The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias'Author(s): David BlankSource: Hermes, 119. Bd., H. 1 (1991), pp. 22-36Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4476794 .Accessed: 19/03/2014 07:40

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THE FATE OF THE IGNORANT IN PLATO'S 'GORGIAS'

The allegory of the water-carriers in Hades, like virtually all references to the >>underworld>Orphicignorance>good>ignorant>foolishSocrates

The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias' 23

I

When Socrates suggests (492e3) that >>they are happy who need nothing

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be taken as passive in sense either on their own6 or in our text. Plato uses each of these words in its active sense elsewhere in the 'Gorgias'7. Further, the pair of adjectives is used in explaining the clever man's theory in order to complement the pair of infinitives in the wise man's thesis (avwunE00Ea1 xct' !icanL3TEuLV 'vw xatw). Just as the two infinitives strengthen one another, so will the adjectives of the second pair explain one another; they can hardly be antithetical8.

The wise man, who called the appetitive part of the soul >>persuadable and changeable

The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias' 25

work of artisans is called xoop6v as are the tools of their trades'2; some of these references are undeniably complimentary, but others are either ironic or negative. At times, xojnop6 seems to mean something like >>delicious>playing on the name>lead astray, mislead by means ofmis- lead us with lies?)21. Whenever Plato uses n7La6yelv/3ctQ6yeoOaL with a dative, the verb means ?deflect (from the truth or in an unwanted direction)>lead astrayaQ- xiien%F.. (Demosthenes also uses the word absolutely, in the sense of >>be misleading

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If we interpret naQaQyo)v Tp 6vo taTL as >>misleading by means of the nameeasy to persuade>persuasive

The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias' 27

493a4)uninitiated

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situation reflects exactly the attitude to the use of myth advocated by Socrates in the Republic: >>Don't you know that at first we tell our children myths, and this, I suppose, because they are on the whole false but also contain truths>a subset of desires in anyone's soul, which are particularly developed in the foolish manalthough Socrates does not say so, these desires seem to be liable to conflict with other desiresPoliteia

The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias' 29

recognition of non-rational desires, according to IRWIN, strengthens Socrates' attack on Callicles' hedonism, because such desires will be destructive of any orderly plan for living, while Callicles himself insists that >>his superior man has a rational plan for his life which he follows with resolution and without flinching; to develop his demanding and expensive desires and find resources to satisfy them, he must restrict the satisfaction of other desires, especially those insatiable non- rational desires which might divert him from his main aims>allow his appetites (taSg [v e'nLO1,it(caSt; x awatoD) to be as large as possible>develop>allow>Geheimkulte, 'Mysterien', treten hervor mit der VerheiBung, dem Geweih- ten im Gegensatz zum Ungeweihten 'Seligkeit' im Jenseits zu vermitteln

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there are intelligent men, and if there are intemperate men all of whose appetites are insatiable, there are also temperate men all of whose appetites are bounded and satisfied.

Now, Socrates cited with approval the wise man's dictum that >>the part of our soul in which the appetites are located happens to be such as to be persuaded and to do flip-flops (493a3-5)(

The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias' 31

III

The wise man's exegesis connects the clever man's story with the point made by Socrates. >>Ignorant?better and superior men>the wiser men>Having intelligence

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xLi [tn anOXac4VWOL 6La' jtctXax(ctv rf;g VPXfg: 491b2-4). Callicles' long speech (491e5-492c8), to which the allegory of the water-carriers is a reply, picks up this contention. He says that natural justice consists in being enslaved to nothing, since he who will live correctly will allow his appetities to become as great as possible and will not rein them in, but will be capable in virtue of his bravery and intelligence (6&' av6Qeiav xai cpeo6vTpv: 492a2) of servicing them and filling them with what- ever is desired. So Callicles says that the more intelligent and brave ought to rule and to have - and want - more than others. Further, he says (491e2) that those whom Socrates calls >>temperate>serving>ignorant>intemperate

The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias' 33

At 497e ff. Socrates is showing Callicles that good things are not the same as pleasant things, and bad things are not the same as painful things. He makes Callicles concede (498c-e) that those whom he calls ?>goodbad

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which characterizes those who have not the >>intelligence

The Fate of the Ignorant in Plato's 'Gorgias' 35

a proven craftsman, who can serve the public good (515af.), since he has just embarked on a political career. We soon get the feeling that Callicles is one of the truly ridiculous and ignorant.

Callicles, however, is not alone in his predicament, for Socrates goes on (515d ff.) to indict the politicians Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles, who Callicles said (503c) had proved themselves to be good men. None of these men, says Socrates, actually made the people better (517a); they all indulged the appetites of the Athenians (518e f.). The final argument used by Socrates is a powerful, tropic one: if these politicians had made the people better, and the people turned against them, then the politicians themselves must be bad, but if the people turned against the politicians because they had not made them better, in this case too they were not good politicians (519b). This argument completes the groundwork for Socrates' later claim (521d ff.) to be one of very few Athenians - indeed, the only one now alive - to practice the truly political art. As we might expect, the claim of the politicians to have been wronged by their people is charac- terized by Socrates as >>foolish

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and furthermore that one ought to shun every form of flattery, using rhetoric and every other activity always to do what is just (527b4-c4).

We are thus brought back into the sphere in which true foolishness or ignorance has been recognized, the sphere of the unproven man or the flatterer engaged in public business (cf. 514c ff.). On the other hand, we are told not to be concerned about being wronged or losing face. The beginning of Socrates' final exhortation (527c5 ff.), then, follows naturally. For Socrates says that Callicles should let anyone look down on him as >>foolish>dishonoring blow>foolish/ignorant