Crowood - McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle

8/13/2019 Crowood - McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle

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McDonnell ougl s F 5 Eagle


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th r titles in the rowood viation SeriesAichi D3A 1/2 ValAirco - Th e Aircraft Manufacturing CompanyAvro LancasterBAC One ElevenBell P-39 AiracobraBoeing 747Boeing 757 and 767Boeing B I 7 Flying FortressConsolidated B-24 LiberatorDe Havilland Mosqui[McDonnell Douglas A 4 SkyhawkDouglas AD SkyraiderEnglish Electric CanberraEnglish Electric LightningFairchild Republic A I Thunderbolt Fokker Aircraft of World War OneGloster MeteorHawker HunterHawker HurricaneJunkers Ju 7 tukaLockheed C 13 HerculesLockheed F-l 4 tarfightcrLuftwaffe - A Pictoria l HistoryMesserschmitt Bf I 1 0Messerschmitt Me 262

orth American B-25 MitchellNorth American F-86 SabreNorth American T-6Panavia TornadoShort SunderlandV-BomhersVickers VCI

Peter SmithMick DavisKen Delve

Malcolm L HillRobert F Dorr with Jerry Scutts

Martin W BowmanThomas Becher

Martin W BowmanMartin W BowmanMartin W Bowman

Brad ElwardPeter SmithBarry Jone

Martin W BowmanPeter mithPaul LeamanBarry JoneBarry Jone

Peter JacolsPeter mith

Martin W BowmanMartin W Bowman

Eric MombeekRon MackayDavid BakerJerry Scutts

Duncan CurtisPeter Smith

Andy EvansKen DelveBarry JonesLance Cole

c onnell ouglasF l ~ E G L EPETER D VIES NDTONYTHORN OROUGH

I ~ c lThe rowood ress


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stpublished in 2001 byCrowood PressLtd

MarlhoroughSN8 2HR

Peter E. D ~ v i e s Tony Thornborough 2001

rightsreserved. No part of thispublication maybe reproducedor fr


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e ly ha s a n y a i rc r af t l iv ed up to itsas convincingly as the F-15 Eagle .a substantial bird of prey, w i th k e enand powerful f light giving i t mas

o f t h e air, or asa symbol ofA mericana n d p a tr i ot i sm , M c Do n ne l l Doumasterpiece has certainly r u le d a lls ki es i t h as entered during the last[ n a er i al c o mb a t, s i nc e

n e [ 97 9, a ro un d one hundred of itsm i es h a ve fallen without loss to thefighter. O nly in comparison

t h at o t he r A m er i ca n e ag le , t h ee s t t e n- d ol l a r c o i n , m i gh t t h e parall s run short. In paying for their F- [5sU S t a xp a ye r s h a d to adjust to unit

that, at around Z Zm per copy indollars , were about four times morethan their prede ce s sor s. I nEagle s replacement will quadru

that sum again, w itheach F-ZZA Rapi n g a t least IOOm.

As prices have risen numbers of aircraftdeclined, so that each F- [5 had t o b e

m or e c a pa b le t ha n t he far moreFAs and F-106s that precededThe F-ZZA, of w hich only339 are cur

expected, will probably have to fulthe tasks that around 600 light grey Fs were performing i n 1999. Raptor willt a in l y h a v e t o e a rn t h e a i r d o m in a n ce

that itsdesigners claim for it .If t he U SA F manages to win funds forr e R ap to rs t he y wou ld eventually reEaglesof a darker feather, the FEagles . W h e n t h e U S AF e l e ct to retire itssuperb, though age ingF- I I I Fikeforce itchoseto take advantage ofthe5 sconsiderable growth potential, alliedh new developments in digital night/a llther attack systems. F-15E with itss ys tem quickly be came the

premier strike/interdictor and it

ntrodu tionwill continue in production thirty yearsafter the Eagle first flew.

L ike a ll c la ss ic de signs the Eagle wasright first t i me a n d its predatory appearance has a lt er ed h ar dl y a t all since ite n t er e d s q ua d ro n service, although itse n gi n es , a v io n ic s and w ea po ns h av esteadily improved. It h as a ls o been thesafest f i gh t er i n USAF service, with astrike rate of6.9 in itsf irst 145,000hoursof flight compared 13.8 for the USAFF A P ha nt o m a nd 14.5 for the F-14 Tomc at o ve r t he s am e p er io d. Eagles haver e tu r ne d t o base after airborne incidentsthat have removed large portions of airframe; in one case a n e n t ir e wing.

All b ut o ne o f t h e air forces that havepurchased F-15s have u se d i t a ct iv el y incombatand it rapidly attained airsuperiority, its chief purpose, in battles over Syria,Iraq a nd t he Balkans during some o f t hemost intense air-to-air f ighting since theS econd World War. Although it never metthe hordes o f S ov ie t B lo c M iGs andS ukhois that i t was originally designed repel o ve r C en tr al Europe s potentialbattlefields, the Eagle has engaged andconclUSively defeated Foxbats, Fulcrumsand Floggers in those post-C old War conf li ct s. I nso doing , i tp roved the real efficacy o f t h e previously disappointing A[M-7Sparrow missile a n d d e mo n st r at e d truebeyond visual range BVR) airsuperioritytactics. At the same time F- I5Es showedthat a couple of guided bombs, accuratelytargeted, could consistently wipe out pinpoint targets that would previously haver equi re d a f orma ti on of heavi ly l adenbombers rather than a pai r of fighters thatcould also defeat any aeria l opposition tot h ei r a t ta c k. The same F-15Es, f lyingpatrols o ve r t he n o fly areas of Iraq since[991 have worked as SEAD partners with

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F-16C] Wi ld Wea se ls , s te ad i ly erodingSaddam Hussein s air defences every timehe challengesoverflights by Allied aircraft.In t h e c o nt i n en t al USA Eagle s r eequipped m an y A i r N a ti o na l G ua r d unitsa nd t he y j oi ned regular USAF F-15squadrons in defending US airspace out toits extremi ti es f rom Alaska , I ce la nd andHawaii. For the Japanese, the Eagle s longendurance and powerful radar Sight havealso made i t a n ide al a ir defence fighter fortheir needs. [srae li pilots were so eager toe nj o y t h e Eagle s combat edge t h a t t h eywillingly accepted a batch of used Researchand D evelopment aircraft give themearly m e mb e rs h ip o f t h e e l it e F-15 club.Israelwasstill receiving aspeciallymodifiedStrike Eagle , the F- [51 in 1999. The country s fighterpilots claimed the first fifty-fiveair-to-air kills for the Eagle, without loss,and added their range of domestically produced missiles to itspowerful talons.

As wel l a s introducingmany new techn ol og ie s i n its s t ru c tu r e, a v io ni c s a n dengines the F-15 hasalso been used t o t e steven more advanced concepts such asta ilmounted, thrust-vectoringengine nozzles,new digital electronic control systems andeven self-repairing flight control systems.S om e o f t he se r ev ol ut io na ry d ev el op ments will become operational i n F-ZZAand its possible successors.

For some years America seemed to havethe wrong fighters and tactics for the warsi t w as c o mp e ll e d t o fight. Many lessonswere learned a n d r e me m be r ed in thedesign o f t h e F-15. Since it first flew the StLouis nest in 1 97 2 it h as c on Si st en tl yshown itself to be ide al ly s ui t ed t o thesituations i t has had to face.

PE. Davies and A .M.T hornborough,Briscol 200

The F-15 Eagle s immediate predecessorand America s p ri nc ip al f ig ht er i n theVietnam War, t h e F A P h an t om has sometimes been portrayed as a rather unmanageable heavyweight, outc la ss ed in a dogfight by t h e n i mb l er M i Gs of the NorthVietnamese. In fact, when flown w it h t h eright tactics, an aggressive approach anda d eq u at e w a rn i ng o f a t ta c k it could dealwith those opponents more than capably,as U S N av y pilots proved i n 1972. AfterTot un initiatives insti l led effectiveACM procedures they were able to destroym or e M i Gs in o n e m o nt h t ha n t h ey h a dscored d ur i ng t h e e n ti r e war up to thatpoint. I n 1 97 2 N av y a nd M ar in e crewss h ot d o wn twenty-six MiGs, losing onlyt h re e o f t h ei r o w n n u mb e r to the opposingfighters. More r el i ab le weapons wouldhave increased that total considerably: thedisappointingAIM-7 Sparrow wasused foronly o ne o f those kills. Despite these successes the FA s overall air-to-air performance was seen as inadequate, and ratherunfairlyso since i t was not designed for theclose-in fighting that the rules of engagem e n t o f V i et n am forced u po n F A pilots.The usual n e ed t o identify enemy aircraftvisually before e n ga gi n g w i th missiles,thereby avoiding the risk of blue on bluehits, largely ruled out the use o f t h e aircraft s primary A I M- 7 S pa r ro w missilearmament as the launch r ange to i ts targetwould h a ve b e en t o o s h o r t f or i t t o h o meand detonate successfully.

Other critics pointed to the P hantom slack of a gun i na l l but its USAF FAE version as a major handicap for the resultantc los e- in a ir f igh t ing . F ive o f t he F-4E stwenty-one aeria l vic tories involved itsinbuilt cannon, though twice as manygunkillswere by FAC/D aircraftusing a strapo n e x te r na l c a n no n . Forty o f t h e U SA F st o ta l o f 138 kil ls (Z9 pe r cent) involved agun. For the [sraeli Air Force in 1973 thefigure approached 65pe r cent. The avy sdedicated gunfighter, the F-8 Crusaderused its ZOmm weapons for one completekill and a combination of ZOmm and miss il es for two others. Phantoms destroyed

H PTER ONE

X1 50 o r th V ie tn am es e aircraft against aprobable loss of forty-nine t o M iGs,t h ou g h t h e majority of i ts vic tories camerather l at e in the war, largely due tochanges in training routinesand a belatedrealization that the F-4 could be a competent dog-fighter as well as a n a t ta c k airc ra ft , a r ol e i n w hi ch t he A ir Force andN avy had used it most extensively.From t he e vi de nce o f t he se r at he rmixed messages U S A F planners began toenvisage t he P ha nt om s suc ce ssor , aprocess that began in 1965, soon after theFA s combat debut. A s the war progressedthey saw that the type could performattack, air superiority and reconnaissancetype missions for a ll t h re e U S a r me d services, thereby vindicating in Governmenteyes t h e c o nc e p t o f c o m m on a li t y thatre igned in t h e P e nt a go n a t this time. Thispolicy was also meant to produce a common fighter/attack/fleet defence aircraft,the TFX (F- [11) for t h e U S AF and USNa nd t he project s fa ilure to produce morethan a strike bomber from this originalproposal did n o t hi n g t o curtail t h e q u es tfor commonality in later projects, inc luding t h e P h an t om r e pl a ce m en t i n it i at i ve .Also in its f ighter inventory at this timewere the F-105, soon to be phased out afterheavy losses in battle andthe specialist, miss il e a rmed F-IOZ and F- [06 air defencein te rc eptor s, l inked to a complex groundcontrol network. Missing from the line-upwas a dedicated airsuperiority fighter , uncompromised by the common requirementto perform other missions. In its previousmajor engagement, the Korean War, theUSAF had relied heavily upon i ts F-86Sabre as a trueair superiority antidore [ theMiG-IS. As defence analysts observed thebattles in South-East Asia it was clear thatthis type of f ighter was not, a ft er a ll , outmoded. The main difference between simpleday-fighters like the F-86E a n d t h e complex, multipurpose je ts o f t he 1960s wascost. Aircraft l ike the F-[05 and F-4 tookenormous sums to build and operate, andtheywerebeinglost in largenumbers [ themost primitive forms of air defence, often

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while attacking targets of limitimportance. Inevitably t h e U S Dretary, Robert McNamara, chiefof commonality, sought cheapefor the taxpayer. Ideal replacems ee n t o b e l ig ht , cheaper tactisuch as the A-7 Corsair anotheUSAF/USN p ro je ct ) a nd F-5Fighter. The USAF was e ncaccept 454 A-7D Corsairs and inwon McNamara s permission toF-X s tudyfor an F-4 Phantom reoptimized for the A ir Force s fighF rom A pr il 1 96 5 the USdesign studies for its ideal air-toconcentrating on higher thrusratio than the F-4 a n d m u ch b eair capability. A rmament proptred o n a n improved version oradar/infrared guided missile miaround 1,000 copie s was antic ou n te r t h e expected improvSoviet bloc fighter technologyt he h or de s o f e ar li er -t ec hn olthat would be faced in t h e e v e npean conflict. Once t h e c o nc ethe political arena i ts pure air-did not survive l ong beforeoverruled senior USAF persdemanded a secondaryair-to-grbility for their money t o g ivemaximum utilization. This decenced the eventualspecificatiocraft s avionics and airframe strfortuitously made possible thed e ve l op m en t o f a n a t ta c k v a ri15E. However, a t t he t im e thmise was seen as a minor priceF or ce t o p ay fo r the r ig ht t ofighter, rather than having tosher common design with theMc a ma ra would have preferr

Once the basic F-X requiremmulated, a Request forProposalissued to thirteen companiesonber 1965 resul t ing in contractsLockheed and orth AmericMarch o ut o f t he e i gh t w h oThe McDonnell Douglas propofavoured w i th a contract from


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ery incha classic from theday i twas rolled out F 15A 71 280 the first Eagle at St Louis on 26 June 1972.via NormTayor

Concept For m ula tionStudy CF ) b u t t h ecompany began its own F-X study underformer FA Pr ojec tMa na ge r, D on Ma lver n.

All o f t he initial CFS p r o po sals w er et u rn e d d o wn , p ar t ly b ec au se t h ey werec o mp r om i se d t o o h e av i ly by the air-togr ound r e quir e m e nt. Most were reminisc en t o f t he T FX , w i th swing-wings, fourunder-fuselage AIM-7s, advanced navattack avionics and tw in podde dtur bof a nspowering an aircraft weighing in exce s of65,000 Ib 29,484kg). At this pointanoth

r influence wa br oughtto bear on U AFthinking a t he C FS team continued its

i b er a ti o n t h ro u g h 1 9 66 . M a j John R.Boyd, a ut ho r o f t he Fighter Weapons

l s ta c tic s m a nua l ri l ttack tudyha d de ve lope d a concept known as energy

anoeuvrability based on his studies atTechnical College and later at

glin AFB. ing early U AF mainframer s he analysed the performance of

election of f i gh t ers b y tudying theirand kinetic energy in manoeu

n g s i tu a ti o ns , at various altitudes,and ai r sp eeds. H i s f i nd i n gs, when

in May 1964, providedengineersaccurate tool to assess a nd c om pa re

F X

thecombat performance of any d esi gn p r o posals. Application of these ideas to the F-X conundrum produced revised target.The 65,0001b 29,4 Okg) weight close tothat ofthe stately A A Vigilantebomber)was r e duc e dto below 40,0001b l8,144kg);m ax im um p eed cam d ow n from Mach2.7 to a m or e pr a c tica l Ma c h 2.4 to e c onomize on structural material and thrust-tow e ight r a tio was set at I:I Variable-sweepwings were till preferred.

By Ju l y 1 9 67 the F-X oncept Formulat i on P ac k ag e h a d b e co m e p r et t y firm andin the same month i t w a s energized by theappearanceof the prototype MiG-25 Foxbat at the D om oda dovoa ir dis pla y i n Ru ssia. A na lysts judged t h e S o vi e t f ighte r tobe a generation ahead of t he U S fighteri n ve n to r y. D es ig n ed t o c o un t e r t h e stillbor n X B - 70 Valkyrie bomber and possiblyt he R -7 l Blackbird too) the M iG-25 wasbuilt for sustained Mach 3 performance,smashed a number of world performancer ec o rd b e tw e en 1965 and 1977, and in1 99 1 w as to be the pr obable c a use o f t h eCoalition Forces only a ir -to- a ir l os s i nOperation Desert Storrn. Ithough it didn t mature as a m u l ti p u rp o se t y pe u n t il

197 the MiG-25 s extraordinary performance was an unpleasant surprise to theWest, as the M iG-15 had been in 1950.

The effect o f t h e MiG-25 revelation wasto increase the mphasis on air superiorityin the F-X specification and a reduction inthe air-to-ground f act or . A new request forbids went out t o s ev e n c o mp a ni e s on 11August J 967 followed by contracts forMcDonnell Douglas a ndG e ne r a l D ynam ic sa nd t he inclusion of company-funded submissions from North American, Lockheed,Fairchild-Republic a n d G r um m an . W h il ethe e companies refined their bids through196 another change ofempha is occurredwhen the N dropped their troublesome,overweight F 111B programme and pushedf or a d i ff e re n t solution to their fleet airdefence fighter requirement via the VF-Xp r o ject . F eari n g t ha t t he Department ofDefense, u nd er a n i nc om in g P re si de ntw o u ld see thi as another opportunity f or acost-saving common programme that mightbluntthe F-X initiative, the U AF accelerated its programme by de c iding to bypasthe usual prototype r ag e i n f av ou r of goingstraight to a production fly before buy aircraft. [ nor de r to make its needs as different

a s p o s i bl e f r om V F- X i t a l s o p u s he d the airsuperiority priority and insisted on a si n gl eplace cockpit, knowing that the avy wantl d a two-scat pilota nd RIO arrangement, asin the F -4 . L t G e n J o h n Burns former COo f t h e 8 t h T F W Wolfpack), argued t h a t t h etwo-man concept w as e s se n ti a ll y a Navyi d ea, su i ted to t h ei r F A i n te r ce p to r b u tlIlappropriate for t h e U S AF where both F-4 crewmen were officially pilot. Single-seatfighter p il ot h ad not taken kindly to the F-4 i n m a ny cases and there w a a r es u rg e nc eo f t h e w il d b l u e yonder fighter pilot philosophyfor the F-X.

[ n i ts f in al s t ag e s the F-X DevelopmentConcept Paper also called for twinengines, a cockpit that gave first-class, allround visibility n ot the FA s strongpoint), a 260mi 41 km) radius on intern a l f ue l and an inbuilt gun. The issue ofthe C oncept P a pe r t o ok p l ac e a g ai n st ahackground o f a n ot h er internal U AFd eb at e a bo ut t he basic purpose of F-X.Fighte r a na lys t Maj John C. Boyd andP Ie rr e p re y workingdirectly for the Secretary of D e f ens e ) s tr ongly advocated amuch lighter, simpler fighter, c i ti n g t h evulnerabi Iity of m or e s ophis tica t d designto c os t ove r runs , te c hnologic al s hor tf a llsand poor r eli ab il i t y. Bo yd , a r ch i t ec t o fenergy manoeuvrability, was unconvincedthat a h eavy , complex F-X would m e e t t h eperformance targets. T heir argumentswere persuasive t o t h os e s e ek i ng t o m a in ta in f r ont-line f i g ht er s i n s uf fic ient num her in the face of ever-increasing unitlostS. T heir point of view led e ve ntuallytothe U SA F s s e pa ra te L ightwe ight Fighte rpr ogr am m e a nd the F-16 at half the priceo f t h e F-X. However, that evolution wasstill some way ahead and this la s t-m inuteattempt t o d e ra i l F-X s er v ed t o hardenllpinion defenSively b eh in d t he wellestablished F-X proposals f or f ear of losingt u nd i n g t o a cheaper aircraft. The word inthe Pentagon was, th e only w ay a secondlieutenantcan make it to first lieutenant istll s w ea r a lle gia nce to the F-X or F -1 5 asIt became from 12 September 1 96 ).

Eight companies received RFPs on 30September 1968 the ugust 1967 line -upllf companies plus orthrop) though G O ,llne o f t he first contenders t o b ec om ell1\ olved in the F-X endeavour, w as r u l edllut soon afterwards. T h r ee m o nt h s later,Contract D e f inition Pha se contracts w entto orth A merican, Fairchild-Hiller andMcDonnell D ou gl as . I t w as a demandingspecification, requiring the f i gh t er t o bea hl e t o fly t o E ur op e without air-to-air

F X

r ef u el l in g ; a f ir st f or any f ighte r a ir cr a f tthat ar o se f r om t h e n e ed t o p r ov i de rapidreinforcement to SAFE units in anemergency. Low wing-loading was to givebuffet-free flight a t M a c h 0.9 a n d t h e twin,s e lf- s tar ting e ngines were t o p ush thef ighte r to a Mach 2.5 top speed. Maximumta ke -of f w e ight was 40,OOOIb 18,144kg)a nd t he airframe was t o h av e a 4,000hrf at ig u e l i fe with a scatter factor of 4, sothat 16,000hr would be possible) andmaintenance man-hour per flight hour mmh/fh) were not t o e x ce e d to lThe latter was to be achieved mainlyt h ro u gh t h e use of l ine -r e plac e a ble units LRUs) for the avionics. Low mean-timebetween failures m tbf ) for radar units ha dbeen the m a in r ea s on for poor aircraftavailability in Vietnam. A rmament wasstill t he e ig ht missile-plus-gun arrangement, built around a far-reaching pulseD op p le r r ad ar w it h l oo k- do wn , shootdown capability. O n e- m an o pe ra ti on o ft h is c o m pl e x system w ould be f a cili tate dby advances in cockpit de ign allowing thep i lo t t o w o rk h e ad s up rather than reduci ng h i s awareness o f t h e c o m ba t situationoutside by peering at inaccessible instruments or searching for s w it c he s t o s e t upcomplex a r m am e n t o r radar procedures.To satisfy the followers of Pierre prey andJohn Boyd b y n o w known as the FighterMafia) i t w as decreed that the F-15 shouldrely heavily on proven, low-risk technology to m inim iz e the possibility of c os tove r r u ns o r fa ile d y tem . Major componentswere the r ef or e to be s uppl ied from ongoingG overnment-funded development programmes. On the l i st al so another legacyofVietnam) was high survivability in comb a t, i n cl u di n g l o w- v ul n er a bi l it y flightcontrols, fuel and electrical sy st em s as w ellas tructural integrity. The achievement ofan I r aeli pilot, sev eral y ear s l at er , i n bringing h om e a n F -1 5D w it h a n entire wingmissing showed how well the winningcontractor ati fied that requirement.

While evaluating the three manufacturers proposals t h e U S AF ource SelectionEvaluation Board, headed by Col Benj a m in N . Bellis h ad t o b e ar in mind the F-1 5 s l ik e ly opponents. gile MiG-21s improved versionso f t h e fighters that hadled some Vietnam-hardened p il ot s t oadvocate a purchase o f t h e type for A Fa ir de f e nc e purposes) till comprised thebulk o f t he fighter f or ce i n the WarsawPact c o un t ri e s a n d t h ei r allie . The F-15would have to manoeuvre with them, relying on s upe rior pe r f or m a nce , armament

and tactic t o c o mp en a te for tc a l s uper ior ity of the MiGs. Atime it would need excellentradar and missiles to deal witbreed of Soviet BVR fightersadvanced weapons systems. Baspeed r e quir e d to see off aM iG-agility to fight through a pack oattacking from both high a lfrom t h e d e ck required s om edifficult de s ign de cis ions . P r ethe FighterMafia f o r a single-ecraft was countered by the F-1h a ul a n e i gh t - mi si l e l o ad ov 1,360kg)), its heavy fire- ontand a f ue l l o ad sufficient for Trdeployment. 0 existing enghave provided the necessarythere was no t i me t o d e v e lo p o

Col Bell is f r esh f r om t he Sgr a m m e, ga ve t h e t h re e c o nt eJ a nuar y to June 1969 t o w o r k onp os al . H is team at U A F e

ystems took f ro m J u ly t o D ethat year to assess them. On 231969 there were celebrationswhen the McD onnell Douglaswas declared the winner.

AirframeTheir F-15 came outat roughly tha s i t FA predecessor, though imounted wing o f 6 0 sq ft 57 q4 sw as 5 3 0 sq ft 49sq m ) ) a n d 30m) greater o v eral l t o p sUl facearseem more massive. W e ig h t a vthe use of simpler structural ca n d t i ta n iu m or composite maround a quarter of the airframeit was 6,0001b 2,722kg) lighter4 E P h an t om . Th e i n te r na l t requipment wasalso not as denseli t w a s i n many other contemporDon Malvern s team tunnel-testedesigns out of 00 paper p ro pothree wind t u n ne l s t h e wing dp u t t h r o ug h o v er 22, 00 hours ot im e s a s l on g a s the process thathe FA s d i st i nc t iv e c r an k

I though s om e of the t est i t emswing-wingvariants, favoured byfor their VF-X/F-14 T o mc at , bopposed by Col Boyd on groundand complexity, McDonnell Doed t o w ar d sa f ix ed w i ng . Th e chu se d a 45-degree l e ad i ng e d geh ad p r o ved to be a n e xc elle ntcfor h i gh a n d low-speed handlin

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F-X F X

Below The Number One F 15A assignedto the AFFTC atEdwards AFB The originalwingtip andhorizontal stabil izedoutl ines were retained unti l March 1974Norm Taylor Colecton

fter the ApriI 1968 issue of RFersRichard J. Com and R.T. Basand Whitney drew on their 1965ject de ign, their e x pe r ien e oand the extremely powerful J571 Blackbird. Their goal was anwas 1, 0 0 Ib 450kg) lighter thanwith about 5,0001b 2 n k g) mbut very similar fuel consumptionrapid throttle re p on s e. I n d ir ect i on f or the TEGG (advancengine gasgenerator) contract t15 was General Electric s GEI/IAt that stage the DoD s Joint EgramOfficewanted a common-ck no wn a s the F 40 I , f or F -1 5 ae n gin ed To mc a t. A ll F-1 4s a f tea ir r af tw o u ld have received theas F-14Bs. From the o u ts e t th e redamental differences betweenthat wanted another 5,0001bthrust andthe USAFthat neededafterburner, fan and low-pressursor to achieve it s peci fi ed 9,9 8 k g) th ru s t. Soon after thetr a ct w as s ign ed in J a n u ar y 1 96 9clear that c o st o v er r u n w ou ld nsubstantial F-14B programnle anw as c o nf in ed to a b ri ef t es t1973-74. On February 1970,

Provingthe in flight refuelling system. which was to be crucial forthe Eagle smanylongdeploymentfl ights. on 15 January 1973 Norm Taylor Colecton

l ,430kg) thrust; roughly the s a me a s them as s iv e Tu ma n sk ii R- 15 B-3 0 u se d in theM i G- 2S . F ue l economy for l on g r an geim plied a low - by pa ss tu rb o fa n u sin g ligh tweight materials. The AF s first combatturbofan, the Pratt and Whitney TF30P-I eventuallybecame an extremelyreliableengine, yielding over 25,0001b (II ,340kg)thrust in itsfinal TF30-P-1 00 version for theF-l II F A a rd v ar k . Earl i er v ar ia nt s h ad a llsuffered a variety of stall problem associate d m a in ly w ith the F-III s short a ir in tak educ t. The had used the TF-30-P-6 inthe A -7 A, r ep la ci ng i t w it h the RollsRoyce/ ison TF41, a Iso u se d f or theUSAF A - 7D . I n the F- 14 it w as the powers ou rc e i n he r it e d f ro m the cancelled FIII B f rom 1 969 u nt il 198 8, when reenginedTomcatsbegan using thenew General Electric FII . F or much of i ts t i me i nthe F-14 the TF-30 threw up problems withfan-bladelossand fires, causing a number oflos se .With this rather uneven background of

turbofan experience, an estimated budget of2 m p e r engine and the prevailing philoso

phy of commonality i t w as in ev itab le thatthe DoD hould attemrt to d e ve lo p a r eliable engine that would rowerthe F-15 ando ff er a better solution for the F- 14 A to o.

Eagle Power: FIOO-PW-IOO

In the rear fuselage section w as a continuous t i tan ium struc tu re conta ininghoth engines that could be drawn outr e ar w ar d s f or maintenance. A titaniumk ee l a r e a acted a s a f ire wa ll between thel ngine and also supported the tailhook .Mounting lugs for the twin vertical stabilizers and the all-moving horizontal stabilizer were included. Tw in ta ils w e r e chosen( un li ke t he e co nd c ho ic e o rt h Ame ri Gill S that hadone) for better yaw tabilitya t h ig h speeds and h igh angles of attack.Initially, shorter v e rtic al s tab iliz er s w e relombined with ventral stabilizers bu t thelatter a f fe c te d c r u is e d r a g b a dly and weredeleted from the drawings in pril 1971 infavour of taller tails.Hydraulic f lu id l ea ka ge f ro m AAA

dilmage had been a major cause ofcombatlosses to f igh ter s in South East sia. Fort he n ew fighter twin hydraulic ystemsI11corrorated a sensor system that couldImmediately identify leaks and isolate thedamaged circuit. The tail (stabilator) control system, themain flying control forroll,lIld ritch control in supersonic flight,could also draw power f rom a u ti li tyhydraulic y st em . e lf -s ea l in g f ue l l i ne sw er e u se d and the fuel tanks were kept,Iway from the engines to r e du c e f ir e damage risks, rather than being situated abovethe engines a s i n the FA. i ng a range ofadvancedmaterialsand con truction techniques McDonnell Douglas engineered alight, strong a ir fr a me , p a r ts o f w hi ch( inc lud ing the boron composi te ta il s ur faces) were fatigue tested to 16,000 hours.Lacking these technical advantages in theUSSR, M ikoyan-Gurevich had to usetemrered st el for 80 per cen to f the M iG25 s main s t ruc tu re to resist Mach 3 airfriction tempera tures of 300C (572F).While the F-1 5 d es ign te am , h e ad e d by

Ceorge Graff w it h D on M al ve rn as P ro grammeManager, refined their plans, prepar a tio n s w er e m a de to integrate the AF elected engines, radar and armament.

Producing an engine that w ou ld a ll ow acomraratively large fighter like the F-15 toenter a 1001 at 15 k t,a c c e ler a te in a Mach0.9, 5g turn without afterburner, fly atMach 2.5 and cross the Atlantic without atanker was an unprecedented challenge.The requirement f or m as s iv e p o w e r to givea thrust-to-weight ratio the rightside of I: I lIggesled a n e ng in e o f around 23,OOOlb

As a bonus, their flat uppersurfaceact d asa canard area, increasing the effectivene so f t h e horizontal stabilizers. Intake anglewas regulated automatically by a computerized air inletcontrol (each inletwa contr olled b y an independen t air in le t controller). The incoming air was then haredby three automatically v a ria ble r a mI s inthe roof ofeach in le t duct w ith a b yp as sdoo r (Door 3 3) a nd bleed-air vent. Thefirst and second r a mp s w e re p e r fo r ate d toallow air to filter through while the longrear sect ion smoothed the a irnow f or i tspassage to the turbine face.

F 15A 71-0286 with the F 15 Joint Task Force atEdwards AFB o n 1 6 June 1975 Thisaircraft tested carriage ofthe AN/ALQ-119 ECM podon itsoutboard wing pylonrevealing adverseeffects on aircraft handling. Jack Morris via Jim Rotramel

a t tached to a tru s construction that carried the structural loads around the twin,side-by-sideair duc ts to save the weight ofa separate wing-surport framework. Theintakes had variable geometry to enab lethe a irc r af t to r e a ch Mach 2 .5 w ith nodding ramps r ivot inga t the lower lip of theintake. Their overall shape w as r e min is cen to f the intakes on the Nor th AmericanA-5 Vigilante, but also o f t he MiG-25 s.They enabled air to be capturedand directedefficiently into theduc ta t highangles ofa tt ac k o f u p t o 2 4 de gr ees by pointingdownwards to match the aircraft s attitude.

from the F-IOO originally calledabre 45) t o t h e F-4. Optimized for flightMach .9 the w in g u se d no high lift

on i ts l e ad in g e dg e, employings t ea d a high degree of conical camber

it 42. ft (13m) span. I ts l ow wing(56-6 Ib/sq ft) gave a turn rate of

degrees per second,only I d e gr e e les sthe F-16, and reduced landing speed

1 20 kt f or a much softer touch-downn the FA s . I ts z e ro a n gle of incidencemaximum acceleration by reducing

d ra g c au se d b y r ap id Ii ft production.w in g w a s de ig ne d to take quite sub

g lo a din g with anyone of its threespars in each wingfractured. Overall,

fatigue life requirement for the F-15300 per cent h igher than tha t o f the Fwhich required structural reinforcementquite e a rly in its s e rv ic e lif e.

Additional lift came from the fuselage,t in three s e ctio ns . I n the forward secconsisting of a nosebarrel and two ver-joined ide p a ne l assemllies werelly all the avionics and over 0 p er

n t o f the w irin g. Fr om the ou tse t thea r e a w a s de i gn ed w i th s pa ce f or a

c on d s ea t o r a dd it io na l e qu ipme ntw ithout the need for extensive reThe centre fuselage, extending

o m j us t b eh in d t h e pilot s clamshellto the front faces o f t he engines,the g u n s y ste m, Sparrow m is ile

and fuel. The w in gs w er e

70 77


8/103

F X F X

engine tests on the F100-PW-229 IPE, simulating conditions at highspeed and low altitude at Arnoldering Development Centre AEDCI. Arnold Engineerng DevelopmentCentre weight and costgraphs for F-15

diately soared out of feasible lim1973 brought more pressure o

budget F-I4and alternativesweexamined a t the insistence o fArmed Services Committee.compared with various cut-pricecapability F-J4 alternatives andwing Phantom, F-4(FVS). Aarmed F-I5(N-PHX) would havnearly 47,0001b (21,320kg), whizedSparrow-firing version wass1 ,950kg) over the basic F-15Alacked the F-14 s swing-wing tolanding and launch speeds a t tBlown BLC flaps, single-slotteand Krueger leading-edge flapsb ee n n ec es sa ry t o p ro vi de h igreduce approach speed to 136werealso expressed about the nl anding gea r s s tab il i ty for a dea nd about t he pilot s view o f t happroach because of the aircraft

An F100-PW-220 pulled from an F-15Ethe special handlingequipmentneedetask. va o Thurlow

Above AEDC performed many hours oftheirsupersonic wind tunnel in 1972 tocompatibility of the F100 enginewith thinlet system. Arnold Engineerng Developm

The company s long exper ience w ithnaval fighters served them wel l in p er suading the Navy that a viable Tomcata l ternat ive could be b ui lt wi th on ly2,3001b (I,043kg) of extra weight. However, the Navy s FighterStudy Group II Ithat clearly did not favour an Air ForceFighter added a considerable package ofe xt ra e qu i pment a nd t h e Tomca t s fourAIM-54 Phoenix missiles (known as thebuffalo because of i ts bulky shape). The

By 1971 F 4 cost ing prob lems hadtaken Grumman to the verge ofbankruptcy and in te res t in a naval F-15 alternativewas r ea ro us ed . McDonnell Douglasassured Deputy Secretary for DefenseNitze that a version of the ir Model 199IB (F -15A) could opera te from carrierswith the a dd it i on o f wing -fo ld ing, as t ronger a r res ting hook , a twin-wheelextending nose gear for nose-towcata pultlaunch and re in forced main land ing gear.

When it becameclear in 1965 tha t the USNilVY was going to d i tch the t roubled F-II I B Fleet Defence fighter project,McDonnell Douglas sought to repeat theirti cess with the Phan tomand build a newltghter for the Ai r Force, Navy andMarines. DonMalvernheaded a team that\\ orked on proposals for the Navy s VF-Xrl LJuirement, using Pratt Whitneyl ngines a nd t he a dv an ce d Hughe s AN /AWG-9 radar /weapons control systemthat was in tended to have least 50 perll tH commonalitywith the USAF s anticIpated fighter/attack needs. In June 1968\\ hen RFPs were issued, McDonnell Douglas prepared their variable-sweep, twint.lilcd Model 225 alongside an upgraded,,wing-wing Phantomderivative. The victory of Grumman s Design 303 (F-14ATomcat) had been heavily predicted butMalvern persisted with h is d es ign s tudythat already began to resemble the F-15.

Sea Eagles: USN F-15N

aerodynamic properties. Anyone who hasbeen insidea test chamberwith a large jetengine, buckingagainst its shackles at fullthrottle, will apprec iate how the massivevibration could cause this to happen. Onth is occas ion the af te rburner separatedfrom the engine and theentire powerplantb eh in d t h e f an was destroyed by fire.Another engine had exploded the previousweek under similar circumstances.The YF100 was used in the first five F-15As, subsequent aircraft receiving theproduction F100-PW-100 with a slightlybeefed-up compressor. Contrary to P W snormal practicethe pace of the programmeruled out flight-testing the engine, whichthe company had planned to d o i n a B-45testbed aircraft. Problems tha t occurredlatermay havebeen revealed by this missedstage, despitedelays.

segment afterburner with balanced beamnozzlewas attached. Extensive use of Iightweight t i ta ni um and adv an ce d coolingtechniques permitted a turbine temperatureof2,500F 1 ,370C)with a an overallcompress ion ra tio of 23:1. As development progressed the F100 steadily met itsdeadlines, apart f rom a 150hr endurancequalification in Feb ruary 1973 when abladefailure occurred at 132hr during simulated Mach 2.3, 40,000ft (l2,190m) running. Despite Congressional disapprovalGeneral Bellis agreed to a slight reductionin the parameters for this over-demandingtest i n o r de r t o keep the programme onschedule . In fact, the f ai lu re was late rattributed to flakes of rust, shaken off thetest chamber walls and ingested throughthe engine so tha t theycoa tedsomeof theblades and reduced their self-cooling and

cormaet for the F-15 engine, leavingE le ct ri c t o p ro ce ed w it h t he ir

that eventually matured into thfor the F/A-l8, F10 I for the B 1 Bandas a replacement for P W senginesinF-15 and F-16.P W s YF100two-shaft turbofan enginehed mock-up stage in January 1971flight-testing in February 1972 witha milestone programme that requiredto satisfy requirements at eight stagesupproduct ion s tandard , each miles tone

the release of new funding.its prototype ver s ions i t developed

(lO,810kg) of thrust, u si ng afan and ten-stage compressor.

high-pressure stages ( r un n in g a tand two low-pressure stages

the single igh and th ree lowo f t he T F3 0 and a large r, f iv e-

12 13


9/103

F-X F X

INM30.6

STANDBYRETICLE,DEPRESSED44 MilS.

A/A GUN MODE.RADAR TRACKSCALES REJ -

AUTO GUN SCAN

SELECT GUN/AUTOMODE. 6 BAR. 20EU60 AZSCAN,MEDPRF SCANCENTER AZEL CONTROLLED B AUTO-ACO FROM 0.5 TO 10 NM. BUMP AUTD-ACO BY SELECTINGREJ

940.757LOG

BURANGEBAR ~ : T I M E _ O F _ F l ITAB -

10~50.4

l T C NRANGE

----5

+ +10~ J

.../

940.757 ONM29G 26.4

3 AA MODE RADAR TRACK,SCALES REJ

5 mAR STEP1- - 3

AZFRAME N O D D I N G ) L ~ 4 S O ~TOTAL AZ COVERAGE 7.5

1 AA GUNMODE,RADAR SEARCH,SCALES NORM

GUN ~ ~ 01 )RETIClE 11500400 ~ ~ ~ ~ I O I O450 [10500 2-MILPPPER

2S-MILSEGMENTEDCIRCLE

940

) ( : c

ROUNDSREMAINING

HUD displays.gun mode steering. USAF

Vertical scan/gunscan autoacquisition.

SELECT AUTD-ACO REAR POSITION. 2 BAR,SO TO 45 EL SCAN,MED PRF. AUTO-ACO FROM500 FEET T O1 0 NM.

VERTICAL SCAN

2Sm m w e a pon was selected aFter a Decemher 1971 competition with a General Electric proposal at Eglin AFB and was t o h a v eheen Fitted to Eag le F5. I t u se d Br un s wic kLaseless ammunition a lr ea dy r e jec te d byI he US Army aFter separate trials) t o s av eweight and cost, but this was its downFall.There was a n u n ac c ep t ab l e probabilitythat t he am m uni t i on m ighte xplode w ithtn its Feed tunnel to the g un . I t a l so tendl d to leave high levels of chemical residue_In addition, the gun Feed mechanism couldnot be made to w o rk r e lia bly , partlyhecause d et on at io n o f t he s he ll s w asu ne ve n a t t he high Firing speed of 6, 00rounds per minute. The project hadalready consumed 1 00 m by September1973 w he n t he A i r Force decided t hat itcould wait no longer. General lectric sdesign had encountered similar problems.The com bat -hardened M61-A -l Vulcanrotary can non t hat t he SA F had pref er re d a ll along, was ins ta lled ins tea d,though mountings For t he G AU- 7remained in place i n E ag le s u p to the FISE. The First Four test F-lsAs had usedM61s w hile a w a iting their GA -7s, Firing2 J ,000r ounds in the r I 1,000 test flights.

Locating the gun in the airFrame was noteasy. Placing it under t he n o se , a s in the F4E, would ha ve ups et the delicate avionicsin the nose w ith vibr ation. A position Further back in the Fuselage was considered,though gun-gas ingestion i n to t h e i n ta k eruled this out leaving o n e o f t h e wing-rootsas the hest choice. It offered space For thew e ap o n a n d its ammunition d r um w h il ekeeping it Fairlyclose to t h e c e n t re o fgravity to a void r e c oil- induc ed aiming errors. Italsogave much easier gun alignment in thevertical plane to keep the shells on target.In the F-4E, m ount i ngt he gun o n t h e Fuselage centreline ax is r eq ui re d a l ig ht ly

A not her F ig ht er t ud y Group was setup and its del i berat ion evemual l y produced a Formula or the next-generationnaval Fighter, t h e F / A - l rather than an F15 . Meanwhile, rising concern about theMiddle East situation, in which carrieraviation would ha ve be e n c r ucia l in the evemof a c onf lic t involving t h e U S A, reinstated the F- 14A as a perceived necessity.A l t ho u g h M c Do n ne l l D o ug las s Ea gle ,while still c h ea p er t h a n a T omcat , nevers aw a carrierdeck, its linear successor, the A-I Hor net became the true SNPhant om repl acemem and w ent on to supp l am t h e A - 6, A - 7 and some F-14As too.

McDonnell new Fighter needed aname. For the F -4 a company-wide competition produced a range of sobriquetsreflecting J McDonnell s imerest in theoccult, From which he chose Pham om 11.

similarly s upe r natur a l r a nge of nameswas put to t h e t e I or F-ls, together withtho e s ug ge st in g b ir ds of prey alsoFa vo ur e d b y the Bo . From these herapidly selected Eagle beFore it c o ul d b ebe towed o n t h e B-1 bomber. Detail designcontinued through to June 1972 sped onby the company s investment in computeraided design and Followinga similar milestone p la n t o t hat used For the engine.Wi t hi n a s er ie s of cost-plus and Fixedpri e incentives, McDonnell Douglaspressed on towards the First milestone inSeptember 1970: the preliminary designreview. W i t h t h e c h oi c e o f e n g i ne settledattention turned to a rm am en t a nd t h eradarj ire control system t o operat e it.

F-15A 74-110 inJune 1976 with the atti tudedeception paintscheme devisedby Keith Ferris.TF-15As74-0139 and 74-1030 had similar schemes.as did F-15A 73-0111. Colours were FS36440. 36231and 36118. JimRotramel

Eagle Talons: The GunDespite the relatively mall proport i on ofair-to-air kill. involving guns in Vietnami t w as Felt t h at n o Future Fighter s h ou l d b ebuilt without one. I t w as considered t hatthe weight and inte r nal s pa ce pe na lty of a26sIb 120kg) M61 cannon plus ammunit i o n m i g h t payoFFin close combat or whenthe missiles r an o u t. At First, the Eagle sprimary armamen I was to he the A IM82A D og Figh t m iss ile , a r e vis ed Sparrowdesignated AIM-7F and a n ew g un , theGAU-7. Engineered by Philco- Ford this

MASTER MODEBUTTONS

WEAPON RELEASEBUTTONMISSILE LAUNCHBOMBRELEASE)

HUDCOMBININGGLASS

STICK GRIP

HEAD-UPDISPLAY CONTROLPANEL HUD)

/UNTRIGGER(2-DETENT)WE PO SWIT H3 pOsltlonlRE R l ModeandGunENTER S RMM s s eFORW RD MRM Ms s e

VERTICAL SITUATIONDISPLAY VSD)

[ AFTER TO IF-1S-606

e control anddisplaysystems.

74 75


10/103

F-X F-X

A/Amodesradar search parameters.

Al SCAN rATTERN0 NM 20 NM JO NM

FIXEO

2 lAR El SCAN WITH RANGE DEPENDENT HACI

B RPACNG

- - - - - :- :- ' : : : : -- - - - - - - : : : ' : : : , -- - - - : : : ' : : : : - - - - -

W S N PA_rTJ_ EI _NS

L = N M ~MED PRF only in 1 0 NM ronge: H PRF o nl y i n 1 60 NM ra n g e .Velocity coveroge in 380 t o2100 KTS i n 1 6 0 NM ra n g e.I n P S P oircraft, becomes MED PRF mode.In PSP aircroft, only 3 -F ra m e d a t a a g i n g a v a i l a b l e .

RANGE/yELOCITY ANTENNA SCAN SEARCH VSDA/A MODE SCALES SELECTABLE AZ SCAN EL BARS DISPLAYlong Range 10, 20, 40, 80, o r 120, 6lJ I, 2, 4, 6 0 B-Scon, Space-StabilizedSeorch LRS 160NM or 200 or 8 Bor . U p t o 7 F ro m e Dato AgingHI/MED PRFVelocity Search: RNG Scale,Seorch VS 8 0 to 1 80 0 kll TGT Some 0$ LRS except during

Re l at i v e GS 0 Some os lRS search, TG TR e la tive G SHI P RF T ra ck : 1 0, 2 0, 4 0, l n sl e od o fRNG80, or 1 60 N M

Short Range S eo rch dO , 2 0 , 4 0 , NMSearch SRS Track 10, 2 0 , 4 0 , Some C5 LRS Some os LRSMED PRF 80or 160NMPulse Search 10, 2 0 , 4 0 , 80 or Some co LRS B-Scon, Spoce- StabilizedLO PRF 160NM No Dolo Agin9Beacon 1 0, 2 0 , 4 0 , 80 or S ome as LRS 8 -S c a n , S p a ce S t a b i l i z e dLO PRF 160NM RAM Search 35NM se. below) B-S c an , S p a ce S t a b i li z e dMED PRF Scon Center A u t o mo t i c D o t o A g i n g

Below A Block 7 F 15A destinedfor the 58th nw at luke AFB Opposing pilotssooncalled it a f1yingtennis court sincethe area ofits flyingsurfaceswas significantlylargerthanthe F 4 Phantom s. 73 100 was the first production Eagle inthe CompassGhostGreycolour scheme. I twas laterpaintedin RSAF c o lo u rs f o r t h e s a l es d r iv e i nSaudi Arabia. Norm Taylor Colecton

the A I M- 7 Sp ar r ow . On g oo d d ay s t h eywere excellent systems but their complexity and u n re lia b ility o f ten r e du c ed theiravailability severely and c r ew s w e re luc k yt o be a bl e t o l oc k on to target at muchmore than 12mi l9km) for an A IM-7 shot.H u gh e s h a d d e ve lop e d the sophisticatedA WG -9 A ir Weapons G roup9) system forthe F-14A that c o uld tr a ck 2 4 ta r g ets at upto 19Smi 3 1 4k m ) a n d a t t ac k six of themSimultaneously at different distances anda ltitud e s. I tc o u ld o p e r ate in s ix m o d es ,f o u rof them pulse Doppler, and h a s r e m ain e dhighly effective forover thirty years.

For the F-ISA, the firstall-digital fighter,a new long-rangepulseDopplersystemwithlook-down, shoot-down c a pa b ility w as r equired. Whereas H u gh e s h a d put togethert h ei r A W G- 9 a t t h ei r EI S e gu nd o , a li fo rnia plant using Navy-funded componentst h ei r A P G- 6 3 for the F - IS u se d v ar io uscontractor-funded equipment CFE) underMcDonnell Douglas control. Long-rangeearch was to be combined with moreeffec-tive c o nt r ol o f t h e c h os e n A I M- 7 m i s ileand a lso ta r ge t- fin d in g f or t he A IM -9S idew inder and the gun. Operating in theX - Ba n d f r eq u en c y r a ng e the r a da r a r ra yscanned up to lSOmi 240km) ahead, cov-ering an airspace volum t o 6 0 degree eachside of the f igh ter in a z imu th and /-10d eg r ee s in e le va tion ove and below thecentreline. It could emitand analyse a mixture of h ig h p ul se r ep et it io n f req u n cy PRF) and medium PRFsignals a t t he a metime. This meant t h at t h e pilot receivedtw o ty pe s o f d a t a t o h el p him locate andt ra k h is t ar ge t. The h ig h PRF tr an s mis sions known as Velocity Search), pulsingat up to 10,000pulsespersecond,were goodfor detecting targets at long range, partiCLIlarly when approaching h e ad - on a t highclosing speeds. The programmable signalp r oc e ss o r PSP) in la ter m o de ls c o u ld f ilterout clutter and recognize from these pulse s a D o pp ler s h if t , or s ligh t in cr e as e in thenumber of p uls ed w a ve - fo r m r e a ch in g thetargetas itclosed,causingan increase in thefrequency of the s ig na l. F ro m t h es e d a ta ,the ta rg et s c lo in g r a te c o u ld b e e s tab lish e dso that the radar/fire-control system couldet up missile launch parameters. However,

h ig h P RF w as of l i tt l e u e a ga i ns t t ar ge tsthat w e re b e in g p u rs u ed by the F-15 orapproaching i t f ro m a ny other angle thanh e a d- o n . H e re , Lo ng R an ge e ar ch L R )m o de m ixe d in m e d ium PRFs that werebetter for tracking targets that changed speedor direction, and g ve better definitionagainst ground clutter returns. The ability

DOORJL

Eagle Eyes: Th e ni APG-63RadarWe s tin gh o us e s A / AP Q- 7Z a nd A PQ 1 00 r ad ar s, u sed i n the e ar ly F -4 s w er eground-breaking, long-range detectionandmissile-guidance set. T h e AP Q- l 2 0 w as aligh ter , o lid- s tate s y ste m f or the F-4E andtheA WG -l 0systemfor the F-4] introducedp ul se D op pl er , l o ok -d ow n, shoot-downcapability as well as pulse search-whiletrack and continuousw ve illuminationfor

TARGETWEAPONSWITCH

GUARD HORN

NULL FILLINGHORN FLOODANTENNA

RADARANTENNA

RAOOMEASSEMBL Y

[ AFTER TO IF-15-BOO

r set installation.

ressed line of f ir e b ec au e of the airdrooping noseprofile and thereforea

t nose-up p i tc h t o fire t h e g u n accut el y. A w i ng -r o ot location solved thisb lem d e s pite b e ing ligh tly o f f- a xi .AI 0 included in the first m i l e t o n es a r ad ar f ly o ff competition betweeng he a n d W e st i ng h ou s e for t h e F -l S s

With the award of a c o n tr a c t t o t h eHughes design at the end of

the main c o m po n en t s o f t h e F - lSgn began to fall into place.

r controls. USAF

16 77


11/103

F-X F-X

;

NORIIALSEAPILOT POSITIONS ACSYMBOLON TARGETTARGETAREA) ANORAMMODE

6 CIRCLEREPRPRIORITYTAnGPRIORITYTARGETRELATIVEAZPOSITION lODES NOTMOVEWITHPERIODICANTENNA SCAN)RAi DISPUY

/// // / /I /

1/SPOT GHT - - _ y

G 502 U33

27 42

,I 1-

,HI

SOUOSYMBOL TARGETSIN TRACKFILE

PRID RITYTARGETEL POSITION

AZIMUTH COVERAGE OfSCAN PATIERNATDESIGNATEDAREARANGE 14S NM)

IN RAil THE R R AlTERNATES BE WEEN SEARCH SPOnlGHT

RAi SEARCH DISPUY

RAMMODECUE

ALTTUDE OFSCANCENTER ATDESIGNATEDAREA RANGE

ALTITUDE RAMCOVERAGEATDESIGNATEDAREA RANGE

OESIGNATEOAREA \ H T


12/103

AND IRP-MTP

WARNINGDuring RP MTP.a releasepulse issentously to ll selected aircraft stations hithe release o on or twomorebombs thFor exampl e: w it ha Q ty 3 se le ct edand2stationsselected. 4 bombs are released.

MULTlPLE REEASE

STA2 STAS STA 8

I I I6.17.18 I I1314 IS I I10.11.12 I I7 8 9 I I I S 6 I I1 2 3 CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE SEOUENCESHOWN:QUANTITY 18 SELECTEO.J - lGSTATIONS SELECTEO.18 BOM8SLOADED ON J MER 8OM8 RACKS.

SINGLERELEASE

J N O ~

M E R e O M e R C K ~ I U

S TA 2 STAS STA 8

I I 18I 17 I 16I ISI 14 I 13I 2I PATTERN I OLENGTH I I II I II I ELECTEO INTERVAL I

Above The 3247thTest Squadronat Eglin AFB Floridabeganto use AD codes signifying ArmDivision in 1982, c h an g in g t o E T i n O c t ob e r 1989. F-15A 75-0056 was oneof several Eaglesusenew weapons and their associated systems. Norm Taylor

Ordnancereleasesequences forthe F-15C/D inthe ground attackmode.

Middle Bearing an MASDCnumber FH002 on itsretirementthe third F-15A 71-0282tested formationstr ip l ights fl ight-tested the APG-63 radarand in1917 tested the F-15 Advanced EnvironmentalControlSystem AECS . NormTaylor ColectonBottom The faithful 71-0291, i n o n e o f i t s m a nyguises served asdemonstratorfor therange ofweaponry thathad beenclearedfor the Eagle byFebruary 1979. Norm TaylorColecton

Oppositepage:Top McDonnell Douglas s much-travelleddemonstratorTF-15A 71-0291 in Bicentennialcolours at Wright PattersonAFB 23 July 1976.I twas the first Eagleto traveloutsidethe USA.NormTaylor Colecton

employed betweenthe search and acqui i-tion stages and onc e acquired the targetbecame a P rima ry Des ig na te d Targe tPDT and wast rackedin a Single TargetTracking Mode TT by default . AnyAIM-7s fired then guided to that target.Companion radar acquisi t ion mode areused for specific target lock-on preparatoryto employment of missiles or guns and fallunder two broad cat egor ies; Manual andAutomatic. Manual employs the throttleTarget Designator Control TDC switch toshift the acqui-ition bracketsover the rele

vant target return on the VSD. Once lockedand tracked thi providessteeringto targeton both the V D and H D as dothe automatic modes. These are for separate Automatic modes for he ds up target acquisitionthat continue to acquire targets unti l thepilot rejects that mode or selects another.Supersearch uses radar toscan the volumeof airspace vi ible in the H 0 in a 6 -barscan at lcdium PRE This would typicallybeused at BVR at longerranges or in an IFR

20 27


13/103

Middle An AIM-120Adepartsfrom this ArmamentDivision F 15C 38 MC w il aircraft-mountedcameras record itsflight. USAFBottom This TripleNickel F 15C displays thestandard air-to-airarmamentof AIM-9LSidewinders and AIM-7F/M SparrowmissilesthatEaglescarried until the early 1990s. McDonneD ouglas v i aN ormTay l or

Oppositepage:Top An AIM-7Mflies straight and truefrom this4485 Operational TestSquadron F-15A-18-MC.Coded EO until 1982 the squadronundertookarmamenttrialsusinga largeselectionof aircrafttypes. Raytheon

ThisPage:Above The McDonnell Douglas ACES II AdvancedConceptEjection Seat) replaced the IC 7 seat usedin F 15As up to Block 17. Afterthis throughthecanopy ejectionfrom a redundant F 15A airframetwo rocketmotors powerthe seat upwardsandforwards as theparachute beginsto deploy. USAFRight The AIM-120A Slammer introducedfire-and-forgetmissile technology,vastlyincreasing the combat capabilityof fighterslikethe F 15. Seen here on the LAU-114A/AAIM-9 launchrail it can also be drop-launchedfromthe fuselage missilestations. Hughes


14/103

F-X

-3-MC 71-0286 continued to test fuel systems and armament in 1973, still in its International OrangeMacair vi orm Taylor

A-7-MC73-0110 was delivered to the 58th nw at Luke AFB and is seen here in January 1975. Theon the airbrake and the borderlessnational insignia are evident. NormTaylor

for the 12th Air Force with headquarters at Bergstrom AFB), this TF-15A 73-0112) carries blackACM stripes in June 1976. NormTaylor

24

e nvir onm e nt. B or e sight slaves the radara nr e nna along the aircraft s boresightor rolla x e a n d s ea rc he s in range between 500ft 1 50 m) an d 1 0nm l ater 2 0n m) o ut atMedium PRF u nt il t h e e ne my is acquiredand locked onto, typically w h er e t h e pilothas s ighte dthe e ne m yor w he r e s uc h a sighting is imminent, based on a r a d ar se a r c hcontact. Before t he i nt ro du ct io n o f l heP P, Boresight mode u sed a Low PRF ifPulse s e ar c hha d be e n selected a n d t h e p i lo tflew the Eagle t o p u t t h e e n e m y w i t h in a 4degree Boresight steering circle on theHUD.) Vertical Scan employs MediumPRF with a 2 - bar , 40 d e g r ee v e r ti c a l sc a n ,also at ranges between 500ft 1 50 m ) a n d1 0 nm I m er 2 0 nm ) , s t ar t in g a t 5 d egr eesabove the fuselage reference line. T hiswould b e u sed primarily in a one-on-one inlook-up aspect and c ons eque ntly dow n ifthe pilot rolls inverted), but a ls o i n a situat ion w he re an engagementdeteriorates intoa yo-yo , w h en b o t h t h e Eagle and its adversary arc c ha sing e a c h other s tails round incircles, allowing the F-15 pilottoge t a shortrange missile lock in a i tuation w he re it isdifficult t o g e t e n o ug h lead t o p ut the gunso n h i m. A u t o G u n s w o rk - i n Medium PRFa gaina nd features a moveable via the TD Cb u t to n ) s ca n p a tt e rn a b ou t t h e f r o nt o f t h emachine, effective a t b e tw e en 0 . 5 -1 0 n m .This provides a lead-computingaiming reference for accurateshooting.

In a ddition, PSP E agl eso f f er a MediumP RF R ai d A ss es sm en t M od e R A M),allowing the radar to break-out closelyspread multiple targets that m i g ht o t h er wise appear as just one t a rg e t r e tu r n, a tranges of up t o 3 5 nm , a nd t o c re at e separate track files on up to four o f t h e m l a te rexpanded). On e may also be singled out forSingle T a r get T r a ck f or a m is s il e launch.The spotl igh ted area is selected usi ng thenormal TD C lock-on pr oc edur e on a ny target in the VSD, and selecting RAM mode.In th i m od e the system scan the smallspotlighted volume around the designmeda re a w h il e s i mu l ta n eo u sl y scanning abr oa de r s w a the of sky around it. Furtherspecial modes designed to r e duc e de te ct i on o f the Eagle and/or to work in a countermeasure--saturated environment arcalso a v ai l ab l e, c o mp r is i ng n i H a n d F l oo dm o de s. E n ga gi n g n i ff causes the r a da r t oceasetransmittin g at t h e e n d of it currentBar s c a n, but to continue receiving. Targetsthat a r e r a dia tingnois e - jam m ing c a n thenbe a c quir e da nd will be shown o n t h e VSO,using A n gl e -o f -J am r e ce p ti o n m e th o d s,a nd H om e -on- J am to deri ve fi ri ng sol utions

F-X

TF-15A 73-0109 of the 55th TFTS in January 1975, theonly Air Superiority Blue F-15to have its white Lcodes overpainted in black. Jim Rotramel

for missiles. Flood engage- a Medium PRFantenna pa tte rn or Low PRF if the radar isworking i n a P ul se m o d e) e ff ec ti v e o u t t o2nm for accurate air-to-airgunnery, as w ellas pr ovidinga utom a tic a c quis it ion f o r m i ssile attack in a dogfight situation.

All missile-ready, o p t im u m t ee r in g a n dla unc h c ues a r c f ur nis hed o n t h e HUD fort im e ly la unc hof w e a pons w ithin the ir prescribed firing parameters. T here are sepanne displays for the k e y t yp e s of Ms S id e wi n de r , S p ar r ow a n d A MR A A M)that arc pe r iodic ally upda te d using newOperational F l ig h t P r og r am s o ft w ar e tocater for the e xa c tpe r f or m a nc e c ha r a c te r istics of ne w s ub- m a r ks as they enter operational service.

In the lmer A PG -? O r a dar the pilotc oulds w itc h to T r ac k -W h i le - c a n T WS )or H i gh D a ta TW H O T W ) so that hecould still track the Pr ima r y D e s igna te dTarget PDT) a n d k e e p a n eye out for moretargets. With the a d ve n t o f A M R AM itbecame possible to de s igna te Se c ondar yD e s igna ted T a r ge ts 1: a 1M -120scan be unleashed in s e que nce a ga ins t m ultiple, s e par a te targets. Th e s e a rc h m ode sa l so u n d er w en t e v o lu t io n a ry c h an g e s forA P G -? . VelOCity Se a r ch r e m a ine d, plusRange While S e ar ch R WS ) in High,Me dium or I nte rle a ved m odes , e s se ntia llysimilar to L R S/SR S. R a nge G ated High RGH) mode provides data purely on highand Jow-c1osure rate t arg ets. A High PRF Acceleration in the vertical plane,the F-15 s speciality. Authors Collection

25


15/103

F-15Cs had a different design,although i twas interchangeableearlier pattern. A new design was introduced for the F-15E anduseable on previous Eagles. Author s Collection

The APG-63 radar scanner. USAF

Aboveright EarlyF-15A-style wheel with the Macair logo on its hub. Author

Above T hes lendernose-gear, seen here on an F-15A, hashadsmal l modificationst ocope with t heex t ra weight of later, heavier Eagles. AuthorsCo ect on

These modes actually gave t h e F - IS A ac o ns id er a ble b o mb in g c a p a bility , u ing s ixd el i v er y m od es t o r el ea se a w id e r an ge ofw e ap o ns f ro m th r ee MER- 20 0 bomb racks.Early ighttest experience indicatedbombing accuracy superior to t he A -7 D a nd F-ll and considerably b e tt e r t h an t h e F-4E. All air-to-ground data appeared o n t h eH 0 without preventing a q u ic k s w itc h toair-to-air ifneeded.ln Automatic mode thesystem would compute ballistics and autom a tic ally r e le a se in lev el, d ive or dive/tossdelivery, giving steeringcoordinates to thetarget and radar offsets o n t h e H U D . A l t er natively, the p ilot c o uld in itia te m a nu a lly ,focusing on a o nt i nu ou s ly d is pl ay ed i mpact point i n h is HUD, generated by computer b allis tic s. Ba ck - up m o de s p r ov ide ds im ila r d e liv er y p ro files in t he e ve nt o f af a ilu re in t h e H UD , c e nt r al c o mp u te r o rarmament control set. Another mode handleddelivery of guided weapons a nd M k 4b o mb s w ith either laser or electro-opticalg u id a n ce w er e c lea r ed f or the F-15A. Proposalsfor other w e a po n in c lu d ed GBU-15,S R AM a n d Harpoon.

A complete F 15 a v ion ic s s y ste m w asextensively f li gh t- te st ed in a WB-66bomber prior to installation in an Eagle sothat it operated very close to itsdesign targ e ts f ro m the start. The entire avionicsevaluation programme was conductedusing only one r a d ar s e t that h el d u p w e llth roughou t.

T hroughout the fi n part of 1971 politic al o p po s itio n s till s o u gh t t o p re ve nt t heEaglefrom hatch ing. As the enormouscostso f t h e F-14 T omcat and F-I5 programmesbecamemore visible the House Appropriations C ommittee continued try to foistt h e F - I4 onw t h e A i r Force on the pretextthat i t c ou ld p el fo rm t he U SA F missionand carry the avy s Phoenix missile.Other Congressional pressure groups continued to a g ita te f or ligh ter , cheaper fighte rs , p ,win g the w ay f or F- 16 . Me a nw h ile,the F [ 5 p r og r am m e s ta y ed on target, easingpast more milestones in April and Maya n d a c hi e vi n g i ts s ix th t ar ge t; engineand in let c o mp m ib ility, in Fe br ua r y [ 9 72 .Remarkably for an aircraft of thm e ra itw as a lso 3 9 0lb l77kg) under its 40,0001b I8,144kg) target weight. On 26 J u ne t h ef ir st a irc r af t, 7 1 -2 8 0 r o lle d out under itsown power at St Louis, on time and belowhudget. Chief Te,t Pilot I r vin g L. Burrowstook the fighter for itsfirst flight on 27 July,fourteen yearsafter the first F-4flew, havingprepared thoroughly in the very advancedMcDonnell Douglasflight simulator.

TARGETDESIGNATIONCONTROLTOC

NOTUSED I

Centre/Forward: A owsseecton ofA G. VI o r ADI mastermode.

RADAR ANTENNAELEVATIONCONTROL

3. Not P r e sse d : C o n t r ol o f a n t e n na a Z imu t h sca n ce n t r e radarground mapmode .Controlsazimuthscan centrewhen radar i s i n narrowscanRBG mapor BCN modes.Cont rospost on of acqUst on symbo in D B S f ul a ndsectorscan.

F X

5. PACS Aircraft: Cages HUD Veoctyvector and pt chscaeto zero driftif AUTO or CDIP is notse ected.

Release: Designatesair-ta-ground target.

1 . Controlsantenna elevation in radarground map mode.2. ACS Aircraft: Cages HUD VelOCiy vector and pt chscaeto zero drift I fAUTO or CDIP notseected.

4. Rear:De-energlz6S N VI or ADI mode status.

PACS Aircraft: Not used.

Pressed: Rate contro of HUD targetdeS gnator radar InAG rangngmode)or rate contro of VSD cursor radar inground map ; contro of VSD targetdeSgnator In DBSmodes.

passively t o d e te e r sources of r a da r n o is ejamming that w e re in ter f e r in g w it h t h eA PG-6 3s other modes. The r a da r c o uIda ls o be e mp lo ye d i n three air-to-groundm o de s , a le ga cy ofthe earlier requirementfor the F -1 5 t o have a s e c on d a ry attackc a pa b ility, b y s wi tc hi ng t o A /G o n t hemdar p an el . D RL R, a Doppler function,pointed the antenna [5 degrees down andscanning 45 degree left and right to readground s p ee d f ro m its r e tu rn s , thereby providing the central computer w ith u p da te sfor n 1\ igation. In R angingmode R G) itcould a lso r e ad slant r a ng e s o f f points onthe ground for the plan position indicator PPI), or, usingloll PRFs read the groundfor mapping purposes.

Aircraft

MICROPHONESWITCH

Aircraft

t t lecont ro ls in t he ground attack mode.

SPHOBRAKESWITCH

mode can be u e d and this doublestime it ta ke s III complete the scan, theadataand processingtime beingused

k u p tin y, and possibly first-generationthy, targets at very long range. Acqui

o n m od e s w e r e g iv e n in cr e as e d r a n g e tothe newer missiles capability., non-w eapons I llo de s in c lu d e d i n te r ro g at e a n d h o me onto

a i rc r af t s u ch as a t an ke r) o r abeacon tr a ns p on d e r, u s in g

an format air-to-air), or Plan Positioncator showingground returns for air

f or [ FF identification. Pilotsoften use this a a q u ic k w ay of hom

onto the base beacon after a mission.Illode could b e u se d a ct i\ oc ly or

26 27


16/103

F-X OperationalTestand Evaluation

F-15A 73-0113 ofthe 461st TFTS in June 1976 with no national insignia and afalse canopy marking beneath thenose. This aircraftwas sold to Israel in 1992.Jim Rotrame Canadan InternationalA ir Expositon andtheAir show t he same week. So, two air

deployed toTrenton, Ontaro and with tankerF-15 supported both shows eachday. The tsentto Canada were an Air Superiority Buethe first producton 'Grey' Eage, 73-100. Thecraft hadless than 25 total hourssince delvCanadan friends could notbeleve that we wa 'new' aircraft to support the air show. Whrence for everyone: the local population reathe daiy flights at Trenton, everyone was twell andthe aircraft performance was excCanadianslovedthe performanceof the aircvery tight turns and vertical clmb capabi ty.wereconfguredwith threeexternal tanks anarrved at Trenton, we tookoff the two winf lew with the centerlne ony. The effectspainted aircraft versus the Blue aircraft weable. Remember at Luke, it was clear blueevery day. TheBlue aircraft realy stoodoutdark clouds while the Grey aircraft just diThe aircraft flew non-stop from Luke to Treturned thesame way.

The OT E Program was mixed in with ouring program at Luke and al maintenance acOT E aircraft was carefully t racked to gainfor reliability and maintainability. I am suresoftware changes in the radar system werthedatagainedfrom the OT E program.Alsconstantly trying to fnd ways to improveshootng procedures andto fndways to supBIT programsof the varous systems.

The airplane was much easier to maintaPhantom or F-ll1. The systems were mucable andin general more maintainable. Theels, forexamplecould be opened with a coa special tool to unsnap the locking screwsgiving tours and briefings on the aircraftthose sessions, I would offer t o open taccess panel t o show t he varous LRUs.would say that I had forgotten my specialthe panels. I would then asksomeone inthecoin which of course, Iwould use to open thImustsay it wasalways quite impressive thgain access to the avionics bays of the aircrequiring anyspecial tools I

JohnPoole right with TAC-t. JohnPooe

veryhappyto see themissionreturn tothe single 'air-toair tasking. The air-to-ground capabi ty was neverremoved from the software and the Israel Air Forcequickly made good use of thatcapabity.

One of the mostim portantphases of the OT E programoccurred at Eg n AFB in 1975 and involved among otherthings, compatibilitytesting of the AIM-7F with the F-15.The AIM-7F was anewmissie and al ofour test assetswereflown in on an F-4C supportaircraft fromthe factory in Calfornia. Our piots tested the aircraft against various targetsincluding helcopters andB-52s.Someof thetestng involved launching against varousdrone targets,probablythe most impressive wasthe BOMARC [BoeingIM-99A ramjet-powered unmanned interceptorl. TheBOMARC was originally designed as a longrange, highaltitude air defense weapon and when phased out.became a target drone capable of speeds in excess ofMach 3 above 60,OOOft [a,OOOm. From our vantagepoint on the flight lne a t E g n, w e c oul d see theBOMARCs as they were launched from their site on thebeach, west of Egn. What a sight toseethem clmbingvertically fromthe launch pad toward their target track,far out into theGulfof Mexico. To supportthe BOMARCshots, the F-15 'shooter aircraft would have alreadylaunched, refueled fromthe KC-97 tanker and would bein positonfor the GCI site to vector hm toward the target as it flew its preprogrammed profie. The tming forthese missions was critical because oncethe BOMARClaunched,the F-15 either had t ogo or t hem iss ionwaslost along with the drone. These missions werecriticalto demonstrate and evaluate the capabi ty of the individual parts IAIM-7, APG-63 Radar and aircraft) to perform as an integrated weaponssystem against a widevariety of threats. The results of the shots wereclassifed but. f romthe debrief ofthe piots aftereachmission,we knew things went very well. As maintenance personne supportng theprogram, ourtaskingwas toinsurethat each tme the aircraft launched, it launched with atrouble free radarsystem. Our radar technicians, crewchiefs and other maintenance personnel did an absolutely fantastic jobandneveroncedid we lose amission formaintenance.

Another experence (non-OT Ej early in the programinvolved the first visit of the Eageto another countrysupported only by Air Force maintenance personnel.The Air Force was invited to participate in the 1975

The OT E program began immediately the aircraftarrved at Luke and within some short perod. we hadtheassigned aircraft and the program waswell underway.The OT E program continualy evaluated not only theaircraft performance fromthe piots perspectve but alsothe maintenance and supportabi ty. Much tme wasspent in evaluatng the Buit In Test (BIT) systemdesigned into thevarous avionics systems in the aircraft. Ofconcern was the ability of the aircraft systemsto alert themaintenancepersonnel whensomethingwaswrong. In the nose-wheel wel was the Avionics StatusPane ASP which through a seres of mechanical indicators (red or white coloured bals) referred to as 'BitBals', indicated ifa system had a fault. Red if bad, whiteif good. The system was supposed to work very smpy.If onelooked at thepane after flight and a 'red' bal wasshown againstaparticular system, one was supposedtobe able toopenthepanel where thesystem LRUs werelocated, and see a further indicator (on the LRU itself), inthis case 'white if bad', remove the offending LRU andwith aquick operatonal check of thesystem, return theaircraft to service. Without going into a very lengthyexplanaton, the system had its problems. As an example, one verylargecontroversywas never fuly resolved.What if the pilot reported no faults and thesystemsadan LRU was faulted? The perfect situationwould be tochange the offending LRU and f y . We quickly found thatthe best way was to power up the 'faulted' system andcomplete a thorough check ourselves.I remember onevery spectacular 'Scramble' test todemonstrate the minimum tme for the crews to enterthe aircraft, start up andlaunch. It wasthe first tmewehadseen the aircraft in a 'Scramble' typelaunch and itwas impressive.Later, we were to see many such actua scramblesandtheynever faied toimpresseveryone.One of the OT E piots was a member o fAir DefenseCommand and atthat tme, the aircraft was still beingconsidered for introduction into the Air Defense fleetand so hs interest in evaluatng the interceptcapabi tieswas very important to theprogram. TheOT E folkswere tasked to test every capability of the aircraft andour maintenance folks supported them on al deployments. They operated from Edwards AFB to test thecapability of the aircraft against the SR-71A and ofcourse theHughes folkswere very interested in makingsure that theradar worked and that plenty ofsparepartswere avaiable in case of failure (the Hughes peoplecame to Edwards with a large numberof 'extra' radarLRUs to insure that thesystem was always at ful capability). They were quietly t old t o t ake t he extra partsback tothe factory and properly delver them as spares.There wasto be no 'extra' partssupportdur ng the testprogram to skew the support posture of theprogram.

Wing maintenance personnel supported the OT E programdurng severa visits to Nel s AFB and other sites.On the f irstNel svisit . the tasking involved air togroundtestng and notmany daysafter arrval. amessage fromHQ TAC came that said tostoptheair-to-ground phase ofthe OT E testng with the aircraft. Immediatelythe piotsgot themessage; the 'Caterpiar hats (from thecompanywho makes earth-moving equipment very quickly disappeared,never to reappear Needless to say, we were

John Pooe was one o the initi l cadre o personnelassigned the F 15 Program at LukeAFB from July1974. He spent two years there supportng theOT Eprogramand pilot training.

demonstrator before ir became rhe StrikeEagle/F-ISE concepr demonstrator. T I(71-290) w as r o g o rhrough many changesof configurarion in irs lo ng c a re e r, a p pe a rin g a s rhe AdvancedConcepr demonstrato r, F-IS TOl/ManoeuvringTechnologydemonstrator, F-ISE cockpir restbed and

F-ISE wirh ACTIVE rechnology vecroring nozzles and canard foreplanes.

Followingcon1plerion ofCar I r he U AFperformed Car II f ro m 14 March 1974,rhough Air Force pilors had already flownsome of rheCaregory ]sorries. Col WendellShawler, Direcror of rhe Joinr Tesr Force,was first to do s o for a 7 Sm in flig hr s rarringar 9 am on Saturday 1 8 A u gu s r 1 97 2. Thep r og ra m me s ho we d r ha r Don Malvern sengineers and designers had jusr about gorirrig h t, w ith only tw e nry -rh re e s m all n gineering change p rop o sa ls ECPs) re co m mended. Some i nv ol ve d d er ai ls s uc h a srerouting wirebundles or redesigningbolr .Three involved exrernal changes based onthe exhaustive flig h r-tes rin g ro utine s .Minor flurrer in the horizonral srabilizerw as c u re d b y c u rrin g b ac k the inboard 4ft( I .2m) o f e ach srabilizer to a distance ofl6in 4 em). The resulring snag reducedrh e c o effic ien r of p re s u re and slightlyalter d the momenr of inertia, eliminatingrheflurrer. AircraftF4 f li gh t- re st ed r he E Pand ir was applied to FI-3 also.

The Eagle s distincrive curaway wingr ip s w er e l ir er al ly s aw n a wa y r o cure asevere buffer problem at high g in the highsubsonic s p ee d ra ng e a t a round 30,000fr(9,000m). I t w as established rhar rhe reararea of each s q u are d-o ff rip w as creatingtoo much l if t i n thar condirion, causing

Family ModelThe other rwoCaregory 1resraircrafrwerer he f ir sr r wo r w i n r ub TF-ISAs, 71-290and 7 1 -2 9 1. From r he n on every sevenrhaircrafr off rh e Iin c w as a rw o-s ea rer, la re rdesignared F-ISB. Addirion of rhe secondcockpir p os ir i on i n rhe growth pacebehind rhe pilor added OOlb 363kg) andre qu ire d re mo v al of rhe orrhrop A /AlQ-13S ECM boxes from rhar a re a. I norher respect ir resembled rhe single- earF-ISA. A second s c ar p rov e d in va lu a l: Ief or a w id e v ar ie ry of developmenr rasks,and in rhe case of 71-291 for McDonnellD ou gla s s F-IS s a le s e fforr. This aircrafrbecame rhe be sr -known E ag le a fr er i rsworld sales tour and i ts w or k a s a company

firring a brake chure. Holdinga high angleof arrack on rouchdown bore rhe risk of arail-scrape and a showerof s p ark s ro g e r rh earrenrion of rhose watching from rhe control to we r. Afrer a few such s c ra p es rh eH D w as m o di fi ed to givea flashing warning when rhe angle reached 13 degreesnose-up, allowing anorher 2 degrees beforecontacr was made. Changes were made inthe compression of rhe main gear legs,allowing rhem to absorb mosr of t he landin g lo a d on touchdown and to rhe rudderaileron inrerconnecr thar had rended toraise the wing on the windward side whenthe ru dd e r w as u se d ro correct a weathervane motion, making the siruarion evenworse. Crosswind landing tolerance wasincreased to 30ke A d dirion a lly , rh e n os egear sreering was made more sensitive.

Timepre-production (not prototype)

ft were budgeted; twelve for the coninitial tests Caregory I and eight

r he AF Joinr T e r F or ce of TAAi r F or ce y st em s Command (AF C)(Categoryll) . Afrer making ir maid

flighr ar Edwards AFB 7 1- 2 a ir cr af tiniriared rhe firsr of rhe rhre e manu

rurer s resr srages using aircraft FI ro FlOrhe fir r rw o-s ea r v e rs ion s , T FI a nd

. Fl e x plo red rhe basic flighr envelopehandling with exrernal srores and irjoined in Seprember 1972 by F 2 71rhar became rhe main engine restair

e. Basic handling resrswere assisred byscale remorely pilored replica of rhe

S. D rop p ed from an N B- S2 r he m od elsrall and spin resrs under SA

supervisionso rhar rhese characrics w e re w ell u n de rs ro o d b e fo re res r

o rs flew rh e rea l rh in g . By ugusr 1973Burrow s, Pe re Garrisonand rh e ir re am

m a de 1 ,00 0 flig hrs, exceeding Machand 6 0 ,0 0 0fr I ,300m). Both aircrafri v d the tesr programme, F-l g o in g ro

AFB Museum and F-2 ro langleyhe A /APG-63 w as firsr in sta lle d in

F3 71 - 2 2 ) f or r ad ar and calibraredeed resrs from ovember 1973, while

71-2 3) performed strucrural rests andwasfirsr wirh rhe M 61 g u n and exrernal

ra nk s . Fu rrh e r developmenr of raclarweapons control sysremsfell ro F6 rhar

rhe Air Su p erio riry Blue painredforce in June and FLO i n which in te

of rhe radar, avionics and Tacticaltron ic Wa rfa re Sy sre m (TEWS) was

F7 joined the exrernal sroresr es rs b ef or e s e rv in g a s a ground

rrainer w hi l e F wa s u s ed r o r e fi nefuel sysrem and for s p in te srs with an

parachure conrainer arrached rorear fuselage. Up t o 29 Ocrober 1973of rhe eleven r e r a ir cr af r i n u se had

a ge d f ou rr ee n f li gh r p er monrh. Irvrows reporred rhar minor adjusrmenrsbeen made in rhe Conrrol Augmentaysrem to damp down rhe effecrs of

small conrrol stick movement roid rh e danger of pi lor-induced oscilla

He commenred on rhe tendency tor vane on landing in a c ros s win d,

rhe nose to be lowered asquicklypossible rhereby parrially negaring rheal nose-high landing ru n u s in g rhe air

considerable s u rfa ce a rea a s a n a e ro b ra ke r o s l ow i t down instead of

28 29


17/103

F X

of thef i r s tbatch of USAFE Eagles. F-15A 76-0011 forthe 36th W at Bitburg. Author s Colecton

CHAPTER TWO

eady Tea l

Red and white ACM markings were an attemptto makethe irSuperiority Blue F 15As lincluding this one73-0103 more visibleagainsta skybackground. 73-100 had yellow and black stripes and TF 15A 73-0112had a black and white pattern.This paradoxicalburst ofcolour on the monochromeEagles was sadlyshort lived. Norm Taylor Co le cto nsevere enough to a larm the te t. A standard wingfence solution was

without effect. Finally, an area of 4sq.3 7s q m) was cut off e ac h t ip diagoa nd t he g ap w as s ea le d with wood

filler. The revised, raked til s appearedfactory line f or a production F-15s

theywere retrofitted to the test Eagles.the airbrake had caused buffet tooextended s o i ts a r ea w as i n cr ea se d20 to 3 1 .5s q f t 2 .9s q m ) that allowed

p re vi ous a Imost verticaI extensiont o b e r e du ce d without reducingthe

u nt o f d ra g i t created. The l on g rneeded an external stiffener rib on

first thirty production aircraft, deletedn the s t ruc tu re was made more rigid.id-I974 the programme had encoun

f ew a i rc r af t problems and F-15Asrolling off the I ine m o re cheaply and32 per cent fewer assembly manthan originally assumed. The use of

e, integrally machined parts, includingeach weighing 1451b 66kg)

machined f r om a I ,2 50 1b (56 7kg) titablock. As a further weight-saving,

D o ug las w as contracted in

Ma y 1 97 1 to d e sig n a boron w ing f or theaircraft, saving another 4 b 181kg), butthis was cancelled in 1 97 5 .There was, however, one increasingly

w or ry in g s er i s of discoveries concerningthe behaviour of the FJOO engine in combat-type flight situations. Col Bellis s teamhad been charged with commissioninganaircraft with minimum-risk technology,b ut t he F-15 neverthele s had a hi ghl yinnovative radar and cockpit and anengine that pushed the limits of compression, internal temperaturesand responsivene s in combat very hard indeed. Althoughthe FIOO s miles tone poin ts had beenpassed, albeit w ith s lig h t relaxation of thefinal one 1973 brought a s e rie s of enginefires and compressor failures. Mostly, thesew r connected w ith r a pid throttle movements a t high altitude le ad in g to enginestalls and afterburner b low - ou ts. I n thehands of experienced t e t p il ot s nonehadled t o a n a cc id en t: t he F-1 5 w as the firstU f ig ht er to reachits first 5,000hrwithouta serious mishap and it flew 7,300hr beforethe first loss and 30,000hr before the second. Problems withthe FIOO caused delays

30

while P W fine-tuned theengine to makeit more tolerant of rapid throttle movements in manoeuvring f li gh t. a dl y, thestall-stagnationdifficulty persisted into serv ice lif e and i t h as r eq ui re d an ongo ingseries of improvements th roughout theEagle s career to date.As th e first batchofF-15 pilots became

used t o t he ir new aircraft they quicklyappreciated that they w er e r i di n g a g en uine fighter with superior energy, turningand acceleration. It had a cockpit that waseasy to use and gave visibility through 360degrees, even includingdownward visionthrough i ts b u lg e d Lexan c a no p y. I t hadthe e thos of a weapon that could restorethe morale of pilots, sti somewhat jadedby the exper ience of V ietnam. However,e ve n t h e most opt imis tic o f them couldhard ly have forecast t h at USAF Eaglesk il l- to -I os s r at io i n t he ir n ex t m aj orengagement w ou ld b e 3 4: , or that Israelip i lo ts w ou ld u se e ar l y F - 15 As to destroyfifty-seven enemy aircraft (includingthreeMiG-25s) without loss, o r e v en t ha t t heEagles overall kill to loss ratio by the endof the centu ry would approach 100:0.

FledglingsIt was arpropriate that the 555th TriJJleNichel Squadron should become the firstUSAF recirientof the F-15A.The tor-scori ng , q u ad ro n i n Vietnam, with 40 M iG sdowned between 23 A pr il 1 96 6 and 2December 1972, it had included Col RobinOlds, Cart _teve Ritchie and Capt ChuckDeBelievue among its multiple MiG-killersand accumulated a w e alth of fighter experie nc e. I n p ra ct i ce , i ts f am ou s i de nt i ty w astransfelTed in number o nl y t o t he 5 8t hTFTWat Luk e A FB f ro m J u ly 1 97 4 thoughmany former Vietnam F -4 p il ot s w er eamong itsfirst Eagle Drivers . Selection forthe s q ua d ro n w as c o ns ide r ed a p r iv ile g e.CadI R D te stin g w as f inis he d by 14Nm ember 1974 when the 555th TL CO,Lt Col T ed L au di se r ec ei \ ed the firstEagle from Edwards AFB, TF-15A 7 3- 10 ,labelled TAC-I and flown in by Lt Col TedLa ud ise w ith Lt Col A rt Be rg m an in the

backseat. The presence of President GeraldFord and t he US F Chief o f Staff, GenDavid Jones, a nd t he TAC Commander,Gen Robert J Dixon, underlined the significance o f t h e occasion. From March 1975the test program passed to the A ir ForceTestand Evaluation Center(AFTEC) andthen,f ro m 1 97 7 to the 422nd Fighter WeaponsSquadronat ellis AFB, whereCategory IIIFollow-On Test and Evaluation (FOT E)continued. AFTEC s team at Luke, under LtC ol A rt Be rg m an , in clu de d s e ve n TAC,ADC and AFSC pilots flying six F-15s on < from the 57th FWW at Nellis, including TACI . They developed ACM tactics atEdwards AFB and against USN TO linstructors at MCAS Yuma aswell asflyingweapons and ECM trials at ellis and EglinAFB.At Luke the 4461st TFTS acti\ated on

23 June 1976 as the second F-15A trainingunit, becoming the 461st TFT Jesters inJuly 1977. With Tri[Jle ickel they began to

31

prepare the pilots for the first opW in g. I n d ue c ou rs e t wo otherunits formed within it at Luke; tTFT Silver agles in August 197426th TFTS in January 1981. TTFTW was renamed 5 th TTW o1977 and on 29 August 1979 therole passed to the th TTW, aboThe last F-15A training missionat the Ari:ona base on 15 m emby former 555th TFT CO Lt CoGranquist,whereupon allEagle inpassed to Ty nd a ll A FB, le av in gTTW to concentrateon the F-16appropriate code change f ro m L Lu ke Fa lco n ) in the process.

By 1 97 8 L uk e had receivedF 5A B models for i ts th reesquadrons, under Ready Team Pfound the Eagle an cas) aircraftwith f ew v ic es and spectaculamance in ACM. It wa:, forthe f ir st f igh ter c ap ah le o f s


18/103

READY TEAM READY TEAM

AFBs F 15 squadrons worked hardto train the first generationof Eagle driversmid-1970s. One of their 555th TFTS F-15As. 74-0117.leaves for another training

e. In 1974 i twas passed to Israe l as part o fa post -Gul l war compensationMcDonne Douglas via NormTaylor Colecton

Switching from SW (Sidewinder) to Sr o w) , y ou to find the second swthe left on t he lowerfront p ~ n e l amoother s im ila r switches . We ended uprubber hose, known a donkey dickweaponsswitch to l e t u s f i n d i t withoudown . A l l we apons informa tion and

inside the cockpit. T he TACAN

For trainee pilots at Lukelearningthe new fighter, t he HOTAS (throttleand stick) control techniduced with the F-I5 w as one of thchallenges, but i t also conferredadvantages. Pilots of Vietnam-erhadbeen far t oovul nerabl e and mmany opportunities or warningt he y h ad t o s p en d s omuch t i me sswitches or checking dials i n thinstead of keepi ng an eye o n t heoutside. In a single-seat fighter sawareness is particularlyvital. Sechange of missile in the FAB, for

Heads Up

required an impractical series of coas USMC aviator Manfred Fokkeexplained:

panelsm odulated (moved), ~ o n g with the innerpanels,as the power h ~ n g e d and the afterburnerwasused. They seemed to constantlydeform andjam , tearing bending. Somethought thattheproblem wasm agnified by highspeed but I neversaw that officially stated anywhere. The onlycorrective Clction was 0 remove (lnt replace them.This problem continued for several years andfinally a decision was made to remove the outerpanels, thus ending the problem. The i m p ~ c t sappeared to be m inim al, other than looks asnowthe inner hardware exposed.

One thing t h ~ t c o n t i n u ~ l y caused the enginecommunity problem s were the Turkey Feathersat the rear of the engine. These outer, m o v e ~ h l e

-

fuel at sea level and less at altitude. Therewa s a ls o a reduction i n f ue l f lo w at themaximum afterburner setting and th ise l imina ted many of the blow-outs. Anunwelcome consequence of these changeswas the partial loss of the engine ssmokeless exhaust. Highly visible smoke hadbeen a b ig disadvantage i n earli erj et s andthe FIOO was meant to be a clean engine.Sadly, engine problems continued to occuruntil the digital FIOO-nO became available i n 1985. John Poole recalled:

ACM when pilotswouldaccelerate to a t arget and then rapidly throttle back t oavoi dover-running it. It might have been of somesmal l comfort t o E ngi ne Shop w orkers t oknow tha t the earl y Mi G-2S engi nes had alifespan of ISO hours.Although similar engine problems were

not new they drew unwelcome attentiont o t h e F 1 5 programme at a ti me when thecost-cutterswerestill outto cancel it. Critics becamemorevociferous whenthe FIOOwas adapted for use in t h e G en er a lDynamics F-16A. Although t his reducedengine unit, already inflated by the cancellation of F-14B the F-16 s developmen tflying in 1975-76 showed that i t had none

Kel ly AFB. Texas hosted a visit by this57thFWW F-15A-14-MC o n 1 0 September 1977 st i ll w i th its whitetailcodes. Eddy viaNorm Taylor

of the problems with the F100 that doggedthe Eagle. P Wand McDonnell Douglascontinued to modify the fuel control system, adjust throttle travel and modify theairflow splittet for the fanduct . They alsointroduced borescope inspection f or t ur bine blades,a great time-saver.One simplemodification that brought considerableimprovement in afterburner reliabiIitywas a barometric device that controlledthe fuel flow to the afterburner sprayringsat rates dependent upon al ti t ude: m ore

example, we h ad ou r entire spares complcmentf or a f ul l w i ng of aircraft 72) delivCIed priortothe January 1977arrival ofthe first three aircraft.The same thing occurred at Soesterbergas well.

There werestill minor airframe discrepancies to resolve. An RWR fairing a t t h e tipof the leftvertical stabilizer was subject toso much vibration that the cables leadingto the ALQ-128 antenna tended to fract ur e. A s im pl e solution was f oun d byinstalling a st yrofoam t ube to contain thecable and its connections. At first, groundcrew s w ere t old t o avoi d using their usualcadmium-plated t ool s because t hey coul dreact with the largeareas of titanium metalused i n the F-lS s structure. Large quantities of tools were replaced, but soon afterw ar ds it was decided t ha t t he risk w asinconsiderable and the remaining originaltoolswere reapproved.

Engine maintenanceman hours, i n particular, had been muchhigherthan expected and stall-stagnation problems, leadingto fires, continued to occur. Accelerationtimes for the engine were slower than predicted and pilots sometimes had difficultyi n rest art i ng their e ng in es a ft er a s ta llbecause the fuel/ ai r m ix w as too lean, orafter an afterburnerblow-outbecauseit wastoo rich. Blow-outs occurred mainly at highaltitude in rarefied air.With fuel

Crowood - McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle

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