CRITERIA FOR LEVEL CROSSING REMOVAL RISK EVALUATION AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Email Contact: lluis.ubalde@upc.es CENIT (Centre for Innovation in Transport) –

UPC Technical University of Catalonia (Barcelona, Spain)

Key words cost-benefit effects FMEA rule stakeholders ABSTRACT Nowadays, most railway accidents are due to the existence of level crossings. This fact involves important investments in order to reduce the risk associated to this part of the infrastructure. Despite these efforts, the design of a great deal of current level crossings is still inefficient to avoid road vehicle crashes and especially pedestrian severe accidents, which suppose social, political, economic consequences. Moreover, increased speed process in railways entails incompatibility with safety conditions. For instance, in Spain general rules applied to transport consider that top speed in lines where there are level crossings is about 160 km/h and then upgrading these lines compels undoubtedly level crossing removal campaigns. Therefore, the project of improved safety for road users and pedestrians, and increased speed in railways has to be channelled into risk evaluation using specific methods. One of these is FMEA (“Failure Mode and Effect Analysis”), which is based on calculating probability, severity and detection capability for whatever possible mode of accident. If this method indicated an excessive dangerousness, it would be necessary to remove the level crossing and made a cost-benefit analysis that took into consideration not only the direct effects but also all the stakeholders and effects (including external effects) involved in that case. The aim of this paper consists of describing how to use FMEA method for level crossing evaluation and how to use a complete cost-benefit analysis in order to know how much social profitability a removal campaign supposes.

Luis Ubalde Civil Engineer

Adrina Bachiller Civil Engineer

Carles Casas Civil Engineer

1. INTRODUCTION In general, level crossings constitute currently one of the most dangerous issues of a railways line. Increased traffic and the fact that nowadays train speed is very higher than in the past (when most of the existing level crossings were designed) have led to promote level crossing removal campaigns or even to change regulations in order to avoid level crossings under certain circumstances. Modern trains are also more silent, which supposes extreme risk for pedestrians. Their decision of crossing is usually based not on looking at the track but on listening to any sound from a train. In case the engine driver does not use properly the claxon of the machine, presence of the train is not perceived in time by pedestrians. This situation is extremely important in stations or in level crossings with a relevant pedestrian traffic (typical case in urban areas). In this context, it is very important to analyse separately risks for road traffic and risks for pedestrians. Unfortunately, there are great deals of level crossings that have been designed exclusively for vehicles but both vehicles and pedestrians use them. Certainly, an accurate risk analysis can detect these cases, allowing defining solutions for minimizing dangerousness. Another case that deserves special attention is level crossing between platforms. Very often they are not signalized adequately. A specific risk analysis is required, considering not only ideal passengers in optimum form but also passengers with reduced mobility. Sometimes, an unfenced line involves uncontrolled level crossings along the track, especially near stations. Pedestrians like accessing to the station following the shortest way, which could be a very risky access if it is not signalised adequately. Most pedestrians are not conscious of the fact that trains are very silent nowadays and generate an air turbulence pulling to themselves, when circulating fast. Under these circumstances, legal rules are more and more strict, insisting on improved protection measures. However, regarding some aspects, on one hand, these rules are not enough in order to guarantee safety conditions and, on the other hand, reality is very different from what legal documents state.

2. CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION AND LEVEL CROSSING STATISTICS IN SPAIN 2.1. Statistics of accidents Despite the downward trend of the last decade, as you can see in figure 1, deaths associated to level crossings are not negligible in Spain. Rate between deaths and accidents is relatively high (63% on average) in comparison with accidents of different nature.

STATISTICS OF LEVEL CROSSING ACCIDENTS

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999

Year

AccidentsDeathsInjured people

Figure 1.- Statistics of level crossing accidents in Spain, including national broad gauge network (RENFE) and national narrow gauge network (FEVE). Source: Spanish Government – Ministerio de Fomento

(Ministry responsible for public works), 2001 [1]. 2.2. Level crossing rules and classification Level crossing removal projects are often associated to application of transport rules. These rules consider three general aspects to make a decision about elimination or improved protections: railway speed, traffic momentum and visibility at the level crossing (table 1).

Table 1.- Aspects about level crossing elimination or improved

protections considered in Spanish transport rules. Source: CENIT (2004).

Speed In high speed lines or even in lines where top speed is higher than 160 km/h, level crossings are not allowed.

Traffic momentum (A·T)

Daily average number of road vehicles (A) x Daily average number of

trains (T)

Technical visibility: Dt: technical visibility distance of level crossing (m)

Vm: maximum speed of railway (km/h) N: number of tracks

( )0,5mt N6,25·1,1·VD +=

Visibility (rate between

technical visibility and real

visibility)

Real visibility:

According to a rule stated in 2001 by the Ministerio de Fomento (Spanish Ministry responsible for public works) new level crossings are not allowed and existing ones have to be removed when railway top speed is equal to or higher than 160 km/h or when traffic momentum (defined in table 1) is equal to or higher than 1500 [2]. This rule substitutes another one stated in 1990, which determined as limits 160 km/h and 24000 respectively [3]. When a level crossing is possible, protection system (signalling, crossing gates) has to be adequate for characteristics of road traffic and railway traffic. In tables 2 and 3 you can see specifications of the above rule of 2001.

5 mDr: real visibility (you have to consider

the shortest one of the four possible visibilities)

Table 2.- Classification of level crossings according Spanish regulations (2001) depending on protection system. Source: CENIT (2004).

Railway Road Type of

level crossing

Whistle poster Traffic lights Crossing

keeper Vertical

fixed signalling

Standard traffic lights

Horizontal fixed

signalling

Traffic lights (2 red

intermittent lights)

Acoustic signalling

Complete or partial

crossing gates

A Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No B Yes* Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Optional No C Yes* Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Optional Yes D Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No No E Yes* No Yes Yes No Yes Optional Optional Yes F Yes No No Yes Optional No No No No

* Whistle posters can be removed if there is acoustic signalling.

Table 3.- Classification of level crossings according Spanish regulations (2001) depending on traffic characteristics. Source: CENIT (2004).

Type of level crossing Brief description Location Traffic characteristics

Out of stations Vm < 160 km/h, A·T < 1000, real visibility > technical visibility A Fixed signalling

At stations Provisional

Vm < 160 km/h, 1000 < A·T < 1500, A < 100 Out of stations

Vm < 160 km/h, A·T < 1000, A >100 B Traffic lights and fixed signalling

At stations No

Out of stations Vm < 160 km/h, 1000 < A·T <1500, A > 100 C Crossing gates, traffic lights

and fixed signalling At stations Vm < 160 km/h, but level crossing for pedestrians and livestock or private level crossings

Out of stations Vm < 40 km/h, 1000 < A·T < 1500 D

Train only can run if it has permission given by railway personnel At stations Vm < 40 km/h, 1000 < A·T < 1500

E Crossing gates and railway personnel at level crossing Provisional

F Level crossing for pedestrians and livestock

As you can see in figure 2, the most dangerous level crossings (non-protected) are the most common in Spain (data of 2001). Apart of this fact, real situation worsens, if traffic is evaluated. Effectively, as figure 3 shows, there were 79 level crossings that had to be removed (in 2001 in RENFE network). They were not according with stated by the above rule of 1990. If you consider criteria of the current rule, which was approved in 2001, level crossings that had to be removed increase extremely.

LEVEL CROSSING CLASSIFICATION (2001)

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

Total Protected (crossing gatesor traffic lights)

Non-protected (only fixedsignalling)

Private level crossing

FEVERENFE

Figure 2.- Level crossing classification in Spain, including national broad

gauge network (RENFE) and national narrow gauge network (FEVE). Source: Spanish Government – Ministerio de Fomento

(Ministry responsible for public works), 2001 [1]. It is very important to take into consideration the fact that counter measures in order to reduce risk involve a substantial investment and indubitable require a certain period of time. As figure 4 indicates, investment per year in level crossings in Spain during the last decade has been higher than € 20 million but years 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1995. This investment has allowed removing about 1500 level crossings in Spain between 1990 and 2000, equivalent to an average annual value of 132 (figure 5). This process has been channelled into the accident tendency depicted in figure 1.

LEVEL CROSSINGS IN SPAIN THAT HAD TO BE REMOVED (2001)

79

793

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

Traffic momentum > 24000 Traffic momentum > 1500

Figure 3.- Statistics of level crossings in Spain that did not observe criteria stated in government rules, including only national broad gauge

network (RENFE). Source: Spanish Government – Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry responsible for public works), 2001 [1].

LEVEL CROSSING INVESTMENT

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

x100

0 €

Removal by Government Removal by RENFE or FEVE Signalling investment by RENFE or FEVE

Figure 4.- Level crossing investment in Spain, including national broad gauge network (RENFE) and national narrow gauge network (FEVE).

Source: Spanish Government – Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry responsible for public works), 2001 [1].

LEVEL CROSSING REMOVAL TENDENCY

151

191

113

62

144

9994

202

131

125

142

0

50

100

150

200

250

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Figure 5.- Level crossing removal tendency in Spain, including national

broad gauge network (RENFE) and national narrow gauge network (FEVE). Source: Spanish Government – Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry responsible for

public works), 2001 [1]. 3. ANALYSIS OF RISK 3.1. Approaching the issue Up to a point, above criteria for level crossing removal, based exclusively on train speed and traffic momentum, are very simple. Real problems need a more complex analysis in order to minimize risk effectively. One of the most relevant deficiencies of rules is inconsiderateness of pedestrians and cyclists. In this aspect, experience leads to the following items:

Common crossing gates (consisting of barriers that take up the whole road or just one half) are useless for preventing pedestrians or cyclists from crossing when train is coming.

In level crossings there is no specific area (lane) in the road for pedestrians and cyclist when there is not alternative way (flyover or underpass), even if there are pavements in the road or street accessing to the level crossing.

In most cases, there is no signalling specific (traffic lights, vertical fixed signalling) for pedestrians and cyclists.

Alternative ways (flyovers or underpasses) are not well designed for pedestrians and cyclists, who usually use the way that entails less energy and offers a satisfactory visibility in order to avoid criminal actions.

In a lot of stations there is no alternative way for level crossing between platforms.

Level crossings are not well designed for handicapped people. In order to illustrate this subject, three representative examples of RENFE network level crossings are analysed. All of them are type C, corresponding to the most complete protection system (crossing gates, traffic lights, etc.), and have high pedestrian traffic, as a consequence of being placed at urban area. First example is level crossing in Sant Feliu de Llobregat (village near Barcelona). As you can see in figure 6, there is a flyover for pedestrians, which is not used by anybody. Pedestrians prefer to cross where vehicles run and, although barriers are down, they cross just only checking by themselves if the train is coming. Handicapped people have important problems assuming very relevant risks when crossing. This level crossing is besides the station. In fact, there is pavement that connects it to the platforms of the station (figure 7). Despite prohibition of walking along this pavement, some people use this way because, on one hand, it is shorter than way to the station building and, on the other, they avoid paying ticket.

Figure 6.- Level crossing and flyover in Sant Feliu de Llobregat (village

near Barcelona) – RENFE network. Source: CENIT (2004).

Flyover

Figure 7.- Level crossing seen from station of Sant Feliu de Llobregat

(village near Barcelona) – RENFE network. Source: CENIT (2004).

Second example is in El Prat de Llobregat, which is also a village in the surroundings of Barcelona. This level crossing is near the station and is characterized by high railway traffic (358 passenger trains per day in peak day and from 20 to 30 freight trains on average), stopping at the station only 170 trains. This supposes a great deal of trains running fast and having the crossing gates closed during substantial periods of time, including night timetable. There is an underpass for pedestrians but using it is not recommendable (figure 8).

Figure 8.- Level crossing and underpass in El Prat de Llobregat (village

near Barcelona) – RENFE network. Source: CENIT (2004). The last example is a level crossing in a tourist town near Tarragona. In this case there is no alternative way for pedestrians; the only measure for them is

Level crossing Illegal access to the station

Illegal access to the station

Underpass

specific traffic lights attached with the road ones. As you can see in figure 9, vehicles and pedestrians share dangerously the same area.

Figure 9.- Level crossing in Salou (village near Tarragona) – RENFE

network. Source: UPC (2000). 3.2. Methodology According to experience, applying FMEA brainstorming, design of level crossing should consider factors listed in table 4. Table 4.- Some factors that should be considered in a safety assessment

of a level crossing. Source: CENIT (2004).

Railway

Speed Number of trains per day Turnouts at level crossing Location near stations Signalling

Vehicles

Speed Number of vehicles per day Classification of vehicles Signalling (for vehicles & for pedestrians)

Road

Pedestrians Traffic Handicapped people access

Crossing Geometry

Visibility Protection system Alternative ways for pedestrians Number of tracks Number of road lanes Road layout Track layout Nearby intersections Background distractions

Traffic lights for pedestrians

Based on the above table, general classification of level crossing would be that one stated in table 5.

Table 5.- Classification of level crossings considering their protection

system. Source: CENIT (2004). Type of level crossing I II III IV V

Adequate visibility conditions -- -- -- Yes No

Road fixed signalling Yes Yes Yes Yes No

Acoustic signalling Yes Yes Yes Yes No

Road traffic lights Yes Yes Yes No No

Crossing gates Yes Yes No No No

Fenced surroundings Yes Yes No No No

Alternative way for only pedestrians and cyclists* Yes No No No No

*Adequate, comfortable, safety way FMEA application involves evaluating three issues in order to get a representative risk factor (K):

Probability of failure i (Ai) Detection facilities (Bi) Severity of failure consequences (Ci)

Level Crossing Failure analysis (LECROF analysis) proposed by CENIT, Center for Innovation in Transport, of the Technical University of Catalonia at Barcelona (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya), Spain, assigns probability associated to accident risks (death, severe injured, slightly injured, railway rolling stock material damages, road rolling stock material damages and infrastructure material damages) to each type depicted in table 5. On the other hand, for each type of level crossing, probability of protection system failure has to be evaluated. If there is a failure, then category of level crossing changes to a higher number. For calculating factor Ai, a failure risk tree should be designed. If we define Xi

I, Xi

II, XiIII, Xi

IV and Xiv as the probability of accident associated to risk i in level

crossing type I, II, III, IV or V respectively, and Yjk the probability of protection

system failure that transforms a level crossing type k into type j, being k, j =I÷V, k<j, factor Ai can be deduced from the schema depicted in figure 10 (example applied to a level crossing type III). Xi only includes probability of accident when level crossing works properly.

( ) IIIV

Vi

IVV

IIIIV

Vi

IIIIV

IVV

IVi

V

IVj

IIIj

IIIii YX·Y·YX·YY1·XY1·XA ++−+⎟⎟

⎠

⎞⎜⎜⎝

⎛−= ∑

=

Figure 10.- Calculation of factor Ai for level crossing type III – LECROF

analysis. Source: CENIT (2004). Values of factor Bi are lower than 1 if risk can be easily detected and values of factor Ci are weights related to global cost, including externalities. Then, if AT is traffic momentum:

∑=i Risks

iii ·C·BA·K AT

Certainly, calculation could be more precise if traffic momentum is considered when determining values of Ai, Bi and Ci independently. 4. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS In order to determine priorities among level crossing removal projects, besides factor K defined above (exclusively related to risk), it is essential to quantify in terms of money all effects generated by the project affecting all stakeholders. This is necessary not only in order to assign priority among level crossing

Level crossing type III

Level crossing type IV

Level crossing type V

Level crossing type III

Level crossing type IV

Level crossing type V Traffic lights and

signalling failure

Traffic lights failure

Signalling failure

⎟⎟⎠

⎞⎜⎜⎝

⎛− ∑

=

V

IVj

IIIj

IIIi Y1·X

No failure

No failure

( ) IIIIV

IVV

IVi ·YY1·X −

IVV

IIIIV

Vi ·Y·YX

IIIV

Vi ·YX

removal projects but also to appraise projects of different nature or even projects in different countries, which is especially interesting for finance institutions. In this context, CENIT has developed a new complete methodology for railway investment project appraisal (RITA Guidelines) [4], during 2003, under contract with the European Community and the guidance of the European Investment Bank. The RITA Guidelines (Guidelines for Railway Investment projecT Appraisal) define the methodology for evaluating railway investment projects, using both socio-economic and financial analysis for all concerned stakeholders (“consumers” and “producers”) considering all perceived effects. These Guidelines are based on the socio-economic cost benefit analysis stated in TINA (October 1999) [5] and constitute a follow-up complementary study specialized in railway projects. This document has been conceived as guidelines but not as a manual, which constitutes a possible further step. Its application is focused on railway projects but general methodology could be adapted to other transport modes inserting adequate specifications. Schema of this methodology is different from TINA schema. In effect, whilst TINA studies in detail assessment of project viability, RITA intends to compare mutually exclusive alternatives and to determine how a project ranks in relation to other available projects competing for the same funds. RITA is also focused in railway project considering different case studies, including level crossing removal. The most important aim chased in this document is the harmonization among criteria, methodology and values used in current evaluations from each country assuring comparability among different railways projects and their alternatives. Nowadays there are significant differences which involve an extremely difficult comparison or priorization when taking into consideration several projects or some alternatives for the same project. Specific “railway sector” issues are incorporated in this framework that clarifies the procedures for financial and socio-economic analysis of investments in the railway sector. The Guidelines take into account its changing conditions under EU transport policy, such as the segregation of infrastructure from operation or interoperability requirements, which are quickly changing the scenarios and require to pay particular attention to factors that are becoming increasingly relevant in investment decisions (multiple service providers, increased network and border effects, social and environmental costs, etc.). The Guidelines also

address the decision making process in the railway sector by attempting to make explicit those variables that could help systematize the process. In contrast with other methodologies, RITA Guidelines intends to be a simple, complete (Multicriteria and Cost-Benefit Analysis), very clear tool for helping decision makers, giving them not only a global final result but also intermediate ones that describe the evaluation process and each relationship among effects and stakeholders separately. By this way, special interests of stakeholders to promote or not a project could be identified objectively. Cost-Benefit and Multicriteria Analysis is coordinated by matrixes (“Incidence Matrixes”) where stakeholders are columns and effects are rows. Each cell represents the importance of the relationship between a specific effect upon a specific stakeholder. From one hand, there are matrixes where financial values are studied and transfers among stakeholders are shown explicitly. On the other hand, matrixes for socio-economic analysis express in terms of money qualitative concepts (for instance standard of living or users comfort), taking into consideration unitary values with a general application. These values do not entail a study in detail but an approach to the importance of the involved issues. RITA methodology allows you to revise and update easily unit values in order to get adequate results under different hypothesis. Both financial analysis and socio-economic analysis lead to global net present value for each cell of the Incidence Matrix, what is the same, for each relationship between effects and stakeholders. The consideration of all cells of the matrix allows you to get a representative total value, useful to compare different projects or different alternatives. Apart from NPV, other ratios are proposed in order to get relevant information in this way, especially regarding the magnitude of the investment. Incidence Matrixes have been designed in order to ensure that each relevant effect is considered and it is considered only one time, implying one or more than one stakeholders but avoiding double counting. To fill up the cells of the matrixes, it is necessary to define several common general aspects. Until now, you can appreciate a great deal of differences among parameters considered in different countries, including financial parameters like discount rate. Most of these parameters are defined according to the TINA Guidelines but some of them are defined specifically from the railways angle.

Successful application of RITA methodology depends on the adequate traffic forecasting and the chosen demand models. Incidence Matrixes work with hypothetical values of traffic and calculate surpluses using them. Otherwise, it is important to underline the necessity of defining properly alternatives: not only the proposed one (level crossing removal) and the alternative corresponding to maintain the current situation with a minimum investment (“do-minimum alternative”), but also intermediate alternatives that let you know whether the magnitude of the investment is justified or not. For instance, for a secondary street or a local path, alternative consisting of a deviation from the initial layout to another street or main road that crosses the railway line over a bridge, has to be considered when appraising. 5. CONCLUSIONS Dangerousness at level crossings has to be studied adequately using FMEA methodology considering all risks and all stakeholders. Using these principles, LECROF analysis, proposed by CENIT, classifies level crossings and calculates a risk factor that could be useful to motivate removal campaigns. This factor could take part in a multicriteria analysis or even in a global socio-economic, financial railway project appraisal (RITA Guidelines). Government rules should be based on this and focus in detail on pedestrian requirements. Until now, these rules have defined specifications of level crossings according only to railway traffic and road traffic, which is not enough, especially in urban areas. 6. REFERENCES [1] Álvarez-Cascos, F. (2001). Comparecencia ante la Comisión de Infraestructuras sobre la seguridad en los pasos a nivel de la red ferroviaria española. Ministerio de Fomento. Madrid (Spain). [2] Real Decreto 1211/1990 de 28 de septiembre (Spanish Regulation). [3] Orden de 2 de agosto de 2001 (Spanish Regulation). [4] CENIT (2004). Guidelines for Railway Investment Project Appraisal (RITA Guidelines). Barcelona (Spain). [5] University of Leeds (1999). Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA): Socio-Economic Cost Benefit Analysis.