CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Case Study: TOR Anonymity Network

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CSE 486/586, Spring 2012 CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Case Study: TOR Anonymity Network Bahadir Ismail Aydin Computer Sciences and Engineering University at Buffalo

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CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Case Study: TOR Anonymity Network. Bahadir Ismail Aydin Computer Sciences and Engineering University at Buffalo. Outline. Overview Users Onion Routing The Solution Hidden services The future of Tor How to install/use TOR?. Overview. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Case Study: TOR Anonymity Network

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CSE 486/586 Distributed SystemsCase Study: TOR Anonymity Network

Bahadir Ismail AydinComputer Sciences and Engineering

University at Buffalo

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Outline• Overview• Users• Onion Routing• The Solution• Hidden services• The future of Tor• How to install/use TOR?

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Overview• Onion routing project of the U.S. Naval Research

Laboratory• Tor hides you among the other users on the network• Use: Using Tor protects you against a common form

of Internet surveillance known as "traffic analysis." • What is traffic analysis? How does it work?

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Users• Militaries use Tor

– First designd with US Navy in mind• Normal people use Tor• Journalists and their audience use Tor• Law enforcement officers use Tor• Activists & Whistleblowers use Tor• High & low profile people use Tor• Business executives use Tor• Bloggers use Tor• IT Professionals use Tor

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• Hide message source by routing it randomly• Popular technique: Crowds, Onion Routing, TOR

• Routers don’t know for sure if the apparent source of a message is the true sender or another router• Only secure against local attackers!

Onion Routing

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R R4

R1R2

RRR3

Bob

R

RR

• Sender chooses a random sequence of routers

• Some routers are honest, some hostile

• Sender controls the length of the path

• Goal: hostile routers shouldn’t learn that Alice is talking to Bob

Alice

Onion Routing

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R4

R1

R2 R3Bob

Alice

{R2,k1}pk(R1),{ }k1{R3,k2}pk(R2),{ }k2

{R4,k3}pk(R3),{ }k3{B,k4}pk(R4),{ }k4

{M}pk(B)

• Routing info for each link encrypted with router’s public key

• Each router learns only the identity of the next router

Onion Routing

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Solution

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Solution

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Solution

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Hidden Services

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Hidden Services

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Hidden Services

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Hidden Services

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Hidden Services

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Hidden Services

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Future for TOR• Tor can't solve all anonymity problems.• As Tor's usability increases, it will attract more users,

which will increase the possible sources and destinations of each communication, thus increasing security for everyone. We're making progress, but we need your help. Please consider running a relay or volunteering as a developer.

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