Critique and Conservation in Gauya Vaiava TheologyJonathan B. Edelmann | Mississippi State UniversityAmerican Academy of Religion | DNAM | Friday, Nov 21, 2014, 9:0011:00 amTable of Contents1. The Theologian as Parrot12. rdhara Svmin in the Caitanyacaritmta23. Jva Gosvmin and rdhara Svmin: some similarities, differences, and unknowns33.1 The Inherent Feature of the tman: Bhgavata Pura 3.26.33rdhara Svmins Bhvrthadpik (3.26.3)3rdhara Svmin, Subodhin (4.32)4Jva Gosvmin on the inherent features of the self (tma-svabhva)43.2 The Reality or Non-Reality of the World4rdhara Svmins Bhvthadpik (1.1.1)4Jva Gosvmin on the nature of the material world4Conclusion4Bibliography4

1. The Theologian as ParrotFor some time I have been involved in arguing, along with a number of others, that there are scholars and scholarly texts in larger Hindu traditions that are justifiably called theological, and by this I mean a philosophical and philological reflection on the meaning of revealed scripture.

This is not to say that theology is perfect term, only that it is more appropriate in many cases that philosophy or some other term.

In this paper I want to confront a particular prva-paka, one that I wont spend our time here tracing, but one that will at least seem familiar. The prva-paka is that the theologian, the tradition-specific interpreter of previous teachers and their comments on root stras, is but a parrot who repeats in new words the exact same thing that the predecessors thought. The view is expressed by Hindus as diverse as Jayanta Bhaa and Bhaktivedanta Swami.[footnoteRef:1] [1: Bhaktivedanta Swami said, What Ka says, I repeat, like parrot. That's all. I have no knowledge. (740219 - Lecture BG 07.04 Bombay)]

A theologians walks into a locked, ossified, and yet immaculate system of thought, and one is only a real theologian if one unquestioningly and consistently re-articulates that system like a parrot repeats the words he was taught.

I admit that this prva-paka is one of the ways in which Hinduism was introduced to me, ways that were shaped by Bhaktivedanta Swami, who repeatedly said that the role of a teacher is to parrot the previous teachers.

I have noted that that the acceptance of these theses would undermine the brilliance and fecundity of Indian intellectuals, reducing them to mere parrots rather than independently thoughtful, creative, and constructive authors.

But this parrot (ukcrya) view of the theologian is particularly vexing for the Gauya Vaiava for two reasons:

1. the state of the art understanding of the tradition is so limited that parroting is impossible,2. the relationship of the early Gauya Vaiava theologians with their previous teachers is clearly not one of a parrot parroting a parrot.

I wish to focus on the second point, looking at the relationship between rdhara Svmin (mid-14th century) and Jva Gosvmin (16th century).2. rdhara Svmin in the CaitanyacaritmtaWhen one talks about the Gauya Vaiava tradition or the Gauya Vaiava sapradya there are a number of problems that arise. With whom does it start? What are its sources? Who are the major carriers of that tradition from its beginning to now?

For the purposes of this paper I want to focus on the role of rdhara Svmin (mid-14th century), who wrote the oldest surviving Bhgavata Pura commentary called the Bhvrthadpik. The Bhgavata Pura aside, rdhara Svmin is in some sense the oldest and most important source of theology for the Gauya Vaiava tradition. There is an even older commentary on the Bhgavata Pura by Madhva (13th century), but this is rarely used by Jva Gosvmin.

As noted by many, like Ravi Gupta, rdhara Svmin is quoted judiciously by the Gauya Vaiava theologians; used when supportive, politely overlooked when not. rdhara Svmin is never explicitly contradicted (as far as I know) even when hes implicitly contradicted.

This issue of how and in what ways Hindu thinkers disagree with their authorities is one that has been given great attention by Indologists. Rosalind OHanlon recently noted a student must have carefully disagreed with an authority because the student-teacher relationship was often a father-son relationship; they shared the same space and decorum was important. While this is an important insight, it is inapplicable in our case here because Jva Gosvmin and rdhara Svmin were separated by hundreds of years.

rdhara Svmin is famously located in the tradition by Ka dsa in the CC. Ka dsa has Caitany saying, one who does not honor Svm is to counted as inwardly a prostitute (Dimock and Stewart, p.877, di.7.98; see Gupta p.67).

A number of questions follow from this: Why would the otherwise respectful and humble Caitanya take such a hard stand on what appears to be marginal issue, the use of rdhara Svmin who was not unambigiously a Vaiava? Such concerns were not raised about Madhvas commentary. In fact, the early Gauya Vaiava mostly ignored it. Why would Caitanya defend rdhara Svmin so passionately when it appears that rdhara Svmin is an Advaitin, at least at times? Perhaps Caitanya was himself an Advaitin, and his passionate defense of rdhara reflects that, or perhaps Kadsa over-dramatized for reasons all his own. Given that Gauya Vaiava do contradict rdhara Svmin, can we say Caitanyas disciples (e.g. Jva Gosvmin) honored rdhara? What would it mean to honor in this context?

The contradictions between rdhara and the orthodox Gauya Vaiava theologians is widely recognized, and often explained by the Gauya Vaiava tradition by saying that rdhara was trying to lure the interest[footnoteRef:2] of the Advaitins by creating a theology that has all the bells and whistles of Advaita, but leads them to pure and personalistic bhakti of proper Gauya Vaiava theology. This leads to another question: [2: see Sheridan, p.50; Tattvasandarbha 27; The Advaitic statements of rdhara, Baladeva argues, are like the meat on the end of a hook, meant to lure fish (Elkman 1986: 119 120). See also S C Chakravarti, Philosophical Foundations, p.22; and SK De, 1961, p.18.]

Why should we believe that rdhara Svmin was a fisher of Advaitins and not just a regular Advaitin? As far as I know rdhara Svmin never identifies himself as a fisher of Advaitins, not that it would be prudent to do so if he was.3. Jva Gosvmin and rdhara Svmin: some similarities, differences, and unknowns

I hope to demonstrate here that Jva Gosvmin does in fact differ from rdhara on a number of key theological issues, but that the extent to which this is true requires a lot of further clarification. Yet he doesnt always differ as an Advaitin, as he is often accused. Whatever the case I have never seen a place where Jva Gosvmin explicitly denies Sridhara in the manner that is often used in the dialectical reasoning of commentaries, e.g. iti cen, na.

3.1 The Inherent Feature of the tman: Bhgavata Pura 3.26.3There is a tremendous amout of debate in Indian philosophy and theology about the inherent features of the self (tma-svarpa). Edwin Gerow and David Lawrence (Odd Eyed One), for instance have noted the tendency in Advaita to deny agency as a feature of the self, something that Buddhist thinkers like Ngrjuna and Dharmakrti take to an extreme. It culminated in the grammarian Ngeas treatment of the passive intransitive as paradigmatic in language. Other traditions, such as Abhinavaguptas and Vidycakravatins Kashmiri aivism, as well as Jva Gosvmins and Vivantha Cakravartins Gauya Vaiava bring agency and other features directly into the innate qualities of the self.

There is some evidence, given below, that rdhara takes a traditional Advaitin view that self, tman, is devoid of qualities such as agency. This is a view that Gauya Vaiava must deny since they want to argue that bhakti for Bhagavn Ka is expressive of the selfs desire, that it is liberative, and that it exists even in the liberated state when the self has discarded the material body and mind, the very things that Advaitins would say are the locus of agency and other illusory qualities. For example, Chakravarthi Ramprasad (2011: 335) notes that, the conscious subject of Advaita is strictly devoid of agency, being witness (skin)rdhara Svmins Bhvrthadpik (3.26.3)andir tm puruo nirgua prakte para |pratyag-dhm svaya-jyotir viva yena samanvitam || BhP 3.26.3 ||

KEYNOTE

Here rdhara is clearly reviewing a number of competing theories of self. Just after this he talks about Prbhkara Mms. While not developed here, he is interpreting the BhP as defending an Advaita theory of self, one in which the self in its purest state is without qualities.

Jva Gosvmin discusses this verse in his Kramasandarbha (3.26.3) and Bhagavatsandarbha (section 23, Dasa p.219). In both cases he takes it as saying something about the supreme self (paramtman). In neither text does he pursue rdharas interpretation, not does he directly contradict it, although he ultimately does develop a contradictory theory of self, which I discuss further below.rdhara Svmin, Subodhin (4.32)Elsewhere rdhara Svmin more explicitly articulates an Advaitic conception of the tman. When commenting on BhG 4.32, a verse that says the vaidika yajas are , he writes:

eva bahu-vidh yaj vitat brahmao mukhe |karma-jn viddhi tn sarvn eva jtv vimokyase ||BhG 4.32||

Thus the yajas are of many types were enjoined in the mouth of Brahman. You should know they are born of karma. Having known all of them, you shall be free.

jna-yaja stotum uktn yajn upasaharati eva bahu-vidh iti | brahmao vedasya mukhe vitat | vedena skd-vihit ity artha | tathpi tn sarvn v-mana-kya-karma-janitn tma-svarpa-saspara-rahitn viddhi jnhi | tmana karmgocaratvt | eva jtv jna-niha san sasrd vimukto bhaviyasi ||rdhara Svmins ?? BhG 4.32||

In this verse he concludes [] They were enjoined in the mouth of Brahman, or of the Veda. The meaning of this verse is that [the yajas] are enjoined directly by the Veda. You should know, you should understand, that although all of them [the yajas] are produced from the karma of words, mind, and body, in a manner devoid of contact with the inherent nature of the tman since the tman is not within the realm of karma. Having known, being fixed in jna, you will be freed from the cycle of birth and death.

At the same time, rdhara Svmin does talk about the spiritual body (siddha-deha) in a number of places, and I am not sure how a self devoid of qualities can be or was reconciled with the idea that the self can live in a spiritual body for eternity with Viu.

Jva Gosvmin on the inherent features of the self (tma-svabhva)For Gauya Vaiavas, however, agency and other features of the self are quality potentials, powers or energies of the self that manifest in and through contact with a body and mind. For example, Jva Gosvmin quotes and comments a verse, which appears to be based on the Padmapura, of Jmt Muni (c. 1370-1443 ad) who is also known as Varavara Muni, a follower of Rmnuja (c. 10171137 ad) in his Paramtmasandarbha (section 19, [Haridsa 1984: 80]):

tath jttva-karttva-bhokttva-nija-dharmaka |

Furthermore, the intrinsic or innate characteristics of the self are apprehension, agency and qualitative experience.

KEYNOTE

Here Jva Gosvmin explicitly contradicts rdhara Svmin by affirming that the self has specific qualities. Jva Gosvmin says in the Paramtmasandarbha that these qualities manifest when in contact with a spiritual or material body.

uddhasyaiva karttva-aktau ca yasypi brahmai layas tasya brahmnandenvarat karma-sayogsayogc ca karttva-akter antar-bhva evety abhyupagantavya, yasya ca bhagavad-bhakti-rpa-cic-chaktyviat cic-chaki-vtti-viea-prada-deha-prptir v, tasya tat-sev-karttve tu na prakti-prdhnyam | prvatra tm upamardya cic-chakte prdhnyt | aparatra kaivalyc ca | (Paramtmasandarbha, Sarvasavdin, section 37, [Haridsa 1984: 110])

Moreover, while it is the case that pure [self] has the power of agency,[footnoteRef:3] [1] nevertheless when he is conflated with Brahman the power of agency is internalized because of the non-connection with [the items, e.g. the mind-body complex] that link him with karma, and because of the covering caused by the bliss of Brahman. That much we can agree upon. Furthermore, [2] he[footnoteRef:4] who is possessed of the internal power (cit-akti) in the form of devotion for the Lord, or [3] he[footnoteRef:5] who obtains a [spiritual] body as a companion [of the Lord] that is qualified by a particular aspect of the internal power, they possess agency for the service of that Lord, but it is not predominated by matter. In the first case, he has superseded the [predominance of matter] by the internal power; in the second case he is absolutely free from matter. [3: He has already argued that there is agency in the pure self, and here he is listing three possible ways that this agency can exist.] [4: This is the liberated devotee who still lives in the material world, called a jvanmukta.] [5: This is the liberated devotee, who is living in the eternal realm of Vaikuha.]

KEYNOTE

Given that the tmans inherent qualities only manifest when the tman is connected with the body, Jva Gosvmin and other Gauya Vaiava argue the tman accepts a spiritual body (siddha-deha) in the liberated state. Although rdhara Svmin talks about spiritual bodies in his commentary on Bhgavata Pura 1.6.29, it is not clear he accepts them as a goal to be attained.

3.2 The Reality or Non-Reality of the WorldAlthough there is very little written on rdhara, most see him as denying the reality of the world:

Siddhevara Bhacraya (1950: 28) says of rdharas interpretation of BhP 2.9.33: So rdharas interpretation of the text boils down to this: -As one experiences hallucination of the second moon though there is no second moon, so the world is cognised (through illusion) though it is not actually existent.

Daniel Sheridan (56) paraphrases a passage from rdharas commentary on BhP 1.1.1 as: the three-fold evolution is not real in reality but false (mithy).

Stewart Elkman and Ravi Gupta also note the Advaitic strands in rdhara Svmins interpretation of the Bhgavata Pura.

I would first note that the Advaitin position of the status of the world is contested. Anantananda Rambachan persuasively argues that akaras view is that Brahman is the nimitta and updna kraa of the world, and this contradicts the popular illusionism that is often called Advaita by later commentators, the sort of illusionism reflected in Siddhevara Bhacrayas reading of rdhara Svmin, but also I would assume early commentators like Padmapda, Toaka and Surevara. Rambachan argues, as I discuss more below, that akara never says the world is false, only our cognition of it.

Others, however, have noted that rdhara Svmin differs from Advaita in other ways; ways that Madhva and Vijayatrtha did not need to critique him in their commentaries at certain places (Sharma (2000: 128, 459) and Okita (2014)).

rdhara Svmins Bhvthadpik (1.1.1)KEYNOTE

I will begin by looking at the terms svarpa-lakaa and taastha-lakaa, which appear have been first used by Surevara in his Dakimrtivrttika and Padmapda in his Pacapdik. It does not seem that not akara himself made this distinction. I think it helps Padmapda make my and mithy into ontological categories, something Rambachan and Comas argues akara himself never did.

In the his Pacapdik (5.4.9-11) Padmapda says that the definition of Brahman must first be provided, and only then can other things, like prama, yukti, sdhana and phala can be defined. There is a definition of Brahman is in Brahmastra 1.1.2, janmdy asya yata, from whom this world is born, etc.

Padmapda takes this as akaras definition of Brahman, from whom the world has come (yata) to be the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the world. He calls this definition the svarpalakaa, a definition that expresses the inherent features of Brahman. The svarpalakaa, according to Padmapda, is of two types:

1) upalakaa, indicative definition, which are worldly properties existing separately (from the defiendum, that which is to be defined, lakya). Padmapda writes that these attributive adjuncts of the world stand outside of Brahman and yet denote Brahman by indirect characterization and not by a description of its nature (Rjasevsakta D Benkataramaih, 1948, p.261). In his Dakimrtivrttika or Mnasollsa, Surevara seems to define taasthalakaa in a manner similar to Padmapdas upalakaa: Calling God and self cause and effect is to speak of them in the accidental (taastha) definition, like defining the moon to be on the branch of a tree (Potter, p.555).

2) vieaalakaa, descriptive definitions (Rjasevsakta D Benkataramaih, 1948, p.261).

Padmapda takes the stra from whom this world is born, etc., as an upalakaa, a definition of Brahman that characterizes the attributes of Brahman that stand out side Brahman. It is not a description of Brahman itself. Both Surevara and Padmapda agree that definitions like the well known passage from the Taittirya Upaniad (2.1.2), satya jnam ananta brahma, the ultimate reality is unlimited true awareness or statements like Brahman is saccidnanda are descriptions of Brahman itself.

Does Jva Gosvmin sustain these distinctions? He does not explicitly reject them, but his theology does not distinguish between the Lord and things outside the Lord. Jva Gosvmin writes in his commentary on Bhgavata Pura 2.9.32: the Lord says, that which is this universe, even that is I only. This means that the universe has the nature of me since it is not different from me (Okita p.65). Furthermore, Jva Gosvmin use the term svarpa in a very different way, as the Lords most internal, intimate, and essential nature (svarpa-akti, also called cit-akti, antaraga-akti, uddha-sattva, hldin-akti, and yoga-my). And the term taastha refers not to an indicative definition of Brahman, but the souls (jva) who are manifested from the indwelling Lord (paramtman).

Furthermore, like akara, Jva Gosvmin argues that Bhagavn, a personal, real, qualified God in the form of r Ka is both the updna- and nimitta-kraa. The world is a real transformation (parinma) of Bhagavn, and Jva Gosvmin says parinma does not necessitate vivarta. Jva Gosvmin is committed to a vision of the world that sees it as non-different from Bhagavn.

More puzzling, however is rdhara Svmin use of the term mithy-sarga. Srinivasa Rao and Anant Rambachan have argued convincingly that akara never uses term mithy in a compound with a word for the created world (e.g. sarga, jagat, prapaca, prakti, etc.). Rather, the term mithy is applied to our jna, or our cognition or understanding of objects and the world in general.

In other words, mithy in akaras theology is an epistemological or cognitive descriptor, not an ontological descriptor. Rambachan (Advaita Worldview, p.76) writes:

akara does not describe the world as an illusion, and it is often not remembered that he argued against the subjective idealists who reduce the world to a mere idea of the perceiving individual and who deny the world any existence outside of the mind. rdhara Svmins Advaita sounds more like Toakcrya, who writes in is ruti-sra-samuddharaa (vs. 116):

gagana-pramukha pthiv-cara viayondriya-buddhi-mana sahitam |janimaj-jagad etad abhtam iti rutaya pravadanty upamna-atai || 116

The ruti says, through hundreds of illustrations, that this world that has originated comprising everything from space to earth and including sense-objects, sense-organs, intellect and mind is unreal (abhta) (Comas, p.78).

Against Toaka and rdhara Svmin, I am reminded of the fact that Vivantha, an 18th century Gauya Vaiava, also defines mithy as a cognitive state, one in which a person wrongly connects two things that are in fact not connected Perhaps, then, in this sense the Gauya Vaiava disagree with rdhara Svmin, who is often called an Advaitin, only to find themselves closer to akara.

As seen in the translated text, rdhara Svmins views are ambiguous, partly because he provides different interpretations, some more illusionist than others. Whatever the case, Jva Gosvmin is at odds with rdhara Svmin in this regard.

Jva Gosvmin on the nature of the material world[footnoteRef:6] [6: I want to thank Satyanryaa Bb for pointing me to these passages, and providing a rough translation of them.]

Jva Gosvmin accepts that the world is a transformation (parinma) of the Lords paradoxical (acintya) power (akti), one which is the same as and different from him at the same time. More specifically, the world is a transformation of the Lords my-akti, which is both the nimitta and updana causes of the world. Like other Vedtins Jva Gosvmin would like to show that although the world transforms, the Lord does not, and the analogy he uses is that of a cintmai, or a touchstone and a magnet, both of which are said to create movement and change from a distance without themselves moving or changing. Jva Gosvmin unambiguously differs from rdhara Svmin in that he affirms the reality of the world.

Paramtmasandarbha, section 58 (H 172-3)tasmt paramtma-parima eva stra-siddhnta | [] tatra cpariatasyaiva satocintay tay akty parima ity sau san-mtratvabhsamna-svarpa-vyha-rpa-dravykhya-akti-rpeaiva pariamate na tu svarpeeti gamyate | yathaiva cintmai | atas tan-mlatvn na paramtmopdnat-sampratipatti-bhaga |

Therefore, the conclusion of the scripture is that [the world] is a transformation of the indwelling Lord. [] The transformation is of the real, non-transforming, indwelling Lord by the paradoxical power. Thus he transforms only by his power, which is referred to as a substance, in the form of an extension of his inherent nature, which is manifesting only from true begin (sat), but it should not be understood he transforms by his inherent nature. This is just like a cintmai, a touchstone. Thus, since the [world] has him as its foundation, one need not disregard the view that the indwelling Lord is the material cause [of the universe].

Jva Gosvmin also comments on the notion of adhysa or ropa or superimposition, reflecting directly on the analogy of a mirage that was discussed by rdhara Svmin in BD 1.1.1. He attempts to show, however, that superimposition establishes the reality of the world.

Paramtmasandarbha, section 58 (H p.174, l.6)anyatra siddhasya vastuna evnyatrropo yath uktau rajatasya etad eva mithy-kha-pupder ropsambhavt prva-prva-vivarta-mtra-siddhndi-parampartve dntbhvc ca | kica prva khalu vri-darand vry-kr mano-vttir jtpi tad-aprasaga-samaye supt tihati tat-tulya-vastu-daranena tu jgrti tad-vienusandhna vin tad-abhedena svatantratm ropayati, tasmn na vri mithy, na v smaraa-may tad-kr vttir na v tat-tulya marcikdi vastu kintu tad-abhedenropa evyathrthatvn mithy |

It is only an object that exists elsewhere that is superimposed on something else, like silver on an oyster-shell. There is the impossibility of superimposing a false (mithy) object like a sky-flower, and there is no example of a beginning-less succession of vivarta[footnoteRef:7] one before the other. Furthermore, only on account of seeing water in the past, a form of water is produced as a mental impression; upon being disconnected from it, it is dormant. By seeing an object that is similar to it [water], it is awakened and without properly discerning its characteristics, one willfully (svatantrat) superimposes because of the similarity (abheda) with it. Therefore, water is not false, nor is the mental form of it that has the nature of a memory, nor is the object or the mirage that is similar to it. Rather, there is superimposition because of the similarity (abheda) with it; there is falsity because of the unreality (ayath) of the object. [7: akaras doctrine of vivarta says that the underlying cause is real, but the objects or effects that are made out of the cause are not real. The doctrine is based on Chndogya Upaniad (6.1.4). Comas has argued: The teaching that Brahman is the material cause and that the world is its actual transformation (parima) leads on to the teaching that there is only an apparent transformation (vivarta), once it is clearly understood that the effect of the material cause is not an entity in its own right. (Early method, p.192).]

There are other points of difference: rdhara Svmin says there are 332 chapters in the Bhgavata Pura, Jva Gosvmin says there are 335. rdhara Svmin at times accepts karma that is dispassionately offered to the Lord as a form of Bhakti, Jva Gosvmin does not. rdhara Svmin suggests that Ka is an avatra of Viu, Jva Gosvmin does not.ConclusionLet me now return to the topics of the theologian as parrot, and the relationship of a rdhara Svmin (an Advaitin) and Jva Gosvmin.

Popular as it may be, the parrot conception of the theologian, and/or the notion of an unchanging theology moving from teacher to student over time finds problems at every step, at least in this context. rdhara Svmin is an uncommon Advaitin, one who denies the reality of the world at times (calling it mithy-sarga), against the views of akara. Jva Gosvmin a critic, who we find returning to akara and thus skipping over rdhara Svmin in the sense of re-defining mithy a cognitive state, denying its ontological usage. Although both rdhara Svmin and Jva Gosvmin have their own views about these topics, both are conservationists, carrying them the teachings of the previous teachers, all the while making them their own. They were men steeped in tradition, but men of their own minds. Hindu theology today can accept a similar relationship with the past, one of respect but critical engagement.Bibliography1. Daniel Sheridan. rdhara 1.1.12. Siddhevara Bhacrya. A Critique of the Bhgavata-Pura. 3. Dimock and Stewart, CC4. K5. The Phenomenal Separateness of Self, Chakravathi Ram-Prasad6. HD, PS7. Rambachan, Advaita Worldview8. Halbfass, Philology and Confrontation

1Jonathan B. Edelmann