Criminal Procedure Acquittal; appeal. In this jurisdiction, after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Abelardo P. Panlaqui, et al., G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010.

Acquittal; denial of due process. The instant case involves an alleged error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner has not convincingly shown that the prosecution has indeed been deprived of due process of law. There is no showing that the trial court hampered the prosecution’s presentation of evidence in any way. On the contrary, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its ten witnesses and all necessary documentary evidence. The case was only submitted for decision after the parties had duly rested their case. Respondent trial court clearly stated in its decision which pieces of evidence led it to its conclusion that the project was actually undertaken, justifying payment to the contractor. Clearly, petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial resulting in denial of due process. People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Abelardo P. Panlaqui, et al., G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010.

Appeal; failure to file appellant’s brief. Under Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, a criminal case may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the prescribed time. The phrase “with notice to the appellant” means that a notice must first be furnished the appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. The purpose of such a notice is to give an appellant the opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed because of such failure, in order that the appellate court may determine whether or not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory. Gregorio Dimarucot y Garcia vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975, September 20, 2010.Appeal; failure to file appellant’s brief. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice requiring him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief. Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions granted to him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of appeal by the appellate court sans notice to the accused for failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file his brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion after considering said reasons, the dismissal was held proper. Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but the appellant took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his appeal. Gregorio Dimarucot y Garcia vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975,

September 20, 2010.

Arraignment; pendency of second motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contention that his second motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman should have suspended his arraignment. According to the Supreme Court, the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman allows the filing of an information in court pending a motion for reconsideration of the finding of a probable cause; hence, if the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information. Brig Gen. (Ret.) Jose Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172476-99.,September 15, 2010.

Arraignment; pendency of second motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman. An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later. Brig Gen. (Ret.) Jose Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172476-99.,September 15, 2010.

Arraignment; pendency of second motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman. Petitioner failed to show any of the grounds for suspension of arraignment as provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493. Brig Gen. (Ret.) Jose Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172476-99.,September 15, 2010

Evidence; ballistics report. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative in nature. The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are more than enough to sustain his conviction. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010

Evidence; ballistics report. Even without a ballistic report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of the assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can be dispensed with in proving petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the

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Criminal Procedure Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010

Evidence; credibility of witness. The determination of the credibility of the offended party’s testimony is the most basic consideration in every prosecution for rape. The lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. As in most rape cases, the ultimate issue in this case is credibility. In this regard, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question as it heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. The exceptions to the rule are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstance of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. None of these circumstances are present in the case at bar to warrant its exception from the coverage of this rule. People of the Philippines vs. Miguelito Malana y Lardisabay, G.R. No. 185716. September 29, 2010

Evidence; credibility of witness. The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. It need not present each and every witness as long as it meets the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. That AAA’s brother was not presented does not thus infirm the case for the prosecution for, among other things, his testimony would have been merely corroborative. It need not be underlined that the weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony. That explains why an accused in rape cases may be convicted solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the victim where such testimony is clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in AAA’s testimony in this case. People of the Philippines vs. Paterno Lasanas, G.R. No. 183829. September 6, 2010

Evidence; conspiracy. The Supreme Court agreed with appellant Naranjo that the prosecution in this case failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted in conspiracy with the other accused. The buy-bust operation was supposedly set-up based on the police informant’s report of illegal activities of “Acas and Arnel.” But the evidence shows that the informant was not familiar with Naranjo. Indeed, the informant got to identify only Babanggol during the buy-bust operation. And it was Babanggol who introduced Naranjo to Alfonso, the poseur-buyer. The Supreme Court ruled that a person’s mere presence when an illegal transaction had taken place does not mean that he was into the conspiracy. People of the Philippines vs. Arnel Babanggol and Cesar Naranjo, G.R. No. 181422. September 15, 2010

Evidence; conspiracy. To be guilty as a conspirator, the accused needs to have done an overt act in pursuit of the crime. While the testimonies of the three other accused were inconsistent in some material points, they all agreed that Naranjo was a mere hired driver. The prosecution did not bother to contradict this. It presented no proof that Naranjo knew of the criminal intentions of the other accused, much less that he adopted the same. All told, nothing in the circumstances of this case can be used to infer that Naranjo was in conspiracy with the other accused. People of the Philippines vs. Arnel

Babanggol and Cesar Naranjo, G.R. No. 181422. September 15, 2010

Evidence; lack of formal offer of evidence. The High Court modified the accused’s conviction from qualified rape to simple rape since both medical certificate and AAA’s birth certificate, although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, were not formally offered in evidence pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. According to the Court, a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. People of the Philippines vs. Saturnino Villanueva Vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 181829, September 1, 2010

Evidence; lack of formal offer of evidence. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value pursuant to the express mandate that ‘the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.’ Consequently, as in this case, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected. People of the Philippines vs. Saturnino Villanueva Vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 181829, September 1, 2010

Evidence; state witness. Turning an accused into a state witness is not a magic formula that cures all the deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence. The state witness cannot simply allege everything left unproved and automatically produce a conviction of the crime charged against the remaining accused. Corroboration of the account of the state witness is key. It is in fact a requirement for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given can be substantially corroborated in its material points. People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano Anabe y Capillan, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010

Evidence; state witness. As an exception to the general rule requiring corroboration, the uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano Anabe y Capillan, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010

Evidence; state witness. This exception, however, applies only if the state witness is an eyewitness since the testimony would then be direct evidence. Section 17 of Rule 119 actually assumes that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged as a state witness would constitute direct evidence (i.e., that he or she is an eyewitness) in that it requires that there is no other direct evidence, except the testimony of the said accused. Where, as here, the state witness is not an eyewitness, the testimony partakes of the nature of circumstantial evidence. The rule on circumstantial evidence thus applies. If the testimony is uncorroborated, it does not suffice. It cannot merit full credence. People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano Anabe y Capillan, G.R. No.

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Criminal Procedure 179033, September 6, 2010

Evidence; testimony of witness. The fact is that AAA’s testimony is not flawless. However, it is but ordinary for a witness, a rape victim no less, to have some inconsistencies in her statements since not only had the rapes occurred four or five years prior to her testimony but her testimony pertains to facts and details of shameful events that she would rather forget. Truly, if not for the motivation to seek justice for the molestations she had gone through, AAA would choose to bury those details in the deepest recesses of her memory. Moreover, inconsistencies may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of the testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions. Likewise, inconsistencies in the testimony of a rape victim are inconsequential when they refer to minor details that have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of the crime — carnal knowledge through force or intimidation. People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Parohinog Alejandro, G.R. No. 186232, September 27, 2010.

Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. The core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The Court held in the affirmative, citing the provisions of R.A. 8249. . People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Rolando Plaza, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010

Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. 8249, the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Rolando Plaza, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010

Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Rolando Plaza, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010.

Criminal Contempt. The guarantee given to Jesus Disini that he would not be compelled to testify in other cases against Herminio Disini constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. Here, Disini’s refusal to testify as ordered by the Sandiganbayan is certain to result in prosecution for criminal contempt. It constitutes criminal contempt since guilt would draw a penalty of fine or imprisonment or both. Criminal contempt is “conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act of obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute and disrespect. Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 180564. June 22, 2010

Criminal Contempt. In criminal contempt, the proceedings are regarded as criminal and the rules of criminal procedure apply. What is more, it is generally held that the State or respondent Republic is the real prosecutor in such case. The grant therefore of immunity to Disini, against being compelled to testify is ultimately a grant of immunity from being criminally prosecuted by the State for refusal to testify, something that falls within the express coverage of the immunity given him. Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 180564. June 22, 2010

Evidence; corpus delicti. Paragraph 1 of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized drugs. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines is not fatal. Indeed, the implementing rules provide that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items.” People of the Philippines vs. Aldrin Berdadero y Armamento, G.R. No. 179710, June 29, 2010.

Evidence; corpus delicti. The Supreme Court reiterated its ruling in People v. Del Monte that what is of vital importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. People of the Philippines vs. Aldrin Berdadero y Armamento, G.R. No. 179710, June 29, 2010.

Evidence; corpus delicti. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. People of the

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Criminal Procedure Philippines vs. Aldrin Berdadero y Armamento, G.R. No. 179710, June 29, 2010.

Evidence; corpus delicti. In this case, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses convincingly show that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal substance was properly preserved. The appellant in this case has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits of public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharge their duties. The appellant was unable to discharge such burden. People of the Philippines vs. Aldrin Berdadero y Armamento, G.R. No. 179710, June 29, 2010.

Evidence; dying declaration. Under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “the declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.” A dying declaration is evidence of the highest order; it is entitled to the utmost credence on the premise that no one person who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts of concocting lies disappear. People of the Philippines vs. Albert Sanchez y Galera, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010.

Evidence; dying declaration. As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. People of the Philippines vs. Jonel Falabrica Serenas, et al., G.R. No. 188124, June 29, 2010.

Dismissal; appeal by private party. The dismissal made by the RTC can only be appealed by the OSG. The private offended party has no legal personality to do so. Here, the Supreme Court applied the general rule under Sec. 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provided that only the OSG can bring and/or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the people or the State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the CA.

Private offended parties have limited roles in criminal cases. They are only witnesses for the prosecution. Thus, a private offended party may not appeal the dismissal of a criminal case or the acquittal of an accused because the aggrieved party is the People of the Philippines. However, the offended party may appeal the civil aspect of the case and may, thus, file a special civil action for certiorari questioning the decision/action of the court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the private offended party cannot bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines, but must prosecute the same in his own personal capacity. Elvira O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336. December 23, 2009.

Information; objection to form. Objections relating to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. The accused-appellant should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars or for the quashal of the information. Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived his objections to any formal defect in the information. The People of the Philippines vs. Romar Teodoro y Vallejo, G.R. No. 172372. December 4, 2009.

Information; options available to RTC upon filing of information. The options available to the RTC upon the filing of an information before it by the public prosecutor or any prosecutor of the Secretary of Justice, are the following: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if the RTC finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty (3) days from the filing of the information. The Supreme Court held that dismissal of the case by the RTC judge in this case did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. Rather, it clearly showed his compliance with his duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. Elvira O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336. December 23, 2009

Jurisdiction; election cases. A public prosecutor exceeded the authority delegated to him by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to prosecute election-related cases when he filed amended informations in court against the respondent Pablo Olivares even after he had been directed by the Legal Department of the COMELEC to suspend the implementation of his joint resolution (which found that the respondent should be indicted) but before his delegated authority had been revoked by the COMELEC en banc.

The Constitution, particularly Article IX, Section 20, empowers the COMELEC to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election cases. Furthermore, under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct the preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the OEC and to prosecute the same. Under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC may avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the continuing delegation of authority to other prosecuting arms of the government, which authority, however, may be revoked or withdrawn at anytime by the COMELEC in the proper exercise of its judgment. Section 10 of the same Rule 34 gives the COMELEC the power to motu proprio revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors.

Clearly, the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. However, such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good or

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Criminal Procedure where it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the COMELEC in relation to election cases where it had been deputized to investigate and prosecute by the COMELEC. As mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors acting on behalf of the COMELEC must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority. Bievenido Diño and Renato Comparativo vs. Pablo Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009.

Petition for review; questions of fact. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should only raise issues involving questions of law and not questions of fact. As a general rule, a Rule 45 petition for certiorari should only involve legal questions which should be raised and distinctly set forth in the petition because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court will not disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, unless such findings are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin.

The Supreme Court explained that questions of law exist when there is doubt on what law is applicable to a certain set of facts, while questions of fact are involved when there is an issue regarding the truth or falsity of the statements of facts. Questions on whether certain pieces of evidence should be accorded with probative value or whether the proofs presented by one party are clear, convincing, and adequate to establish a proposition, are issues of fact which are not subject to review by the Supreme Court. Juno Batistis vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181571. December 16, 2009.

Probable case; reversal of finding. A new presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court can reverse the order issued by a former presiding Judge finding no probable cause against respondents. although the former presiding judge had found no probable cause against respondents, he did not altogether close the issue. In fact, he ignored respondents’ motion to dismiss the case and even directed the City Prosecutor’s Office to submit additional evidence. This indicated that he still had doubts about his findings. Thus, when Judge Justalero took over, Judge Justalero committed no grave abuse of discretion when he reversed his predecessor’s earlier unsettled position.

There was no grave abuse of discretion when Judge Justalero found probable cause against respondents. Probable cause assumes the existence of facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the person sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest. People of the Philippines vs. Jan Michael Tan and Archie Tan, G.R. No. 182310, December 9, 2009.

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