6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES VS JONATHAN HONRALES

FACTS:

On August 19, 2002, Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan Honrales. Thus, in a Resolution[3] dated October 28, 2002, Bernardino R. Camba, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, recommended the filing of an information for parricide against respondent. On November 18, 2002, the following Information[4] was filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Manila. On November 21, 2002, Judge Teresa P. Soriaso of the RTC of Manila, Branch 27, ordered respondent’s arrest.[5]

On November 22, 2002, respondent moved to reconsider[6] the October 28, 2002 Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Camba which recommended the filing of parricide charges. Respondent later also filed a supplement to his motion. In view of respondent’s motion for reconsideration, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Alfredo E. Ednave moved that the RTC defer proceedings.[7] Respondent in turn filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest,[8] which the public prosecutor opposed.[9]

On December 12, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[10] deferring proceedings in view of the pendency of

respondent’s motion for reconsideration. It, however, denied the motion to recall the arrest warrant

since deferment of proceedings does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the

same defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the offense as would constitute a

ground for quashing the information. The trial court further held that considering the evidence

submitted, it finds probable cause for the issuance of the arrest warrant. Then the case was

reinvestigated upon the motion of a prosecutor. Then after investigation, a motion to withdraw the

parricide case has been filed and another information this time for reckless imprudence resulting to

parricide was filed against the respondent while the motion was still pending.

BGEN JOSE RAMSICAL VS SANDIGAN BAYAN AND PEOPLE

FACTS:

The petitioner was charged by a congresswoman with a violation of RA 3019 and malversation

of public funds or property through falsification of public documents before the office of the

Ombudsman. After the PI, the ombudsman found probable cause of both offenses and filed before the

Sandiganbayan 12 informations. Then petitioners filed an MR to remove his name form amongst the

accused. But after a thorough review of the OMB – military, it was found that indeed the petitioner

issued his signature in the unilateral deeds of sale. So the Sandiganbayan scheduled an arraignment for

the case at the same the petitioner filed his second MR. Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to

enter his plea so the sandiganbayan entered a plea of not guilty for his favor. The petitioner filed a

motion to set aside the arraignment pending his 2nd MR. It was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence the

petition before the court.

ISSUE:

Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside

his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s

finding of probable cause against him?

RULING:

Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. – a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution

shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court;

b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the

corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution

subject of the motion.

If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.

An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused,

for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused

is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.

Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department

of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty

(60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayancommitted no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.

Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution, petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second motion for reconsideration

of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. The Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005

memorandum, has already denied petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration,[26] impugning for the first

time the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of

Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for

reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no

end to litigation.

HILARIO SORIANO VS PEOPLE AND BSP

FACTS:

The petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents for

allegedy securing a loan of 48 million in the name of 2 persons when in fact these individuals did not

make any loans in the bank, nor did the bank’s officers approved or had any information about the said

loan. The state prosecutor conducted PI on the basis of letters sent by officers of special investigation of

the BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed 2 separate information against the petitioner before the RTC

of Bulacan- estafa through falsification of commercial documents and violation of DORSI law.

On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash[21] these informations on two grounds: that the

court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an

offense.

On the first ground, petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription.[22] Moreover, petitioner argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the “letter-complaint,” were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to petitioner, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653). On the second ground, petitioner contended that the commission of estafa under paragraph 1(b) of

Article 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law (as set out in Section

83[23] of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795),[24] hence a person cannot be charged for both offenses. He

argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires the offender to obtain a loan from his bank, without

complying with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On the other hand, estafa under par.

1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires the offender to misappropriate or convert something that he holds

in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to

return the same.

RTC denied the motion which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule

112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.

Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to

Quash?

RULINGS:

We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the

DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not

contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense.

The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal

knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them,

initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the

witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with

Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority

holds that it can be initiated by “any competent person” with personal knowledge of the acts committed

by the offender. Thus, the witnesses who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of “any

competent person” who may institute the complaint for a public crime.

A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent

person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law

enforcer as the nominal complainant.

In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy

to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the

accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had

invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal

therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special

civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the

special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances

in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the

CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.[

YU –VS SAMSON TATAD

FACTS:

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the

petitioner was filed with the RTC and they were convicted. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.[3]

In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack of merit.[4]

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to

our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[5] she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from November 3, 2005,

the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a

notice of appeal.

On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.[8]

On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.[9]

On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution. On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance

of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on

the prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution;s motions when she filed her

notice of appeal within the 15 day reglementary period applying the fresh period rule? OR WHETEHER

THE NEYPES RULES IS APPLICABLE IN CRIMINAL CASES

RULING:

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.[14] The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),[15] as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided,

however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the

notice of the judgment appealed from. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for

new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or

reconsideration shall be allowed. The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the

appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal

period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a

motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with

counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from

receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or

resolution.

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal

on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of

receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.