Cultural Origins of Cooperation: The Role of Collectivism ... · Cultural Origins of Cooperation:...

Cultural Origins of Cooperation: The Role ofCollectivism and Individualism

Simon Gachter1, Jonathan F. Schulz1, Christian Thoni2

1University of Nottingham, 2University of LausanneERC-Grant COOPERATION

Social Norms and Institutions, AsconaMay 13, 2015

Gachter, Schulz, Thoni Cultural Origins of Cooperations 1 / 18

Overview

Cooperation

Cooperation of unrelated individuals is essential for well-functioning ofmodern societies

Research QuestionsI Are there societal differences in cooperation when institutions are held

constant? YESI What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation among

unrelated individuals?

Hypothesis: Permeability of social networks plays a major role


Overview

Cooperation



constant?

YESI What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation among




Overview

Cooperation



constant? YES

I What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation amongunrelated individuals?



Overview

Cooperation



constant? YESI What may explain cross-societal variation in cooperation among




Overview Factors explaining societal differences

Importance of permeability of social networks for morality

Confucius (551 - 479 BCE) argued that one has the moral obligation toprotect kin, even one who broke the law and harmed others. Greif andTabellini (2015)

Banfield (1958) ’Amoral Familism’

Yamagishi (1998): ”Intense group ties (...) prevent trust fromdeveloping beyond group boundaries”

Tabellini (2008) ’Limited vs. generalized morality’

Alesina and Giuliano (2014) ’Family ties’

Greif and Tabellini (2015) ’The clan vs. the coperation’

→ in societies with tight group boundaries morality is limited towards thein-group


Overview

Approach

Experimental methodology allows to control the institutionalenvironment

Tool: Public Goods Game without (N) and with peer punishment (P)

I 10 periods N then 10 periods P (within subject)I Partner matching, groups of 4, MPCR of 0.4, punishment 1:3 (as

Herrmann, Thoni and Gachter, 2008)

Two measures:

I Initial cooperation N: (Cooperation in first period of N )I Efficiency P: Realized profits relative to Nash eq. profits in Period 6 to

10 of P


Overview

Approach





Two measures:

I Initial cooperation N: (Cooperation in first period of N )

I Efficiency P: Realized profits relative to Nash eq. profits in Period 6 to10 of P


Overview

Approach





Two measures:

I Initial cooperation N: (Cooperation in first period of N )I Efficiency P: Realized profits relative to Nash eq. profits in Period 6 to

10 of P


Overview

Procedures

Aim: Minimize variation between subject pools

Student sample - similar according tosocio-economic indicators

Recruiting as in Herrmann et al. (2008)

Divider walls, computerized (z-Tree)

Conducted by local staff

Earnings adjusted to students’ local purchasingpower


Overview Societal differences in cooperation

52 universities; 41 countries; 3936 participants


Overview Societal differences in cooperation

Strasbourg Dnipropetrovs'k

Izmir

IasiBratislava

SamaraVilnius

Tbilisi

Minsk

Zurich

Warsaw

Prague

Tel Aviv

Copenhagen

Amsterdam

Athens

Vienna

IstanbulRome

St.Gallen

Nottingham

Bonn

Granada

Lausanne

Groningen

Meknes

Konstanz


Results Societal differences in cooperation

Initial Cooperation N

14.2

6.9

05

1015

Initi

al C

oope

ratio

n N

New

Zea

land

Den

mar

kA

ustr

iaU

SA

Bel

arus

Ger

man

yS

witz

erla

ndS

lova

kia

Net

herla

nds

Vie

tnam

Ukr

aine

Chi

naR

ussi

aR

oman

iaLi

thua

nia

Laos UK

Pol

and

Mal

aysi

aT

urke

yIta

lyIs

rael

Cze

ch R

epub

licC

olom

bia

Om

anT

anza

nia

Fra

nce

Spa

inS

outh

Afr

ica

Gua

tem

ala

Sou

th K

orea

Aus

tral

iaG

reec

eT

haila

ndS

audi

Ara

bia

Geo

rgia

Indo

nesi

aK

enya

Japa

nM

exic

oM

oroc

co


Results Societal differences in cooperation

Efficiency in P

.79

−.75

−1

−.5

0.5

1E

ffici

ency

in P

(P

erio

d 6

to 1

0)

New

Zea

land

Den

mar

kC

zech

Rep

ublic

Chi

naN

ethe

rland

sP

olan

dU

KG

erm

any

Aus

tral

iaS

witz

erla

ndS

outh

Kor

eaLi

thua

nia

Aus

tria

US

AC

olom

bia

Slo

vaki

aF

ranc

eIs

rael

Japa

nG

uate

mal

aIta

lyS

outh

Afr

ica

Rom

ania

Bel

arus

Vie

tnam

Rus

sia

Ukr

aine

Mex

ico

Spa

inM

oroc

coM

alay

sia

Laos

Tha

iland

Tur

key

Tan

zani

aK

enya

Gre

ece

Geo

rgia

Sau

di A

rabi

aO

man

Indo

nesi

a


Factors explaining societal differences

Measure of Permeability of social networks

Hofstede’s Individualism vs Collectivism country level data

Individualistic societies: ’preference for loosely-knit social frameworkin which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves andtheir immediate families’

Collectivistic societies: ’preference for tightly-knit framework insociety in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of aparticular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioningloyalty.’


Factors explaining societal differences Societal differences in cooperation

Individualism - Initial Cooperation N

AUS

AUT

CHN

COL CZE

DNK

FRA

DEU

GRCGTM

IDN

ISRITA

JPNKEN

KOR

LTU

MYS

MEX

MAR

OMN

NLD

NZL

POLROM RUS

SVK

VNM

ESP

CHE

THA

TURGBR

USA

68

1012

14C

oope

ratio

n (P

erio

d 1,

N)

0 20 40 60 80 100Individualism

Rho (N=34): 0.47, P=0.0051


Factors explaining societal differences Societal differences in cooperation

Individualism - Efficiency in P

AUS

AUT

CHN

COL

CZE DNK

FRA

DEU

GRC

GTM

IDN

ISRITA

JPN

KEN

KORLTU

MYS

MEXMAR

OMN

NLD

NZL

POL

ROMRUS

SVK

VNM

ESP

CHE

THA TUR

GBR

USA−

1−

.50

.51

Effi

cien

cy in

P (

Per

iod

6 to

10)

0 20 40 60 80 100Individualism

Rho (N=34): 0.57, P=0.0004


Conclusion

Conclusions

Substantial societal variation in cooperation in PG with and withoutpunishment

Network structures within societes explain variation

I Initial cooperation in PG w/o punishment higher in individualisticsocieties

I Peer Punishment increases/stabilizes cooperation in individualisticsocietes


Pronoun-drop

’Deep’ grammatical rule: Pronoun-drop

Language evolves slowly over time→ Language reflects distant cultural traditions (rather than morerecently acquired traits)

Kashima and Kashima (1998): languages that forbid dropping thefirst person pronoun are of cultural traditions that put more emphasison the individualSign. Corr. Pronoun-drop / Individualism (Rho: 0.75, P < 0.0001)

Used as instrument for cultural traits emphasizing individualism byLicht et al. (2008), Tabellini (2008), and Alesina and Giuliano (2007).


Pronoun-drop Societal differences in cooperation

Pronoun-Drop0

510

15In

itial

Coo

pera

tion

N

No−Pronoun−Drop Pro−Drop

0.2

.4.6

Effi

cien

cy P

No−Pronoun−Drop Pronoun−Drop


Pronoun-drop Societal differences in cooperation

2SLS Regression

(1) (2)Init. Coop. N Efficiency P

Individualism 0.109** 0.020**(0.047) (0.009)

Income 1980-2000 -1.471 -0.195(1.247) (0.228)

Rule of Law, 1996 -0.312 -0.080(0.747) (0.137)

Dummies legal origin Yes Yes

Constant 19.550** 1.339(9.772) (1.791)

R2 0.22 0.42Observations 30 30

2SLS estimates; robust standard errors in parentheses. Instrument for Individualism: pronoun-drop. Dummies for

UK and French legal origin included


Conclusions

Conclusions

Substantial societal variation in cooperation in PG with and withoutpunishment

Network structures within societes explain variation

I Initial cooperation in PG w/o punishment higher in individualisticsocieties

I Peer Punishment increases/stabilizes cooperation in individualisticsocietes

Results are robust to ’deep’ linguistic measure for individualism


Conclusions

Thank You!


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