Cutting to the Chase, Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology and Secularization_Pini...

7/22/2019 Cutting to the Chase, Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology and Secularization_Pini Ifergan

1/25

Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and

Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology

and Secularization

Pini Ifergan

The termpolitical theologyconceptualizes an attempt to rediscover and expose

the theological dimension entwined within the fabric of politics. Political theol-

ogy must be understood against the backdrop of the common perception of the

political in the modern era, at least since the publication of Thomas Hobbess

Leviathanin 1651. On this view, among the distinctive features of the political

are its complete independence from any and all lofty theological notions and,

conversely, its preoccupation with the here and now. This effort to reexpose the

relations of dependence between the theological and political does not entail

moving theology or religion back to the center of human existencea position

that these beliefs lost after the profound changes in the modern Wests under-

standing of the world and humanity. Needless to say, religion has not disap-peared in the modern epoch, and its place on the pedestal has indeed been

subsequently restored. Be that as it may, the motivation for clarifying the rela-

tions of dependence between the theological and the political is not religious,

but emerged from within modern political and legal thought itself, as it endeav-

ored to answer the following question: to what extent is modern political the-

ory based on or independent of the theological realm?

The philosopher most closely identied with elucidating the modern

attributes of the political is Carl Schmitt (18881985). In Political Theology

New German Critique 111 Vol 37 No 3 Fall 2010


2/25

150 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology

(1922), Schmitt formulated political theologys principal argument: All the

quintessential concepts of the theory of the modern state are secularized theo-

logical concepts.1From a normative standpoint, this statement can be inter-

preted as a neutral observation. In other words, rather than make a principled

judgment, Schmitt merely points to a conceptual analogy or resemblance

between the underlying theoretical principles of the modern state and those of

Christian theology. That said, this succinct sentence can just as easily be read

as a normative observation on the question of modernitys liberation from the

legacy of theological thought. In fact, this statementand political theology in

generalhas drawn criticism from both adherents of theological worldviews

and those committed to the tenets of modernity. The former lash out at the

attempts to eviscerate political thought of what they believe to be its rudimen-tary theological content, whereas the standard-bearers of modernity bemoan

the absence of a political theory that is radical enough to completely extricate

itself from the grips of the religious worldview. Schmitt is chiey responsible

for the ambiguity over political theologys fundamental position, as he persis-

tently refrained from spelling out his motives. In consequence, the normative

ramications of his position remain an open question. This veil of uncertainty

does not emanate solely from Schmitts position, however, as his oeuvre clearly

points to his theological leanings.The ambiguity also stems from a broader and more principled issue,

which is well reected in Schmitts position: the view of modern consciousness

as a self-contained and self-derived system of well-dened norms that strive for

self-justication. Only through this unique form of justication will modern

self-consciousness be able to reafrm that it is an all-inclusive system of norms

and absolutely distinct from the Christian theological framework, which the

founders of modernity saw themselves as breaking away from. This funda-

mental objective, which has yet to be attained, has accompanied the Wests

intellectual history since long before the appearance of Schmitts theological-

political thesis. However, the latter molded this entire issue into a particular

form that sets it apart from its previous manifestations.

Schmitts approach is unique for two reasons. To begin with, when Polit-

ical Theologyrst came out, the trenchant Nietzschean critique of the origins

of modern consciousness and, above all, Max Webers sociological-historical

characterization of the modern eras social and political institutions were

already in the background. More specically, Friedrich Nietzsche and Weber

had substantially deated the self-condent attitude of modernitys defenders


3/25

Pini Ifergan 151

who were certain that modern consciousness was a historical phase in which

humanity had cast off the shackles of the Christian theological worldview.

The second reason is much more local. Schmitt wrote his seminal works

(Political Theologyincluded) during the nascent stages of the Weimar Repub-

lic. The founding of the new political order on the ruins of the imperial gov-

ernment in the immediate aftermath of Germanys defeat in World War I trig-

gered an extensive discussion on the edgling regimes stability and strength,

or lack thereof. Schmitt adopted a critical line toward the new government.

Focusing on the concept of sovereignty, he claimed that it had lost some of

its validity because of the inherent ambiguity over who holds the decision-

making power in the Weimar Republic. It was in this highly tangible context

that political theologys underlying principlethat secularized theologicalconcepts undergird the theory of the modern statecame into being. This

position allowed Schmitt to launch a lucid discussion on sovereignty, which

he identied with the age-old theological belief in a divine ruler. The concept

of sovereigntys legitimacy, in Schmitts view, can be rehabilitated only if

we assume that there is a succession between the terminology of Christian

theology and that of the modern state. Put differently, his secularization

argument must be understood primarily as a way to shore up the sovereignty

of governments (most notably the Weimar Republic) in the modern politicalsphere, so that they may overcome their inherent instability. However, the spe-

cic political context of Schmitts argument eventually took a backseat to the

discussion on secularization, especially in all that concerned modernitys

demand to view itself as a new historical epoch, which derives its legitimacy

from itself, alone.

While the history-of-ideas movement, which jettisons central ideas in

favor of the marginal, partly contributed to this shift to a much wider context,

it was primarily the result of the deep rupture that beset the modern West

because of, among other events, the Weimar Republics collapse and its replace-

ment with a totalitarian government. These events rendered the discussion on

sovereignty, certainly in all that concerns Schmitts local points of emphasis,

irrelevant and even illegitimate (Schmitt was personally involved with the Nazi

regime). Instead, the desire to explain the deep rupture caused by the horrors

of World War II spurred on the need to analyze the ideological origins as well

as question the legitimacy of modern consciousness. This imperative was

manifest in works as varied asDialectic of Enlightenment, by Max Horkheimer

and Theodor W. Adorno (1944), andMeaning of History, by Karl Lwith

(1949). As part of this same discourse, Hans Blumenberg (192096) proposed


4/25


consciousness of the crisis plays a major role and also in his innovative focus

on demonstrating that secularization was not a factor in the advent of modern

consciousness. Blumenberg clearly distinguishes his own work from the criti-

cism on modernity. In so doing, he situates himself in a unique position.

Blumenbergs emphasis on the dynamics that spawned the change,

while emphatically ignoring its ramications, led him to focus his criticism

on those schools of thought that held that secularization is the key to under-

standing the workings of the historical dynamic. According to Blumenberg,

this explanation is inappropriate for modernity and is based on a misunder-

standing of its very nature. But Blumenbergs overt effort to distance himself

from the critical-normative discussion on modernity means not that his posi-

tion lacks a normative dimension but that it merely disguises it. In Blumenberg-ian thought, the modern eras normative obligation may be ascertained from

the account of the dynamics of historical change, which assumes a patently

modern picture of humanity and the motives behind human actions in the

world. These motives are not openly declared but gradually revealed to be the

components of this same account.

Blumenbergs unique strategy bears a certain resemblance to the one

that Schmitt adopted in his critique of modernity. Neither directly confronts

the problem of modernity itself, as their views on the topic rise to the sur-face within the framework of the theological-political debate. The similarity

between the two philosophers mode of argumentation heightens our interest

in their exchange of letters. Not only does their correspondence enable us to

further understand their positions, but above all it points to an unusual way to

contend with the problem of modernity. By refusing to place themselves in the

seat of either the theologian (Schmitt) or the advocate of the Enlightenment

(Blumenberg), both philosophers deviate from the standard framework wherein

the contours of the debate between the supporters and detractors of modernity

are clear-cut. Instead, the two correspondents reevaluate these positions and

alter their meaning while nevertheless remaining within the boundaries of the

important discussion on modern consciousness.

Blumenberg initiated the correspondence with Schmitt, which ran

between 1971 and 1978 and was published in 2007.2In the rst letter, from

March 1971, Blumenberg ascribed his decision to solicit his colleague to a

2. Alexander Schmitz and Marcel Lepper, eds.,Hans Blumenberg Carl Schmitt Briefwechsel,

19711978, und weitere Materialien(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). The letters appear on

10358. All references to the correspondence between Schmitt and Blumenberg are to this book


5/25


6/25


the secularization category in various contexts of religious knowledge but to

shed light on the categorys normative elements, which transcend its ostensibly

neutral role. Although Blumenberg joined others in exposing the exploitation

of the secularization category, his work is unique in that it does not accuse

those philosophers who availed themselves of this category of consciously

attempting to undermine the justication of the new historical age. According

to Blumenberg, their efforts should not be attributed to a preconceived norma-

tive motive. Instead, they should be understood as the result of a neutral theo-

retical consideration that pertains to the nature of the historical period, espe-

cially in all that concerns the changes that it has reputedly ushered in. Deeming

the historical-conceptual category of secularization one of the causes behind

the genesis of the modern age essentially delegitimizes the notion that it isindeed a new epoch, for it lends credence to what Blumenberg referred to as

a quasicultural debt of the new historical age to its predecessor. In Blumen-

bergs estimation, this claim can be refuted only if secularization is perceived

as a reoccupation of the position held by the religious-theological outlook,

whereby completely new ideas supplanted the old context, as opposed to a

process of copying extant religious-theological notions into a new format that

preserves the original content. Thus Blumenberg contended that the historical

transition to the modern era consisted of the evisceration of the old content andthen the appropriation of the vacated framework on the part of new elements,

thereby giving rise to what is deemed a new epoch. In contrast to the use of the

secularization category by the critics of modernity, which Blumenberg consid-

ered a travesty, the legitimacy that he demanded for the new age was pre-

sented as the minimal criteria for inaugurating something new, even if that

same phenomenon is notand can never besomething created ex nihilo.

This extremely brief summary of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age

focuses on the projects complex and nebulous normative standing. Blumen-

berg launched his attempts to dispense with the normative vagueness, or at

least explain it, in the second (1974) edition, as part of his effort to respond to

the various critiques of the rst edition. As noted, one critic who forced Blu-

menberg to amend his rst version was undoubtedly Schmitt, whose philoso-

phy focuses on the modern states legal system. The nature and magnitude of

Schmitts criticism are somewhat surprising, given that Blumenberg hitherto

referred to his work only in passing; to wit, in the rst edition Schmitt is but

one in a long line of philosophers for whom secularization is a fundamental

category in their analysis of the modern era. Nonetheless, Blumenberg proba-

bly viewed Schmitt from the outset as one of the more prominent thinkers to


7/25

Pini Ifergan 155

TheologySchmitt asserted that all the signicant concepts of the modern

doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts.8In the epilogue to

Politische Theologie II, however, Schmitt contended that Blumenbergs fail-

ure to distinguish between his own unique use of this category and that of the

other cited scholars had led Blumenberg to misunderstand his theological-

political thesis and the role that secularization lls therein.

More specically, Blumenberg failed to distinguish Schmitts position

from those motivated by ambiguous metaphysics and thus depicted his view

supercially. Schmitt also surveyed some of the positions espoused by the

other philosophers targeted by Blumenberg, such as the correlation between

the notion of modern progress and the messianic-eschatological impulse in

monotheistic theology, or the view that Western rationalism in its modernform incarnates the religious praxis of asceticism. In characterizing these

views as metaphysical, Schmitt partly accepted Blumenbergs criticism of the

secularization category, whereby the latter homed in on the metaphysical

premise that underpins the enduring historical substance that the seculariza-

tion category undertakes to explain, including certain modications it under-

went. Nevertheless, Schmitt endeavored to show why Blumenbergs inclusion

of his work in this category was misguided. As far as Schmitt was concerned,

his own use of the category is predicated on a highly specialized tradition ofthe theory of state and law according to which the transition between its rst

and second phases, which are based on the Catholic Churchs interpretation

of this theory andIus Publicum Europeum(the international European law or

order), respectively, entail the secularization of one stage in the terms of the

other. Schmitt assumed that this shift pertains to the rewriting of the inter-

national rules of war and constituted the primary historical venue in which

the coming of the new era played itself out. In other words, the transition to

modernity released humanity from the theological context in which these

laws were previously understood. In both Politische Theologie IIand his per-

sonal letter to Blumenberg, Schmitt directed his readers attention to Alber-

ico Gentili, the renowned international law scholar (15521608). According

to Schmitt, Gentilis exhortation that theologians should keep quiet about a

matter outside your eldthat is, the eld of historymarked the threshold

of the new era.

At this early juncture in the debate, Schmitt already proved an extremely

ironic critic who, at least to some extent, was inclined to assume a self-induced

navet. For example, Schmitt made use of Blumenbergs own terms to describe


8/25


the dawn of the new age, which the former considered a process of reoccu-

pying the position of the erstwhile rules of war with those practiced in the

modern era. The evocation of Gentilis command also contained a bit of nuanced

irony, as immediately after the citation Schmitt alluded to the fact that Gentili

was a contemporary of Giordano Bruno, who was also persecuted by the Inqui-

sition. What is more, Bruno was cast as a leading protagonist in Blumenbergs

account of the rise of the modern era. In resorting to irony, Schmitt apparently

sought to point to the propinquity between his and Blumenbergs positions by

distancing his theory from the other objects of his correspondents criticism and

by taking the trouble to hint at the structural resemblance between his own line

of thought and the Blumenbergian alternative. In other words, Schmitt adopted

this approach to blunt the sting of his critics assault and to cloak himself in ashroud of navet as if something had been imputed to him that he neither

intended nor had the power to do. Schmitt thus presented himself as having

been falsely pegged as a member of the camp that aspires to undermine the

efforts to distinguish modernity from the previous epoch. This critical irony

and self-induced navet that he brought to bear on his polemic with Blumen-

berg can hardly be considered chance strategies of a master rhetorician of

Schmitts caliber; they were calculated to serve a highly specic purposeto

safeguard and justify Schmitts theological-political categorywhich consti-tutes a mainstay of his entire philosophy. In fact, Schmitt expressly noted that

his decision to lock horns with the Blumenbergian enterprise stemmed from the

fact that he considered it the most updated and nontheological attempt to render

his theological-political category superuous:

This book positions the nonabsolute as an absolute and undertakes to scien-

tically negate every political theology. The negation is understood to be

scientic only from the standpoint of a scientic term that is free of all rem-

nants of continued inuence, or reoccupation, on the part of the redemp-tion gospel, which, for its part, is valid only within a religion that positions

itself as absolute. That same reoccupation, which preserved a link to that

same theology, is perceived by him [Blumenberg] as merely a tragic debt

to eras past. The tireless efforts to cancel that same debt are attributed to

the worldliness of the new age, which was eviscerated theologically, and it

remains the ongoing critical mission of modernity.9

Accordingly, Schmitt devised two approaches for contending with Blu-

menbergs project. The rst, ostensibly neutral, points to the methodological


9/25

Pini Ifergan 157

resemblance between their stances, whereas the second considers Blumen-

bergs work a frontal attack on the conceptual standing of his political theol-

ogy. These two strategies indicate the ambiguity that informs Schmitts own

position: the dual commitment to a supposedly neutral scientic objective ver-

sus his largely normative and theological outlook. Schmitt and Blumenbergs

dialectics inevitably lead us to ask whether political theology is indeed a neu-

tral category that explains the changes the theory of law and state underwent

during the transition to the modern era through, among other things, an anal-

ogy between political theology itself, or the Christian theory of law and state,

and modernity. Alternatively, perhaps any understanding of the modern era

must preserve a Christian-theological dimension, for any explanationand

perhaps justicationof the modern era that lacks this element is bound to bewanting, if not defective.

The polemic between the two philosophers provides us with an opportu-

nity to dissipate the cloud of ambiguity surrounding the theological-political

category. Schmitt projected the general debate over this issue onto the Blu-

menbergian enterprise by exposing the fact that behind his correspondents

so-called neutral explanation for the genesis of the new era, which Blumenberg

refrained from couching in terms of the secularization category, stands an

unequivocally antitheological motive. In so doing, Schmitt afrmedboth dejure and de factothe existence of a strong theological impetus behind the

theological-political category, even if it was broached solely as an analogous

explanation for the rise of the new historical era. In addition, Schmitt contrived

to trap Blumenberg in his own problematics and compelled him to take part in

the theological debate over the enduring presence of Christianity in the politi-

cal-public sphere.

For the most part, Schmitt conducted this polemic with theologians

who assumed that the political-theology category should be removed from the

public discourse on account of the distinction they drew between the divine

and temporal city, as well as the theological realms inherent incompatibility

with politics. Conversely, the dialectic with Blumenberg over secularization

was waged on an entirely different front. Blumenberg mainly pitted himself

against critics of modernity who contended that the new era is still in thrall to

the conceptual frameworks of Christian theology. After being dragged into the

fray by Schmitt, Blumenbergwho joined others in contending that moder-

nity has been remarkably successful in detaching itself from its Christian

rootsfound himself lumped together with those same theologians whom his

interlocutor accused of undermining the validity of the theological-political


10/25


those who believed that modernity has failed to extricate itself from its theo-

logical origins. In fact, he apparently found conrmation for his view in Blu-

menbergs assumption that an intentional effort was being, or had been, waged

to oust religion from the public sphere. For his part, Blumenberg deemed

Schmitt and his ilk his sworn ideological enemies, so that it was incumbent on

him to dispel their persistent theologically motivated attempts to undermine

the legitimacy of the modern age. In sum, Schmitt sought to lure Blumenberg

into the debate, while Blumenberg entered the fray of his own volition. There-

after the two philosophers began to gather evidence for the ongoing struggle

between the proponents of monotheistic theology and the proponents of the

modernist worldview (including the conceptual framework that the latter is

predicated on), even though members of both sides claimed that the strugglehad already been decided or had never actually taken place.

Blumenbergs willingness to participate in the debate within the connes

of Schmitts ambiguous framework is evident from his very rst letter. Blu-

menberg unreservedly accepted Schmitts contention that he had compartmen-

talized the latters usage of the secularization category together with that of

other philosophers and had failed to discern its uniqueness. Notwithstanding

his acceptance of Schmitts criticism, Blumenberg did not, at least in this par-

ticular letter, explain how he understood his addressees use of the category tobe different from the rest. Instead, he undertook, in this of all contexts, to dis-

close the dynamics that led him to the concept of legitimation. It turns out that

what made Blumenberg reassess the historical change in terms of reoccupy-

ing or reconquering the position was the desire not to defend the new epoch

but to uncover the element of illegitimacy that was latent in its various detrac-

tors use of the secularization category. Only by dint of this new understanding

could he consider the possibility of tying secularization to legitimation. In his

rst letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg described the meteoric rise of this concept

within the context of attempting to convey the utter contingency of the legiti-

mation argument as strange and almost paradoxical.10More specically, it

did not derive from an established conceptual system, according to Blumen-

berg, but is among the arbitrary results of the dynamics of historical change.

The objective behind this brief genealogy of the Blumenbergian concept of

legitimation was to muster a riposte against Schmitts contention that Blumen-

bergs use of the term legitimacywas misleading and the suggestion that his

true intention was to argue on behalf of the new ages legality. Schmitt showed

that the terms usage contains a bona de historical dimension in which the


11/25

Pini Ifergan 159

present is considered a legitimate successor of the past if it fullls certain con-

ditions of succession that render the transition legitimate or justied. However,

this sort of justication model is obviously predicated on an interpretation that

preserves the idea of a succession between past and present. Schmitt argued

that this was not the justication that Blumenberg was referring to. According

to Schmitt, Blumenberg essentially advocated a rational justication model

whereby the modern eras legitimacy derives from a system of unbending and

historically self-contained laws, so that the epochs adherence to the law is the

sole criterion for its standing. In crafting this argument, Schmitt endeavored

to lure Blumenberg into becoming another representative of modernity who

sought to justify the epoch by trumpeting it as the Age of Enlightenmentan

era that, from a historical standpoint, embodies reasons perennial and manda-tory system of laws. Although Schmitt indeed pushed in this direction to posi-

tion himself as a champion of the Enlightenment and enemy of religion, his

primary objective was to thwart Blumenbergs criticism concerning the use of

the secularization category. By claiming that Blumenbergs concept of legiti-

mation essentially refers to legalization, Schmitt could argue that the legaliza-

tion of the modern age is merely a secularized reincarnation of the theological

idea of the law.

Blumenberg was well aware of Schmitts tactics and knew that the shortgenealogy was meant to be the rst step toward a possible answer. His compre-

hensive response would have to wait, however, until the expanded second edi-

tion of The Legitimacy of the Modern Ageappeared in 1974: The objection

that under the title of legitimacy, what I was concerned about was only legality,

puts in question the status of the books problematic and its thesis as historical.

As a criticism this could hardly be stronger.11Blumenberg insisted that his

proffered conception of legitimation should be considered a historical category

or, more accurately, a category that arises from an understanding of historical

dynamics rather than a logical or temporary antecedent to the actual historical

event. His rm stance should be viewed as a conscious attempt to distinguish

his theory from those aimed at justifying the Enlightenment and from those

premised on the fact that the only substitute for this line of thinking is to return

to the theological apologetics of yesteryear, namely, the position that was the

object of criticism of the Enlightenments supporters. In claiming that Blu-

menbergs concept of legitimation refers exclusively to legalization, Schmitt

11. Blumenbergs criticism of Politische Theologie IIappears in the second edition ofLegiti-

mitt, published in 1974. It is concentrated in the chapter Political Theology I and II. See Legiti-


12/25


sought to trap the former in a pincer movement, which would force him either

to adopt the outlook of the Enlightenment, so that he could accuse Blumenberg

of essentially being interested in the self-empowerment of man,12which tes-

ties to the fact that human reason is the only source of justication, or to

acknowledge the huge debt that the modern era owes to the same theological

forms of justication that Blumenberg sought to extricate himself from, lest he

be accused of what Schmitt described as a form of justication whose imma-

nent characteristic is that of autism.

However, Schmitt turned a blind eye to a third option whereby that same

self-empowermentor what Blumenberg referred to as self-assertion and

self-determinationis an inherently historical reaction, which assumed the

form of an enduring (atemporal and ahistorical) set of laws and is to be con-ceived as a replacement for the earlier explanatory framework. Insofar as Blu-

menberg was concerned, the emphasis need not be on the self-depiction of that

same system but on the specic historic function that it fullleda function

that can be dened in terms of self-assertion and self-determination.13In his

own detailed account of the genesis of the new age (a topic beyond the purview

of the present article), Blumenberg explained why this rational system, which

derives from the individual himself or herself, is essentially a historical reac-

tion to the implosion of the theological system. The reason behind Schmittsmisunderstanding of the unique alternative that Blumenberg introduced is

twofold. He ignored its existence and overemphasized the self-characterization

of that rational systema description putatively unconnected to the historical

conditions that paved the way for that system. Blumenberg portrays Schmitts

oversight thus:

Self-assertion determines the radicalness of reason, not its logic. An extreme

pressure toward self-assertion gave rise to the idea of the epoch as a self-

foundation . . . that emerges from nothing. It must seem paradoxical to Carl

Schmitt that the legitimacy of an epoch is supposed to consist in its discon-

tinuity in relation to its pre-history, and this paradox prevents him from

thinking that anything else could be at issue but mere legality vis--vis a

hypostatized reason that decrees positive law.14

Schmitts misunderstanding of Blumenbergs conceptual alternative also

prevented him from appreciating the difculties that pertain to secularization,

12. Schmitt,Materialien, 39.

13 Blumenberg Legitimacy 97


13/25

Pini Ifergan 161

for he basically viewed it as a means for legitimation. As a result, Schmitt

approached the historical past as a source for reorienting and thereby stabiliz-

ing contemporary reality, which seems on the brink of collapsing into a rud-

derless state of serendipity, by maintaining its connection with that same past.

According to Schmitt, the secularization category fosters legitimacy for the

new historical state of affairs by deeming it an indivisible part of the ongoing

construction of a historical identity whose attendant transitions are similarly

characterized and justied by secularization. Assuming that this sort of histori-

cal identity renders secularization into a particularly attractive category insofar

as legitimation is concerned, as it engenders the requisite succession for con-

templating a historical identity that negates the possibility of a radical new. In

fact, it is this very negation that exposed the stratum of illegitimacy in the cat-egory of secularization. Schmitt was careful not to disclose the dening attri-

butes of his version of historical identity. Instead, he preferred to undermine

the claim for a new age by pointing to the inherent absurdity of attempting to

create anything ex nihilo. From Schmitts vantage point, it was clear that there

exists a something whose multifarious reincarnations or phases can be tied to

a single identity, which will constitute the source for explaining the change. In

addition, that same something will impart meaning to the exceptional or

aberrant. This is of utmost importance to Schmitts hypothesis because in theabsence of that identity, the aberrant is bound to constitute a lingering threat to

the systems stability. At this juncture, it is worth asking whether Schmitts

concept of identity is akin to god, a metaphysical substance, existence itself,

or whoever embodies the principle that the sovereign is who decided on the

exception at any given moment.15Or perhaps it is a dichotomous pair, such as

friendfoe or sealand, whose constituent parts express that same identity in

concert. To anyone who reads Schmitts writings, he clearly oscillated between

these possibilities. Be that as it may, the present article is not the venue to decide

which option is best suited to Schmitts stance or best conveys the relationship

of these antitheses. Yet Schmitts deep commitment to this sort of concept of

identity, which in his estimation stands at the heart of historical events, is what

essentially sets his position apart from that of Blumenberg.

Blumenberg, who is considerably more skeptical as to whether there is

such an identity, replaces it with a functional constraint that recognizes the

need for a system which confers order and signicance. But Blumenbergs sys-

tem is not intrinsically tied to any claim of identity. The quest to validate the

modern era does not entail the need to justify the attempt to reveal the essence


14/25


of human rationality, the system of order, or the ultimate meaning of exis-

tence. Moreover, it does not express the zenith of the historical or theological

process but merely contends that the new historical epoch is a legitimate and

unique framework for coping with the ineluctable demand for order and mean-

ing. It was Schmitt, of all people, who concisely phrased Blumenbergs inten-

tions in the concluding paragraph of his 1942 book Land and Sea: Human

trepidation of the new is frequently as great as the trepidation from the void,

even when the new is . . . [aimed at] overcoming . . . the void. Therefore, many

see but an incomprehensible lack of order upon hearing the ring of the new

understood.16In fact, Blumenberg advocated this very denition on chroni-

cling how the new era came into being and humanitys efforts to cope with the

disappearance of a meaningful order by instituting a new one that derives fromthe individual. As such, this solution endows the new order with a legitimation

not dependent on the previous one. According to Schmitt, this transition to a

new framework proceeds through an apparent void and is constantly reined in

by erstwhile phases, which inltrate the present system and provide the frame-

work for crafting a new meaning and order. Notwithstanding its novelty, the

modern age is not incommensurate with either the past or its forms. In light

of the above, must we assume the existence of an enduring identity to con-

tend that this sort of transition from old to new indeed transpired? Does everychange basically consist of reappareling an existing identity?

The fact that the debate between Schmitt and Blumenberg ultimately

came down to this fundamental metaphysical issue can be gleaned from two

subsequent stages of their correspondence, wherein Blumenberg assumed the

lead in trying to pinpoint the differences between them. In the same epilogue

to Politische Theologie II, containing Schmitts original critique of Blumen-

berg, the former put forward an interpretation to the epigraph of the fourth part

of Goethes autobiography, Poetry and Truth. The epigraph states that nemo

contra deum nisi deus ipse (no one can stand against a god unless he is a god

himself).17Although Goethes aphorism reects on a notion of a unity, it leaves

more than enough room for the possibility of an embedded dualism. For

Schmitt, this passage must be understood in a theological-political context. In

other words, it contains a kernel of instability or friction that is liable to alter

16. Carl Schmitt,Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung, 3rd ed. (Cologne:

Hohenheim, 1981), 107; my translation.

17. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, From My Life: Poetry and Truth, in The Collected Works,ed. Thomas P. Saint and Jeffery L. Sammons, trans. Robert R. Heitner, vol. 5 (Princeton, NJ: Prince-

t U i it P 1987)


15/25


16/25


To Schmitt, the connection is so obvious that he did not even bother to elabo-

rate on why this passage should be viewed as an expression, much less the

origin, of Goethes epigraph.

This omission obviously warrants criticism, but it is peripheral to the

debate with Blumenberg. The crux of Schmitts argument lies in the need for a

theological key to unlock the mystery surrounding the position of Goethe, who

can hardly be suspected of religious fanaticism. If Goethe indeed espoused

this view, it would bolster the argument that the theological dimension cannot

be dislodged and can even be found in decidedly political contexts. The pres-

ence of a theological matter at the heart of a historicopolitical situation rein-

forces the argument that an underlying theological basis is requiredbe it con-

sciously or notto understand the political, and the theological may very wellserve as the basis of its meaning. Schmitt subsequently quotes from a conver-

sation between Goethe and Chancellor Friedrich von Mueller on October 10,

1823, which Goethe documented in his diary: His doctrine with respect to

the divinity of Jesus, Goethe wrote, is in need of a despotism, perhaps

even more than despotism needs it.22Although Schmitt cited this passage to

soften the impression that Goethe was ambivalent toward Christian theology,

it apparently encapsulated his own theological-political position.

As noted, Blumenbergs concerted effort to plumb the differencesbetween himself and Schmitt commenced in his very rst letter to his critic.

Blumenberg mentioned how surprised he was to nd that they both inde-

pendently sought to interpret and track down the source of Goethes cryptic

epigraph. But in contrast to Schmitts Christological exegesis, Blumenberg

offered a polytheistic reading that revolves around the image of the rebellious

god Prometheus. Blumenberg took the trouble (perhaps for the sake of show-

ing his correspondent that they shared a similar point of departure and his

interest in Goethes epigraph served no ulterior motive) to inform Schmitt

that he had rst tackled Goethes aphorism a year before the publication of

Schmitts book (in a conversation with Gershom Scholem and Hans Georg

Gadamer). The premise behind Blumenbergs interpretation is rather straight-

forward and is connected to the fact that toward the end of the third part (the

installment before the epigraph), Goethe discussed a scandal that was prompted

by his Ode to Prometheus and that subsequently gave rise to the so-called

pantheism polemics (whose main protagonists were Gotthold Ephraim Less-

ing and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi). In Goethes words, the ode was the

tinder for an explosion which revealed and brought to discussion the most


17/25

Pini Ifergan 165

23. Goethe, Poetry and Truth, 469.

24. Blumenberg eventually turned this issue into the main topic of his book on myths, whichalso refers, albeit briey, to the polemic with Schmitt. See Hans Blumenberg,Arbeit am Mythos

(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1979) For an English translation see Work on Myth

secret concerns of worthy men, concerns which, unknown even to them, slum-

bered in an otherwise very enlightened society.23Controversy aside, within

the narrow scope of Schmitt and Blumenbergs relationship, I am more con-

cerned with how the latter used the polytheistic context to undermine Schmitts

theological-political interpretation that is dependent on a strong principle

of identity. Blumenberg appears to argue that the riddle of Goethes apho-

rism yields to a polytheist reading that allows for the rise of a new order that,

unlike Schmitts position, is not limited to modifying a single, strong identity

that appears in different guises. Instead, the era is forged either by a struggle

between separate forces or by the petering out of one force and the emergence

of another from the ruins of the former. Even in the absence of a detailed expla-

nation or justication for his interpretation, Blumenbergs mobilization behinda polytheistic reading of that epigraph constitutes, among other effects, an

assault on the underlying premise of Schmitts political theology and its mono-

theistic Christian context. As such, Blumenberg assumesand Schmitt was

in no rush to deny itthat the sense of succession from a past epoch is man-

ifest only under the assumptions of monotheistic theology, whereas the shift

to a polytheistic mind-set pulls the ground out from beneath the theological-

political category and its instrument of implementationthe category of secu-

larization. As opposed to Schmitt and his Christological rendering, Blumenbergapparently adopts the explanation that Goethe himself gave for his excitement

over what the latter referred to as the poetic gure of Prometheus, which

he contrasted with Satan, the poetic gure of the monotheistic theological

tradition:24

The Titans are the foil to polytheism, just as the devil can be viewed as

the foil to monotheism. But neither the latter nor the One God to whom he

stands in contrast is a poetic gure. Miltons Satan . . . remains in a disad -

vantageously subaltern position as he attempts to destroy the splendid cre-ation of a superior Being. Prometheus, on the other hand, has the advantage

of being able to create and form in deance of higher beings. Also, it is a

beautiful thought, one appropriate for poetry, to have human beings created,

not by the supreme ruler of the world, but by a lesser gure who, however, is

sufciently worthy and important to do this because he is a scion of the old-

est dynasty.25


18/25


26. Carl Schmitt, Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung, Universitas: Zeitschrift fr Wissen-

schaft und Literatur8 (1950): 92530.

27. The book was originally written in English and published in the United States; see Karl

h h l l l f h h l h f

The second occasion on which Blumenberg sought to underscore the dif-

ferences between himself and Schmitt took place after a three-year silence

between the two in the aftermath of their initial exchange. In a relatively long

letter, Blumenberg responded to an article penned by Schmitt, The Three

Phases of Providing Historical Understanding, which the latter attached to

one of his letters.26Like the correspondence on Goethes epigraph, the two

philosophers availed themselves of this opportunity to demarcate more sharply

their positions. What is more, the article introduced Lwith to the mix. Lwiths

work, especially his bookMeaning in History, played a central role in Blu-

menbergs decision to embark on a treatise on modernity in the rst place.27It

also had a signicant impact on the theological-political theory of Schmitt,

who praised and made direct reference toMeaning in Historyin the above-noted article. The books well-known theory, which has long become a main-

stay in the theoretical discourse of the history of ideas, posits that the modern

phenomenon of the philosophy of history should be understood as a later, sec-

ularized incarnation of the Judeo-Christian eschatological outlook. Of course,

this theory further enhanced Schmitts theological-political position, as his

contribution to the theory of the modern state seems in keeping with Lwiths

contribution to the historical-ideological sphere, which undergirds the dis-

course of modern consciousness. However, this substantive resemblancebetween Lwiths and Schmitts thought does not extend to their motivations.

Although Lwiths theory debunks the modern camps pretension for auton-

omy and liberation from its theological origins, Lwith did not espouse this

view in the name of either theology or secularized modernity. Instead, he

wielded this theory against both schools of thought on the premise that mod-

ern consciousness can be explained only from a theological standpoint; that

is, it is deeply indebted to the eschatological idea. In contrast, Schmitts case

against modernity appears to focus on its adherents inherently false pretenses

of detaching themselves from their theological roots, which Lwith revealed in

his book. Schmitt averred that this can be remedied if modernity recognized

its debt to its theological past. By dint of Lwiths fundamental historical dis-

tinction between circular (Greek-pagan) and linear (Judeo-Christian) time,

Schmitt put forward his own characterization of historical consciousness,

which informed his own day and age. More specically, Schmitt asseverated


19/25

Pini Ifergan 167

28 Schmitt Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung 929

that time is neither circular nor eschatological but is entirely limited to the

individual who presents and determines the meaning of historical time and

constantly transforms it into a framework of meaning for himself or herself

and other human beings. As such, history is no longer understood as a mani-

festation of either cosmic time or a divine plan; it is merely a way to bestow

meaning on oneself and then apply it to or force it on others. Though Lw-

ith shared Schmitts view according to which historical consciousness is a

later incarnation of the perception of eschatological time, the latter eschewed

Lwiths conclusion that humankind must reembrace some version of circular

time to avert the problematic outcome of eschatological time. To wit: Schmitt

insisted that it is possible to dovetail eschatological faith to historical con-

sciousness. It seems rather odd, however, to ascribe this view to Lwith, giventhat he viewed historical consciousness as a reincarnation of and dependent on

eschatological faith.

It is precisely at this point where the disparate motivations driving

Lwith and Schmitt come to light and, for my purposes, array the former and

Blumenberg against Schmitt. Lwith linked his criticism of modern histori-

cal consciousness to eschatological belief to show that at the very moment the

West unfettered itself from the promise of the redemption, which heretofore

had kept it in check, humankind turned into a destructive force. So long aseschatological faith was emphasized and undisputed, it had the wherewithal to

prevent the advent of a historical consciousness that would distort the accepted

meaning of the historicalthat is, a longing for the end of time or redemption.

Schmitt, who endeavored to demonstrate that eschatological faith continues to

exist within the framework of the new form of historical consciousness, insisted

that a way could be found to bridge the two. With this in mind, he turned to the

theological idea of the katkhon, the restrainer, which appears in Pauls Sec-

ond Epistle to the Thessalonians (2:7). The bridge rests, according to Schmitt,

on the image of the power that delays the apocalyptic ending and defeats

evil.28In other words, modern consciousness lls the role of the restrainer. As

such, it merely delays the coming of the end; it does not go so far as to eradi-

cate eschatological faith. Since it is the individual who imparts meaning onto

history, the theological system is exible enough to encompass this delay and

even shield humankind from the collapse that Lwith warned against.

In his letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg wondered if I have already man-

aged to point out the crux of the difference between us.29Nevertheless, he


20/25


took another stab at it by responding to Schmitts above-noted article. Unlike

Schmitt, Blumenberg espoused a view somewhat reminiscent of Lwiths,

whereby historical consciousness and eschatological belief are beyond rec-

onciliation. Once again, Blumenberg undertook to justify the newmodern

historical consciousnessby offering a divergent interpretation of the said

katkhon. Blumenberg asked whether the postponement of the end of time

and the enervation of eschatological faith remain within the same eschato-

logical purview, or perhaps signify the abandonment of the entire outlook.

He answered, in his patented style, that the modern perspective advocates not

the simultaneity of history and eschatology but the inversion of their meaning.

Consequently, the prospects of the redemption still retain the form of an escha-

tological promise, but now it entails suspending the eschatological denoue-ment. Blumenberg offered a comprehensive interpretation of this inversion

whereby the hopes for redemption were dashed time and again. In the process,

the signs that were supposed to herald the beginning of the end were metamor-

phosed into something so atrocious that humankind was left with no choice

but to stop it from coming to pass. According to Blumenberg, the katkhon

is but an expression of the radicalization of the eschatological craving at this

moment in history. As such, Blumenberg left the interpretation of the katkhon

within the theological framework, thereby upholding his refusal to view it asthe conceptual basis of historical consciousness.

This notion of the radicalization of a religious concept that triggers the

evisceration or disappearance of that concept, and the emergence of another

one in its place, constitutes the linchpin of Blumenbergs depiction of the rise

of modern consciousness. Nevertheless, his account revolves around the con-

cept of God as an absolute power, rather than the notion of eschatological

redemption. What sets this particular instance of radicalization apart from the

similar process that Blumenberg believed to have transpired in the theological

nominalism of the late Middle Ages is that in the latter the theological frame-

work managed to contend with the resurgent yearnings, whereas in the Enlight-

enment the radicalization led to the collapse of that framework and the con-

struction of another. Consequently, Blumenberg wrote to Schmitt that, from a

conceptual standpoint, the rise of the modern consciousness must have been

preceded by a marked waxing or waning of the force of eschatological paraly-

sis. However, its emergence could have transpired only against the backdrop

of an absolute negation of the eschatological forceas opposed to a mere

transformation or modicationfor otherwise it would have been capable of

restraining the eschatological element. In light of the above, Blumenberg real-


21/25

Pini Ifergan 169

30. See Blumenberg to Schmitt, August 7, 1975, in Briefwechsel, 13036.

among other purposes, to connect eschatological belief and historical con-

sciousness. On the other hand, Blumenberg endorsed a much weaker, func-

tional concept of identity that enables us to keep track of the entire process

the evisceration of a framework of meaning that induced a reaction whose

implications can no longer be explained in terms of that framework.30Blu-

menberg elaborated on the weak identity that he advocated in the fourth part

of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, where he contended that reoccupa-

tion is the key concept for comprehending the new historical era: The con-

cept of reoccupation designates, by implication, the minimum of identity that

it must be possible to discover, or at least presuppose and to search for, in even

the most agitated movement of history.31

Blumenbergs efforts notwithstanding, Schmitt was under no obligationto accept his correspondents depiction of his own position. If Schmitt indeed

rejected Blumenbergs reading, we would then be forced to formulate another

explanation for Schmitts insistence on nding alternative bridging or tran-

sitional categories for preserving the succession not of the historical as such

but of the historical as an entity predicated on the theological. As Blumenberg

argued, Schmitts notion of an unceasing effort to bridge the conceptual gap

between the theological and what seeks to detach itself from the theological

can be understood as a practice that assumes, and is dedicated to, a strongmetaphysical notion of identity, which embodies its debt to the Christian theo-

logical worldview. However, Schmitt could have eschewed this metaphysical

assumption by asserting that this commitment is merely ethicotheological and

not metaphysical; in other words, it is a perspective motivated by a normative

worldview in which the historicophilosophical discourse is only a means for

justifying this stance. The exposure of this discussions metaphysical strata

apparently stemmed, at least partly, from Schmitts inclination to keep a safe

distance from the normative or theological sphere while taking advantage

of conceptual analogies that fall between the theological and other areas of

human endeavor. This tendency was put to the test during the correspondence

with Blumenberg, who agreed to participate in the conceptual exchange

according to the rules that Schmitt laid down in his initial critique. Blumen-

berg then proceeded to expose Schmitts underlying metaphysical point of

departure by compelling Schmitt, who sought to avoid the metaphysical realm,

to articulate a normative-theological commitment in its stead, which under-

girds his position. The fact that this disclosure transpired during the dialogue


22/25


with Blumenberg is no accident. For Blumenberg, the point of departure, which

disclosed Schmitts above-noted leanings, is a conceptually neutral discourse.

That said, disclosure was neither Blumenbergs express purpose nor even his

intention. The normative strata naturally surfaced during the debates clarica-

tion process, at the very moment the conceptual description was jettisoned.

Indeed, the correspondence shed light on Blumenbergs loyalties in equal mea-

sure. Schmitt described Blumenberg as the most cogent representative of the

opposing viewpoint and was cognizant of the role his younger colleague played

in elucidating his own position. Blumenberg was unwittingly cast by Schmitt

in the role of the most eloquent voice of a worldview that he was not interested

in championing. Schmitt, of all people, provided a succinct survey of this out-

look in his initial critique of Blumenberg (i.e., the appendix to Politische The-ologie II, which was the last work that Schmitt was to publish in his lifetime).

Schmitt offered a lucid yet satirical look at this same worldview as

early as 1918, through a ctional character named Buribunken:

I write therefore I am; I am, therefore I write. What do I write? I write myself.

Who writes me? I myself. . . . What is the content of my writing? I write that

I write myself. What is the principal driving force that saves me from the

self-serving cycle of the I? History! If so, Im a letter in the typewriter of

history; Im a letter that writes itself. Yet if we are to be precise, it is not I who

writes me, but merely the letters that are me which write. However, it is

through me that the global spirit perceiveswritesitself, so when I per-

ceive my own self the global spirit is perceived. . . . In other words: I am not

only the reader of world history, but . . . the one who writes it.32

It may very well be that that same innervation that Schmitts critical response

aroused in his colleague was connected to Blumenbergs desire to wash his

hands clean of this sort of gure, which ostensibly represented the impetus

behind his attempt to bestow legitimacy on the new age. Blumenberg with-

stood the temptation of afliating himself with this gure or directly renounc-

ing it. Instead, he dug himself in behind a neutral discourse that revolves

around the possibility of historical change, which at times appears to be his

only commitment to modernity. In other words, the notion that this worldview

possesses a clear normative dimension derives solely from his unwavering

commitment to a conceptual analysis that shuns basic metaphysical assump-

tions, be they hidden or revealed. Nevertheless, his inability to remain com-

pletely ambivalent to the normative dimension that Schmitt had thrust on


23/25

Pini Ifergan 171

his shoulders points, at the very least, to the fact that he recognized the pos-

sibility of a normative dimension, even if he sought to distance himself from

it and preferred to view it as no more than the product of, rather than the

reason behind, a conceptual decision. Likewise, it may be said that Blumen-

bergs insistence on critiquing Schmitt by emphasizing his theorys underlying

metaphysical premise, instead of its conspicuous theological dimension, indi-

cates that same desire to refrain, as much as possible, from routing the polemic

onto a normative track. However, here too, Blumenbergs adamancy ultimately

engendered his own commitment to the normative sphere, which may perhaps

be dened as modern. This is manifest in Blumenbergs critical aversion to

the notion of a strong, substantive identity that he found looming over whatever

Schmitt had to say. Against this backdrop, Blumenberg refused to accept theimage that Schmitt tried to foist on him of an individual creating himself and

his world. In so doing, however, it soon became evident that Blumenberg cast

doubt on the existence of anything that may be characterized as absolute.

His refusal to recognize the existence of an absolutebe it God, humanity,

existence, or the self-constitutive subject itselfis the only motive that would

appear to express, albeit in an admittedly circuitous fashion, a normative com-

mitment to modernity that may be ascribed to Blumenberg.

Blumenbergs inclination to extricate and distance himself from theabsolute stands in stark contradistinction to Schmitts unremitting desire to

locate and reinforce the presence of that same absolute. Hence it appears that

Blumenberg and Schmitt needed one another to activate the normative dimen-

sion that both were inclined to obfuscateeach in his own wayas part of a

conscious effort to assume the role of the singular outsider within the frame-

work of a discussion they were expected to take part in. Just as Schmitt accom-

plished this objective through the discussion on theology, Blumenberg did so

in the philosophical discourse on modernity. In my estimation, the correspon-

dence between Schmitt and Blumenberg indeed repositioned each participant

in the coveted role of outsider or, at least, a unique thinker.


24/25

Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political

Theology and Secularization

Pini Ifergan

Is modernity a distinct historical epoch that can be radically distinguished

from the one that preceded it? What are the implicit philosophical

assumptions regarding our understanding of historical time that determine

the sort of answer that we are inclined to give to this question? The debate

between Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg concerning the conceptual status

of secularization as an explanatory category for the emergence of modernity

provides us with a paradigmatic case that sheds light on those questions.

With the recent publication of the correspondence between Schmitt and

Blumenberg, I suggest in my article a reading of the debate that exposes

how they use each others argument to sharpen their distinctive evaluation of

modernity and its relation to Christian theology. These two arguments and

their unique dynamic transcend the common ways of either defending or

criticizing modernitys claim to be a distinct and legitimate historical epoch.

The suggested conceptual reconstructions of the Schmitt-Blumenberg debate

point to a revaluation of the terms of the quarrel over modernity, Christian

theology, and the relations between them.


25/25

Copyright of New German Critique is the property of Duke University Press and its content may not be copied

or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.

However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Cutting to the Chase, Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology and Secularization_Pini...

Documents

Transcript of Cutting to the Chase, Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology and Secularization_Pini...