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CYBER WARFARE AND INDIRECT FIRES:

ARE WE READY FOR THE NEXT CONFLICT?

The rise of cyber warfare and the increasing threat context in Eastern Europe might force NATO and Allied forces to reassess their response towards the threat posed by cyber to their indirect fire assets. With systems being more and more digitised and thus vulnerable to

potential hacks, how can land forces operating mortars, artillery guns and rocket systems remain relevant in the next near-peer conflict?

Ahead of the inaugural Future Indirect Fires Eastern Europe conference (5th – 6th December) set in Bucharest, Romania, we decided to put our focus on cyber warfare. We asked more than 100 experts their view on challenges, allied forces’ preparedness and the implementation of countermeasures, in order to get an idea of the relevancy of indirect fires in the future.

CYBER WARFARE AND INDIRECT FIRES:

ARE WE READY FOR THE NEXT CONFLICT?

www.indirectfires.iqpc.co.uk

To what level would you rate the ability of the Allied Armed Forces to counter the wide variety of

adversaries’ EW systems and ensure the effectiveness of surveillance, ISR and networking capabilities to support land-based operations?

Very good Good Satisfactory Low Very Low

9%

28%

36%

25%

2%

CYBER PREPAREDNESS More than a quarter of the respondents (27%) believe the ability of the Allied Armed Forces to counter the EW threat in order to support land-based operations with surveillance, ISR and networking capabilities is low or very low. The invasion of Ukraine in 2014 by Russia and their new concept of hybrid war highlighted the lack of preparedness of NATO. Three years later, nothing much has changed. The recent International Centre for Defence and Security report, Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities To 2025, published in September, found that Russia “is stepping up its efforts to renew and modernize its EW inventory, complemented by changes to organisation, doctrine, command structure, training and tactics, as well as techniques and procedures.” Moscow’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach will clearly pose a serious threat to NATO’s presence in

the Baltic states and its entire Eastern flank in case of an assault, as it is tailored and targeted at NATO’s C4ISR. NATO will thus have to revise its concepts and practices and train its troops in offensive and defensive operations in the view of a future saturated EMS battlespace. Currently, “NATO plans to defend its Eastern flank including the Baltic are inadequate as they do not take into account of the full spectrum of Russia’s current and future EW capabilities and their use.”

36% of respondents rate this ability as satisfactory. Is that enough? As Russia is developing a “total package” of EW systems that don’t go unnoticed. Colonel Jeffrey Church, chief of the Army staff at the Pentagon’s Electronic Warfare Division explained during a meeting

The invasion of Ukraine in 2014 by

Russia and their new concept of hybrid war highlighted the lack of preparedness of NATO.

of EW specialists back in December 2015 that the U.S. army was choosing not to be better than Russia at the EW game: “we do not have EW units, we have very little equipment, and we do very little EW training.”

COUNTERMEASURESThe majority of respondents (70.8%) believe it is standard to include cyber countermeasures when developing cyber warfare. This view is reflected by NATO, who with its Allies, “rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” In 2016, NATO announced an investment of €3B in air and missile defence, advanced software and cyber, following the Warsaw Summit and decisions taken there to make NATO’s defence and deterrence stronger. This is an importance point. Allied forces must assume the adversary is attempting the same attack and preparing a response or a counterattack is essential.

There is also a crucial need to protect the secrecy of vital information, as Russia’s Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) aim at influencing “the mind, emotions, reasoning, own belief system and of most importance the behaviour of the target population” through “agitation, propaganda and other information actions.”

Moreover, cyber warfare and warfare in general is an attack-response dual system, where defensive measures are as important as the offensive ones. An attack on the adversary can trigger a counterattack and countermeasures do help in mitigating its effectiveness, even if it means that it hasn’t been repelled entirely. The

integrity of the Allied Forces’ systems is paramount, as it increases the commander’s liberty of action, the availability of means and communication with the troops deployed on the ground. A hacked Fire-Control System (FCS) by an enemy means an unusable asset and a possible redirection of the weapon to a friendly location.

Currently there is no hermetic cyber defence system and intelligence is needed to determine which attacks require an instant response, which should be part of a wider cyber defence package.

However, 9.5% of respondents believe it is not standard to include cyber countermeasures when developing cyber warfare. What has been highlighted is that there might be a lack of awareness of the threat in detailed, which prevents a strong resilience planning. There also seems to be a lack of development of both the capability and counter-capability simultaneously, as there is a focus on how to overcome shortcomings associated with a capability but not countermeasures. They seem to be developed reactively, after an attack has occurred, rather than proactively.

THE MOST URGENT CYBER THREATS POSED TO INDIRECT FIRES

When asked about the most urgent threats posed by cyber warfare to Allied land forces that need to be considered when it comes to indirect fires, a few in particular were mentioned several times across answers from all of the respondents. The first was hacking conducted whether on software, or on communication or

www.indirectfires.iqpc.co.uk

In 2016, NATO announced an investment of €3B in air and missile defence,

advanced software and cyber

control systems; this could prevent NATO and other allied forces to operate as a coalition. The second was the disruption of Command and Control systems; an inability of commanders to have a clear view of the situation on the ground could paralyse troops on the ground, by fear of attacking on the wrong location and inflicting massive collateral damage. Thirdly, cyber espionage and theft of sensitive data; the ability of the enemy to infiltrate and steal strategic plans, location of friendly troops or intelligence could prove devastating for coalition forces. The adversary could also use it to create false data on allied forces, commands or intelligence. Lastly, GPS spoofing could redirect friendly fire and make it land on a deserted area instead of the enemy’s location.

Cyber warfare could well be the asset giving a key advantage to one side or the other during a conflict. As indirect fires systems become more digitised, allied forces need to assess the risk and opportunity that cyber poses now, in order to ensure their dominance during the next conflict

5th – 6th December 2017 | Bucharest, Romania

Contact us: +44 (0) 207 036 1300

Email: enquire@iqpc.co.uk

Join in in the inaugural Future Indirect Fires conference and help the community take the firepower forward, with our panel of senior speakers.

Sources:https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/doc/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_Warfare_to_2025.pdf

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_134254.htm?selectedLocale=en

https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/117652/MATTSSON%20Peter_WG10_Abstract_Modern%20Russian%20Psychological%20Operations%20%28PSYOPS%29.pdf?sequence=2

Attend Future Indirect Fires 2017 and:• Ensure that your planned acquisition are secure and capable by discovering how other users are

mitigating the risk of using precision-guided munitions in a digitised battlespace

• Adopt the latest allied and adversarial proficiencies in non-kinetic warfare – such as countering enemy jamming techniques – enabling you to better understand and tackle the fully integrated modern threat

• Learn how to use your fire support systems in combat to better locate, track and assess hostile artillery, mortar units and formations

• Select your preferred target acquisition technology to combat the future threat by assessing the types of targets that will need to be engaged in the years to 2030

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In 2016, NATO announced an

investment of €3B in air and missile defence,

advanced software and cyber