Culture as the Co-Evolution of Psysich and Social Systems

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DOI: 10.1177/1354067X09353208

2010 16: 213Culture PsychologyBeat Thommen and Alexander Wettstein

Environment RelationshipPerspectives on the PersonCulture as the Co-evolution of Psychic and Social Systems: New

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Abstract In this article we contribute a new theoreticalperspective to the analysis of the relationship between individual

and culture, and the person and the environment. Many hotlydebated issues in cultural psychology, such as reification, the

discourse of personality traits, and models of partwholehierarchies are productively addressed. Taking a systems-

theoretical approach following Niklas Luhmann and others, wedistinguish three different types of system and their operational

processes (biotic, psychic and social) and suggest that thepersonenvironment relationship should be conceptualized as a

process of co-evolution of psychic and social systems. We discussthe critical role of communication in this process and its

implications for the concept of culture. Our own research onclassroom disruptions and problem behavior in educational

settings provides illustrative examples for the kinds ofmethodological considerations generally relevant to a systems-

theoretical approach in empirical research.

Key Words behavior disorders, classroom disruption,communication, culture, Niklas Luhmann, personenvironment

relationship, social systems, systems theory

Beat Thommen and Alexander WettsteinPHBern, University of Applied Sciences, Switzerland

Culture as the Co-evolution ofPsychic and Social Systems:

New Perspectives on thePersonEnvironment Relationship

Questions concerning the relationship of individual and culture areas old as psychology itself: How is an individual person formedby culture? How are new cultural phenomena created, and how docultures change? What are the interrelations between psychologicalprocesses on an individual level and social processes at the level ofgroups, societies or cultures? Valsiner (2007) distinguished threebasic conceptualizations of the relationship between persons andculture:

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1. A person belongs to culture. This position is represented mainly inintercultural psychology and states that a person belongs to aculture because of certain characteristics. Typically, members of this

culture share certain patterns of thinking, feeling and behavior.2. Culture belongs to a person. This position defines culture as an

inherent, systemic organizer of each persons psychological system.These intra-psychological mechanisms determine the person inde-pendently from a particular environment.

3. Culture is part of the relationship of persons with the environment.Here culture is constituted in the diverse processes in which personsrelate to the world, including their social environment. Culture isdefined as the result of ongoing exchanges between persons and

their environment.

The first two positions define culture as a static entity, and they fail todeal, therefore, with questions of cultural development and change.There are different approaches for a process-oriented approach,summarized by the third position, but these tend toward reductionismby favoring one side or the other of the exchange, culture or person.Recent developments in systems theory, particularly studies buildingon the work of Niklas Luhmann, offer new perspectives for these old

problems. A systems-theoretical approach conceives the relationbetween person and culture as a co-evolutionary process of individualpsychic systems and social communicative systems. As a result, manytautologies and paradoxes confounding more established theories canbe avoided.

Reification and the Language of Traits

The use of dispositional, static concepts is very common in person-ality psychology, social psychology and sociology. The use of dispo-

sitional concepts is influenced by (culturally based) patterns ofthinking and speaking, where everyday language offers a rich reper-tory of dispositional concepts describing psychological and socialphenomena; for example, a person may be characterized as aggressive,honest, lazy, achievement-oriented, etc. Language itself predisposes usto think of people in terms of static and general traits. What we experi-ence in the course of feeling, thinking and doing becomes similarlyobjectified and reified by the linguistic descriptions we use. As a resultof such reification, psychological characteristics are seen like physical

properties such as height, weight or hair color. Thinking and speakingin terms of dispositions and traits has influenced the development of

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scientific theories. The psychology of personality is to a great extent apsychology of dispositional constructs (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Thequestion of how cognitive, emotional and behavioral processes

develop through exchanges with certain environments cannot beaddressed by a trait-oriented, static theoretical framework.

Reifications are also used when attributing static properties to socialgroups, societies or cultures. In our everyday language we even speakof the character, or the soul, of a social or cultural group. Allport(1961), however, warned against equating analytical cultural constructsand actual occurring cultural processes. Moreover, many concepts suchas norms, values or social knowledge are assigned to individuals as wellas social groups. In descriptions of social knowledge and social repre-

sentations, an implicit assumption is often made that social processesunfold like individual, psychological processes (see Jovchelovitch, 2007;Moscovici, 1961, 2000). The language of static traits and dispositions isan efficient tool, facilitating the characterization of psychological andsocial phenomena in a few words. In contrast, describing processes ina language that captures their ongoing, temporal character is muchmore complicated and circumstantial.

Part/Whole Models

According to Bachelard (2002), one of the main obstacles hamperingprogress in scientific theorizing about the relationship of individualsand culture is thinking in terms of partwhole relationships. Indi-viduals are seen as parts of a group, and groups as parts of greatersocial units, of societies or cultures. However, by differentiating partand whole, a categorical distinction is being made that creates hier-archical relations between the whole and its parts. Problems arisewhen causal arguments are made on the basis of such a hierarchicalsystem and its categorical distinctions. For example, the statement that

the social system of a neighborhood influences a family is paradoxi-cal, because a particular family is itself part of the whole neighbor-hood system. Taken to its logical conclusion, the statement is, then,that a family influences itself; a paradox well-known in the classicBarber paradox. When investigating the mutual influence of indi-viduals and their (social) environment, it is problematic to think interms of partwhole hierarchies; this leads to inextricable logicalproblems.

Thommen & Wettstein Culture as Co-evolution

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The PersonEnvironment Relationship: Holism

and Dualism

Definitions of the personenvironment relationship fall between twoextreme positions: holism and dualism. Both positions pose majorepistemological problems. Radical holism proposes an inseparablepersonenvironment unit and, as a consequence, it does not enablethinking in terms of a personenvironment relationship. Dualism,however, posits the radical, exclusive separation of the person and theenvironment, which makes it difficult to consider interactions betweenthe two elements and disregards their mutual interdependency.Valsiner (1998) proposes a third solution and introduces the concept ofinclusive separation:

From the standpoint of inclusive separation, the dangers of dualism areeliminated a priori. The person and the environment are both separate andunited; separation makes it possible to study their actual relationship as aprocess. The notion of unity here becomes explicitly available for study,since the duality of the personenvironment structure entails both unityand separation. The very differentiation of the person and the environmentmakes it possible to study the ways in which they are interdependent.Dualityco-presence and relationof differentiated parts that functionwithin the same whole is not dualism but a form of systemic organization.

(Valsiner, 1998, p. 21)

Following a dialectical approach, Valsiner (1998) contrasts the personand the environment on a conceptual level, but relates them on a func-tional level as interdependent. The relationship between the personand the environment therefore becomes the primary investigativefocus. He thus obviates the problems of both extreme holism andextreme dualism. Several issues remain to be addressed, however:What are the methodological consequences of positing both unity andseparation and their mutual relation? How can environment andperson be captured independently? How can we think aboutprocesses between the person and the environment that are dependentand independent at the same time?

Summarizing the discussion concerning the relation of individualand culture, we agree with a statement by Smedslund (1995) thatpsychologys problems are primarily theoretical and conceptual, andonly secondarily empirical. In systems theory (particularly throughdevelopments in cybernetics II) there are theoretical and conceptualpropositions which could help to solve some of these problems.


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The Theoretical Framework of Systems Theory:

The Co-Evolution of Self-Referential Systems

Systems theory does not refer to a coherent, unified theory. Rather,systems theory subsumes a variety of approaches in different scientificdisciplines, all of which, however, share some general principles.Systems theory developed from research in cybernetics, informationtheory, physics, chemistry, biology, neuro-biology, sociology, semioticsand philosophy. Similarly diverse are the applications of systemicthinking, but in philosophy of science in particular, systems theory ledto new constructivist positions. It is not surprising, then, that the re-ception of systems theory is varied and ranges from euphoria to totalrejection. Drawing on the principles of systems theory, we present anattempt at conceptualizing the individualculture and the personenvironment relationship in new ways, and we propose alternativesfor dealing with methodological problems that arise in investigatingthese relationships. We base our argument and discussion primarily onNiklas Luhmanns (1995) conception of systems theory. Luhmans aimwas to develop a sociological theory that was founded on systems-theoretical premises and was as general and coherent as possible.

Systems Defined by their Operational Processes

Systems theory conceptualizes systems consistently as processes, to theextent that they can only be defined by their ongoing processes. Hence,the central object of every investigation is processes unfolding in time.This is fundamentally a developmental approach, and the primaryscientific interest is the description and explanation of how a certainsystem evolves from one state to the next. The position fits well withthe claims made by Valsiner (1994) for a development-orientedpsychology. In the case of investigating problem behavior, the keyquestion should not be whether a child can be identified as having a

behavior disorder (which is already the attribution of a state). From asystems theory perspective, the relevant questions in this case wouldbe: In which situations does the problematic behavior occur? How dointeraction partners react to this behavior? And what effect do thesereactions have on the childs behavior? Instead of attributing personaltraits and seeking causal explanations based on circumstances in thepast, the processes of exchange between individuals and their environ-ment, that is, their interaction partners, is essential. What is thesequence of interactions taking place? Do these interaction sequences

develop in a stable, homeostatic way? Do they escalate or de-escalatein a certain direction? The intricate descriptions necessary for this kind


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of investigation demonstrate the problems involved in expressing aprocess-oriented view in our language. Our language is much moresuited to characterizing persons by static traits than to describing inter-

actions as they occur over time. It appears that our thinking aboutpsychological phenomena and our language developed in a co-evolutionary way (see Selvini-Palazzoli, 1989), a proposition that isitself based on a systemic view.

Structure and Process

This strong emphasis on processes as a crucial characteristic of systemsis unfamiliar and goes against both scientific and ordinary, everydaythinking. The dualism of structure versus process mirrors the classic

polarity between rather static and rather dynamic world views which,as an area of conflict, brought about far-reaching controversies evenamong the ancient Greek philosophers. For Luhmann, the structure ofa system consists of a constant, recurring series of events (see vonAmeln, 2004, p. 106). By positing structures as regular patterns ofprocesses occurring in time, Luhmann overcomes the dualism of struc-ture and process. His conception is to a large extent compatible withthe theory of Vygotsky (1929), who posited structure as a selection andseries of psychic operations.

Systems Constituted by Differences from their Environment

Instead of beginning with partwhole distinctions (e.g., the individualas part of a dyad, the dyad as part of a group), Luhmanns conceptionof systems theory begins with the basic difference between system andenvironment. A system is defined as structurally and functionallyoriented to a specific environment. Living systems (e.g. organisms) areopen to their environment, with which reciprocal exchanges ofmaterial, energy and/or information take place. The borders betweensystem and environment are ongoing outcomes of these exchanges. In

a recursive process a system defines its unity and also its environment(von Uexkll & Kriszat, 1970). Systems constitute and maintain theirunity by this very differentiation from their environment which, inturn, only emerges through the very operations of and exchangeswith the system. As a consequence, systems must inevitably be seen asself-referential or autopoetic. According to Luhmann (1995, pp. 3234),systems have no possibility to come into contact with their environ-ment other than through the processes and relational operations bywhich they are constituted, a form of self-contact by way of the

environment, because they possess no other form of environmentalcontact than this self-contact (Luhmann, 1995, p. 33).


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This view has extensive epistemological ramifications and led tonew conceptualizations of constructivism (see Glasersfeld, 1997;Maturana & Varela, 1987; von Foerster, 1984; Watzlawick, 1984).

According to the constructivist position, it is always a specific system,capable of recognition and knowledge, that performs perceptual andcognitive processes and thus differentiates itself from its environment.Hence, in any investigation and analysis, the precise system in oper-ation has to be identified, that is, the difference between an observer(or system) of the first order and a second-order observer who differ-entiates how a first-order system makes distinctions and differentiatesitself. Which sector of the observed field is classified as the system andwhich as the environment is hence always relative to an observer who

makes specific judgments and decisions. In this sense, scientificpsychological knowledge is based on second-order observations, forexample, when a scientist investigates cognitive or emotional phenom-ena or eventually third-order observations, when the nave theoriesof parents about the cognitive and emotional development of theirchildren are the focus of investigation. There are diverse constructivistpositions, ranging from radical constructivism (e.g. von Foerster, 1984)to social constructivism (Gergen, 1990, 1991) to a more moderateposition of evolutionary constructivism (e.g. Vollmer, 1995).

From a constructivist perspective, the problem of causality has to bereconsidered: the relation between a living system (e.g. a person) andits environment is not deterministic. To the contrary, the environmentoffers certain possibilities and a system chooses, depending on itsperceptual and cognitive capacities, which properties of the environ-ment it responds to (or, more precisely, which it recognizes andacts on). The person-systems perceptual sensibilities and cognitivecapacities are crucial, because they render certain properties of theenvironment relevant while others remain unrecognized. Systemsrespond very selectively. Some incidents in the environment can cause

upset and change, while others do not. Rather than an incident itself,it is the processes activated by an environmental incident in the systemthat are decisive. Bateson (1972) speaks in this context of a differencewhich makes a difference. Only those properties of the environmentthat a system can perceive as differences (in Batesons terms, theelementary units of information) have the potential to influence theinternal operations of the system. Vygotsky repeatedly discussed thispoint in his writings as well:

Even when the environment remains little changed, the very fact that the childchanges in the process of development, results in a situation where the role andmeaning of these environmental factors, which seemingly have remained


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unchanged, in actual fact do undergo a change, and the same environmentalfactors which may have one meaning and play a certain role during a givenage, two years on begin to have a different meaning and to play a different

role because the child has changed; in other words, the childs relation tothese particular environmental factors has altered. (Vygotsky, 1935, cited invan der Veer & Valsiner, 1994, p. 339).

This non-deterministic view can be applied to all non-trivial living,information-processing systems, while deterministic explanatorymodels may be applied appositely to trivial systems like mechanicalmachines (see von Foerster, 1984).

Reducing Complexity

The main aims of a system are to keep alive and to reproduce. Becausesystems are considered operationally closed, any system only has directaccess to, and can only define itself by, its own ongoing processes.According to Luhmann (1995, p. 3338), living systems are thus self-referential or autopoetic, and Maturana and Varela (1987) called theprocess of self-reproduction autopoiesis. The question is, however, howsystems can maintain their unity and secure their survival in a particu-lar environment, especially since there are no physical structures toguarantee stability and order. Although we speak in relation to psychic

systems of knowledge, motives, self, identity, even soul, static physicalcorrelates for these have never been empirically ascertained. Generalsystems theory argues that systems survive by reducing the com-plexity of their operational processes in relation to their environment.Environments have the potential to generate more complexity (of infor-mation, for example) than a particular system can process and handle.A system reduces complexity, however, by enforced selectivity; certainperceptions produce particular and specific operational responses.Abstraction and generalization are organizational processes limiting therange of possible operations in relation to certain perceptions, butsystems are thus capable of building complex and enduring operationalpatterns of higher levels. Valsiner (1998) calls these selective organiz-ational processes constraints and attractors. Rather than structures ofquestionable ontological status, patterns (regularities of sequences andprocesses) guarantee the identity and survival of a system. Accordingto this dynamic view, no structures existing independently of anyprocesses are assumed to exist; on the contrary, a system sustains itsunity and survival by reproducing stable patterns of processes asoperational sequences.

The concepts of operational closure, self-organization andautopoiesis do not contradict the postulate that all living systems are


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open toward their environment. Operational closure only refers tothose processes going on within a system and their relative autonomy,but at the same time, through these very processes, an exchange of

information, material and/or energy with the environment takes place.These exchanges are highly selective, however, because they dependon what the environment affords and on the capacities of the particu-lar system, i.e., its perceptual and operational capacities.

Co-Evolution and Structural Interconnection

What answers can a systems-theoretical approach offer to questionsabout the development of systems? How do systems develop whenthey function autonomously and are self-referential? Taking evolution-

ary theory into account, there are several points from which we canbegin to formulate answers. The environment offers a wide range ofpossibilities to any system. In the evolution of species, living systemsdeveloped different ways of using the potentialities of the environmentand securing their survival through mutation. Different and diversesolutions proved to be viable for survival in a particular environment.A systems autonomy is, therefore, always relative: relative to a specificenvironment and the potentialities it affords. An environment thuslimits the developmental possibilities of self-referential systems.

Maturana and Varela (1987) call this ongoing interaction betweensystem and environment structural interconnection. It needs to besaid here that a second-order observer (e.g. a scientific psychologist)may identify two living systems in his environment and describe astructural interconnection between them. From a systems-theoreticalperspective, then, development can be conceptualized as the co-evolutionof interacting living systems. If these interactions are successful,their development is complementary and they mutually ensure theirsurvival.

The development of human beings is much more intricate, of course.

To a great extent, people live in a physical and symbolic environmentthat they have created themselves (e.g. cultural creations such aswriting, meaningful objects such as churches, traffic signs, to name afew). Human systems thus co-evolve with a culturally constructedenvironment that they have made themselves. As a consequence,what are cultural achievements appear to human beings in their onto-genesis as if coming from outside. Much of socialization consists ofan individuals appropriation of these cultural achievements in thecourse of their development. An individual internalizes externally

given, culturally defined rules of behavior and routines. This view wasprimarily introduced to psychology by Vygotsky (1997, p. 91ff), and


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following Vygotsky different studies in developmental psychologyhave demonstrated the close connection between socioculturalenvironment and cognitive development (e.g. Toomela, 1996, 2003). In

the next section, we further develop the phenomenon of co-evolutionin a cultural environment.

Three Types of System and their Modes of Operation

The criterion for differentiating types of system is their mode or qualityof operations. This makes sense, because autopoiesis affords a certainoperational homogeneity of a system, so that psychic operations, forexample, connect with other psychic operations, or physical operationswith physical ones. As neuro-psychological research drastically

demonstrates (Roth, 1996), physical electric impulses are a necessarycondition for the psychic sensation of emotions, but these psychicsensations and experiences cannot be reduced to electric impulses.According to the criterion of homogeneous modes of operation,Luhmann (1995) defines three types of systems (see Figure 1). Ineveryday life, we think of another human being as a unity. Accordingto Luhmann, however, a human being is not a single homogeneoussystem but consists of different biotic and psychic systems. As a conse-quence, theoretical statements should refer to the specific system with

its specific mode of operation. For each type of system (e.g. psychic),the other system (e.g. biotic) forms its environment, and they evolvetogether (co-evolution). Social systems are defined as systems by theirown qualities, and communicative processes are constitutive for socialsystems. Consequently, questions can be asked as to how differentsystems co-evolve: the psychic and the biotic system within a person;the psychic system of a teacher and the psychic system of a student; ora teachers and their students individual psychic systems and thecommunicative system in the classroom.


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Social systems

Communicative processes

information

addressees

meaning/

understanding

Psychic systems

Psychic processes

(Consciousness)

cognition

feeling

motivation

Living systems

Biotic processes

(Manifest behavior)

nonlinguistic

paralinguistic

linguistic

Figure 1. Operations and types of systems



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Biotic Processes as a Precondition for Psychic Processes

While purely physical systems (e.g. planetary constellations) arelargely subject to environmental influences, by means of cognitive

processes living systems (e.g. mammals) have the capacity to representtheir environment. Living systems actively seek favorable conditionsand withdraw from undesirable conditions and influences. Livingsystems can be described through their biotic (bio-physiological)processes, such as neurobiological or motor processes manifesting asbehavior, which are a precondition for psychic processes but, as arguedabove, cannot be reduced to biochemical processes (see Lang, 1993).

Psychic Systems and Consciousness

Psychic systems are, through their semiotic processes, capable ofdeveloping representations of their environment and themselves. It isthis capacity that differentiates psychic systems qualitatively frombiotic systems. Luhmann (1995, pp. 262267) defines this capacity asconsciousness. Consciousness does not exist independent of semioticprocesses within psychic systems. Various theories state that con-sciousness developed parallel to biotic developments of the neuralsystem and to social developments, that is, communication, and thatboth ontogenetically and phylogenetically, consciousness is linked tocommunication processes. Language, the medium for communication,is the most important link between psychic and social systems; it is themost powerful medium for semiotic processes as well as communi-cative processes. Wygotski (1985, 309ff)/Vygotsky (1987) demon-strated in a variety of experimental studies the central functionlanguage has in transmission, since it is a culturally available tool forthe development of higher cognitive functions.

Psychic processes can be distinguished as cognitive, affective/emotional and motivational processes, and they are all greatly inter-dependent. Ciompi (1999) characterizes affects as:

an encompassing psycho-physical mood (brought about by internal orexternal stimuli) of varying quality, duration, and degree of consciousness.Affects are the crucial providers of energy or motors and motivators ofany psychic dynamic, and they determine the focus of attention. Affects arelike locks or gates which open or close access to different psychic processes.Affects create continuity; their impact on cognitive elements is like a kind ofglue or connective tissue and they determine the hierarchy of our thoughtcontent. Affects can be identified, therefore, as eminently important reducersof complexity. (Ciompi, 1999, p. 67)

While processes of consciousness depend on and correlate withbio-physiological processes, their qualities can only be accessed as


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experience and as externalizations of these experiences by means oflanguage. This causes methodological problems for neurologicalinvestigations of consciousness and psychological research; we will

discuss some of the latter below.

Social Systems are Defined by Communication

Systems are defined by their modes of operations. According toLuhmann (1995, pp. 137175), social systems are nothing butcommunications. It is significant to note that actual communicativeprocesses are constitutive of a social system and not aggregates of indi-viduals who identify themselves as belonging to some social group orother. It follows that if communication processes end, the social system

ceases to exist. Luhmanns (1995) definition of communication differsfrom those of traditional communication theory, whereby communi-cation is the transmission of information from a sender to a recipient(see Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Wiener, 1948). For Luhmann, this defi-nition is too ontological, because it suggests that information exists inthe head of a sender and is transmitted by way of a physical mediumto the head of a recipient. For Luhmann, the concept refers exclusivelyto the self-referential processes of a social system. Information isthe operation by which a system reduces uncertainty by selecting

some operations and disregarding others. Through enforced selectiveinformation-processing, a system reduces complexity when dealingwith a particular environment.

Drawing on Bhler (1990), Luhmann defines communication as asynthesis of three selections: a selection of information, a selection ofan addressee and a selection of meaning. Communication transcendsacts of single individuals, and communication should not beconsidered a chain of communicative acts. The selectivity of what isuttered, information, and the selectivity of understanding always enterinto communication, and precisely these differences, which enable its

unity, constitute the essence of communication (Luhmann, 1995,p. 164).

For example, when at the beginning of a lesson a teacher asks thestudents to put their books on their desks, there is a threefold selectionto this communication: information (selection 1: information: what?)the teacher could have asked the students to put their rubbers ontheir desks; she addresses her message to all students of the class(selection 2: addressee: who?)she could have addressed her messageto only one student; and essential to communication is that the

students understand the message (selection 3: meaning). Understand-ing is a social phenomenon and can only be deduced from the students


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reactions. Whether a message has meaning cannot be decided on thebasis of the processes of a single individual but only on the grounds ofhow the processes of at last two psychic systems are related. The

students reactions will show whether the teachers message hasconnectivity (in German,Anschlussfhigkeit). The selection of meaningis connected with processes of mutual expectations, for whichLuhmann (1995, pp. 103136) coins the concept double contingency.The students could react as the teacher expects and put their books ontheir desks. But a show of recalcitrance or outright protest against itwould also demonstrate meaningful communication, because if thestudents did not understand what the teacher wanted of them, theycould not protest and do the opposite. The students, as addressees,

make in turn a selection of information, addressee and meaning. If aselection in one of the three domains does not take place, whateverhappens should not be characterized as communication in Luhmannssense. In such cases, the teacher may not make a selection of infor-mation (e.g. he always utters the same sentence), or the students maynot feel addressed at all, or the students reactions may be beyond whatcould reasonably be expected, that is, their responses lack connectivity.Understanding can always include misunderstanding, and accordingto Luhmann this is in fact most frequently the case. Mutual under-

standing only has to go as far as is necessary to coordinate systemsinteractions (see Grice, 1975).

Interrelations between the Three Types of System

With regard to operational closure, the three different systems functionautonomously, but they function interdependently due to their struc-tural connections. For example, psychic processes are dependent onbio-physiological conditions, so that neural systems make cognitive,emotional and motivational processes possible. But psychic processescannot be reduced to biotic processes, nor are they determined by

them. Likewise, psychic processes are a precondition for communi-cative processes in social systems, but communicative processes havequalities that cannot be derived from psychic systems.

Each of the three systems can be considered as an environment forany other. As environments, they simultaneously enable and delimitthe possibilities of the related systems. The conception of systems asoperating simultaneously and in parallel makes this view possible andstands in contrast to traditional notions of systems as hierarchicallystructured. It also opens up questions about how different systems

evolve, and evolve in exchange with each otherthat is, what we,drawing on Luhmann (1995), call co-evolution. Employing this notion


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in our empirical investigation, we would ask, for example: How doteachers psychic processes (e.g. their opinions about challengingbehaviors) match or correspond to communicative processes (e.g.

communication about certain content)? Or, in reverse: Do certaincommunicative patterns develop in parallel with students psychicprocesses (e.g. demotivation)?

Culture as Communication

Following Luhmann, culture cannot be defined in terms of individualmembership to a social community or in terms of territorial bound-aries. Culture as an attribute of social systems consists of communi-cation. Systems theory avoids making the kinds of static ascriptions

made through traditional concepts like social knowledge, values,norms or roles that are, it needs to be stressed, analytical constructsdevised by researchers and not phenomena that can be the subject ofempirical investigation. Rather, culture is constituted, maintained andchanged by communication. When communicative processes occur inthe same or in similar ways repeatedly, communicative patterns areformed. They are structurally related to psychic systems, andcommunicative patterns can therefore influence (not determine)parallel developments in psychic systems (as patterns of expectations,

for example). Psychic systems have a capacity for (symbolic) general-ization, which is in turn a condition for communicative processes.Patterns that reduce the complexity of psychic systems operationsdevelop in parallel with communicative systems, as a co-evolutionaryprocess of psychic and social systems. This concept of pattern iscomparable to Valsiners (1998) concept of constraints with regard topsychic systems. Constraints structure a psychic systems possibilitiesof thinking, feeling and acting. Constraints describe patterns ofprocessing, leading to a reduction of complexity in a system, always inrelation to a given and specific environment.

Patterns can be distinguished by laypersons as well as researchers,and they can refer to properties of psychic systems or social systems.To avoid paradoxical reasoning, however, who asserts the existence ofa pattern and to which system it refers must be defined. Using theconcept for different subjects and objects often leads to epistemologi-cal problems; if pattern can refer to the activities of researchers orlaypersons, and to processes of psychic or communicative systems, itremains vague. Moreover, its use as an explanatory concept oftenresults in tautologies, for example when communicative patterns are

explained by psychic patterns and vice-versa.


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Culture as the Co-Evolution of Psychic and Social Systems

Within a systems-theoretical framework, culture can be conceptualized asthe enduring patterns of the co-evolution of psychic and communicative

processes. These patterns often result in generalized symbolic forms.Language is the most prominent and powerful cultural product andthe most effective medium to deal with culturally relevant processes inpsychic and social systems. Language has the advantage that hiddenoperational processes and patterns are exteriorized and symbolicallyrepresented. Through writing in particular, language attains constancyover time and enables the conservation of otherwise ephemeralprocesses (see Donald, 1991). By means of language, representations ofsemiotic processes can be transmitted over time and space. Therefore,

language and the related semiotic processes are an effective cultural means ofcoordinating individuals psychic processes, their manifest behavior andcommunicative processes.

Having said that, written language is first of all nothing more thanblack ink on a white piece of paper, and like all physical objects it issubject to physical decay. Besides, it remains a physical artifact, anincomprehensible sign, as long as it is not interpreted by psychicprocesses and transmitted by communicative processes. Pointing thisout, we are trying to avoid the danger of seeing signs as if they arepsychic processes, when in fact they are merely triggers and results ofpsychic or communicative processes. From this perspective, it becomesintelligible why different people and groups have been fighting forthousands of years over the proper interpretation of contentiouslinguistic artifacts (such as the Bible), or why the interpretation of themeaning of texts will never come to a definite end (this article will beno exception). Besides language, culturally relevant semiotic processesare represented by other symbols. Different icons u. , H) maychannel and coordinate psychic and communicative processes more orless successfully both in small or global social groups. Similarly,

physical objects can be loaded with cultural meaning. For example,religious symbols and buildings such as crosses, cathedrals, mosquesor synagogues activate diverse psychic processes, depending on theperspective of the interpreter. These psychic processes develop parallelto communicative processes, which can end in consensus or in hostilebattles between persons with a different social history.

Symbols are very powerful and economic cultural devices forguiding thought and action (Vygotsky, 1929) and coordinating com-munication, but they sometimes miss their target. Symbolically trans-

mitted rules and prescriptions are often violated (e.g. the violation ofa schools house rules or an infringement of traffic rules). Using


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physical barriers to guide behavior is much more laborious but some-times more effective (e.g. a fence to mark the border of a schoolyard,street barriers or prison architecture).

A strictly process-oriented conception of culture (defined as struc-turally related psychic and communicative systems) offers productiveperspectives on questions that arise when cultural phenomena areobjectified as concepts. Those processes should only be consideredcultural if researchers identify and construct them as such (i.e. asregular and enduring patterns of co-evolution). This is itself anaccomplishment and construction of psychic systems in the sense ofa second-order observationor a third-order one if researchers makestatements regarding a persons observation about their own psychic

system, the system of a partner, or the cultural system in which theylive. A question about how students themselves explain the origin ofbehavior problems in the classroom is a third-order observation by aresearcher about students second-order observations about them-selves and their behavior. Differences between the students second-order observations and the researchers third-order observations canbe explored further through questions such as: Are there differencesbetween everyday cultural psychology and academic cultural psy-chology (see Bruner, 1996; Thommen, 1985)?

Cultural phenomena are often specific to certain situations, persons,groups and times: this is compatible with a dynamic, process-orientedconcept of culture. Individual and situational differences (variations)are indispensable for evolutionary change. Without variation there willbe no selection and no evolution. Social minorities often initiate differ-ent psychic and communicative processes and are a powerful motorfor enduring cultural change (see Mugny & Prez, 1991). When in-vestigating cultural phenomena empirically, the type of system thatis the focus of investigations must be specified. The main focus ofcultural psychology is the co-evolution of psychic and social systems.

The traditional categorization of perspectives as sociological, social-psychological or personality-psychological cannot be maintained,because these emphasize only different aspects of the same co-evolutionary process.

The extent to which semiotic processes in different psychic or socialsystems accord is an empirical question that is settled by researcherswhen making (more or less arbitrary and nominal) decisions as towhether a phenomenon should be described as cultural. In doing so,they take into account the number of persons reporting equal semiotic

processes and the degree of consensus among them. Accords form acontinuum, from private phantasms (as when the picture of a school


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building evokes memories of ones first teacher) to globally sharedinterpretations of icons (e.g. an arrow).

The Benefits of a Multi-Perspective Approach

The current tendency of theories in the social sciences to separateanalytically some topological or temporal segments of reality causesrestrictions and a lack of investigation into complex relationshipsbetween social and individual processes. The microgenetic co-

ordination of goal-directed behavior, the acquisition of conventional-ized semiotic processes in ontogenesis, and the historical changes ofthese processes make for three different time foci and three levels ofdifferentiation which together a researcher has to bring to a topic. Eachprocess within a system can be analyzed from a microgenetic, onto-genetic or sociogenetic perspective (see Wygotski, 1985, p. 31). From amicrogenetic perspective, the constancy or variability of processeswithin a person or among persons in the same situation can be in-vestigated. An ontogenetic perspective looks at changes of processes

over a certain period of life or a lifetime. From a socio-genetic per-spective, the variability or constancy of processes over historical


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Figure 2. Structural links and co-evolution of psychic and communicative processes

structural links

co-evolution

perturbations

psychic

processes

communicative

processes

time



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periods is being investigated. Generally, these three perspectives arenot conceptualized and investigated simultaneously and in relation toeach other. If two perspectives are mentioned it is often in a reduction-

ist way, because facts determined from one perspective are oftentaken as causal factors for explanations from another. By contrast,systems theory conceptualizes the different types of system as functioningautonomously but being structurally linked, without the subordination of onesystem to another.

New Questions for Old Problems

Systems theory differentiates strictly between psychic and communi-cative processes. Cultural processes have a qualitatively different

status, since they emerge from the co-evolution of psychic andcommunicative processes. The crucial question, then, is no longerabout the relationship between individual and culture, but about theinterrelation of psychic and communicative processes that lead to co-evolutionary cultural patterns.

Valsiners (1998, p. 21) concept of the inclusive separation of personand environment is based on an expansion of classical two-value logic:a and non-a can be seen as complementary parts of a system and arenot mutually exclusive. Such a solution based on logic addresses

certain conceptual problems, but it does not address the temporaldimension of processes unfolding in time.In systems theory, the concept of environment is completely relative

(e.g. von Uexkll & Kriszat, 1970): environments differ in relation to aprocessing system. It also has to be specified which system defines acertain environment (literally another system) as an environment; thisincludes, for example, the environment defined by the system of aresearcher. According to Luhmann (1995), the functional system ofscience forms a self-referential system. Communication within thescientific community as well as between science and other functional

systems (e.g. the political system that provides financial support andapplies results) determines which scientific findings will persist anddisseminate and which will disappear. This, however, does not indicateanything about their epistemological truth. Different episodes in thehistory of science illustrate this statement. For example, Aristarchos ofSamos argued as early as 400BC that the earth moves around the sun,but for religious and political reasons this theory was only acceptedaround 2000 years later.


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Theoretical and Methodological Consequences:

The Investigation of Classroom Disruptions

ProblemHere we illustrate theoretical and methodological consequences of asystems-theoretical approach by discussing an empirical example: thatof the development of classroom disruptions. At first sight, classroomdisruptions do not appear to be a cultural phenomenon. They areusually regarded as individual students psychic problems (e.g.Myschker, 2005) or as social problems of the whole class as acommunity (e.g. Kounin, 1970; Molnar & Lindquist, 2006). But accord-ing to our definition of culture as the co-evolution of psychic and social

systems, the emergence of classroom disruptions can be interpreted asa cultural phenomenon of all members of a class sharing a classroom.In this study we are especially interested in questions of how individ-ual behavior, psychic processes and social processes in the class interact.The systems-theoretical framework we have outlined allows us todefine the various qualitative processes with conceptual precision, torecord them empirically, and to describe the patterns of events goingon, both internal to these processes and among them. Following asystems-theoretical and constructivist approach, the problem can be

formulated using the following questions (see Figure 3):Which processes can be described and which patterns of processescan be identified:

in the living systems of teacher and students (behavior)?Example: Violating classroom rules, a student leaves his chair at hisdesk 12 times during a lesson. Each time the teacher admonisheshim to go back to his desk.

in the psychic systems of teacher and students (cognitive, emotional,motivational)?Example: The teacher is convinced that he will succeed in achievinga behavior change if he consistently admonishes the student everytime. The student is happy about the personal attention he gets fromthe teacher.

in the social system of the class (communication)?Example: The communication between teacher and student unfoldstime and again according to the same pattern. The student getsup, the teacher admonishes, the student does not respond to the

admonishment, and so forth . . .


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How do the different systems co-evolve? In our study, we concentrateon the co-evolution of psychic systems and the social system.

How are they structurally linked? What patterns can be identified,taking into account the operational processes in the two systems?Example: Even though the teachers intervention does not result inthe student changing his behavior as desired, the teacher does notchange his strategy. The conviction in the teacher s cognitive systemand the positive feelings triggered in the student (psychic system)lead to a communicative process that takes the same stereotypicalcourse time and again.

Most theories of problem behavior and classroom disruption address

issues of type and . Learning theories in general do not go beyondthis conceptual level. Bandura, Ross and Ross (1961), in their classicbaby-doll experiment about imitation of aggressive behavior, forexample, defined properties of the environment as a static variable ora group of variables, but not as an autonomous social system. Thus,questions of the co-evolution of psychic and social systems could notarise. Their explanations are restricted to operations within living andpsychic systems.

Labeling behavior as problematic is a normative judgment, and

normative judgments are made by persons or groups of persons aboutthe psychic processes of other persons. A systems-theoretical approach,however, allows the following questions to be raised about so-calledproblem behavior: Who judges which processes as problematic ordisruptive? Is it the actor him/herself, an interaction partner, or theresearcher? These issues can be addressed in turn and any differencesor agreements can be stated explicitly. In our empirical study we, asresearchers, define only those communicative processes as disruptivethat refer to the communicative process itself and attempt to steer it,because they impede curriculum-related activities in the classroom.

Describing Operations of Three Different Types of System

In our investigation of classroom disruptions we focus on an indepen-dent description of operational processes in three qualitatively differ-ent systems using the following methods (see Figure 3):

Observing bio-physiological and motor processes (especiallybehavior) of teachers and students

Analyzing psychic processes of teachers and students

Describing communicative processes between teacher and students.


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Our descriptions are based on certain theoretical assumptions abouteach of these specific processes. The descriptions are the starting pointfor statements of a higher order concerning the co-evolution of theseprocesses, which are developing in parallel.

The Observation of Manifest Behavior

In this context we are interested in registering manifest behavior asfar as verbal, non-verbal and paraverbal behavior is concerned. Werefer to a rich tradition of methods of behavior observation developedby Gestaltpsychologie and field theory (Khler, 1973; Lewin, 1963),ecological psychology (Barker & Wright, 1955) and ethology (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). Through systematic behavior observation (Fassnacht,1982, 1995) and an event-sampling technique, we assess two variables:on-task/off-task behavior and students aggressive behavior (see

Wettstein, 2006, 2008).


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Figure 3. System processes and methodological approaches

Social systems

Communicative

processes

- contents

- addressees

- sense/

comprehension

Psychic systems

Psychic processes- cognition

- feeling

- motivation

Living systems

Biotic processesManifest behavior

- non-verbal

- para-verbal

- verbal

Researcher

Second- and third-order

observations

Observation of

manifest behavior

Observation of

communicative processes

Inferring by observation and

analyzing self-reports

Statements about structural linksStatements about structural links



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Analyzing Psychic Processes

Psychic systems reproduce themselves through self-referentialprocesses (see Luhmann, 1995, pp. 59102) and through semiotic

processes in particular, psychic systems create meaning (Sinn). Thecreation of meaning, making sense, is a property of both psychicsystems and communicative systems. We argue that meaning andsense-making is the evolutionary achievement, by common drift, ofpsychic and social systems. If psychic processes are not reduced toobservable biotic processes, they have to be interpreted by the psychicsystem itself (self-consciousness) or other perceptive psychic systems(interaction partners or researchers). The investigation of psychic andsocial systems has to be compellingly reconstructive and interpretative

(Bohnsack, 2007; Vogd, 2005). The attribution of meaning is alwaysan act carried out by a particular psychic system, either as an act ofself-attribution or as an attribution to processes as they are perceived.For the researcher as a first-, second- and third-order observer, there-fore, two methodological possibilities open up (see Wettstein &Thommen, 2009):

1. Psychic processes (e.g. motives, aims, feelings) can be analyzed,interpreted and inferred from observable biotic processes. Manifestbehavior, expressed bodily and/or through language, enables

insight into cognitive constructs such as intention, motive and aims.2. Because of their capacity for self-perception and self-reflection,

psychic systems can interpret and communicate their own psychicprocesses; the methods introspection and self-confrontation makeuse of this capacity to gain access to psychic processes.

When interpreting both ones own and others behavior, theconstruction of meaning is based on a foundation of more or lessconventional semiotic processes and mutual expectation. Psychic andsocial processes cannot be described in an objective way. They are partof a poly-contextual order which presents differently, depending on thespecific interpreter and their specific perspective and semiotic history(e.g. Bohnsack, 2003).

The researchers challenge is to reconstruct patterns of psychicprocesses and communication in such a way that they can shed lighton the co-evolutionary process. Researchers are able to interpretbehavior only when they are themselves members of these culturallyshared semiotic processes. They interpret it against the background oftheir own knowledge, beliefs and values (see Boesch, 1996). This has

far-reaching epistemological consequences, but a detailed discussion isbeyond the scope of this article; here we offer only a few remarks.


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Because every interpretation is bound to an observing psychic system,there is no absolute objective knowledge. This also applies to anempirically working scientist who is, therefore, not in a privileged

position when making truth claims for his or her interpretations.Having said that, there are agreed rules and procedures in sciencethat govern observations and the research process; therefore, the veryoperations involved in research become comprehensible, transparentand hence open to criticism. We all know, however, that there is nogeneral agreement in science about the precise rules and proceduresour never-ending epistemological and methodological disputes aretestimony to that.

Describing Communicative ProcessesCommunicative operations have qualities that cannot be reduced topsychic processes. To describe the particular qualities of communi-cative processes, it is necessary to observe repeated events of interact-ing psychic systems, because they cannot be reconstructed as theaccumulation of behavioral expressions of psychic systems. Communi-cative processes are based on already existing semiotic processes andat the same time constitute new meanings, and we are thereforeconfronted with methodological problems comparable to those met

when interpreting psychic processes.One of our primary concerns is the question: Are there stable, esca-lating or de-escalating patterns of communicative processes? Stabilityor escalation may refer to different aspects of communicativeprocesses: to the selection of information, to the selection of anaddressee, or to the question of understanding. Luhmann (1995)proposed a general theory of communication. In order to make thistheory fruitful for empirical work, his guiding ideas have to be mademore specific and applicable to classroom situations. Our recentlypublished explorative study (see Wettstein & Thommen, 2006) is a first

attempt in this direction.Here we offer an illustrative example. In the communicative

processes between teacher and students, three themes alternate.From the standpoint of the institution, it is desirable that communi-

cation deals with curriculum matters (Theme 1). When lessons becomechallenging, however, communication often shifts to Theme 2, thenegotiation of social rules, or even to Theme 3, when the studentsdoubt the authority of the teacher. Our analyses so far show that anincrease in problem behavior is linked to a high degree with the

development of communication, as in the example above. From thesefindings about the co-evolutionary processes of biotic (problem


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behavior) and communicative processes it is possible to derive a rangeof highly promising interventions by teachers who are facing problembehavior. Improving the didactic quality of lessons can significantlycontribute to keeping communication between teachers and studentsto the content level (Theme 1) rather than letting it drift to the steeringlevel (Theme 2) or even power level (Theme 3).

With regard to formal criteria, communication processes and theireffects on problem behavior can be analyzed by the followingquestions:

1. Who initiates a change of theme?Example: Time after time, students begin to discuss classroom rulesand to question them. The teacher attends to their questions.

2. Over a longer period of time, communications deal with a particu-lar theme (constant pattern) or communications rapidly shift

between different themes (fluctuating pattern).Example for the constant pattern: The students are working on theirtasks for the particular lesson. The teacher provides input whereappropriate.Example for the fluctuating pattern: The students are working ontheir tasks. The teacher intervenes often, whenever she perceivesminor violations against classroom rules.

With regard to methods, the particular challenge is how patterns ofcommunicative processes that are going on over time can be recorded

and described. Methodological approaches to analyzing and describ-ing processes in dynamic systems can be found in synergetics and


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Figure 4. Themes of communication: critical turning points of escalation

Theme 1. Communication about content and curriculummatters forthis lessonTeacher: Today we will talk about your dictations.Student: Takes his booklet out of the desk.

Theme 3. Communication about the power to define social values,norms and rules; i.e., who is authorized to steer action?Teacher: Im the boss here.Student: You arent mymother. So dont orderme!

Theme 2. Communication about steering actions: social values,norms and rulesStudent (loudly): I hate dictations. I dont want to correct mymistakes. Teacher: Hey, not in that tone of voice.Turning points



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clinical psychology (Haken & Schiepek, 2005; Molenaar & Valsiner,2005), in family systems research (van Geert, 1998; van Geert &Lichtwarck-Aschoff, 2005) and in research of organizational processes

(Vogd, 2005). We attempt to translate these approaches to the descrip-tion of psychic and communicative processes in the classroom and toshed light onto their co-evolution.

How to Ascertain Structural Links between Systems

We conceptualized culture as the co-evolution of psychic and socialsystems. As a methodological consequence, sequences and patterns ofprocesses going on in two operationally closed systems have to be

interrelated and regularities of a higher order have to be identified.Luhmanns particular formulation of a systems theory provides aconceptual framework that allows us to represent processes in differ-ent, qualitatively diverse and concurrent or parallel existing systems aswell as their interdependencies and interrelations. Investigationscommitted to this conceptual framework have to proceed with new,appropriate methods. In the social sciences, many methods and modelshave been developed for handling aggregated data of different groups,but only very few for the description of data representing time series.

When the temporal factor is critical, the situation is comparable with,to use a metaphor, the score of a piece of music (see Haken & Schiepek,2005; Vorsmann, 1972). Methods and models need to be developedfurther that enable the identification of synchronic and diachronic,constant and changing, harmonious and non-harmonious patternsamong the different tunes of this scorethat is to say among biotic,psychic and communicative processes that are parallel processes,concurrently occurring over time.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Dr Claudia Gross (Department of Anthropology,University of Auckland, PB 92019, Auckland, New Zealand (email:[email protected]) for the translation of the German text into English.She has not only translated the text but was at the same time an importantdiscussion partner with regard to theoretical and conceptual issues.

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design and methods in empirical research. ADDRESS: PHBern, Institut frHeilpdagogik, Zhringersstrasse 19, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland.[email: [email protected]]

ALEXANDER WETTSTEIN, PhD, is currently working as a Lecturer andResearcher at the Department of Special Needs Education, University ofApplied Sciences in Bern, Switzerland. His main field of research is systematic

behavior observation in educational settings. He has conducted a series offield studies on social behavior in naturalistic educational settings. In 2008 heauthored the Observation System for the Analysis of Aggressive Behavior inClassroom Settings, BASYS, and published a series of articles concerning thequality of teaching and social interaction in educational settings. In his currentresearch project he is investigating aggressive adolescents environments.


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