Critical notes on Dreyfus interpretation of Heidegger. [These notes could seem as critiques of Heidegger philosophy, but they are not. That would be highly irresponsible, however I have to acknowledge the negative opinion of Heidegger works and my reliance on other authors to deal with the more non-reflexive aspects of human activity. These notes are hypothesis and question that Ill use to interrogate Time and Being]IntroductionHeideggers (from now onwards H.) project is highly suspicious of: a. Intentionality and mental (clear) representations that give intelligibility and orient human action (as in Husserl). Consciousness is intention about something. For H. is false to assume that all human activity is preceded by representations of something to which the consciousness is oriented, and that there is an I that have desire, motive or intentions. These could exist, but not necessary are reasons that has an previous actuality to human activity, that could be interpreted as causally efficacious. One thing is mindless coping skills other thing is a clear intentionality. b. If activity (any activity) cannot presupposes intentions or intentional mind. The Cartesian distinction between subject/object is a product of a set of conditions. Heidegger seems inclined to think that sufficient and necessary conditions are some kind of being aware of a breakdown. The breakdown is determined by a background of our (habitual?) everyday practice. This background is the dasein in his restful form. His complexity is so great that, against analytic philosophers as earlier Wittgenstein, Austin or Searle, we cant determine the rules of a particular background or a universal pragmatics. As, we can also know and describe inside of a being-there, the project is not referential, but indexical; not analytical, but hermeneutical. So: H. writes and thinks:AgainstIn Favor of

ExplicitnessShared backgrounds and Implicitness

Mental RepresentationsPractical experiences

Theoretical Holism Practical Being-there holism; structured, but indescribable

Detachment and Objectivity Pragmatical

Methodological Individualism Methodological everydayness, describe only with new words, as our common language only covers what is discursive and mental. New words will sign new dimensions of the phenomena for the reader

Chapter 1: Being Nature of Being H. denies thata. Being is the most universal concept. If this would be true, the beingness as a predicate quality will represent the same in any subject. But the being of numbers, tree or humans is different. Therefore, this general doesnt represent the same, despite the fact that beingness could be found in everything. b. So, if being is not the most general predicative what it is? Is ab empty concept (pure indexicality?), a subject that could be anything or anything, or all in this case? H. says that being is not an entity. Dreyfus doesnt offer a compelling replication of Hs argument. However, Im inclined to think that H. is evading to equal being with Geist, Transcendental Subject, God or any other Archimedean point that is very common in German idealism, as the source of authenticity and freedom (and the explicit or implicit of the normative prepositions). D. would only say that H. dont believe that being is something as entity, a process or an event. These ideas are misleading. Would be possible that being is a becoming? The entity rejection covers becoming? c. what about not-important? A lot of questions are not important, especially in hermeneutic and phenomenology, why discuss the non-controversial? Or why to bring to consciousness what is not problematic? H. says that while is true that is not problematic for our being-there and practical engagement with the world, this experience of understanding of the being is only an obscure experience. As our being-there vaguely understand our being, we should dug it up! D. dont offer why should transform the vague and obscure in clear and illuminated. So how to know the being?!, we cant (at least Im interpreting that) but, H. says that we cant find some intelligibility in the ways of the being, talking about this ways can bring as some hermeneutical clarity (context-bounded, momentary and dialogical) As I tried to say in class, I think that Dasein is inspired by human activity, our common understanding of what dasein is was based on the individual human being. However, as dasein is not about human, but as how humanity exists, Im inclined to think that they are no-coextended. 1. Not all humans embodied dasein in all their forms 2. And even when one does, the dasein is embodied in a relations of things, persons, practices and places organically integrated. A particular embodied dasein talks through the language of the ego or the ego-centered race or nation. But as Geist in Hegel, for me the big secret of dasein is that in the end all is the same dasein. If this is inside or outside of history, I dont know. 3. As dasein is not human individuality, but talks through them, dasein could represent a nation or race.

But What H. says according to D.?a. Dasein is not a conscious subject. Dasein is all the quality of human being, but at the same time a particular human being (p.14). I think that. Dasein is the particular human way of being. Being there. The logic of practice, the socialization, practical consciousness, the feel of the game, etc, etc. So Being We dont know, lets examine why of being to understand something about being Ways of being numbers, trees, humans, unicorns Way of being human Dasein Way of being particular human Also Dasein!, but a Dasein; As Geist, dasein could only be embodied in particulars, not general. The experience of the notion of Dasein (if there is something like that, I think that H. would react negatively to a platonic idea of notion or idea) D. think that we have to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis. Between the Cartesian distinction between a dasein as embodiment of Dasein and to give preeminence to a Dasein over the social practice in which the individual is thrown down. b. dasein is existence, as human as particular dasein can understood something about their existence and their relation to the general quality of Dasein. Here comes reflexivity as self-interpreting (openness or pure negativity). Existence and self-interpreting are co-extensive predicative. This is hermeneutical proposition, no necessary and sufficient conditions here! (15), but he use a kind of transcendental argument: to consciousness to exist, there have to be some kind of existences of human essence. In that way, culture and scientific institution also exist. Studying every day practices of cultures, institutions and individual we can know their particular way of being. So there is the connection from being and everydayness. I think that part of the difference between just being and existence, is that the possibility of self-interpreting also involve the possibility of self-making. The existence is exist as something because is not victim of the changing circumstances of the different ways of being. Achieve some kind of identity to understand itself as entity. Of maybe, it is my emergentism talking. c. dasein always come with some understanding of being and its particularity. Dasein is not only something (ontic) but has a way of being (ontological). I think that other entities, their being as similar to their ways of being. So ontic and ontological are the same, these kind of objects only have an ontic dimension. The different ways of being are mainly cultural, as culture determine the understanding of person, and object and a society. So a particular dasein shapes the first intuitions and obscure preconscious understating of a dasein and Dasein. All rock have the same rockiness, but not human has the same humanness. Being-there is not only the practical engagement with the world, but also is the cultural particular of that practical engagement. So, also shape the obscure understating of the being in the being-there. In anthropologist, daseins (particular/cultural) understating of the being is not a belief system implicit, are embodied (ineffable) principles. H. calls these principles as preontological or pretheoretical understating of the being (19)Scheme of possible investigations: what/who (non-dasein/dasein) + ontic/ontologic (static-roles-positions/dynamic or alternatives-experience-historical subjects) PTUoB makes that something appears as something an actuality of the being We can grasp completely the dasein, as pure immediateness, because we are close, because we are in. This is implies again a background, that is not a belief system, but a skills and practices. As we dwell in the dasein, our understanding of it depends on the dwelling, any analitic statement is bad representation, as there is not set of rules hermeneutic ontology (22)But Dasein is pure dwelling or being-there!? How a dasein can think about their dwelling? Not, as Dasain is a special way of being that has PTUoB: Human beings can interpret themselves in any of these ways and many more, and they can, in varying degrees, become any of these things, but to be human is not to be essentially any of them. Human being is essentially simple self-interpreting (23)The restless dimension of Dasein. Homo sapiens can be characterized by factuality inhereted culture. People, as they exist, they have to interpret themselves as any practical categories available, the possible ways to be determinated by each culture. Dasein can never get clear about its facticity, so it can never get clear of its facticity and interpret things in a radically new way. (25) The most a Dasein can do is raise its consciousness. That is clarify the interpretation in the culture. (24). Man is the result of a cultural interpretation; his culturally defined characteristic constitute his facility. Now we see that precisely because Dasein way of being makes facticity possible, it can never by defined by its facticity. This is the fundamental misunderstanding; people can only know the dasain through the PTUoB particular to their culture, but at the same time, this evidence is fundamentally a misdirection to the particular that makes impossible to know the universal Dasein belong to someone, this is not solipsism, is taking a stand (existential responsibility) Own up Chosen a possibility / never identify themselves in a role/ the groundlessness / manifest in the style of its activity

Disown Got itself into them / choose but fail to achieve the detachment / people who identify with their roles / cover up, its true self interpreting structure

Fail to take stand (Just) grow up in them / passive roles incorporation

Mineness (26) makes a stand against the irrefutable unsettledness There is not sharing in Heidegger, (as in Sartre or Husserl)Chapter 2 : Method

HusserlSpill out / intentional / content /own belief system / indubitable evidence (psychological process epochal?)

Kid H.Letting / something shared/ can never be articulated / there is no evidence

The phenomenon, as something that shows itself, is the necessary condition for all the derivative kind