D. F. Pears On `Is Existence A Predicate.pdf

8/10/2019 D. F. Pears On `Is Existence A Predicate.pdf

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D. F. Pears On `Is Existence A Predicate?'Author(s): D. A. GriffithsSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 84, No. 335 (Jul., 1975), pp. 431-435Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Mind Association

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2/6

D. F. Pears

On 'Is

ExistenceA

Predicate?'

D. A. GRIFFITHS

Two quite differentoints have,

on different

ccasions,been

meant

by,

or

been

given

s the

meaning f,

Existence s not a

predicate'.

The

points

may

be

related,

but

they

are different

oints.

This would

not

matter

unless it resulted n confusionbetween the two

points; unfortunately

confusion

has occurredon at

least

one

occasion.

My

aim

in

this note

is

to show

that

such confusion an be found n D.

F.

Pears'

'Is

Existence

a Predicate?'

reprinted

n

Philosophical ogic,

edited

by

P.

F.

Strawson).

More precisely,myclaim is that Pears is led to say some very strange

things

because

he

is

trying

o relate

to

one

meaning

of ENP

('Existence

is

not

a

predicate') remarks

hat were

intended

to

relate

to the other

meaning.

(i) The twopoints.The two pointswhich have

been linked

with ENP

are familiar.One we find n (amongstmany other ources)

Russell

(e.g.

Introduction

o

Mathematical hilosophy, hapter

5).

The

point

can

at

least

be identified

y

the

following

tatement: A's exist'

is not about

particularmembers instances, rguments)

or

each

member

instance,

argument) f the

class of

A's (of the concept A', satisfyinghe function

'x is an A'); rather,t s abouttheclass ofA's (theconcept A', thefunction

'x

is

an

A'). Specifically o say

that

A's exist

s to

say

that he class

of

A's

has

members the concept A' has instances,

he

function

x

is

an

A'

has

arguments

hat

satisfy t).

Let us call this

point

the

CMP

(the

class-

membership oint).

The

other

point we can

find

tated

n

Pears' article

on p. 98).

In

the

statement

This

room

exists'

the subject-phrase

This

room'

implies

that hisroomexists

by making reference

o

it,

and thus

the

verb

exists'

is redundant.And in the statementThis room does

not exist' the verb

contradictswhat is implied by the subject-phrase. ears

describes the

point n termsof referentialautologies' nd 'referentialontradictions'

(let

us call it

the RTCP) and extends t (p. ioi) to cover

general xisten-

tial statements.

Now,

about

the

RTCP

Pears

says

two

particular

hings

which want

to examine.He

says

that

the

RTCP

is

a

refinement

f two

inexact

for-

mulations'

of

ENP;

and he

says

that n his

exposition

f

the

RTCP,

he

is

following p some ideas that G. E. Moore put

forward n his article

'Is Existence Predicate?' Proceedings f the

Aristotelian ociety, upp.

Vol.,

936.

Reprinted

n

Logic and Language, eries I, editedby

A.

G. N.

Flew.)

(ii) Thefirst nexact ormulationIFi). 'If I assert hattigers xist, he

verb "exist" does not add

anything o the concept fthe subject tigers"

(P. 97).

How does Pears

show that

the RTCP is 'really refinement'

f IFi?

The connection s made through he idea of

adding. In that the verb

43I

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3/6

432

D. A.

GRIFFITHS:

'exists'

is

redundant

n 'This

room exists'

it adds nothing

new (p.

98).

'Adds nothing'

n IFi

means adds nothing

ew' in the sense

relevant

o

the T' partof the RTCP.

But is this

sharing

f the notion

of adding

nothing eally

ufficient

o

justify

he claim that

the

RTCP and IFi

make the

same point?

Firstly,

we mightnote

that

IFi talks about

not adding

anything

o the

concept

of the subject

'tigers', whereas

Pears'

point seems

best

expressed by

talking bout not

adding anything

o the nformation

mplied

by the

use

of

the

subject

phrase. Secondly,

Fi is about Tigers

exist';

Pears' point

is about

This tiger

xists'. Fi is

about general

tatements,

ears'

point

about

singular

statements.However,

Pears

does say something

bout

general

statements.

He points

out that

All tame tigers

exist'

lacks a

clear sense, and argues that it lacks sense because 'All tame tigers'

implies

thatthereexist

tame tigers,

nd therefore

All tame

tigers xist'

is a referential

autology.

But again Pears

seems to be

dealing

with

something

ther

han

that

contained

n IFi, namely

Tigers exist'.

And

here

s the

crucial

objection

o Pears'

'refining'. ll

Pears' examples

are,

of

course,

referentialautologies.

But

'Tigers

exist'

makes perfectly

lear

sense;

it is

not

a

referentialautology.

o suggest

hat the

RTCP

is

the

same

point

as

that

made in

IFi

is

absurd;

for

the

RTCP

is

a

point

about

existence

statements

hat are referential

autologies

or

contra-

dictions),

whereas

Fi

claims that

exist'

adds

nothing

n

cases

that are

not

referential

autologies.

So IFi does not relate n anydirectway to theRTCP. Does it relate

to

the

CMP?

(For,

my

claim s that Pears

triedto

relate

o

one

meaning

of

ENP

remarks

hat

were intended

to relate

to the other

meaning.)

t

relates,

very obviously,

o

the

CMP

in

the following

way:

The CMP

asserts

hat o

say

thatA's exist

s not to

say

something

bout nstances

f

the

concept

A',

but to

say

thatthe

concept

A'

has

instances;

but

to

say

that

a

concept

has instances

s not to

add

anything

o that

concept.

Now,

it will be

pointed

out

that,

ccording

o Pears

(p. 97)

'to

say

that

a

concept

has instances

n

reality

s

certainly

o

add

something

o

it,

even

if what

s added

is

peculiar'.

But this,

f

true,

does not

of course

require

us to saythat Fi concerns omepointother hantheCMP. Allwe need

say

is that those

who have

proposed

IFi have

been inexact n

stating

what

follows

rom

he

CMP.

(And,

anyway,

ne

is surely nclined

to

think hat Pears

is

just

mis-

taken.

If

we say

that a

concept

has

instances

we

can

be described

as

saying

something

bout the

concept,

and,

therefore

dding

something

(to

whathas

already

been

aid)

about

the

concept;

but

not

adding

some-

thing

o the

concept.)

(iii)

The second

nexact

ormulation

IF2).

'When

I

assert

that

tigers

exist

am not

saying

nything

bout

tigers'

p. 97).

Preparedbythe refinement'f IFi, we might xpectto find hat F2

means

that

n 'This

tiger

xists' and 'All

tigers

xist',

since existence

s

already

mplied by

This

tiger'

and 'All

tigers',

he

verb

exist' does

not

say

anything

bout

tigers

that

has

not

already,

n

some

sense,

been

expressed.

But Pears in

fact

and

fortunately,

ince

we

have

rejected

his

refinement

f

IFi)

does

something uite

different.

e

claims that

IF2



4/6

D. F. PEARS

ON

'IS

EXISTENCE

A

PREDICATE?'

433

(unlike IFi) does really

as they

both appear to) make

a point

about

fully ignificant

tatementsike

Tigers exist'.

Buthow s Pears going o pull off he trick f giving precisereformu-

lation of

'not saying

anything bout tigers';

a reformulation

hat is

applicable

to

statements

hat

are not referential autologies,

yet a

re-

formulation

n terms

f

the RTCP, which,

on the face

of t, s applicable

onlyto referential

autologies?

e claimsthat "being

about something"

means

"being about something

n such a way that ts existence

s referen-

tially mplied" (p.

98). But this

really s a trick f the

tutor's omment

at the bottom f

a student's ssay

s 'This does not answer

he question',

and the student ays

to himself

All he means is that

I did not answer

the question

n such a way .. (as, for xample,

o relate

t to last week's

essay), i.e. I did answer the question,but not in this particularway',

then

we

can

only

hink

hat

he

is

deludinghimself at least,

over what

his

tutormeant).

Pears'

'refining'

t least leaves open the

question whether

anything

s

said

about

tigers,

nd strongly

uggests he following

nter-

pretation: Although

omething

s being said about tigers,

t is not

said

in such

a

way

that .

.' (particularly

ince Pears, on page

97, argues

that

something

s said about

tigers).

But

IF2 states, uite

simply, hatnothing

is said

about tigers.

Whatevermay be said

about the

truth r falsity f

IF2,

Pears'

'refining'

s not a refining, ut

a rejecting.

Thus

Pears

makes the strange

suggestion

hat says nothing

about

tigers'reallymeans

says something

bout tigers, ut

not in such

. . .

My claimthen s thathe is led to make this suggestionn his attempt o

forceonto the RTCP something esigned

to express he

CMP. So how

does

IF2 relate to the CMP?

Well, if we

turn back

to

the identifying

statement

f

the CMP, we find

what

s,

simply

nd clearly, generalised

IF2.

In

this

particular

ase we get: 'When

I assert

hattigers xist

am

not saying

anything bout (individual)

tigers

that is,

about

particular

members,

r each

member,

f the class

of

tigers), but

I am

saying

ome-

thing

bout

the

class of

tigers).'This,

I would

claim,

s

neither

ejection

(which

is

what

Pears

does) nor refiningPears'

intention),

ut

merely

clarification.

(iv) Pears andMoore.Let us now turnto Pears' suggestion hathe is

following p

some ideas of G. E.

Moore. Moore,

in

his

article,

draws

attention

o certain

differences

etween

exists'

and

other

grammatical

predicates,

nd

suggests

that

these differences

re

perhaps

involved

n

what

has been meant

by

ENP. Our

question,

hen,

s

this: Do

Moore's

differences

elate

to the

RTCP,

as Pears

appears

to

claim,

or do

they

n

fact

relate

o

the CMP? Moore's

positive

ccount

of the

differences

s in

two

parts

Sections I(i)

and

I(2)

of his

article),

nd

it will

be

convenient

to take

the

second

part

first.

(a)

'This

tiger

xists'.

n

Section

I(2)

Moore

compares

ertain

uses of

'exists' and 'growls'and arguesthat the fundamental ifferences that,

given

a certain

understanding

f

exist',

then

to

say

This exists'

would

(unlike saying

This

growls')

be

to

express

no

proposition

t

all,

would

be

absolutely

meaningless p. I85

in P.A.S.S.V.

I936).

Now

Pears,

as

we have

seen,

uses the RTCP

to

explain

the

queerness

of This exists'.

Thus

both

writers

rovide

a reason

for This exists'

being,

n some

way,



5/6

434

D.

A.

GRIFFITHS:

defective.

ut

(i) Moore's account

s

quite explicitly discussionof

the

CMP,

and

(2)

Moore himself

istinguishes

is

conclusion

harply

rom

anything esembling ears' conclusion.

(i) The understanding f 'exist' that, Moore thinks, nvolves

the

meaninglessness

f This exists' is

precisely

hat

understanding

et

out

by

Russell in 'Introduction o Mathematical

Philosophy',

hat

is, pre-

cisely

that

understanding hat constitutes

he

CMP. About

this

there

can be

no

question; Moore examines

Russell's account n some

detail,

nd,

like Russell, concludes that

it

entails the meaninglessness

f 'This

exists'.

This is not to

say

that

Moore

thinks

hat

his

s

all there

s to

say

about existence; he later argues

that This exists' can have

meaning.

Nor

is

it

to

say

that

Russell

and

Moore

are

right

n

thinking

hat the

CMP entails hemeaninglessness f This exists'. Nakhnikian nd Sal-

mon

('

"Exists" as a

Predicate',

Phil. Rev.

I957)

have shown in what

sense

t does

not.

It is

merely

o

say

thatPears'

remarks

bout

the

queer-

ness

of This exists'

relate

o

a

quite

different

oint.

(2)

If

any

doubt

can

remain,

Moore

eliminates t for us in the last

sentence

of

his

discussion

p. I85):

'

"This is a tame

tiger,

nd exists"

would

be not

tautologous, ut meaningless.'

(b)

'Tame

tigers xist'. n I(i) Moore

discusses he

following

ifference

between

exist'

and 'growl': whereas

Tame

tigersgrowl'

s

ambiguous

between

All

tame tigers growl', Most

tame

tigers growl'

and 'Some

tame tigers growl', Tame tigers exist'

must

mean

'Some tame

tigers

exist'. The point is that All tame tigersexist' and 'Most tame tigers

exist'

have no clear

meaning.

Now

we

might xpect Moore

to deal with

this

differencen

the

same

way

that

he

dealt with

This

tiger

exists'. Just

s

'This

tiger

xists'

is,

on Russell's

interpretation

f

existence,meaningless,

o will all

stages

of

the 'This

. .

.

a few

. . . most . .

. all

tigers

exist'

sequence

of

statements

be

meaningless.

A's

exist'

is

not about

particular

membersof the

class

ofA's, so

it s

not about some members,

r most

members,

r

all

members.

Thus

'Some tigers xist' does

not stand to

'Tigers

exist'

as

'Some

tigers

growl'

stands to

'Tigers growl'.

But

Moore

does

not

straightforwardly

do this. Instead he providesan explanation hat does perhapswarrant

Pears' linking f the RTCP with Moore's article.

What he

does

is to

relate he

queerness

of

Most

tame

tigers

xist'

and

'All

tame

tigers

xist' to the

queerness

of Some tame

tigers

o not

exist'.

And

about this he

says

that f t

has

any meaning

t

must

mean

'There

are some

tame tigerswhich do

not

exist';

which

s,

he

claims,nonsense.

Here, perhaps,

re

grounds

for

ntroducing

he RTCP. For

Moore seems

to be

saying

hat the use

of

the

expression

Some

tame

tigers'

ndicates

that

there are some tame

tigers implies

that some tame

tigers

exist);

hence,

we can

explain

the

'nonsense' by saying

hat

f we

go

on to

say

thatthese same tame tigersdo not exist,we get involved n a sort of

contradiction,

hichwe can

call

a

referentialontradiction.

The claim that

the two inexactformulations,nd

that

Moore's point

about 'This

tiger exists',

relate to the

RTCP,

we

found to

involve a

confusion between the RTCP and the other

meaning

for

ENP,

the

CMP.

For

it

is the

atter,

ot the

former,

hat

they

relate o.

But

in

this



6/6

D.

F.

PEARS ON

'IS

EXISTENCE

A

PREDICATE?'

last case, Moore's pointabout Some tigersdo not exist',we find hathis

accountdoes seem to relate

o

the RTCP. However,the nteresting oint

is that f t is the case that Moore, in I(i) is concernedwith the RTCP,

then we can transfer o himthe chargeof confusion etweenthe RTCP

and the CMP. For, what Moore says about 'Some tame tigers do not

exist' is that it is 'pure nonsense' and 'has no meaning at all'. And it

follows,he claims, that All tame tigers exist' and 'Most tame tigers

exist' also have no meaning at all (p. I79). But, of course, the

RTCP

shows

that these statements

re

contradictions

r

tautologies,which,

as

we

have

seen,

is

for Moore

a

quite different atter.The

RTCP

does

not ead to the conclusions hat

Moore draws. So,

what

possible

reason

could Moore have for claiming hat the statements ave no meaning

at

all? Only the reason given forthe meaninglessness f This tiger xists',

the reason contained n the CMP. Thus, in this last case, if we cannot

claim thatto link Moore's account with the RTCP involves confusion

between the RTCP and the CMP, we can claim

that

Moore's

account

itself ontains his confusion.

UNIVERSITY

OF

HONG KONG

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