CT RISES: PLANNING FOR LONG-TERM · Planning Long-Term Recovery Committee. PREPARING FOR LONG-TERM...

by

CTRisesVolunteersandSurvivorsofSuperstormSandy2019

CTRISES:PLANNINGFORLONG-TERMDISASTERRECOVERY

AGuideandToolkit

Supplementto

TheLocalEmergencyManagementDirectoryandMunicipalOfficialHandbook

FEMA

CTRises,along-termrecoverynon-profit,developedthisguideandtoolkitbasedonSuperstormSandyrecoveryefforts.Itisagrantdeliverablefundedbythe

StateofConnecticutDepartmentofHousingthroughaCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrant—DisasterRecovery(CDBG-DR)grant.

www.ctrises.org

SecondEdition

ISBN:9781072173540

PLANNINGFORLONG-TERMDISASTERRECOVERY

PREPARINGFORLONG-TERMDISASTERRECOVERY

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

FundingforthisguidebookwasprovidedbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment(HUD),throughtheCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrantDisasterRecovery(CDBG-DR)

ProgramadministeredbytheStateofConnecticutDepartmentofHousing(DOH).Grant:B-13-DS-09-0001

NedLamont,Governor

SeilaMosquera-Bruno,CommissionerofHousingHermiaDelaire,ProgramsManager–CDBG-DR

CTRisesBoardmembers:

FletcherWatton-ChairmanandPresident(25yearswithAmeriCaresandHomeFront)DariaSmith-ViceChair(ExecutiveDirector,CTStateIndependentLivingCouncil,Inc.)BruceStratford-Treasurer(HelpingHands,TheChurchofJesusChristofLatter-daySaints)TerronJones-Secretary(CityofBridgeport,Dept.ofHomelandSecurity)Rev.TomVencuss–(NYConference,UMCOR)RichardBranigan-(Director,CTRedCross)LisaFarren,(JewishCommunityFoundationofGreaterHartford)Individualswhohavemadesignificantcontributionsandeditstothisdocument:TheresaRanciato-VieleSusanShawJohnMucciMelissaMarshallMarcieRothSpecialthanksto:ElizabethSwenson,CTDepartmentofHousingGeorgeBradner,Co-Chairman,CTLong-termRecoveryGroupBrendaBergeron,KenDumais,andRitaStewart,CTDivisionofEmergencyManagementandHomelandSecurityThisdocumentisavailableinaprintandanelectronicformat.LinkswhichareliveintheelectronicPDFversionareavailableintheappendixoftheprinteditionasBIT.LYlinksthatareeasilyenteredintoabrowser.


TABLEOFCONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION:ANOVERVIEWOFEMERGENCYMANAGEMENTINCONNECTICUT.............1

2. TROPICALSTORMSANDY—ACASESTUDY...............................................................................5

3. ADDITIONALCHALLENGESPOST-SANDY.................................................................................10

4. PROGRAMGUIDANCE,RECOMMENDATIONSANDLESSONSLEARNED.................................14

5. DISASTERRECOVERYCENTERS(DRCS).....................................................................................20

6. LONG-TERMRECOVERYGROUPS(LTRG).................................................................................25

7. ECONOMICRECOVERY.............................................................................................................39

8. MUNICIPALPOST-DISASTERMITIGATION:PLANNINGANDACTIVITIES.................................43

9. HEALTHIMPACTASSESSMENTS(HIAS)ANDACQUISITION.....................................................46

10. DEFININGANDFOSTERINGCOMMUNITY&MUNICIPALRESILIENCE................................48

11. BUSINESSPREPAREDNESS&COMMUNITYRECOVERY.......................................................60

12. THEROLEOFTHESTATEINDISASTERCASEMANAGEMENTPROGRAMS..........................63

13. DISASTERANDMITIGATIONPROGRAMSINDIVIDUALASSISTANCE...................................68

14. FEMANATIONALFLOODINSURANCEPROGRAM(NFIP).....................................................78

15. RECOMMENDATIONSFORTHELONG-TERMRECOVERYCOMMITTEE..............................81

16. APPENDIX1:ACRONYMS.....................................................................................................86

17. APPENDIX2:RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................................90

18. APPENDIX3:TOOLKITOFFORMSANDSUPPORTDOCUMENTS.......................................103

19. CHECKLISTSANDRESOURCES............................................................................................112


EXECUTIVESUMMARY CTRisespreparedthisguideandtoolkittoprovideguidancetolocalandregionalRecoveryCoordi-natorsintheStateofConnecticut.Thegoalofthiscompanion-volumetotheLocalEmergencyMan-agementDirectorandMunicipalOfficialHandbook(LocalEMDandCEOHandbook),istoprovideinsightintotheconsequencesofdisasterandguidancetoprepareforfuturedisasters.Itwaspre-paredbyCTRisesfundedthroughtheStateofConnecticutDepartmentofHousingundertheCom-munityDevelopmentBlockGrant-DisasterRecovery(CDBG-DR)program,andisintendedtodothefollowing:

1. ProvideanoverviewandanalysisofSuperstormSandyresponseandrecoveryefforts2. Providebestpractices,lessonslearnedandrecommendationsbasedontheresponseto

SuperstormSandy3. ProvideLocalandRegionalRecoveryCoordinatorswithacommunity-basedframeworkfor

recovery4. Reportoninnovativenationaldisasterrecoverytoolsandprograms5. Sharestoriesofrecoveryandtheimpactonpeopleandprograms

Thisdocumentsupportseffortstoengagecommunitiestobepreparedforfuturedisastersbyex-aminingandlearningfrompreviousnaturaldisastersinConnecticut,especiallyHurricaneIrene,inAugust26,2011,andSuperstormSandy,whichmadelandfallOctober28,2012.It’sclearthatcontinuingtofundcrisis-to-crisisisnotonlyinsufficient,butunsustainable.Fundingfordisastersmustbemorestrategic—andwithaneyetomitigatinglossthroughdisasterpreplan-ning,buildingcommunityresilience,aswellasNon-GovernmentalOrganization(NGO)partnershipsandcollaborations.Preparednessisasharedresponsibility;itcallsfortheinvolvementofeveryone—notjustthegov-ernment—inpreparednessefforts.Byworkingtogether,wecanhelpkeepthenationresilientwhenstruckbyhazards,suchasnaturaldisasters,actsofterrorism,andpandemics.Planningneces-sitatestakingstockofnotonlythepotentialhazards,butalsotheresponseandrecoverycapabili-tiesoflocalgovernment.Recoveryplannersshouldincludeallstakeholdersinpreparingandupdat-ingemergencyplans—theplanningprocessshouldinvolvetheWholeCommunity.Thephrase“wholecommunity”appearsfrequentlyinpreparednessmaterials,asoneoftheguidingprinciples.Forthepurposeofthisguide,“WholeCommunity”includes:

• Individualsandfamilies,includingthosewithaccessandfunctionalneeds• Businesses• Faith-basedandcommunityorganizations• Nonprofitgroups• Schoolsandacademia• Mediaoutlets• Alllevelsofgovernment,includingstate,local,tribal,territorial,andfederalpartners


FORACRONYMSSEEAPPENDIX1Page

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Photo:BridgeportCT.Channel12News

1. Introduction:ANOVERVIEWOFEMERGENCYMANAGEMENTINCONNECTICUT

Therearetwophasesofrecovery:Short-termrecovery.Duringshort-termrecovery,manyemergencyandreliefprogramscompletetheirwork.Restorationofinfrastructureandvitallifesupportsystemshappeninthisphase.Thecommunityidentifieslocalresourcestoformalong-termrecoverygroup(LTRG),andinitiationofplansforpermanenthousingbegins.Long-termrecovery.Transitionoccursbetweenthepresenceofnationalorganizationsandthelocalcommunity.Implementationbeginsfordisastercasemanagement(DCM)andrecoveryinitiativesadministeredbythelocalcommunity.Constructionactivitiesincluderepairing,rebuildingorrelocatinghomes,proceedsduringthisphase.Resumptionoftheroutinesofdailylifecharacterizesthisphase.Human,material,andfinan-



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cialresourcescomeintoacommunityafteradisaster,butwilldecreaseaspublicawarenessdimin-ishesovertime.Astrong,well-organizedLong-TermRecoveryGroupcanensurethatavailablere-sourcesareutilizedtoaddressrecoveryneeds.StateResponseFramework(SRF)InConnecticut,emergencymanagementatthestatelevel,isimplementedthroughtheStateRe-sponseFramework(SRF).TheSRFdescribestheinteractionofstategovernmentwithlocal,federalandtribalgovernments,nongovernmentalresponseorganizationsandotherprivatesectorpart-ners,themedia,andthepublicinimplementingemergencyresponseandrecoveryfunctionsintimesofcrisis.TheDepartmentofEmergencyServicesandPublicProtection,DivisionofEmergencyManagementandHomelandSecurity(DESPP/DEMHS)hastheprimaryresponsibilityforthedevel-opmentandimplementationofthestate’semergencymanagementprogram.DEMHSissupportedbytheDEMHSAdvisoryCouncilanditsvarioussub-committeesincludingtheLong-TermRecoveryCommittee.

TheStateLong-TermRecoveryCommitteeTheStateLong-TermRecoveryCommittee(SLTRC),asubcommitteeoftheDEMHSAdvisoryCouncil,iscomprisedoflocal,state,federal,andprivatesectorpartnersworkingtogethertoenhancelong-termrecoveryandprepareforfutureevents.TheSLTRCisco-chairedbythestateDepartmentofInsuranceandthestateDepartmentofEconomicandCommunityDevelopment,undertheauspicesoftheStateDisasterRecoveryCoordinator.TheStateLong-TermRecoveryCommitteeconductsregularmeetingstodiscussandreviewplanupdates,bestpracticesandnextstepsinensuringthatConnecticutisbetterpreparedforfuturedisasters.PlanningThestructureoftheSRFalignswiththeNationalResponseFramework(NRF).TheSRFdescribeshowtheStateanditspartnerswillworktogethertosupportlocalgovernmentandresidentsinre-spondingtodisastersandemergencies.InadditiontoStateplans,eachDEMHSRegionhasdevel-opedaRegionalEmergencySupportPlan(RESP)whichoutlinesenhancedmutualaidwithinthere-gion.EachmunicipalityintheStatehasdevelopedandmaintainsaLocalEmergencyOperationsPlan(LEOP).AnLEOPtemplateandresourcescanbefoundontheDESPP/DEMHSwebsite.

StateRecoveryCoordinator

IndividualRecoveryGroup

EconomicRecoveryGroup

Natural&CulturalResources

CommunityPlanning

Long-TermRecoveryCommittee



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TheStateandmunicipalitiesorganizetheiremergencyresponseunderthestandardsoftheNa-tionalIncidentManagementSystem(NIMS).UnderNIMS,responsecapabilitiesareorganizedintoEmergencySupportFunctions(ESFs).ESF-14istheRecoverysupportfunction.AspartoftheSRF,theStateofConnecticutDisasterRecoveryFrameworkandESF-14outlinesthefollowingactivities:

1. TrainingandExercises2. EmergencyPlanUpdates3. CommunityEducationandAwareness4. AssessmentofStateandLocalHazardsandRisks5. PartnershipswithResponseandRecoveryPartnersonLocal,Regional,StateandFederal

Levels6. Identification,recruitmentandTrainingofVolunteersinDisasterResponseand

Recovery

ThemostimportantpreparednessactivityforState,RegionalandLocalrecoveryplannersisad-vanceplanning.Planningnecessitatestakingstockofnotonlythepotentialhazards,butalsotheresponseandrecoverycapabilitiesoflocalgovernment.Recoveryplannersshouldincludeallstake-holdersinpreparingandupdatingemergencyplans—theplanningprocessshouldinvolvecommu-nitymembersincludingresidents,regionalpartners,stateagenciesandorganizations.Wholecom-munitypartnersshouldalsobeincludedintrainingontheemergencyplans.Exerciseshelptoiden-tifyplanninggapsandcorrectiveactions.TheAfter-ActionReportsandImprovementPlansthataredevelopedasaresultofexercisesshouldbeutilizedtoupdatetheseplans.Themantraofrecoveryis:“Alldisastersstartandendlocally.”Whilefederal,stateandregionalre-coveryagencieswillprovidecoordinationandassistance,municipalleadersaretheoneswhoseabilitiesandskillswillshapelong-termrecoveryoutcomes.UnitedWay2-1-1UndertheSRF,UnitedWay’s2-1-1isthestatewidepointofaccessforinformationandresourcesonemergenciesordisastersbyphoneoronline(www.211ct.org).2-1-1providesinformationandre-ferralstoresidentsandbusinessesduringandafterdisasters.Thissystemprovidesacriticalservicethroughouttherecoveryprocess.UnitedWay2-1-1hasaseatattheStateEmergencyOperationsCenterduringdrillsandactivations.Formoreon2-1-1,seeAppendixCorvisit2-1-1’swebsiteathttp://www.211.org/.CTVOADThemissionofCTVoluntaryOrganizationsActiveinDisaster(CTVOAD)istoprovidealiaisonwithvolunteerorganizationsthatprovidedisasterservicesandlocal,stateandfederalagencies.CTVOADhasaseatatthestateEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC),attheStateLTRCandattheIR(IndividualRecovery)WorkingGroup.Itsmissionistofosterefficient,streamlinedservicedelivery



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whileeliminatingunnecessaryduplicationofeffortthroughcooperationinthefourphasesofdisas-ter:preparedness,response,recoveryandmitigation.Recoverybeginsandendswithvoluntaryor-ganizations.AmericanRedCrossandothernon-profitorganizationsthatareactiveindisasterresponsearemembersoftheCTVOAD.FormoreinformationonRedCrossseeAppendixB,orvisitTheConnecti-cutRedCrossonlineatwww.ctredcross.org.AdditionalinformationonCTVOADiscontainedinAp-pendixAandontheCTVOADwebsite,atctvoad.communityos.org.CTRISESWorkingincollaborationwithCTVOAD,CTRisesisastatewidelong-termrecoverynon-profitandiscomprisedofnon-profitandgovernmentalpartners.CTRiseswasformedimmediatelyafterSuper-stormSandy,adisasterthat,alongwithtwomajordisastersthatprecededit(TropicalStormIreneinAugustof2011andtheOctoberNor’easterof2011),affectedourstateanditsresidentsandchangedthewaywelookatdisasters.

CTRisesprovidesguidanceandassistancetolocalandregionalrecoverycoordinators,aswellaslo-calandstatepartnersforalltypesofdisasters:natural,man-caused,smallorlarge,aswellasde-claredornon-declared.WorkingwiththeState,CTVOAD,aswellasprivateandgovernmentalpart-ners,CTRisesassistsinthecoordinationofrecoveryactivities.Formoreinformation,visitwww.ctrises.org.WhilethefocusofthisreportisonSuperstormSandyrecovery,theguidanceandlessonslearnedareusefulinanytypeofeventthatoverwhelmsacommunity.Thisguideisintendedtobeare-sourcewhichcanbeusedinconjunctionwith:

• TheLocalEmergencyManagementDirectorandMunicipalOfficialHandbook• TheLocalEmergencyOperationsPlans• TheRegionalEmergencySupportPlans• TheStateResponseFramework,includingESF14StateDisasterRecoveryFramework.

Itisimportanttonotethat“individualshavingaccessandfunctionalneeds”referstopersonswhomayhaveadditionalneedsbefore,duringandafteranincidentinfunctionalareas,includingbutnotlimitedto:maintaininghealth,independence,communication,transportation,support,ser-vices,self-determinationandmedicalcare.

CTRisesisanorganizationdedicatedtoresilienceandlong-termrecovery.Whatthismeansfor

Connecticutisthatthenexttimedisasterstrikes—declaredorotherwise—wewillbeabletoassistwitheffectivecollaboration,andrevitalizeourtownsand

citiesmorecompletely.



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Photo:CTPost/BayviewareaofMilford

2. TROPICALSTORMSANDY—ACASESTUDYChallengesasaresultofanexpediteddeclarationSuperstormSandymadelandfallinNewJerseyonOctober29,2012;by6:00P.M.,windsstatewidereachedtropicalstormforcestrength.AlthoughthestormwasnothurricanestrengthwhenithitConnecticut,theravagesofwindandwaterweresevere.Recoveryeffortscontinuedthroughtheendof2018,withmitigationinitiativescontinuingthereafter.DuetotheunusualseverityofSuperstormSandy,theStateofConnecticutreceivedanexpeditedMajorDisasterDeclarationwhichincludedbothPublicAssistance(municipalandstateassistance)andIndividualAssistance(assistanceforhouseholds)forthefourshorelinecounties.Aspartofthedeclaration,theSmallBusinessAdministrationDisasterLoanProgramwasalsoreleased.Anexpediteddeclarationiswhenamajordisasterisdeclared:

• Withoutthenormalprocessofcollectingdamagedatafrommunicipalities• WithoutconductingJointPreliminaryDamageAssessments(PDA)• Withoutsubmittingaformaldeclarationrequest



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Althoughthisreleasedfederaldisasterassistanceprogramssooner,thelackofPDAsdidpresentsomechallenges.

• Thenumberofimpactedresidentsandthefullextentofdamageswasnotimmediatelyknown.

• Theneedfordisastercasemanagementservicesexceededoriginalexpectations• Theabilitytoaccessotherdisasterprograms,manyofwhichrequiredassessments,wasaf-

fectedandresultedindelays• Unmetneedsofimpactedresidentswerenotfullyrealizedintheinitialstagesofrecovery• Thedemandforadditionalmunicipalsupportwasnotanticipated(landuse,building

official)• TheEmergencyManagementDirectorinmanymunicipalitiesalsotookontheroleofthe

RecoveryCoordinator(insmallerscaledisastersthiswascommonlydone)• Theabilitytosharevitalinformationwithresidentswasimpacted

BasedoninformationgatheredintheJointPDAs,FEMAcanprojectthenumberofregistrationstheymayreceive.WithoutthePDAs,estimatingthelevelofuninsureddamagesandimpactedhouseholdswasmoredifficultandaffectedtheState’sapplicationforasupplementalprogramun-derIndividualAssistance(IA).TheStateappliedforFEMA’sDisasterCaseManagementProgram(DCMP),asupplementalprogramunderIA,thatwouldprovide18monthsoffundingfordisastercasemanagement.Asoutlinedintheprogramguidance,FEMAconductedanassessmentoftheneedfortheprogramandthecapacityofnon-profitorganizationscurrentlyprovidingdisastercasemanagementservicesintheState.AfterreviewingtheState’sapplicationandtheassessment,FEMAadvisedthattheassessmentresultswereverylowandtheState’sapplicationwasdenied.ThedenialwasbasedonFEMA’sestimateofthenumberofpotentialcasesandtheirassessmentofthecapacityofexistingnon-governmentalorganizationstoprovideDisasterCaseManagement.TheStatefiledanappeal,demonstratingthatasfurtherdatabecameavailable,therewasaclearandcontinuingneedfortheDisasterCaseManagementprograminConnecticut.Additionalfactorssuchasthecomplexityofdisasterprogramsavailableandthefactthatresidentswerestillrecover-ingfromtheimpactofTropicalStormIrenewerealsocited.Althoughtheappealwassuccessful,therewasasignificantdelayinimplementingtheprogram.ThiswastheState’sfirstapplicationforFEMA’sDCMP.Withpastdisasters,ourIndividualAssis-tancestaffandvolunteerorganizationshadbeenabletoaddressresidentconcernsandprovidere-ferralsforassistance.Followingthisdisaster,residentsneededadditionalsupportandguidanceinrebuildingtheirlives.SandyResidentsandCaseManagementTheresiliencyofshorelineresidentshasbeenimpactedbyrecurrentdisasters.SuperstormSandyimpactedConnecticut’sshorelineinareasthathadbeendevastatedbyTropicalStormIrenejustoneyearearlier.Residentswhowerestillintheprocessofrebuildingtheirlivesandhomeswereagainhitbyadisaster.Theseresidentsneededadditionalguidancetohelpthemnavigatethevari-ousfederal,private,foundationprogramsthatareavailabletoaffectedresidents.



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Over1,200Connecticutresidentsregisteredvia2-1-1orthroughrecoverygroupsforDisasterCaseManagementservices(DCM)with$7millionindirectaidprovided.DemandonMunicipalservicesThefirstweeksfollowingadisasterrevolvearoundtakingcareofurgentneeds:clearingstreetsofdebris;assessingdamagetoresidences,businessesandinfrastructure;andworkingwithStateandFederalagencies.ThelevelofdamagessustainedfromTropicalStormSandycreatedadditionalde-mandsformunicipalservices.Manymunicipalitiesfacedthefollowing:

• Difficultyinbalancingrecoveryeffortswhilecontinuingtomanageday-to-daycityopera-tions,includinglanduse,economicandemergencymanagementdepartments

• Slowtransitionfromemergencyandresponsefunctionstolong-termrecoverymanagement• Thechallengeofmanagingdonationsandlinkingresidentstolocalresources• Assessmentofdamagesandthescopeofunmetneeds

Particularlyintheareaofrepairandreconstruction,therewereanumberofissuespost-Sandy,suchas:

• Manyindividualsandcityofficialsbeganundertakingrecoverytoosoon.Post-Irene,buildingofficialswereissuingpermitsforstormrepairswithoutacompletedamagereport.Insomecases,homeownerswerenotawarethatifthecostofrepairsexceeded50%ofthevalueoftheirhome,theirworkwouldbestoppedbythebuildingdepartmentandthehomeownerwouldneedtoelevate.

• Therewereinstancesofhomeownersoptingtodemolishtheircondemnedhomes;how-ever,theywereunawareoftheneedtoinformtheirmortgagecompany.Someoftheseres-identsfacedforeclosure.

• Residentsstartedrepairworkwithoutunderstandingthetotalcostsinvolved,leavingthemunabletocompleterepairs

• Residentshiredthe‘cheapest’contractorsandfoundtheirhomesnotwerenotincompli-ancewithbuildingcodes

• Homeownersdidimmediaterepairwork,suchasmoldremediation,thateitherdidnotmeetstandardsorwasunnecessaryduetothehomeneedingextensiverepairs

• Municipalitiesfoundthemselvesunpreparedforzoningissues.Forinstance,manyhomesintheBayviewareaofMilfordweremulti-family.Thetownwasconfrontedwithresidentialdemandstorebuildwhilezoningregulationsprohibitedtherebuildingofnon-conformingstructuresandnon-conforminguses.Theconfusionsurroundedrebuildingofgaragesandfencesalsostymiedlocalofficialsandfrustratedresidents.

• Forthosehomeownerswhowereunabletoaffordthefullcostofrebuildingorneededtomitigatetheirhomes,therewasalackofunderstandingoftheavailablegrantsprogramssuchasCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrant–DisasterRecovery(CDBG-DR)andtheHaz-ardMitigationGrantProgram(HMGP).Post-Irene,manyhomeownersappliedforHMGPto



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helpdefraythecostsofmitigationbutwerenotawarethathomesthathadbeensubstan-tiallydamagedwereineligiblefortheprogram.

LocalRecoveryCoordinatorsTheEmergencyManagementDirectorsinmanymunicipalitiesalsoservedastheRecoveryCoordi-nator.Insmallscaledisasters,thismayhaveworkedfine.DuetotheseverityofSuperstormSandy,theneedfordedicatedrecoverystaffbecameapparent.LocalandRegionalRecoveryCommitteesPost-Sandy,CTRisesandall4localLongTermRecoveryCommittees(LTRG)operatedunmetneedscommittees.Thesecommitteeswereoperatedbyvolunteerswhodidnotserveinanofficialcapac-itywiththecity.UnmetNeedsCommitteesweresetupinNorwalk,Fairfield,Bridgeport,andMil-ford.Asoriginallyenvisioned,fundingforresidentunmetneedswouldbesourcedthroughtheLTRGintheircommunity.CTRisesoperatedastate-wideunmetneedsgroupthatworkedtomeettheneedsofCTresidentslivingoutsideoftownswithLTRGsaswellasprovidingadditionalassistance,ifneeded,toresidentswhohadexhaustedfundingthroughtheirlocalLTRG.Giventhescopeofdamageandlimitedresources,itwasnotpossibleforanyoneagencytohandletheunmetneedsofresidents.Participatingagenciesprovidingdisastercasemanagementservicesincluded:TheAmericanRedCross,CatholicCharitiesofFairfieldCounty,UnitedWay,UMCOR(UnitedMethodistCommitteeonRelief),andTheSalvationArmy.TheprocessduringSandywasagency-centric,withagencyDCMsundertakingrecoveryplanningandprovidingassistancebasedontheirownagency’scriteria.Residentswerereferredtootheragenciesasneededforadditionalfinancialassistance.Unmetneedsgroupstendedtobethelastfundingresource,althoughnotineverycase.Thisprocesswasinpartnecessitatedbythelatestartofsomecommunity’sunmetneedsgroups.Itwouldhavebeenpreferableforthesegroupstobeusedasafirststopforrecoveryplanningandresources.LTRGsandtheirunmetneedsgroupshaveawiderarrayofexpertiseavailableaswellastheabilitytoprovideaforumforotherfunderswhocanprovideassistance.Theresultwasresidentialrecoverynotinitiallyhandledbylocalrecoverygroupsandpartnerrecov-eryagencieswhoparticipatedthroughLTRGs.Thisposedseveralissuesandchallenges:

• Recoveryplanning,includingallrecoveryassetsthatwouldbeavailablethroughtheunmetneedscommitteewasnotreadilyresourced.Agenciesusedtheirownresourcestomeettheneedsofclients.

• Eligibilityforassistancevariedfromagencytoagency.Insomecases,anagencywoulddenyassistancewithoutreferringtootheragencieswhosehelpmayhavebeenavailable.



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• Reviewingrecoveryplanswithlocalrecoverycoordinatorsandunmetneedsgroupshelpsarriveatmoreefficientandattimeslesscostlywaystoprovideassistance—thiswasmissingintheagency-centricapproach.

• LTRGswereunabletotrackrecoveryintheirowncommunity• AmericanRedCross-fundedunmetneedcommitteeswererequiredtodemonstrateneed

andspendmoneywithinacertaintimeframe;whenagenciesfailedtousetheseearmarkedfunds,theydepletedtheirownfunds(thosewhichcouldbeusedforresidentsnotservedbyanLTRG)

CTRisesfoundthatmanycasemanagersdislikedusingunmetneedsgroups;someofthereasonsincluded:

• Casemanagerswerehandlingmorethan35caseseachinthefirsttwoyears,anddidnotfeeltheyhadthetimetoprepareforunmetneedsgroupswhometonamonthlybasis.

• Paperworkwasconsideredcumbersome,andinthefirstmonthsofmeetingseachunmetneedsgrouphaddifferentcriteriaandpaperwork

• Processeswerestreamlinedandtemplatesprovided,resultingingreaterefficiencies



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3. ADDITIONALCHALLENGESPOST-SANDYComplexityofDisasterAssistanceProgramsandFundsDuetotheseverityofdamagebroughtbySuperstormSandy,moresourcesofdisasterassistancewereavailablethaninpreviousdisasters.Foundationfunds(RobinHood)andFederalProgramsun-dertheSandyRecoveryActsuchastheCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrants(CDBG-DRwerenewerdisasterprogramstotheState.Thevariouseligibilityrequirementsandprogramcriteriacouldbeconfusingtoresidentstryingtofindthebestprogramtomeettheirneeds.Unlikemanystates,Connecticutdoesnothaveacountygovernmentstructuretohandlethedistri-butionofrecoveryfunding.Initsafter-actionreport,theCityofBridgeportcommented,“Whenre-coveryfundingbecameavailable,itwaslefttobedeterminedhowthefundswouldbedistributedwithineachmunicipality.Nothavingdealtwiththismagnitudeofadisasterbefore,therewerelargelynomechanismsinplace.”ChallengeswithNavigatingFederalPrograms-HazardMitigationGrantProgram(HMGP)

• Applicantsneededtoprovideestimatesandplansatthetimeofgrantsubmission—whichwentthroughthemunicipalitiesgrantsadministrator

• Therewereout-of-pocketcostsforresidentsjusttobeabletosubmittheapplication;plans(includinginsomecasesengineereddrawings)costmorethan$5,000

• Thetimebetweenapplication,planreview,andfinalapprovalwasyears.Thismeantforsomeresidents,ifnotmost,thatthecostsforelevationhadincreased

• Manyhomeownersdidnothavetheabilitytopayfullcostsofmitigation(onaverage$100,000);butreimbursementsweresoslowthatmunicipalofficialstoldresidentstheyshouldbepreparedtopaytheentirecosts

• TobecompliantwithHMGPrules,theonlyactivitythatthehomeownercouldundertakewaselevation—changestothestructurecannotbemade(regardlessofwhoispayingforthosechanges)

• Forsomehomeowners,therewereapprovaldelaysforchangestostairwaysordecksduetotheplannedelevation.Thiswastruewhenmechanicalsneededtobeelevatedandnewout-sidestructuresneededtobebuilt.

• ThecomplexitiesofmanagingHMGPprojectshavecausedsomemunicipalitiestorefusetoofferHMGPtotheirresidents

Mostmunicipalitieswereveryfamiliarwithdealingwithreimbursablegrants;butHMGPwas,ac-cordingtomanycityeconomicdevelopmentdirectors,toodifficultandtime-consumingtonavigate



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ChallengeswithPost-DisasterVolunteerDeploymentCTRises,initsdevelopmentofavolunteerprogram,encounteredsomebarriers,including:

• Thelackoftrackingtools• Hesitationfrommunicipalitiesandhomeownersaboututilizingvolunteergroups,dueto

concernswithliability,andpossibleproselytizing

Thelackoftrackingtoolsmadeitdifficulttomatchprojectswithappropriatevolunteers.Forin-stance,whenHomeFront(homefrontprogram.org/),acommunity-basedhomerepairprogramprovidingfreehomerepairstolow-incomeresidents,wasavailableforroofrepairs,CTRisessentaninquirytodisastercasemanagersconcerning:

• Clientsthatneededrepairstoroofs• ClientsthatmetHomeFront’sincomeguidelines• Clients’location

Usingthetoolsthattheyhad,DCMgroupscouldnotreadilyidentifyappropriateclients.Therewassomedifficultyinmatchingrepairneedswithavailableandsuitablevolunteergroups.Integratingvolunteerprojectsintoassistancewasperceivedbysomecasemanagersandrecoverycoordinatorsasburdensome.Forinstance,payingforacontractortorepairorreplacetheroofwassometimesfasterthancoordinatingwithavailablevolunteergroups.Therewasalsoskepticismaboutvolunteerrepairandrebuildonthepartofclients,aswellasdisas-tercasemanagersandsomemunicipalrecoveryleaders.CTRises,workingwithlocalchurches,wasabletolocateahomeinHamdenforMethodistrepairgroups,becausevolunteersfounditdifficulttoworkinsomeareasofthestateduetoalackofavailableandaffordablehousing.Somemunicipalleaderswerealsoskeptical.Forexample,WorldRenew(www.worldrenew.net/),aninternationaldisasterrecoveryorganization,wasinitiallyturnedawayfromprovidingdoor-to-doorassessmentsthatweredesignedtohelpbothcasemanagersandCTRisestounderstandthescopeofthedisaster.Municipalleaders,whohadjustcompletedtheirowncity-wideassessments,wereconcernedthatresidentswouldbeconfusedbyadditionalassessmentsandthattheresultsmightimpactfederaldisasterassistance.Therewasalsoaconcernaboutpossibleproselytizing.CTRiseswasabletoaddressmanyoftheconcerns,andWorldRenewendedupprovidingassistancetohard-hitcommunities.Otherchallengesfacedwhiledeployingvolunteers:

• ClientsAboveAreaMedianIncome(AMI).Someprograms(suchasHomeFront)wereexclu-sivelyforlowerincomeresidents(thoseat80%orbelowAMI);however,CTRiseshadmanyclientsatoraboveAMIwhowereunabletorecoverwithoutcharitableassistance

• Lackofqualitycommunicationwithavailablevolunteergroups.AlthoughCTRises,incoordi-nationwithotherCTVOADpartners,begantodevelopandimplementvolunteeropera-tions,thisdidnotoccuruntillatein2014.

• Needforacentraldatabase.Itisevidentthatthereisaneedforacentraldatabase,tobeupdatedateveryinstanceofadisaster,tomatchresourcesandneedsefficiently



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• NocleardirectionforVolunteergroups.Hopingtoprovideassistanceintheearlymonthsfollowingthedisaster,Volunteergroupsweresometimesstymiedsincetherewasnocleardirectiononspecificneedsorwheretheyweremostrequired.Asaconsequence,volunteergroupsmovedontootherareaswherevolunteeropportunitieswerebetterdefined.

• ObtainingPermitsandworkquality.Somevolunteergroupsworkeddirectlywithhomeown-erswhichresultedinissues.Insomecases,theworkwasnotpermitted,orhadnotbeencompleted,orsomeoftheworkwasfoundtobedeficient.

Challenges–NeedforRentalAssistanceManyConnecticutresidentsdidreceiveFEMArentalassistance,underIA,welloverhalfofcli-entsindisastercasemanagementwereregisteredwithFEMA.However,inareviewofthecli-entsassistedbyCTRisesandothergroups,therewereotherseligiblewhodidnotobtainassis-tance,duetothefollowing:

• ManyresidentsreachedtheirmaximumgrantunderIA(usingfundsforhomerepairs)• ManyresidentswerenotawareoftheIAprogram’slimitedregistrationperiod• ThereweredelaysinimplementingFEMA’sDisasterCaseManagementProgram(DCMP)• SomeresidentswerehesitanttoregisterforFEMAoranytypeofgovernmentassistance• Someresidentsthoughttheirhomerepairwouldtakeonlyafewmonthsanddidnot

anticipateneedingrentalassistance• SomeNGOsbeganpayingforrentalsfromotherfunds,thatinsomecasesrenderedthe

clientineligibleforFEMAhousingassistance(toavoidduplicationofbenefits)• MonthlyrentalcapsforFEMAhousingdidnotmeetcostsassociatedwithhousingin

certainareasofthestate.Inthesecases,DCMwouldtrytohelpbridgethegap.• FEMAcloseditsrentalassistanceinApril2014.Thisclosurecoincidedwiththeendof

TheSalvationArmy’sMoveinAssistanceProgram(MIAP),whichalsohelpedtopayhousingcosts

Bythemiddleof2014(18monthsafterSuperstormSandy)nostand-alonerentalorhousingprogramremained.However,CDBG-DROORRandHMGPwerejustgettingunderway;neitherprogramhadfundingearmarkedforrentalassistanceduringtherepairandmitigationofhomes.ContractorsandRebuildingIntheirafter-disasterreport,Bridgeportnotedthefollowing:

“Acentralsystemforidentifyingcontractorsandothersisimportant,socasework-ersdon’thavetosearchforresources.ThiscouldbeadatabasewithpeoplewhoarevettedalmostlikeanAngie’sList.Toomuchtimewaswastedwithcaseworkershav-ingtofigurethingsout.”



13

Insomecases,residentshadissueswithcontractors.SomeclientsofCTRisesreportedtheyfelt“taken-in”bytheircontractors.Insomecases,workhadbeendonewithoutpermits,orcontrac-torsdidnotcompleteaprojectordidsub-standardwork.Thelowestbidwasnotalwaysthebestoption.MoldwasanissueformanyresidentsimpactedbySuperstormSandy.Approximately$1millioninmoldremediationwasfundedbycharitableorganizations.Moldremediationcanbeexpen-sive.Manyresidents,inthedaysandweekspost-flood,hiredmoldremediationservices—sometimescostingover$20,000—onlytofindoutthattheworkwasinsufficientornotneeded.Somemoldremediationcompaniespromisedhomeownersthecostswouldbecoveredbytheirinsurance;however,foravarietyofreasons,thatwasnotalwaysthecase.Therearevolunteergroupstrainedtoremovemold,buttherewerenotenoughinstateattherighttimeinthewakeofSuperstormSandy.ListofKeyRecoveryChallengesPost-Sandy

1. Lackofaffordablehousing2. Lackcasemanagerstrainedonwhatislegallyrequiredwhenservingpeoplewithaccess

andfunctionalneeds3. Lackofappropriateaccessibilityforthosewithaccessandfunctionalneeds4. Needforimprovedcommunicationsaddressingtheneedsofthosewithhearingandvis-

ualimpairments5. Lackofpartnershipsandcollaborationswithorganizationsthatcanprovideexpertise

andassistanceaddressingtheneedsofseniors,peoplewithfunctionalneeds,etc.Lackofconnectiontopeersupport

6. Lackofhousingthatacceptspets7. Lackoftransportationoptionsfordisplacedresidents8. Chronicunemploymentorunderemployment9. Affordablechildcare10. Aneedforpro-bonoprofessionalservices—legal,financial,mortgage

BestPractices:Housing—temporaryandpermanent—willbethetoughestandmostexpensivechallenge.Lookatyourmostvulnerablehousingpre-disasterandbeginthinkingaboutsolutions,ifthathousingisdestroyed.



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4. PROGRAMGUIDANCE,RECOMMENDATIONSANDLESSONSLEARNEDAkeyfactorincommunityresiliencyistheabilityoflocalgovernmenttoconfrontthechal-lengesofdisaster.Thestrengthandcapacityoflocal,regionalandstatepartnershipswillallplayaroleinhowrecoveryoperationsfunction.KeyStepsforMunicipalitiestoBuildResiliencyInadditiontotheitemsoutlinedintheRecoveryChecklist(Appendix3),municipalitiesshouldconsiderthefollowingstepstoincreaseresiliency:

• AppointormaintainalocalRecoveryCoordinatorasthemunicipallinktoregional,stateandfederalagencies—includingtheStateLong-TermRecoveryCommitteeandIndivid-ualRecoveryWorkingGroup

• CoordinatewiththeDESPP/DEMHStopre-identifylocationsforFEMA’sDisasterRecov-eryCenters(DRC).

• ReviewtheguidanceforsettingupamunicipalorregionalResourceCenteroraMunici-palAssistanceResourceCenter(MARC)toprovideextendedassistance.

• Improvepre-andpost-recoverycommunicationswithlocalandregionalpartners–par-ticipateinCTVOAD,RegionalEmergencyPlanningTeam(REPT)andotherregionalmeetings.

• Reviewconstruction/rebuildingpermittingandconfrontpossiblezoningissuesthatmayhinderrecoveryefforts



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• ExpandtherecoveryroleofEconomicDevelopmentdepartment,throughparticipationinJointPDAs.Designatedepartmentstafftodevelopanunderstandingoffederalandstaterecoveryprograms,includingloansandgrantsthatmaybecomeavailableafteradisaster

• Explorewaystoreachmoreresidentsthroughtheuseofthetownwebsite,socialmediato:

o Provideupdatedinformationo Encouragetheuseof2-1-1asaresourceo EncourageresidentstovisitFEMA’sDisasterRecoveryCenters(DRC)forinfor-

mationondisasterassistanceprograms.(whenapplicable)o Encourageresidentstoapplyforassistance(whenapplicable)

• EstablishorpartnerwithadjoiningcommunitiestoformeffectiveLong-TermRecoveryGroups

• RecruitandtrainnewCERT(CommunityEmergencyResponseTeam)membersandsus-tainexistingmemberswithparticipationinadvancedtraining,exercisesandactivations(seetheCitizenCorpsProgramandHandbookforadditionalinformation)

• Maximizenon-monetaryresources,includinglocalandstate-widevolunteers• Solicitandmanagedonations

LocalRecoveryCoordinatorMunicipalitiesareencouragedtoappointaLocalRecoveryCoordinator.ThisefforthasalreadybeguninmanymunicipalitiesthroughcoordinationoftheRegionalEmergencyPlanningTeams(REPTs).REPTsaremulti-jurisdictional,multi-disciplinaryplanningteamsineachofthefiveplan-ningandpreparednessregionsoftheConnecticutDivisionofEmergencyManagementandHomelandSecurity(DEMHS)Thepersonselectedtoserveasthelong-termrecoverycoordina-torshouldnothaveacompetingdisasterresponserole.Forexample,amunicipalityshouldnotselectitsEmergencyManagementDirectortoserveasthelong-termrecoverycoordinatorsincetheirresponserolewillpreventthemfromtheproperfocusonrecovery.RoleoftheRecoveryCoordinatorTheStateESF-14identifiestheRecoveryCoordinatorastheleadinbothpre-disasterplanningandpost-disasterrecoveryoperations.LocalRecoveryCoordinatorwillcoordinatewithlocal,regionalandstatepartners:



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RecoveryCoordinator

Volunteer

COAD;CERT

CTVOAD

ConstructionCoordinator

PermittingandLandUse

SocialServices

MentalHealth

SeniorServices Meals onWheels

UnmetNeeds DisasterCaseMgmt

Health Dept.

SpiritualCare

Residents

EconomicDevelopment

ChamberofCommerce LocalBusinesses

Education

ProfessionalServices Insurance LegalAid FinancialServices

Housing

Transportation



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Long-termrecoverycoordinatorsdonotneedtobeexpertsinemergencymanagement,butra-therpeoplewhohaveastrongbasisincommunitydevelopmentandknowledgeofthecommu-nity’sdemographics,suchasamunicipalplanner.Recoveryplannersmustbeproactiveinreachingouttoallcommunitystakeholderspriortoadisaster.Theyshouldaddresslong-termrecoveryplanningwiththesamefocusaspreparingforemergencyresponse.Regionalandstaterecoveryagenciesassistlocalcommunitiestodevelopthetoolsandtrainingneededtoensurecompetentrecoveryplanning,andmustlinktotheStateLong-TermRecoveryFrameworkearly,andthroughouttheprocess.Ensuringinclusionofthewholecommunityisthecornerstoneofanysuccessfulrecoveryeffort.Understandinglegalobligationsandsharingbestpracticeswhenplanningandimplementingre-coverystrategiestoavoidexcludinggroupsiscritical.

RecoveryCoo

rdinator

StateLTRG

StateIndividualAssistanceStaff DOH

CDBG-DR

HousingRegionalRecovery

Coordinator

FEMA-VAL HMGP

StateEconomicRecovery

StateHistoricProperties

Itiscriticaltoprovidecurrentinformationonshelters,

resources,etc.toUnitedWay2-1-1



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ACONCISETO-DOLIST

• Donottellyourresidentsthateverythingwillbemadebetterin1,3or6months.Tellthemrecoverytakestimeandyouwillworktogethertowardthatgoal.Recoveryisamarathon,notasprint.

• Identifyalong-termrecoverycoordinatorwhoisNOTanemergencyservicesemployee.Theywillbebusywithresponse.Dothisnow,priortodisaster.

• IntroduceyourselftoyourDEMHSRegionalCoordinator.HeorsheisyourlinktotheState.

• Haveyourassessor,yourplanner,andyourbuildinginspectorreadytoworkwithalldis-asterassessmentteams–includingtheAmericanRedCross,FEMAandWorldRenew.

• Remember:thoroughassessmentsbasedonproperdocumentationwillmeanmorefundingopportunities.

• WorkwiththeState,FEMA,211,VOADSandtheAmericanRedCrossonaregionalMulti-AgencyResourceCentertogetitupandrunning.Getyourselfandyourpeoplethere.Thevolunteersareontheirway.

• VolunteersandDonations.UsingVolunteerscorrectlycansaveyourtownorcitythe25%thatFEMAwillnotreimburseforpublicassistance.Donations:peoplewillwanttohelpanddonate.Cashisthebestkindofdonation,asyoudon’twantwhatyoucan’tuseorstore.ThemorequicklyyoucanorganizeaLong-TermRecoveryGroup,thesoonervolunteersanddonationscanbeorganizedanddistributed.

• Callyourlocalmoversandshakers-theRotaryClub,theLions’Club,religiousleaders,PTAheadsandseniorsactiveinthecommunity.Findoutwhattheirneighborsaresay-ingandwhattheyneed.Askthemforsuggestionsforrecoverycommitteemembers.

• Inclusionanddiversitymatter.YourLong-TermRecoveryGroupshouldbecomprisedofmembersthatrepresentthewholeofthecommunity.Thismaymeanventuringoutofyourpoliticalorsocialcircles.

• InviteCTRisestomeetwithyourcommittee.Donotre-inventthewheel–thesooneryourcommitteehasitscredentials,thesoonertheycanexpectassistance.

• AskwhatFEMAcanprovide–andmakesureyourregionalrepresentativeandyouremergencydirectoradvocateloudlyfortheseprograms.Theworstscenarioforapoliti-cianistohaveitsaidthattheydidn’tdoenough.

• Ifyouhavelocallargebusinessesandcorporations,callonthem.Askthemtoconsiderdirectingsomefundingtoyourlocallong-termrecoverygroups–theLTRGwillbetheretotheendhelpingtheiremployees.

• Mostdisastersarewidespread–lookatrecoveryoptionswitharegionaleye.Resourcescanandshouldcrosstownlines.

• Regardlessofthetypeofdisaster,housing—temporaryandpermanent—willbeyourbiggestchallenge.Currentrebuildprogramstakeyearstobecompleted.



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• SilverLining:Usethisopportunitytofixwhatwasbrokenormissingbeforethedisaster.Isthestreettornup?Putinsidewalkswheretherewerenone!Seniorsoutofunsafehomes?Looknowfordevelopersandfundingopportunitiesforseniorhousing.

• Adisastermayhaveaneffectonthephysical,mentalandemotionalhealthofyourciti-zens.Beempatheticindealingwithallwhohavebeenaffected.



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5. DISASTERRECOVERYCENTERS(DRCS)FEMAopensDRCsincoordinationwiththestatefollowinganIAdeclaration.Thesecentersarede-signedasacentrallocationwhereresidentsandbusinessescanreceiveinformationandaskques-tionsondisasterassistanceprograms.InordertofacilitatetheopeningofDRCswithin48hoursofadeclaration,DESPP/DEMHShasen-teredintotoaMemorandumofUnderstandingwithcommunitycollegesandinterestedmunicipali-ties.TheMOUoutlinesFEMA’srequirementsandexpectationsforDRCoperations.FormoreinformationonDRCs–seetheStateDisasterRecoveryFramework(ESF14)(https://portal.ct.gov/DEMHS/Emergency-Management/Resources-For-Officials/Planning-For-All-Hazards)(https://bit.ly/2WydrsX)

BestPractices:AttendaCTVOADmeetingin“blueskies”andworktoidentifyalocal,long-termrecoverycoordinator.



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AssistanceCentersFollowingadisaster,amunicipalitymaychoosetoopenuparesourcecentertoprovideadditional,longertermassistancetoresidents.TheAmericanRedCrosshasdevelopedaMulti-AgencyRe-sourceCenter(MARC)protocolonsettingupacenter.Ideally,these‘centers’arelocatedatneutrallocationsandareplaceswhereafullrangeofdisasterresourcesarerepresented.Inordertobefullyaccessible,centersneedtocomplywiththeADAandthefederalRehabilitationAct.Thesein-cludetheabilitytoprovideequallyeffectivecommunications,admittingserviceanimals,modifyingpoliciesandpracticeswhennecessarytoprovideaccommodationstoresidentswithaccessorfunc-tionalneeds.Ideally,MARCsareoperationalwithinthefirstweeksafteradisasterevent.

• PlanningforwhereandhowthesecentersoperateandwhoshouldberepresentedattheseCentersshouldbecoordinatedpre-disaster

• AtaMARCandworkingwithprofessionals,residentscanformulatearecoveryplanandbegintheprocessofrecovery

MARCscandifferbycommunity,butsomeoftheprofessionalsandotherswhoshouldbepresentinclude:

• Representativesfrommentalhealthagencies• StateIndependentLivingCouncil,CentersforIndependentLivingCentersandother

statewidesupportorganizationsthatunderstandaccess,effectivecommunicationandpol-icyandpracticesforpeoplewithdisabilities

• Casemanagementagencies(i.e.TheSalvationArmy,CentersforIndependentLiving)whowillberepresentingclientswithunmetneeds

• TheAmericanRedCrossandotherassistanceagencies(ortheirmaterialsre:availableassistance)

• Volunteersfromthelegal,banking,andmortgageandinsuranceindustriestoanswerques-tionsfromresidents

• Avolunteerorrepresentativefromstateagenciesassistingindisaster• AmemberorrepresentativefromVOAD• Volunteerstoassistinchildcare• SeniorsorolderadultrepresentativesthroughAreaAgenciesonAgingandotheragingor-

ganizations• Arepresentativefromthebuildingtrades• AnagencyorpersontofullycoordinatetheMARC

SpecifictypesofassistanceandservicesprovidedataMARCaredeterminedbyparticipatingagen-ciesbasedoncommunityneedsandavailableresources.Theresourcesmaycommonlyinclude:



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• Informationaboutthecaseworkprocess,howtoobtainassistance,andreferralstootheroff-siteservicesasavailable

• Assistancewithnavigatinggrantandfederalorstateprogramsthatprovideassistancetoresidentsandbusinesses

• Mentalhealthservicesandpeerrecoveryspecialists• Emotionalandspiritualcare,aswellasotherhealthandmentalhealthservices(withapro-

visionforMARCstafftoreceivesupportandpreventemotionalfatigue)• Accesstosystemsthatsupportreunificationincluding,butnotlimitedto,emailaccounts,

socialmediasites,andreunificationtoolssuchastheAmericanRedCross"SafeandWell"website,whichenablethoseaffectedbythedisastertoregisterandnotifyfamilymembersoftheirconditionandlocation.

• Officeareasprovidedforpaperworkmanagement• Distributionofbulksupplies• Alocationthatservesasameetingplaceforfamilies,friendsandcommunitymembers

Whiledifferentcommunitiesmaydetermineadditionalprinciples,mostMARCsaredesignedto:• Expediteindividual,familyandcommunityrecoveryfollowingadisaster• Provideefficient,effectiveassistancetoindividualsandfamiliesaffectedbyadisasterina

single,“onestopshop”location• Minimizethetimeandtraveldistanceneededforaffectedindividualsandfamiliestoobtain

assistanceafteradisaster• Aidthereunificationoffamilyandfriends• Maximizetheuseofcollectiveresourcesandexpeditetheabilityoforganizationstodeliver

services

AllMARCshaveanobligationtoprovidephysical,programandeffectivecommunicationaccess.Itiscriticallyimportanttonotethatindividual,familyandcommunityneedscannotbeexpeditedunlessaccessandfunctionalneedsaremetandpeoplehaveequalaccesstodisasterservices.Response-to-RecoveryPhaseCommunicationsAspartoftheirLocalEmergencyOperationsPlan(LEOP),theEmergencySupportFunction(ESF)15outlinesemergencymessagingandexternalaffairs.ThefollowingshouldbeconsideredunderESF15:

• Equallyaccessiblecommunicationstrategiesforpeoplewithvisualandspeechimpairments.Thisincludessignlanguageinterpretersonscreenandin-person,websitewithscreenreadercompatibleandaccessibletopeoplewithvisualneeds.

• Strategiesforuseofthemunicipalwebsite,includingPodcastsandweb-streaming• TheuseofsocialmediasuchasFacebookandTwitter,todisseminatepreparedness,re-

sponse,andrecoveryinformation• Regularwebsiteupdatesduringtherecoveryphasetoprovideinformationrelatingtorecov-

eryresources,buildingpermits,businessesre-opening,municipalrecoveryactivities,andprogramsforresidentialrecovery



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• Methodsofcommunicatingwithfaith-basedorganizationsandcommunityorganizations

• Providingtranslatorsortranslatedinformationtoprovidepreparedness,response,andre-coveryinformation

• Communicationtoolstosupportsecureandconsistentcommunicationamongmunicipalstaff

• Methodsofsharinginformationondamageassessment,permitting,andinspectioninfor-mationtoresidentsandbusinessowners

• Useofthemunicipality’semergencynotificationsystemtoprovidekeyinformation• Regularmediaupdatesandpressreleases(asklocalnewsoutletstoprovidearegularfea-

tureupdatingrecoveryeffortsandrelayingkeyinformation)• Flyerdistributionto:hotelsandmotels;doortodoor;cafésandothercommunitymeeting

places;allmunicipaloffices

Theinformationprovided,especiallyintheearlyphaseofrecovery,shouldbefocusedon:

• Encouragingresidentstocontact2-1-1forinformation• Identifyingthetypesofdisasterassistanceavailable• Advisingresidentstocontacttheirinsurancecarriers• StressingtheimportanceofregisteringwithFEMA.gov(ifamajordisasterhasbeende-

claredauthorizingIndividualAssistance)• Ensuringthatdisplacedresidentsarenotforgotten• Reunitingfamiliesandlovedones

Aswithanemergencycommunicationsplanpriorandduringadisaster,apost-eventcommunica-tionstrategyshouldincludeoutreachto:

• Peoplewithlimitedliteracy• Speakersofotherlanguages(aswellasthedeafcommunity)• Peoplewithfunctionalneeds

Anexampleofaneffectivecommunicationtoolis“ShowMe.”Thisbookletservesasacommunica-tiontoolforemergencyshelters.Effectiveandaccessiblecommunicationforallresidentsmustcontinuethroughoutadisaster.

Keepingthedisasterrecoveryprocessinthemindsofresidentsalsohelpskeepdisasterassistanceflowingintothecommunity,intheformofdirectdonationsorvolunteers.

Thoseimpactedbydisastershouldnotfeel—orbe—forgotten.



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BestPractices:InasymposiumonKatrina,participantsurgedthatapre-disastercommunitycenterbeformed.Thiscenterwouldprovidepost-disastercontactinformationaswellastakingresidentcontactinformation.Toomanypeoplewhocouldnotreturntotheirhomeswere“lost”totheircommunityandfriends.

RegisteringwithFEMAFollowingadeclarationauthorizingIndividualAssistance,FEMAopensitsregistrationprocess.Un-fortunately,despitepressreleasesandotherformsofoutreach,manyimpactedhouseholdsdonotregisterforassistance.Insomecases,residentsmaybeoverlyoptimisticaboutwhatitwilltaketorecoverfromadisaster,orwhattheirshareofthecostsmaybetorebuildtheirhomes.Dependingonthedisaster,avarietyofdisasterprogramsmaybeavailable.

KeymessagingfollowinganIAdisasterdeclarationincludesencouragingaffectedresidentstocon-tacttheirinsurancecompanyandregisterforFEMAassistance.ItisimportantthatresidentsgainanunderstandingofthetypesofdisasterassistanceprogramsavailablethroughFEMAandnon-governmentalorganizationdisasterprograms.InformationcanbeaccessedthroughUnitedWay’s2-1-1(aconfidential,free,24-hourservicetoconnectresidentstohumanservices).Avarietyofresourcesmaybeavailable;dependingonthedisaster,thismayin-clude:

• Financialassistanceforclean-up,repairandrebuild• Rentalassistanceandotherhousingneeds• Informationonrebuildingandmitigationgrants• Moldtestingandremediation• Advocacy• Recoveryguidance• Legalandmortgageassistance• Accesstospiritualcareandmentalhealthprofessionals• Donatedgoodssuchasclothing

BestPractices:Followingadisasterdeclaration,residentsshouldcontacttheirinsurancecompaniesandregisterwithFEMA.

Outreachtoresidentsisnotone-way.Thoseassistingintheresponse-recoveryphasehavetheop-portunitytogetafirst-handassessmentofthetypesofneedsandpopulationsthataremostaf-fected.Communicationofresidents’needswiththelocalandregionalRecoveryCoordinatorswillaidintherecoveryprocess.



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6. LONG-TERMRECOVERYGROUPS(LTRG)EstablishingamunicipalLong-TermRecoveryGroup(LTRG)iscentraltorecovery.Itsformationwillsetthetoneandpaceofrecovery.Theunmetneedsgroupwillprovidetheframeworkandcriteriaforaddressingtheneedsofimpactedfamilies—eitherthroughdirectfinancialassistanceorbyprovidingaccesstoprofessionalservices,donationsorvolunteers.TheRecoveryCoordinatorcanidentifygovernmentalandnon-governmentalindividualstopartici-pateintheLTRG.



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LTRGsshouldincluderepresentativesfrom:

• Businesses• Faith-basedorganizations• Professionalservicessuchasfinancialandlegal,socialservices,communityadvocates,edu-

cation,andresidents

WhiletheLTRGisamechanismforthemunicipalitytomoveforward,public-sectorparticipationisimperativeinordertohaveaninvolvedandinformedcitizenry.Anidealboardwouldconsistofamixoflocalcitizens,membersofthevolunteercommunity,andrepresentativesofthe“helpingcommunity,”includingmortgage,insurance,banking,andconstruc-tion.

TheLTRGshouldalsodesignatecommittees;thesecommitteesshouldbeledbynon-governmentalorganizationsandresidents.Keycommitteesare:UnmetNeeds/CaseManagement;ConstructionandLandUse;VolunteerManagementandCoordination;EconomicDevelopment.

Local RecoveryCoordinator

UnmetNeeds/Disaster-CaseManagers

VolunteerCoordination Construction Economic

Development

Construction;Permittingand

LandUse

Long-TermRecoveryGroup

Whatyouneedinalong-termrecoverygroupiscommunityknowledgeandflexibility,anabilitytoseeksolutions.Abureaucraticorgovernment-centriclong-termrecoverygroupmaynotalwaysallowforthis.



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UnderConnecticut’sDisasterRecoveryFramework,thelocalRecoveryCoordinatorwillbethepersontoconvenealong-termrecoverygroup.Post-SuperstormSandy,theStatehadfourlocalLTRGs,andCTRisesservedasthestatewideLTRG,providingassistancetocommunitieswithanLTRG,aswellascommunitiesthatdidnothaverecoverygroupsorunmetneedsfunding.ImportanceofDCM-LTRGPartnershipTheinteractionbetweendisastercasemanagersandlong-termrecoverygroupsisvitalindisasterrecovery.LTRGsoftencoordinaterecoveryresourcesforvoluntaryagenciesinacommunityduringthelong-termrecoveryprocess.Itisthereforeimperativethatclear,collaborativeprocessesandpoliciesareinplaceforcasemanagerstoaccessresourcesonbehalfofclients.

BestPractices:OceanCityNJ’sLong-TermRecoveryGroupassignedadisastercasemanagertowalkresidentsthroughtheoften-cumber-someprocessofapplyingforthestate’srebuildingprogram.

Thereisnosingle“correct”waytostructurethecollaborationofDCMandLTRGs.Themostappro-priatestructureisdependentonthenatureofthedisaster,thelocalcommunity,theresourcesavailable,andthevoluntaryagenciesworkingontherecovery.Thefollowingpointsshouldbecon-sidered:

• TheDisasterCaseManageristheprimarypointofcontact,assistingtheclientincoordinat-ingnecessaryservicesandresourcestoaddresscomplexdisasterrecoveryneeds.There-fore,theDisasterCaseManagerservesasthecentrallinkbetweentheindividualandfamilyandtheLTRGs.

• LTRGsmustensurethatresourceallocationisonlyprovidedtoclientsthathavebeenap-provedthroughthecasemanagementprocess

• Identifyingclientinformationpresentedthroughtheunmetneedsprocessmustbekeptconfidential.TheLTRGshallnotprovidecasespecificinformationtoanyotherentityexter-naltotheLTRG.

• EachLTRGshouldhaveanunmetneedsreviewprocessconsistingofmembersexperiencedinreviewingcasesandapprovingfundsaccordingtopre-determinedcriteria

• ThereshouldbeafairandequitableprocessthroughwhichdisastercasemanagersfromvariousorganizationsmaypresentcasestotheLTRGinordertoaccessrecoveryfundsonbehalfoftheirclients

• ThereshouldbeastandardLTRGunmetneedsapplicationusedbyallDisasterCaseManag-ersfortheirclientsinordertoaccessfunds

• LTRGshavetheresponsibilityofcasepresentation,includingtheformsandresourcesspe-cifictotheLTRGunmetneedsprocess



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CaseManagementAdvisoryGroupLTRGsaremosteffectivewhentheyaresupportedbyacasemanagementadvisorygroup.Subjectmatterexpertiseofthisgroupmayserveoneormoreofthefollowingfunctions:

• Providesupport,guidance,resourcedevelopment,andopportunitiesfortraining• Offertheopportunityforpeerreviewofcasestobepresentedtotheunmetneedstable.• CoordinatewiththeotherfunctionsandcommitteesoftheLTRG• AppointarepresentativetoservewithintheLTRGleadershipstructure.TheoptimalLTRG

structureisdependentupontheneedsofthelocalcommunityaswellasthescale,nature,andresourcesofthedisasterandrecoveryefforts.

ResourcessuchasSustainableCT(www.sustainablect.com),providemunicipalitieswithavarietyofvoluntaryactions,designedtoassistthemtobecomemoresustainable.Itprovidesresourcesandtoolsthatmunicipalitiescanusetoimplementactions,advancingprogramsforthebenefitofallresidents.Theorganizationcertifiesandrecognizesmunicipalitiesfortheirongoingsustainabilityachievements.ThereareanumberofwaysthatdisastercasemanagerscancoordinatewithLTRGs:

• DisastercasemanagersfromvariousvoluntaryagenciesaccesstheLTRGthroughanestab-lishedunmetneedscommittee,butoperatecasemanagementservicesseparatelyfromtheLTRGadministrationandinfrastructure

• VoluntaryagenciesmaypooltheirresourcesandhireoneormoredisastercasemanagerstoworkasemployeesoftheLTRG

• Oneormorevoluntaryagenciesmayoffertoprovidecasemanagementservicestoindivid-ualsandfamiliesonbehalfoftheLTRG

LTRGsareencouragedtoconsiderotherfactors,includingbutnotlimitedto:• Conflictofinterestanddualrelationships• Capacityofthedisastercasemanagingorganizationtoprovideservicesthroughoutthere-

coveryphase(limitedbyavailableresources)• Capacityofthedisastercasemanagingorganizationtosupportthedisastercasemanage-

mentpersonnel(limitedbyavailableresources)• CapacityofthecasemanagingorganizationtoimplementservicesinaccordancewithNa-

tionalVOADCaseManagementCommitteeGuidance(https://bit.ly/2C0J8p0)• ApplicableStateandFederallawsforhiring,retentionandterminationofstaffrelativeto

thetime-limitednatureofdisasterrecovery• Equitableaccesstorecoveryresourceswhetherthecasemanagerisarepresentativeofthe

LTRGorofavoluntaryorganization



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Rebuilding—PermitsandOrdinancesPlanningandpermittingservicesintheaftermathofadisasterwillpresentachallengetomunicipal-ities.Staffinglevelsinthebuildingandlandusedepartmentsareamajorconcernpostdisaster.Regularpermittingoperationsinthelocaltownhallswillbeoverwhelmedbythevolumeandrangeofrequestsforassistance.Themunicipalityshouldconsiderplanningfortwoapproachestohandlethedemand.First,ifaDRCorAssistanceCenterissetupinthemunicipalities,providestafffromthedepartmentsand/ortrainedvolunteers.Second,thebuildingandzoningdepartmentsshouldplanforadditionalstaffandextendedhours,intotheeveningandonweekends.MunicipalitiesshouldconsiderenteringintocontractsorMemorandaofUnderstanding(MOU)withprivatecompaniesorotherentities,tosupplementexistingstaffresourcesintheaftermathofalarge-scaledisaster.ServicescoveredunderanMOUcouldincludeprovidingadequatesupportforrecovery-relateddatacollectionandmapping,damageassessment,permitreviewandprocessing,andpropertyinspectionservices.Pre-positioningcontractsandmutual-aidagreementstosupportrecoveryactivitiesshouldbedesignedtoaddressthenatureofservicesrequired;theskillsandex-periencesofstaff;requirementsfortrainingandcertificationtoensurereadinessandperformance.ConsiderationsforLandUseDepartments

• Additionalstaffingandextendedhoursincludingweekendhours• Mutualaidagreementsestablishedwithothermunicipalities• EnsurelandusestaffunderstandDEEP(DepartmentofEnergyandEnvironmentalProtec-

tion)andNFIP(NationalFloodInsuranceProgram)buildingrequirements• Provideon-linepermitprocess,ifpossible(manyresidentsmaybedisplacedandlivingout-

sideofthecommunity)• Planforextrastafftohandleinspections• Considerprioritizingdisasterplanreviews• ExploreDisasterOrdinanceorregulationswiththetownattorney

DisasterOrdinance/RegulationsInordertoestablishemergencypowersforextraordinaryactionsfacilitatingshort-termrecovery,DisasterOrdinanceorregulationsmaybesetinplacetohelptointerveneinmattersaffectingpri-vatepropertyandprotectingpublicsafety,andensuringdesiredlong-termrecoveryoutcomes.

Temporaryandspecialregulationsareattheheartoftheearlyrecovery

process.



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Thistypeofordinanceisdesignedspecificallytofillavoidthatoftenappearsduringimmediatepost-disasterhours,days,andweekswhenitisdifficulttoobtainnecessaryquorumstoadoptemergencyauthorizationstoprotectpublichealthandsafety.

Ordinancescanprovidespecialregulatorytoolsthroughwhichamunicipalitycanenacttemporaryregulationsfollowingthedeclarationofalocalemergency.Theseregulationswillstrikeabalancebetweenregulatorystreamliningneededtofacilitaterecoveryandprotectionoftheunderlyingzon-inglaws.Temporaryandspecialregulationsareattheheartoftheearlyrecoveryprocess.Althoughstatelawortownordinancesmayauthorizecertainincidentalemergencyfunctions,itisdesira-bletohaveasourceofregulationenablingimplementationofrecovery.Thesecanbeachievedeitherthroughmodificationofexistingregulationstoexpediterecoveryorinterventiononmat-tersdealingwithprivatepropertytoprotectpublichealthandsafety.Amongthesespecialreg-ulationsareprovisionsdealingwith:

1. Environmentalclearances.InlandWetlands,Zoning,andCoastalAreaManagementaresomeapprovalsthatresidentsmayneedinordertorebuildafterdisaster

2. Debrisclearanceandhazardabatement.Incompliancewithstatestatuesregardingaccesstoprivateproperty,amunicipalitywillneedtoworkwiththeownerstoremovedebrisappropriatelyandinaccordancewiththelaw

3. Damageassessmentandplacarding.AssessingdamageandclassifyingthelevelofdamagemustbeconsistentwithFEMA’sdefinitionforaffectedminor,majoranddestroyedstruc-tures(seesectiononDamageAssessment).Itisimportanttoidentifydamageseverityandwhattypeofinformationisneededtoassurepublichealth,accessandsafety.

4. Temporaryuseandrepairpermits.Thistypeofpermittingwillaidintheimmediateresto-rationofcriticalfacilitiesinanareaadverselyimpactedbyamajordisaster(police,fire,emergencymedical,oremergencycommunicationsfacility).Theplacementofarecrea-tionalvehicle,trailerorashort-termstoragefacilityonaresidentialorcommercialpropertyforuseduringrebuildingisanexampleofatemporaryusepermit.

5. Defermentofpermitfeesforrepairandrebuilding.Feesforrepairandreconstructionper-mitsmaybedeferreduntilissuanceofcertificatesofoccupancy.Thereisoftenpressuretowaiveprocessingfeesafteradisasterwhenvictimsareunsureoftheirsourcesoffinancingforrebuilding.Asanalternative,localgovernmentsdeferfeestoallowrepairsandrebuild-ingtocontinue.Deferraloffeesuntiloccupancypermitissuanceallowstimetolocatealter-natefundingsourceswithoutimpactingnecessaryrevenueflowstothemunicipality.

6. Continuityofnonconformingbuildingsanduses,accompaniedbysafetyupgrades.Inmanyolderpartsofcitiesandtowns,buildingsmightbenonconforminglegallyintermsofuse,height,numberofstories,lotarea,floorarea,residentialdensity,orotherzoningre-quirements.Thiscanbemorecommoninbeachcommunitiesandneighborhoodswithrentalproperties.Intheory,disastersareseenasanopportunitytoeliminatelegalnoncon-formingbuildingsanduses.Inreality,followingadisaster,propertyownersmayseekto



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reestablishthepreviousdevelopmentpattern,includingnonconformingbuildingsanduses.Itiscriticallyimportanttodeterminetheexistingprogramsandhowtheycanbeusedtoen-hancehazardmitigationandpublicsafety.

7. Developmentofmoratoriatoassurepublichealthandsafety.Amoratoriumisatempo-raryhold,foradefinedperiodoftime,ontheissuanceofbuildingpermits,approvalofland-useapplicationsorotherpermitsandentitlementsrelatedtotheuse,development,andoc-cupancyofprivatepropertyintheinterestsofprotectionoflifeandproperty.Thisapproachmaybeutilizedtoallowanexaminationofexistingbuildingandlifesafetycodes.Anewde-velopmentmoratoriummightbeusefulbasedupontheresultsofdamageassessmentandrecommendationsfromthemunicipalBuildingOfficialandtheRecoveryCoordinator.Ifallinspectorsareworkingondisasterassessment,dailybusinesstasksmayneedtobeputonhold.

8. Emergencycontractorcertification.ThePurposeofthismeasureistoreduceunscrupulouspostdisasterpredatoractivity.Itrequirescontractorcertificationindisastercleanupandreconstruction.Inthisprocess,thetownorcityverifiesthatcontractorsareproperlyregis-teredand/orlicensedwiththestatecontractors’licensingagencyofthestate.Contractorsmustcomplywithstatelicensing.

Althoughtemporaryregulatorymodificationsoutlinedhereareassociatedwiththemunicipalcode,federalandstatedisasterassistancewillbecontingentuponcompliancewithrequirementsoffed-erallawsandprograms,suchastheNationalFloodInsuranceProgram,StaffordAct,NationalEnvi-ronmentalPolicyAct,NationalHistoricPreservationAct,andEndangeredSpeciesAct.Changestolocalordinances,thoughtemporary,willnotchangethesefederalrequirements.Foradetailedanalysisof2018ConnecticutRegulationsandRecommendationsforFutureCTRegulations,seetheUniversityofConnecticutInstituteforResilienceandClimateAdaptation(UCONN/CIRCA),LawandPolicyWhitePapers:“StatutoryAdoptionofUpdatedSea-LevelRiseScenarios,”“HeightRestrictionsonElevatedResidentialBuildingsinConnecticutCoastalFloodplains,”“FloodplainBuildingElevationsStandards–CurrentRequirementsandEnhancementOptionsforConnecticutShorelineMunicipalities,”and“OceanfrontStateCoastalManagementPrograms.”Thesewerepro-ducedbyUCONNLawSchoolasapartofa“MunicipalResiliencePlanningAssistanceProjectGrant”fundedbyCTCDBG-DR.ResidentialRepairandConstructionBridgeportrecoverycoordinatorsnotedthattheyneeded

“…someonewhospecializesinconstructionmanagement,availableduringtheprocess;thiswouldhaveavoidedduplicatingservices,poorproductandunnecessaryrepairs.”

Ideally,recoverycoordinatorsandlong-termrecoverygroupsshouldhaveaccesstoaprofessionalconstructionadvisor.Thispersonshouldnotbeassociatedwithmunicipalgovernment.



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Bridgeport’sobservationswerecertainlynotuniquetoBridgeport;manycasemanagershadlittleornoabilitytooverseeorgaugeprojects,norwereallunmetneedsgroupsfullyawareofconstruc-tionneeds.Moreover,insomecases,theDCMagencyactedasthecontractor.

• CTRiseshadtwoconstructionprofessionalsavailable(beginninginlate2014)whoprovidedscopeofworkguidanceandreviewedcontractorquotes,incompliancewithalllocalandstaterequirements

• CTRises’constructionverifiedthatdamagewasdisaster-relatedandnottheresultofde-ferredmaintenance

• Bidswerereviewedandallcontractorsneededtobeincompliancewithinsurance,etc.Typ-ically,atleasttwobidswererequiredforrepaircostsbetween$2,500and$7,500andthreebidsforprojectsover$7,500.Thisallowedhomeownerstoworkwithacontractortheyfeltcomfortableusingratherthanneedingtogowiththelowestbidder.

MoldandStandingWater• Eveninhomesthatmayhavehadslightdamageoronlybasementflooding,moldcancause

pervasiveandserioushealthissues.• Moldisespeciallydangerousforpeoplewithexistingbreathingproblemscausedbyaller-

giesorasthma.Highlevelsofmoldcancauseproblemsforpeoplewhoarerelativelyhealthy.BoththeCDC(cdc.gov)andtheCTDepartmentofPublicHealth(portal.ct.gov/DPH)provideinformationanddetailsonmoldandenvironmentalhealthconcerns.

• Inadditiontohealthcomplaints,molddamagesbuildingmaterials,goods,andfurnishingsasitgrows.Moldgrowthandmoisturemayeventuallycompromisethebuild-ing’sstructuralintegrity.Becauseofpotentialhealthconcernsanddamagetoproperty,moldshouldnotbeallowedtogrowandmultiplyindoors.

• Damagemaybedonebyoneinchoffloodwater.Moldisoftenhiddeninbuildingandhomematerials.Pullingupsectionsofcarpetandpadding,ofwallpaperandwallboardorsheet-rockisnecessaryifmoldispresent.Molding,floorsandhollowcoredoorsalsoneedtoberemovedandexamined.Crawl-spacesandatticsareprimespotsforgrowth.Thegrowthcanbeidentifiedbysmellaswellascolorandtexture.Generally,amoldgrowthareaover10sq.feetshouldnotbeattemptedforcleanupbyahomeownerorvolunteergroup.

• Oneveryimportantstepthatallhomeownersneedtorememberistodocumentdamage.Allfloodedareas,allhomecontentsandespeciallyallareasthatarehidden(e.g.,moldbe-neathrugs)needtobephotographed.PostSuperstormSandy,moldabatementcostNGOsandhomeownersmillionsofdollars.

SupportingLocalContractorsandBuildersWhileresidentsmaybeabletohireoutsideareacontractorsforlessmoney,localcontractorsarelikelytobemorefamiliarwithlocalbuildingcodes(particularlyimportantforrepairingandrebuild-inginfloodzones)andbetterabletonavigatelocalbuildingdepartments.Wherethepricediffer-encewasnotsignificant,homeownersoftenoptedto“payalittlemore”forworkperformedbysomeonelocal.Itwasalsoeasiertocheckreferencesandtocontactcontractorsshouldadditionalworkberequired.



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Constructionprofessionalscanandshouldhelpwithsitesupervisionforvolunteerrepairandre-build.

• CTRiseswasabletouselocalcontractorstooverseeandhelpwithvolunteerprojectsmuchtotheadvantageofvolunteers,thehomeownerandthefundingagency

• Thesecontractorsenhancedtherecoverymissionbyvolunteeringtheirtimeandprofes-sionalexpertise

• Discountedmaterialsandconstructiondonationswereobtainedthroughaffiliationwithlo-calcontractors.Independentcontractorsalsoprovidedpro-bonoservicesonbehalfofresi-dents,including:Providingresidentswithascopeofworkfornofee

• Advisingonpermittingandzoningprocedures• Referringresidentstocharitableresources• Providingcostestimatesonbehalfofresidentsneedingtoapplyforgrants(HMGPgrants

requiredestimatesofworkpriortoacceptanceofgrantrequests.Theseestimatescouldcostupto$5,000)

Municipalpersonnelshouldprovidegeneralguidancetoresidentsonchoosingandworkingwithacontractor.Thisinformationcanbemadeavailableinlandusedepartments,postedoronweb-sites,socialmediasitesandatpublicgatheringplacessuchascafesandlibraries.

• AnyclaimswithcontractorsshouldbereportedtotheCTDepartmentofConsumerProtec-tion

• Inadditionto2-1-1services,eachtownshouldhavealocalpost-disasterhotlineavailabletoanswerresidentquestionsandhandlecomplaintsrelatedtodisasterrepair

• Allresidentsneedtobeeducatedoncontractorfraudorunethicalpracticesincludingbeingoverchargedforwork

• Mostresidentshaveneverundertakensuchalargeandexpensiverepairandthereforemaynotbefamiliarwithoverseeingtheworkofacontractor

• MARCsshouldhavebuildingofficialsorconstructionprofessionalsavailabletoanswerques-tions.Municipalitiesshouldconsiderconductinginformationalmeetingswithresidentstooutlinehowtheyshouldapproachrebuildingandrepair.

• Outreachmethodssuchastheuseofsocialmediaandthedistributionofpamphletsshouldalsobeconsidered

• CopiesofContractorFraudChecklist(seeAppendix3)shouldbemadeavailableinPlanningandZoning,Building,TownandCityClerkoffices,socialservicesdepartmentsandseniorcenters.LTRGshouldalsoprovidethischecklisttotheresidentstheyserve.Besuretohavethemcheckforlead,mold,andasbestoswhenconsideringabatement.

SeeAppendix3,ContractorFraudChecklist



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MunicipalVolunteerRecruitmentandManagementMunicipalitiessuchasBridgeportthathadarobustCommunityEmergencyResponseTeam(CERT),leveragedtheirteamstoperformbasicpost-disasterfunctionssuchasmuck-outs,stairanddeckrepairs,debrisremoval,andsiteclean-up.Seasonedvolunteergroupscanhelpcommunitiesmanage‘spontaneous’volunteerismbyprovidingmentoringandtrainingthatwillallowresidentswithinthecommunitytoassistintheirownrecovery.LessonslearnedbytheselocalvolunteerscanformthebasisofaCommu-nityOrganizationActiveinDisaster(COAD),oraddcapacitytoexistingCERTTeamsthatwillprovidegreaterresiliencytothecommunity.MunicipalitiesmayalsolooktoCOADsforassistance.TheselocalgroupstakeontheroleofLong-TermRecoveryCommitteesandundertakepreparednessaswellasrecoveryoperations.

Localgroups,suchasCERT,communicatedwithlocalrecoveryleadersaboutemergingneedsandhelpedidentifyresidentsincriticalneed.Bridgeportfoundthathavinglocalgroupsactiveinrepairandothervolunteeractivitiesserveddualpurposes:itgavepeoplehopeandoptimismandithelpedconnectresidentsandcommu-nitieswithdisasterresources.TheState’sDisasterRecoveryFrameworkencouragesrecoverycoordinatorstoincludeplanningforanddeploymentoflocalandstate-widevolunteers.

• In2014,CTRisescoordinatedwithvolunteerorganizationssuchasTeamRubicon,MormonHelpingHands,aswellasUMCOR/NYAC,WorldRenew,andHomeFront

• Activitiesundertakenwere:debrisremoval;roofrepairandreplacement;basicinteriorandexteriorrepair;siteclean-up;movingofhouseholditems,doortodoorcanvassing,andspir-itualcare

LocalRecoveryCoordinatorswereencouragedtousevolunteersincommunityrecovery.Theuseofmultiplegroupscanhaveahugepositiveimpactonrecovery.Residentsshouldconnectwithlocal

Accordingtoa2013FEMAreport,anestimated173,544volunteershadinvestedmorethan1millionvolunteer

hoursinSandyrecoveryefforts.Thevalueoftheircontri-butionswasestimatedtobeover$30million.



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UnitedWay,andmunicipalofficeofcommunity/socialservicestodeterminethebestwaytopro-ceedandconnect.Pre-EventVolunteerIdentificationandCapacityBuildingExpandingthenumberofCERTsandprovidingcontinualtraininginrecoveryskills,includingcar-pentryandmuck-out,willhelpmeetbasicresidentialrecoveryneeds.Identifyingothervolunteerrecoverypartnersthroughfaith-basedorcivicorganizations—andcombiningtheireffortswithCERTTeamsisagoodwaytoexpandcapabilities.Identifyingavolunteerrecoverycoordinatorpre-disas-terisrecommended.LocalCERTteamsorvolunteerscanalsohelptoundertakedoor-to-doorcan-vassingthatwillhelplocalRecoveryCoordinatorsbetterunderstandthescopeofdamageandneeds,andwillhelptocommunicatetoresidentshowandwheretofindservices.ForadditionalinformationontheState’sCitizenCorpsProgramseethe“CitizenCorpsProgramManual”ontheDESPP/DEMHSwebsite.(https://bit.ly/2JrjUlM)WithLTRGandCTRisesinvolvement:

• Permitswereobtainedonbehalfofthehomeownerandinspectionsscheduled(someofourlocalbuildingofficialswereopentoworkingSaturdaystoaccommodatevolunteerwork)

• On-sitelicensedcontractorswereusedwhobothscopedtheprojectpriortovolunteerre-pairorrebuildandremainedonsitetomakesureworkwasproperlycompleted

• Ifworkcouldnotbecompleted,casemanagershadtheabilitytopaycontractorstomakesureworkwascompleted

Faith-basedandNon-GovernmentalOrganizationsTheprevalenceoffaith-basedandnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)incommunities,andtheirabilitytoprovideneededassistancefollowingemergencyoperations,isacriticalrecoveryre-source.Manyoftheseorganizationsaremoreresponsivetothediversityofneedsinthelocalcom-munity.Throughouttherecoveryprocess,nonprofitorganizationsandvolunteersplaykeyrolesinmitigatingeffectsoftheinitialdisasterandpreventingsubsequentcrises.Pollsshowthatduringtimesofcrisis,themajorityofAmericans–nearly60%–saytheyturnfirsttoareligiousleaderforcomfortandguidance.InthemodelbyGEMA(GeorgiaEmergencyManagementAgency)describedabove,faith-basedorganizationspartneredwithemergencymanagementtoprepareandrespondtodisaster(seehttps://bit.ly/2WRPnFC).Thesetypesofpartnershipscanmakeapositivedifferenceinrecoveryassistanceprovidedthroughnon-governmentalorganizationsincludeclothing,goods,money,tem-poraryshelter,mentalhealthandspiritualservices,aswellasvolunteerrepairandrebuild,childcareandmuchmore.ConsiderationsandRecommendations:

• Whendevelopingorupdatingemergencypreparednessplans,municipalitiesshouldbeawareoftheavailabilityandcapabilitiesoffaith-basedorganizations



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• Communitiesshouldengagewithfaith-basedandNGOsindisasterandrecoveryplanningandexercises

• Recoveryservicesneededafteradisastersometimesextendfarbeyondthetraditionalboundariesofemergencyrelief(seebelow)

• Coordinationamongresourceproviders,emergencypersonnelandfaith-basedorganiza-tionsshouldbeenhanced

• Solicitingandmanagingcash,materialdonationsandvolunteerservicesarekeytoeffectivedisasterresponse

• Theabilityoffaith-basedorganizationstorespondwilldependonthemagnitudeofthedis-asterandtheextentofdamagetheysustaintotheirownoperations

• Asdiscussedinthisguide,developmentandtrainingofCommunityOrganizationsActiveinDisasters(COADs)canenhancepreparednessactivities

• ThedevelopmentandtrainingprovidedbyCommunityEmergencyResponseTeams(CERT),providegreatbenefitsthroughbasicdisasterresponseskills,suchasfiresafety,lightsearchandrescue,teamorganization,anddisastermedicaloperations.

HowFaith-BasedandNGOsPrepareforDisasterResponseandRecoveryActivities• Takestockoftheorganization’scapabilities• Expandresourcesandabilitiestomeetcommunityvulnerabilitiesandanticipateddisaster

needs• Partnerwithotherorganizations• Engageintraining(Long-TermRecovery,CERT,RebuildandRepair,Muck-out,SpiritualCare)• Developapreparednessandrecoveryplan• LettingmunicipalEmergencyManagementDirectors(EMD)andSocialServicesagencies

knowhowtheycanhelpwithrecoveryefforts• Stayingincontactwithmembersbefore,duringandafteradisaster:theirinformationhelps

tokeepEMDsinformedandhelpstoformresponse• PartneringwithLong-TermRecoverygroupsandotheraidproviders,duringrecovery,ifa

LTRGhasbeenformedpriortodisaster.Thiswillaidingaugingandaddressingimmediateneedsofresidentsandplanningforthechallengesofrecovery.

Faith-basedorganizationscanbekeytoprovidingandreceivingimportantinformation.

BestPractices:Thosepreparingemergencypreparednessplansneedtobetterunderstandtheavailabilityandcapabilitiesoffaith-basedorgani-zations.Identifyingdisastersurvivors,theirneedsandtheresourcestoad-dressthoseneedsiscriticaltoaresponseeffort.Incorporatinganinven-toryoflocalfaith-basedorganizationsandtheircontactinformationintodisasterplansisrecommended.Ideally,thenatureoftheirfacilities,theircapabilities,andpriorexperiencewouldbeincludedintheplan.



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Faith-BasedOrganizationsandDisasterPlanningThurstonCounty,Washington,hasactivelyinvolvedfaith-basedorganizationsinemergencyplan-ningsince2006.Inadditiontoquarterlymeetingstodiscussdisasterplanning,ThurstonCountyEmergencyManagement(seehttps://bit.ly/2LBcteC)conductsamultifacetedtrainingandeduca-tionprogramindisasterministryandsupportforthelong-termrecoveryprocess.

“Thepurposeoriginallywasgettingthefaithcommunitiestorealizewheretheycouldhelpoutinadisasterorpriortoadisaster.Wegavethemtrain-ingatthepersonallevelsotheycouldpreparetheircongregation,andthentalkedtothemabouthowtheycanhelpothersandeducatethemonwhatrespondersdoandwhattheroleofemergencymanagementis.Wehadachurchhosttheinitialgatheringforus,andwehadboothswithedu-cationalinformationandsupplies.Itwasawaytobringthemtothetableandmakethemmoreofapartnerinemergencymanagement.”—VivianEason,CountyEmergencyManagementCoordinator.

Easonsaidthecountypreparednesstrainingatchurches,workstoformrelationshipsbetweenfaithcommunities,emergencymanagementpersonnelandfirstresponders.Thecountyalsoprovidesawidearrayofeducationopportunities,suchashamradiotrainingandsheltertrainingincoordina-tionwiththeAmericanRedCross.

“Wehavetobereadytotakecareofthewholecounty,”shesaid.“Faithcommunitiesareofteninselectareas,sowearetryingtogivethemideasonhowtheycanbebetterpreparedtohelpthefolksintheircommunity,ormaybejuststanduptobeashelterifneeded.Themorehandsondeck,thebetter.”(fromChurchesPlayaGrowingRoleinEmergencyManagement,JustineBrown.EmergencyManagement,April28,2015)

DonationsManagementCommunitiescaneasilyfindthemselveschallengedbyunsoliciteddonations.Afteralargeapart-mentcomplexfireinBridgeport,donationsfilledanentireballfield.Storinganddistributingsuchlargesseissometimesoverwhelming,withtheresultbeingthatitemscannotreachthosewhoneedthemmost.PublicmessagingpostdisastershouldencouragedonationstoNGOsorcashdonationsratherthandonationofgoods.Evenwithconsistentmessaging,donationsstillmayarrive.Pre-planningshouldincludeidentificationofavailablewarehousefacilities—eitherlocallyorregion-ally.TheStatemaintainsaMemorandumofAgreementwithAdventistCommunityServices,whichspecializesinwarehousingofdonations.CommunitiescanalsoworkwithregionalRecoveryCoordinatorstolocateoff-sitewarehousinganddistributioncenters.



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Socialmediahashelpedinmatchingresourcestoneeds.Severalcommunitieshavewebsitesde-votedtoassistinginmanagingdonations.Bettertoolsareneededtotrackareasofneedandavaila-bleresources.CTRisesworkedwithSt.VincentdePaulSocietytoprovidehomegoodstoCTresidents.Thispro-gramwascalled“HouseinaBox”andprovidedeverythingfrombedsandmattressestoplatesandtowels.AlocalbusinessownerinMilforddonatedtheuseofanemptywarehouse.Disastercasemanagershelpedmatchtheseitemswithresidentsinneed.Thetotalvalueofgoodsdistributedwasestimatedtobearound$85,000.

BestPractices:SocialMediaUtilizesocialmediaplatformsassoonaspossible,post-disaster,toidentifynecessaryitemsanddropoffpointsforin-Kinddona-tions.Planningforre-distributioncanbedoneincooperationwithVOADsandlocalnon-profits.



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7. ECONOMICRECOVERYBusinessrecoveryisimportanttoacommunity.Businessescanalsoplayaroleinrecoveryop-erationsbyprovidingleadershipandmanagementskills,providingmaterialgoodsandservicestoimpactedresidentsandcommunities.Evenifbusinessesescapethebruntofstormdamage,businessesarestillvulnerabletoeco-nomicdownturnsduetolackofconsumerconfidence.Localeconomicdevelopmentdepartments,commissionsandlocalbusinessorganizationsshouldparticipateinpreplanningandrecoveryoperations.Duringrecovery,mosttownsrelyoneconomicdevelopmentofficestoalsomanagegrantsforresidentialrebuilding.RoleofLocalEconomicDevelopmentAgenciesEconomicdevelopmentofficeswillbetaskedwithprovidingguidancetoresidentsseekingstateandfederalgrantssuchasCDBG-DRandHMGPandotherrecoveryresourcessuchastheSmallBusinessAdministration’sDisasterLoanProgram(SBA).



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• Mosteconomicdevelopmentdepartmentswerefoundtobeunderstaffed;personnelwererequiredtotakeontheaddedroleofgrantsadministratorwhilecontinuingtodotheirregu-larduties.IntownslikeMilford,residentslookedtotheEconomicDevelopmentDirectorastheirresourcefordirectionandassistance.

• ManagementofHMGPapplicationsandmitigationactivities(alsoincludingacquisitionap-plications)areextremelytime-consumingformunicipalities.

Whilerecognizingthattheimpactonlocaleconomieswasnotprofound,post-Sandy,thereisstillapossibilityafuturedisastermaycausemorewide-spreadbusinessdownturnsandfailures.

• Smallbusinesseslikelytofailpriortoadisasterwillhaveahardertimepostdisaster.Forex-ample,lookingatthestatesaffectedbytheMississippiRiverflooding,262,555businesses—95%consideredsmall—hadaworsethanaveragefinancialoutlook,makingitevenmoredifficultiftheywereimpactedbythedisaster.

• Asnotedearlier,(BusinessPreparednessandRecovery),accordingtoastudyin2007of2,500businesses,71%ofsmallbusinessesdidnothaveadisasterplaninplace;64%saidtheydidnotneedone.

• ItfallstoEconomicDevelopmentdepartmentstoworkwiththelocalchambers,economicdevelopmentcommissions,andorganizations,tohelpensurethatbusinessesarebothpre-paredforadisasterandthemunicipalityisabletoassistthebusinesscommunitytosurvive,post-disaster.

Inpre-andpost-disasterplanning,EconomicDevelopmentleadersandmunicipalplannersneedtoaddresspost-disasterrebuildingintheirplans.GuidelinesTowardDevelopingaPre-disasterPlanSeveraleconomicdevelopmentplanningguideswerereviewed(Fairfax,VA;SanFranciscoBayAreaRecovery;andRestoreYourEconomy,compiledbytheStateofFlorida),andmanyusethefollowingsteps:

• Identifyaleadeconomicdevelopmentagency• Holdkick-offmeetingswithalleconomicrecoverystakeholders• Thinkstrategicallyabouthowadisastercouldaffecteconomicdevelopment• Proposeactionstrategiesandsteps• Compilecontactinformation• Developalistoffundingsources• Identifyzoningregulationsthatmayneedtobealteredpost-disastertobetterenablecriti-

calbusinessestooperate• Provideongoingeducationopportunitiesforbusinessestoadoptpre-disasterpractices• Followupwithaplan

Post-DisasterBusinessRevitalizationInarecentsurveyofSandy-impactedbusinesseswithintheRockawayPeninsulaintheBoroughofQueens,300businesseswerecontactedtodiscusstheirrecoveryneeds.Themostfrequentlystatedissueforallsurveyedbusinesseswastheneedforfinancialassistancetorepairandrebuildtheir



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livelihoods.Ofthosesurveyed,HurricaneSandyhadforced90%ofallbusinessestocloseimmedi-ately,andalmost60%ofthosehadremainedclosedforatleastfourmonthsafterthestorm.Thisreluctancewasdrivenbyeitherexistingindebtednessorsignificantdoubtsabouttheirabilitytorecapturealostcustomerbase.Thisissuepresentsasignificantchallengeformanybusinessas-sistanceprograms,especiallyfederalloanprograms.Planners,EMDs,businesses,businessassocia-tions,andeconomicdevelopmentcommissionsshouldbecomefamiliarwiththedisasterassistanceavailablethroughSmallBusinessAdministration(SBA).Alarge-scaleeconomicdisruptionmayne-cessitateamorestrategicandfocusedapproach.Belowareconsiderationsonhelpingthebusinesscommunitytorebound:

• Immediatelyfollowingamajordisaster,arecoverycentershouldincluderesourcestomeetthepressingneedsoflocalbusinesses,particularlywhenalargenumberhavebeenaf-fected.

• Centersshouldbesetuptoprovideanintegrationoflocal,state,andfederalresourcesavailabletobusinesses—oftensmallandmedium-sizedfirms—afteranincidenttohelpthemrecover.

• Thecentersprovideanimportantroleinassistingimpactedbusinesseswithcriticalrecoveryinformationandresourcessuchasfinancialandbusinesscounselingservicesandinfor-mationonutilityrestoration

• Oftenguidedbytrainedbusinesscounselorswhohavetheinformationordedicatedcom-mitmentsfromabroadsuiteofassistanceresources

• Recoverycenterscandomuchtohelpsmallandmedium-sizedbusinessessecurefinancingandtechnicalassistanceinshort-termandgap-financing.Traditionalloansareconsideredriskyforsmallbusinessesintheimmediateaftermathofadisaster.Intheshortterm,smallbusinessesneedaccesstofinancingwithlowinterestandflexibleterms.

• Gapfinancingprovidesbusinesseswithworkingcapitaluntiltheycansecurefundsfromothersources,suchasinsuranceclaimsandotherlong-termfinancingsources

• ABusinessEmergencyOperationsCenterorNetworkBackground(BEOC)facilitatescommu-nicationwithbusinessesandindustries,aswellasownersandoperatorsofcriticalinfra-structuresandkeyresources,toenhanceemergencymanagementefforts

• BEOCssupportthatrelationshipandcoordinatingprivatesectorinvolvementandsupportduringatimeofcrisis

• BEOCsworkwithbusinessestoimprovetheirdisasterpreparedness;improvecommunica-tionwithbusinessandindustrybefore,duringandafterdisasterevents;rapidlydevelopsoundeconomic-impactestimatestosupportdecisionmakingandrequestsforbusinessas-sistance

• AneffectiveBEOCNetworkcouldworkwithbusinessestoimprovetheirdisasterprepared-ness;improvecommunicationwithandbetweenbusinessandindustrybefore,duringandafterdisasterevents;provideavenuefortrainingandbuildingofrelationshipsbetweenand



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amongbusinessesandsupportorganizationstoenhancebusinesscontinuity;coordinatere-sponseeffortstoassistbusinessesintheireffortstoreturntonormaloperationsasquicklyaspossible;andhelpcoordinateoverallemergencyresponseandresilienceefforts.

• A“buylocal”campaignisencouraged,post-disaster,tohelpsupportlocalbusinessrecovery• DuringSandyrecovery,manycasemanagerstriedtohireandsourcematerialsthroughlocal

businesses

BestPractices:smallbusinessadministration(SBA)LowinterestloansmaybeavailablefromSBAforbusi-nesses.Besuretocommunicatethispre-andpost-disastertoyourlocalChamberofCommerce,EconomicDevelop-mentCommission,andotherstakeholders.



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Photo:FoxNews

8. MUNICIPALPOST-DISASTERMITIGATION:PLANNINGANDACTIVITIESHMGPfundingisavailablestate-wideafteraMajorDeclarationauthorizingPublicAssistance.Inad-dition,FEMAhastwoannualmitigationgrantprograms:FloodMitigationAssistanceandPre-Disas-terMitigationGrantProgram.MoreinformationontheseprogramscanbefoundintheStateRe-coveryFrameworkandonFEMA.gov.Forresidentslookingtomitigatehomes,thereiscurrentlylittlefundingavailabletohelpunderwriteordefraycosts.FEMAHMA(HazardMitigationAssistance)didprovidesomenon-Sandyrelatedmitigationfundingtocities,includingMilfordCT.Yetpost-disastermitigationisthemostexpensiveand,intermsofwhole-communityresiliency,islesseffectivethanpre-eventmitigation.ManymunicipalitiesimpactedbySandyutilizedCDBG-DRfundingtobettersecuremunicipalfacili-tiesandbolsterinfrastructure,whichwillhelphardentheseareas.Butthesemunicipalitiesandoth-ersarestillvulnerabletofuturedisasters.Thereareactivitiesthatcanbeundertakenthatmayhelplessentheimpactsoffuturestorms.Alteringzoningregulationstolimitbuildingdensityinhigh-riskareasiseffective,andcanalsoin-volveeffortstolowerdensityinriskareasincludingzoningagainstmulti-familyhomes.



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Municipally-ownedpropertiesinhigh-riskareasshouldberestrictedtoopenspacewheneverpossi-ble.ThenumberofforeclosuresincreasedduringtheaftermathofSandyduetounpaidtaxesonpropertiesinhigh-riskareas.Ratherthansellingtheseproperties,municipalitiesshouldconsiderrevertingthepropertytoopenspace,orasinonecase,allowingresidentstousethepropertyforoff-streetparking.Ensurehomesandbusinessesarebeingbuilttocomplywithupdatednational,state,andlocalbuildingcodes,andzoningordinances.BusinessesshouldconductpreparednessworkshopsthroughEconomicDevelopmentCommissions,ChambersofCommerceandRotaryClubsorotherlocalbusi-nessorganizations.Whenpublicforumsareheldforresidentstodiscusstheimportanceoftakingpreventivestepstolowerrisks,highlightprecautionssuchas:

• Thevalueofelevationspriortodisaster• Theimportanceofelevatingmechanicalsoutofharmfromflooding• ApplyingforHUDgrantsthroughmunicipalitiesandotheroutsidefundingsourcestoassist

insuchpre-disasteractivitiesforlower-incomefamiliesinhigh-riskareas• COADsorCERTteamsprovidingassistanceforsomeactivitiesinsomecases• Simpleandinexpensivewaystomitigateloss,suchaswater-sealinggaragesandbasements

whichmayhelptopreventtheaccumulationofmold• Installorrepairsump-pumps• Understandthetypesandlimitsoftheirinsurancepolicies.Renters,inparticular,aresome-

timesunawaretheyarerentinginariskareawiththepotentialforloss.Theimportanceofcarryingrenter’sorcontentsinsuranceshouldbeencouragedaswellastheneedtoplanfordisplacement.

• Advocateformorefederalspendingonmitigationforlow-tomoderate-incomefamiliesinflood-proneareasaswellasforhardeningessentialinfrastructureandbarriers.

• Planformoreaffordablehousingasawaytohelpresidentsrelocateoutofhighriskareas;thisisparticularlyimportantforvulnerableresidents

• Undertakeacquisitionandhazardmitigationplanning

Mostpost-Sandyactivitiescenteredonreturningresidentstotheirhomes;whilethereweresomeacquisitionactivities,mostacquisitionswereinitiatedbyhomeownersforfinancialreasons.

BestPractices:CodeComplianceIfdamageexceeds50%ofassessedvalue,apropertywillmostlikelyberebuilttomeetallcurrentcodes(includingbuilding,fire,landuse,etc.)

Municipalitiesmustlooktoboldermitigationactivitiestoensurerepetitivelossareasareabletowithstandfuturestorms.Moreaggressiveplanningmaybeneededtoidentifyareaswhereagrad-ualrelocationofresidentsandareturnoftheareatoitsnaturalstatemusttakeplace.



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Whiletheissuesarecomplex,municipalplannersandEMDsincoastalareasneedtoplanforpossi-blerelocationactivitiesinhigh-riskareas.Suchplanningcaninclude:

• Identifyinghigh-riskareas• UnderstandingacquisitionprogramsthroughbothHMGPandCDBG-DR• Howtomarkettheseprogramstoresidentsinhigh-riskareas• Identifyingaffordablehousingoptionsnear,butoutside,floodareas• Howtogiveprioritytothemostvulnerablefamiliesforrelocationtoout-of-hazardzones

Challengesfacingmunicipalitiesincludedhesitationonpromotingacquisition,understandingacqui-sitionprograms,andidentifyingareaswhereacquisitioncouldworkforthemunicipality,inthelong-term.Formanytowns,thepost-disasterapproachwaswhollyreactive—missinganoppor-tunitytobeproactiveinredesigningneighborhoodstomeettherealitiesofclimatechange.

BestPractices:AcquisitionsAnacquisitionor“buyout”programcanresultinupgradedhous-ing,additionalopenspaceandqualityfloodprevention.Keepanopenmindabouttheseprograms.ConsultationwithDESPP/DEMHSisrecommended.



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CTPost:PointBeach,Milford,CT.

9. HEALTHIMPACTASSESSMENTS(HIAS)ANDACQUISITIONInastudyforHoboken,Rutgerspreparedareport,basedonsurveyresults,thattrackedresidents’attitudestowardsrepetitivelocalfloodingaswellasadesireforopenspaceandreducedrisk.Thissurveyallowedresidentsandplannerstoassessflooding’simpactonhealth.Thestudyalsoas-sessedpublicandgovernmentalattitudesaboutacquisitionandothermitigationactivities.Suchsurveyscanhelpcommunitystakeholdersarriveatsolutionsthatmitigateriskandincreasecommu-nityresiliencyandoverallhealth.Thesurveyhelpsresidentstounderstandboththehumanandfinancialtollofrepetitivefloodingbyaskingquestionsaboutmissedtimeatwork,missedmedicalappointments,changesindietandex-erciseaswellasmentalstressduetoflooding.Thisinformation,combinedwithdataonactualcostsassociatedwithminorfloodinglosses,helpresidentsunderstandtherealitiesoflivinginflood-proneareas.Additionally,thesesurveyshelpplannersgaugeattitudestowardsestablishinggreenwaysaswellasprovidingunderstandingonwhattypesofacquisitionprogramsmightmotivateresidentstomoveoutofvulnerableareas.RutgershasalsousedHIAstoassistrecoveryplannersandmunicipalleaderstobetterunderstandtheirownattitudesandmunicipalcosts—bothshort-termandlong-term—ofpropertyacquisition.Inastudyforpost-SandyacquisitionforMysticIsland,Rutgerspublishedreportundertheir“Plan-ningHealthyCommunitiesInitiatives”thatprovidesdecision-makerswithanopportunitytounder-standtheimpactsofdecisionsonaffectedcommunities,andtoconsiderrecommendationsforhowtheproposedactivitiesandchangescanbestsupportpublichealth,healthequity,andenvironmen-taljustice.See(https://bit.ly/2BXQ6cN).Inthisreportitwassuggested,basedontheirsurveys:



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• Buyoutsshouldbeclusteredinageographicareathatresultingreatestpotentialtoreducestorm-relatedimpacts.(i.e.,mostvulnerabletostormimpactsandfewestelevatedhomes)

• Socialservices,particularlymentalhealthservices,shouldbeincludedasacomplementtoabuyoutprogramandtargetedtolowerincome,lesseducatedpopulations

• Buyoutprogramsshouldbefundedandreadilyactivatedandofferedtoresidentsquicklyafterstorm-relateddisastersoccur

• Usesforthenewopenspacethatwillprovidephysicalhealthbenefitsandgatheringplacesforcommunity-buildingandpubliceventsshouldbeconsidered

• Focusonkeyriskareasandat-riskpopulationsinplanningforacquisition

Theeffectsofpost-disasterrecoveryonspecificvulnerablesub-populationsincluded:• Prioritizationofbuyoutareasbasedonhealthandriskreduction,consideringsociallyvul-

nerablepopulations• Quantifytheimpactofopenspaceonnuisanceflooding• Impactofbuyoutsonneighborhoodquality-of-lifefactors• Healthimpactsforhouseholdswhoacceptbuyouts• Effectsofresiliencystrategiesonlocalandregionaleconomy• Comparisonofresiliencestrategiesvs.doingnothing(opportunitycost)



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10. DEFININGANDFOSTERINGCOMMUNITY&MUNICIPALRESILIENCEAsapartoftheirmitigationplanning,Connecticutcommunitiesarerequiredtoassessarearisks.ThesereviewshelpEmergencyManagementDirectorsdevelopactionableresponseplansandiden-tifyemergencyresourcesandcapacities.Hazardmitigationplanningalsoinvolvesdevisingstrate-giesforbuildingandlandusethatreflecttheneedtomovetowardsmoresustainablecommunities.RiskAssessmentsIndevelopingdisasterrecoveryplansbasedonriskassessmentsandmitigationplans,plannersshouldassesscommunityresiliencywithsimilarurgency.Researchintocommunityresiliencehasidentifieddifferentresourcesthatdefinehowwellacommunityispoisedtorecoverfromdisaster:

1. Socialcapital,measuredbythelevelsoftrustandengagementamongcommunitymem-bers;itisthestrengthofthesetypesofrelationshipsthatcomprisethesenseofcommunitythatleadstogreaterresiliencythroughgreateraccesstoresourcesandsocialsupport.

2. Economiccapital,notonlyaboutoverallincome,savingsandemploymentbutalsothede-greeinwhicheconomiccapitalisdisbursedamongdiverseandvulnerablepopulations.

3. Naturalcapital,thenaturalenvironmentofthecommunityandincludestheabilityofthecommunityandindividualstowithstandtheeffectsofadisaster.Thisincludeshazardre-ductionactivities,includingprotectingvitalresourcesandinfrastructure,elevatinghomesordis-allowingdevelopmentinareasofhighrisk.

4. Communitycompetence,thecapabilityoflocalandstatepoliticalleaders,businessesandcommunityorganizationstomanageintimesofcrisesandtoworkcollaboratively

(fromHowFirmResponsestoNaturalDisasterStrengthenCommunityResilience:AStakeholder-BasedPerspective,SAGE,2016.Seehttp://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1086026616629794)(https://bit.ly/2Fojko3)HallmarksofResilientCommunities:

• Engagementatthecommunitylevel,includingasenseofcohesivenessandneighborhoodinvolvementorintegration

• Partnershipamongorganizationsandbusinesses,includingintegratedpre-eventplanning,exercises,andagreements

• Sustainedlocalleadershipsupportedbypartnershipwithstateandfederalgovernment• Effectiveandculturallyrelevanteducationaboutrisks• RapidrestorationofservicesandsocialnetworksIndividual-levelpreparednessandself-suf-

ficiency• Targetedstrategiesthatempowerandengagevulnerablepopulations• Financialresiliencyoffamiliesandbusinesses,andefficientleveragingofresourcesforre-

covery.



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Withanunderstandingofboththestrengthandweaknessesofcommunities,recoveryplannerscanundertakestepsthatwillhelptobolsterresiliency.NaturalCapitalandHazardReductionSealevelriseandtheeffectsofclimatechangeonweathermayforcepopulationstomigrateawayfromrepetitivefloodareas.SealevelsinNewEnglandarerisingatanalarmingrate,yetpost-Sandyrebuildingremainedprimarilyfocusedonrebuildinginplace.Municipalitiesarerequiredtohave(orbeincludedinamulti-jurisdictional)FEMA-approvedNaturalHazardMitigationPlantobeeligibleforfederaldisasterfunding.Inclusiveplanningthatmovesto-wardsgreatercoastalresiliencythroughacombinationofmitigationandreductionofhousingden-sityinhighriskareasisencouraged.AcquisitionofrepetitivelosspropertiesinConnecticutisoftenlargelybasedontheeconomicreali-tiesofthehomeownersandmaynotbereflectiveoflong-termplanningbymunicipalleaders.Itistimetomovetowardsinclusiveriskreductionplanning,incoordinationwithresidents,whileatthesametimeidentifyinganddevelopingaffordablehousingoptionsawayfromhigh-riskareas.WhileindividualhomesrecentlyrebuilttoFEMAstandardsmaybeabletowithstandthenextdisas-ter,manyarestillnotresilient.Municipalitiesthatrelyontaxproceedsfromcoastalareascouldfindthemselvesfacingleantimesshouldtheseareasbestruckbyanotherstorm;preplanningisawaytochartafuturethatallowstownstoremainvitallongintothefuture.Eveninareaswherehomesweremitigated,riskremainsduetopotentialhurricanes,continualbeachandlanderosion.Communitiesshouldlookto:

• Zoningchangesthatencouragelessdensityinriskareas• Community-widemeetingstodiscusspost-disasteroptionsforhomeowners• Community-wideengagementinplanningresilientcommunities

Communitiesmustcharttheirownfuturethroughatransparentandinclusiveapproachtohazardreductionplanning.IncreasingSocialCapitalFollowingSandy,communitiesthathaddevelopedapre-disastersocialcohesivenesswerebetterabletomeetthechallengesofrecovery.IncommunitiesthroughouttheState,localorganizations—particularlythoseinbeachcommunities—providedadvocacynotjustwithlocalleadersbutattheStateandFederallevel.Recoverycoordinatorsandlocalleaderscanrelyonthesegroupstohelpgetinformationouttothecommunityandtohelprecoverypersonnelbetterunderstandtheobsta-clestorecovery.Localfaith-basedorganizationsassistedtheirlocalresidentsbyprovidingspiritualcareandmaterialassistance.State-wide,theUnitedWayprovideddirectfunding.InbothBridgeportandMilford,UnitedWayhelpedguidethedevelopmentandoperationoftheLTRGs.Butmorecouldhavebeendone.Manylocalorganizationsmaynothaveknownhowtheycouldhelp.Asthelocalchairmanof



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aphilanthropicorganizationsaid:“Ididn’tknowthatanyoneneededanythingbecausenooneasked.”TheStateDisasterRecoveryFrameworkidentifiesrolesandestablishesrecoverypartnershipsonalocal,regional,stateandfederallevel.Long-termrecoveryshouldbeincorporatedintostate-wideemergencydrills.Throughexercises,municipalitieswillbetterunderstandhowthesepartnershipsworkandwillbeabletoanticipategapsinavailableresources.Individualresiliencyshouldbepromotedbyprovidinginformationtoresidents,especiallythoseinhigh-riskareas,onthecostsassociatedwithpost-disasterreconstruction.Itwasfoundthatpeoplenotonlyunder-assessedrisk(“Ithasn’tfloodedhereinover50years”)butunder-assessedcosts(evenwithinsurance)associatedwithadevastatingloss.EconomicCapitalAcentraldefiningfactorinestablishingwhichresidentswouldbeconsideredvulnerableisincome.Thecostsassociatedwithdisasterarehigh,muchhigherthanmostpeoplemayassume.Middlein-comefamilieswerejustaschallengedtomeetthesecostsaslower-incomeresidents.HousingcostsintheStateremainhighasdotransportationcosts.Formanyresidentshousingcostswereoverone-thirdoftheirmonthlyincome.ThisfactissupportedbyUnitedWay’sALICEreport(AssetLim-ited,IncomeConstrained,Employed),whichfindsthat35%offamiliesarestrugglingtogetby.Housingcoststakeuptoomuchofafamily’sincome;theresultbeingthatevenmiddle-incomefamiliesareunabletorecoverfromdisasterswithoutsignificantoutsidefinancialassistance.Thelackofaffordablehousingoptionsacrossthestateremainsanimpedimentforeasinghousingdensityinmanycoastalareas,andremainsabarrierforolderorlower-incomepeopletomoveoutofrepetitivelossareas.CommunityCompetenceTheabilityoflocalleadershiptomanagepost-disasterisincreasedwhenleadersundertakedisasterpreplanningandcapacitybuilding.Disasters,especiallyweatherrelated,aremoreandmorefre-quent;yetlocalleadersneedtolearntoaddresstheurgentandlong-termneedsoftheirresidents.Thereareresourcesincludingagrowingnumberofstudiesonrecoveryprocessesandthereneedstobecontinualimprovementsandintegrationofbestpracticesaswellasaneedforbetterrecov-erytoolsandeducation.

• CTRiseshasdevelopedsoftwaretoolsthatallowforamoreintegratedapproachtoclientrecoveryandresourceplanning.Thesetoolsallowforamoretransparenttrackingofneedsanddemographics,whileallowingforbetterdonationsandvolunteermanagement.

FederalandStateguidanceandcoordinationthroughtheDisasterRecoveryFrameworkandtheStateLong-TermRecoveryCommitteehashelpedcommunitiesbetterrespondtodisasters.Thefo-cusonpreplanningandcapacitybuildingbyState,RegionalandLocalRecoveryCoordinatorswilldomuchtoincreasecommunityresiliency.



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IndividualResiliencyandSelf-AssessmentAnoverlookedaspectofpreparednessandresiliencyismakingsureresidentsunderstandnotonlytherisksandproceduresforkeepingthemselvessafe,butthattheyunderstandwhattheywillbefacingintheeventofadevastatingevent.InSandy,residentsandmunicipalleadersforthemostpart,wereunawareofthetruecostsofthisdisaster.OperationHope,anationalorganizationfocusingonempoweringunderservedcommunities,haspreparedanonlinetoolkitforassessingpersonaldisasterresiliency(https://bit.ly/2wxCBwx).Thistypeofframeworkwasusedattownmeetingswithresidents.Theyreviewedthecostsassoci-atedwithdisplacementandrebuilding,aswellasthelimitationsofinsurance,andtheaddedcostsofmandatedmitigation.TakenabackbythefinancialimplicationsofadisastersuchasIreneandSandy,residentsbegantoconsiderundertakingmitigationactivitiespriortoadisaster,ortocon-sideroptionsforre-locationawayfromhigh-riskareas.Ifmorefundingwasavailabletohelplowerincomeresidentsmitigateandsecuretheirhomeswithactivitiessuchasrelocatingmechanicalstohigherlevels,itcouldgreatlyreduceoverallcommunityrecoverycosts.Understandingtheimplicationsoflong-termdisplacement(aswellastheimplicationsforreales-tatevaluesandincreasedcostsforinsurance),helpspeoplemakebetterdecisionsregardingthelong-termviabilityoflivinginhigh-riskareasandencouragespre-eventmitigationactivities.Resi-dentswholiveintheseareasneedtohaveanunderstandingoftheobstaclesandchallengestheywillfaceshouldadisasteroccur.Itisimportantthatmunicipalrecoveryplannersunderstandwhatindividualsmayfaceinpost-disas-terrebuilding,including:

• Howlongthefamilycanbesustainediftheyarepayingrentforalongperiodoftime(inadeclareddisaster,residentsmaybeabletosecurerentalassistancethroughFEMAduringthefirst18months)

• Awarenessofmitigationcosts.Dependingontheavailabilityoffunding,themajorityofmiti-gationcostsmaybetheresponsibilityofthehomeowner(thereis$30KavailablethroughNFIP/ICC)

• AwarenessthatfloodinsurancepoliciescoverReplacementCostValueonly• Floodinsuranceorhomeowners’insurancepremiumsmayincreaseduetoafloodloss• Propertyandhomevalues,particularlyinrepetitivelossareas,maygodown• Residentsmaynotbeabletokeepupwithincreasedinsurancecostsandpossibleincreases

inpropertytaxes• ResidentsneedanunderstandingofSBA’sDisasterLoanProgramsinadeclareddisaster;

theseloansareavailableonlytothosewithgoodcreditandincome;andareonlyavailabletorepairhomeandbringitbacktoitspre-stormcondition(excludesrent,andmitigationprojects).SBAloansareavailableunderaMajorDisasterDeclaration,authorizingIndividualAssistanceandforsmallerdisastersfollowinganSBAdisasterdeclaration.



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• Whilethereareprogramsthathelpwithsomeofthecostsassociatedwithacatastrophiclossintheeventofdeclareddisaster(andsomefundinginnon-declared),residentsarefac-ingalongroadtorecoverywithoutofpocketcoststhatcanexceedtheirsavings.

• OperationHopeusesanonlinequestionnairetohelpresidentsfindtheirresiliencyscore;basedonthatassessmentandwhatresidentsexperiencedpostSandy,thefollowingguid-ancewasdeveloped:

Self-AssessmentGuidetoResiliency

• Howsecureisyouremployment?• Doyouliveinadesignatedfloodplain,andifso,doesyourhomemeetallcurrentcodesfor

homesinafloodplain?• Doyouhavesufficientsavingsthatyoucanaccessintheeventoflong-termdisplacement?• Doyouhaveagoodcreditscore,sufficientincomeandemploymentrecordsshouldyou

needtosecurealoan,realizingthathomeequitymaynothelpifyourhomeisbadlydam-aged?

• Areyoufullyawareofwhatyourinsurancepoliciesdoanddon’tcover?• Doyouhaveenoughcoveragetocoverthecostsofseveredamage?• Insuranceproceedsareusually,formajorlosses,providedasareimbursementandcanbe

usedonlyfordesignatedrepairs,notlivingcostsorothercostsnotcoveredbyyourpolicy.• Ifyoucannotreturntoyourhome,doyouknowwhereyouwillbeabletolivefor3months

ormore?• Doyouhaveaccesstopropertransportationifyouarelivingawayfromyourhome?• Willyourchildrenhaveaccesstotransportationtoandfromschool?• Willyoubeabletomanageyourpets?• Forthosewithlimitedmobility;whataretheavailabilityofsuitableaccommodations?• Doyouknowwhatthebuildingrequirementsareforyourareashouldyouneedtounder-

takemajorrepairsorrebuilding?• Doyourequirewaiversfornon-conforminguses,suchason-siteapartmentsorstructures?• Areyouawareoffloodplainbuildingcodesincludingelevationheights?• Areyouuptodateonmortgageandtaxpayments?Delinquenciesmaycauseyoutobeuna-

bletoaccessinsurancepaymentsortobeginrebuilding• Doyouknowhowmuchmoneyitwouldtaketorebuildyourhome(andmitigateifre-

quired)andhowmuchmoneymayberequiredtoliveelsewherewhileyourhomeisbeingrebuilt?(Infloodzones,NFIPonlycoversACVanddoesnotcovermitigation).

• Onceahomeisrebuilt;theremaybeadditionalon-goingcostssuchasincreasedpropertytaxes,andincreasesininsurance—isincomesufficienttobearthesecosts?

• Ifyouarearenter,doyouhaverenters/contentsinsurance?• Asarenter,doyouhavethefinancialabilitytorelocate—considerthecostsofmoving;first

andlastmonths’rentandsecuritydeposits?• Asarenter,doyouhaveacredithistorythatwillallowyoutosecurearentalunit?



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BestPractices:communityself-assessmentImportanttotaketheaboveself-assessmenttest.Shareitwithcommissions,localcivicorganizationsandanyoneinvolvedinyourtown–itcangiveyouanideaastohowpreparedyouandyourcitizensarefordisaster.

IndividualandFamilyVulnerabilitiesThestressofadisastercancausesignificantchallengesforanyone,butitisespeciallydifficultforourmostvulnerablecitizens,theelderly,thepoor(includingtheworkingpoor),thosewithphysicalormentalillness,orthosewhohavefunctionalneeds.Notsurprisinglymanyoftheseresidentsliveinolder,smallerhomeswhicharemorelikelytoincursubstantialdamageinastorm.Itwasalsofoundthatanumberoflowerincomeresidents,particu-larlytheelderly,didnotcarryinsurance.

"…peoplewhoarepoor,disconnected,ill-educated,old,orinfirmdonothavetheluxuryofinformation,counsel,time,andaccesstopower.Conse-quently,manypoorfolkswereabletoreadilyaccessimmediatefood,clothingandshelter,butdidnotmakethebestjudgmentsaboutlong-termdecisionsrelativetothingslikeemploymentandhousing."—DennisDeMers,executivedirector,TVOC

PlanningforVulnerablePopulationsPre-eventplanningthattakesintoaccountthechallengesofrecovery,includingvulnerablepopula-tions,shouldbecoordinatedwithlocal,regionalandstateagenciesandNGOs.Planningandrecov-eryshouldincludethefollowing:

• CentersforIndependentLivingandotherorganizationsthatsupportpeoplewithfunctionalneeds

• Seniorcentersandsenioradvocacygroups• Local,regionalandstatetransportationdepartments• Mentalhealthprofessionalsandagenciesandsocialserviceorganizations• Faith-basedorganizations• Children’sadvocatesandlocalchildcarecenters• Seniorhousingauthorities,localandstate

Conductingcommunity-widemeetingswithafocusonmitigationandrecoveryoptionsshouldbeheldpre-disaster.Post-disaster,RecoveryCoordinatorsshouldincludeadvocatesforchallengedpopulationsinlong-termrecoverygroupsattheStateandlocallevel.Ananalysisofpost-disasterunmetneedsresourcedthroughcharitableprovidersshowsthefollowing:



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• 65%ofthosereceivingassistancewereover65yearsofagewithhousingbeingtheirmostcriticalneed

• 80%ofseniorsreceivingassistancehadincomesbelowAMI(areamedianincome)• 80%ofallseniorswhorequiredassistancehadoneormorefamilymemberswhosuffered

fromachronicillnessorfunctionalneed• 55%ofseniorsreceivingsomeformofassistancelivedalone• Morethan65%ofthoseseekingNGOservicesmadebelow$65,000ayear• Itisestimatedthatnearlytwo-thirdsofthosereceivingcasemanagementwereuninsured

orhadreceivedinsurancecompensationthatwasmorethan30%lessthanthecostofre-pairorrebuild

• Themajorityofcharitablefundingorganizationssupportedhousingwithaveragehousingcostsat$1,700andaveragedurationmorethan12months.

Lackofaffordablehousinginmanyareashavemadeitdifficultforseniorstorelocateawayfromhigh-riskareas.Overhalfofresidents65andolder,hadmortgagesthatwerepaid-offandamajor-ityofthosethathadmortgageswerepayinglessthan$800amonth.Manyofthehomeswereover75yearsoldandlocatedindenselypopulatedareasnearbeachesorinlow-lyingareas.Italsowasnotunusualtofindthosewhohadnomortgageshadoptedforforegoinsurancecoverage.Manyhaddeepconnectionstotheircommunity.Thosewhodidnotdriveorownacar,wereeitherinwalkingdistanceofstores,orhadnearbyfriendswhocouldassist.AmajorityofSandyaffectedseniorresidentsreceivingdisastercasemanagementserviceslivedaloneandhadtofacedisplacementandrebuildingontheirown.

• Anumberofseniorshadreversemortgages.Thisformofhomeloanmadeitpossiblefortheseresidentstoaffordpropertytaxesandhaveenoughincometosupportthemselveswhilelivingintheirownhome.However,whentheirhomesweresubstantiallydamaged,theylostthemonthlyequitypayments.Somewereatriskofforeclosureduetostipulationsintheirreversemortgagecontractsthattheymustliveinthehome.

• Itwasclearthatwithoutthebenefitsofthereversemortgage,theseresidentswerenotsus-tainable.Moreover,anumberofresidentsfacedadditionalcostsassociatedwithrebuildingincludinghigherpropertytaxesandhomeowners’insurance(duetotheincreasedvalueoftheirhomesoncetheywererebuilt).

• Inacoupleofcases,theseresidentslookedtoacquisitionthroughprogramssuchasFEMAsHazardMitigationGrantProgram,HMGP.However,theassessedvalueandfinalpayoutwasnotenoughtoprovideenoughmoneyforhousingthatwasaffordableorforlivingexpenses(seesectiononHMGPacquisition).Somehomevalueshaddeclinedin2014duetothere-cession;andinMilfordandotherareasparticularly,StormIrenehadanegativeeffectonareaprices.HMGPassessmentsarebasedonpre-Sandylandvalues.

Forthoseclientsonfixedincomes,itwasnotfeasibletorelocateprimarilybecauseofalackofaf-fordablehousingoptions.Otherconcernssuchaslossofcommunitysupportplayedarole;butasit



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wasformanyotherresidentsmakinghardchoicespost-disaster,itcamedowntoeconomics.Asex-pensiveandtime-consumingasrebuildingandmitigationwas,forthoseonfixedincomes,pro-gramssuchasCDBG-DROORRwastheonlyeconomicallyviablesolution.Thebestoutcomeforthehealthandwell-beingofthehomeowner,wouldhavebeentorelocateawayfromareasofrepeti-tiveflooding.Servicesthatenableindividualswithaccessandfunctionalneedstomaintaintheirindependenceiscriticallyimportantduringallphasesofdisaster.Servicesneededmayincludedurablemedicalequipment,personalassistanceservices,andcommunicationassistanceanddevices.Legalrequire-ments,toinclude,butnotlimitedtotheADA,FairHousingAct,RehabAct,etc.,forinclusion,inte-grationandequalopportunityarenotwaivedduringdisasteroremergencysituations.OtherConsiderationsAtsomepointduringthecourseofrecovery,clientswouldexperienceanxiety,depressionandotheremotionalissuesmakingithardforthemtofocusontheirrecovery,ontheirjobsandfamily.Forthemostpart,DisasterCaseManagersdidnothavetrainingnecessarytodealwiththesetypesofissues.Chronicmentalhealthissues,complicatedtheworkofcasemanagersanddelayed,orde-railedrecovery.

• Thosewhohoardarelesslikelytoallowoutsidersintotheirhomes.Embarrassmentandconcernthattheirpossessionswillbeconfiscatedaretheprimaryreasonsforthosewhohoardtoavoidassistance.

• Volunteers,bothlocalandstate-wide,providedassistance,butitwasverydifficulttolocateavailablementalhealthprofessionalsthatcouldworkwiththefamily.Whilethehomewasmadesafe,ittooktheeffortsoflocalsocialservicesdepartments,themayor’sofficeandcityattorneytomakementalhealthservicesavailable.Whentheprojectwasdone,casemanagersneededassurancethattherewouldbecontinuingassistanceforthefamily.

• Low-costorfreementalhealthservicesinConnecticut,havewaitinglistsof4to6months.Casemanagersandlocalrecoverygroupshaddifficultyaccessingtheseservicesforfamiliesinneed.

• SSBG(SocialServicesBlockGrant)providedgrantfundingformentalhealthservicesthroughCatholicCharities.Whiletheprogramwashelpful,itwasshort–livedandsomecli-entswhowerebenefitingwereleftwithoutserviceswhentheprogramended.(Therewerenootheragenciesorfundingtoprovidecontinuingmentalhealthservices).

• Spiritualcareisanimportantcomponentofrecovery,60%ofthosefacingcrisislooktoreli-giousorganizationsforhelp

Bridgeport,post-disaster,wasabletoutilizetheirfaith-basedcommunitytohelplocateresidentsinneedanditwasthroughtheirCommunityEmergencyResponseTeams(CERT)thattheywereabletoprovidetranslationservices.PostSandy,door-to-doorcanvassershelplocateresidentswhoforamyriadofreasonshadbeenhesitanttoreachoutforhelp.Formunicipalities,thegreatestconcernismakingsurethatresidentsandtheirfamiliesaresafeandthatmessagehastobemadecleartoallimpactedresidents.



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ChronicHealthConditionsInSandy,thepervasivenessofmoldwasnoted.InMilfordandinothermunicipalities,localhealthdepartmentsworkedwiththeircommunityandlong-termrecoverygroupstogetthewordoutaboutthedangersofmold.InMilford,effortsincludedensuringthateducatorsandschoolnurseswereawareofmoldrelatedrespiratorysymptoms.Moldcanthreatenthosewhohaverespiratoryillnessesorsevereallergies.PetsAnoverlookedpopulationispets.Formanyofus,ourpetsareconsideredpartofourfamily.Fortheelderlyandchildren,especiallythosewhoareill,petsprovidedneededcompanionship.Chil-drenwithfunctionalneeds,includingautism,sometimesusepetstoregulatestressandcalmthem-selves.Petsgivetheelderlycompanyandsomethingtocarefor,aswellasprovidinganoppor-tunityforexerciseandsocialization.ChildrenandSingle-ParentHouseholdsChildrenareoftenbufferedfromstressbyresilientadultswhoprotectthemthroughtheperiodoftraumaandrecovery.However,thelongerrecoverytakesandthemorestressfultheprocessis,itbecomesmoredifficultfortheadultstoremainaresilientbufferforthechildren.Afterweeks,months,andevenyearsofwaitingforthesituationtoimprove,parentswhowereoncestrongbegintolosetheirabilitytoprovideanemotionalandfunctionalsafetynetfortheirchildren.Chil-drenmaybedisplacedfromtheirneighborhoodfriendsandsurroundings.Theymaybelivingincrowdedconditionsinrentalortransienthousing.Theyalsomaybemissingoutonextra-curricularandsocialactivitiesduetofinancialhardshipscausedbythedisaster.

• Approximately30%ofhouseholdsreceivingassistancethroughdisastercasemanagementweresingleparenthomes,with10%ofthosehomeshavingaseniorasthesoleguardian.

Followingadisaster,childrenmayremaininahomethathasbeendamaged.Incaseofadisasterthathasincludedflooding,moldmaybepresentinthehouse.Thiscancausewheezing,shortnessofbreath,sorethroats,flu-likeachesandpains,andfatigue.Itcanalsoexacerbateasthma.Actingoutinclass,withdrawalfromactivity,physicalsymptoms(headaches,vomiting,rashes),andanxietyordepressioncanbesomeoftheissueschildrenmayexhibit.HousingLimitedhousingoptions,asdiscussed,remainsamajorissueforthestate.Post-disaster,thisposesbarrierstorelocatingresidentsortohelpresidentsgaingreaterresiliencyandindependence.Wholecommunityplanningisneededineverycommunitythatisinclusiveofallpopulationsandisincompliancewithlegalrequirements,specificallyprovidingequalaccesstopeoplewithaccessandfunctionalneeds.Itisimportanttonotethatindividualscannotberesilientwithoutprovidingequalaccess.



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LowtoModerateIncomePopulationsForthosemakingfundingdecisionsonbehalfofcharitableorganizations,helpingpeoplegetbacktosafe,secureandsanitaryhomeswascomplicatedbyresidents’lackofeconomicstability.TropicalStormSandystruckConnecticutatthemid-pointofthegreatrecession.Middle-incomeandlower-incomefamiliesinthestatewerestruggling,asfamilieswerethroughouttheUS.Thefollowingisanexamplethatisrepresentativeofresidentialbarrierstorecovery:Asinglemotherwithateenageddaughtersoughtassistancetopayforstorm-relateddamagetoherhomefromBridgeport’sunmetneedstable.Shehadlostherjobseveralmonthsagoandhadnoimmedi-atejobprospects.

• Fundersatthetablequestionedthereasonablenessofpayingfortheneededrepairs,know-ingthatthehomeownerwasunabletopaythemortgage.Mortgagepaymentswerealreadyinarrearsandtheunmetneedsgrouprecognizedthatthehomemightmovetoforeclosure.

• Theresidents’inabilitytokeepupwithmortgagepaymentswasnotbecauseofthedisasterandthereforeoutsideofSandyrecoverycriteria.Atfirst,thefundersoptedoutoffundingbasedonthecriteriatheyhadsetforreceivingassistance:allassistanceneededtobeforSandy-relatedunmetneeds.

• However,intheend,funderswentforwardwithprovidingfundingforrepairand2monthsofmortgageassistance.Theunmetneedscommitteealsoreachedouttoalocalbankertohelpwithamodificationoftheresident’smortgage.

• Fundersoptedtopayfornon-Sandyrelateddebt:• Themortgageandthetaxesonthehomewere$950permonth.Thecommitteefeltthatit

wasunlikelythatiftheresidentlostherhome,sheandherdaughterwouldbeabletofindarentalthatwasasaffordable.Forthecityandforthecommunity,helpingtheresidentfindawaytomeetherhousingobligationsseemedabetteralternative.

Decisionssuchastheseweremadefrequentlyatunmetneedstablethroughoutrecovery.Inthestate,thereisalackofaffordablehousingcoupledwithpoorlocaltransportation;opportunitiesforlow-tomoderate-incomefamiliesto‘downsize’inmanycasessimplydoesnotexist.UnitedWayconductedanALICEsurvey,(AssetLimited,IncomeConstrained,Employed).Accordingtothisstudy,10%ofConnecticuthouseholdsliveinpovertyand35%ofresidentsstruggletogetby.Accordingtothesurvey,ALICEhouseholdsrepresentacross-sectionofthepopulationthatincludesallraces,ethnicities,agesandpeoplefromeverycityandtowninConnecticut.



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See:https://alice.ctunitedway.org/files/2016/01/HousingBudget-600x491.png(https://bit.ly/2Mew18k)

ThesefactsdemonstratethevulnerabilityofmanyofConnecticut’sresidentstoanydisruption.Ac-cordingtheALICEsurvey,afamilyoffour,tobesustainable,musthaveayearlyincomeof$64,689ayear($5,391amonth).

• Duringanunmetneedsmeetingwhereaquestionaroseregardingaclient’ssustainability,afunderaskedhowmanypeopleintheroomcouldpaytheirrentormortgageiftheymissed1or2paychecks.Overhalfthepeopleintheroomraisedtheirhands.

GiventheresultsoftheALICEstudyandwhatwaslearnedfromSandyrecovery,abetterunder-standingisgainedonthepotentialimpactsamajordisastereventcouldhaveonresidents,localcommunitiesandthestate.Formanypeople,theirhomereflectedmostoftheirwealth.This“wealth”providedasafetynet,awaytoaffordretirementwhenthetimecame,orquickmoneyshouldtheyencountereconomicdif-ficulties.Asourceofmoneytheycouldrealizewithanequityloanorquicksell.Butsubstantiallydamagedhomesorhomesinareaswheretherehasbeenextensivedamagehavelittleequity(atleastwithinthefirst3yearspost-disaster,andlongerinsomeareassuchastheCoseyBeachareaofEastHaven).

• Aresident,whosehomewassubstantiallydamaged,wasalsothesolesupporterforase-verelydisabledchild.Insurancepaymentsforthedamagebarelycoveredrepaircosts(theresidentreceived$100,000),anddidnotcovermostofthecostsassociatedwithelevation.(TheState’sCDBG-DRprogramestimatedrepairandmitigationstobe$425,000).

• Thehomeowner,recognizingthatevenifshecouldaffordtorebuildandmitigate,accesstothehomeforherdisabledsonwouldbetoodifficult(duetostairs),optedtoputthehome



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onthemarket.Thebestofferforthehomewas$30,000.Thisoffer,plustheproceedsfromtheinsurancesettlement,wouldnotcovertheamountdueonhermortgage,norallowhertoprovidealternativehousingforherselfandherson.

• Thisresident,whoseincomewas$70,000,had,priortothestormbeenself-sufficient.Post-storm,shewaslookingatforeclosureinacommunitywithfewaffordablehousingoptions.

TheALICEstudyservestohighlightthatAMIandpovertynumbersarepoorguidestoassessingwhoshouldreceivecharitableassistance.ManyresidentswereaboveAMI(40%),butweredemonstra-blyunabletomanagetheout-of-pocketcostsofdisplacementorrepair.DuetofocusonAMI,someoftheseresidentsmayhavebeenunderserved.

• SandyrecoveryassistancethroughAmericanRedCross-fundedunmetneedsgroupswascappedat$12,000.

• Exceptionsweremadeonlyincasesofincomeatorbelow80%ofAMI,ifthefamilyhadafamilymemberwithafunctionalneed.

• Considerationwasalsogiventosingleparentfamilies.Thistypeofincome-centriccriteriaforeligibilityisnotunique.

• Deeperanalysisofneedsandvulnerabilitiesinestablishingeligibilityforassistanceisen-couraged.

DisasterLoanprogramssuchasSBAmaybeavailabletohomeownerswhoneedassistancewiththereconstructionormitigationoftheirhome.Manymiddle-to-lowtoincomehouseholdsdidnothavetheincomeorcredit-worthinessneededtosecuretheselow-interestloans.Thesamewastrueforotherloanprograms,suchasShoreUp!Connecticut.Manyresidentshadtheirwealthtiedupintheirhomes.Oncethehomeslosttheirequity,home-ownersthatweresustainableandabletoplanforthefuture,wereleftfacingsomethingtheyneverthoughttheywouldhavetoface:foreclosureandinsomecases,homelessness.Challenges

• Lackofclearinformationandconfusingpaperworkforresidents—particularlyamongvul-nerablepopulations

• Lackofaccesstomentalandspiritualcare—especiallycareforyoungchildren• Unsafelivingconditions—particularlyinhomesthathaddevelopedmold• Languageandculturalbarriers• Reachingthosethataremarginalized• Inabilityofresidentstoremaininacommunity“theyknow”



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11. BUSINESSPREPAREDNESS&COMMUNITYRECOVERYTheeconomicvitalityofacommunityisacentralcomponentofrecovery.Economiccapital(anditsdisbursementthroughoutthecommunity,Sage,2018)isameasureofacommunity’sresiliency.Amunicipalitydependsonitsbusinessesfortaxrevenueandforprovidingeconomicgrowthandop-portunities.Forthemostpart;centralbusinessdistrictsweresparedfromthetypeofdevastationthataffectedareasofNewYorkandNewJersey.However,giventhepotentialfordisruptionofbusinessopera-tionsandthepossibleeffectsthatamajordisasterwouldhaveoncommunityandstateeconomicvitality,businessandeconomicdevelopmentagencyinvolvementinpre-disasterplanningisencour-aged.Accordingtoastudyconductedin2007of2,500businesses,71%ofsmallbusinessesdidnothaveadisasterplaninplace;64%felttheydidnotneedone.Forrecoverytomoveforward,pre-planningfocusedonbusinesspreparednessandrecoveryisvital.Thecosttoconductpre-planningissmallcomparedwithpotentialdollarslostfollowingadisaster.TheU.S.ChamberofCommerceanditsBusinessCivicLeadershipCenterhasprovidedguidancetolocalchambersofcommerceandbusinessesontheimportanceofpreparednessandtherolesthatbusinessescanplayindisasterrecovery.“Inmanycases,protectingtheirbusinessoperationsinor-dertogetbackupandrunningquicklyafteradisasteristhebestthingtodoforitscommunity,”writeStephenJordanandGeraldMcSwiggan(USChamberofCommerceBusinessCivicLeadershipCenter,CorporateexpertiseinDisaster).(SeeAppendix3,Toolbox:BusinessPreparednessGuide)FormerFEMAdirector,CraigFugatelaudedthe“incrediblerestorativefunctionofbusinesses.”Onebenefitofsupportinglocalbusinessoperationsistheassistancetheycanprovidewithdeliveringwaterorotherneededresources.Municipalleaders,EmergencyManagementDirectorsandeco-nomicdevelopmentorganizationsonaFederal,Stateandlocallevel,shouldincorporatebusinessesintotheiremergencypreparedness,responseandrecoveryplans.AmodelsuchastheBEOCcanhelpcommunity’srecoverandensurearevitalizedbusinesscommunity.

DisastersandBusinessStudies,includingfromFEMAandtheUSSmallBusinessAd-ministrationfindthat40%ofbusinessesdonotreopenafteradisasterandanother25%fail.Upwardsof90%ofbusi-

nessesfailwithintwoyearsafterbeingstruckbyadisaster



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BruceMoeller,citymanagerofSunrise,Florida,saysopencommunicationwiththebusinesscom-munityisessential."Thecitymanagerneedstohaveafrankdiscussionwiththebusinesscommu-nityregardingtheimportanceofbusinesscontinuityplansintheeventofadisaster,"Moellersays."Thisisparticularlytruewithsmallbusinessestohelpthemunderstandhowtopreparetorecoverquicklyafteradisaster."ExamplesofBusinessesActiveinDisasterResponseandRecoveryMajorbusinessessuchasWalmartandWaffleHousehavegrowntheirrolesinresponseandrecov-ery.IntheaftermathofHurricaneKatrina,LouisianadevelopedtheLouisianaGovernor’sOfficeandHomelandSecurityandEmergencyPreparedness(GOHSEP)andlaterthedevelopmentoftheBusi-nessEmergencyOperationsCenter(BEOC)whichwasnamedabestpracticebytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.Thedirectivewastosupporttheresiliencyofbusinessesandusetheircapabili-tiesindisasterresponsewheneverpossible(USChamberofCommerceFoundation,Public-PrivateCollaboration:SixYearsafterHurricaneKatrina,June20,2012).“Thisintegration…enablesgovernmenttoleveragethecapabilitiesoftheprivatesector…andcon-tributestothecommunity’soverallabilitytomanagethroughadisaster.”Thismodelwasuseddur-ingHurricaneGustav(2008).UsingtheBEOCconceptlocalrestaurantswereabletosupportmassfeedingoperationsofimpactedpeople.Thisprogram,accordingtotheU.S.ChamberofCommerceFoundationreport,savedtaxpayersapproximately$1.5million.(USChamberofCommerceFounda-tion,Public-PrivateCollaboration:SixYearsAfterHurricaneKatrina,June20,2012).Businessescanprovideservicesandmaterialstothecommunity(food,generators,buildingsup-plies,insurance,officesupplies,clothingetc.),andretailoutletscanprovideaspacewherepeoplecanmeet,exchangeinformationandreconnect(USChamberFoundation).Businessesarepartofthecommunityandtheirabilityto“bounceback”helpstobringnormalcybacktothecommunity.BuildingResilientCommunities–ExamplesTheNeighborhoodEmpowermentNetwork(NEN)wasformedbyseveralNorthernCaliforniacom-munitiestohelpfosterstronger,moreresilientcommunitiesandneighborhoods.ItspilotinitiativeistheEmpoweredCommunitiesProgram.Thisprogramisfocusedonbuildingneighborhooden-gagementthatwillpavethewayforpositiverecoveryoutcomesfollowingadisasteroremergency.

NENusesFEMA’sWholeCommunityApproachwhich“supportscommunitiesastheyworktoachieveapre-eventconditionthatwillallowthemtoperformatthehighestlevelintimesofstress.”

Understandingthatlong-termrecoveryisacommunityeffort,buildingastronger,moreresilientcommunitypriortoadisasterisa

communityresponsibility.



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Declaringthateveryonehastherighttoliveinasafe,clean,healthyandinclusiveneighborhood,NEN’smissionisto“supporttheempowermentofresidentsandcommunitieswiththecapacityandresourcestobuildstrongcommunities.”(adaptedfromhttp://www.empowersf.org/2016/12/01/nen-resilience-summit/)(https://bit.ly/2ML3BiC)Tomovetowardsgreaterresiliency,communitiesfollowingtheNENmodelbuiltpartnershipswithdisparatemembersoftheircommunitiesaswellascitydepartments,civicleaders,disasterrecov-eryorganizationssuchasTeamRubiconandcorporateentitiessuchasMicrosoft

“Weurgedonorstofocusnotjustonimmediaterelief,buttoconsiderthefullarcofdisastersfromplanning,preparation,andmitigationtothelongandarduoustaskofrebuilding.Mostdisasterfundingis

stilldrivenbytheemotionsexperiencedimmediatelyfollowingadisaster,andmostfundingisstill

awardedwithintwomonthsofanevent.”—RobertOttenhoff,presidentandCEO,

CenterforDisasterPhilanthropy.



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12. THEROLEOFTHESTATEINDISASTERCASEMANAGEMENTPROGRAMS

Section426oftheStaffordActauthorizesFEMAto“providecasemanagementservices,includingfinancialassistance,toStateorlocalgovernmentagenciesorqualifiedprivateorganizationstopro-videsuchservicestovictimsofmajordisasterstoidentifyandaddressunmetneeds.”TheDCMPprogramisadministeredbyDESPP/DEMHS,andallowsforapotentialtwo-stageimplementationprocessfollowinganIndividualAssistance(IA)declaration:

1. ImmediateFederalDCM:arapiddeploymentandimplementationofservicestosupportstate,local,andnon-profitcapacityfordisastercasemanagement,andtoaugmentandbuildcapacitywherenoneexists

2. DCMStateGrant:along-termprogramfocusedonmatchingresourceswiththesurvivor’sDisasterRecoveryPlanandcontinuedcapacitybuildingwithintheState.

NGOs,particularlythoseprovidingDisasterCaseManagementservicesfundedthroughFEMA,sometimesneedmoneytobeginoperations.TheNongovernmentalSectorinDisasterResilience:ConferenceRecommendationsforaPolicyAgendahighlightsthisneed:“NGOsneedup-frontfund-ingavailabletoquicklyprovideservices.CurrentmechanismsthatprovidefundingtoNGOsthatmustpassthroughstateagenciescreatedelaysinprocessinganddistributionofthatfunding.Inad-dition,stateagenciesoftentakeadministrativecostsoutofthisfunding,requiringNGOstocovertheirownadministrativecosts.”(SeeAcosta,Chandra,andFeeney,2010)(https://bit.ly/2LekzV5)



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Toensurequickdeliveryofneededfunds,thereneedstobeinplaceaprequalificationprocessbe-foreadisasteroccurs.

DCMandClientUnmetNeedsThegoaloftheDisasterCaseManagementProgramisthedeliveryoffairandequitablepost-disas-tercasemanagementservices.TheseservicesrequirequalifiedandmotivatedDCMs,thewilling-nessandabilityoftheagencyoragenciestopartnerwithotherNGOproviders,andcoordinationwithfederal,state,andlocalLTRGstoleverageandexpandresources.Additionally,providersofdis-astercasemanagementmustprovidetransparentfundingcriteriaandbeaccountabletotheirpart-nersandthecommunitytheyserve.Itisalsoincumbentthatprovidersoffercontinuityofservicesforthetermoftheirprogram.Inpractice,itwasnotalwaysclearhowfundingdecisions–toprovideassistanceordenyassis-tance—weredeterminedwithincertainagencies.Clearerandmoreconsistentfundingwouldhaveenabledagenciestoworktogethermorecollaboratively,sinceitwouldhaveledtogreatertrust.EstablishingCriteriaforAssistanceOurexperiencefromSandyshowsthatthereisaneedtolookpastAMIasapre-requisiteforassis-tance.AMIisjustonetoolthatcanbeusedinassessingaresidents’qualificationsforassistance,butitshouldn’tbeabarriertodisasteraid.(FormoreinformationonAMIdeterminations,seeCTDemographicsandtheUnitedWay’sALICEstudyatchapter10inthisguide).Similarly,mostagen-ciesestablishcapsonassistance.OurexperienceinSandyisthatmostDCMagenciesincreasedfundingcapsonacase-by-casebasiswhentheneedwasurgentandallotherfundingoptionswereclosed,especiallyinthecaseofparticularresidentvulnerabilitiessuchaschronicillnessorage.

BestPractices:AssistanceCriteriaAssesswhatportionofyourcitizensisinsured.Manyseniorciti-zens,whodonothavemortgages,arenot(manyrentersarenotaswell.)Thesegroupswillbemorelikelytobeinneedofassis-tancefromyourlong-termrecoverygroup(LTRG).

InrecommendationsbasedonKatrinarecovery,RandHealthfoundthatsuchaprocessofdeterminationwouldpopulatea“qualifiedlist”ofNGOs,especiallythoseincasemanagement.Thisallowsor-ganizationstobereadyforadisasterandwouldalsoinformasetofcontingencyplansforotherNGOstoengage,iftheprimarygroupisoverwhelmedduetodisaster.(“TheRoleofNGOsinLong-TermHu-

manRecoveryAfterDisaster,”AcostaandChandra,2009)



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Allprogramsstressthatfundingmustbeforadirectdisasterunmetneed.However,allagenciesacknowledgedthatitwasnecessarytoprovideforneedsthatwerenotrelatedtoSandy.Ahomethatwasfloodedmayreceivefundingfornewflooring,electricalandotherinteriorrepair;buttheserepairsaremeaningless—andawaste—iftheroofisleakingduetolackofpre-stormmainte-nance.Deferredmaintenanceofhomes,especiallyamonglowerincomeandvulnerablepopula-tions,wasprevalent.Inordertoprovidesafe,secureandsanitaryhousing,NGOsprovidedtheneededresources.Pre-existing,non-disasterrelatedcircumstancessuchaseconomic,health,legalandfamilyissues,oftenmadeitdifficulttobeginrecovery.NGOsfunded,wherenecessary,financialplanning,mentalhealthandlegalservices—needsthatwerenotdirectlyassociatedwiththedisaster.However,ourexperienceindicatesthat,overall,thesetypesofexpendituresallowedformorecost-effectivere-coveryandhelpedbuildafoundationforsustainability.Pre-planningandcapacitybuildingshouldincludeidentifyingandbolsteringtheavailabilityofsuchservicesandpost-disastertheseservicesshouldbeintegratedintorecoveryoperations.ClientRecoveryPlanningAgencieswillbecalledontoprovideassistanceforemergencyneedssuchaslocatingandfundingtemporaryhousingaswellasprovidingfood,clothingandotherbasicneedsduringandshortlyaf-tertheresponsephaseofadisaster.Butwhenemergency-managementturnstolonger-termre-coveryfunctions,casemanagersneedtoworkwithclientstopreparearecoveryplan.Toooftenaresident’sdesireto“getstarted”andthedisinclinationoftheircasemanagertobeseenasunhelp-fulareinconflictwiththebestinterestoftheclientandwithgoodmanagementofresources.Lackofarecoveryplan—orfailuretoconsiderallrecoveryneeds—ledtoagenciesandfunderstobeginfundingcaseswithoutfullyappreciatingwhatthetotalcostswouldbe.Recoveryplanningrequiresboththeresidentandcasemanagertostop,takeabreath,andputto-getheraplanthatencompassesallthestepsandresourcesneededtore-attainsustainabilityortoreachanewnormal.Planningforrepairorrebuildingmaymeanusingconsultingcontractorstoundertakeafullscopeofworkpriortoundertakingeventhemostbasicrepairs.Planningforrecoverymayalsoinvolvetakingacloselookattheclients’financialresourcesaswellasexaminingpre-existingconditionssuchasage,functionalneedsorchronichealthproblemsthatmayimpacttheclients’abilitytoreachtheirgoalofsustainability.Inmanycases,toachievethegoalsofaclient’srecoveryplan,thedisastercasemanagerwillneedtoleverageassistancefromotherfundingandresourceproviders.Reviewingsuchplanswithidenti-fiedpartnerspriortoinitialclientrecoveryfundingensuresthateveryoneisonboardandrecoverycanmoveforwardwithoutinterruption.



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Animportantaspectofassessingaclient’spathtorecoveryisestablishingifandhowassistancewillleadtosustainability.

• TherewerecasesintheaftermathofSandywhereaclienthadnomeansofsustainingpost-disaster(mostlyduetopre-disasterhealthorfinancialissues),makingitdifficulttojustifyfinancialassistance.

Withcoordinationamonglocalsocialserviceandhealthdepartments(aswellasDepartmentofHousingandotherStateagencies),aswellasnurturinganetworkofprofessionalserviceproviders,apathtowardssustainabilitymightbefound—thisapproach,however,maynotresultinreturningresidentstotheirpre-disastercondition.Theseprofessionalconnectionsneedtobepartofpre-planningforrecoveryandneedtobestrengthenedduringtherecoveryphase.CoordinationwithPartnerAgencies,NGOs,LTRG,StateandFederalOrganizationsWorkingwithavailablepartnersandidentifyingnewpartnersformsthebasisofFEMA’sWholeRe-coveryFramework.DCMagenciesmustengagecollaborativelywithallstakeholdersandrecoverypartners,suchascommunityleaders,othernon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)providingas-sistance,socialservices,mentalhealthprofessionals,Long-TermRecoveryGroups(LTRG),volun-teers,businesses,aswellasStateandFederalagencies.OurexperiencefromSandyisthatDCMswerenotalwaysworkingcollaborativelywithourfivelong-termrecoverygroups.Thedemandsofrecoveryrequireallagenciestopracticethe4C’s:coordina-tion,collaboration,cooperationandcommunication.VariousagenciesworkinginSandyrecoveryhad,attimes,fluctuatingfundingcriteria.Thiscausedfrustrationandconfusionamongpartnersandclients.Somechangestocriteriawerebroughtaboutbychangesinrecoverygrantprogramsorwereinstitutedbyanagencyduetodwindlingavailablefunds.Whateverthereasonsbehindchangesintheadministrationofresources,thereneedstobecontinuityamongallagencies,asmuchaspossible.Allresourcepartnersshoulddevelopaconsensusviewaboutsuchbasiccriteriaashowtoestablishdirectdisasterunmetneedsandhowtogaugesustainability.SinceDCMsaresometimescalledontomakedecisionsaboutsourcingmaterialsandservices,itisimportanttopurchasegoodsandservices,wheneverpossible,locally.Whiletheremaybesomesavingsinmakingpurchasesoutsideofanimpactedarea—(itisn’tpossibletobuylocally,some-times),supportinglocaleconomiespost-disasterispartofachievingwhole-communityrecovery.Localprovidersofservicesandgoodsareoftentimesvaluablepartnersinrecovery—localcontrac-torsandsupplierswereindispensableduringSandyrecovery—andtheseconnectionswillbeavaila-bleifandwhenanotherdisasterstrikes.It’simportanttonote“that68%ofeverydollarspentatlocally-ownedbusinessesstaysinthecommunity.”(AmericanIndependentBusinessAlliance)InformationGatheringandSharing(SoftwareTools)TheCoordinatedAccessNetwork(CAN)isnotrobustenoughtohelpDisasterCaseManagerscoor-dinateresourcedistributionamongavarietyofpartners.Noristherethetransparencyneededto



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ensurethatfundingdecisionsandtheuseofnon-monetaryresourcesaremeetingtheneedsofres-identsandtheircommunities.DCMsneedtoolsthatallowthemtoformulaterecoveryplansandtocommunicatewithanarrayofpartners—again,withthenecessarysafeguardstoprotectclientcon-fidentiality.PartofthedevelopmentofaDCMPistohaverecoverytoolsthatallowforefficientdis-tributionofresources,whileprovidingdisasterrecoverystakeholderswiththeinformationneededtotracktheprogressandqualityofrecoveryoperations.

AFTERSANDY,ITWASNOTPOSSIBLETOVIEWNEEDSWITHINANAGENCYORACROSSAGENCIES.SIMILARLY,ITWASNOT

ABLETOREPORTTOTHESTATEPARTNERS’EXACTDATAONEMERGINGNEEDSORDEMOGRAPHICS.TOENHANCERECOVERYOPERATIONS,ALLNGOS—ANDPARTICULARLYDCMS—NEEDTHEPROPERREPORTINGTOOLS.



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13. DISASTERANDMITIGATIONPROGRAMSINDIVIDUALASSISTANCEDependingonthedisaster,majordisasterdeclarationscanauthorizePublicAssistance(PA)and/orIndividualAssistance(IA)indeclaredcounties.FEMAIndividualAssistanceFEMA’sIndividualsandHouseholdsProgramorIndividualAssistance(IA)iscomprisedoftwocate-goriesofassistance:

• HousingAssistance(HA)–fundsforhomerepair,rentalassistance• OtherNeedsAssistance(ONA)–essentialneeds,personalproperty

TheFEMAregistrationperiodforisopenfor60days.PublicmessagingshouldstresstheimportanceofcontractinginsurancecarriersandregisteringwithFEMA.FailuretoregisterwithFEMAmaypre-ventaresidentfromreceivingother–non-FEMAassistance.Forinstance,TheSalvationArmydoesnotacceptclientsthathavenotregisteredwithFEMA.ThefundsaneligiblehouseholdwillreceiveunderIAarebasedonuninsureddamagesverifiedbyaFEMA-contractedinspector.FormostONAitems,householdsmustfirstcompleteaSmallBusinessAdministration(SBA)DisasterLoanApplication.AnSBALoanapplicationissenttohouseholdsaftercompletingtheirFEMAregis-tration.ONAitemsthatarenotSBA-dependentaredisasterrelatedfuneral,dental,andmedicalex-penses.

BestPractices:SBAIndividualLoansSBAloansforhomeownersareincomeandcreditbased.Notallresidentswillqualifybutallshouldapply

OtherIAProgramsthataStatecanrequestfromFEMAaspartofadeclarationand/orfollowingadeclarationinclude:

• CrisisCounseling• DisasterUnemployment• DisasterLegalServices• DisasterCaseManagement

FormoreinformationonIA–SeetheStateDisasterRecoveryFrameworkSmallBusinessAdministrationDisasterLoansTheSmallBusinessAdministration(SBA)DisasterLoanProgramcanprovidefederallysubsidizedlowinterestdisasterloanstohomeowners,renters,eligiblenonprofitsandbusinessesinadeclareddis-aster.TheDisasterLoanProgramincludesthreetypesofdisasterloanprogramstoqualifiedhouseholdsandbusinesses:



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• Homedisasterloans:loanstohomeownersandrenterstorepairorreplacedisasterrelateddamagestohomeorpersonalproperty

• Businessphysicaldisasterloans:loanstobusinessownerstorepairorreplacedisasterdam-agedpropertyincludinginventor

• EconomicInjuryLoans:loanstobusinessestoprovideworkingcapitaltohelpbusinessesmeettheirobligationsduringrecovery

SBA’sDisasterLoanProgramisreleasedinconjunctionwithaPresidentialMajorDisasterdeclara-tionauthorizingIA.Inaddition,fordisastersthatdonotmeetFEMA’scriteriaforadeclaration,theStatemayseekanAgency-onlydeclarationfromtheSmallBusinessAdministration.FEMAPublicAssistanceThePublicAssistanceProgramprovidesassistancetostate,localcitiesandtowns,andfederally-rec-ognizedtribalgovernmentsaswellascertainprivatenon-profitentities,toassistthemwiththere-sponsetoandrecoveryfromdisasters.ARequestforPublicAssistancemustbefiledbythegranteewithin30daysaftertheareaisdesignatedeligibleforassistance,inthefollowingcategories:

• CategoryA:Debrisremoval• CategoryB:Emergencyprotectivemeasures• CategoryC:Roadsandbridges• CategoryD:Watercontrolfacilities• CategoryE:Publicbuildingsandcontents• CategoryF:Publicutilities• CategoryG:Parks,recreational,andotherfacilities

InConnecticut,post-Sandyfederalfundingexceeded$160milliondollarsandsupportedmorethan660projects.TheseincludedroaddrainageimprovementsandfloodmitigationprojectsinMilford,andtheOldFieldCreekReclamationprojectinWestHaven,tonameafew.MoreinformationonFEMA’sPublicAssistanceProgramcanbefoundintheStateDisasterRecoveryFramework.VolunteerHoursInmanycases,volunteerhourscanbeappliedtothemunicipalities25%cost-sharewithFEMA.Vol-unteerhoursshouldbecarefullytrackedduringresponseandrecovery.

BestPractices:VolunteerHoursVolunteerhours,includingin-kinddonations,mayhelpoffsetlocalshareofFEMAassistance.BesuretotrackallhoursandreporttothestatethroughyourDEMHSregionalcoordinator.



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FEMAHazardMitigationGrantProgram(HMGP)HMGPfundingisreleasedinconjunctionwithaMajorDisasterDeclarationauthorizingPublicAssis-tance.Thismitigationprogramprovidesfundingforprojectsthatlessentheimpactoffuturedisas-ters.HMGPisadministeredbythemunicipality;inmostcases,thelocalEconomicDevelopmentofficeprovidessupportforHMGPprojectswhichinvolvehelpingresidentstoapply,andthenprovideoversighttothegrantthroughtheendofconstruction.Notallmunicipalitieswillchoosetopartici-pateinHMPG.FEMAalsooffersannualHazardMitigationGrants:thePre-DisasterMitigationProgram(PDM)andFloodMitigationProgram(FMA).

• PDM:isdesignedtoassistStates,Territories,IndianTribalgovernmentsandlocalcommuni-tiestoimplementasustainedpre-disasterhazardmitigationprogramtoreduceoverallrisktothepopulationandstructuresfromfuturehazardevents,whilealsoreducingrelianceonfederalfundinginfuturedisasters.

• FMA:ThegoaloftheFMAProgramistoreduceoreliminateclaimsundertheNationalFloodInsurance(NFIP).

• EligibleapplicantsincludeStates,IndianTribalgovernments,andlocalcommunities.• ProjectsmustdirectlybenefitstructuresinsuredundertheNFIP.

MoreinformationontheseprogramscanbefoundonFEMA’swebsiteunderHazardMitigationGrantProgram.(https://bit.ly/1j14PHC)CDBG-DRandOwner-OccupiedRehabilitationandRebuilding(OORR)OneofthelargersourcesofsupplementalrecoveryassistanceistheCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrantforDisasterRelief(CDBG-DR).Afteramajordisaster,Congressmaychoosetoreleasethisfundingmechanismtoprovideadditionalsupporttocommunitiesfordisasterrecovery.CDBG-DRfundsaretargetedtothosecommunitiesthathavedemonstratedsignificantunmetneedsnotaddressedbyothergrantprograms.ThesefundshavethreeimportantadvantagesoverStaf-fordActfunds:flexibility(owingtotheirnatureasablockgrant),theabilitytoaddressunmetneeds,andtargetedassistanceprovidedtovulnerablepopulations.AtleasthalfofCDBG-DRfundsmustbeusedtoassistlow-andmoderate-incomeresidents,un-lessawaiverisgrantedbytheHUDSecretary.



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ComparisonofFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA),CommunityDevelopmentBlockGrant(CDBG),andSocialServicesBlockGrant(SSBG)expendituresfordisasterrecoveryforrecentdisasters.NOTES:FEMA-DRF=FEMADisasterReliefFunds,includingIndividualAssistance,PublicAssistance,andHazardMitigationGrantProgramfunds;HHS-SSBGDR=HHSSocialServicesBlockGrantDisasterRecoveryFunds;HUDCDBGDR=HUDCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrantDisasterRe-coveryfunds;KRW=HurricanesKatrina,Rita,andWilma.SOURCES:DatafromCRS,2012b,2014b;HUD,2014a

Thesefundscanbeusedforavarietyofdisasterrecoveryactivities.Becausetheyaremoreflexibleandavailableforabroadrangeofuses,CDBG-DRappropriationscreateanumberofopportunitiesforcommunitiestomakechangestophysicalandsocialenvironmentsthatinfluencehealth.“Withcommunitydevelopmentdollarsyoucanaddresshousing,economicrecoveryaswellasso-cialservices,bricksandmortar,economicdevelopment”(SmithParker,2014)—allfactorsthatsig-nificantlyinfluencehealth.Allthatisneededisvisiontoutilizethefundsincreativewaysthatmeetmultipleneeds(e.g.,multipurposebuildings).However,thesefundscanbeusedonlyforneedsthatariseasadirectresultofadisaster.Furthermore,giventheirsupplementalnature,CDBG-DRfundsarenotavailableinallpresidentially-declareddisasters.Connecticut,initsallocationplanforCDBG-DR,optedtoprovidefundingprimarilyforresidentialusethroughOwner-OccupiedRehabilitationandRestoration(OORR),whichwasearmarkedtore-pair,rebuildandmitigatehomes,aswellassomeplanningandinfrastructureprojects.InadditiontotheOORRProgram,Multi-FamilyAssistanceProgramswereestablished,suchastheScatteredSiteRehabilitationandRebuildingProgram(SSRR).CDBG-DRassistanceundertheSSRRprogramhasprovidedfinancialassistancetorehabilitatenon-owner-occupiedhomes(1-4units).Oncereha-bilitatedorrebuilt,propertyownerscommittorentingyear-roundtolow/moderateincomehouse-holdsforfiveyears.



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BestPractices:StaffTrainingforDisasterVictimInteractionsTrainingonhowtoworkwithpost-disastervictimsshouldbeman-datoryforaDepartmentofHousingpersonnel,municipalemploy-ees,consultants,engineersandcontractorsandanyotherswhowillbeinteractingwiththepublic.

MultifamilyCDBG-DRassistanceprogramsalsoprovidedfundingfornecessaryexpensesforlargerscalelowormoderate-incomehousing.Typically,thisincludedpublichousing,HUD-assistedhous-ing,McKinney-Ventofundedsheltersandhousingforthehomeless,whichweredamagedbySuper-stormSandy.Dependinguponparticularprogramrequirements,thehousingmayhavebeenlo-catedeitherwithinoroutsidethe100or500-yearfloodplaininanyeligiblecommunitylocatedinthefourdesignatedcountieswithemphasisonpropertieslocatedinFairfieldandNewHavencoun-ties.(Source:CTCDBG-DRMultifamilyAssistancePrograms).TheDOHprogram,underHUDguidelines,prioritizedlow-andmoderate-incomefamilieswithatleast51%ofmoniesneededtobeexpendedonthosebetween80%and120%ofAMI.Asanexam-pleofAMI,afamilyoffourinMilfordwouldbeat80%ofAMIiftheyearned$64,000annuallyandat120%iftheyearned$109,000.Giventheurgencyandnecessityofprovidingsafe,secure,sanitaryandaffordabletemporaryhous-ing,DOHmustplayagreaterroleinassistingresidentswhohavebeen—orwillbeduetomitiga-tion—displaced.Thisisespeciallytrueforthoseoflowerincomewhocannotaffordrent(average$1700)forthedurationofrepair.FEMAdoesnotproviderentalassistunlessthereisworkbeingdoneonahomeandFEMAsrentalprogramlastsonly18months(subjecttomaxgrant).ThereareareaswhereDOHhasexpertisethatcanbeusedduringpost-disasterrecovery:

• Helpingindividualsandfamilieslocateaffordablehousing• Helpingresidentsfindnewhomesawayfromrepetitivelossareas(includingpromotingac-

quisitions)• Assistingwithfindingtemporaryorpermanenthousingforthosewithfunctionaloraccess

needs.

TheDOHHousingGroupisanintegralpartofdisasterresponseandrecovery,anditneedstoplayanactiveroleindisasterrecovery.DOHshouldprovidearentalcomponentinitsadministrationofCDBG-DRdollarstocoverrentalcosts.DOHshouldworkto:

• Developapublicandprivatehousinginitiative• Matchappropriatehousingbasedonclients’needsandincome• Makefundingavailableformovingexpenses(fortenants,nothomeowners),securitydepos-

itsandotherneeds(furnishings,etc.)



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Theseexistingprogramscouldbeleveragedtoassistlowerincomeandvulnerablefamiliesduringtimesofdisaster:

• Securitydepositguaranteeprogram• Renters’rebateforelderlyordisabledrenters• TransitionalLivingProgram

AcquisitionProgramsAdecisiontopartwithone'shomeandcommunityisnotaneasyone.AsFEMAdescribesinlitera-turetoprospectiveparticipants,theadvantagesincludetheeliminationoffuturerisk,faircompen-sationfortheproperty'spre-stormvalue,andtheopportunityforanewstart.Thedisadvantagesincludethelossofrootsandcommunityandthepossibilitythatone'sindividualeconomicsituationwillnotimproveduetothecostofreplacementpropertiesinotherareas.Fromthetaxpayer'sperspective,propertyacquisitionscouldresultingreatercostsavingsforthegovernmentthancontinuedrepairofat-riskproperties.Incomparisonwithtraditionaldisasterre-liefmeasures,whichgenerallyencouragerebuildinginthepathoffuturerepetitivedisasters,theacquisitionseliminatethecostofmaintainingandrepairingfloodcontrolstructuresandpublicbuildingsandinfrastructure,aswellasthecostoffloodinsurancepayments.

FEMAAcquisitionProcessFEMAdoesnotbuypropertiesdirectly.Stateandlocalcommunitiesidentifypotentialbuyoutareasandsubmitapplicationsonbehalfofhomeowners.Whenthestateapprovesanapplication,itissubmittedtoFEMA,whichthenmustdetermineiftheproposalisenvironmentallysound,withintherules,andcost-effective.IftheapplicationisapprovedbyFEMA,thenFEMAcontributes75%ofthefunding,whiletheremainderofthefundsarederivedfromsourcesincludingthestateandlocalcommunities.Thecommunitybuystheproperties,acquirestitle,andclearstheland.Theprocesscantakemonthstoinitiate,butonceahomeowneracceptsabuyoutoffer,theaverageclosingtakes45days.

BenefitsofAcquisition“Formanyfloodplaincommunities,voluntarybuyoutsofrepeti-tive-lossstructureswouldgeneratesubstantiallygreaterlong-termcostsavingsthancontinuingtorebuildthesepropertiesaf-tereveryflood.Specifically,pastbuyoutsofrepetitivelossstruc-tureshavegenerated,forevery$1invested,$2inreductionof

futurefloodinsurancepaymentsalone.”



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Variouslimitationsexistonwhatpropertiesmaybepurchased.Propertysiteswithhazardouswastewillnotbepurchased.Inaddition,propertyownersmustbeU.S.citizensorqualifiedaliens.Whiletheprogramisvoluntaryforhomeowners,propertyacquisitionsmaycomeasanunwelcomesur-priseforresidentialandcommercialtenantsandmobilehomeownerswhorenthomepads.Theseindividualsareentitledtoassistance,includingout-of-pocketmovingexpensesandincreasesinrent,andutilitycostsduetothemove.(FederalEmergencyManagementAgency,HazardMitigationAssistanceUnifiedGuidance:HazardMitigationGrantProgram,Pre-DisasterMitigationProgram,FloodMitigationAssistanceProgram,RepetitiveFloodClaimsProgram,SevereRepetitiveLossPro-gram,(2010)pages83-90).FEMA'sacquisitionprocessissubjecttoenvironmentalreviewundertheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(NEPA),buttheSandyRecoveryImprovementActof2013addsanewprovisionfor"streamlined"environmentalreviewprocedures,requiringthatadequateresourcesaredevotedtoenvironmentalreviewandthat"theshortestexistingapplicableprocessunder[NEPA]isutilized.(SandyRecoveryImprovementActof2013,HR152-36.FEMA'sexistingNEPAregulationsarefoundat44C.F.R.Part10.)CostsInvolvedHomeownersareentitledtothefairmarketvalueoftheirhomesbeforethedisaster,asdeterminedbyalicensedappraiserchosenbythecommunity.Thelocalcommunitymustpayforappraisals,ti-tlesearches,lotsurveys,andotherclosingcosts.Thepropertyownerisresponsibleformortgagesandliensagainsttheproperty,aswellasmovingcostsandothercostsassociatedwithrentingorbuyinganewproperty.(FEMA,HazardMitigationAssistance,PropertyAcquisitionBuyouts.)Ifthepurchaseofferistoolowfortheownertopurchaseacomparablelocalreplacementdwelling,asupplementalpaymentof$22,500tothehomeownermaybeavailable.Thefinalpurchasepricemustbethegreatestofthefollowing:thecurrentmarketvalueoftheproperty;thepre-disastermarketvalueoftheproperty;theoriginalpurchasepriceoftheproperty;ortheoutstandingamountofanyloantothepropertyownersecuredbyarecordedinterestintheproperty.Otherad-ditionalallowablecostsincludemovingthestructuretoanewsiteandtheremovalofdemolitionanddebristoalandfill.(FederalEmergencyManagementAgency,HazardMitigationAssistanceUni-fiedGuidance:HazardMitigationGrantProgram,Pre-DisasterMitigationProgram,FloodMitigationAssistanceProgram,RepetitiveFloodClaimsProgram,SevereRepetitiveLossProgram(2010),pages81,85,89,and96).Bylaw,thepropertyacquiredundertheprogrambecomespublicpropertythatcannotberedevel-oped,andmustremainopenspaceinperpetuity.CDBG-DRAcquisitionBothFEMAthroughHMGPandCDBG-DRhaveprogramsavailableforacquisitionfollowingadisas-terdeclaration.Post-disasterprogramssuchasacquisitionofrepetitivelossstructuresaredifficultto“sell”attimesofstressandambiguity.Toomanyresidentsarestillreelinganddonothavea



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goodpictureofavailableassistanceforrebuildandmitigation.Mostresidentsarepronetowanttogetbacktothe“waythingswere”priortoadisaster.Someresidentswhoconsideredacquisitionfoundthatthebuy-outwasnotsufficienttopayoffanexistingmortgageandstillhavemoneytorelocate.Citieswereveryreluctanteventoentertainac-quisitions;partofthiswasareflectionofthenegativeresponsefromresidents,butalsofromafearoflosingsomeoftheirtaxbaseandalsoneedingtocontinuetomaintaintheopenspaceinperpe-tuity.CDBG-DRreceivedalumpsumofmoneyforIndividualAssistance;citiesbelieved—rightfully—thatmoneyearmarkedforacquisitionwoulddiminishtheamountofmoneyavailableforrebuildandmitigation.Allacquisitionprogramsarevoluntary;andbecauseofthis,acquiredproperties(inthecaseofSandy—propertiesacquiredthroughHMGP)werenotcontiguousnornecessarilyinthemostvulnerableareas.ThedecisiontouseHMGPfundsforacquisitionwaspurelyafinancialone.Thoseresidentswhocouldnotaffordtorebuildandmitigateoptedfortheonlyprogramavailabletothem.Considerationmustbegiventoelderlyanddisabledresidents;relocationcanbedifficultinsofarasitseparatesthesepopulationsfromareastowhichtheyareaccustomed.However,mitigatedhomescanposeproblemsforthosewithlimitedmobility;findingappropriatehousingintheareacanbedifficultifnotimpossible.AdditionalStateandFederalDisasterResourcesFEMAHousingPortalTheFEMAHousingPortalisaimedatassistingpeopleandhouseholdstofindahomewhohavebeenforcedtorelocateduetoacalamity.Theportalmergesrentalsuppliestoassistindividualsandhouseholdslocatevacantrentalhousingintheirarea.FEMA90-DayPrivateSectorRepresentativeProgramThisisaspecialseatthatisactivatedintheNationalResponseCoordinationCenter(NRCC).ItcanbeinplacebothwhentheNRCCisactivatedornot,andisanimportanttoolinadisaster.Thisrep-resentativewillworktocommunicate,coordinateandcollaboratebetweenpublicandprivatestakeholderstofulfillvariousobjectivesthatsupportandcontributetotheoverallresponseandre-coveryduringanevent.WhenNRCCisactivated,therepresentativecan:

• ServeastheintermediarybetweenFEMAandtheprivatesector• Supportsituationalawarenessofdisasterimpactandrecoverywithintheprivatesector• CoordinatewithotherEmergencySupportFunctionsandinfrastructureliaisonstosupport

privatesectorrecoveryefforts

StateHistoricPreservationOffice(SHPO)OnbehalfoftheNationalParkService,theConnecticutStateHistoricPreservationOffice(SHPO)offeredgrantassistancefortherestorationofpropertieslistedon,oreligibleforlistingontheNa-tionalRegisterofHistoricPlaceswhichweredamagedbyHurricaneSandy.Thisgrantwasproposed



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toprovidereimbursementstechnicalassistanceandemergencyrepairstohomesbuiltmorethan50yearsago.Forhistoricpropertiesdamaged—butnotinneedofintrusiveelevation,SHPOwasabletoprovideneededassistance.However,whilemanycommunitiesbelieved,basedoninformationfromSHPOthatelevatedhomeswouldbeeligible,morethan2yearsafteracceptinggrantsandconfirmingeli-gibility,theNationalParksServiceddeemedelevatedhomescouldnotalsobehistoric.

• InformationaboutallrelevantrecoveryresourcesshouldbeavailabletoStateandMunici-palRecoveryplanners

• State,RegionalandLocalrecoverycoordinatorsshouldalsobecomeawareofthesepro-grams—priortodisaster—sotheycanadvocateforappropriateresourcesfromStateandFederalagencies

ShoreUpConnecticutDuringSandy,ShoreUpCTwasastate-financed,low-interestloanprogramwhichprovidedloanstopropertyownersincoastalmunicipalitieslocatedinFloodZonesVEorAEtofinanceorrefinancepropertyelevationsandrepair.Additionalretrofittingforfloodprotectionandwindproofingactivi-tiescouldalsobefinanced.ShoreUpCTalsoadoptedtheState’selevationrequirementof500’year+1(incontrasttoFEMA’sandlocalbuildingcodeswhichrequireelevationof100’year+1).Thiswastheonlyloanprogramthataddressedtheneedsofmulti-familyhomesandincomeproperties.Criteriaforeligibilitywere:

• Primaryandsecondarysingle-familyhomes,or1-4unitowner-occupiedrentals• Businesseswithfewerthan100employeesandingoodstandingwithallstateagencies• Opentomostcoastlinemunicipalities• Mustbeuptodatewithalllocal,state,andfederaltaxes• Upto$300,000.00couldbeborrowedfor15yearsata2.75%rate.• Property,hazardandfloodinsurancemustbemaintainedforthelifeoftheloan



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FloodplainBuildingElevationStandardRequirements(CIRCA/UCONN)InternalRevenueServiceTheInternalRevenueServicehastaxreliefprogramsavailabletoassistthoseaffectedbydisaster.TheIRSmayallow,withapresidentialdeclaration:

• Underinsuredoruninsureddisasterlossesonhome,personalproperty,andhouseholdgoodstobedeductedonincometaxreturns

• Taxcounselingandtaxrebates• IRSmayallowdeductionsofcertainuninsuredcasualtylossesonahomeowner’sfederalin-

cometaxreturn• IRSmaygrantadditionaltimetofilereturnsandpaytaxes

Specialtaxlawprovisionsmayhelptaxpayersandbusinessesrecoverfinanciallyfromtheimpactofadisaster.Taxpayersmayalsobeeligibleforareductioninpropertyvaluationduetodisaster-causeddam-ages,resultinginareductionoflocalpropertytaxes.Thisdoesnotrequireapresidentialdisasterdeclaration.NEXTSTEPS:TheStateLTRG,theIRWorkingGroupandCTRisesshouldallhavetaxprofessionalsattheirtables.Charitableorganizationsassistedmanyclientswithtaxissues.



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CTPost/MilfordCT

14. FEMANATIONALFLOODINSURANCEPROGRAM(NFIP)TheNationalFloodInsuranceProgram(NFIP)providesfloodinsurancetomillionsofAmericans.Homeowners’insurancedoesnotcoverlossesassociatedwithflooding.ThisprogramispresentlybeingreviewedinCongress,andissubjecttochange.Claimsfromfloodsfarexceedthepremiumspaid;andbecauseofthegrowingnumberofcatastrophicstorms,thepro-gramislookingtoincreasepremiumsbasedonriskaswellasdevelopbetterfloodmapping,andfocusmoreonmitigationandresiliency.Homeownersinfloodareasarerequiredtopurchasefloodinsuranceiftheyholdamortgage;thosewhofailtohavefloodinsurancenotonlyriskbeingunabletopayforrepairsbutmayfindthem-selvesineligibleforrehabilitationandmitigationgrants.



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WhatEveryoneShouldKnowAboutNFIPFloodInsuranceCoverage

• Floodinsurancepoliciesarecappedat$250,000perclaim.• FloodinsurancepoliciespayActualCashValue(ACV)—notreplacementcost• NFIPhaslimitationsoncoverage.RentalcostswhilehomeisbeingrepairedareNOTcov-

ered.

Whatthismeans:• Olderandorsmallerhomeshavelessvalue;floodinsurancepayoutswillbelessforolder

homes(ACV)despitetheactualcostsassociatedwithrebuildingandrepair• Tohelpwiththecodecompliance,includingmitigationassociatedwithbringinghomesback

uptocodethathavebeensubstantiallydamaged,NFIPinsuranceprovidesupto$30,000towardthecostofelevation—andnottoexceedthe$250,000capforrehabilitationorre-building

• InSandy,despite60%ofhomeownersassistedbyNGOshavingfloodinsurance,requestsforadditionalfinancialhelpwasneeded.ThishelpwasrequiredtodefrayhousingcostsnotcoveredbyNFIPinsurance,aswellasfinancialassistancetomakeuptheshortfallininsur-ancesettlements.

• RecoveryPlannersshouldbecomefamiliarwithNFIPinsuranceaswell.Assessingtheamountoftimeandmoneyitwilltakeforhomeownerstorepairandrebuildandifneces-sary,mitigatetheirhomes,requiresanunderstandingofwhatfloodandhomeowner’sin-surancewillandwillnotcover,andhowlongitwilltaketosettleclaims.

Itisnotunusualforinsuredhomeownersimpactedbyfloodingtosettletheirclaimsforlessthanthecostforrepairorrebuild.Thisisparticularlytrueforthosehomesthataresubstantiallydam-aged.Suchhomesmayalsoneedtobemitigated.Costsformitigation(elevation)canbewellover$100,000,ofwhichonly$30,000iseligibletobeunderwrittenbyIncreasedCostofCompliance-Coverage(ICC).However,evenwithICCcoverage,claimsarecappedat$250,000.HelpingResidentsmanageafter-disasterclaims:

• Homeownersandrentersmustunderstandtheneedforinsurance—andinfloodpronear-eas—floodinsurance(andrenters’insurance)andunderstandclearlywhattheirpoliciescoveranddonotcover

• Post-disaster,representativesfromtheinsuranceindustryandNFIPshouldbeavailableinthecommunitytoanswerquestions

• PoliciesneedtobewritteninplainEnglish.SinceSandy,lawmakersinNewJerseyhavetakennoteofthehordesofangrypolicyholdersandhavedraftedabilltohelpeasecustom-ers’confusion.Thebillwouldrequirethataone-pagesummaryofthepolicybeincludedinthebrochureconsumersarealreadygivenwhenpurchasingthepolicy.Thedraftersofthebillpromisethat“notablecoverageandexclusions”willbeessentialpartsofthesesummar-ies.



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• Atriskcommunities(andthosecommunitiesparticipatinginCRS)shouldincludepublicmeetingsaboutfloodinsuranceandbestpracticesforfilingfloodclaims

• Peopleneedtounderstand,inthecaseofastormorhurricane,thecoveragecontainedintheirHomeowners’policies.

• Homeownersmustunderstandtheadjustingprocessandbesuretheyknowwhattheircostswillbetorepairorrebuildtheirhome

• InthewakeofIreneandSandy,changestohowNFIPadjustsclaimshavebeensuggested.AmongthemistocapprofitsforindependentinsurancecompaniesmanagingNFIP.Allleaseagreementsforresidentialhousingindesignatedfloodzonesshouldberequiredtostateclearlythatthepropertyisinafloodzoneandthatrentersarestronglyencouragedtopur-chasefloodinsurancefortheircontents

Finally,theNFIPshouldnotbeinconflictwiththegoalofensuringmoreresilienthomesandcom-munities.Delays,under-adjusting,orcomplexprocessesmakerepairandmitigationdifficult.Whilehomeownersarerequiredtomitigateiftheirhomeissubstantiallydamaged—andabulkofthecostformitigationisbornebythehomeowner—theirabilitytopayforsuchactivitiesisharmediftheyaredeniedafairandtimelysettlement.Additionally,homeownersarefacingrentalandothercostsassociatedwithbeingdisplaced.

BestPractices:FloodInsuranceCoverageIncreasedcostofcompliancecoverageisoneofseveralre-sourcesforfloodinsurancepolicyholderswhoneedadditionalhelprebuildingafteraflood.Itprovidesupto$30,000tohelpcoverthecostofmitigationmeasuresthatwillreducefloodrisk.Thisinformationshouldbesharedwithyourlocalassessoraswellaslanduseandbuildinginspectors.



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15. RECOMMENDATIONSFORTHELONG-TERMRECOVERYCOMMITTEEEconomicRecoveryWorkingGroupTherewasalimiteddisruptionofeconomicactivitypost-Sandy;however,thingscouldhavebeenmarkedlydifferent.RecommendedstepsfortheLong-TermRecoveryandtheEconomicRecoveryWorkingGroupinclude:

• Institutingregularpre-disasterplanningstrategiesmeetingsacrossthestate,workingwithCTChamberofCommerce

• Providinginformationdirecttobusinessestohelpbolsterindividualbusinessdisasterpre-paredness

• Helpingtodevelopadaptableeconomicrecoveryplansformunicipalities

CommunityPlanningandCapacityBuilding(CPCB)WorkingGroupThisgrouphasbeenfocusedonmitigationandcommunityresilienceactivities.Theyshouldalsoun-dertakesomeofthecapacitybuildingactivitiesdescribedinthisguide,suchas:

• Assistmunicipalitiesconductcommunity-widemeetingswithresidentstodiscussrisksandpre-disastermitigationactivities.

• Helpidentifystateandregionalpartnershipsthatwillhelpcommunitiesbettermanagepost-disasteroperations

• Provideleadershiponpre-disasterplanning

AdditionalInformationandResourcesFloodplainMappingThroughFEMA'sfloodhazardmappingprogram,RiskMapping,AssessmentandPlanning(MAP),FEMAidentifiesfloodhazards,assessesfloodrisksandpartnerswithstatesandcommunitiestoprovideaccuratefloodhazardandriskdatatoguidethemtomitigationactions.Floodhazardmap-pingisanimportantpartoftheNationalFloodInsuranceProgram(NFIP),asitisthebasisoftheNFIPregulationsandfloodinsurancerequirements.FEMAmaintainsandupdatesdatathroughFloodInsuranceRateMaps(FIRMs)andriskassessments.

CalculatingRiskFrequencyoffloodingintheUSisusuallydepictedasa1%chance(1/100)ofoccurringinanygivenyear,whichiswhyitisknownas“100-yearflood.”Practicallyspeaking,itmeansthatin25yearsthereisa1-in-4chanceofamajorflood.

Risk=hazardxfrequency;youcanmitigateriskbydecreasingthemagnitudeofthefrequencyorthehazard.(FEMA)



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FloodInsuranceCostsOnApril2017,floodinsuranceratesweresettoriseanaverageof6percent—todate,thishasnotyethappened.Underthe2014Af-fordabilityamendmentstotheBiggert-Wa-tersreforms,individualpropertyownersmayseearateincreaseupto18%fornewerprop-ertiesand20%forolderones.Ratesfornewlymappedpropertiesbeginatthelowestorpreferredriskrateandgraduallyincreasetofullriskusingamultipliertable.

BFE=BaseFloodElevationCommunityRatingSystem–upto45%offflood-insurancecostsTheCommunityRatingSystem(CRS)recognizesandencouragescommunityfloodplainmanage-mentactivitiesthatexceedtheminimumNFIPstandards.Dependinguponthelevelofparticipa-tion,floodinsurancepremiumratesforpolicyholderscanbereducedupto45%.Besidesthebenefitofreducedinsurancerates,CRSfloodplainmanagementactivitiesenhancepublicsafety,reducedamagestopropertyandpublicinfrastructure,avoideconomicdisruptionandlosses,reducehumansuffering,andprotecttheenvironment.Technicalassistanceondesigningandimplementingsomeactivitiesisavailableatnocharge.ParticipatingintheCRSprovidesanin-centivetomaintainingandimprovingacommunity'sfloodplainmanagementprogramovertheyears.ImplementingsomeCRSactivitiescanhelpprojectsqualifyforcertainotherFederalassis-tanceprograms.Despitetheemphasisonresiliencyandthebillionsofdollarsspentonrecovery,therearenoagreed-uponmetricsforgaugingresiliencyorevaluatingpost-disasteroutcomes.Understand-ingthatdifferentcommunitiesfacevaryingpre-disasterrisksandpost-disasterchallenges,therestillremainswithinreachawealthofinformationthatcanhelpbetterguidebothresiliencyandrecoveryactionsandspendingacrossallrecoverynetworks.ImportanceofgoalsettingandevaluationThedevelopmentofbenchmarkscanassistplannersgraderesiliency,preparednessandrecov-eryactivities;onlyinthiswaycanperformancebecontinuallyassessedimprovementsbeun-dertaken.Allthosevestedindisasterplanning,responseandrecovery,needtobecontinuallymovingtowardmoreefficientandthereforeless-costlypost-disasterrecoveryoperations.Theycannotcontinuetorelyonanecdotesorperceivedwisdomtomakecriticaldecisionscostingmillionsofdollarsandaffectingbothindividualsandcommunities.Finally,thereisnobetterwaytoencouragepre-planningactivities(onthepartoftowns,indi-viduals,statesaswellasNGOsandcorporations)thanbytakingamorequantitativelookat



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costsofrecoveryandquestioningwhetherthoserecoverycostsachievedtheirgoals,overall.Rutgers’HealthImpactAssessmentsispartoftheanswerintermsofindividualassessments,butthereisstillmorethatcouldbedonetoensuregoodpre-planningandrecoverychoices.RESILIENCY:

• Define‘Resiliency’andEstablishGoalsandBenchmarks(i.e.,SocialCapital;EconomicCapital;NaturalCapital.CommunityCompetence—see,PreparednessFosteringIndivid-ualandCommunityResiliency)

• Pre-planningStrategies—EvaluateandPrioritizeActivitiesbasedonestablishedgoalsforpost-disasteroutcomes

RECOVERY:

• Definegoalsofpost-eventrecoveryacrossresponseandrecoverynetworks• ThisPre-DisasterandPost-Recoveryappraisalcanbecarriedoutbyallstakeholders:

GOsandNGOscanusesuchamodeltoevaluatehowtheirresourceswereusedandiftheyachievedthecommunitygoals.

Withtheincreaseinman-causedandnaturaldisasters(DeepWaterHorizon,HurricanesMatthewandSandy)thereneedstobeachangeinhowresponseandrecoveryismanaged.Thetop-downapproachisnotenough—andisoftentimesinsufficient—tomanagerecovery.TheRANDGulfStatesPolicyInstitutefornongovernmentalsectordisasterresponseandrecoveryhaspublished:

“Inthewakeof(manmadeandnaturaldisasters),bothgovernmentandnongov-ernmentalorganizations(NGOs,includingnonprofitandfor-profitorganizations)mustbeengagedinlong-termrecoveryandcommunityresilience-buildingactivi-tiestoimprovecommunities’abilitytowithstandfuturestressors.NGOsarethe‘go-to’entitiesindisasterresponseandrecoverybecauseoftheirrealorper-ceivedinsightontheassets,needsandsocioculturalcomplexitiesoftheirneigh-borhoods;abilitytoleverageresourceswithlessadministrativehassleformore-effi-cientresponse;oftenuniqueaccesstodistributionanddisseminationchannelsfordisaster-relatedinformationandresources;andabilitytosupportsustainablelong-

Pre-DisasterResiliency

DisasterEvent

Post-RecoveryResiliency



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termrecoveryeffortsgivenongoingandintegratedlocalpresence.”(TheNon-Govern-mentalSectorinDisasterResilience,ConferenceRecommendationsforaPolicyAgenda,2011)

Whiledirectassistancefromcharitiesandfoundationsismoreeasilyaccessibleafteradisaster;rarelyarethesefundsavailableforpreparednessandresiliencyactives—eitherpriortoaneventorafter.TheNationalCenterforDisasterPreparednessatColumbiaUniversityproducedaDisasterRecoveryGuideforDonorsinJanuary,2013.Itskeyrecommendations:

“Create,nurtureorfundlocalNGOstopromotewidespreadadoptionofexistingpreparednessstandardsbylocalnon-profitsandfaith-basedor-ganizations,andtoprovidepreparednesstraining.Simplyincreasingthelikelihoodthatnon-profitnetworkswillsurvivemajordisasterswouldbeamajorcontributiontothesuccessoflong-termrecovery.”

TheprimarygoalsofbringingaboutfullparticipationacrossallrecoverynetworksandNGOsin-volvesthefollowing:

• ClearlydelineatingrolesandresponsibilitiesforNGOsduringeachphaseofadisaster• IdentifyingNGOcapacities&opportunitiesforexpandingrolesinpreparednessandopera-

tions• ImprovinginformationexchangeamongNGOs,GovernmentalAgenciesandCommunity• Increasingcommunitycapacitytodeliverseamless,evidence-basedservicesbefore,during

andafterdisasterthroughNGOpartnerships• CreatingguidanceabouthowtoallocateresourcesforNGOs—financialandnon-financial• EvaluatingcostsandbenefitsofNGOparticipationtoworktowardscontinualimprovement

Intheirafter-reportonrecoveryaftertornadoesstruckAlabamainApril2011,theJessieBallDuPontFundnotedthefollowing:

“Whenadisasterisnotontheimmediatehorizon...orhasfadedfrommemory,itiseasytooverlookthepreparationsthatorganizationsandcommunitiescanmaketomitigatelossoflifeandpropertyandfacilitateeffectivedisasterresponse.”

Theyurgecharitablefoundationsandotherstoknowthebenefitofhavingdisasterprepared-nessandrecoveryplansinplace,withreviewandrehearsaloftheseplanspartofongoingtrain-ing.



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Theyconclude:“…communitieswillbenefitiffoundationsemphasizetheimportanceofdisasterpreparednessandprovideappropriateassistanceinthateffort.”

WhatisclearisthatthereisariseindisastersandadecreaseinavailablefundingforrecoveryattheFederal/StatelevelandthroughouttheNGOcommunity.Bothareoverlytaxedbymeet-ingtheongoingneedsofweather-relateddisasters.Accordingtoastudy,U.S.foundationsandcorporationsdonatednearly$300millionfordisas-terrecoveryin2014,anincreaseover2013.ThesenumbersdonotcomeclosetowhatisspentthroughFEMAandHUDforrebuildingandmitigationafteradisaster.It’salsoclearthatcontinuingtofundcrisis-to-crisisisnotonlyinsufficient,butunsustainable.Fundingfordisastersmustbemorestrategic—andwithaneyetowardmitigatinglossthroughdisasterpreplanning,communityresiliencebuilding,aswellasNGOpartnershipsandcollabora-tions.



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16. APPENDIX1:ACRONYMSACRONYMMEANINGABC AmericanBaptistChurchesACF AdministrationforChildrenandFamiliesACV ActualCashValueALICE AssetLimited,IncomeConstrained,EmployedAMI AreaMedianIncomeARC AmericanRedCrossBEOC BusinessEmergencyOperationsCenterCAN CoordinatedAccessNetworkCC CatholicCharitiesUSACCP CrisisCounselingProgramCCUSA CatholicCharitiesUSACDBG-DR CommunityDevelopmentBlockGrantDisasterRecoveryCERT CommunityEmergencyResponseTeamCIRCA ConnecticutInstituteforResilienceandClimateAdaptationCM CaseManagerCME ChristianMethodistEpiscopalChurchCOA CouncilonAccreditationCOAD CommunityofOrganizationsActiveinDisasterCOB ChurchoftheBrethrenCPCB CommunityPlanningandCapacityBuildingCOG CouncilsofGovernmentsCRS CommunityRatingSystemCRWRC ChristianReformWorldReliefCommitteeCWS ChurchWorldServiceDCM DisasterCasemanagementDCMCW DisasterCaseManagementCaseWorkerDCMP DisasterCaseManagementProgramDEEP DepartmentofEnergyandEnvironmentalProtectionDEMHS DivisionofEmergencyManagementandHomelandSecurityDESPP DepartmentofEmergencyServicesandPublicProtectionDHCR DivisionofHousingandCommunityRenewalDHSES DivisionofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyServicesDLS DisasterLegalServiceDOB DuplicationofBenefitsReport(providedbyFEMA)DOH DepartmentofHousing



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DPH DepartmentofPublicHealthDR# DisasterRecoveryNumberDRC DisasterRecoveryCenterDRS DisasterRecoverySpecialistDUA DisasterUnemploymentAssistanceEIDL EconomicInjuryDisasterLoanEMD EmergencyManagementDirectorESF EmergencySupportFunctionsESF-14 EmergencySupportFunction-RecoverySupportFEMA FederalEmergencyManagementAgencyFEMA-VAL FEMAVolunteerAssistanceLiaisonsFIRMs FloodInsuranceRateMapsGEMA GeorgiaEmergencyManagementAgencyGOHSEP Governor’sOffice&HomelandSecurity&EmergencyPreparednessHA HousingAssistanceHIA HealthImpactAssessmentHHS U.S.DepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesHMA HazardMitigationAssistanceHS HumanServiceHUD USDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopmentIDCMP ImmediateDisasterCaseManagementProgramI&R InformationandReferralIA IndividualAssistance(FEMAbenefits)ICC IncreasedCostofCompliance-CoverageICS IncidentCommandSystemIHP IndividualsandHouseholdsProgram(FEMAbenefits)IT InformationTechnologyJFO JointFieldOffice(FEMAregionaloffices)LDR LutheranDisasterResponseLDS ChurchofJesusChristofLatter-daySaintsLEOP LocalEmergencyOperationsPlanLEP LimitedEnglishProficientLER LodgingExpenseReimbursementLTRC Long-TermRecoveryCommitteeLTRG Long-TermRecoveryGroupMAP Mapping,AssessmentandPlanningMARC MunicipalAssistanceResourceCenterMC/EA MassCareandEmergencyAssistanceMDS MennoniteDisasterService



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MIAP Move-inAssistanceProgramMLRP Multi-FamilyLeaseandRepairPolicyMOU MemorandumofUnderstandingNDRF NationalDisasterRecoveryFrameworkNEMIS NationalEmergencyManagementInformationSystem(FEMADB)NEN NeighborhoodEmpowermentNetworkNEPA NationalEnvironmentalPolicyActNFIP NationalFloodInsuranceProgramNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganizationNIMS NationalIncidentManagementSystemNRCC NationalResponseCoordinationCenterNVOAD NationalVoluntaryOrganizationsActiveinDisasterNYAC MethodistNewYorkAreaConferenceOCFS OfficeofChildrenandFamilyServicesOEM OfficeofEmergencyManagementOHSEPR OfficeofHumanServicesEmergencyPreparednessandResponseOMH OfficeofMentalHealthONA OtherNeedsAssistance(FEMAbenefits)OORR OwnerOccupiedRehabilitationandRebuildingOOR OwnerOccupiedRehabilitationOTDA OfficeofTemporaryandDisabilityAssistancePA PublicAssistance(FEMAbenefits)PDA PreliminaryDamageAssessmentsPHA PublicHousingAuthority(HUDlocaloffices)PNP PrivateNon-ProfitRESP RegionalEmergencySupportPlanREPT RegionalEmergencyPlanningTeamSA SalvationArmySAMHSA SubstanceAbuseandMentalHealthServicesAdministrationSBA SmallBusinessAssociationSHPO StateHistoricPreservationOfficeSLTRC StateLong-TermRecoveryCommitteeSPB St.BernardProject(DisasterResilienceOrganization)SRF StateResponseFrameworkSS SocialSecuritySSBG SocialServicesBlockGrantSSI SupplementalSecurityIncomeTANF TemporaryAssistanceforNeedyFamiliesTDD TelecommunicationsDevicefortheDeaf



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THU TemporaryHousingUnitTRO TransitionalRecoveryOffice(FEMAlocaloffices)TSA TheSalvationArmy-alsoSATVOC Tri-ValleyOpportunityCouncil,Inc.(NorthDakota)UCONN UniversityofConnecticutUMCOR UnitedMethodistCommitteeonReliefVAL VoluntaryAgencyLiaison(FEMAstaff)VOAD VoluntaryOrganizationsActiveinDisaster



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17. APPENDIX2:RECOMMENDATIONSDCMandUnmetNeedsCommitteesRecommendations

• Basedonhowunmetneedsgroupsoperatedinthestate,abasictemplatehasbeendevel-opedforunmetneeds.Thetemplatebelowoutlinestheinformationunmetneedsgroupsshouldlookforwhenreviewingacase.(See“Appendix3:UnmetNeedsPreparationTem-plates”)

• CTRiseshasdevelopedsoftwaretoshareinformationelectronicallyandtoenablecasemanagerstomoreeasilyprovidefundinggroupswiththeabilitytoeasilyreviewcasesandmakedeterminationsandcommitments

• Thesetoolshavebeendesignedforunmetneedsgroupsandotherresourceproviders,in-cludingvolunteers

• Thesetoolsarenotmeanttoreplaceunmetneedsmeetings,butmayallowDCMsandun-metneedsgroupstoaddressprioritycasesmoreefficiently

BestPracticesforUnmetNeedsCommitteeMembers:Whenmakingafundingdecision,gatherandreviewthefollowinginformation:1. Theentireunmetneedsoftheresident2. Thefamilies’financialpicture3. Thefamilysituationpriortodisaster4. Thatthefamily,iftheyreceiveassistance,willbesustainable.

Don’trelyexclusivelyonAMI,AreaMedianIncome(astatisticgeneratedbytheUSDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment(HUD)forpurposesofdeterminingtheeligibilityofappli-cantsforcertainfederalhousingprograms)todetermineneed.Costsforrepaircanfarexceedtheabilityofwhatmostfamiliescanafford.Lookatthetotalityofthefamilyanditscircum-stancestodetermineifthereareunmetneeds.Whilefundingisexclusivelyfordisaster-relatedneeds,itissometimeshardtoignoreexistingproblemsthatmustbesolvediffundingistomakeapositivedifference.Forinstance,itwouldnotbebeneficialtopayfornewsheetrockandinsulationiftheroofisleaking(understandingthattheroofdamageisnotduetodisaster);norcanyourepairahomewherethereisapre-existingunsafeconditionwithouttakingcareofthatcondition.EnsurethattheDisasterResourceManagershavepreparedacomprehensiverecoveryplanandthatyouunderstandhowyourfundingwillhelpachieverecovery.Thecommitteewillworkcloselywithalldisasterstaffandagencies.Workingtogether,thecommitteeshouldadoptstandardsthatensurethehighestlevelofintegrityandprofessional-ism.TheUnmetNeedsCommitteeshouldconductbusinesswithstrictconfidentiality.



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MunicipalVolunteerRecruitmentandManagement-NextStepsandRecommendations

• Seasonedvolunteergroupscanhelpcommunitiesmanage“spontaneous”volunteerismbyprovidingmentoringandtrainingthatwillallowresidentswithinthecommunitytoassistintheirownrecovery.LessonslearnedbytheselocalvolunteerscanformthebasisofaCom-munityOrganizationActiveinDisaster(COAD)oraddcapacitytoexistingCERTTeamsthatwillprovidegreaterresiliencytothecommunity.

• Continueddevelopmentofbettertoolsandsoftwaretoshowtheconcentrationofneedsbygeographicareaandothermetrics.Thistypeofinformationwillallowvolunteercoordina-tors(orrecoverycoordinators)tobetteralignprojectswithvolunteers.Itwillalsoaidintrackingofworkperformed.

• Recoveryandvolunteercoordinatorsneedaplanformanagingvolunteersincludinglocatingnecessaryhousingandprovidingotherneededsupport,suchasassistancewithpermittingandinspections

• Thesecoordinatorsmustworkwithqualifiedcontractorswhomayserveason-siteprojectmanagers

• Wheneverpossible,effortmustbemadetohavedisastercasemanagersinvolvedinprovid-ingresidentsupport

• CTRises,asamemberofVOAD,canassistwithvolunteercoordination,developpartner-shipswithlocalrecoverymanagers,facilitatemeetingsbetweenrecoveryorganizationsandEmergencyManagementDirectors.ThiswouldbeafirststeptowarddevelopingamutualunderstandingofthestrengthsandlimitationswithboththecommunityandNGOpartners.

• Volunteerscanandshouldplayarolepre-disaster.Volunteerscanhelpbyperformingpre-disastermitigationactivitiessuchaswater-sealingbasementsandelevatinghomemechani-calssuchaswaterheaters.Thereisnotalackofskilledassistance;communitiesshouldidentifyneedsanddevelopacommunityframeworkforreceivingassistance.

• Bolstertheabilityofvolunteerorganizationstomeetrecoveryneedsby1)surveyingandincreasingtheircapabilitiestomeetthechallengesofdisasterresponseandrecovery;2)networkingwithotherNGOstobettercoordinateandpreparefordisasterrecovery;3)inte-gratingwithFederal,Stateandmunicipalpreparedness,responseandrecoveryoperationsincludingtheDisasterRecoveryFrameworkand4)developingrobusttoolsandmethodsfororganizingandcommunicatingamongvolunteerpartnersandresponseandrecoverystake-holderspreandpostdisaster.

BUILDINGANETWORKOFVOLUNTEERANDCOMMUNITYSUPPORT—LessonsLearnedfromFlorida

• RecognizingthegoalofsuccessfulcollaborationbetweenEmergencyManagementDirectorsandvolunteerorganizations,VolunteerFloridaundertookaprogramtobuildcapacityandrelationshipsthroughtheestablishmentofVolunteerCenters



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• Floridadevelopedagrantprogramdesignedtoincreasepreparednessandresponsecapa-bilitiesofvolunteersandvolunteercentersstatewide.OperationStepUpprovidedtrainingtovolunteercentersonavarietyofemergencymanagementrelatedtopics,includingconti-nuityofoperations,disastermitigation,long-termrecovery,andmanagementofspontane-ousvolunteers.Thegrantprogramjoinedlocalvolunteercentersandemergencyresponseagenciesto:(1)developtherolesofvolunteercentersinlocalemergencymanagementplans;(2)mentoremergencyresponseagenciestodevelopvolunteerprograms;(3)unitevolunteercentersandemergencyresponseagenciestousevolunteersindisasterresponse;(4)engageandenablevolunteersinurbanareastoleadinpreparationandresponsetodis-asters;and,(5)utilizevolunteerstomitigatedisasterslocally.

VulnerabilitiesRecommendations• AssistanceprogramsshoulduseAMIasjustoneofmanyfactorsinassessingeligibilityfor

assistance.Itshouldnotbethedeterminingfactorinprovidingassistanceorthelevelofas-sistanceavailable.

• Tounderstandwhatresidentswillbefacingpost-disaster(shouldtheirhomebesubstan-tiallydamaged)itisimportantthatplannersunderstandthelimitationsofprograms,partic-ularlyNFIPinsurance.Asdiscussed,manymunicipalrecoveryplannersdidnotunderstandthatinsurancewouldnotcover,insomecases,allorasignificantportionofrebuildandmit-igationcosts.Plannersshouldbecomefamiliarwiththeseprograms.

• Ashighlighted,partofcommunityresiliencyisensuringthatresidentsunderstandthetruecostsassociatedwithlossoftheirhomes.Manybelievedthatinsurancewouldcoverdisas-terlossesorthatadequateassistanceprogramswouldbeavailable.Thatwasnotalwaysthecase.Residentsneedtounderstandtheirownvulnerabilities,whichmayleadtobetterpre-disasterhousingchoices.

• Disastercasemanagersandsocialservicedepartmentsneedtohaveaccesstofinancialplannerswhocanhelpfamiliesbudgetandmanagetheirmoney.Itisimportanttonotonlyprovidefundingforimmediateneeds,buttoalsotoprovideguidanceforresidentswholackeconomicstability.

• Economicdevelopmentdepartmentscanpromotegreatereconomicstabilitybyhostingjobfairsandprovidingreferralstotrainingprograms

• Recoveryinvolvesnotsimplyhelpingpeopletorebuild,butremovingsomeofthebarriersthatmadethemvulnerable.Thiscanincludeassistingwithlanguageskillsthroughuseofnon-profitliteracycentersorhelpingworkthroughotherissuesthataddtovulnerabilityandimpactsustainability.

• Recoveryplannersandcasemanagersneedtohelptheirclientsunderstandthatcostsasso-ciatedwithanewly-rebuilthomemightincreaseduetohigherinsurancecostsandpropertytaxes.



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Seniors

• Affordablehousingneedstobemadeavailabletoseniorstorelocatefromhigh-riskareas• ConsideroptionssuchasacquisitionprogramssuchasFEMA’sHazardMitigationGrantPro-

gram,HMGPorCDBG-DR

PeoplewithFunctionalandAccessNeedsImportantimprovements:

• Addresshouseholdsthatreportallfunctionalneeds,notjustmobilityconcerns• Organizationsshouldworkdirectlywiththefive(5)cross-disabilityCentersforIndependent

Livingandotheradvocacyorganizationsforpeoplewithfunctionalneedsthatworkwithpeoplewithfunctionalneedseverydayandhavetheknowledgeandexpertise

ChronicandSituationalMentalHealthNeeds• Greaterfocusondeliveringmentalhealthservicestoresidentsimpactedbydisasteris

needed.• MentalhealthrepresentativeshouldparticipateinStateIAmeetings• TrainDisasterCaseManagersonmentalhealthandappropriatereferralservices• Workwithpeermentalhealthproviders,CentersforIndependentLivingandotherorganiza-

tionsthatsupportpeoplewithfunctionalneeds• Post-disaster,fundingneedstobemadeavailableformentalhealthservices• Meetingsforthoseimpactedbythedisasterareencouraged.Forashortperiodoftimea

programwasofferedinMilfordbutclosedduetolackoffunding

LanguageandOtherBarriers• Localnonprofitscanbeusedtoholdcommunitymeetingsortosetupinformationcenters,

andfaith-basedorganizationsshouldbeaskedtoassistinreachingouttothoseinthecom-munitywhomayneedhelp—tousetheirnetworkstolocatethosewhohaveunmetneeds

ChronicHealthConditionsandMold• Residentswithchronicconditionssuchasasthmaordifficultybreathingareespeciallysus-

ceptibletomold.Theyneedtobeidentifiedandprioritizedforcasemanagementservices,assistanceandsafetemporaryhousing.Particularattentionshouldbegiventorentalop-tionsandrepairstotheirhomeincludingtheremovalofmold.

HousingandPets• Accommodationsforpetsandco-locatingpetsshouldbeconsideredinplanning• Findtemporaryhousingaswellasrebuildprogramsforpet-owningresidents• Coordinatetransportationandsocialservicesforthosewithfunctionalneeds,autism,the

elderly



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ChildrenandSingleParentHouseholds

• Mandatorytrainingshouldberequiredfordisastercasemanagersindealingwithchildrenanddisaster.Whileitwasnotedinthedatabasethatclientsdidhavechildren,therewasnotastandardsetofquestionsoroutreachforthispopulation.

• Muchliketheelderlyanddisabledpopulations,socialservicesandlocalagenciesthatmayalreadybeservingchildrenshouldbereadytoreachoutpostdisaster

• Schoolnursesandteachersneedtobetrainedtoidentifyandrecommendinterventionforissues.Parents,daycareproviders,grandparents,sitters,coachesandclergyshouldalsobeinformed.Trainingforallofthesecaregiversshouldbeprovidedpre-disaster.

• Approximately30%ofhouseholdsreceivingassistancethroughdisastercasemanagementweresingleparenthomes,with10%ofthosehomeshavingaseniorasthesoleguardian.

• Manychildrenlostclothingandpossessions.Earlyassistancerequestsindicatedneedsforyoungadultclothing,backpacksandreplacementofschoolitemssuchaslaptops.

• SuperstormSandyoccurredinthefallanddisruptedholidayplansandfestivities• Schoolsprovidedsupporttodisplacedstudents.Someschooldistrictswereabletoprovide

transportationtoschool,othersprovidedgiftcardstostudentswhosehomeshadsuffereddamaged.

• Socialservicesandlocalagenciesthatmayalreadybeservingchildrenshouldbereadytoreachoutpostdisaster

NextStepsforState,MunicipalitiesandNGOs• Affordablehousingfordisplacedresidents• TheDepartmentofHousinghasdevelopedaDisasterHousingPlanthatassistsinproviding

affordablehousingforthoseimpactedbydisaster(https://www.hudexchange.info/re-sources/documents/Housing-Counseling-Disaster-Program-Guide.pdf)(https://bit.ly/2C0LnJa)

• Developrelationshipswiththephilanthropiccommunityinordertoassistwithfundinggapsinservices

• Communitiesshouldplantoaddresshousingneedsforthosewhowillbedisplacedforlongerthan1or2months

• Developrobust,probonolegalservices.ResidentsneedlegalassistanceforInsuranceClaims,ContractorFraud,Bankforeclosures,zoningapplications

• Providefinancialservicesincludingmortgageandinsuranceclaimsassistance.Insurancepoliciesandclaimsadjustingiscomplicated;forthosewithlimitedlanguageskillsorthosewithmentalhealthissues,theprocessisextremelyconfusingandcumbersome

• Stateandfederalgrantapplicationsmustbemoreuser-friendly• Itisnecessarytoworkwithresidentstoimprovetheirfinancialsituation.Issuessuchas

chronicunemploymentandpovertyarenotusuallycontemplatedwhensettinguporman-



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agingrecoveryresources.However,usingresourcessuchasnon-profitemploymentagen-ciesandotherorganizationscanprovideassistancetoresidentswhowouldotherwisehavefewoptions.

• CentersforIndependentLivingandotherorganizationsthatsupportpeoplewithfunctionalneedsshouldprovidecasemanagementforpeoplewithfunctionalneedsorshouldprovidetrainingforothercasemanagers.

• Betteraccesstotranslators:UniversitiesandCollegesmaybeabletohelp

Forimprovedpost-disasteroutreachintocommunities,door-to-dooroutreachisimportantandagreatwaytoreachdisplacedresidents(hotels,faith-basedcenters,publicplaces)inordertodirectthemtoservicesandassistance.Thisisparticularlytrueforrenters.

• CTRisesworkedwithVOADmemberWorldRenewtoprovidedoor-to-doorassessments(3/2014);thisactivityallowedCTRisesanditspartnerstoreachouttoresidentsinneedandtogaugetypesofunmetneeds

• FocusonMentalHealth.Closerrelationshipsareencouragedbetweendisastercaseman-agement,localandstatementalhealthprofessionals.

Bettercoordinationwithlocalandstatesocialservicedepartmentscanbeachieved.Someoftheissuesfacingourresidentswerechronicandneededtobeaddressedwithinthecontextoflocalso-cialservices.Forexample,socialservicedepartmentscanprovideheatingassistanceandfoodassis-tancetolowincomefamilies.DCMswerenotalwaysabletoconnectresidentswithareasocialser-vicesorwereunawareoftheavailabilityoftheseservices.

• Youth-centricrecoveryprogramsareneeded.Theseprogramscanassistineasinganxietyanddepressionaswellasprovideallowancesforreplacementoflostitemsincludingclothesandcomputers.

• Ifpossible,housingoptionsforresidentswithchildrenshouldbeprioritizedsotheyareabletolivewithinorneartheirhomecommunity.

• Provideprepaidcellphonestodisplacedresidentswhodonothavethem.Casemanagersoftenhaddifficultycontactingdisplacedresidents.

• Additionalassistanceforresidentsisneededwithfilingclaims,obtainingassistance,apply-ingforgrants,andlocatingtemporaryhousing.

• Provideaplacewhereresidentscanhaveaccesstocomputers,printers,scanners,faxma-chines,copiersandtrainedstaffthatcanprovidecoachingonpreparingdocuments.

• Providefortransportationwhichmayincludelocalshuttlesandfreebuspasses• Forresidentsrelocatedtohotelswithoutcookingfacilities,providefoodassistanceandres-

taurantvouchers

BusinessPreparednessRecommendations• Local,RegionalandStateEmergencyManagersneedtoinvolvebusinessesinpreparedness

andrecoveryoperations.UsingtheBEOCmodel–andhavingthisorganizationsetuppriortoadisasterevent—willhelpbusinessesandcommunitiesrecoverfaster.



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• TheChamberofCommerce—attheNational,StateandLocallevel—shouldmakeprepared-nesstrainingpartoftheirregularbusinessseminarsandtrainings

• Businessesthatsupplymaterials,goodsorservicesneededpost-disastershouldbegivenpriorityingettingbacktobusiness

• Buyinglocalshouldbepartofrecoverystrategies• Keyprovidersofgoods—areagrocerystoresorgasstations—shouldbeabletooperatefor

longperiodsoftimeintheeventofapoweroutage(inpartsofFlorida,thesetypesofbusi-nessesarerequiredtohaveback-upgenerators)

• Allbusinessesneedtobeencouragedtoundertakesimplepre-disasterpreparednessstepsasoutlinedinthisguide;andthesebusinessesshouldalsoencouragetheirvendorstodothesame

• LocalChambersofCommerceorEconomicDevelopmentorganizationsshouldmakedisas-terpreparednesstrainingspartoftheirregularprogramming.In2014theConnecticutChamberofCommerceundertookseminarsonpreparedness.Theseorganizationscanhelpintegratebusinessesintoresponseandrecoveryactivities.

IndividualRecovery(IR)WorkingGroupRecommendationsIR,asagroup,performedwellduringrecoveryoperations,thoughwiththefollowingimprovementssuggested:

• Communicationtolocalrecoverypersonnelcouldhavebeenimproved.Responsesfromlo-calcoordinatorssuggestthattheywerenotalwaysawareofstatusofprogramsordirectioninundertakingcommunityrecovery

• Someoftheinformationdisconnectwasduetothepressureonlocalrecoveryorganizationstomeetimmediateandpressingresidents’needs—especiallyinthefirst6monthspost-event

• Recoveryoperationswereundertakenbyemergencymanagerswhowerealso,inthefirstmonths,navigatingresponseandfocusedonassessmentsandhousingofdisplacedresi-dents

• TheState’sDisasterRecoveryFramework,shouldhelprecoverypersonnelbetterunder-standdisasterprograms,recoveryresponsibilitiesandprocesses

• CTRises,asthestate-widelong-termrecoverygroup,canandshouldhelptodeliverim-portantinformationtocommunitiesandrecoverypartners

• Long-termrecoveryputsastrainongovernmentofficialswhomustalsomanagetheirown—non-disaster—tasks.However,itwouldhavebeenbeneficialtohavemoreconsistentcommunicationswithIAgroupmemberssuchas:

o CThousingAuthorityo SocialServiceo VolunteergroupssuchasTheSalvationArmyandCatholicCharities



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• Assuggestedelsewhereinthisguide,recoverychallengesrequiredrecoverycoordinatorsandcasemanagementtoseekoutdisasterandnon-disasterrelatedassistancebeyondtra-ditionalpost-disasterprograms.GivenIAsfocusondeliveringandmonitoringassistance,representativesfromtheHealthDepartment(includingMentalHealth)aswellasBankingandLegalshouldbeincluded.

• InformationgleanedfromIAmeetingsneedstobetransmittedtoregionalandlocalcoordi-natorsaswellastorelevantrecoverypartners

CTRises,initsroleasthestate-widelong-termrecoverygroup,attendedIAmeetingsandthroughtheDisasterResourceSpecialist,providedupdatestoexistingLTRGs.Thisactivityshouldbefirst,formalizedandthen,enlargedtoencompassallcommunitiesimpactedbySandy.(CitiessuchasEastHaven,Stratford,Greenwich,etc.,didnothaveformalLTRGandwerenotusually—orfor-mally—includedinallcommunications.NotethatinformationwastransmittedthroughDEMHSandregionalcoordinators—butimportanceofamorethoughtfulapproachtocommunicationthatin-cludesallstakeholdersisimportant).NGOS—VOAD,NextStepsRecommendationsforstrengtheningNGOs:

• ContinuetodevelopCapacityBuildingOpportunitiesforNGOs• IdentifyandcultivateVOADmembership• Beinacontinuousstateoforganizationalimprovements;includetrainingsforworkingwith

vulnerableordisadvantagedcommunitiesandworkingwiththosewithpost-disasterhealthissues

• EnhancerecognitionofVOADandNGOprogramsanddisastercapabilitiesamongallstake-holders

• Forlocalrecoverycoordinators,prepareaguidetoavailablerecoveryservices—updateguideregularlyalongwithwebsite

• BeapartofState-widedisasterdrills• UnderstandFEMAsandHUDsafter-disasterproceduresandassistancecapabilities• AvoidusingvolunteerordonatedresourcesonactivitiesthatcanbeundertakenbyStateor

Federalagencies• CommunicateregularlywithVOADandlocalRecoveryCoordinators;updaterecoverypart-

nersoncapacitiesandbestpractices• Helpcommunitiestrainlocalvolunteers(throughCERT)• Developorganizationaltoolsthathelpcoordinatevolunteeractivities• InthesectiononVOAD,recommendationstoimprovecoordinationbetweenState-wide

groupsandlocalrecoverycoordinatorsareprovided• Existingvolunteerorganizationsareencouragedtoincreasetrainingandcapacitybuilding.

TheStateandrecoverypartnersareurgedtohelpbetterintegratevolunteerservicesintorecoverythroughthedevelopmentofsoftwaretoolsthatallowassistanceprovidersandre-coverycoordinatorstobettermatchvolunteerskillswithsuitableresidents’needs



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ChallengesandNextStepsforIndividualAssistance-VolunteerOrganizationsActiveinDisasters(VOADs)/CTRISES

• Theavailablesoftwaretool—CAN—isnotrobustenoughtoprovidethetypeofinformationthatallowsforcoordinationamongresourceproviders.LackofmorerobustsoftwaremakesitdifficultforCTRisestomanageanddistributedonationsormatchvolunteerswithsuitableprojects.

• Bestpracticesandinformationonrecoveryactivitiesandpreparednesshavenotbeenabletobeeffectivelycommunicatedacrossallstakeholders

• CTRisescancontinuetoprovideinformationtostateandregionalrecoverygroupsandCOGs,butCTRisesneedsamorestrategiccommunicationsplan.Thisplanwouldalsocon-siderhowtobetterdeliverinformationpost-disaster.

• Lackoffundingtoadvancepre-disastercapacitybuildingamongallstakeholders• CTRises’roleincoordinatingLTRGoperationsandunmetneedsshouldbebetterdefined

amongallDCMagencies,forfuturedisasters• CTRisesfounditselfunabletogleaninformationonrecoverystatusorclientprogressfrom

somedisastercasemanagersoragencies—somewerehelpfulandsomenot.Thismadeitmoredifficulttohelpotherresourceprovidersorgroupsmanagerecovery.Recoverypart-nershipsmustbecollaborativeinordertomakesurethatneedsarebeingaddressed.

RecommendationsforDisasterCaseManagementPrograms(DCMP)

• FEMAandtheStateneedtodeveloporrefinetheircriteriaforselectionofDCMP• Innon-declareddisasters,wheretheremaybenodesignatedDCMP,CTRisesmaybeable

toprovideinterim,ordependingonnumberofclients,continuingDisasterCaseManage-ment

• Alistofpre-qualifiedagenciesabletoconductDCMPintheStateshouldbecompiledpriortoadisaster.

• Pre-qualifiedagenciesshouldberequiredtoconductonceyearlypre-disastertrainingforDCMpersonneltoremainqualified

• AgencieschosentosupplyDCMPafteradisastershouldberequiredto:1) Provideregularandas-neededreportingoncases,demographicsand

spendingtostateandlocalpartners2) EstablishMOU’swithlong-termrecoverygroups3) Workcollaborativelywithallotherrecoverygroups4) AttendregularIAandLong-TermRecoveryMeetings

• DCMPagenciesshouldfollowestablishedDCMpractices• AgenciesprovidingDCMPshould,priortoadisaster,continuetoexpandtheirdisasterre-

sponseandrecoverycapacity,continuetrainingforagencystaff,andbeanactivememberofVOAD.Trainingshouldfocusattentiononmanagingrecoveryacrossdiverseandmargin-alizedcommunitiesaswellasassistingdisabledandvulnerablepopulations.



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• FEMAandtheState,afterawardinggrantsandcontractsfordeliveryofDCMservices,mustmonitorDCMPthroughouttherecoveryphase;thisreviewshouldfocusonqualitativeandquantitativemeasuresofdeliverables

• DCMPagenciesshouldconsiderutilizingexistingstaffforDCMsothatstaffisreadyintheeventofadisaster

• Identifyadditionalstreamsoffundingfortheadministrationofdisastercasemanagement• ProvidersofDCMshouldconsidercommittingforlongerperiodsoftimetoensurecontinu-

ityofservices.Currentlyitisstandardtocommitfor18months—tooshorttobringresi-dentsandcommunitiestorecovery.

• Provideup-frontStateFundingforDCMPs(priortoreleaseofFEMADCMPfunding)andcaponStateadministrativefees

• StateandFederalreviewofDCMPeffectivenessbasedonestablishedgoals—duringandpostdisaster

• ProvidersofDCMPshouldconduct360-degreereviewsthroughouttherecoveryprocessandpost-disastertofindareaswheretheycanenhancetheirprograms

ChallengesandRecommendationsforCDBG-DRSandyRecoveryCDBGGuidelinesEligibilitythresholdrequirementsfortheOORRprogramrefertofeasibilityforeachproject,demon-stratingthattheyarefinanciallyfeasible,sustainable,andlikelytocontributetothelong-termre-coveryofdisaster-impactedcommunities.Thereweresomecaseswheretheclientswerenoteconomicallyabletosustaintheirhome,post-mitigation.ForNGOfunders,itwasdifficulttojustifyprovidingalternatehousingassistancetothosewhowouldbebetterservedthroughasocialserviceagency.

• CDBG-DRprogramrequiredthathomeownersbecurrentontheirmortgageandonprop-ertytaxesandthattherebenoliens.Itwasmoreusualthannot,thatDCMagencieswouldassisthomeownersinbackmortgagepaymentsetc.Thistypeofactivityinsomecases(notall)providedafalseimpressionofthehomeowners’sustainability.

• Agreateremphasisonestablishingaclient’ssustainabilityshouldbeundertakenbytheDCM

• DisasterCaseManagersneedtobetrainedonhowtoworkwithCDBG-DRclients,andun-derstandtheprogramfully.



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Applicants:Manyapplicantsdidnotunderstandthedetailedplansandthelengthoftheproject.ThoughCDBG-DRspecialiststriedtoinstructapplicants,therewereoccasionaldisconnectsbetweenhomeownerandDOH.Someofourmostvulnerableapplicants—theelderlyordisabled—haddiffi-cultynavigatingtheprogram.

• ItmaybeworthwhiletohaveapointpersonatanagencyorLTRG(suchasCTRises)whocanworkwithCDBG-DRapplicantswhoareincasemanagement

TemporaryHousing—DOHandCDBG-DRRecommendationsAfterSandy,therewereolderresidentswhowouldhaveagreedtoHMGPsacquisitionprogram,buttherewasnoaffordablehousingavailable.Thisisespeciallytrueforresidentswithlimitedmobility.

• Givelow-income,elderly,anddisabledresidentslivinginvulnerableareaspriorityforsubsi-dizedhousing

• RevisetheadministrationoftheHMGPgrantstomakeiteasierforresidentsandcitiestobenefitfrommitigationactivities

CDBG-DRandHazardMitigationGrantProgram(HMGP)AcquisitionRecommendations

• Aswithalltherecommendations,pre-disasterplanningforacquisitionofpropertiesisstronglyencouraged—particularlyinthemostvulnerableareas.ThisrequiresthecitytotakestockofstructuresandlocationswhereacquisitionmakesthemostsenseandtheStateandFederalgovernmenttodoabetterjobofmarketingacquisitionprograms.

• Homeownersinareasvulnerabletofloodingshouldbeawareofallprogramsthatmaybeavailableshouldtherebeadisaster,understandingthatsomeoftheseprogramschange

• Municipalitiesshoulddevelopalong-termplanforgraduallyacquiringproperty,andlooktolowerdensityinthoseareas

• Considerwaystodecreasebuildingandre-buildinginareasthatarethemostecologicallysensitiveandmostsusceptibletorepetitivedamage

NextStepsPre-andPost-Disaster• BetterinformationattherecoverycentersaboutIAeligibility• EducatingmunicipalpersonnelandresidentsduringblueskiesaboutFEMAprogram

eligibility• CTRisesandDCMPagenciesstandingupearlierinthedisasterrecoveryprocess• CoordinationbetweenCTRisesandotherNGO/charitableagenciesconcerningrentaland

householdassistanceanduseofFEMAfundingfirst• Providein-depthassessmentofdamagedhomeswhichincludesexaminationformold• RequesttheFEMAcapbeliftedorextendedduetohighcostofrentals• FEMArentalassistance(extension)toassistthosehomeownerswhoareawaitinggrants

fromHMGPandCDBG-DR(subjecttomaxgrant)



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CommunityActivitiesQualifyingforFloodRateReductionsTheNationalFloodInsurance(NFIP)Program’sCommunityRatingSystem(CRS)wasdevelopedbyFEMA.CRSrecognizesandencouragescommunityfloodplainmanagementactivitiesthatexceedtheminimumNFIPstandards.ResidentswholiveinatownthatparticipatesintheNFIPneedtoim-pressontheircityleaderstheimportanceofworkingtowardsahighCRSrating.Failureofcitiestoworktodecreaselossesduetofloodingcancausehomeownerstoloseneededdiscounts;andinsomecases,loseNFIPinsurancecoveragealtogether.Dependinguponthelevelofparticipation,floodinsurancepremiumratesforpolicyholderscanbereducedupto45%.FEMAhascreatedase-riesofactivities(Series300,400,500,600)toprovidetownsandcitieswitharangeofoptionsaimedatcreatingmoreresilientcommunities. PublicInformation(Series300)Thisseriescreditsprogramsthatadvisepeopleaboutthefloodhazard,floodinsurance,andwaystoreduceflooddamage.

Activity310ElevationCertificatesActivity320MapInformationServiceActivity330OutreachProjectsActivity340HazardDisclosureActivity350FloodProtectionInformationActivity360FloodProtectionAssistanceActivity370FloodInsurancePromotion

MappingandRegulations(Series400)Thisseriescreditsprogramsthatprovideincreasedprotectiontonewdevelopment.

Activity410FloodplainMappingActivity420OpenSpacePreservationActivity430HigherRegulatoryStandardsActivity440FloodDataMaintenanceActivity450Storm-waterManagement

FloodDamageReduction(Series500)Thisseriescreditsprogramsthatreduceflooddamagetoexistingbuildings.

Activity510FloodplainManagementPlanningActivity520AcquisitionandRelocationActivity530FloodProtectionActivity540DrainageSystemMaintenance

WarningandResponse(Series600)Thisseriescreditsfloodwarningandresponseprograms.

Activity610FloodWarningandResponseActivity620LeveesActivity630Dams



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Inadditiontoreducedfloodinsurancerates,CRSfloodplainmanagementactivitiesenhancepublicsafety,reducedamagestopropertyandpublicinfrastructure,avoideconomicdisruptionandlosses,reducehumansuffering,andprotecttheenvironment.Technicalassistanceondesigningandimple-mentingsomeactivitiesisavailableatnocharge.ParticipatingintheCRSprovidesanincentivetomaintainandimproveacommunity'sfloodplainmanagementprogramovertheyears.ImplementingsomeCRSactivitiescanhelpprojectsqualifyforcertainotherFederalassistancepro-grams.See:http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-community-rating-system(https://bit.ly/PtQ400)[email protected],orphone317-848-2898.(Source:FEMA–NationalFloodInsuranceProgram)



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18. APPENDIX3:TOOLKITOFFORMSANDSUPPORTDOCUMENTS

UnmetNeedsTablePreparationTemplates(SAMPLE)

CTRisesUnmetNeedsTableDatePresented:____________ Agency:________CaseManager:_____________ DOB:__________

CAN#____________________TotalRequest:$______________

• Agesofhouseholdmembers:________________________________• Isthisasingle-parenthousehold?(Y/N)______• Doesthishouseholdincludeindividualswithspecialneedsordisability?(Y/N)____• OwnorRent___________• ClientReleaseforUnmetNeedsTable(Y/N)_______

Addressattimeofdisaster:_________________________________________________Provideanoverviewofclient’sPost-disastercondition:WhataretheUnmetNeedsforthisdisaster?Thetotal$Amountrequested:___________________________WillAssistancehelptheclientleadtosustainablerecovery?(Y/N)________ClientRecoveryResourcesPersonalResources_________________MonthlyIncome___________________MonthlyExpenses___________________



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Investments________________________Savings____________________________OtherPersonalResources_____________TotalPersonalResourcesavailableforrecovery$____________Non-personalRecoveryResources$_________________________TotalNon-personalavailableRecoveryResources$_____________Doestheclienthaveasustainablerecoveryplan?(Y/N)___________Astheadvocateforthisclient,Iaffirmthattheinformationasdescribedhasbeenverifiedtoeveryextentpossible.________________________________________________________________Signature DateINCLUDEDWITHTHISFUNDINGREQUEST:

• Non-personalRecoveryResourcesWorksheet• 2constructionQuotesforrepaircostsover$2500(orCTRises’ConstructionCostVerifica-

tion)• W-9;Contractor’sLicenseandProofofInsurance(fordirect-to-contractorpayments)• ContractorPaymentRequestForm• Photographsofpropertydamage• FEMAduplicationofbenefitsform• Clientreleaseforunmetneedstable



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SAMPLE:(Dollarfiguresareshownforexampleonly)

Funding ApprovedY/N

AmountRe-ceived

AmountDue HowFundswereused

Floodinsurance Y $16,242.00 $0.00 HomeRepairICC N $0.00 $0.00 N/AHomeowners N $0.00 N/AFEMA N $5,106.00 $0.00 RentalAssistanceSBA Y $0.00 $0.00 N/ASHPO N $0.00 $0.00 N/AShorelineResiliency N $0.00 $0.00 N/AAmericanRedCross N $0.00 $0.00 N/ACatholicCharitiesofFairfield

N $0.00 $0.00 N/A

TSAFinancialAssistance Y $5,883.43 $9,116.57 OtherAssistanceUMCOR N $5,200.00 $4,800.00 RentalAssistanceTheUnitedWay N $0.00 $0.00 N/ACTRises Y $0.00 $0.00 N/ACDBG/Priority N $250,000 $0.00 HomeRepairHMGP N $0.00 $0.00 N/AOperationHope Y $0.00 $0.00 N/A $0.00 $0.00 N/ATOTAL $282,431.43 13,916.57



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ContractorFraudChecklist



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FEMAMulti-FamilyLeaseandRepairProgram:(MLRP)

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1384452357718-95f11f1ef06e063e305edd22bee70964/MLRP_Policy.pdf

(https://bit.ly/2NqCOse)



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TIPSFOREFFECTIVELYCOMMUNICATINGWITHPROTECTEDPOPULATIONS



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BusinessContinuityResourceWorksheet(Sample)



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19. CHECKLISTSANDRESOURCESChecklistforPre-EventPlanningandPost-DisasterRecovery(BasedonFEMAwhole-communityrecovery)

1. Identifyvulnerableareasandpeople,businesseswhoaremostatriskinvariousdisasterscenarios.Utilizeinformationonsoilandbuildingtypes,forexample,inanticipatingearth-quakevulnerability.

2. Makesureallcommunitygroups,businessesandresourceorganizationsunderstandhowthegovernmentwillrespondandwheretheyfitinbyestablishingrolesandrelationships

3. Understandissuesrelatedtoaccessandfunctionalneedsandconnectwithseniorandsup-portorganizationstoparticipateinallplanning.

4. PrepareaCommunity-BasedDisasterResponsePlanidentifyinglinkagesamonggovernmentrespondersandthevarietyoforganizationsthatwillbeinvolvedinresponseincludingmedi-cal,shelter,relief,neighborhood,business,socialservice,religious,school,andothers.Tai-lortheplantotheuniquenessofthecommunity.

5. FormalizetherelationshipswithMemorandaofUnderstandingbetweentheCityandeachcommunity-basedorganization.SupportingrespondersauthorizedintheadoptedDisasterResponsePlanbecomeeligibleforFEMAreimbursement.

6. Planforflexibleadministrativestructuresadaptabletotheparticularsofthedisaster.Keepinmindthatnewworkingrelationshipswillneedtobeformedandthatclientgroupsout-sidecityhallwillseektoworkwithstaffwithwhomtheyaremostfamiliar.

7. EmphasizesituationanalysisandinformationgatheringanddisseminationcapabilitiesintheDisasterResponsePlan.Situationanalysisistheessentialbuildingblockfromwhichtobeginmakingrecoverydecisions.Establishinformationlinkagesandnetworkswidelythroughoutthecommunity.

8. Preparemobilizationstrategiesformassivebuildinginspectionneeds.9. Anticipatehowemergencyresponsedecisionsmayaffectlong-termrecovery(e.g.,demoli-

tionpolicies).Preparescenarioswitharangeof“acceptablerisk”choices.10. EstablishseparationsandlinkagesbetweenpolicymakersandtheEmergencyOperations

Center.AnticipatehowpolicymatterswillberesolvedandhowinformationwillflowtoandfromtheEOCandthecommunitypoliticalleadership.



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ChecklistforBusinessRecovery

1. Retrofitvulnerablestructures.Important!Retrofitting,eveninmarginalapplications,cangreatlyenhancetherecoverypotentialforanindividualproperty.

2. Recognizethatshort-termsurvivalofthedamagedbusinessdistrictiscriticaltolong-termrecovery.

3. Recognizethatstrongpublic/privatepartnershipswillbeneededforlong-termrecovery.4. Encourageprivate-sectorpre-disasterplanningforprotectionand/orredundancyofim-

portantbusinessrecordsanddocumentation.5. Includeinventoryrecoverystrategiesinpre-eventplanning6. Formulateaplanandastructureforplanningshort-termbusinessresumptionfollowingthe

disaster.Includeconsiderationofwhoshouldbeinvolvedintheplanningaswellassubstan-tiveconcernssuchastransportation,circulation,alternativebusinesslocations,temporaryquarters(e.g.,pavilions),etc.Makesuretoanticipatetheresourcesneededtohandlethedetailssuchasrealestateagentsandattorneys.

7. Includealong-termrecoveryplanningprocessandstructureintheCommunityBasedDisas-terResponsePlan.Identifythekeyplayers(stakeholders,politicians,officials)whowillneedtobeginplanningforrecoveryduringtheemergencyresponsephaseandkeepthelistcur-rent.

8. Establishatax-deductiblebusinessrelieffundaccountthroughtheChamberofCommerceorotherbusinessorganizationthatcanacceptreliefcontributionsforbusiness.Establishaprocessfordisbursingreliefmoney.

9. Identifyandbecomefamiliarwithpost-disasterreliefprogramsandsourcessuchasFEMAassistance,SmallBusinessAdministrationloanprograms,etc.Assignresponsibilitiesinad-vanceforpublicagencyandprivatesectorpeopletopursuerecoveryassistanceimmedi-atelyfollowingthedisaster.Preparetomovequicklywhilethe“opportunitywindow”iswidest.

10. AnticipatehowongoingFederalorStateeconomicdevelopmentassistanceprogramscouldberefocusedarecoveryresourcesforparticularbusinessdistrictsorareas.

11. Anticipatehowredevelopmentpowerscouldbeappliedinthepost-disastersetting,includ-ingthepotentialexpansionorreconstitutingofexistingredevelopmentdistricts.

12. Worktominimizevulnerabilityofcontenttodamage.Contentdamagecanbeamajorsourceofloss,evenabsentstructuralfailure.



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ChecklistforHousingRecovery

1. Emphasizeretrofitandmitigation.2. Establishsheltersitesandidentifyareasthatcouldserveassitesforinterimhousing.Be

suretoidentifyinappropriatetemporarysitesandputemergencypersonnelthereimmedi-atelyfollowingadisastertodirectpeopletotheappropriateareas.

3. Adoptapolicyorordinancetodealwithnonconforminguses.4. Establishacity-sponsoredrelieffundthatcanbedirectedtohousingrecovery.5. Tailorshort-andlong-termresponsestomeettheneedsofthepeoplewithaccessand

functionalneedsandanticipateethnic,language,culturalorotherconsiderations.6. Identifyresourceandassistanceprogramsinadvancethatcanbeactivatedfollowingthe

disaster.Donotoverlookfoundationsorphilanthropicagenciesthatwouldnototherwisebeinvolvedinhousing.

7. Planwaysforexistingcityhousingprograms(e.g.,rehabilitation)toberefocusedfollowingthedisaster.

8. Workwithlocalnon-profithousingagenciestoestablishpost-disasterroles.9. Evaluatelocalhousingmarketconditions(elasticity)toanticipatehowvaryinglevelsofneed

couldbeaddressed.10. Prepareaplanforbuildingpermanentstreamlining,includingfieldissuanceofsometypes

ofpermits,andhow-to-repairinformationforcommondamageitemssuchaschimneys.11. Integratepre-disasterplanningforrecoveryintootherongoingcommunityplanningactivi-

ties.Forexample,whenpreparingeconomicdevelopmentstrategies,includeacomponentforbusinesshazardmitigation,resumptionandrecovery.Dolikewiseforneighborhoodplanning.

12. Considerhistoricpreservationneedsandstrategiesinpre-eventplanning.13. Bepractical;avoidadoomsdaymentality.Riskreductionisalwaysanachievablegoalandall

incrementalmitigationscount.14. Usescenariostoinvolvethecommunityinriskidentificationandhazardreductionstrate-

gies.15. Keepupwithchangingtechnology.Informationexchangeisthemostimportantaspectof

disasterresponseandrecoveryandthisiswheretechnologyismovingthefastest.Useout-sideresources;learnfromothers



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RESOURCESOnlineresourcesmentionedinthetext

1. NationalResponseFramework:https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf(https://bit.ly/1TIxZeu)

2. ChiefExecutiveOfficerandEmergencyManagementDirectorHandbook,theLocalEmer-gencyOperationsPlans,theRegionalEmergencySupportPlans,andtheStateResponseFramework,includingtheNationalDisasterRecoveryFramework.https://www.fema.gov/national-disaster-recovery-framework.(bit.ly/2LZIKLi)

3. StateofCTDisasterRecoveryFrameworkandESF-14https://portal.ct.gov/DEMHS/Emergency-Management/Resources-For-Officials/Planning-For-All-Hazards(https://bit.ly/2WydrsX)

4. ThoseapplyingtheNationalDisasterRecoveryFramework(NDRF)shouldbeawareofstatu-toryandExecutiveOrderobligationsinvolved:https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014998123-4bec8550930f774269e0c5968b120ba2/National_Disaster_Recovery_Framework2nd.pdf.(https://bit.ly/2vjv1V1)

5. LEOPTemplateandresources:https://portal.ct.gov/DEMHS/Emergency-Management/Resources-For-Officials/Planning-For-All-Hazards/LEOP/Local-Emergency-Operations-Plan-Resources(https://bit.ly/2W6EMSb)

6. NoticefromtheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityOfficeforCivilRightsandCivilLiber-ties,FEMAOfficeofEqualRights,andFEMAOfficeofDisabilityIntegration&Coordination:https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/notice-nondiscrimination-during-dis-asters.pdf(https://bit.ly/2M2cVBI)

7. RutgersMysticIslandVoluntaryBuyoutHealthImpactAssessment:AssessingHealthOutcomesofPost-SandyDecision-Making.https://bit.ly/2BXQ6cN2.

8. SustainableConnecticut(https://sustainablect.org).Providingmunicipalitieswithamenuofcoordinated,voluntaryactionstocontinuallybecomemoresustainable.Hasresourcesandtoolstoassistmunicipalitiesinimplementingsustainabilityactions.

9. Dept.ofJusticeGuidancetoStateandLocalGovernmentsandOtherFederallyAssistedRe-cipientsEngagedinEmergencyPreparedness,Response,Mitigation,andRecoveryActivitiesonCompliancewithTitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof1964https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/EmergenciesGuidance#_ftn6(https://bit.ly/2LVy2ph)

10. StateofCTLocalEmergencyManagementDirector&MunicipalOfficialHandbook11. http://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/ceo_emd/demhs_emd_ceo_handbook_2014.pdf

(https://bit.ly/2LXnnqP)12. ReferencetoNationalPreparednessGoal2:

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-



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2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf(https://bit.ly/2nKSdHk)

13. FormoreinformationonsettingupaMARC,pleasereviewthefollowing:https://www.preparecenter.org/resources/multi-agency-resource-center-marc-planning-resource(https://bit.ly/2M5muzA)

14. FEMA’sDisasterCaseManagementProgram(DCMP)GuidanceManualhttp://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732994(https://bit.ly/2OgvM9k)

15. NationalVOADCaseManagementCommitteeGuidance(http://www.nvoad.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2014/04/dcm_guidelines_-_fi-nal_-_2012_-_feb.pdf)(https://bit.ly/2C0J8p0)

16. HomelandSecurityNationalPreparednessGoal:https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf(https://bit.ly/2nKSdHk)

17. Community-basedhomerepairprogram:HomeFrontProgram:www.homefrontprogram.org

18. WorldRenew,internationaldisasterrecoveryorganization:https://worldrenew.net19. OperationHope,onlinetoolkitforassessingpersonaldisasterresiliency:

http://www.njvoad.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/PDPG-Full-English-Color-1.pdf(https://bit.ly/2wxCBwx)

20. UnitedWay’sALICEsurvey:https://alice.ctunitedway.org/files/2016/01/HousingBudget-600x491.png(https://bit.ly/2Mew18k)

21. TheRandCorporationreport:"TheNongovernmentalSectorinDisasterResilience"(https://bit.ly/2LekzV5)

22. The“CitizenCorpsProgramManual”ontheDESPP/DEMHSwebsite.https://portal.ct.gov/DEMHS/Emergency-Management/Resources-For-Officials/Citizen-Corps-Program(https://bit.ly/2JrjUlM)

23. FEMA’sHazardMitigationGrantProgram(https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-grant-program)(https://bit.ly/1j14PHC)

24. FEMAMulti-FamilyLeaseandRepairProgram(MLRP):(https://bit.ly/2NqCOse)25. NoticefromtheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityOfficeforCivilRightsandCivilLiber-

ties,FEMAOfficeofEqualRights,andFEMAOfficeofDisabilityIntegration&Coordinationhttps://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/notice-nondiscrimination-during-dis-asters.pdf(https://bit.ly/2M2cVBI)

26. Dept.ofJusticeGuidancetoStateandLocalGovernmentsandOtherFederallyAssistedRe-cipientsEngagedinEmergencyPreparedness,Response,Mitigation,andRecoveryActivitiesonCompliancewithTitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof1964https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/EmergenciesGuidance#_ftn6(https://bit.ly/2LVy2ph)



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AdditionalResources:

• RobertT.StaffordDisasterReliefandEmergencyAssistanceAct(StaffordAct),asamended• Post-KatrinaEmergencyManagementReformAct• RehabilitationActof1973,asamended• AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA),asamended2008• FairHousingActof1968,asamended• ArchitecturalBarriersActof1968• CommunicationsActof1934,asamended• IndividualswithDisabilitiesEducationAct(IDEA)of1975,asamended• TitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof1964,asamended• TheAgeDiscriminationActof1975,asamended• ExecutiveOrder12898(February11,1994),–FederalActionstoAddressEnvironmentalJus-

ticeinMinorityPopulationsandLow-IncomePopulations• ExecutiveOrder13166(August11,2000),–ImprovingAccesstoServicesforPersonswith

LimitedEnglishProficiency

ExecutiveOrder13347(July22,2004),–-IndividualswithDisabilitiesinEmergencyPrepared-ness.



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INDEXofTOPICS

AAmericanRedCross,4AssistanceCenters,21

BBusinessRevitalization,40BusinessesActiveinDisaster

Response,61

CCalculatingFloodRisk,81CapacityBuilding(CPCB)Working

Group,81CaseManagementAdvisoryGroup,

28Challenges:asaresultofexpedited

declarationduringSandy,5;ContractorsandRebuilding,12;ListofKeyRecoveryChallengesPost-Sandy,13;NeedforRentalAssistance,12;withNavigatingFederalPrograms,10;withPost-disasterVolunteerDeployment,11

Checklists:forBusinessRecovery,113;forHousingRecovery,114;forPre-EventPlanningandPost-DisasterRecovery,112

ChronicHealthConditions,56ClientRecoveryPlanning,65CommunityCompetence,50CommunityRatingSystem,82ComplexityofDisasterAssistance

ProgramsandFunds,10CTRISES,4CTVOAD,3

DDCMandClientUnmetNeeds,64DCM-LTRGPartnership,27DemandonMunicipalservices,7DisasterOrdinance/Regulations,

29DonationsManagement,37

EEconomicCapital,50EconomicRecoveryWorkingGroup,

81

FFaith-basedandNon-Governmental

Organizations,35FEMA:AcquisitionProcess,73;

AcquisitionPrograms,73;CDBG-DRAcquisition,74;CDBG-DRandOwner-OccupiedRehabilitationandRebuilding,70;FloodInsuranceCoverage,79;HazardMitigationGrantProgram(HMGP),70;HousingPortal,75;IndividualAssistance,68;PublicAssistance,69

FloodInsuranceCosts,82FloodplainMapping,81FraudChecklist,33FunctionalNeeds,4

GGuidelinesTowardDevelopinga

Pre-disasterPlan,40

HHazardMitigationGrantProgram

(HMGP),10HistoricPreservationOffice,75

IIncreasingSocialCapital,49InformationGatheringandSharing,

66

KKeyStepsforMunicipalitiestoBuild

Resiliency,14

LLandUseDepartments,29

LocalandRegionalRecoveryCommittees,8

LocalContractorsandBuilders,32LocalEconomicDevelopment

Agencies,39LocalEmergencyOperationsPlan

(LEOP),2LocalRecoveryCoordinator,15LocalRecoveryCoordinators,8Long-termrecovery,1

MMoldandStandingWater,32Multi-AgencyResourceCenter

(MARC),21

NNationalResponseFramework

(NRF),2NaturalCapitalandHazard

Reduction,49

PPartnerAgencies,66PermitsandOrdinances,29Pets,56

RRegisteringwithFEMA,24ResidentialRepairand

Construction,31Resiliency:ALICEsurvey,57;

BuildingResilientCommunities,61;ChildrenandSingle-ParentHouseholds,56;HallmarksofResilientCommunities,48;IndividualandFamilyVulnerabilities,53;IndividualResiliencyandSelf-Assessment,51;LowtoModerateIncomePopulations,57;PlanningforVulnerablePopulations,53;RiskAssessments,48;Self-AssessmentGuide,52



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SSandyResidentsandCase

Management,6SBADisasterLoans,68Short-termrecovery.,1StaffordAct,63StateandFederalDisaster

Resources,75

StateofConnecticutDisasterRecoveryFramework,3

StateResponseFramework(SRF),2

TTaxRelief,77TheStateLong-TermRecovery

Committee(SLTRC),2

UUnitedWay2-1-1,3

VVolunteerIdentificationand

CapacityBuilding,35VolunteerRecruitmentand

Management,34

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