to understand for the average person and hence did not vitiate his consent.

Issue: 1. WON a COMAG entered into by spouses, one of

whom was convicted with adultery, giving the convicted spouse a share in the conjugal property, valid and legal.

2. WON the partial voluntary separation of property made by spouses pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Decision:

1. Valid 2. Valid

Rationale:

1. Law does not disqualify a spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in conjugal properties. Disqualification in A43/FC applies only in void marriages while that in A63/FC refer to effects of legal separation; both not applicable to instant case.

2. Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take

place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. COMAG was judicially approved and was one allowed by law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. But Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to A36/FC.

Villanueva v. CA (April, 2004) J. Carpio Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) Facts:

1. Eusebia Napisa Retuya (ENR) is legal wife of Nicolas Retuya (NR), married Oct 1926; 5 children. During marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements in Mandaue City and Consolacion, Cebu (Case enumerated 20 parcels of land).

a. One of those parcels of land was in the name of Pacita Villanueva (PV).

b. Also, NR is co-owner of a parcel of land in Mandaue wc he inherited from parents.

c. Some of abovementioned properties earn income from coconuts and the other lands/houses are leased to a number of individuals and corporations.

2. In 1945, NR no longer lived with legit family and cohabited with PV with whom he had an illegitimate son, Procopio Villanueva (PRV).

a. Nicolas then was the only person who received income of abovementioned properties.

b. Pacita from time of concubinage with NR, no occupation, no properties.

3. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke, could not talk nor walk. From time NR suffered stroke until present, PRV has been receiving income of said properties.

a. Daughter Natividad Retuya (DNR) asked PRV that they talk things over but PRV said it was not yet time to talk about the matter.

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b. No settlement was reached between legitimate family and the illegitimate family.

4. Oct 1988, ENR filed complaint before RTC against NR, PV and PRV, seeking reconveyance from NR and PV of several properties as such were her conprops with NR. She also prayed for accounting, damages and delivery of rent and other income from subject properties.

a. At the court, DNR testified that land in name of PV was property bought by NR from one Adriano Marababol for at time of purchase, PV had no means of livelihood.

b. RTC decided in favor of Eusebia. c. The petitioners appealed to CA. Eusebia

died and so heirs substituted her pursuant to CA resolution. CA upheld RTC decision.

d. Petitioners filed for MR but it was denied. 5. Petitioners went to SC.

a. RTC and CA were one in saying PV failed to rebut presumed conjugality of properties under A116/FC.

b. Petitioners sought reversal and raised among others (as conjugality and bar by prescription on action for reconveyance over lot under PV name. They are off-tangent to topic though) whether CA erred in not applying instead presumption under A148/FC in favor of co-ownership bet NR and PV.

Issue: Did CA err in not applying instead presumption under A148/FC in favor of co-ownership bet NR and PV? Decision: NO. CA was correct in not applying instead presumption under A148/FC in favor of co-ownership bet NR and PV. Rationale:

1. Petitioner‘s reliance on A148 of FC is misplaced. A reading of said provision shows there must be proof of ―actual joint contribution‖ by both live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution.

2. The presumption of equality of contribution in A148/FC arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Petitioners failed to provide such proof of actual joint contribution in the acquisition of land in PV name. Hence, no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing.

Persons: Property relations: Art. 148

Agapay v Palang 28 July 1997 Ponente: Justice Romero SUMMARY: Miguel Palang married Carlina, left for Hawaii, and then refused to return to her and their daughter, Herminia. Instead, he married Erlinda Agapay (the marriage was void, since he was still married to Carlina), bought some rice land and a house and lot, and had a son, Kristopher, with Erlinda. Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of the crime of concubinage. After he died, Carlina and Herminia demanded that they get the properties Miguel bought while he was living with Erlinda. The RTC ruled that the properties would go to

Erlinda and Kristopher. The CA reversed the decision and gave the properties to Carlina and Herminia. Kristopher wasn‘t officially recognized as Miguel‘s illegitimate child. The Supreme Court ruled that under Art. 148, Erlinda should have made an actual contribution to the purchase of the rice land if she wanted to have a share in it. Since she didn‟t, she and Kristopher weren‟t entitled to any part of it. As for the house and lot, the sale was under Erlinda‘s name, but the money was Miguel‘s, making it a donation to her. Art. 87 prohibits donations made between people who are living together as husband and wife. FACTS:

- Case is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals

- Miguel Palang married respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol in 1949, then left to work in Hawaii. They had one child in 1950: Herminia o Miguel tried to divorce Carlina as early as 1957, and

when he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina and Herminia

- 15 July 1973: Miguel (63) married Erlinda Agapay (19, petitioner) o Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly

purchased a parcel of rice land which was issued in their names

o 23 September 1975: Erlinda allegedly bought a house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan. It was issued in her name

o They had a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on 6 December 1977

- 30 October 1975: Miguel and Carlina Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a compromise agreement. They both agreed to donate their conjugal property to Herminia Palang.

- 1979: Upon Carlina‘s complaint, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage

- 15 February 1981: Miguel died - 11 July 1981: Carlina Palang and Herminia Palang de la

Cruz instituted the case at bar o They wanted recovery of ownership and possession

with damages against Erlinda They wanted the rice land and the house and lot

that Miguel allegedly bought while he was living with Erlinda

- Lower Court: DISMISSED Carlina‘s complaint. There was little evidence to prove that the properties were Carlina and Miguel‘s conjugal properties, and the Lower Court provided for the intestate shares of the parties o It confirmed the fact that Erlinda Agapay exclusively

owned the house and lot in Binalonan and that she owned half of the rice land in Binalonan

o It adjudicated to Kristopher as his inheritance, half of the rice land; as long as he executes a quit-claim within 15 days, renouncing claims to annul or reduce Herminia‘s donation from her parents

- Court of Appeals: REVERSED the trial court‘s decision o Declared that Carlina and Herminia were the owners of

the properties o Ordered Erlinda to vacate the properties and deliver

them to Carlina and Herminia o Ordered the Pangasinan Registrar of Deeds to cancel

the Transfer Certificates of Title and issue another certificate of title in Carlina‘s and Herminia‘s names

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ISSUES o Erlinda claims that the Court of Appeals erred:

1. In not sustaining the validity of the deeds covering the absolute sale of the rice land and the house and lot

2. In not finding that Kristopher should be considered party-defendant in the case before the trial court

3. In not declaring Kristopher as Miguel‘s illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel‘s estate

SUPREME COURT RULING

Petition DENIED, challenged CA decision AFFIRMED HELD

- Petitioner Agapay‘s claims have no merit 1. The deeds of sale of the properties should go to Carlina

and Herminia - Deeds of conveyance were valid - Applicable provision of law is Art. 148 of the Family

Code: property regime for when a man and a woman who aren‟t capacitated to marry cohabitate or live under a void marriage o Miguel and Erlinda married in 1973, but their union

was void because Miguel was still married to Carlina.

o Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion to their respective contributions. If a party‟s contribution isn‟t proven, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares

- Rice Land: o CA correctly ruled that it would revert to Miguel and

Carlina‘s conjugal partnership o Purchase was made when Erlinda was only 20; she

couldn‘t have been able to have contributed the PhP3750 that she claims was her share in the purchase price. Also, Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the US Government

- House and Lot: o Erlinda allegedly bought it for PhP20,000, but the notary

public testified that Miguel provided the money and simply asked that Erlinda alone be placed as vendee. This makes it a donation, which is void under Art.

739 of the Civil Code since it was made by persons guilty of concubinage

Art. 87 also expressly provides that donations between spouses now also applies to donations between those who cohabitate as spouses

- The fact that Miguel and Carlina agreed to donate their conjugal property to Herminia is immaterial. It doesn‘t count as a judicial confirmation of separation of property since it wasn‘t specifically and expressly for separation of property.

2. Kristopher‘s claim as illegitimate son and heir to Miguel‘s estate should have been ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. An unrecognized child has no rights from his parents or to their estate

3. Kristopher had not been impleaded before the trial court and therefore was not involved in the case at bar

Property relations: Art 121 Family Code

Ayala Investment and Development Corp v. CA (1998)

Private respondents: spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching

FACTS:

1. Respondent Alfredo, as executive VP of Philippine Blooming Mills, made himself answerable with PBM‘s indebtedness to Ayala when he executed security agreements. PBM failed to pay the P50M loan.

2. Ayala filed a case for sum of money with CFI Pasig, which in turn ordered PBM and Alfredo to pay Ayala. While appeal of the judgment was pending, the lower court issued a writ of execution. There, a sheriff sale was conducted on 3 of the respondents‟ conjugal properties. An auction sale of the properties was scheduled.

3. The spouses sought to enjoin the auction sale. Lower court favored the spouses. Ayala filed with CA, which in turn, enjoined the lower court from enforcing its order (to suspend auction sale). So, the auction sale took place. Ayala was the only bidder (as usual), and was issued a Certificate of Sale and later, Final Deed of Sale.

4. A different legal situation arose because 2 of the properties are in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to the case before CFI Pasig.

5. So CFI Pasig proceeded with the trial. It decided that the sale on execution was null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Art 121 FC: ―The conjugal partnership shall be liable for… all

debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the

designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal

partnership of gains.‖ (Art 161 CC is similarly worded.)

Ayala‘s main contention: The conjugal partnership of the

spouses is liable for Alfredo‘s obligation. There‘s no need to

prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the

partnership. The transaction Alfredo entered into was for the

benefit of the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE: Is the agreement that Alfredo entered into considered

―for the benefit of the conjugal partnership‖ which is chargeable

against the conjugal partnership?

RULING:

NO. Alfredo acted only as a surety or guarantor, i.e., he did

not directly receive the money and services to be used for his

own business or profession… unless Ayala can prove that the

conjugal partnership actually benefited from the contract. Ayala

failed to do so.

Ayala merely cited as benefits the prospects of longer

employment and probable increase in the value of stocks of

the family in PBM. The Court said these were indirect and

remote, incidental and speculative—not the benefits referred to

by Art 121 FC and Art 161 CC.

The contract of loan is clearly for the benefit of the

principal debtor (PBM), and not for his family. PBM has a

personality distinct from Alfredo‘s family, even if the family

owns stocks in PBM.

It was a corporate debt. And Ayala‘s right of recourse against

Alfredo as surety is only to the extent of his corporate

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stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of

gains of Alfredo‘s family.

Why does the contract have to be those that redounded to the

benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership’s

liability is to the extent that the family is benefited? Because

the law’s concern is for the conservation of the conjugal

partnership, for the husband’s duty to protect and safeguard, if

not augment. Not to dissipate it.

Babiera v Catotal

IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER: Art. 171 of the Family Code: ―The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

1. If the husband should die before the expiration of the period [1 year if husband/heirs reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place, 2 years if within the Philippines, 3 years if abroad –Art. 170] fixed for bringing his action

2. If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or

3. If the child was born after the death of the husband.‖ Main point of the case: Presentaction B. Catotal asks that Teofista Guinto‘s birth certificate be cancelled. Teofista claims that she is Hermogena and Eugenio Babiera‘s legitimate child, and she presents her (clearly forged) birth certificate as proof. The case doesn‟t apply to Art. 171, since it doesn‟t involve impugning Teofista‟s legitimacy as Hermogena‟s child, but whether or not Teofista is Hermogena and/or Eugenio‟s child at all.

Paternity and Filiation: Rule on DNA Evidence Estate of Rogelio Ong v Diaz December 17, 2007 Joanne Rodjin Diaz, a minor represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky Diaz, had filed a complaint before the RTC of Tarlac City for compulsory recognition, with a prayer for support, against Rogelio Ong. Joanne wanted:

Rogelio Ong to recognize her as his daughter

Rogelio Ong to give her monthly support of P20,000 pendente lite and to fix monthly support

Rogelio Ong to pay her attorney‘s fees of P100,000

Other such relief as may be just and equitable Jinky had met Rogelio when she was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding on February 19, 1993 by an MTC judge. However, Jinky and Rogelio were so in love that they decided to live together (IN SIN!) from January 1994 to September 1998. It is from this relationship that Joanne was conceived AND subsequently born, on February 25, 1998. Rogelio took care of Joanne and Jinky—he brought them home, paid all the hospital bills, paid for all the baptismal expenses, provided for all Joanne‘s needs, effectively recognizing Joanne as his child. However, in September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky, and

stopped supporting Joanne. He said he wasn‘t the father. (cue Maury / Jerry Springer audience) Thus, the complaint. The RTC ordered Rogelio to recognize Joanne as his natural child, and to provide support of P10,000 as well as pay attorney‘s fees and the costs of the suit. Then, in a new trial, the RTC held that, because Joanne was born during Jinky‘s marriage to the Japanese guy, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of that marriage (Art 164 FC). The child is still presumed legitimate, even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Art 167 FC). Art 166 provides for the grounds upon which one may impugn the legitimacy of a child—physical incapacity, having the husband and wife live separately such that sex was not possible, and serious illness of the husband which prevented sex. Evidence showed that the Japanese guy lived outside the country and came home just once a year. No evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year preceding Joanne‘s birth. On the other hand, Rogelio admitted to having shouldered all the hospital bills from Joanne‘s birth. He also admitted that he and Jinky used to go to motels and that he still used to see Jinky even after Joanne was born. The RTC thus found that Joanne was the illegitimate child of Jinky and Rogelio. BUT, he died during the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, so Rogelio was substituted by his estate—the Estate of Rogelio Ong. The CA set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis in order to determine Joanne‘s paternity. The CA held that DNA paternity testing would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the paternity dispute. The SC focused on the issue of the propriety of the CA decision remanding the case to the RTC for the conduct of DNA testing. DNA TESTING! DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. Petitioners contend that it would be impossible to conduct DNA testing, since Rogelio has already died. However, Section 4 of the New Rules on DNA Evidence, which allow the conduct of DNA testing, provide that

as long as a biological sample exists

and it has not been previously subjected to DNA testing OR the results of a prior DNA test require confirmation

the DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique

the DNA testing has scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the resolution of the case

and the existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affection the accuracy/integrity of the DNA testing.

It is evident from this section that the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing, for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. ―Biological sample‖ means any organic material originating from a person‘s body. Petitioners have not shown

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the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be used for DNA testing. Also, it was held in Tecson v COMELEC that the physical residue of the long-dead parent could be resorted to, for DNA testing. The petition for review of the decision and resolution of the CA is thus dismissed.

Magbaleta v Gonong April 22, 1977 Rufino Magbaleta, his wife Romana Magbaleta, and another person, Susan G. Baldovi, filed a petition praying for a preliminary injunction against the orders of respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong. The assailed orders denied petitioners‘ motion to dismiss a complaint filed against them by Rufino‘s brother, Catalino Magbaleta. The original case was this: Catalino had filed a suit to have a parcel of land, which was in Rufino‘s name, be declared in his name instead. Catalino had also claimed that Susana Baldovi, the third petitioner, was trying to take possession of said land from his representative. Susana, on the other hand, had claimed that she had bought the land from spouses Rufino and Romana. The main contention is this: That the assailed orders violated Article 222 of the Civil Code, and Section 1 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which provide that, before suits within the same family can be filed, an earnest efforts towards compromise had been made. It is contended that Catalino had not alleged that such earnest efforts towards compromise had already been made before he filed his complaint. Judge Gonong had refused the petitioners‘ complaint to dismiss because one of the parties, Susana Baldovi, is a stranger—thus, the aforementioned legal provisions did not apply to this case. The SC held that Judge Gonong‘s ruling was correct. While it is necessary that every effort towards compromise be made before litigation ensues within a family, this is not a prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party therein. It is neither practical, nor fair, that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family be made to depend on the way how the family settles its differences. Petition dismissed.

DOMINGO v CA DATE: September 17, 1993 PONENTE: Justice Romero PARTIES: Roberto Domingo v CA and Delia Soledad Avera ACTION: PETITION for review of the decision of the CA (that dismissed Domingo‘s petition to dismiss Delia Avera‘s petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property). FACTS: 1. Delia filed a petition before RTC of Pasig against Roberto

Domingo.

2. They were married November 29, 1976 but unknown to her, Roberto already had a previous marriage with Ermelina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which was still valid and existing. She only found out when in 1983 Ermelina sued them for bigamy.

3. Since 1979, Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation she‘s given.

4. Since 1983 up to the present, Domingo has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties which are under the possession and administration of Roberto

5. In June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman and she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent

6. Thereafter she appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties

7. Domingo failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact.

8. The petition in the Pasig RTC

Petitioner of that case (respondent in this one), Delia wanted

- temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Domingo from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties - their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect - and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of her attorney-in-fact.

Domingo: - filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition

stated no cause of action. - The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. - He added that Delia has no property which is in his possession.

9. RTC Ruling: Denied Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Judge Maria Austria says: - On Domingo arguing that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage: Indeed, under Yap v CA there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, the issue in the Yap case wasn‘t whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity. The case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, is more applicable when the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms that there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. - Finally, the contention of respondent that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits.

10. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Domingo stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. 11. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.

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12. Instead of filing the required answer, Domingo filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. 13. On February 7, 1992, the CA dismissed the petition. - It explained that the case of Yap v. CA cited by petitioner (Domingo) and that of Consuegra v. GSIS cited by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while this case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. - It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties. - Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. - Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 14. Case filed at the SC

Petitioner‘s Argument for SC case (Domingo): - That the Declaration of nullity must be dismissed for being unnecessary (since marriage was void ab initio in the first place) AND - he interprets Art 40 of FC to mean that a declaration of nullity should only be sought for the purpose of remarriage. And since there was no mention of an intention to remarry in the petition, petition should be dismissed.

Respondent (Delia): Declaration is necessary not for the purpose of remarriage but as basis for the separation and distribution of properties.

ISSUE:

1. WON petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary and should it be filed only for the purpose of remarriage.

2. WON Declaration of Nullity and Separation of Property is the proper remedy for Delia to recover her properties.

RULING:

1. WON declaration is necessary: YES! There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and

respondent is bigamous. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. However, the rule is, it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. After a lot of conflicting jurisprudence, the Family Code finally ruled that even if a marriage is void ab intio, it still needs a judicial declaration for nullity to be upheld. (See notes on the movement of requiring the declaration)

Should it be filed only for the purpose of remarriage? NO! Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the

position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, it shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such

previous marriage void." The provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage.

The way Article 40 is formulated denotes that final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.

2. WON Declaration is proper remedy: YES! When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states

that final judgment on the case shall provide for: the liquidation of properties, custody of common children and delivery of presumptive legitimes. So since FC clearly provides for the effects of a declaration of nullity (as seen in Art 43 and 44), including jurisdiction to rule over property relations, lower court committed no abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Court of Appeals decision, AFFIRMED. NOTE: (Just in case it is important)

MOVEMENT ON HOW JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY WAS FINALLY AFFIRMED

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that: ―Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . .‖

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."

Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held

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that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. ILLUSTRATION:

Aragon and Mendoza (no need) -- dissent by J. Reyes (there is) dissent adopted in Gomez v Lipana and abandoned Aragon and Mendoza (there is need) Consuerga v GSIS (applied Gomez v Lipana = there is need) Tolentino v Paras (went back to Aragon and Mendoza = no need) Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (applied Consuerga = need) FC: there is need

Persons: Family Code: Art 163 HERRERA v. ALBA

FACTS: 1. 13 year old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi, filed a petition for recognition and support against the petitioner. 2. Petitioner denied he was the biological father. He denied having any physical contact with Alba's mother. 3. Alba filed a motion to direct the petitioner to take a DNA paternity test. Alba presented the testimony of Dr. Halos (check page 200-201 for the doctor's full list of credentials) 4. Doctor described the process of DNA testing: the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity Petitioner says: It has not gained acceptability and that DNA testing violates his right against self incrimination. Trial court: granted motion to conduct DNA paternity test, in effect compelling the petitioner to undergo testing. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed TC's decision. Thus, he appealed to the SC.

ISSUES: 1. WON DNA test is a valid probative tool to determine filiation. YES

Court described the process of DNA analysis (p. 209) and its admissibility in court in which it cited the Vallejo case which offered guidelines in considering the probative value of DNA testing (p. 211) Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence: Please note: Despite the relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts applies a cautious approach in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. Previous ruling in the Vallejo case:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among other things, the following data:

1. how the samples were collected 2. how they were handled 3. the possibility of contamination of the samples 4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples 5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests 6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

COURT ALSO CITED THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE FC: Art 172 and 175 2. WON the motion to direct the petitioner to take a DNA paternity test is a violation of his right against self-incrimination (Art 3 Sec 17 Consti). NO. This privilege is only applicable to testimonial evidence. "The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence."

Petition DISMISSED. CA decision AFFIRMED.

Modequillo v Breva

Persons: Family Code: Art 163 HERRERA v. ALBA

FACTS: 5. 13 year old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi, filed a petition for recognition and support against the petitioner. 6. Petitioner denied he was the biological father. He denied having any physical contact with Alba's mother. 7. Alba filed a motion to direct the petitioner to take a DNA paternity test. Alba presented the testimony of Dr. Halos (check page 200-201 for the doctor's full list of credentials)

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8. Doctor described the process of DNA testing: the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity Petitioner says: It has not gained acceptability and that DNA testing violates his right against self incrimination. Trial court: granted motion to conduct DNA paternity test, in effect compelling the petitioner to undergo testing. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed TC's decision. Thus, he appealed to the SC.

ISSUES: 1. WON DNA test is a valid probative tool to determine filiation. YES Court described the process of DNA analysis (p. 209) and its admissibility in court in which it cited the Vallejo case which offered guidelines in considering the probative value of DNA testing (p. 211) Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence: Please note: Despite the relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts applies a cautious approach in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. Previous ruling in the Vallejo case:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among other things, the following data:

7. how the samples were collected 8. how they were handled 9. the possibility of contamination of the samples 10. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples 11. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests 12. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

COURT ALSO CITED THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE FC: Art 172 and 175 2. WON the motion to direct the petitioner to take a DNA paternity test is a violation of his right against self-incrimination (Art 3 Sec 17 Consti). NO. This privilege is only applicable to testimonial evidence. "The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence."

Petition DISMISSED. CA decision AFFIRMED.

People v Vergara

IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER: Art. 184 of the Family Code: ―The following persons may not adopt:

1. The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;

2. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

3. An alien, except: a. A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a

relative by consanguinity; b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his

or her Filipino spouse; or c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to

adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Art. 185 of the Family Code: ―Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other

Persons: Family Code: A172, 173, 175

Tayag v CA (1992)

Petitioner: Corito Ocampo Tayag

Respondents: CA & Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan

Emilie is mother and legal guardian of minor Chad. In April

1987, she filed a complaint denominated "Claim for

Inheritance" against Corito, the administratrix of the estate of

Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who died in Sept 1983. Emilie alleged

that:

1. She is Chad‘s mother by the father of the Corito, the late

Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Corito is the known administratrix of the

real and personal properties left by her deceased father

(Ricardo) who died intestate.

3. She has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan,

for several years now and during which time, she and Ricardo

had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, and they

bore Chad, their only son

4. Chad, although illegitimate, is nevertheless entitled to a

share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father

5. Ricardo at the time of his death was the owner of real and

personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in

the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several

millions of pesos;

6. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been

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inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the

surviving heirs including that of Chad has not been

ascertained;

7. The only known surviving heirs of Ricardo are his children,

namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo,

Felina Ocampo, and Chad

9. She has no means of livelihood and only depends on the

charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son,

and that she needs extended financial support from the estate

of Ricardo

10. She made several demands for Corito to grant Chad's

lawful inheritance, but she was refused

IN SUM, Emilie prays that Corito be ordered to render an

inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties

left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver

Chad‟s share in the estate of the deceased; and to give him

support pendente lite.

Corito disputed the allegations, said there was no cause of

action; that the action is premature and barred by

prescription, according to Art 175 (2) of FC.

Trial court denied Corito‘s motion to dismiss. More evidence must be adduced.

This was affirmed by CA, which found that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance.

Corito prayed that be orders of TC and CA be annulled and set

aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Is Art 175 (2) of FC applicable in determining WON the

action has prescribed?

HELD: NO. Art 285 of CC applies. Where a complaint for

recognition was filed before FC, it should be resolved

under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Article 175 of FC doesn‘t apply because it will affect adversely

Emilie‘s and Chad‘s rights which have been vested with the

filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore,

correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil

Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action

has not yet prescribed.

Article 285 CC: The action for the recognition of natural children may be

brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,

except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,

in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration

of four years from the attainment of his majority;

Article 175 FC: Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same

evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period

specified in Article 173, except when the action is

based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in

which case the action may be brought during the

lifetime of the alleged parent.

Article 256 FC: This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not

prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance

with the Civil Code or other laws."

The fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner

her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final

adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time,

and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the

enactment of a new law.

Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Teotico v Del Val (1965)

Petitioner: Vicente Teotico

Respondent: Ana del Val

FACTS:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died in 1955,

leaving properties worth P600,000. She left a will and affixed

her signatures in the presence of 3 persons, who in turn affixed

their signatures. The will was acknowledged by the testatrix

and the witnesses before a notary public.

In the will, she stated that she was: possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; free from illegal pressure or influence from the beneficiaries; freely and spontaneously executed; she had no ascendants or descendants

P20,000 went to Rene Teotico, her physician, and husband of

testatrix's niece Josefina Mortera. She left the usufruct of her

interest in a building to them, while the naked ownership of it,

she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the

legitimate children of the spouses. Josephina was instituted as

her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her

properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Petitioner Vicente Teotico filed for the probate of the will before the CFI Manila

Respondent Ana del Val Chan, claimed to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, testatrix‘s deceased sister, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, testatrix‘s deceased brother.

She opposed the probate of the will alleging that: (1) will was not executed as required by law

(2) testatrix was physically and mentally incapable at the time

(3) the will was executed under duress

(4) will is inoperative as to the share of Rene Teotico because

he was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her

last illness

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The probate court (1) admitted the will to probate (2) declared the disposition made in favor of Rene

void and that instead, it should go to the testatrix's heirs

by way of intestate succession

Petitioner and respondent both filed motions for reconsideration, but both were denied.

ISSUES:

(1) Does Ana del Val Chan have the right to intervene in

this proceeding? NO.

NO. She has no right to intervene because she has no material

or direct interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or

administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property

affected by the will, because it nowhere appears any provision

designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the

estate.

Even if the will is denied probate, she‘d still have no interest

because under the Civil Code, she is not a legal heir of the

deceased.

Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;"

Also, no relationship is created between the adopted and the

collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the

adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the

adopter.

(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?

YES.

YES. The will was duly executed because it was signed by the

testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public

in the manner provided for by law. The burden is on the person

challenging the will (respondent) that such duress/influence

was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here

was not done, for the evidence presented is insufficient, and is

disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses. Also,

nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really

wanted to from subsequently revoking her will if it did not in

fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions.

(3) Could the probate court determine the intrinsic validity of

the provisions of a will? NO.

NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been

executed in accordance with the requirements of the law and

that the testator was in a condition to make a will. It does not

determine nor prejudge the validity or efficiency of the

provisions, despite its authentication. It can‘t decide, for

example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.

Case remanded for further proceedings.

Property relations: Art 147 FC

Valdes vs RTC QC (1996)

Petitioner: Antonio Valdes (husband)

Respondent: Consuelo Gomez (wife)

FACTS:

1. Petitioner and respondent‘s marriage was declared null pursuant to Art 36 FC on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. They were directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art 147, and to comply with the provisions of Art 50, 51, 52.

2. The trial court later clarified that they will own their family home and all their properties in equal shares, governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Petitioner contends: Art 50, 51, 52 should be held controlling.

Art 147 does not apply to cases where parties are

psychologically incapacitated.

ISSUE: What law should govern?

RULING:

Art 147 and 148 FC. In a void marriage, regardless of the

cause, the property relations of the parties during the

period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art

147 and 148 of the Family Code.

Art 50, 51, 52 are explicit in its terms. They relate only to

voidable marriages, and exceptionally, to void marriages under

Art 40.

The trial court correctly applied the law.

Persons: Property relations: Art. 121 & 122

Villaranda v Villaranda 23 February 2004 Ponente: Justice Panganiban SUMMARY: Two brothers, Vicente and Honorio Villaranda, executed a Deed of Exchange so that Honorio gets a parcel of land in Divisoria CDO City that Vicente inherited, in exchange for a property in Macandasig, CDO City. Vicente claims that the Deed is null and void because the contract didn‘t specify the object of exchange and because Honorio‘s wife, Ana, didn‘t sign the contract (meaning it was executed without her consent). The Court DENIED Vicente‘s petition, saying that he brought up the issue of the object of exchange too late, and that the provisions of the Family Code don‟t apply to the contract, since it was executed in 1976. FACTS:

- Action is a Petition for Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

- A parcel of land in Divisoria, Cagayan de Oro City was divided between ten siblings. o The controversy is between two of the brothers, Vicente

(petitioner) and Honorio (respondent) Villaranda

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o Honorio was leased 124 sq. meters of the property, Vicente inherited 64.22 sq. meters of it.

o The brothers executed a Deed of Exchange on July 6, 1976: Vicente would give his 64.22 sq. meters to Honorio

in exchange for a 500 sq. meter property in Macandasig, CDO City.

- Honorio took Vicente‘s lot and constructed a building on it - Honorio and his wife, Ana Maria Y. Villaranda

(respondent), brought a court action to comply with the Dee of Exchange: o Get Vicente to identify and delineate his 500 sq. meter

portion of property o Get Vicente to give them the 64.22 sq. meter lot

- During the pendency of the Case, Honorio conditionally sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. (intervening respondent)

- Respondent: o Vicente admitted to entering into the Deed, but said that

it had not been consummated. He also said that both of them had revoked it. Vicente and the other siblings asked Honorio to

agree to the rescission of the Deed. Vicente said that Honorio agreed

- Regional Trial Court: stipulated on the facts of the case (that the deed existed, that the parties were who they said they were, that the lot being fought over existed and had been registered in the Registry of deeds, that Colorhouse now possessed the 64.22 sq. meter lot through Honorio) o Ruled in favor of Honorio

- Court of Appeals: DISMISSED Vicente‘s petition for reconsideration and affirmed the Trial Court‘s decision. CA Held… o Since the Deed was executed before the enactment of

the Family Code, CIVIL CODE provisions apply to the case at bar Absence of the wife‟s signature on the Deed

only made it voidable, not void outright. CA found that:

ANA knew about the Deed, but didn‘t bring any action for its annulment over the 10 year proscription period: she assented to it

On the capacity of the parties to enter into the Deed of Exchange: moment of its execution is the only time to be reckoned with

Consideration wasn‘t unconscionable enough to warrant voiding of the Contract

ISSUE

4. Was there a Deed of Exchange even though a. There was no specific identification and

delineation of the Deed‘s object b. Another contract had to be executed to

identify the object of exchange in the first place

c. There was no acceptance and delivery of the 500 sq. meters

5. Is the Deed of Exchange valid and in force, even though Honorio‘s wife didn‘t sign it?

SUPREME COURT RULING

Petition DENIED, challenged CA decision AFFIRMED HELD

4. There was a Deed of Exchange. Petitioner‘s argument that the Deed was null and void because the object of the contract wasn‘t determinate was brought up too late.

- Points of law, theories, issues and arguments that weren‘t brought up in the lower court usually won‘t be considered by a reviewing court

5. The Deed of Exchange is valid even though Ana didn‟t sign it.

- The Family Code doesn‟t apply to the Deed, because it was executed in 1976, before the Family Code was enacted o Art. 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no

retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided o Civil Code provisions should apply

- Relevant Civil Code provisions: o Art. 166: Unless the wife is crazy, in jail, a ―spendthrift,‖

or in a leprosarium, the husband can‘t alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without her consent

o Art. 173: The wife may ask the courts for the annulment of any contract the husband entered into without her consent, or when the contract defrauds or impairs her interest in the conjugal partnership property (proscription period: during the marriage, up to 10 years from the transaction)

- Read together, the two provisions of the Civil Code merely make the contract voidable, but not void. The Deed is valid unless annulled. o Ana knew about the contract, but didn‘t bring any action

to annul Honorio‘s transfer, and her right to bring an action to invalidate it has already prescribed. It‘s assumed that she was OK with the contract.

o Papa v Montenegro: legal prohibition against the disposition of conjugal property by one spouse without the other‘s consent must be established by the spouse for whom the law wants to save the conjugal partnership from damages. Vicente can‘t use Art. 173

- Personal remarks: This case seems a bit far removed from the provisions it was filed under, so I‘ll just assume that Ma‘am is trying to emphasize the prospective application of the Family Code again. …But! I‘m assuming that the Deed of Exchange is presumed to fall under the liabilities of conjugal partnership. …but the case itself doesn‘t even specify WHICH Family Code provisions Vicente used to assail the contract. (…not that the Family Code would‘ve helped Vicente anyway, because without Ana‘s signature or consent, the contract could still stand. The only difference is that, under Art. 121, it would only bind Honorio and whatever property he has that isn‘t within the conjugal partnership)

Andal v. Macaraig (May 30, 1951)

Art. 54 of the Family Code: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

Plaintiff: MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIDUEÑAS Defendant: EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant. Ponente: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

A. FACTS:

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1. Facts about path of case: a. Plaintiffs brought action at CFI

Camarines Sur for recovery of ownership of land. COMPLAINT alleges:

i. Mariano Andal is surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas

ii. Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942

iii. Emiliano Andal was owner of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias

iv. Emiliano Andal had been in possession of land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of abnormal situation then prevailing, entered land in question.

b. CFI favored plaintiffs: i. declaring Mariano Andal

legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit land in question

ii. declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land

iii. ordering defendant to pay costs of suit

c. Defendant went to SC with plea that only questions of law are involved.

d. Undisputed: land was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias on marriage with Maria Dueñas. If son born to couple is deemed legitimate, he is entitled to inherit land. If not, land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law.

2. Facts on legitimacy of son Mariano Andal:

a. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis January 1941. Sometime thereafter, brother Felix went to live in his house to help him work his house and farm. His sickness became worse and around eight months after (September 10, 1942), he could hardly move and get up from bed.

b. That time, his wife eloped with Felix and both went to live in house of Maria's father for 9 months (until mid 1943). Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife.

c. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without presence of wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?

d. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides: Children born after the one hundred

and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child.

B. ISSUE: Is Mariano Andal legitimate son of Emiliano Andal, considering relationship between Emiliano and wife during period of conception of child up to birth in connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal?

C. DECISION: YES, LEGITIMATE.

―Wherefore, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED

xxx ―.

D. RATIONALE:

1. Since boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be legitimate son of Emiliano and wife, he having been born within 300 days following dissolution of marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.

2. Manresa says (Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90) impossibility of access by husband to wife would include:

1) absence during the initial period of conception

2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable

3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations

3. NO EVIDENCE Emiliano Andal was absent during initial period of conception, specially during period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942 (the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child).

a. On the contrary, ENOUGH EVIDENCE during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and wife still living under marital roof.

b. Even if brother, was living in same house, and he and the wife were

34

indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife.

4. Emiliano may be said to be really physically weak during time at issue, but experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An Integrated Practice of

Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202).

5. NO EVIDENCE Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable. NO EVIDENCE he was imprisoned. PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY under Civil Code in favor of child NOT OVERCOME.

6. Same result viewing case under S68(3)/Rule 123/Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying Civil Code. Said section provides: o The issue of a wife cohabiting with the

husband who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage,

Aruego v. CA (March 13, 1996)

Petitioners: JOSE ARUEGO, SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA ALANON, ROBERTO TORRES, CRISTINA TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES Respondents: CA and ANTONIA ARUEGO (Guardian: Luz Fabian) Ponente: HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

A. FACTS: 1. Private respondent (minor), together with alleged

sister Evelyn F. Aruego, filed Complaint

for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights at RTC Manila. Defendants were Jose Aruego and the 5 minor children of deceased Gloria Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo Torres. Defendants are now the petitioners in case at SC.

a. COMPLAINT says: Jose Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian (guardian of respondent) sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born respondent and her alleged sister Evelyn.

b. COMPLAINT prayed: these sisters be declared illegitimate children of deceased Jose Aruego, Sr.; that petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as compulsory heirs of the deceased etc.

c. COMPLAINT is founded on the sisters‘ alleged "open and continuous

possession of the status of illegitimate children" founded on that the deceased:

―acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:

(a) Regular support and educational expenses; (b) Allowance to use his surname; (c) Payment of maternal bills; (d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein; (e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing; (f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs; (g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then; (h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.

2. Petitioners denied all these allegations.

Chapter 2 of the Family Code: Proof of Filiation Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Chapter 3: Illegitimate Children Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)

35

3. RTC declared private respondent illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian (Evelyn was not declared illegitimate daughter) and among others, that she was entitled to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego.

4. Herein petitioners filed MR alleging loss of jurisdiction of RTC by virtue of the passage of Family Code which took effect August 3, 1988. RTC denied MR.

5. Petitioners went to CA for Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but CA dismissed for such for lack of merit. MR here was also denied.

6. Petitioners went to SC arguing among others CA erred in ruling there is not perceptible difference between Civil Code provision and those of Family Code anent the time an action for compulsory recognition may be made and that there is no difference under the CC from that of the FC concerning the requirement that an action for compulsory recognition on the ground of continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child should be filed during the lifetime of the putative parent, in utter disregard of Court ruling in Uyguangco case that the CC provision had been superseded or at least modified by the corresponding articles in FC.

7. Arguments: a. Private respondent: action for

compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child is under A285/CC, which states the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to wit:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; . . . .

b. Petitioners: with the advent of FC, RTC lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under A175(2) FC in relation to A172/FC, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.

i. Petitioners point out that, since COMPLAINT was filed March 7, 1983 or almost one year after death of presumed father on March 30, 1982, action has

clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to A256/FC which provides:

This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested of acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

B. ISSUE:

1. Should the provisions of the FC be applied in the instant case?

2. Will the application of the FC in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?

C. DECISION:

1. NO. WHAT SHOULD BE APPLIED IS THE CIVIL CODE.

2. YES. IT WILL IMPAIR PRIVATE RESPONDENT‘S VESTED RIGHTS.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals xxx hereby AFFIRMED.

D. RATIONALE: 1. The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under A256 is

not defined by the FC. Sempio-Diy says "The Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future."

2. In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals (1992), which compeled recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of FC by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," Court ruled:

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.

7

where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can

36

no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. xxx xxx xxx Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

3. The action filed by private respondent prior to FC must be governed by A285/CC and not by A175(2)/FC. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under A285/CC. Thus the action was not yet barred, despite it was brought when putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to general rule under A285/CC.

4. Hence, RTC never lost jurisdiction over case despite passage of FC. It is a principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.

37

PERSONS Digest Lahom v. Sibulo (2003) A. FACTS:

1. Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom had decided to adopt Isabelita‘s nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo. On May 5, 1972, the petition was granted through an order. Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name of the adopted to ―Jose Melvin Lahom‖.

2. Twenty seven (27) years later, Mrs. Lahom petitioned at the RTC for the rescission of the decree of adoption. In the petition, she averred:

a. Respondent refused to change his surname to Lahom to the frustration of the spouses esp of the husband until the latter died

b. Respondent‘s records with the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) showed his name as Sibulo originally issued 1978 until present. He uses that name in all his dealings and activities in connection with the practice of his profession.

c. Respondent remained indifferent and would visit the widowed mother only once a year.

d. Respondent remained callous despite her need for care given the check-ups she has been undergoing for the past three to four years due to a leg ailment.

e. Petitioner has suffered wounded feelings knowing after all, respondent was just after his alleged rights over properties of the spouses as clearly shown by his recent filing for partition against petitioner.

3. Prior to institution of case, March 22, 1998, RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) went into effect. This deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. A6/S19/RA8552 now reads:

Sec. 19. Grounds for rescission of adoption.- xxx ―Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.‖

4. Arguments: a. Jose Melvin filed for dismissal of the petition

saying petitioner has no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provision of RA 8552.

b. Petitioner said the proscription in RA 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the

adoption vested under the regime of then A348/Civil Code

1 and A192/FC

2.

5. In April, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition. 6. Petitioner goes to SC for certiorari.

B. ISSUE: May the subject adoption (decreed May 5, 1972) still be rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of RA 8552? C. DECISION: NO. D. RATIONALE:

1. Very brief history:

Spain which previously disfavored adoption accepted the Roman law concept of adoption of which primary purpose was the continuity of the adopter‘s family and focus was on the rights of the adopter. This law found its way to our archipelago.

The Americans came with their own ideas of adoption which unlike most countries in Europe, focused on the interests of the child.

Children‘s rights invited international attention in the early 20

th century:

i. 1924: Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child

ii. 1948: Universal Declaration of Human Rights

iii. 1989: UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child

2. In 1989, UN initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. We are a State Party to the Convention. We accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with the social and moral responsibility and its underlying intent was geared in favor of the adopted child. RA 8552 secured these rights.

3. Court cites adoption cases RP v. CA and RP v. Miller, wherein ―rights vested‖ by laws governing their petitions at the time they were respectively filed, remained despite amendments by a new law. But, herein petitioner filed her action to rescind adoption decree months after the effectivity of RA 8552. (Besides, even before passage of RA 8552, an action to rescind adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100/Rules of Court

3

1 Art. 348. The adopter may petition the court for revocation of the adoption in any of these cases:

(1) If the adopted person has attempted against the life of the adopter;

(2) When the adopted minor has abandoned the home of the adopter for more than three years;

(3) When by other acts, the adopted person has definitely repudiated the adoption (new)

2 Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:

(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for disinheriting a descendant; or

(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during the minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption.

3 Sec. 5. Time within which to file petition. - A minor or other

incapacitated person must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within five years following his majority, or if

38

Mendoza v. CA (September 24, 1991)

he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within the five (5) years following the recovery from such incompetency.

The adopter must also file the petition to set aside the adoption within five (5) years from the time the cause of or causes giving rise to the rescission or revocation of the same took place.

Chapter 2 of the Family Code: Proof of Filiation Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Chapter 3: Illegitimate Children Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)

39

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Petitioner: ASIMIRO MENDOZA Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO Ponente: CRUZ, J.

A. FACTS: 1. The private respondent claimed she was

the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza (around 90y/o already) in a complaint filed on August 21, 1981 at RTC in Cebu. But the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day.

2. RTC established that according to evidence, Teopista is not illegitimate daughter for lack of ―open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child‖. CA reversed decision.

3. Case was brought to SC for certiorari. Here, petitioner who had died prior appeal at SC, was replaced by his (illegitimate) son Vicente Toring.

4. TESTIMONIES FOR Teopista‘s illegitimacy:

a. Teopista: It was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house.

When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977,

Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring.

In 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita

b. Lolito Tufiacao (Teopista‘s son) said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather

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learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former's land.

c. Gaudencio Mendoza, cousin of Casimiro: Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison many times in the past.

d. Isaac Mendoza, nephew of Casimiro: Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He had also acted go-between.

5. TESTIMONIES AGAINST Teoppista illegitimacy:

a. Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.

b. Vicent (who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring): Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father.

5

c. The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's niece.

B. ISSUE: May other means aside from the requirements in A172/FC be resorted to in establishing filiation?

C. DECISION: Yes. ―WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro

Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. XXX‖

D. Rationale: 1. What both the trial court and the

respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code.

2. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

3. The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.

4. Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:

1. In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

2. When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

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3. when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father.

4. When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

NOTE: A283 was reproduced in A172/FC. 5. In respondent‘s presentation of

accounts about pedigree, she as able to satisfy the following conditions before such may be admitted as evidence:

1) The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

2) The pedigree must be in issue. 3) The declarant must be a

relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4) The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5) The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.

Adoption Republic v Miller (1999) FACTS

RTC Branch 59 of Angeles City granted the adoption of the minor Michael Magno Madayag by respondents Claude and Jumrus Miller, who were American citizens. Michael was voluntarily given up for adoption by his parents because of poverty, and the American couple wanted to adopt him because they can‘t have a child anymore (the wife has problems).

DSWD recommended approval of the petition and the RTC ruled favorably on the petition.

The OSG questioned the fact that the spouses are both aliens and yet they were allowed to adopt a Filipino child, because this is prohibited under the Family Code.

ISSUE

Can aliens adopt Filipinos despite the prohibition under the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt? YES. The petition has become a vested right and the Family Code cannot be made to apply retroactively in their case. The jurisdiction of the court is dependent in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code Decision affirmed Republic v Tayag-San Jose

Date: 28 February 2007

Ponente: Justice Carpio-Morales

Parties: Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, v Laila

Tanyag-San Jose and Manolito San Jose,

respondents

Action: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision

and resolution of the Court of Appeals

Facts:

Laila Tanyag-San Jose and Manolito San

Jose were married on 12 June 1988, they

had two children, and they lived with

Manolito‘s parents for nine years

Manolito was jobless and gambled and did

drugs

Laila sold fish at the Taguig wet market

Laila left Manolito and went to live in her

parents‘ house on 20 August 1998, and on 9

March 1999, she filed a Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Art

36 in the RTC of Pasig City.

o Manolito left the house that night,

but didn‘t return the next morning

Dr. Nedy Tayag testified for Laila, saying that

she found Manolito to be psychologically

incapacitated because he showed signs of

Anti-Social Personality Disorder.

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o Findings were brought about

through her psychological test and

clinical interview of Laila

o Manolito‘s behavior (constant

irresponsibility, lack of concern for

others‘ welfare, self-centered

orientation, absence of remorse,

violent tendencies, involvement in

activities defying social and moral

ethics) falls under Anti-Social

Personality Disorder

RTC decision:

o Petition was DENIED

o Republic v CA and Molina (as well

as Santos v CA) were cited

“Psychological

incapacity” should refer

to a serious personality

disorder that clearly

demonstrates “utter

insensitivity or inability

to give meaning and

significance to

marriage,” characterized

by

Gravity

Juridical

antecedence

Incurability

o Layla‘s portrayal of Manolito isn‘t

enough; Dr. Tayag‘s assessment of

Manolito doesn‘t count. The data

that her findings were based on is

inadequate, since she wasn‘t able

to interview him or any of his

relatives

Laila filed for a motion of reconsideration,

was denied, and then appealed to the Court

of Appeals saying that RTC erred in holding

that she failed to comply with the guidelines

enumerated in Molina

CA decision:

o Reversed RTC‘s decision

o ―Totality of evidence presented‖

were enough to sustain that

Manolito is psychologically

incapacitated

o Took exception from the Molina

case; noted in Handbook of the

Family Code of the Philippines, by

Judge Sempio-Diy: ―committee did

not give any example of

psychological incapacity… the

Committee would like the judge to

apply the provision on a case-to-

case basis…‖ and found that

whether or not psychological

incapacity exists is for the Court to

establish

Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, was denied, and filed the

current Petition for Review

o RP posts that:

Manolito‘s defects have

not been proven to

constitute psychological

incapacity and that the

defects have not been

proven to have juridical

antecedence or to be

grave and incurable

CA erred in not adhering

to the Molina case ruling

under the doctrine of stare

decisis

Issues:

Do Manolito‘s alleged defects constitute

psychological incapacity?

Did the CA make the right call in deviating

from the ruling in Molina?

Ruling:

Petition GRANTED; CA decision reversed

and RTC decision REINSTATED

o The totality of evidence doesn‘t show Manolito‘s

psychological incapacity

Ferraris v. Ferraris: Article 36 “refers to a

serious psychological illness afflicting a party

even before the celebration of the marriage…

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity

or inability to give meaning and significance

to the marriage… the root cause must be

identified as a psychological illness and its

incapacitating nature must be fully explained”

There is no requirement for one to be

personally examined by a psychologist or

physician in order to be declared

psychologically incapacitated

Dr. Tayag‘s report was based on information from

Laila and is therefore hearsay (cited Choa v

Choa in saying that a doctor‟s testimony is

unscientific and unreliable if information

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about the other spouse is relayed by the

petitioning spouse)

Report said nothing about whether or not the

alleged anti-social personality disorder is

incurable or present at the inception of marriage

Laila‘s testimony is the only proof that Manolito is

psychologically incapacitated:

That he is jobless and a drug user and cannot

support his family

That he doesn‘t want to assume the obligations

of marriage

o It‘s not enough to show that it‘s rooted in some

debilitating or incapacitating psychological

condition

o Ferraris v Ferraris: habitual alcoholism,

emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, and

failure or refusal to meet the duties and

responsibilities of a married man do not

constitute as a ground from declaring nullity

of marriage based on psychological

incapacity

o The facts and circumstances of this case do not

warrant a deviation from the Molina case

Republic v Toledano

FACTS:

1. Alvin and Evelyn Clouse, aliens, wanted to

adopt Solomon Alcala (younger brother of

Evelyn)

2. The hearing was set and notice was

published in newspaper for 3 weeks

consecutive

3. Alvin is a natural born US citizen and Evelyn

is a naturalized US citizen

4. Simon, mother Nery and social worker all

give consent and approval of adoption

5. Judge Toledano granted petition for adoption

6. Sol Gen contested adoption, spouses

Clouse aren‘t qualified to adopt

ISSUES:

1. Under Art 184 Alvin can‘t adopt. He is not

part o the exceptions listed in paragraph 3 of

Art 184.

a. He is not a former Filipino

b. Solomon isn‘t a relative by

consanguinity nor a legitimate child

of his spouse

c. Evelyn gave up citizenship when

she was naturalized as a US citizen

2. Evelyn can adopt under p 3 Art 184, BUT Art

185 mandates joint adoption by husband and

wife. The spouses don‘t fall under the

exceptions of Art 185

3. This rule is to promote joint parental

authority over child and to ensure harmony

between spouses. PD 603 says spouses

―may‖ jointly adopt, but it was amended by

E.O. 91, which says husband and wife ―shall‖

jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. The

Family Code reiterated by saying alien

spouses ―must‖ jointly adopt.

DECISION:

Petition granted, lower court ruling set aside. Alien

spouses can‘t adopt Solomon.

Republic v. Valencia [1986] FACTS: Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed w/ the CFI-Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of her 2 minor children in the Civil Registry of Cebu. The petition seeks to (1) change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and (2) their status from "Legitimate" to "Illegitimate," and (3) changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single." The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. From the decision of the lower court, oppositor-appellant Republic appealed. HELD/DECI: petition DENIED. If the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, w/c is indisputably substantial as well as controversial, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. What is meant by appropriate adversary proceeding? Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows: "One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an

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ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.‖ Provided that the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suitor proceeding is "appropriate." xxx [T]he persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-- (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest w/c would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to— (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a wk for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition-- (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/ or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under R 108, ROC can no longer be described as "summary." There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/ or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. In this case, the court took note of the fact that all the procedural requirements have been followed and hence the recorded proceedings that actually took place could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.

Santos v Court of Appeals

Date: 4 January 1995

Ponente: Justice Vitug

Parties: Leouel Santos, petitioner, v Court of Appeals

and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, respondents

Action: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of

Court of Appeals

Facts:

Philippine Army 1st Lieutenant Leouel Santos

and Julia Bedia-Santos married on 20 Sept

1986 and they lived with Julia‘s parents in

Iloilo

18 July 1987: they had a baby boy

Leouel says that they started fighting

because of Julia‘s parents meddling in their

affairs

o They fought over when they should

move out

o They fought whenever Leouel

would spend a few days with his

parents

19 May 1988: Julia went to the US to work

as a nurse

Julia didn‘t contact Leouel until 7 months

later (1 January 1989), and promised to

return home when her contract expired

Julia never returned, even when Leouel went

to the States to train (under the auspices of

the AFP) and searched for Julia (10 April-25

August 1990)

Leouel filed a complaint for ―Voiding of

Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family

Code‖ with the RTC of Negros Oriental

o Julia answered through counsel

that Leouel was the one who was

incompetent and irresponsible

o Julia never appeared for pre-trial

conferences and filed a

manifestation that she wouldn‘t

RTC decision:

o Complaint was dismissed for lack of

merit

CA decision:

o Affirmed RTC decision

Leouel filed for certiorari stating that CA

erred because

o Julia‘s failure to return or

communicate for more than 5 years

shows that she is psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the

―essential marital obligations of

marriage‖

Issues:

Does Julia‘s behavior show that she is

psychologically incapacitated, as per the

requirements of Article 36 of the Family

Code?

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Ruling:

PETITION DENIED

It didn‘t comply with Circular 28-91, which

requires a certification of non-forum

shopping

It lacks merit

o ―Psychological incapacity‖ should

refer to a serious personality

disorder that clearly demonstrates

―utter insensitivity or inability to give

meaning and significance to

marriage,‖ characterized by

Gravity (party is

incapable of

carrying out

ordinary duties

required in

marriage)

Juridical

antecedence

(party had the

problem even

before the

marriage had

been contracted)

Incurability

o Deliberations during the Family

Code Revision Committee sessions

were reproduced in the case text to

show that Art.36 should be handled

on a case-to-case basis, which is

why the phrasing isn‘t specific

The judge should be

guided by experience, the

findings of experts and

researchers, and the

persuasive effect of church

decisions and Canon Law

(provision was taken from

Canon Law)

Sec. 3 of Canon

Law 1095: ―who

for causes of

psychological

nature are unable

to assume the

essential

obligations of

marriage‖

Fr. Ladislas Orsy,

S.J.: ―concedes

that

‗psychological

incapacity‘ defies

any precise

definition since

psychological

causes can be of

an infinite variety‖

o Article 36 must be understood in

conjunction with existing marriage

law precepts

Psychological incapacity

means that the party

mentally cannot wrap their

head around (―truly

incognitive of‖) basic

marital covenants

expressed by Article 68 of

the Family Code

Mutual

obligations to live

together, love,

respect, be

faithful to, and

support each

other

o Article 36 doesn‘t refer to spouse‘s

inability to sexually perform; the

intendment of the law was to

confine psychological incapacity to

the ―most serious of personality

disorders‖

o Other forms of psychoses present

at the inception of marriage

(alcoholism, concealed drug

addiction, homosexuality or

lesbianism, unsound mind, etc.)

only make a marriage voidable

under Art. 46

If the psychoses develop

during the marriage,

they‘re only grounds for

legal separation under Art.

55

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Justice Padilla, Dissent:

o Julia is psychologically

incapacitated; she doesn‘t comply

with the obligation of cohabitation,

even though Leouel hasn‘t shown

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that he doesn‘t deserve to live with

her

o She has no intention of living with

him and doesn‘t even want him to

know of her whereabouts

Justice Romero, Concurring:

o Petitions should be handled on a

case-to-case basis, with the judge

guided by experience,

psychological research, exepert

findings, and the persuasive effect

of Canon Law and church tribunal

decisions

o Article 36 was created as a

recognition that some marriages,

because of one or both of the

contracting parties‘ incapacity, fall

short of the ideal. It offers them a

legally-accepted way out of such a

marriage

TISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Article 163: The filiation of children may be

by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation

may be legitimate or illegitimate.

Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene R.

Dezoller vs CA and Teodora Domingo

July 31, 1997

Regalado, J.

FACTS:

1. A parcel of land with a house and and an

apartment located at Quezon City was

owned by the couple Martin Guerrero and

Teodora Dezoller-Guerrero.

2. Teodora died without descendants and

ascendants. She was survived by her

husband, Martin and her niece and nephew

Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller. Corazon

and Rene‘s deceased father (Hermogenes

Dezoller) was Teodora‘s brother.

3. Upon the death of Teodora, Martin

executed a joint affidavit of settlement as

sole heir. He then sold the property to

Teodora Domingo.

4. When Martin died, Corazon and Rene

filed an action for reconveyance of the said

property claiming that they have a share in

the inheritance by right of representation.

(Remember that since Teodora did not have

any descendants or ascendants, her brother

Hermogenes has a share in her property).

5. During the pre-trial conference, one of the

issues was whether they were really nephew

and niece of Teodora.

6. Corazon was presented as lone witness in

court and claimed that sometime in 1946,

Teodora categorically said that she was her

niece. As proof, they also presented: a family

picture, baptismal certificates of Teodora and

Hermogenes, certificates of destroyed

records of birth of Teo and Hermo,

certification of destroyed records of live birth

of Corzaon and Rene, etc.

7. Domingo alleged that Corazon and Rene

failed to prove legitimate filiation with

Teodora in accordance to Art 172 of the

Family Code.

8. The RTC upheld Domingo. CA affirmed

RTC.

ISSUES:

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W/N the petitioners failed to meet the

quantum of proof required by Art 172 to

establish legitimacy and filiation

NO, they have successfully proven their

legitimacy and filiation.

On the issue of legitimacy: the lower court

erroneously assumed that the issue of

legitimacy may be controverted in an action

for reconveyance.

(a) Presumption of legitimacy is

universally recognized. It cannot be

contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a

different purpose. Such action can be

brought only by the husband or his heirs

within the period allowed. Upon expiration of

the period, the status becomes fixed and can

no longer be questioned.

Thus: Domingo is not the propery party to

impugn legitimacy. The burden proof rests

on her part.

W/N the evidences presented is sufficient

to establish the relationship of the

petitioners to Teodora

YES.

(a) A declaration about pedigree is sufficient

evidence for as long as the declaration was

made by the decedent whose estate is in

controversy. (Remember Corazon‘s

testimony).

However, general rule is: Where the party

claiming seeks recovery against a relative

common to both claimant and declarant, but

not from declarant himself or the declarant‘s

estate, the relationship to the common

relative may not be proved by the declaration

itself. Other evidences independent of this

must be brought up.

How should the estate be divided?

Going with Art 975, 995, 1001 of the Civil

Code, half of the property shall go to Martin.

The remaining half shall be divided between

Martin and the petitioners.

HELD: CA decision is REVERSED AND

SET ASIDE. Petitioners and respondent

declared as co-owner (¾ of the property-

Domingo, 1/4 –Corazon and Rene)

Property relations between husband and wife

Article 148 Family Code

Tumlos v spouses Fernandez

petition for review on certiorari

FACTS

CA reversed the RTC decision that affirmed the MTC decision in favor of Guillerma Tumlos, which ordered the dismissal of the petition.

The case is about the ejectment order of Guillerma, Toto and Gina Tumlos from the apartment building in Valenzuela of the spouses Fernandez (Mario and Lourdes). The spouses, on the other hand, say that they are the absolute owners of the property. They said that the Tumloses have been living in their apartment for the last seven years but that they had agreed that the Tumloses will have to pay their rental after such time, but they failed to do so.

Guillerma, on the other hand, say that the ejectment suit cannot stand because she is

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actually co-owner of the property, because she is a co-vendee together with Mario Fernandez. They bought the property as their love nest and had two kids. She was deceived by him when she found out that his prior marriage had not been annulled like he said it was. She also said that Toto and Gina were only transient dwellers in the property and are not tenants of the spouses Fernandez.

Guillerma also said that the contract to sell submitted by the spouses as proof of their ownership was falsified to reflect that Lourdes was the co-vendee with Mario, after she discovered their subsisting marriage and Mario asked for the contract to be changed to what it is now.

CA RULING

Mario is not legally capacitated to marry Guillerma, so the rules on co-ownership must fail. Also, Guillerma failed to show that she made any actual joint contribution to the property to prove that she has a claim in it.

ISSUES

Preliminary matters -Guillerma says that CA is biased in

favor of respondents, but then

procedural errors cannot now be raised

because they were not raised earlier.

Also, the CA has already rendered its

judgment.

-MTC has jurisdiction over the case

because the issue of co-ownership may

be passed upon by the MTC to settle

issue on possession.

Petitioner is not co-owner -procedural rules have been complied with,

because CA was right in saying that issues not raised

during trial cannot be raised for the first time during

appeal

-she is not co-owner under Art 144 of the

Civil Code, which applies only to a relationship

between a man and a woman not legally capacitated

to marry one another. It would be absurd to create a

co-ownership when there exists a prior CPG or

absolute community between a man and his legal

wife.

-no actual joint contribution, and the claim of

administration over the property during

cohabitation has not been proven.

Support and ejectment -petitioner says that Mario failed to refute the

filiation of his alleged sons and in effect admits that he

is the father, thus making him liable to support them,

including providing for shelter. She says that their

right to support prevails over the ejectment suit.

-SC says that the ejectment suit deals

exclusively with the issue of possession of the

property and nothing else. Filiation is irrelevant.

RULING

Petition denied.

Uyguangco v CA

FACTS:

1. Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children

2. They divided considerable properties amongst themselves extrajudicially.

3. Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco claims to be illegitimate son and filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. He was left out.

4. Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao

5. At 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental (with approval from father‘s legitimate family). Here he received support from his father for high school.

6. He was also assigned by his father (again without objection from the family) as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store.

7. Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. 1) the record of birth 2) a will 3) a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing.

8. The petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code.

9. Motion to dismiss was denied, so petitioners appealed this case.

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ISSUES:

1. The petitioners argued that only evidence under Article 278 is allowed, which Graciano doesn‘t have. He can‘t resort to Article 285 because he was already an adult when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions:

a. ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear in which either or both parents recognize the child.

2. Graciano says he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family."

3. Sc says: The Civil Code provisions both parties invoke have been superseded the Family Code.

a. Art. 175 and Art. 172. Private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in Art 172 par 1, but he says he has been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation under Art 172 paragraph 2.

b. He says lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support, that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners, that he has shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation, and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate.

c. Illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of

witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

4. However, Graciano seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975.

a. The action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

b. It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed to give evidence of his status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation.

5. Why the rule? Siempo-Diy: The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.

DECISION:

Petition granted, Graciano not allowed to present evidence or prove filiation.

Santos vs Republic

Petitioner Santos spouses seek to adopt the

4-year old sickly brother of the wife. It was

established that the petitioners are both 32 years of

age and have maintained a conjugal home of their

own. They do not have a child of their own blood nor

has any one of them been convicted of a crime

involving moral turpitude. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a

lawyer, with business interests in a textile

development enterprise and the IBA electric plant,

and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the

secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His co-

petitioner-wife is a nurse by profession. The parents

of the child testified that they entrusted him to the

petitioners who reared and brought him up.

Issue: Can a sister adopt her own brother?

Held:

Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates

those persons who may not adopt, and it has been

shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not

among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of

the same code names those who cannot be adopted,

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and the minor child whose adoption is under

consideration, is not one of those excluded by the

law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the

adoption of a natural child by the natural father or

mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or

mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or

stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary

to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited

even in these cases where there already exist a

relationship of parent and child between them by

nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed

when the adopter and the adopted are related to each

other, except in these cases enumerated in Article

338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no

matter how far removed or in whatever degree that

relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the

policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child

to be adopted should be of paramount consideration.

Republic vs Court of Appeals

James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. The spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt the minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition.

Issue: Can the spouses adopt the minors?

Held:

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when

one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

Republic vs Toledano Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the petition. Issue: Can the spouses adopt Solomon? Held: Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the

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following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Cang vs Court of Appeals Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US. Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2) the parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality.

Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and

children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. Cervantes vs Fajardo

The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon.

The adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. Subsequently, the respondents took the child. Issue: Can respondents take back their child? Held: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, whp is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right

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to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. Sayson vs Court of Appeals

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five

children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,

Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10,

1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who

had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972.

His wife died nine years later. Their properties were

left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel,

all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios,

together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed

a complaint for partition and accounting of the

intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. Delia,

Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this

time for the accounting and partition of the intestate

estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the

couple's four surviving children.

Both cases were decided in favor Delia, et al

on the basis of practically the same evidence. The

Judge declared in his decision that Delia and

Edmundo were the legally adopted children of

Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of

adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as

evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the

three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and

Rafaela by right of representation.

Held:

In consequence of the above observations,

we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of

Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo,

as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to

the intestate estate of the deceased couple,

conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil

Code: Art. 979. Legitimate children and their

descendants succeed the parents and other

ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and

even if they should come from different marriages. An

adopted child succeeds to the property of the

adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate

child.

There is no question that as the legitimate

daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of

Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent

her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate

estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted

above, she is entitled to the share her father would

have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be

equal to the shares of her grandparents' other

children.