Criteria Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and Inherent Characteristics

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Criteria Criteria Criteria Criteria 1.2.11.2.11.2.11.2.1

I&C and Inherent CharacteristicsI&C and Inherent CharacteristicsI&C and Inherent CharacteristicsI&C and Inherent Characteristics

IAEA INPRO DF-7

Vienna, November 19-22, 2013

Jong Tae Seo

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1. INPRO Criteria 1.2.1

2. APR1400 I&C Design

Characteristics

3. INPRO Evaluation

• EP 1.2.1.1 Continuous Monitoring of

Plant Health

• EP 1.2.1.2 Dynamic Plant Analysis

4. Summary

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User Requirements and Criteria

INPRO Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and Inherent

Characteristics

Basic PrincipleBasic PrincipleBasic PrincipleBasic Principle BPBPBPBP1 1 1 1 (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced defencedefencedefencedefence----inininin----depth as a part of their depth as a part of their depth as a part of their depth as a part of their fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in defencedefencedefencedefence----inininin----depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.

User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR) Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)

URURURUR1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 (Detection and (Detection and (Detection and (Detection and interception):interception):interception):interception):Installations of an INS Installations of an INS Installations of an INS Installations of an INS should detect and should detect and should detect and should detect and intercept deviations from intercept deviations from intercept deviations from intercept deviations from normal operational states normal operational states normal operational states normal operational states in order to prevent in order to prevent in order to prevent in order to prevent anticipated operational anticipated operational anticipated operational anticipated operational occurrences fromoccurrences fromoccurrences fromoccurrences fromescalating to accidentescalating to accidentescalating to accidentescalating to accidentconditions.conditions.conditions.conditions.

Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN) Acceptance Limits (AL)Acceptance Limits (AL)Acceptance Limits (AL)Acceptance Limits (AL)

CRCRCRCR1.2.1 1.2.1 1.2.1 1.2.1 I&C and inherent characteristicsI&C and inherent characteristicsI&C and inherent characteristicsI&C and inherent characteristics

ININININ1.2.11.2.11.2.11.2.1: Capability of: Capability of: Capability of: Capability ofcontrol and control and control and control and instrumentation systeminstrumentation systeminstrumentation systeminstrumentation systemand/or inherent and/or inherent and/or inherent and/or inherent characteristics to detect characteristics to detect characteristics to detect characteristics to detect and intercept and/or and intercept and/or and intercept and/or and intercept and/or compensate deviations compensate deviations compensate deviations compensate deviations from normal operational from normal operational from normal operational from normal operational states.states.states.states.

ALALALAL1.2.11.2.11.2.11.2.1: Key system: Key system: Key system: Key systemvariables relevant to variables relevant to variables relevant to variables relevant to safety (e.g., flow, safety (e.g., flow, safety (e.g., flow, safety (e.g., flow, pressure, temperature, pressure, temperature, pressure, temperature, pressure, temperature, radiation levels) do not radiation levels) do not radiation levels) do not radiation levels) do not exceed limits acceptable exceed limits acceptable exceed limits acceptable exceed limits acceptable for continued operation for continued operation for continued operation for continued operation (no event reporting (no event reporting (no event reporting (no event reporting necessary).necessary).necessary).necessary).

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Defense-in-Depth


Characteristics

DID

LevelINSAG ObjectivesINSAG ObjectivesINSAG ObjectivesINSAG Objectives Innovation Direction (INPRO)Innovation Direction (INPRO)Innovation Direction (INPRO)Innovation Direction (INPRO)

1111

Prevention of Prevention of Prevention of Prevention of abnormalabnormalabnormalabnormaloccurrences andoccurrences andoccurrences andoccurrences andaccidentsaccidentsaccidentsaccidents

Enhance prevention by increased emphasis onEnhance prevention by increased emphasis onEnhance prevention by increased emphasis onEnhance prevention by increased emphasis oninherently safe design characteristics and passiveinherently safe design characteristics and passiveinherently safe design characteristics and passiveinherently safe design characteristics and passivesafety features, and by further reducing humansafety features, and by further reducing humansafety features, and by further reducing humansafety features, and by further reducing humanactions in the routine operation of the plant.actions in the routine operation of the plant.actions in the routine operation of the plant.actions in the routine operation of the plant.

2222

Control of abnormalControl of abnormalControl of abnormalControl of abnormaloperation and operation and operation and operation and detection of failuresdetection of failuresdetection of failuresdetection of failures

Give priority to advanced control and monitoringGive priority to advanced control and monitoringGive priority to advanced control and monitoringGive priority to advanced control and monitoringsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andsystems with enhanced reliability, intelligence andthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormalthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormalthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormalthe ability to anticipate and compensate abnormaltransients.transients.transients.transients.

3333Control of Control of Control of Control of accidents within the accidents within the accidents within the accidents within the design basisdesign basisdesign basisdesign basis

Achieve fundamental safety functions byAchieve fundamental safety functions byAchieve fundamental safety functions byAchieve fundamental safety functions byoptimized combination of active & passive designoptimized combination of active & passive designoptimized combination of active & passive designoptimized combination of active & passive designFeatures.Features.Features.Features.

4444

Control of severe Control of severe Control of severe Control of severe plant conditionsplant conditionsplant conditionsplant conditions

Increase reliability and capability of systems toIncrease reliability and capability of systems toIncrease reliability and capability of systems toIncrease reliability and capability of systems tocontrol and monitor complex accident sequences;control and monitor complex accident sequences;control and monitor complex accident sequences;control and monitor complex accident sequences;decrease expected frequency of severe plantdecrease expected frequency of severe plantdecrease expected frequency of severe plantdecrease expected frequency of severe plantConditions.Conditions.Conditions.Conditions.

5555Mitigation ofMitigation ofMitigation ofMitigation ofradiologicalradiologicalradiologicalradiologicalconsequencesconsequencesconsequencesconsequences

Avoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationAvoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationAvoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationAvoid the necessity for evacuation or relocationmeasures outside the plant site.measures outside the plant site.measures outside the plant site.measures outside the plant site.

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Evaluation Parameters and Acceptability


Characteristics

� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.1: Continuous monitoring of

the plant health

� Acceptability of EP1.2.1.1: Evidence is available to the

INPRO assessor that the INS design includes systems

for continuous monitoring of plant health and

computerized aids for the operators.

� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.2: dynamic plant analysis


INPRO assessor that a deterministic and probabilistic

plant analysis has been performed for the INS and the

results confirm that key system variables relevant to

safety do not exceed limits acceptable for continued

operation and do not result in any short term

consequences affecting normal operation.

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APR1400 I&C Design Characteristics

Systems

Compact

Workstation

PLC(WEC)

PLC(WEC)

Spec200 AFS100/ECS1200(HFC)

Ulchin 5,6Mark V

(GE)Hybrid

Mark V(GE)

Wolsong 1,2,3,4Relay Logic

(AECL)Relay Logic

(AECL)Analog/PDC

(AECL)

DCC X/Y(Computers

Control)

Analog/Relay(AECL)

Hybrid

Relay Logic(ABB-CE)

Relay Logic(ABB-CE)

Spec200m/PLC(Foxboro)(Omron)

PCS(Eaton)

Mark V(GE)

Ulchin 3,4

YGN 5,6Hybrid

Relay Logic(ABB-CE)

Relay Logic(ABB-CE)

Spec200(Foxboro) Spec200m

(Foxboro)

ILS(Forney)

Mark V(GE)

YGN 3,4 Conventional

SSPSRelay Logic

(WEC)

SSPSRelay Logic

(WEC)

7300Analog

7300Analog

7300Analog

Mark V(GE)

Kori 2,3,4

YGN 1,2Conventional

Relay Logic(WEC)

Relay Logic(WEC)

Spec200Spec200m(Foxboro)



DCSKori 1

(Upgrade) Conventional

Kori 1Relay Logic

(WEC)Relay Logic

(WEC)Foxboro

H-lineFoxboro

H-lineFoxboro

H-lineDCS Conventional

Reactor TripSystem

ESFASSystems

ProtectionProcess

NSSSControl

PCS TBN Control Main Control

Shin Kori 1,2

Shin Wolsong 1,2Hybrid

Shin Kori 3,4

(APR1400)

Compact

Workstation

Plants

(Foxboro)

PLC

(WEC)

PLC

(WEC)

PLC

(WEC)

PLC

(WEC)

Spec200

(Foxboro)

PLC

(WEC)

Spec200(Foxboro)

PLC

(Omron)

PLC

(Omron)

Spec200

DCS

(WEC)

HFC6000

(HFC)

DCS

(WEC)

Mark VI

(GE)

Mark VI

(GE)

Shin Ulchin 1,2

(APR1400)

PLC

(DOOSAN)PLC

(DOOSAN)PLC

(DOOSAN)

DCS

(DOOSAN)

DCS

(DOOSAN)Mark VI

(GE)

I&C Platform History

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I&C System Overview of APR1400

ProgramServer

GatewayServer

Control & Monitoring Network

QIAS-N(C, D)

Non-safety Components

(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)

FIDAS NIMSALMSIVMSLPMS

RCPVMS

P-CCSBOP

Controls

NPCSPP&LCSFWCSSBCS

DPS PCSRRS

RPCSDRCS

Remote I/O

ICI Sensors

ENFMSStartup/Control

Safety

Fission

Chamber

Data LinkServer

Dedicated H/W switches

ESFASInitiation

RTInitiation

MinimumInventory

DMASwitches

DISQIAS-P

PPS/CPCS OM QIAS-N

Operator Console

Safety Console Large Display Panel

Protection System

PPS(4 Ch)

ESF-

CCS(4 Ch)

QIAS-P(A, B)

CPCS(4 Ch)

Safety Components

(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)

Channelized Safety Bus

MTP ITP

CIM

AlarmServer

DBServer

APC-S : Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety, CIM : Component Interface Module, CPCS : Core Protection Calculator System, DIS : Diverse Indication System,

DMA : Diverse Manual ESF Actuation, DRCS : Digital Rod Control System, ENFMS : Ex-core Neutron Flux Monitoring System, FIDAS : Fixed In-core Detector

Amplifier System, ICI : In-Core Instrumentation, NIMS : NSSS Integrity Monitoring System, NPCS : NSSS Process Control System, OM : Operator Module,

P-CCS : Process Component Control System, PCS : Power Control System, QIAS-P/N : Qualified Indication & Alarm System - PAMI / Non-safety

APC-S(4 Ch)

DIS

Safety

Soft ControlNon-safety

Soft ControlCh. Confirm

Switches

Control & Monitoring

System

APC-S

Common platform for Safety I&C

Common platform for Non-safety I&C

Dedicated equipment for its function

Computer server, monitor & peripherals

Conventional H/W components

Legend

Safety related network

Non-safety network

Hardwired Connection

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I&C Platform HistoryMain Control Room

Large Display Panel

Safety

Console

Compact Operator Console

EO : Electrical Operator, SS: Shift Supervisor, STA: Shift Technical Advisor, RO : Reactor Operator, TO: Turbine Operator

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� Microprocessor based digital I&C technology

- common PLC platform for safety I&C

- common DCS platform for non-safety I&C

� Four (4) channel redundancy for safety I&C

- installed in separate channelized I&C equipment room.

� Multiplexed I/O and redundant communication network

- from field areas to I&C equipment rooms and MCR

� Diverse Actuation System to cope with the CMF of safety I&C

� Complete electrical, physical and communication isolation

− between redundant safety channels

− between safety system and non-safety system

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� Protection System

– Plant Protection System (PPS)

– Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS)

– Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS)

– Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety (APC-S)

� Diverse Actuation System

– Diverse Protection System (DPS)

– Diverse Indication System (DIS)

– Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Control Switches (DMA switches)

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� Control & Monitoring System

– Power Control System (PCS)

– NSSS Process Control System (NPCS)

– Process-Component Control System (P-CCS)

– Qualified Indication and Alarm System (QIAS) – PAMI

– Qualified Indication and Alarm System (QIAS) – Non-safety

– Neutron Flux Monitoring System (ENFMS / FIDAS)

– NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (ALMS / IVMS / LPMS / RCPVMS)

– T/G Control & Monitoring System

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NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (NIMS)

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NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (NIMS)

Items OPR1000 APR1400

H/W � PC: Alarm Unit, LPAP, DAD � AlphaServer: LPMS-AC � STD Bus: LPMS-AU

� Industrial PC (All Alarm Unit & NOS)

OS & S/W

� MS-DOS: LPMS-AU � Win-98: LPAP � Win-XP: RCPVMS/ALMS-AU,

NOS/IVMS Computer � OpenVMS: LPMS-AC

� OS : Windows � Application : NI LabVIEWTM

based S/W

Remote Control

All subsystem excluding LPMS All subsystems

Cabinet � 2 Cabinets : AUC & ACC

� AUC : MCR � ACC : Computer Room

� 1 Cabinet : AUC (I&C E.R) � 1 Console : ACC (Computer

Room)

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Plant Control System

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Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA)

Win-NPA(Windows-based Nuclear Plant Analyzer)Windows based desk-top engineering simulator

Engineering/training tool for operators/designers

CharacteristicsReal-time, best-estimate simulation for NPP

Accurate, easy-to-use & easy-to-understand analysis tool

Dedicated tools for development & customization

Supports external interfaces (DB, I&C devices)

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RCS Mimic

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Secon-dary

Mimic

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Plots

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INPRO Evaluation

Continuous Monitoring of Plant Health

� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.1: Continuous monitoring of

the plant health


INPRO assessor that the INS design includes systems

for continuous monitoring of plant health and

computerized aids for the operators.

� APR1400 Design has advanced Plant Health Monitoring

Capability over OPR1000 :

� Full computerized I&C System

� Improved NSSS Integrity Monitoring System

� Other computerized plant monitoring systems are

available

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INPRO Evaluation

� Evaluation parameter EP1.2.1.2: dynamic plant analysis


INPRO assessor that a deterministic and probabilistic

plant analysis has been performed for the INS and the

results confirm that key system variables relevant to

safety do not exceed limits acceptable for continued

operation and do not result in any short term

consequences affecting normal operation.

� APR1400 utilized advanced Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA) for

dynamic plant analysis

� Real-time, best-estimate simulation for NPP transients

under normal, abnormal and accident conditions

� Accurately model plant control systems to simulate

abnormal operation conditions

Dynamic Plant Analysis

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Load Rejection to House Load

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

SG

1 N

R L

evel, %

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

EF

WC

V 1

Po

sitio

n D

em

an

d, %

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

20

40

60

80

100

FW

1 F

low

DP

, %

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

20

40

60

80

100

SG

1 S

team

Flo

w D

P, %

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

INPRO Evaluation

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Loss of a main Feedwater Pump

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

SG

1 N

R L

eve

l, %

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

EF

WC

V 1

Po

sitio

n D

em

an

d, %

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

20

40

60

80

100

SG

1 S

team

Flo

w D

P,

%

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0

20

40

60

80

100

FW

1 F

low

DP

, %

Time, seconds

Win-NPA

Win-NPA+H/W

INPRO Evaluation

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Summary

� APR1400 I&C utilize full-digital technology and is designed

to detect and intercept deviations from normal operational

states

� Integrated plant monitoring system and control systems

prevents unnecessary safety system actuations

� Dynamic simulation tool was utilized to verify APR1400

design capabilities

� For a full loss of load and loss of a main feedwater pump

events, all safety related variables can be controlled within the

limit allowing a continued operation with event reporting

� Therefore, APR1400 Design satisfies Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and

Inherent Characteristics

24

Initial Pre-application Meeting

Criteria Criteria 1.2.1 I&C and Inherent Characteristics

Documents

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