Criminal Appeal No 1202 of 2008 [DB-C] C/w Criminal Appeal...
Transcript of Criminal Appeal No 1202 of 2008 [DB-C] C/w Criminal Appeal...
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2012
PRESENT
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE D V SHYLENDRA KUMAR
AND
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE H S KEMPANNA
Criminal Appeal No 1202 of 2008 [DB-C]
C/w
Criminal Appeal No 39 of 2009 [DB-C] And
Criminal RC No.5 of 2008
IN CRL.A. NO. 1202 OF 2008
BETWEEN: 1. SYED MOHAMMED IBRAHIM S/O SYED ISMAIL
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS R/O CHINNAPPA REDDY LAYOUT BELAGERE ROAD NEAR SHARADA VIDYA MANDIR VARTHUR, BANGALORE.
2. SYED HASAN UZ ZAMA S/O LATE S A AZEEZ AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS JUNIOR WARRANT OFFICER R/O AIR FORCE HEAD QUARTERS R K PURAM, NEW DELHI R/O S.M.Q., 60/3, SAFED NAGAR,
GURGAON, HARYANA.
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3. ABDUL RAHMAN SAIT @ SAJID S/O LATE ALI AHAMED SAIT AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT BEML R/O.NO.209, 9TH MAIN ROAD VIJAYANAGAR BANGALORE.
4. AMANATH HUSSAIN MULLA S/O LATE MAGDHUM HUSSAIN MULLA AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS SUPERVISOR IN BEML,
R/O NO.49, 5TH CROSS, GUNDAPPA STREET
REHMATHNAGAR, R.T. NAGAR, 1ST MAIN ROAD, BANGALORE. … APPELLANTS
[By Sri Hashmath Pasha, Adv.]
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY MAGADI ROAD POLICE STATION BANGALORE CITY INVESTIGATED BY DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE SPECIAL ENQUIRY SQUAD C.O.D., BANGALORE REP. BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT
[By H N Nilogal, SPP] THIS CRL.A FILED U/S 374(2) OF CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTIONS DT.21.11.2008 AND SENTENCES DT.29.11.2008 PASSED IN S.C.NO.423/2001 ON THE FILE OF 34TH ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE AND P.O., SPL.COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF CHURCH BOMB BLAST CASES, CENTRAL PRISON PREMISES, BANGALORE AND ETC.,
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IN CRL.A. NO. 39 OF 2009
BETWEEN: 1. SHEIK HASHIM ALI
S/O SYED KHASIM ALI AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS VIDEOGRAPHER R/O 10-4-469,
DEENDAR ANJUMAN ASHRAM ASIF NAGAR, HYDERABAD A.P. STATE
2. MOHAMMED FAROOQ ALI @ FAROOQ
S/O MOHAMMED IFTHEKAR ALI AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS GENERAL STORES R/O FAROOQ KIRANI STORES ANJUMAN ASHRAM, ASIF NAGAR HYDERABAD, A.P. STATE
3. MOHAMED SIDDIQUE S/O MOULANA MOHAMMED MAHABOOB AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS OWNER OF READYMADE GARMENT SHOP R/O PRASHANANAGAR CHIKKABALLAPUR,
KOLAR DISTRICT
4. ABDUL HABEEB S/O LATE MOULA ALI AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS APSRTC DRIVER R/O PASHA PETA, MUSLIM BAZAR
THIRUVOR, KRISHNA DISTRICT A.P. STATE.
5. SHAMSHUZAMA S/O SYED ABDUL AZEEZ
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS APSRTC CONDUCTOR R/O NUZVID, KRISHNA DISTRICT A.P. STATE.
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6. SHEIK FARDEEN VALI @ FAREED
S/O SHEIK ABDUL SATTAR AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS CIVIL CONTRACTOR AND CLOTH SHOP OWNER R/O MUVVA, KRISHNA DISTRICT A.P. STATE
7. SYED ABDUL KHADAR JILANI S/O LATE ABDUL AZEEZ
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS T V MECHANIC R/O PASHA PETA, NUZVID KRISHNA DISTRICT, A.P. … APPELLANTS
[By Sri Hashmath Pasha, Adv.]
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY MAGADI ROAD POLICE STATION BANGALORE CITY INVESTIGATED BY DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SPECIAL ENQUIRY SQUAD C.O.D. BANGALORE REP. BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT
[By H N Nilogal, SPP]
THIS CRL.A FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTIONS DT.21.11.2008 AND SENTENCES DT.29.11.2008 PASSED IN S.C.NO.423/2001 ON THE FILE OF 34TH ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE AND P.O., SPL.COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF CHURCH BOMB BLAST CASES, CENTRAL PRISON PREMISES, BANGALORE AND ETC.,
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IN CRL. RC NO. 5 OF 2008
BETWEEN: THE REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE … PETITIONER
[By Sri H N Nilogal, SPP for Advocate General]
AND:
1. SYED MOHAMMED IBRAHIM S/O SYED ISMAIL
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS R/O CHINNAPPA REDDY LAYOUT BELAGERE ROAD NEAR SHARADA VIDYA MANDIR VARTHUR, BANGALORE.
2. SYED HASAN UZ ZAMA S/O LATE S A AZEEZ AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS JUNIOR WARRANT OFFICER R/O AIR FORCE HEAD QUARTERS R K PURAM, NEW DELHI R/O S.M.Q., 60/3, SAFED NAGAR,
GURGAON, HARYANA.
3. ABDUL RAHMAN SAIT @ SAJID S/O LATE ALI AHAMED SAIT AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT, BEML R/O.NO.209, 9TH B MAIN ROAD VIJAYANAGAR, BANGALORE.
4. AMANATH HUSSAIN MULLA S/O LATE MAGDHUM HUSSAIN MULLA AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS SUPERVISOR IN BEML,
R/O NO.49, 5TH CROSS, GUNDAPPA STREET
REHMATHNAGAR,
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R.T. NAGAR, 1ST MAIN ROAD, BANGALORE. ... RESPONDENTS
(ACCUSED NOS.1, 8, 9 & 17 IN SC NO.423 OF 2001)
THIS CRIMINAL REFERRED CASE IS REGISTERED AS
REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 366 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR CONFIRMATION OF DEATH SENTENCE AWARDED TO THE ABOVE RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED, BY THE XXXIV ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE & PRESIDING OFFICER, SPL. COURT, CENTRAL PRISON PREMISES, BANGALORE BY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE DT. 21/29.11.2008 IN S.C. NO. 423/01 AND ETC.
THESE CRL.APPEALS & CRL.RC COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Criminal Appeal Nos 1202 of 2008 and 39 of 2009 are
preferred by Accused Nos.1, 8, 9, 17 and Accused Nos.5, 6,
10, 13, 14, 16, 18 respectively, challenging the legality and
correctness of the Judgment and Order dated
21.11.2008/29.11.2008 passed in SC No.423/2001 by 34th
Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge & Presiding Officer,
Special Court for the trial of Church Bomb Blast Cases,
sitting at Central Prison Premises, Bangalore City,
convicting:
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[a] A1, A8, A9 & A17 for the offences under sections 121,
120-B r/w. 121-A, 124-A, 153-A of IPC and further Accused
No.1 for the offences punishable under sections 304 Part II,
337, 427 of Indian Penal Code [for short IPC] and under Rule
5 of the Explosives Rules, 1983 [for short ‘Explosive Rules’],
under section 9-B of the Explosives Act, 1884 [for short
Explosives Act] and under sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908 [for short ‘Explosive Substances Act’]
and
[b] Accused Nos. 5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16 and 18 for the
offences under sections 120-B r/w. 121-A, 124-A, 153-A of
IPC
and sentencing:
[a] A1, A8, A9, A17 to death for the offence u/s.121 of
IPC, to undergo imprisonment for life for the offences u/ss.
120B r/w.121A of IPC and u/s.124A of IPC, to undergo R.I.
for three years for the offence u/s.153A of IPC and further
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sentencing A1 to undergo R.I. for 10 years for the offence
u/s.304 Part II of IPC, R.I. for six months for the offence
u/s.337 of IPC, R.I. for two years for the offence u/s.427 of
IPC, R.I. for two years for the offence under Rule 5 of the
Explosive Rules r/w. Section 9B of the Explosives Act and
imprisonment for life and R.I. for ten years for the offences
u/ss.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act respectively
and
[b] A5, A6, A10, A13, A14, A16, A18 to undergo
imprisonment for life for the offences u/ss.120B, r/w.121A
IPC and 124-A of IPC and R.I. for three years for the offence
u/s.153A of IPC.
2. Criminal reference case No.5 of 2008 has been
registered on the basis of submission made to this court as
contemplated under section 366 of Cr.PC by the learned
Sessions Judge to confirm the death sentences passed on
Accused Nos. 1, 8, 9 and 17.
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IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs 1202 OF 2008 & 39 OF 2009:
3. The brief facts of the case are :-
The appellants/accused along with A4 who died during
the pendency of trial were tried on the charges for the
offences punishable under Sections 121, 121-A, 124-A read
with section 120-B, 153-A r/w section 120-B, 304 r/w 120-
B, 337 r/w 120-B, 427 r/w 120-B of IPC and under rule 5 of
Explosives Rules read with section 9-B of the Explosives Act
r/w. 120-B of IPC and under sections 3, 5 of the Explosive
Substances Act r/w. 120-B of IPC.
4. It is alleged that these appellants/accused along with
A2, A3 the two deceased and absconding accused Nos.7, 11,
12 and 15 in the case being the members of Deendar
Anjuman Organization, held secret meeting on 20.10.1999 at
Deendar Anjuman Ashram situated in Asifnagar, Hyderabad
and entered into a criminal conspiracy to spread Islam
religion throughout the world including India and to
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commence Jihad and Nifaaq throughout India to create
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will between the
two major communities of India viz. Hindus and Christians
and to derail the Indian economy and to promote widespread
communal clash, committed many illegal acts within the
state of Andhra Pradesh and further continuing the
conspiracy entered by them at Deendar Anjuman Ashram
situated in Asifnagar, held secret meetings within the State
of Karnataka at various places and in particular in the
houses of A1 and A9 situated at Varthur and Vijayanagar in
Bangalore City in between the period from October 1999 to
9.7.2000 and in furtherance of that continued and renewed
conspiracy, the accused printed, published and circulated
the pamphlets, books, booklets containing literature to
excite disaffection towards the Government established by
law in India and also provoked to take up Jihad and Nifaaq
activities to derail Indian economy by sending secret
information with regard to vital Defence installations of the
Government, roads, bridges etc. to Pakistan through CD’s
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and floppies etc and thereby brought or attempted to bring
hatred or contempt or excited and further, in order to
Islamize whole of India through Jihad and Nifaaq activities,
mobilized funds amongst by illegal means like theft, robbery
and dacoity and also transmitted secret defence information
and collected information about the vital installations in
India to A7 residing at Mardhan in Pakistan and in order to
create communal disturbances, lawlessness, planted bombs
in Churches and other places, desecrated the places of
worship, caused injuries to innocent persons and to thus
wage war or attempted to wage war against the Govt. of
India and further on 9.7.2000 at about 9.30 p.m.
transported bombs in Maruthi Van bearing No.GA-01-U-
2786 illegally without valid licence or permit issued by the
Competent Authority to plant in religious places, which
accidently exploded in front of Minerva Mill Gate, Bangalore
resulting in death of A2, A3, injuries to PW1 and damage to
Maxi Cab belonging to PW8 and thereby have committed the
aforementioned offences.
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5. It is the case of the prosecution that all the accused
persons are the members of an unlawful association,
namely, Deendar Anjuman Ashram, having its head office at
Asifnagar, Hyderabad, State of Andhra Pradesh and
branches in various places in the States of Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Goa, Maharashtra and other States. One late Sri
Hazrath Moulana Syed Siddique Kibla @ Siddique Deendar
Channabasaveshwara, hereinafter referred to as “Hazrath
Siddique” for convenience, is the founder of Deendar
Anjuman Ashram situated at Asifnagar, Hyderabad and he
died on 4th April 1952. His body was buried in the Ashram at
Asifnagar, Hyderabad and a tomb was built there itself. Late
Hazrath Siddique left behind him his son viz., Zia-Ul-
Hassan, who later became Guru of Deendar Anjuman
Ashram. Later he migrated to Pakistan along with his family
members i.e., 7 sons and a daughter and started residing at
Mardan, Pakistan.
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6. The hidden aim and object of Deendar Anjuman
Ashram was to Islamise the whole world including India. To
propagate their object and hidden agenda, they printed,
published and circulated various books in many languages
including Kannada, English, Urdu, Arabi, Tamil, Telugu, to
attract young Muslims in achieving their object. The
organizers of the Deendar Anjuman Ashram used to hold
secret meetings every year after celebration of Urs in the
month of Rajab and motivate the young followers to take
training in Jihad, Nifaaq and Syria activities. Accordingly,
many accused persons went to Pakistan and took training in
preparing and operating arms and using ammunitions
including explosive materials, preparation and blasting of
bombs. A7 namely Sahebjada Zia-Ul-Hassan, with the
assistance of his sons i.e., A.11 viz., Syed Khalid Pasha,
A.12 viz., Syed Sabihul Hassan and A.15 viz., Syed Zahed-
Ul-Hassan, who are absconding. On 20.10.1999 held a main
conspiracy meeting at Deendar Anjuman Ashram,
Hyderabad and at other various places to commit illegal acts
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by illegal means, to create disharmony or feelings of enmity,
hatredness and ill will between two major communities i.e.,
Hindus and Christians, so as to spread communal clashes
in between those communities. In that conspiracy meeting,
they agreed to prepare and circulate pamphlets to the
Christian missionaries in the name of Hindus and vice versa
to create communal ill will in between the major religions of
India. Plans were also prepared to commit holy jihad to
achieve the above goal. Further, in that conspiracy meeting
they agreed to collect the information about the vital
installations of India including bridges, roads, military
bases, railways and like other important places to derail the
Indian economy. They also agreed to blast churches in
various places to create communal hatredness. To perform
this jihad activities they agreed to mobilize the funds by
indulging in theft, robbery, dacoity etc., i.e., Syria and to
send the mobilized amount to their Guru namely Zia-Ul-
Hassan residing at Mardan, Pakistan. The agenda of the
conspiracy was to create hatredness towards the
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Government, established by Law in India and also cause
other Christian dominated western countries to condemn
India. In this direction, many main conspiracy meetings
were held at Deendar Anjuman Ashram and other places on
20.10.1999. Accordingly, many places of worship were
blasted by planting bombs in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
7. It is further the case of prosecution that in furtherance
of the main conspiracy held at Hyderabad, the said
conspiracies were renewed in Karnataka also by holding
secret conspiracy meeting in the houses of A.1 viz., Syed
Mohd. Ibrahim at Varthur and A.9 namely Abdul Rehaman
Sait at Vijayanagar, Bangalore. All the accused persons got
printed various provocative pamphlets in the name of
Hindus addressed to the Christians and in the name of
Christians addressed to Hindus and circulated them in
various places to promote disharmony in between two major
communities. The accused persons collected information
with regard to railways, bridges, important roads,
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Government establishments, defence secrets, atomic energy
plants and other vital installations and transmitted the said
information to A7 residing at Mardan, Pakistan through
internet, floppies, C.Ds., E-mail etc., only to derail Indian
economy, cause financial loss and in turn to destabilize the
Government established by law in India.
8. In furtherance of the renewed and continued
conspiracies held in the houses A.1 and A.9 at Varthur and
Vijayanagar, Bangalore, A1, 2, 5 and 6, prepared bombs in
the house of A.5 namely Sheik Hasim Ali, at Hyderabad and
later sent to Bangalore through A.2 viz., Zakir. A.18 namely
Syed Abdul Khadar Jilani, who was specially trained in
preparing time bombs, prepared the bombs and later
transported it to various places. On 9.7.2000, in furtherance
of the continued conspiracy, with the active assistance of
other accused persons, A.1 along with deceased A2 and 3
transported huge explosive substances and bombs in the
Maruthi Van bearing registration No.GA 01 U 2786 and
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planted some of them at St. Peter and Paul Church, situated
at J.J. Nagar, Bangalore. In the meantime, the members and
followers of Deendar Anjuman Ashram, had planted bombs
at St. Ann’s Catholic Church, Wadi and St. John Lutheran
Church at Hubli, blasted them and created communal
disturbances, law and order problem in those areas. After
planting bomb in St. Peter and Paul Church, situated at J J
Nagar, Bangalore, with an intention to plant some other
bombs and explosive substances in some other places of
worship, A1, deceased A2 and 3, were transporting huge
explosive substances and bombs in the Maruthi van bearing
Reg.No. GA 01 U 2786 driven by A1 on Mysore deviation
road and on account of A1 driving that Maruthi van in a
rash and negligent manner, in front of Minerva mill gate,
situated within the limits of Magadi Road Police Station,
Bangalore, the bomb exploded and caused the death of A.2
and A.3 on the spot and grievous injuries to A1. The Maruthi
van in question was completely blown into pieces. It was
burnt and fully damaged apart from causing damage to
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another maxi cab of one Ramanna PW.8 which was coming
from the opposite direction driven by PW.1 Sadique who also
sustained injuries in the same explosion.
9. It is further the case of prosecution that on 9.7.2000 at
about 9.30 p.m. Police Inspector PW.58 of Magadi road
Police Station, Bangalore received a message from the police
control room to the effect that on Mysore deviation road a
moving vehicle has been caught fire, some persons have
sustained injuries and he should go over to that place
immediately. Accordingly within about 5 to 10 minutes,
PW.58 Police Inspector namely Shivappa Hadimani went to
that spot along with his staff. By that time senior Police
Officers were also present there. He saw a Maruthi van
bearing registration No.GA 01 U 2786 having exploded and
its remnant were spread on the road, three persons lying
with burnt injuries, another maxi cab also being damaged
and its owner viz., Ramanna PW.8 was present there. He
took PW.8 Ramanna to the Police Station, recorded his
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complaint as per Ex.P6 and on the basis of the same
registered a case in Cr.No.290/2000 for the offence U/s.
304-A IPC and also under the provisions of the Explosive Act
and sent FIR to the learned 3rd ACMM, Bangalore. Later he
came to know that the injured Zakir and Siddique have died
and another person by name Ibrahim was in an unconscious
condition. Next day, i.e., on 10.7.2000 he conducted the spot
mahazar, seized all the incriminating articles lying on the
spot in the presence of the panchas, recorded the statements
of witnesses, conducted inquest mahazar on the dead bodies
of Zakir and Siddique and sent a requisition for subjecting
the dead bodies for PM examination. On 10.7.2000 ACP,
Chikpet, Bangalore, PW.59 took up further investigation of
this case as per the direction of DCP, West and conducted
the further investigation. On 15.7.2000 the further
investigation of this case was handed over to COD,
Bangalore. Accordingly on 15.7.2000 Sri M.B. Appanna,
DSP, COD, Special Enquiry Squad PW.66 took up further
investigation from PW.59 ACP Bawa and proceeded with
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investigation. During the course of investigation the I.Os.
searched the residential houses of all the above accused as
well as their work places and recovered huge incriminating
materials like books containing Deendar Anjuman
organization literature, pamphlets, passports, letters
addressed to in between accused persons as well as to their
Guru namely Zia-Ul-Hassan, residing at Mardhan, Pakistan,
information collected with regard to vital installations
situated in Karnataka and other places, defence secrets,
diaries maintained by some of the accused, computers
including CPUs, mobile phones, scooter used in the
commission of the offence, currency notes of various
countries i.e., Pakistan, Phillipines, Saudi Arabia, India. The
I.Os. also collected the ledger extracts of the bank accounts
of some of the accused wherein the accused had made
financial transactions inter se between themselves and had
drawn certain amount in the ATMs situated in various
places in Pakistan. The I.Os. also collected the details of the
landline and mobile telephones of the accused, got retrieved
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the information from the seized CPUs. through experts and
obtained print outs and confirmed about collecting
information regarding vital installations of India and also
about E-mailing the said information to Mardan, Pakistan.
They got all the seized incriminating articles found in the
place of blast examined by FSL experts and confirmed that
powerful explosive substances were used in preparing the
bombs. They also arrested the accused persons on various
dates produced them before the jurisdictional Magistrate,
took them to police custody, interrogated them, recorded
their voluntary statements and in pursuance of the same
seized many incriminating articles at their instance from
their respective residential houses as well as from their work
places. Further, the investigation also revealed that all the
accused got renewed their conspiracy in the house of A.1 at
Varthur, as well as in the house of A.9 at Vijayanagar,
Bangalore and they performed the acts of jihad, nifaaq and
collected required fund through syria. The I.Os. further got
translated the seized Urdu language documents into English
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and Kannada. In view of this accidental explosion of bombs,
the entire secret conspiracy meetings held by all the accused
and the illegal activities carried on by the accused came to
light. Thus, all the accused in furtherance of their renewed
and continued conspiracy committed many grave offences,
printed and circulated various books, pamphlets containing
promotion of disharmony in between two major communities
and also caused law and order problems in various religious
places. Further, these accused persons without any valid
license issued by the competent authorities, possessed,
prepared bombs, transported them and got them exploded
deliberately to cause loss of life and property. A1 knowing
that the huge quantity of explosive substance which he was
transporting in the Maruthi van if by accidentally or
otherwise explode, it will cause death of persons, drove that
maruthi van on the Mysore deviation road and caused the
death of A2, 3, injuries to maxicab driver Sadiq PW.1,
grievous injuries to himself and damage to the maxi cab of
PW.8 Ramanna to the extent of more than Rs.250/-. A1 in
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furtherance of the renewed and continued conspiracy made
along with other accused in the case without any valid
license or permit issued by any competent authority to
manufacture, possess and transport the bombs and other
explosive materials, transported them in the above said
Maruthi van along with deceased A2 and 3 and caused it to
explode in front of Minerva mill gate which resulted in the
death of A.2, A.3, injuries to PW.1 Sadiq and damage to the
maxi cab of PW.8. Thus A1 transported the bombs and
explosive substances with unlawful object.
10. Thereafter, the I.O. obtained the necessary sanction
order from the Police Commissioner, Bangalore to prosecute
all the accused for the offences under Rule 5 of the Rules
read with section 9-B of Explosive Act and also under Sec.5
of the Explosive Substances Act. They also obtained sanction
from the Government of Karnataka to prosecute the accused
persons for the offences under Secs.124-A, 153-A read with
Sec.120-B IPC as required under Sec.196 Cr.P.C. The I.Os.
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also made efforts to secure the absconding A7, 11, 12, 15 by
obtaining arrest warrants against those accused persons
and also got issued red corner notice to Interpol to secure
them. But in spite of their best efforts their presence could
not be secured since they were residing at Mardan, Pakistan.
Therefore, as the investigation had been completed PW.66
DSP, Special Enquiry Squad, COD, Bangalore on 11.10.2000
submitted the final report against 18 accused persons in the
Court of 3rd ACMM, Bangalore City, showing A.7, 11, 12 and
15 as absconding though A2, A3 had died in the blast that
had taken place on 9.7.2000.
11. The learned Magistrate thereafter committed the case
of these accused to the Court of Sessions, which on receipt
of the records, secured presence of the accused and
thereafter initially framed charges for the offences under
sections 124-A, 153-A, 304, 337, 427 read with section 120-
B of IPC and under rule 5 of the Rules read with section 9B
of the Explosives Act, read with section 120-B of IPC and
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also under section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, read
with section 120-B of IPC against the accused. Thereafter,
during the trial, additional charges came to be framed for
the offences under sections 121, 121-A of IPC to which the
accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
12. The prosecution in support of its case, in all examined
PWs.1 to PW.67, got marked Ex.P1 to P298 and MOs.1 to
212. The accused during the course of examination of the
prosecution witnesses got marked Ex.D1.
13. After the additional charges came to be framed, the
prosecution did not lead any further evidence. On the other
hand, the accused got recalled seven of the prosecution
witnesses namely PWs.28, 46, 50, 56, 57, 60, 66 and cross
examined them.
14. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused
were examined under section 313 of Cr.PC. They denied all
the incriminating circumstances that were put to them,
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found in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
Thereafter, they were called upon to enter on their defence
and to lead any evidence that they may have in support of
their case. The accused submitted that they have no defence
evidence to lead. Total denial of the prosecution case is the
defence of the accused.
15. The learned trial Judge thereafter on hearing the
learned Public Prosecutor for the State and learned counsel
for the accused and on considering the evidence and
documents on record and also after examining various
Judgments relied upon by the State and also counsel for the
accused, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has
established the charges leveled against the accused and
accordingly by his Judgment and Order dated
21.11.2008/29.11.2008 convicted and sentenced the
accused as aforesaid.
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16. The accused being aggrieved by the Judgment and
order of conviction and sentence, have preferred these two
appeals.
17. The sum and substance of sentences imposed on the
Accused persons is that the appellants in criminal appeal
No.1202 of 2008 are subjected to death sentence along with
other lesser sentence and appellants in Criminal Appeal
No.39 of 2008, are sentenced for life along with a lesser
sentence to run concurrently.
18. It is in respect of imposition of death sentence on the
appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos.1202 of 2008, Crl. RC
No.5 of 2008 under section 366 of Cr.PC by the learned trial
Judge for confirmation of the death sentence.
19. Appearing on behalf of the appellants, Sri. Hashmath
Pasha, learned counsel has addressed arguments in
common in both the appeals as two appeals arise out of the
very Judgment and only appeals are preferred in two sets,
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one appeal by persons who have been imposed death
sentence and other appeal by the persons who have been
imposed sentence of imprisonment for life and lesser
sentence and it is urged that the Judgment and conviction is
not sustainable in law; that the learned judge of the trial
court has not appreciated the evidence on record in a proper
perspective; that the prosecution had never made good its
version with any degree of acceptable and dependable
evidence; that the evidence placed before the court by the
prosecution was not worthy of acceptance and had suffered
from various legal infirmities; that the very assumption that
there existed criminal conspiracy was fallacious; that the
prosecution failed to make good criminal conspiracy; that
there was no fresh criminal conspiracy; that the facts and
circumstances, based on which the accused persons are
charge sheeted and put on trial were the very facts that had
come to be urged and based on which on an earlier occasion,
the accused persons except for A10 had been prosecuted in
SC No.95 of 2001 on the file of the Additional Metropolitan
29
Sessions Judge for trial of Jubilee Hills Bomb Blast case –
cum - Additional Family Court, Hyderabad; that all the
accused persons except A10 had also been charged of the
offence committing criminal conspiracy on the very set of
facts punishable under section 120B of IPC in that court
and in fact, SC No.95 of 2001 came to be concluded as per
Judgment dated 22.11.2004 and the accused persons
therein amongst whom figured all accused in the present
case, except A10 and who have all been arrayed as accused
in SC No.423/2005 had already been convicted of this
offence and therefore trying the convicted accused for the
very offence and on the very set of facts is not only violative
of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India but is a clear
infraction of provisions of section 300 of Cr.PC.
20. Submission of Sri. Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel
for the appellants on this aspect is that the conspiracy if at
all is one conspiracy and there are no different conspiracies
and a conspiracy once it is implemented or aborted, comes
30
to an end and therefore in respect of same set of facts and
on the same evidence, the question of prosecuting the
appellants – accused and convicting them for the offence
under section 120-B of IPC is not sustainable in law and
therefore conspiracy theory is totally an untenable and
unsustainable version of the prosecution and once
conspiracy theory fails, other consequences also cannot
follow etc., is the submission.
21. Mr. Pasha has submitted that the Judgment in SC
No.95 of 2001 before the Court at Hyderabad having been
brought on record by the prosecution themselves during the
stage of the charge, it is a Judgment contents of which may
have to be necessarily looked into and at any rate enable the
appellants to make a reference to that judgment and on
such premise urge legal contentions as above.
22. In support of the submissions, Mr. Hashmath Pasha,
learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the
following decisions:
31
[a] ‘DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v. DOOT AND OTHERS’ reported in 1973 HL (E) 807; and
[b] ‘STATE OF TAMILNADU’ v. NALINI AND OTHERS’
reported in AIR 1999 SC 2640 23. It is also submitted by Sri. Hashmath Pasha that the
facts as brought out by the prosecution in SC No.95 of 2001
before the Court at Hyderabad being the same facts and the
evidence also substantially being the same evidence as is
referred to and relied upon by the prosecution for proving
their case in SC No.423/2005 before the Bangalore Court
though the appellants had not been charged with some of
the offences such as offences punishable under sections
121, 121-A of IPC, the facts being the same and evidence
relied upon by the prosecution being the same, the
argument equally holds good in respect of conviction of the
appellants who have been convicted of the offence
punishable under these two provisions respectively.
24. In support, reliance is placed on the Judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of ‘KOLLA VEERA RAGHAV RAO
32
v. GORANTLA VENKATESWARA RAO & ANOTHER in AIR
2011 SC 641.
25. This apart, it is also submitted that the evidence let in
by the prosecution in the Judgment under appeal does not
in any cogent manner substantiate the version of
prosecution against the appellants and it is submitted that
even the prosecution case is not that the appellants -
convicted accused had caused any disruptive activity by
resorting to any acts of terrorism or such disruptive activity
as the blast that had occurred in the van which was being
driven by A1 and the blast in the van was only an accidental
blast and it was not at any place of worship or intended to
cause any loss of life or property or injury and therefore also
the conspiracy theory and based on such conspiracy theory,
the charge of committing offences punishable under the
other provisions cannot be sustained.
26. It is the specific submission of Sri. Pasha that it can
never be made good that in respect of an accidental blast,
33
the ingredients of the provisions of section 121 of IPC can be
present or found. In fact, without conceding Mr. Pasha,
learned counsel submits that in a case of accidental blast, at
the best, what one can infer of the possibilities are that it
can be a case for conviction under section 304A and 337 of
IPC and in view of the possession of explosive substances, a
case of possible offence under section 5 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908 and section 9[B] of Explosives Act, can
be made out but nothing else.
27. It is therefore submitted that with A2 and 3 who had
perished in the accidental blast and none of the other
accused appellants having any link or any evidence to link
them up to even the explosive substances found in the van
and which had exploded accidentally, the offences
punishable under the provisions referred to above can never
be attributed; that the conviction is not sustainable and
therefore it is required to be set aside.
34
28. Mr. Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants also
submits that the prosecution has heavily relied upon the
evidence of PW.46 – Abdul Gafoor for the purpose of not only
making good the conspiracy theory, but apart from the
quality of the evidence let in by the prosecution through this
witness, as already noticed, the evidence having already
been examined by the court at Hyderabad in S.C. No.
95/2001 earlier in respect of the accused appellants except
for A10, cannot be pressed into service for conviction once
more on the same evidence and on same set of facts.
29. With regard to additional charges framed for conviction
punishable under sections 121 and 121-A of IPC is
concerned, Mr. Pasha has very strongly urged that the
charge i.e., the additional charge for trying the appellants in
respect of these offences is hit for want of sanction as the
prosecution had not obtained sanction contemplated under
section 196 of Cr.PC before launching the prosecution
against the appellants for the offences punishable under
35
sections 121 and 121-A of IPC. It is submitted that the
prosecution though might have obtained sanction earlier for
the offences punishable under sections 124-A and 153-A of
IPC, such sanction cannot be pressed into service for the
purpose of holding that there was sanction for framing
additional charges punishable under sections 121 and 121-
A of IPC as the basic requirement under section 196 of
Cr.PC for offence punishable under Chapter-VI of Cr.PC had
not been fulfilled as such sanction should be obtained in
respect of each individual offence punishable under sections
121 and 121-A of IPC as it constitutes different offences and
it is not in dispute that sanction had not been obtained from
the competent authority with reference to these statutory
provisions for prosecuting the appellants.
30. Our attention is drawn to Ex.P181 to submit that
sanction order does not specifically speak of permission for
prosecuting the offence under section 121 or 121-A of IPC.
In support of submission relating to the trial being vitiated
36
for want of sanction, Mr. Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel
for the appellants has placed reliance on the Judgment of
the Privy Council in the case of ‘GOKULCHAND
DWARKADAS MORARKA v. THE KING’ reported in AIR
1948 PRIVY COUNCIL 82.
31. Reliance is also placed on the Judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of ‘THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
v. TARACHAND JAIN’ reported in 1973 SCC [CRL] 774 and
Mr. Pasha, learned counsel points out that though it was
open to the prosecution to have made good the lacuna of
want of sanction, particularly, as in this case, additional
charges have been framed in respect of the offences
punishable under sections 121 and 121A of IPC, towards the
fag end of the prosecution closing its case and evidence, and
the prosecution having not placed any additional material
before the court to show that the facts constituting the
additional material for sanction of the prosecution was either
already before the sanctioning authority or it was
37
subsequently placed before the authority insofar as the
additional charges in respect of the offences punishable
under sections 121 and 121-A of IPC are concerned being
without a valid sanction, trial gets vitiated in respect of these
charges and conviction does not sustain.
32. This is specifically made a ground with reference to the
evidence on record as submission of Sri. Pasha, learned
counsel for the appellants is that the additional charges
have been pressed into service and in fact framed by the
learned Sessions Judge only with reference to Ex.P260
which was admittedly not a material that had been placed
before the sanctioning authority nor any statement or
information being given by PW.46 having been placed before
the sanctioning authority and such vital material according
to the prosecution, having not been placed before the
sanctioning authority, there is no sanction in respect of the
offences punishable under section 121 and 121-A of IPC.
38
33. With reference to Ex.P260 which is according to the
prosecution the extra judicial confession by one of the
accused – A8, submission is that the manner and
circumstances under which it has been brought into
existence by the prosecution and has been produced or
brought out by the prosecution during the trial stage, there
is considerable doubt and suspicion about its genuineness
and at any rate about acceptability of the same.
34. It is pointed out that even though according to the
prosecution the letter written by A.8, while he was in judicial
custody at Central Prison, Bangalore, which is addressed to
the III Additional CMM, Bangalore, and the narration is so
very lengthy, the description of the events and dates and it is
highly unbelievable that A.8 would have written the entire
narration on his own. He pointed out that in his
examination, the accused has specifically indicated that he
has been pressurized/induced by the jail officials and the
Investigating Officer.
39
35. It is also pointed out that Ex.P.260 being not in
accordance with the Provision of Section 164 of Cr.P.C.
assuming that it could have been taken as a confessional
statement of an accused, it cannot be relied upon. Apart
from the legality of the manner, in which, it is sought to be
relied upon, since it is sought to be stated in the confession
statement, it is also pointed out that the contents of the
same indicate, it is not a confession of A-8 out of remorse
and regret, but one which had been tendered for bargaining
the pardon, which is obvious on reading the concluding part
of the narration of Ex.P.260, which reads as under:
40. Sir, I am last 31 and ½ years of my service, I am one of the hard worker and disciplined soldier, but all these things have done in half knowledge and blind belief in gurus, sir, what I have done was not for any minority or for
name. Now I came to know (I am a example) the person who have half knowledge and blind belief is how much danger. Sir, my service documents shows my behaviour, as documents are very clean and annual confidential report shows, I am always a hard worker and obedient to my seniors.
I was topping in section, in my annual confidential report.
40
41. Humble Sir, I am requesting, begging you sir, please give me a chance to prove me that, m proud son of my mother land and good soldier. Sir, I am requesting your Honour, please pardon
me for my family at least to give me a chance to rectify my deeds and promise you I will not indulge in any anti National activities, my lord, please pardon me.
36. It is also submitted that Ex.P.260 does not qualify as a
confessional statement within the expression and for the
purpose of Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [for
short, the Evidence Act] and therefore, cannot be given the
status of the confessional statement within the scope of
Section 164 of Cr.P.C. and also being hit by the provision of
Section 24 in the sense that it was not either voluntarily or
freely made by A.8, it has no evidentiary value for securing
conviction either against A.8 or as against the other co-
accused persons, as it is not the material which qualifies for
its acceptability under Section 30 of the Evidence Act.
37. Mr.Pasha with reference to the evidence of PWs.65 and
66 particularly, the witnesses examined only for marking the
41
documents, the said two witnesses having not spoken about
the contents in the statement and the contents of P260
having not been proved, particularly, by not examining the
person to whom the letter was addressed to, namely the
Magistrate, the contents cannot be looked into to conclude
that, it is in the nature of a confessional statement by 8th
accused person.
38. Mr.Pasha has placed reliance on the following
judgment to make good this point namely, in the case of
NARBABE DEVI GUPTA VS. BIRENDRA KUMAR JAISWAL
& ANOTHER [AIR 2004 SC 175] submits that just because
the document is marked, does not in any way amount to
proving the contents. Further reliance is also placed on the
decision of privy council in the case of NAZIR AHMED VS.
KING EMPEROR [AIR 1936 PC 253], in the case of
IBRAHIM VS. EMPEROR [AIR 1937 LAHOR 208] and also
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF
UTTAR PRADESH VS. SINGARA SINGH & OTHERS
42
reported IN AIR 1964 SC 358, to submit that if the
procedure as contemplated under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. has
not been adhered to or followed, it cannot be given the
status of confessional statement within the scope of this
provision.
39. Mr.Pasha submitted that Ex.P.260 does not qualify for
its acceptability under any other enabling statutory
provision of the code of criminal procedure or the Evidence
Act and therefore, it cannot be said that the prosecution has
proved this document, which is the case as against the
convicted appellants.
40. Even with reference to the contents of Ex.P.260,
submission of Mr.Pasha is that the contents of Ex.P.260 at
best can be used by the prosecution for the purpose of its
theory of conspiracy and not any further in the sense, for
commission of any acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and
that the person is not aware of the subsequent developments
etc., It is the submission of Mr.Pasha that the very
43
document having been marked as Exs.P.246 to P.250 in
S.C.No.95/2001 before the Sessions Court at Hyderabad, it
cannot be again relied upon and used as evidence either for
proving the offence Section 120-B IPC for the present case or
in respect of other offences.
41. With reference to the evidentiary value of deposition of
PW.46, first and primary objection raised by Mr.Pasha is
that the deposition of this witness clearly indicates that he
had a role and actually participated in all the meetings of the
members of Deendar Anjuman Organisation and that he has
revealed the information and the decision that took place in
those meetings whether held at Hyderabad or at other places
and if at all was very much part of the conspiracy and stood
in the position of an accomplice in the conspiracy.
42. Submission is based on the premise that the witness,
who is cited as a witness, in fact should have been arraigned
as an accused person and if he is an accused, the question
of his testimony being made use of either against any of the
44
appellant, convicted persons or other persons, cannot arise.
It is submitted that if PW.46 was in the position as an
accused, he could not have either testified against himself or
against other accused persons and the prosecution, just
because he has not been arraigned as an accused in spite of
material being available, the evidence of this witness cannot
be put on par with the evidence of any other witness, who
has testified in support of the prosecution case.
43. It is submitted that if PW.46 should have been
arraigned as an accused, then unless the prosecution had
obtained the permission of the Court for pardoning the
accused within the scope of the provisions of Sections 306
and 307 of Cr.P.C., there was no way for such a person
giving evidence before the Court and the prosecution having
not resorted to this course of action, but on the other hand,
deliberately having opted not to arraign him as an accused,
but at a later stage of trial, through an application filed
under section 311 of the Cr.PC to examine him as witnesses
45
in support of the prosecution case, is virtually an over
reaching act for bypassing the statutory requirement in
terms of provision of Sections 306 and 307 of Cr.P.C.
44. It is also his submission that it also amounts to the
Investigating Officers virtually exercising the power of the
Court or usurping the power of the Court under Sections
306 and 307 of Cr.P.C., which is not permitted in law and
therefore, no reliance could be placed on the evidence of this
witness. In support of his submission, Mr.Pasha placed
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of P.SIRAJUDDIN VS. THE STATE OF MADRAS reported in
AIR 1971 SC 520, wherein the Supreme Court observed as
under:
“26. In our view the granting of amnesty to two persons who are sure to be examined as witnesses for the prosecution was highly irregular and unfortunate. It was rightly pointed out by the High Court.
Neither the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Prevention of Corruption Act recognizes the immunity from prosecution given under these
46
assurances and that the grant of pardon was not in the discretion of police authorities.”
and also the judgment of HARSHAD S. MEHTA VS. STATE
OF MAHARASTRA reported in 2001 SCC (CRI) 1447,
particularly as discussed in para 13 of this judgment.
45. It is submitted that the prosecution has deliberately
avoided the status of an accused to this witness and he has
been styled as a witness in violation of Sections 306 and 307
of Cr.P.C. Submits that his (PW.46) evidence should not be
accepted as a valid piece of acceptable oral evidence. In this
regard, Mr.Pasha also pointed out that so called statement
made by PW.46 under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. before the
Magistrate, Hubli, was in connection with Sessions Case
Nos.580 & 579/2003 in the case of State of Karnataka by
Keshavapura Police, Hubli Vs. Syed Muneeruddin Mulla &
Others, being not brought on record, in the manner
permitted in law, in the present case, the deposition of
PW.46 does not elicit acceptability. It is also the submission
47
of Mr.Pasha that PW.46 in fact had been arrested by the
Hubli Police and was in police custody for more than two
months and it was during such period, the statement had
been recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., but it is also not
brought on record in this case by the prosecution.
46. It is the submission of Mr.Pasha that except for PW.46,
no other independent witness has supported the prosecution
theory of conspiracy and the evidence of PW.46 being so
suspicious and not trustworthy and being hit by the
statutory provision, the conspiracy theory is not made good
by the prosecution and it is not acceptable as cogent
evidence. Therefore, also it is submitted that apart from the
legal infirmity, the conspiracy is not made good by the
prosecution on acceptable cogent evidence.
47. Mr.Pasha has also made submission regarding the
quality of the evidence, which the prosecution has let in
through PW.28 - P.N. Mukunda, a witness who has
48
identified A-1, and who has deposed that he had seen A-1
and two others as the occupants of the Maruthi Van in
which the explosion took place on Magadi Road; that he had
seen the van and the three persons in the vicinity of church
in Jagajeevanram Nagar, where in also a bomb blast took
place rudely disrupting the festivities going on in the church
on that day and even with regard to the evidence brought on
record through PW.46 that the entire evidence does not
reveal the existence of any conspiracy amongst the accused
persons in respect of the incident with reference to which,
the prosecution has launched S.C.No.423/2001.
48. He further submits that the evidence does not contain
any reference to the incident that has taken place at Magadi
Road, Bangalore in front of Minerva Mill Gate, in a Maruthi
Van in which an explosive exploded and in which, A.1 was
travelling.
49. Mr. Pasha also pointed out that with reference to the
evidence of PW.28, by name Mukunda, a worker in a
49
provision store near St. Peter and Paul Church at J.J.Nagar
and in his deposition, he has stated that he had seen A.1
and A.3 moving in the Maruthi Van, in which, the blast took
place at Magadi Road and that he having seen them with
Van being parked near the Church, two persons were seen,
one carrying a bag going inside the Church and returning
and also informing the other one that job is accomplished
and then the van was driven away, is a piece of evidence,
which is to say the least most fantastic, as even according to
the prosecution, it was a festival day and thousands of
people had gathered, he had been to the provision store to
attend his work and it is not indicated as to how he could
have watched all these accused persons. He also pointed
out with reference to the testification of A.1 by this witness
that for the purpose of identification, A.1 had been brought
on a wheel chair and there was no identification
independently as the accused was the only person, who was
in a wheel chair, who was an injured person and therefore, it
was a give away.
50
50. Submission of Mr.Pasha is that, the version is neither
believable nor identification is properly proved and therefore,
the evidence of PW.28 cannot be accepted. It is also further
pointed out that at any rate this evidence does not advance
the case of the prosecution insofar as the blast at a different
place is concerned and the blast being accidental in nature,
cannot link up as an intended act of support to any offensive
act with which the accused are charged.
51. Mr. Pasha, learned counsel for the appellant has
contended that, even while the prosecution has placed heavy
reliance on the evidence of PWs.28 and 46 to make good
their case before the Court and also Ex.P-260, the other oral
and documentary evidence including the mahazars are
either not relevant or not fully proved, because the mahazar
witnesses have turned hostile and also because the evidence
is not fully proved as of acceptable quality.
51
52. Mr. Pasha, points out that the prosecution has
searched the residence of A.1 and had seized articles found
in terms of Ex.P-7 mahazar drawn on 10.7.2000 at the
residence of A.1. It is pointed out that though the mahazar
is supported by the testimony of Investigation Officer, PW.59
and panch witness, PW.12 and attributable recoveries of
MOs 4 to 69 submits with reference to the contents of MOs
11 to 69 is that there is no incriminating materials in the
seizure either to incriminate A.1 of the theory of conspiracy
or for the offences punishable under Sections 121, 121A,
124A, 153A r/w 120B of IPC.
53. As already pointed out except the possible possession
of explosive material by A-1, other accused persons cannot
be linked to any other recovery even with reference to the
material Ex.P-7 mahazar.
54. With reference to the mahazar drawn at the place of
occurrence of the blast that has taken place in respect of
Maruthi Van bearing No.GA-01-V-2786 at about 9.30 p.m.
52
on 9.7.2000, at Magadi Road, in front of Minerva Mill Gate,
it is pointed out that when the blast has taken place on the
previous day between 9 to 9.30 p.m. mahazar was drawn on
the next day between 3 to 5 p.m. and what is more
important to point out is that this mahazar has been drawn
after the drawing of the mahazar Ex.P7 at the house of A1 in
the morning.
55. Submission is that recoveries made with reference to
the mahazar drawn in the place of blast cannot be accepted
on its face value and particularly the recovery of burnt
pamphlets containing the slogans as per MOs 2 and 3 –
warning Christian missionaries to stop conversion or quit
India, which material cannot be believed for the reason that
even according to the prosecution, the blast was so severe
and due to explosion of bomb, the possibility of combustible
substance like the pamphlets MOs 2 and 3 surviving is
highly doubtful and therefore, the recovery of such material
cannot be accepted on its face value, but it is suspicious.
53
56. It is also submitted that even from the evidence of
PW.58, the First Investigating Officer who has admittedly
visited the scene of occurrence on the very night on receipt
of the message through the control room and who has also
made arrangement to put some watch and ward, later on, at
the scene of occurrence having not noticed such
incriminating materials at that time, but the same having
been recovered much later is also a suspicious circumstance
to accept the recovery of MOs 2 and 3 as a genuine recovery,
to be proved against the accused appellant.
57. Mr. Pasha, with reference to the evidence of PW.11 –
H.R.Reddy, Police Sub-Inspector, who had informed about
the occurrence through the control room on his noticing the
incident, while he was on his way to his residence from his
work place and he having not spoken anything about the
existence of such pamphlets as MOs. 2 and 3 also, submits
this also raises doubt about the genuineness of the recovery
of this material from the spot under Ex.P-1. He also
54
submitted that other police officials as PWs 4 and 5 also had
visited the spot and they also having not noticed the
existence of such material or having deposed about the same
and more so, PW.3 being a mechanic, who is a panch
witness for Ex.P-1 and who has visited the spot on the day of
the incident also having not noticed the existence or
availability of MOs 2 and 3, all these circumstances create
doubt and suspicion about the recovery.
58. Even the fact that PW.2 had in fact identified A.1, who
had visited the spot on the previous day of the occurrence
having not noticed and having not mentioned anything
about the existence of MOs 2 and 3 and in these
circumstances, it creates considerable doubt about the
recovery, is the submission of the counsel for appellant.
59. With regard to the mahazar drawn at the work place of
A.9 and A.17 i.e., the factory premises of the BEML,
Bangalore and mahazar Exs.P-13 and 14 drawn within the
factory premises of BEML and the recoveries made therein,
55
Mr. Pasha has submitted that these mahazars are not fully
in consonance with the requirements of the law and the
recoveries are also not without any doubt or suspicion.
60. With reference to Ex.P-13, under which recovery of
material object Exs.P-110 to 146 had been made at the
instance of A.17 as per the mahazar drawn on 29.7.2000
submission of Mr.Pasha is that this recovery does not in any
way point an accusing finger or reveal incriminating material
against A.17 for making out offences with which the accused
has been charged. Except for MO.142 which is again the
pamphlets is in the nature of MOs 2 and 3 all other material
put against accused, Mr.Pasha submits is literature relating
to the Deendar Anjuman Organisation and its objects and
principles and further submits that mere possession of the
said literate does not in any way amounts to commission of
any offence more so of the nature of offences with which
A.17 has been charged.
56
61. With reference to Ex.P-14 mahazar drawn on 3.8.2000
at the workplace of A.9 and said to be at the instance of A.9,
the recovery of MOs 148 to 153 particularly, the floppies
said to have been recovered from the drawer in the control of
A.9, what is pointed out by Mr.Pasha is even as per the
evidence of PW.19 G.Vishwanath, who was the General
Manager of BEML, Bangalore and who is a panch witness for
Exs.P-13 and P-14 and who has identified A.9 and A.17 as
employees of BEML and seizure of MOs 110 to 147 at the
instance of A.17 and MOs 148 to 153 which were at the
instance of A.9, he had also deposed that the drawer of A.9
and cupboard of A.17 had been sealed by security officer of
the factory, On learning about the involvement of the
employees of their factory as on 23.7.2000 when A.9 was
arrested by the police and the same had become known to
the employer through newspaper and about the arrest of
A.17 on 27.7.2000 which also the employer has learnt and
therefore, the security officer has sealed the drawer and
cupboard of A.9 and A.17 respectively, but the mahazar
57
drawn as per Ex.P-13 and P-14 does not necessarily indicate
the seal put by the security official had been opened by the
security official before recoveries were made and therefore,
the submission is that if the seal was not in tact and
developments have taken place in between the date of
mahazar and the date of seal being put by the security
official of the factory, the recoveries become doubtful and
suspicious. He submitted that the material recovered being
such that they can be placed by any one and the contents of
the mahazar expressly having not indicated the position, it
cannot be said that the seal had not been broken earlier.
One other circumstance pointed out by Mr.Pasha is about
the genuineness of the mahazar and the recoveries by the
Investigating Officer. PW.66 who had accompanied A.9 and
A.17 on the dates of the mahazar and when it is the practice
and rule that all visitors to the factory and particulars
noticed at the factory gate/entrance by the security, such an
entry is not found in respect of PW.66 and is therefore yet
another circumstance to doubt the recovery in the presence
58
of PW.66 along with accused at the place where the mahazar
has been drawn recoveries become doubtful in the absence
of corresponding entry made in the security book
maintained in the factory up to date. This position also
having been revealed in the evidence of PW.19 is a
circumstance which creates doubt about genuineness of the
mahazar and recoveries and therefore, not much credence
can be attributed to the recoveries through these mahazars.
62. It is contended with reference to the mahazar dated
23.7.2000 drawn at the residence of A9 and the recoveries
under this mahazar viz. MOs 169 to 185, that the recoveries
does not necessarily constitute incriminating material to
demonstrate the commission of offences which are urged
with by A9; that the material objects do not necessarily link
up to one another; that the pocket diary of A9 containing
telephone number and photo of A1 and also e-mail ID of A8
mentioned in the dairy by themselves does not make out a
case of the commission of the offence with which the
59
accused has been charged; though the panch witness PW57
Jaganath has supported the recoveries. The recoveries by
themselves do not constitute any incriminating material.
The prosecution cannot be said to have been made good
their case through the recoveries made in the residence of
A9. Even with reference to the contents of Ex.P177
particularly the prosecution having placed reliance on the
contents in this mahazar to indicate that A9 had pointed out
to the panchas the place where himself and other accused
persons sat for discussion to chalk out the future course of
action and the discussion about testing the bombs etc. are
all in the nature of confessional statement, but not a
confession statement made by the accused to any person
much less within the scope of Section 164, but in the form of
narration by three persons and incorporated into the
mahazar. It is therefore, submitted that such contents
which are not proved have no evidentiary value and at any
rate the so called discussion relating to the future course of
action amounting to conspiracy against the persons
60
including A9 cannot be accepted as it is more in the nature
of hear-say evidence and the contents have not been
subjected to scrutiny of cross examination of any person
testifying to the same i.e. contents of the mahazar and
therefore, submits that what cannot be achieved directly
cannot be permitted to be achieved indirectly and much
reliance cannot be placed, on such version in the mahazar.
63. Even with reference to Ex.265 which is said to be in
the handwriting of A-16 and which according to the
prosecution is in a coded language containing material
relating to the acts of sabotage intended by the accused
persons and relating to distribution of work planned by the
accused persons and to be carried out by different persons
for whom such responsibilities are entrusted it is submitted
by Mr Pasha that neither it is a document which is proved
nor it is shown to be in the hand writing of A16. It is
submitted that mere recovery of such a chit of paper by itself
cannot amount to and even assuming that it is opined by
61
the hand writing expert that Ex.265 is in the hand writing of
A16, that will not in any way constitute material to
incriminate A9.
64. More particularly, Mr.Pasha submitted that assuming
for argument sake there is some material, such material
does not constitute either primary evidence or basic material
for securing conviction and contends that it is a well
accepted legal principle, that it is in the nature of weak
evidence which by itself cannot achieve the object of
securing conviction, against accused.
65. Even with regard to the mahazar drawn at the office of
the COD and said to be for the purpose of retrieving the
contents of floppies said to have been recovered under
Ex.P14-mahazar and to take out hard copies of the
information containing in the floppies, submission is that
the stand of the prosecution that the information retrieved is
of confidential nature that it had been clandestinely
obtained through A8 and passed on to A7 is not made good;
62
that it is also not proved by the prosecution that the
information contained in the floppies are information in the
nature of secret and confidential information not otherwise
available to the general public and therefore, the services of
A8 in Air force personnel had been employed is
not tenable as the information relating to existence and the
number of defence establishment is an information even
otherwise available and more importantly it is pointed out no
one has been examined to indicate that the information
contained therein is a very confidential information which is
not otherwise available to the general public and therefore,
the accused persons have been availing the services of A8
and transmitting information to A7 in Pakistan. Submission
is, the information is neither confidential nor has any one
testified to that effect and even transmission to A7 in
Pakistan is also not made good by placing any cogent
material.
63
66. Even with regard to the retrievals the contents said to
have been in the floppies and as retrieved to the print outs
which is got done through Venkatesh, Computer Expert,
submission is, that this computer expert is not examined to
make good that the hard copies are the retrievals from the
floppies which had been earlier seized from the drawer of A9
and the material so retrieved cannot be accepted as evidence
for the reasons that it is not within the scope of Section 65A
of the Evidence Act. For not complying with the requirement
under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, the retrieved
contents having not been proved in accordance with the
requirement of law, no reliance can be placed on it. In
support of his submission Mr.Pasha has placed reliance on
the following decision in the case of R V MINORS vs R V
HARPER [(1989) 2 ALL. ER 208] holding that unless the
computer from which the print out is taken out is certified to
be as an electronic instrument, which is functioning with
accuracy and certified to be so by an expert. Admissibility of
documentary record said to be retrieved from such an
64
electronic device cannot be accepted or admitted more so in
the absence of supporting oral evidence of the person, the
expert testifying about the accuracy of the information
retrieved and the proper functioning of the electronic device
from which it is retrieved.
67. Reliance is also placed on a Single Bench decision of
Kerala High Court in the case of M PERUMAL vs M/S. STAR
TOURS AND TRAVELS (INDIA) LTD.. reported in 2010
CRL.LJ 3732. It is particularly pointed out by the learned
Judge of the Kerala High Court that the evidence relied upon
by the respondent in that case having not been made good
by fulfilling the conditions stipulated u/s.65-B(2) nor a
certificate as required under Section 65B(4) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 [for short, Evidence Act]. No reliance
can be placed on the document which was exhibited in that
case in support of the claim of the respondent.
68. Mr Pasha submits this requirement having not been
fulfilled the contents of the retrieval from the floppies
65
does not constitute material of evidentiary value for the
purpose of proving the prosecution case.
69. Insofar as A10 is concerned, submission of Sri.Pasha,
learned counsel for the appellant, is that though his home
was searched and Ex.P9 Mahazar was drawn at his house,
and recoveries as per MO’s 87 to 94 is made, except for
MO87 which is again a pamphlet containing the same slogan
of Christian Missionaries to stop conversion or quit India, all
other material objects are in the nature of books or literature
regarding the Deendar movement as also the general
literature relating to religion and such other subjects. What
is pointed out is that the recovery does not reveal any
incriminating material against A10 either for having
participated in any conspiracy or for taking part in any act
which constituted evidence for which he has been charged.
On the basis of such general material recovered during
search at the house of A10, no conviction can be secured by
the prosecution is the submission.
66
70. Even Ex.P262 voluntary statement of A10 and similar
voluntary statements of other accused do not constitute
acceptable evidence and the statements having not resulted
in the recovery or revelation of a fresh fact, within the
meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the contents
cannot be accepted for evidentiary value. The decision of
privy council in the case of KOTTAYA vs EMPEROR
reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 and the principle laid down
therein is strongly relied upon and this principle having
been consistently followed in full is point out. Mr Pasha has
submitted that marking of Ex.P262 is of no avail for proving
anything against A10 and therefore, contended that there is
absolutely no incriminating circumstance or material made
good by the prosecution as against A10.
71. Mr.Pasha also submitted that even mahazar Ex.P273,
drawn at the residence of A8 which is in Gurgoan, Haryana
resulting in the recovery of MO’s 188-202, and the argument
is that no incriminating material having been recovered nor
67
made good and even with regard to a sum of Rs.50,000/-
cash that had been seized, the investigating officer being
satisfied with the legitimacy of its origin to the wife of A8 as
it represented the sale proceeds of agricultural land which
had been disposed of by A8.
72. It is also pointed out that MOs 196 - 197 which are the
photos of Chand Siddique and 198- Zia Ul Hassan- A7 and
MO199- invitation card for the URS being conducted at
Hyderabad; that these MOs by themselves do not constitute
any incriminating material as against A8 except perhaps to
show that he is also a follower and patron of Deendar
movement.
73. Even with regard to Ex.P260 Mr Pasha has submitted
that the prosecution has placed reliance on this document
as a confessional statement of A8 submission is, though this
was mentioned to A8 for the purpose of recording statement
u/s.313 Cr.P.C, nevertheless the contents of Ex.P260 having
not been explained or put to the accused persons and its
68
effect also not having been properly explained to the accused
persons, it is submitted that it is not the manner of
recording 313 statement as the circumstance which are
revealed for accepting this document has never been
explained to the accused nor the material which constituted
incriminating material against A8 was explained and
therefore, the acceptability of the contents of Ex.260 is again
hit as not adhering to requirements of 313 Cr.P.C. It is
submitted by Mr.Pasha that insofar other accused, who have
been found guilty other than A8 are concerned; that the
contents of Ex.P260 having not been made known to other
persons it is a case of clear violation of provisions of Section
313 as there is no presumption as against other accused
other than A8 about the contents of the same. Even
assuming for the argument sake A8 did know the contents of
the same, Mr.Pasha has also placed reliance on the
authority of the ruling in INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
AKSHINOOR, J & K vs YASH PAL [2009 CR.L.J. 2251],
69
wherein in Para 22 it is stated as under; while discussing
the object and scope of section 313 of Cr.PC.
“At the same time it should be borne in mind that the provision is not intended to nail him to any position, but to comply with the most salutary principle of natural justice enshrined in the maxim audi alteram partem. The word “may” in clause (a) of sub-section (1) in Section 313 of the
Code indicates, without any doubt, that even if the court does not put any question under that clause the accused cannot raise any grievance for it. But if the court fails to put the needed question under clause (b) of the sub section it would result in a handicap to the accused and
he can legitimately claim that no evidence, without affording him the opportunity to explain, can be used against him. It is now well settled that a circumstance about which the accused was not asked to explain cannot be used against him.”
74. With regard to recovery made under ExP12 is
concerned, viz., seizure of one computer comprised of CPU,
monitor, modem, keyboard and mouse, what is submitted by
Sri Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants, is
that the so-called password for sending e-mails from this
computer and in a new account viz., email id:
hsdchandrashekar and password moonforehead is again
70
because of the statement attributed to A-17 as per the
contents of the mahazar and in the nature of a confession,
admitting that that was the very computer which was being
used for sending emails to Pakistan using the email id:
hsdchandrashekar and password moonforehead and a
recording of this nature is not a confession through the
contents of the mahazar and cannot constitute as admissible
evidence against the accused persons.
75. Even with regard to the seizure of scooter said to be
belonging to A-1 and which was parked besides the house of
A-17, submission is that from the boot of the scooter,
recovery of Xerox copies of registration particulars of Maruti
van which was involved in the blast in Magadi road at
Bangalore is not an acceptable recovery, as the mahazar
drawn earlier at the very house of the accused person on 15-
7-2000 has not revealed anything about the scooter being
present near the house of A-17 and so also the location or
placing of a computer under a cot in the house of A-17. It
71
is submitted that recoveries under the mahazars and the
contents therein are highly suspicious and do not constitute
acceptable material and even otherwise the contents of the
mahazar which is in the nature of a confession recorded
[ExP271] by the investigating officer – PW66 – in the
presence of panchas cannot constitute material evidence or
incriminating material to find guilt against the accused in
respect of the offences with which they are charged.
ExP271, which is marked as a sequence in the nature of
voluntary statement recorded by the investigating officer is
not proved in the manner required under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act through discovery of any new fact, as a sequel
to the information leading to drawing of mahazars and the
recoveries.
76. Sri Hashmath Pasha also submitted that rest of the
mahazars drawn by the investigating officer in the presence
of panchas pursuant to the information given by either A-9
or A-10 and at any other place are of no consequence, as no
72
incriminating material as either being recovered or seized
which constitute an offence against the accused persons and
therefore the searches and the consequential mahazars
drawn were of no consequence. It is also submitted that in
fact such places having already been searched by the
Hyderabad police in connection with SC 95 of 2001 tried
before a Hyderabad court, a second or third search on the
same premises yielding anything or not yielding anything is
of no significance or consequence.
77. It is therefore, submitted by Mr.Pasha that the
prosecution has not at all made good its version of the
accused persons being guilty of the charges of the offence
with which they are charged, either as they are acceptable
factual material or as acceptable material as envisaged in
law and on the other hand, material placed by the
prosecution before the trial Court being vitiated due to
infraction of many statutory provisions as noticed above the
convictions cannot be sustained; that it requires to be set
73
aside and at any rate in a matter of this nature, the benefit
of doubt always enures to the accused and not in favour of
the prosecution and even if the material placed accepting
some part of it is constituting some material, being not in
the nature of a foolproof material and therefore, the
prosecution having not proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt the accused should be given benefit of doubt by this
court and accordingly, the judgment and order be set aside
and the accused persons should be acquitted of the charges
of committing offences with which they are charged.
78. Without prejudice to the above contentions, Sri Pasha
has also put forth an alternative submission to submit that
the material on record accepting it at its face value, at the
best, can constitute an offence as against A-1 alone, who
was found driving the Maruti van in which explosive
substances were carried and the explosive substances
having accidently blown up because of rash and negligent
driving and due to vibration and impact on the explosive
74
substances during such driving, the circumstances may, at
the best, reveal commission of offence punishable under
Section 304A, 337, 427 IPC and under Section 5 of Explosive
Substances Act, 1908 and Section 9B(1)(b) of the Explosives
Act, 1884. It is submitted that assuming that for
arguments’ sake, without conceding that the prosecution
has made good the commission of offence punishable under
these provisions by A-1, the maximum punishment that can
be imposed on him is 10 years RI under Section 5 of the
Explosive Substances Act as it existed at the relevant point
of time, though the section has been amended with effect
from 1-2-2002 to provide for a maximum punishment up of
imprisonment for life, that being not applicable to the case
on hand, as the incident alleged being of the year 2000, A-1,
on the basis of being found in possession and transportation
of an explosive substance and also causing death of A-2 and
3 by careless and negligent driving can, at the best, be
punished by imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years RI
and with the A-1 having already been in prison for much
75
more than this period from the date of his arrest and in such
circumstance, having regard to this and the present physical
condition of A-1, Sri Pasha submits that the punishment
imposed or impossable under these provisions, particularly
under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, may be for
the period of imprisonment already underwent by A-1, as A-
1 has been in prison after his arrest for more than 12 years
as of now, he may be given set off for the period of
imprisonment he underwent be sufficient as against such
imposition of punishment and accordingly he may be
released.
79. Countering such submission made by the learned
counsel for the appellants, Sri H N Nilogal, learned SPP has
very strongly urged that the prosecution has made good its
story with as good evidence as is possible in the
circumstance; that even it is judicially noticed that the
conspiracies are hatched in secrecy and that such kind of
conspiracies can never be proved through direct evidence to
76
make good the offence; that the material placed by the
prosecution in the form of evidence, oral and documentary,
was good enough to secure conviction of the accused
persons for the offences with which they have been charged;
that the fact that they are all members of a religious sect
namely Deendar Anjuman Organization; that they have a
strong belief and faith in the movement of their organization;
that periodic meetings held by the followers of this
organization not only at Hyderabad but also at other places
viz., Batkurki and Bangalore, are all circumstances made
good by the prosecution and the accused persons’
involvement in not only the meetings but also connecting
them to the follow up action and incidents that have come
into light being made good by the prosecution, it cannot be
said that the prosecution has failed to prove its case before
the court. It is, therefore, urged that the judgment under
appeal is to be sustained.
77
80. With reference to the nature of the organization and to
understand and appreciate the same, Sri Nilogal has taken
us through the prosecution case as presented before the trial
court and has also drawn our attention to the literature in
the form of book that were exhibited, which throw light on
the nature of the organization and its activities and its goals.
For such purpose, Sri Nilogal has made reference to book
End of an Era authored by Sri K M Munshi and while it is
pointed out that the organization was founded by Hazarath
Moulana Syed Siddiqui, it is specifically mentioned in this
book that he was neither a saint as claimed by the followers
of the organization nor the organization was preaching and
spreading good things and harmony, as is sought to be
projected, but it was found to be a very intolerant
organization, particularly towards Hindu community; that it
was only to Islamize not only the entire population in India
but also the population throughout the world by persuation
or by force; that it propagated hatred towards other
communities including Hindus and Christians; that it is very
78
manifest from its activities from the very beginning of the
movement founded by Hazarath Moulana Syed Siddiqui;
that it also sought to bring about internal differences,
particularly through the Book Lingayat, authored by the
founder of the organization; that it was meant to project
members of Lingayat community as only members belonging
to Mohammadan community and a consistent and concerted
effort was being made to convert all members of Lingayat
community and to make them as their sect and taking them
into the fold of Islam; that such references are found in this
book; though the book authored by late K M Munshi is with
reference to rule of Nizams of Hyderabad and the book also
indicates the rule of Nizams; it also makes mention of the
Deendar Anjuman movement founded by Hazarat Siddiqui;
that it had indulged in acts of violence against the people
belonging to other communities, particularly people
belonging to Hindu community. It is pointed out that all
these aspects have been taken note by the learned judge of
the trial court in his judgment also.
79
81. It is submitted that the members of the organization
had entered into a conspiracy at Hyderabad for furtherance
of the activities of the organization, particularly for
converting all Hindus to Islam by persuasion and if not
possible by force; that for such purpose, if need be wage holy
war jihad; and collected resources through Nifaaq and Syria;
that the meetings were held at Hyderabad; that participation
of the members of the organization including the accused
except A-10 who were congregating at the annual urs being
conducted at Asifnagar, Hyderabad to commemorate the
death anniversary of the founder of the organization was the
focal point for such congregation; that in one such
congregations held in October, 1989, wherein A-7 had
participated along with others, a programme for indulging in
acts of violence and sabotage was chalked out and the
members of the organization who can take active part and
the follow up actions were asked to meet again and to take
follow up action; that while the conspiracy at Hyderabad was
80
in fact subject matter of charge in a sessions case before a
Hyderabad court, the follow up action for acts of disruptions,
sabotage and other acts of waging war against the country
was taken in the meeting of the accused persons and others
held at Batkurki and a subsequent meeting at Bangalore
and in this background submission of Sri Nilogal is that the
conspiracy for commission of offence at Bangalore and other
places in Karnataka state was as a result of fresh and new
conspiracy, a conspiracy apart and in addition to the
conspiracy at Hyderabad and it is on such premise,
submission is made by the learned SPP that the provisions
of Section 300 CrPC and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of
India are not attracted for trying the accused persons in the
SC No 423 of 2001 before the Bangalore court in respect of
the incident of bomb blast in Maruti van driven by the A-1
that took place on 09.07.2000 in front of the factory gate of
Minerva mills on Magadi road, Bangalore.
81
82. Mr.Nilogal, learned SPP has drawn our attention to
page Nos. 68, 111 of the judgment of the Trial Court wherein
there is a detailed discussion about the activities of the
Deendar Anjuman Organization that it is a militant
organization since inception. Learned SPP submitted that
the Hazrath Maulana had set the object of conversion of all
Hindus to Islam using force and other methods. In this
regard has drawn our attention to the book ‘End of an era’
by Sri K M Munshi.
83. Mr. Nilogal, learned SPP submitted that some of the
accused persons had been prosecuted before the Hyderabad
Court in S.C.No.95/2001 only in respect of incidents that
had taken place in Hyderabad State and not with reference
to the bomb blast that had taken place in front of Minerva
Mill Gate at Magadi Road. Therefore, the case of the
accused persons in connection with the incident that took
place due to the bomb blast by Maruthi Van driven by A1
cannot be said to be affected either by the provisions of
82
Section 300 Cr.P.C or Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of
India. His submission is that there was a fresh conspiracy
in respect of the acts in the State of Karnataka and though
the main object was to carry on acts of sabotage and
subversive activities with waging war against the State,
bombing in churches, loot and plunder, railway wagons and
ultimately the object of Islamisation of the entire country
and throw out the established government. However, each
time there was a fresh act, which was the result of a fresh
conspiracy and in furtherance of the original goal and object
of the organization and each time a new incident takes place
there is a conspiracy behind; that it is only to be established.
84. It is also pointed that accused persons had not been
tried for the offences punishable under Sections 121 of 121A
of the IPC before Hyderabad Court and therefore, it cannot
be said that the provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C comes in
the way of the prosecution case before the Bangalore Court
in S.C.No.423/2001.
83
85. Learned SPP submits that new facts had come into
existence in the sense that there was a fresh conspiracy held
at Bangalore at the residences of A1 & A9 and those who
had participated and agreed for carrying out the Act
pursuant to fresh conspiracy are liable and that is the
reason as to why the prosecution case is not affected by the
principles of double jeopardy. He submits that in the cases
relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant all those were cases where in on the same set of
facts a fresh prosecution was held to be not permitted and
as was noticed in the facts of the particular case.
86. Mr.Nilogal, learned SPP has also submitted that the
prosecution case is also not in any way hit by want of
sanction in respect of the additional charge particularly for
trying the accused persons for the offences punishable
under Sections 121 & 121A of the Code. He submitted that
before the sanction obtained as per Ex.P181, prosecution
had placed full material on facts before the sanctioning
84
authority and the sanction had been accorded. That the
prosecution having not led any additional evidence and only
additional charges have been framed and as permitted under
Section 216(5) of the Code, the prosecution case does not
suffer for want of fresh sanction. He submitted that the
facts and evidence being the same and only additional
charges being framed, prosecution case is not affected.
Sanction, which had been obtained at the time of
prosecuting the accused for the offences punishable under
Sections 124A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code is good
enough for prosecuting the accused persons under Sections
121 and 121A of the Code also. In this regard Mr.Nilogal,
learned SPP has placed reliance on the judgment of the Privy
council in the case of GOKULCHAND DWARKADAS
MORARKA reported in AIR 1948 PC 82, the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parliament Bomb blast case, in
the case of STATE (NCT OF DELHI) vs NAVJOT SANDHU
reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715 & in the case of FOOD
INSPECTOR, EARNAKULAM vs P S SREENIVASA
85
SHENOY reported in AIR 2000 SC 2577 & in the case of
LOURIE E JACOBS vs UNION OF INDIA reported in AIR
1958 ALLAHABAD 481.
87. Mr.Nilogal has also drawn our attention to Sections
464 & 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and submits
that sufficient opportunity having been given to the accused
persons after the framing of the charge and accused persons
having been enabled to recall the prosecution witnesses and
to cross-examine them further, there is no prejudice or
failure of justice to the accused persons and therefore, there
is no error in framing of additional charge, so also the
conviction passed on the additional charge. Further reliance
is placed on the following decisions, in the case of KRISHNA
KUMAR vs STATE reported in AIR 1955 PUNJAB 151, in
the case of MOSEB KAKA CHOWDHRY AND ANOTHER VS.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL reported in 1956 SC 536 (S)
and in the case of GOKULCHAND DWARKADAS MORARKA
[supra].
86
88. On the strength of the ratio of this decision he
submitted that the prosecution case is not in any way
vitiated.
89. It is pointed out that though the facts and
information relating to Ex.P260 was not before the
sanctioning authority, nevertheless the confessional
statement of A8 that had been recorded by the investigating
officer on 8-8-2000 [Ex.P274] was very much before the
sanctioning authority at the time sanction was granted as on
10-10-2000. Therefore, Mr. Nilogal submits that all facts
and information enabling framing of additional charges for
offences punishable under Sections 121 & 121A IPC was
before the sanctioning authority and it is on perusal of such
material the sanction has been granted. Separate sanction
in respect of additional charge was not necessary for that
reason. Mr.Nilogal also submitted that the Note put-up
by the concerned official to sanctioning authority do indicate
that such material has been placed and considered by the
87
sanctioning authority, which is part of the original sanction
records of the authority.
90. Mr.Nilogal contended, the argument advanced on
behalf of the appellant that evidence of PW-46 Abdul Gaffur
cannot be looked into for the reason that the said witness
was in the position of an accomplice even for the charges of
conspiracy as he has participated in the very meeting where
the other accused persons said to have been participated
and without arraying him as accused, the prosecution has
examined him as a witness and therefore it is nothing short
of bypassing the provisions of Sections 306 & 307 Cr.P.C, is
not a sound argument. Mr Nilogal submits that in the first
instance, PW-46 was not accused person and therefore
provisions of Sections 306 & 307 Cr.P.C are not attracted.
In this regard, Mr.Nilogal has sought to justify the reliance
placed by Sri Pasha on the judgment of the Supreme Court
in P.SIRAJUDDIN vs STATE OF MADRAS [AIR 1971 SC
520] by submitting that in the case before the Supreme
88
Court, when a police officer has given immunity and
protection to a witness, which is beneficial in favour of
prosecution, which was also in writing and therefore the
ratio of that case is not applicable to the facts of the present
case. On the other hand, reliance is placed on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of L CHORARIA
vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [AIR 1968 SC 938] and
submitted that there is no embargo for examining a person
as witness without arraying him as an accused. Even with
reference to the material on record, it is submitted by
Mr.Nilogal that the very evidence of PW-46 indicates that he
was not a party to the agreement to the conspiracy as he
opted out of the agreement for indulging in acts of sabotage
and other offences in pursuance to the conspiracy meeting
held at Batkurki. On the other hand, submission of
Mr.Nilogal is that the witness had been exhaustively cross-
examined by the defence Lawyers and the answers elicited
supports the prosecution case and also amounts to eliciting
an admission as against accused persons and supportive of
89
prosecution case. Submission is that, as PW-46 opted out
from making any commitment to the acts, bombing in
churches, looting railway wagons and financial institutions
and the mere fact that he has been cited as a witness in the
case as theory of conspiracy in no way diminishes the
present case as he has spoken about fresh conspiracy
pursuant to the meeting held at Batkurki. It is also
submitted that PW-46 was never arrested and was not in
policy custody and therefore his evidence is free and
voluntary.
91. Countering the submissions made on behalf of the
appellants by Sri Pasha about the illegality and acceptability
of Ex.P-260 as confession statement written by A-8 while in
jail, it is pointed-out that firstly, he was not in police custody
and was in judicial custody and that the police or
investigating officer had no free access to the accused person
unless permission had been obtained from the Court. It is
therefore submitted that in the first instance, the confession
90
statement even as recited in the very beginning cannot be
said to be either at the behest of the police officer or the
investigating officer and it is a voluntary statement of an
offender who made the statement out of remorse and
recorded, it being not tainted by either inducement or threat
or coercion and without access to the police, it should be
taken as voluntary confession made by A-8. In this regard,
submission of Mr.Nilogal is that Ex.P260 constitutes a
confessional statement and is not in any way affected by the
provisions of Section 24. On the other hand, being not
tainted by any of the situations referred to in Section 24, as
noticed above, his confession statement made is to be
accepted.
92. It is submitted that it is no doubt true that on the
letter addressed to a Magistrate, the prosecution is not
placing reliance but as the confession statement under
Section 164 has not gone through the procedure, it is only
an extra judicial confession. On authority, it is submitted
91
that even the evidence in the nature of extra judicial
confession can be accepted without any corroboration and
cites the decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of
LAXMAN vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN [(1977) 2 CRIMES
125]. Also relies on paras 4, 5 and 6 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of DEVENDER PAL vs STATE
NCT OF DELHI & ANOTHER [2002(2) CRIMES 133]. On
the authority of these judgments, he submits that
confession statement has to be accepted when the statement
of the accused was voluntary. Reference is also made to
Section 30 of the Evidence Act in this regard and reliance is
placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
SITA RAM vs STATE OF UP [AIR 1966 SC 1906], and
points-out that a confessional letter written by the accused
person admitting that he had committed murder of his wife,
though addressed to the Sub-Inspector of Police, the
Supreme Court opined that it was not tainted by the
provisions of Section 25 of Evidence Act as there was no
material to indicate that police had any influence in the
92
matter. Therefore, Mr Nilogal submits that in the present
case also, police having no access to A-8, when Ex.P-260
was written in the jail at a time when there was no visit or
access by the police to the accused person and therefore the
learned Judge of the trial Court is justified in accepting
Ex.P-260 as confessional statement of the accused.
93. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Parliament bomb blast case NAVJOT
SANDHU [Supra] wherein the Supreme Court had occasion
to discuss the effect of a confession vis-à-vis Section 24 of
the Evidence Act at para 29 at Page 1773. It is also
submitted that A-8 had in fact admitted writing of letter
Ex.P-260 during his statement recorded under Section 313
Cr.P.C but only wanted to retract from the same by stating
that it had been written under pressure, which amounted to
admission about the letter written but retraction came very
late and only at the time of recording statement under
Section 313 Cr.P.C, which has been rightly rejected and
93
confession was acted upon by the trial Court. Mr.Nilogal
also submitted that the contents of Ex.P-260 being not put
to A-8 while recording the statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C by the learned Judge of the trial Court, is not tenable
as accused person was represented by a counsel. It is also
submitted that the same argument holds good in respect of
other accused persons also, as they were also represented by
counsel. On the other hand, all accused had been given a
copy of the voluntary statement that had been given by A-8
before the police as per Ex.P-274 as part of the charge sheet
documents which contained the very information as is found
in exhibit P260 and therefore no prejudice is caused to the
accused persons even if they had not been furnished exhibit
P260 as part of the relied upon documents along with the
charge sheet; that the learned judge of the trial Court not
explaining full details of the contents of Ex.P-260 either to A-
8 or other accused persons while recording their statement
under section 313 Cr.PC. has in no way caused prejudice to
the accused persons including A-8; that accused were not
94
only represented by counsel but were very well aware of the
facts and circumstances as revealed in Ex.P-260 and the
only difference being, Ex.P-274 was a voluntary statement of
A-8, whereas Ex.P-260 was a confessional statement of A-8
in the form of letter written by the very accused while he was
in judicial custody. Reliance is placed on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of MOSEB KAKA
CHOWDHRY [supra] to support this submission.
94. Mr.Nilogal also submits that for attracting Section 30,
and for making use of a confession of an accused person
being used against co-accused, there is no requirement in
law that the confession should be only one recorded under
Section 164, in the sense, it should be a judicial confession;
that even an extra judicial confession is not excluded from
the scope of applicability of Section 30 of the Act.
95. Mr.Nilogal also points-out to the contents of exhibit
P260, wherein information relating to persons who had
undergone training in Pakistan for carrying-out acts of
95
sabotage against state machinery as supportive material for
the offences charged under Sections 121 and 121-A of IPC.
96. Mr Nilogal has taken us through the evidence adduced
on behalf of the prosecution and drawn our special attention
to the mahazars drawn at the place of blast which had
occurred in the Maruthi van at Minerva Mill Gate at Magadi
Road in 2000 and recovery of material objects at that place,
in particular, recovery of semi burnt pamphlets MOs 2 and 3
and the inscription of slogan “Warning to Christian
Missionary – Stop conversion” on it, and recovery of similar
pamphlets at the residence of A-1 and the Computer-M.O.11
seized at the residence of A-1 under Ex.P.7 and print outs
from the information stored in the computer also revealing
the very contents of MOs.2 and 3 and similar details being
recovered at the residence of A-10 under Ex.P.9-mahazar
drawn on 23.7.2000 and recovery of six number of
pamphlets of like nature as per M.O.87, all indicate not only
the existence conspiracy for committing acts of sabotage but
96
also for creating rift amongst communities. The recoveries
having been made in terms of the panchanama in the
presence of the panch witnesses and the examination of
PW.58 by the Investigating Officer during initial stage
constitutes clear evidence of the activities that were planned
and carried out by the accused persons.
97. With regard to the other material recovered at the blast
place, Mr.Nilogal submitted that such a blast of powerful
explosives as testified by the witnesses and A-1 being found
in possession of such powerful explosives also goes to show
that accused persons were committing acts of sabotage and
disruptive activities.
98. Mr.Nilogal, with reference to cross-examination of
PW.58-Investigating Officer in the first phase of the
investigation, submits that a suggestion put to this witness
by the defence counsel to the effect that the pamphlets
recovered at the blast place had been fed into the computer
seized at the residence of A-1 and therefore it was made to
97
appear as though computer contained the same while has
been denied by the witness amounts to an admission on the
part of the accused persons about the recovery of the
pamphlets at the blast place.
99. The factum of blast with powerful explosives and the
recovery therein is the proof of the accused persons
indulging in the offences for which they were charged.
Mr.Nilogal has taken us through the details of Ex.P.7-
mahazar and other recoveries at the house of A-1 and
submits that the recoveries made therein particularly
relating to the Deendar Anjuman movement throws light
about the involvement of the accused persons in the
activities of the organisation. Mr.Nilogal also taken us
through the evidence of PW.58-first Investigating Officer,
PW.59-second Investigating Officer and Mr.M.B.Appanna-
PW.66-third Investigating Officer and various mahazars
drawn by these Investigating Officers and recoveries therein
and also the testimony of the panch witnesses supporting
98
the recoveries pursuant to the mahazars and submits that
these recoveries are fully supportive of the prosecution case
about the conspiracy amongst the accused persons for
carrying out the acts which are in the nature of offence
under the various provisions with which they were charged
and therefore, prosecution has made good its case.
100. With reference to the evidence of PW.28-
Sri.P.N.Mukunda and his statement Under Section 161 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, having already been
recorded by PW.56-Investigating Officer as on 18.6.2000, he
pointed out that this witness had seen the presence of A-1
near the act of sabotage, namely bomb blast taken place
inside a Church in J.J.Nagar and the testimony of PW.28
having not been in any way impeached, it constitutes
substantive evidence about the involvement of A-1,
particularly in an act in the nature of carrying out offence
not only for creating rift amongst the communities but also
an affront to the authorities of the State.
99
101. With reference to recoveries effected pursuant to the
mahazar drawn at the instance of A-9 under Ex.P.177, the
mahazar drawn at BEML Factory, the workplace of A-9
under Ex.P.14 and the recovery of floppies from the desk-
drawer of A-9 and the mahazar drawn as a follow-up action
at the office by the Investigating Officer on 29.8.2000 under
Ex.P.26 when the print outs of the contents of the floppies
were taken out in the presence of PW.7-Lakshminarayana
and the contents therein are all incriminative and so also the
mahazar drawn at the residence of A-17 under Ex.P.8 and
recovery of M.Os.70 to 86 and so also another mahazar
drawn at his residence on 28.7.2000 in his presence and at
his instance under Ex.P.12 and seizure of material objects
M.Os.95 to 105 and further incriminating materials having
been recovered and also the mahazar drawn at the
workplace of A-17, BEML Factory, under Ex.P-13 on
29.7.2000 and recovery of M.Os.110 to 146 reveal more
incriminating materials and the contents of M.O.142-the
100
intimidatory letter with the slogan ‘Christian Missionaries,
stop conversions or QUIT INDIA’, all clearly reveal the
notorious activities undertaken by the accused persons and
are supportive of the prosecution case of not only the
conspiracy amongst the accused but also their further plan
of action for implementation and the manner of
implementation towards the blast subsequently that has
taken place at various places. Therefore, submits that the
prosecution has made good the case with such convincing
and cogent evidence. The contents of Exs.P.161 to 166
reveal that A-9 and A-10 having lead the Police to the
various places where the conspiracy had been hatched
pursuant to the meeting held at various places of Hyderabad
are all supportive material to prove the conduct of the
accused and their involvement being very much relevant for
the purpose of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
that information constitutes valuable piece of evidence and
submitted that such information has to be accepted as
evidence provable against the accused persons in terms of
101
Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in
NAVJOT SANDHU [supra] and submits that there is
acceptable proven evidence against the accused persons to
make good the charges of the prosecution.
102. Mr.Nilogal has also placed reliance on the contents of
Ex.P.177, mahazar drawn at the residence of A-9 when A-9
pointed out the places where himself and other accused had
congregated and discussed about the action plan to carry
out the objects of the organization and as per the directions
of A-7-Zia-Ul-Hassan who was operating from Mardan,
Pakistan.
103. Mr.Nilogal has submitted that under Ex.P.177
mahazar drawn at the residence of A-9, the recovery of a
hand written plan of action as per Ex.P.265 has been proved
to be in the hand writing of A-16 by examining PW.67-
Handwriting Expert who had compared the writing in
Ex.P.265 with the admitted writings of A-16 with the help of
102
scientific instruments and this also constitute the material
not only against A-16 but the contents clearly indicate the
name of persons who were to carry out the plan of action
which were offences and the involvement of such persons in
the conspiracy and the follow-up action.
104. Mr.Nilogal has also drawn our attention to the seizure
mahazar drawn at the residence of A-9 under Ex.P.177 and
the recovery of M.O.185-one small pocket book containing
the telephone numbers, photo of Ibrahim and also E-mail ID
HSD Chandrashekar and password Moon Forehead which
according to the prosecution is the E-mail ID of A-7 as
indicated in Ex.P.260. Therefore, he submits that the
involvement of A-9 and other accused in the acts of sabotage
is amply made out.
105. Sri.Nilogal, Special SPP, submits that the above
recoveries from the residence and work place of A9 and A17
go to show the existence of a conspiracy against the accused
persons and the manner of its implementation; that
103
conspiracies are all hatched in secrecy and executed without
trying to attract attention and is a matter to be inferred from
the circumstances; that the circumstances as has been
inferred from the recoveries and the information revealed
from the recoveries in the background of possession of
powerful explosives by A1 in the Maruthi Van which came to
be exploded is a clear indication about the existence of a
conspiracy and placed reliance on the following decisions in
support of the same :-
1) E.K.CHANDRASENAN – VS – STATE OF
KERALA (1995 CRL.L.J 1445) and based on the
ratio he submits that it is not necessary that all
accused persons should have participated in a
particular meeting, conspiracy can be proved by
circumstantial evidence.
2) The other decision relied is in the case of KEHAR
SINGH AND OTHERS –Vs- THE STATE (DELHI
ADMN.) – AIR 1988 SC 1883 wherein specific
104
reliance is placed on paras 268 to 272 as
follows:-
268. Before considering the other matters
against Balbir Singh, it will be useful to consider the concept of criminal conspiracy under Secs. 120-A and 120-B of IPC. These
provisions have brought the Law of Conspiracy in India in line with the English law by making the overt-act unessential when the conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. The English Law on this matter is well-settled. The following passage
from Russell on Crime (12 Ed. Vol. I, 202) may be usefully noted:
"The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the
purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough. "
269. Glanville Williams in the "Criminal
Law" (Second Ed. 382) explains the proposition with an illustration :
"The question arose in an Iowa case, but it
was discussed in terms of conspiracy rather than of accessoryship. D, who had a grievance against P, told E that if he would
whip P someone would pay his fine. E replied that he did not want anyone to pay his fine, that he had a grievance of his own
105
against P and that he would whip him at the first opportunity. E whipped P. D was acquitted of conspiracy because there was no agreement for "concert of action". no agreement to "co-operate".
270. Coleridge, J., while summing up the
case to Jury in Regina v. Murphy, (1837) 173 ER 502 (508) pertinently states:
"I am bound to tell you, that although the
common design is the root of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that these two parties came together and actually agreed in
terms to have this common design and to pursue it by common means, and so to carry it into execution. This is not necessary, because in many cases of the most clearly established conspiracies there are no means or proving any such thing, and neither law
nor common sense requires that it should be proved. If you find that these two persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part of an act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object which they were
pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. The question you have to ask yourselves is, "Had they this common design, and did they pursue it by these common means-the design being unlawful?"
271. It will be thus seen that the most
important ingredient of the offence of conspiracy is the agreement between two or
more persons to do an illegal act. The illegal
106
act may or may not be done in pursuance of agreement, but the very agreement is an offence and is punishable. Reference to Secs-120-A and 120-B IPC would make
these aspects clear beyond doubt. Entering into an agreement by two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal means is the very quintessence of the offence of conspiracy.
272. Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in
secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in
reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial. But the Court must enquire whether the two persons are
independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter does. It is however, essential that the offence of conspiracy required some kind of physical
manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to Prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts
sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. Gerald Orchard of University of Canterbury, New Zealand (Criminal Law Review I974, 297 at 299) explains the limited nature of this proposition:
107
"Although it is not in doubt that the offence
requires some physical manifestation of agreement, it is important to note the limited nature of this proposition. The law does not
require that the act of agreement take any particular form and the fact of agreement may be communicated by words or conduct. Thus, it has been said that it is unnecessary to prove that the parties "actually came together and agreed in terms" to pursue the
unlawful object; there need never have been an express verbal agreement, it being sufficient that there was "a tacit understanding between conspirators as to what should be done."
106. It is submitted that main object of the followers of the
movement is to enable A7 Zia Ul Hassan now residing in
Pakistan to come to India with 272 patans and to enable the
same, fresh meetings were held in Karnataka subsequent to
the meetings held in Hyderabad and the communication of
those amongst such persons is supported by letter written to
Zia Ul Hassan which is in Urdu revealing preparation of the
action plan which definitely constitutes material to support
the case of the prosecution about fresh conspiracies,
following the initial main conspiracy hatched up at the
108
meeting held in Asif Nagar, Hyderabad and district from that
conspiracy.
107. It is therefore, submitted that there is existence of
independent and separate conspiracy subsequent to the
conspiracy charted out at Hyderabad meetings and that
there is no need for adducing any direct evidence to prove
conspiracy. In support of this proposition he has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination case STATE OF TAMIL NADU
vs NALINI [AIR 1999 SC 2640] and also the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of NAVJOT SANDHU [supra].
108. Sri.Nilogal has also submitted that the requirements to
constitute an offence u/s.121 and 121-A of IPC, as indicated
in Parliament Bomb Blast case, wherein at paragraphs 272,
273, 274 it is stated as follows :
“272. Section 121 and 121A occur in the Chapter
'Offences against the State'. The public peace is disturbed and the normal channels of the Government are disrupted by such offences which
are aimed at subverting the authority of the
109
Government or paralyzing the constitutional machinery. The expression 'war' preceded by the verb 'wages' admits of many shades of meaning and defies a definition with exactitude though it
appeared to be an unambiguous phraseology to the Indian Law Commissioners who examined the draft Penal Code in 1847. The Law Commissioners observed:
"We conceive the term 'wages war against the
Government' naturally to import a person arraying himself in defiance of the Government in like manner and by like means as a foreign enemy would do, and it seems to us, we presume it did to the authors of the Code that any definition of the term so unambiguous would be superfluous."
273. The expression 'Government of India' was
substituted for the expression 'Queen' by the Adaptation of Laws Order of 1950. Section 121 now reads:-
"121. Whoever wages war against the
Government of India or attempts to
wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine".
274. The conspiracy to commit offences
punishable under Section 121 attracts punishment under Section 121A and the maximum sentence could be imprisonment for life. The other limb of Section 121A is the conspiracy to overawe by means of criminal force or the show of
criminal force, the Central Government or any State Government. The Explanation to Section 121-A clarifies that it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission should take place pursuant
110
to the conspiracy, in order to constitute the said offence.”
are clearly made in the present case that it is indicated
therein that the concept of ‘war’ as understood in Section
121 and 121A of IPC is totally different from the
conventional war between two states,
that even an act of a rebellion group of two persons which
challenges the authority of the state and poses a threat to
the peace of tranquility of the society by affronting the
established governance also amounts to waging war within
the scope of this provision of law.
109. The offence committed in the nature of causing
explosions using power explosive material in places of
worship and that tendency to repeat the same shows a
continued intention to carry on the offensive acts against the
interest of the State; that such tendencies posed threat to
the peace and tranquility and security of the country and
therefore, in the case of persons found guilty, the offence of
waging war against the country is made out and the
111
imposition of the extreme sentence as provided u/s.121 IPC
is justified and therefore, prays for confirmation of the death
sentence by accepting the reference.
110. Sri.Nilogal also submitted that not adhering to the
procedure contemplated u/s.65B of the Evidence Act for
proving the print outs taken out from floppies which had
been seized from the drawer of A9 at his office premises was
not contemplated when the floppies were retrieved on
29.8.2000 vide Ex.P16, and the amended provisions of
S.65A and 65B has come into effect from 17.10.2000 by Act
No.21/2000 and therefore, it was not possible to go through
the procedure as enunciated u/s.65B of the Evidence Act.
111. However, on this aspect Mr.Pasha has submitted that
if the prosecution wants to seek admission of the print outs
taken from floppies and being evidence in the nature of
secondary evidence, unless the procedure contemplated
u/s.63 is strictly complied with; that it should firstly qualify
as an admissible evidence in the nature of secondary
112
evidence u/s.63 and regarding applicability of the
amendment and therefore requirement of proof insofar as
the retrieval from electronic record is concerned, as per
Section 65B as otherwise it becomes inadmissible, submits
that even assuming that the provisions of Section 65B were
not in place as on the date of retrieval the absence of Section
65B, amendment of proof, was as contemplated u/s.65 of
the Evidence Act and neither having been complied, the
contents of the print outs said to have retrieved from the
floppies cannot be accepted as of evidentiary value to prove
the prosecution case. It is also submitted that Section 65B
being a procedural provision and made applicable to any
pending proceedings is even otherwise applicable to the print
outs retrieved from the seized floppies.
112. In the wake of the submissions made and contentions
raised by learned counsel for the appellants and learned
SPP, the following points arise for our determination in this
appeal:
113
i) Whether the trial of the accused persons for the offences with which they are charged is vitiated, in view of prohibition contained under Section 300 CrPC and also safeguard
provided under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India in the background of the prosecution case and the trial against the accused persons except A-10 before the designated special court at Hyderabad in SC No 95 of 2001, as contended by learned
counsel for the appellants and in view of the accused persons except A-10 having been tried for the very offences and on the very same set of facts?
ii) Whether the prosecution case for pressing
the charges under Sections 121 and 121A of IPC, which were framed by way of additional charges by the trial court on 12-12-2007 and the resultant conviction is hit by want of proper sanction under Section 196 CrPC for lack of jurisdiction in the court
for taking cognizance of these offences in the absence of an explicit sanction order by the state government in respect of the offences revealed in the additional charge?
iii) Whether, on the evidence placed before the
trial court, the prosecution has made good the charges leveled against the accused persons?
iv) Whether the conviction and sentence by
learned judge of the trial court is
sustainable or calls for interference by this court?
114
v) Whether the reference made by the learned judge of the trial court for affirmation under Section 366 CrPC merits acceptance?
Re: Point (i):
113. The first and foremost legal hurdle posed by Sri
Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants, for the
trial of the accused persons before the court is that it is hit
by the principle of double jeopardy; that the provisions of
Section 300 CrPC is very clear in this aspect and Section
300 is clearly attracted for the reason that except for the
charge under Section 121 and Section 121A IPC, which has
been framed by way of additional charges in the present
case, the accused persons, except A-10, had all been
charged with the rest of the offences before a sessions court
in Hyderabad in SC No 95 of 2001 and tried before that
court and in fact except for A-10, who was not an accused in
that case, all other accused persons in that case were found
guilty of the offence of committing conspiracy under Section
120B IPC and had been sentenced to undergo RI for six
months and therefore trying such accused persons yet again
115
before the court and on the same set of facts is clearly in
violation of Section 300 CrPC and in view of the safeguard
provided under Article 20[2] of the Constitution.
114. With reference to the charges framed in SC No 95 of
2001, Sri Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel for the
appellants, has drawn our attention to the judgment of the
Hyderabad court, a copy of which is placed on record along
with the appeal memo, and submitted that even the
prosecution itself had placed on record a copy of this
judgment before the trial court by way of opposition to the
application that had been filed on behalf of the accused
persons for discharge under Section 227 CrPC, which,
though, was dismissed by the trial court and was not varied
by this court in a further revision petition, nevertheless, in
fact, remains with the prosecution documents itself and that
the facts leading to the trial of the Hyderabad case and
present case are one and the same, and therefore the
provisions of Section 300 CrPC are clearly attracted. In this
116
regard, appellants’ case being supported by the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of NALINI & OTHERS
[supra] and also the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of KOLLA VEERA RAGHAV RAO [supra] wherein the
Supreme Court has recognized the legal principle embedded
in Section 300 CrPC and it is also noticed that the protection
given under Section 300 CrPC is much wider and greater
than what is accorded to a person under Article 20[2] of the
Constitution of India.
115. While, there cannot be any dispute about the legal
proposition and the provisions of Section 300 CrPC, it again
depends upon the fact situation as prevails in a given case
and as to whether the prosecution in the earlier case against
the very accused persons was also based on the same facts.
In this regard, Sri Pasha submits that in so far as the
charge of criminal conspiracy is concerned, it is one
conspiracy and comes to an end with the accomplishment of
the conspiracy or abandonment of the same and at any rate
117
with the arrest of the accused persons, the conspiracy
aspect comes to an end and therefore the charge of
conspiracy in the present case is clearly hit by the provisions
of Section 300 CrPC. Reliance is placed in this regard on
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of LEO ROY
vs SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT JAIL [AIR 1958 SC
119], indicating that criminal conspiracy is an independent
offence and therefore there cannot be a continuing
conspiracy after the person is tried for that conspiracy, is
again, in our considered opinion, dependent on the facts and
circumstances, as existence of conspiracy for an agreed act
which is an offence is one aspect, but having a goal that is
any goal, which, according to the prosecution case, is to
achieve the goal of the founder of the deendar anjuman
movement viz., Islamization of the entire population of the
country, is a goal that is sought to be achieved by different
acts, as submitted by Sri Nilogal, learned SPP and if such is
the situation, the facts constituting each conspiracy, in the
sense, each renewed meeting for achieving the goal by
118
further acts, can definitely constitute a fresh conspiracy
independent of the original conspiracy, which, even
assuming for arguments’ sake, has been either implemented
or aborted and the persons had been prosecuted for the
same, is an independent offence.
116. We find that such is the possibility in theory, as the
word ‘conspiracy’ in itself is not an end, but what is the
conspiracy part, i.e. what is agreed to act or offensive act
which is sought to be carried out pursuant to the
conspiracy, is what is material for deciding this question.
117. Though Sri Pasha has placed reliance on the decision
reported in 1973 HL (E) 807 in the case of DOOT &
OTHERS [supra] we find while this decision can be an
authority for the proposition that the conspiracy continues
to exist till it is executed or abandoned by chance of
necessity, the decision is more an authority for the
proposition in the wake of the continued conspiracy till its
execution, it remains in existence and therefore the accused
119
persons in that case who were beyond the jurisdiction of the
English courts, the moment they entered the British territory
English courts got the jurisdiction to prosecute them and
the proposition in no way advances the case of the
appellants in the present situation. Rejection of the
argument that there should be a fresh agreement in that
case by the House of Lords was in a different context.
118. The question as to whether the provision of Section
300 CrPC is attracted being linked to the existence of a
similar or identical facts, while it is found that narration of
the facts does originate in the present case also and with the
founding of the organization by Moulana Siddiqui and the
activities of its followers and the nature of activities of its
members, the manner of the activities etc., prosecution
theory in the present case is that the conspiracy is continued
by the accused followers by fresh meetings held at places in
Karnataka for carrying out the further acts of sabotage and
also act of waging war against the Government of India and
120
disruption at places of worship, disturbing public peace and
tranquility as indicated in various sections with which the
accused persons had been charged. Existence of such facts
leading to an agreement amongst the accused persons for
carrying out the acts constituting offences and fresh offences
can definitely give rise to an inference that a fresh
conspiracy has been hatched and if so it becomes an
independent offence yet again punishable under Section
120B IPC. It is, therefore, that we would proceed to further
examine the evidence of the prosecution as let in before the
trial court, if reveals the existence of such fresh facts either
through meetings or otherwise indicative of the conspiracy
or common intention of the accused persons to commit fresh
acts of violence or sabotage or terrorism or waging war
against the state or to disturb public peace and tranquility,
causing rift amongst the communities etc., then the
provisions of Section 300 CrPC being not attracted, as the
prosecution is not on the same set of facts.
121
119. While it is true that on the facts as had been placed
and relied upon by the prosecution in the case before the
Hyderabad court and there is no question of trying the
accused persons on the same set of facts, mere fact that the
earlier goal is persisted, but if it is shown that further acts
have been committed in pursuance of a fresh conspiracy
hatched at the meetings held at Batkurki or in the houses of
A1 and A9, then, in our considered opinion, will not amount
to prosecuting the accused persons for the same set of facts.
120. However, as contended by Sri Pasha, learned counsel
for the appellants, if the prosecution is unable to make good
any further or fresh facts disclosing a conspiracy yet again
for committing further offensive acts, then it is a case where
the prosecution case fails for proving the offence of
conspiracy and the fact that the accused persons except A-
10, were found guilty will not in any way advance the case of
the prosecution in the present case.
Re: Point (ii):
122
121. The second legal contention which is raised and which
affects the trial before the sessions court is in respect of the
additional charges for the offences punishable under
Sections 121 and 121A IPC with which the accused persons
were charged and as to whether the court could not have
taken cognizance of the additional charges for the said
offences as framed under the additional charges, for want of
sanction in respect of the offences as disclosed in the
additional charge.
122. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellants as
well as the learned SPP have placed reliance on a
considerable number of authorities, which we have referred
to above. From a perusal of these authorities, it is clear
that the sanction under Section 196 CrPC is based on the
information and facts as placed by the prosecution before
the sanctioning authority. Requirement of law is that the
sanctioning authority should be aware of the circumstances
and should expressly accord sanction for the court to take
123
cognizance in the wake of the nature of the offences which
are under Chapter VI of IPC, which are offences against the
state.
123. Specific case on behalf of the appellants is that
Sections 121 and 121A IPC being in Chapter VI, prior
sanction was mandatory before the court could take
cognizance of these offences. The provisions of sub-section
5 of Section 216 CrPC, reading as under:
216. Court may alter charge :- xxx (5) If the offence stated in the altered or added
charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is
founded. while does enable the case being proceeded against the
accused persons when a previous sanction was there against
them in respect of the same facts, based on which the
additional or altered charges are framed, we find that there
124
is a subtle distinction between the granting of sanction
under Section 196 CrPC, which is as judicially noticed,
almost mandatory and want of sanction does affect a trial,
the enabling provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 216
CrPC is in a slightly different context.
124. Additional charges under Section 216(5) are framed on
the same set of facts and material and a fresh sanction is
not a sine qua non, as sanction is obtained and granted by
the government based on the facts and information placed
before the sanctioning authority. Therefore, the question is
as to whether the facts and circumstances from which the
sanctioning authority could have inferred that the offences
can also be one punishable under Section 121 were in fact
made available before the sanction was granted.
125. It is in this regard, Sri Nilogal, learned SPP has
submitted that the only fact situation which was not before
the sanctioning authority at the time of sanction was about
the existence of ExP260, which, in fact, was sought to be
125
made part of the record only at the advanced stage of the
trial and in the year 2007, while the sanction had been
granted on 10-10-2000 itself and the information from the
evidence of PW46, which was also not a fact before the
sanctioning authority, as PW46 was not a charge sheet
witness, but to get over this obvious shortcoming,
submission is that the statement of A-8 as recorded by
investigating officer – PW66 – was very much part of the
record and it contains the very information as is revealed in
ExP260. It is, therefore, the argument that with the same
set of facts, no fresh sanction is necessary when the
additional charges were framed.
126. Reliance is placed by Mr. Nilogal, learned SPP on the
decision of NAVJOT SANDHU [supra], particularly,
paragraph 16 of the judgment to submit that Supreme Court
having reviewed the letter relating to grant of sanction under
Section 196 of Cr.P.C. and having opined that grant of a
sanction order cannot be given or elevated to the status of
126
judicial review; that it is more in the nature of the
administrative order and therefore, it need not necessarily
answer the test of judicial scrutiny in terms of general
standards and element of positive sanction is inevitable.
We find that the distinction made indicates that the trial
court was satisfied that all material facts, in fact had been
placed before the sanctioning authority and even sanction
order recited the details of the same and therefore, it is
because one or two aspects had not been mentioned though
in itself indicates that there is no application of mind and
therefore, in the present circumstance applying this
standard statement to all the prosecution witness should be
accepted.
127. On the question of additional charges for punishment
under sections 121 and 121-A of IPC being vitiated for want
of fresh sanction, while our examination as above indicate
that the material such as Ex.P260 and the evidence of
PW.46 is the earlier statement by this witness before the
127
Police had not been placed before the sanctioning authority
at the time of sanction as per order dated 10.10.2000 as per
Ex.P181 nor was it possible. The question does not end by
merely noticing this position as independent of this material
whether the available material had indicated the fact
situation based on which charges under sections 121 and
121-A of IPC could have been framed. This examination
arises in view of the provisions of section 216[5] of Cr.PC
and in the wake of the earlier sanction granted by the
Government in respect of the offences as against the
accused persons sought to be made out in the charge sheet
proposed to be filed and for which sanction had been sought
for by the prosecution in respect of offences punishable
under the provisions of sections 124-A and 153-A of IPC.
Insofar as the sanction in respect of the prosecution of
accused under these provisions of law is concerned, is as
covered by Ex.P181 sanction order dated 10.10.2010 by the
prosecution to make good there was sanction and further
sought to be established before the court through oral
128
testimony of PW.60 – Narayanaswamy, Under Secretary of
the Government Department when evidence was given before
the court and that is not in dispute. The further question is
as to whether in terms of section 216[5] of Cr.PC, this can be
said to be good enough for pressing additional charges for
the purpose of sanction order to prosecute the accused for
offences punishable under sections 121 and 121-A of IPC
which came to be framed much later on 12.12.2007. We find
from the sanction order that record had been placed by the
prosecution seeking for sanction only in the background of
the sanction being required under section 196 of Cr.PC in
respect of the offences suggested in the proposal, namely,
sections 124A and 153-A of IPC. Sections 124A and 153A
are also provisions occurring in chapter-VI of IPC wherein
the offences against the State are all grouped and
punishment indicated. Sections 121 and 121-A of IPC are
also offences against the State and they figure in the very
beginning of the Chapter.
129
128. We find from the recital of the sanction order that the
accused persons belonging to Muslim community that they
with the object to create communal disharmony and for
carrying on the Holy War ‘Jihad’ in India, are taking steps
and making preparations; that A1, A2 and A3, for such
purpose were transporting explosives in a Maruti Van
bearing registration No.GA 01 U 2786 from Magadi Road
going towards Majestic when there was an explosion in the
van and the A1, A2 & A3 were transporting explosives in the
van for the purpose of carrying out disruptive activities by
terrorizing people and therefore sanction was sought for
prosecuting eighteen persons whose names had been
enclosed along with and in respect of this proposal, sanction
was indicated and such sanction had been granted on
10.10.2000. The testimony is also that the entire record was
placed and we find the record included the mahazars
Ex.P177 drawn at the residence of A9. Ex.P14 mahazar
dated 3.8.2000 drawn at the office of premises of A9 wherein
amongst the recoveries were included floppies – MOs 148 to
130
150. Further, Ex.P16 to P25 are the retrieves from the
floppies which was at the office of A9 and the printouts from
some of the seized floppies were obtained at the office of
PW.66. We notice that the information contained in these
printouts does constitute material for inferring the accused
persons were involved in the activity of waging or attempting
to wage war against India. This is an inference which is
possible as the material reveals gathering of wide and large
information about the Defence installations and contents of
letter through English translation of which it is found that
there was suggestion made by A1 and A9 that there is need
to establish a rocket launching station within the radius of 7
kilometers in Bangalore for carrying out the acts of
destruction of Defence installations and other
establishments. In the wake of such material being placed
before the sanctioning authority and the recital that the
accused persons were preparing to wage holy war against
Government of India inside the country, in our considered
opinion, it possibly constitutes factual information and
131
material for possible charge under sections 121 and 121-A of
IPC.
129. However, Sri. Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel for the
appellants – accused persons has submitted that the
sanction order is to be proved in a proper manner; that it is
not proved in a proper manner and moreover it does not on
the face of it reveal that due consideration has been given by
the sanctioning authority before passing any sanction order.
Submission is that the sanction order dated 10.10.2000 is
not made good whether for prosecuting the accused persons
under sections 121 and 121-A of IPC as per additional
charge or even as per the original charge for the offences
punishable under section 124-A of IPC. However,
submission of Sri. Nilogal, learned State Public Prosecutor is
that the entire record was there and sanction order per se
recites that it has been produced and in the context of
requirement under section 124-A of IPC, sanction has been
granted by the Government and moreover the sanction order
132
itself being in the nature of an administrative order need not
be akin to judicial or quasi judicial order spelling out
reasons for passing the order etc., but prima facie inference
can be drawn that authority was aware of the facts and
circumstances and in the light of the same, it has granted
sanction and that is good enough and in this regard has
placed reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of NAVJOT SANDHU [supra] and other cases.
130. There is no doubt or dispute that sanction order is an
administrative order. Though Mr. Pasha, learned counsel for
the appellants has contended that unless sanction order per
se recites that the sanction authority had examined the
matter before it and had shown awareness to the matter and
it should be necessarily made good by leading extraneous
evidence as is held in the cases of GOKULCHAND
DWARKADAS MORARKA and TARACHAND JAIN [supra].
131. While this legal position cannot be disputed, we find
that the preamble to the sanction order and the sanction
133
order read together and as noticed above on the face of it
reveals that the matter placed before the sanctioning
authority is for the purpose of prosecuting the accused
persons under various provisions including section 124A of
IPC for which sanction of the Government is required as it is
evidence figuring in chapter-VI of IPC.
132. The recital also indicates the kind of disruptive
activities and the waging of holy war in India by the accused
persons as part of the movement of organization for which
they are members and as members belonging to Muslim
community. The prosecution case itself was that this
organization has been a militant organization ever since and
that is the narration as above. In this background and with
the presumption that acts done in the normal course of
business can be accepted and with PW.60 having spoken
about the sanction order having been granted in the normal
course with reference to Ex.P181 sanction order dated
10.10.2000, we are of the opinion that sitting in Judgment
134
over the sanction order applying objective tests and on the
premise that it is required to meet the test on the judicial
scrutiny or judicial or quasi judicial order in our considered
opinion is not required or necessary.
133. Insofar as the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of ‘KEDARNATH v. STATE OF BIHAR’ reported in AIR
1962 SC 955 is concerned, the Supreme Court did give
meaning and scope of section 124-A, we notice that
examination was not in the context of looking into the
validity of sanction order or existence of sanction order but
as to whether sections 124-A and 505 of IPC had been
rendered unconstitutional as violative of Article 19-1[A] of
the Constitution of India which was a larger examination.
134. The judicial examination on the scope of validity of
statutory provision, operation of which had resulted in a
conviction by a court and in an appeal the convicted persons
had questioned the constitutional validity of the very
provision under which they had been convicted is totally
135
different and can never be compared to a sanction order
required to be granted by the Government on its
administrative side to fulfill the requirements of section 196
of Cr.PC.
135. The sanction order being more in the nature of an
administrative order is now quite well settled and can be
examined only on the touchstone of the requirements to
satisfy the passing of an order which is on the subjective
satisfaction of the administrative authority. Viewed from this
background and looking into the sanction order and on a
perusal of the same, we are of the opinion that the recitals in
the proposal and the sanction order per se reveal that the
accused persons were indulging in acts of waging holy war
and though Mr. Pasha contend that this is not the same as
waging war but is only a religious activity, nevertheless, we
are not going in for further aspects of this examination at
this stage as we find prima facie and on the face of the
record, sanction has been granted in respect of the activity
136
of waging holy war against India and that in our considered
opinion is good enough to include charge under sections 121
and 121-A of IPC and comes within the scope of the saving
provision of section 216[5] of Cr.PC. It is for this reason, we
hold that the prosecution case for pressing charges by way
of framing additional charges under sections 121 and 121-A
of IPC does not get vitiated only for want of sanction under
section 196 of Cr.PC being a situation coming within the
scope of section 216[5] of Cr.PC.
Re: Point (iii) & (iv):
136. That will take to us to the next aspect i.e., the
examination of the material that had been adduced by the
trial court and as to what charges had been made good
based on such evidence.
137. In support of the prosecution case, the prosecution
had examined as many as 67 witnesses viz., PWs.1 to 67,
got marked documentary evidence Exs.P.1 to P.298 and had
137
produced material objects MOs.1 to 212. So far as the
defence is concerned except for marking a portion of Ex.P.2
as Ex.D.1 no other documentary evidence was adduced and
on the other hand, the defence was content with cross
examining prosecution witness.
138. The prosecution has examined as many as 67
witnesses in all. All the witnesses who have supported the
prosecution case and the key witness even according to the
prosecution are only those, who are directly involved in the
incident of blast and the follow-up action and the witnesses,
who have supported the mahazars drawn at the spot or
scene of occurrence, seizure of documents and objects and
mahazars drawn when recoveries were made pursuant to
and the incriminating material sought to be seized by the
prosecution at the instance of the accused persons. This
essentially comprises of the primary documentary evidence
on behalf of the prosecution. It is in the wake of
examination of such evidence the learned Trial Judge has
138
examined the prosecution case in the background of the
accused persons being members of the Deendar Anjuman
Institution that they all belong to Muslim community and
pursuing the objects and beliefs of the followers of Deendar
Anjuman organization and as to the manner in which the
evidence supports the charges pressed against the accused
persons. Even to make good the aims and objects the
evidence of PW.46 is relied upon and the learned Trial Judge
has examined the same. The prosecution has placed heavy
reliance on the mahazar drawn, as per Ex.P.1 the mahazar
dated 10.7.2000 drawn by PW.58 - the initial investigating
officer between 3.00 pm and 5.00 pm in the presence of
panchas and material objects 1 to 8. We find this is a
mahazar drawn at the spot where the blast took place on
9.7.2000 at 9.30 p.m. The prosecution has recovered some
incriminating material MOs. 2 and 3 the pamphlets, which
were half burnt at the edges and contained the slogan
“WARNING – CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES STOP
CONVERSIONS OR QUIT INDIA”
139
139. PW.3 - R. Gopal, who had come to the spot on hearing
the blast while had seen the occurrence, is a panch witness
to Ex.P.1 and has stated that he found that the blast was
not a cylinder blast and has specifically stated that it is due
to a bomb blast.
140. PW.8 - S. Ramanna Owner of a maxicab, which also
got damaged in the blast that took place in the Maruti Van
driven by A1 in which A.2 and A.3 were travelling and who
had lodged first information Ex.P.6, and has acted as panch
witnesses for Ex.P.1
141. A2 died on the way to the hospital and was
pronounced brought dead. A3 died on the spot. One Dr. S B
Patil conducted autopsy over the two bodies and issued the
post mortem reports Ex.P167 and P168. PW.55 – Medical
Officer who has been examined has identified the signature
of Dr.S.B.Patil who had conducted the autopsy on the body
of the dead persons and had given the post mortem report
140
ExsP.167 and P.168 opining that shock, multiplier injuries
were suffered by the persons in the bomb blast. The report is
stated that the persons died in the bomb blast.
142. PW.58 – the initial Investigating Officer – Shivappa Y
Hadimani, who had held inquest over the dead bodies of A.2
and A.3 and drawn up the inquest mahazars as per Exs.P.31
and P.178 respectively, in the presence of panchas has
stated that the injuries sustained by the two deceased were
due to explosive substance.
143. The death of A.2 and A.3 due to the explosion by the
bomb is not much in dispute and in fact it is in this
explosion, the death of these two persons and damage to the
maruti van which have caused the investigation by the
prosecution.
144. As follow up of the blast, mahazar was drawn on the
next morning at the residence of A.1 as per Ex.P.7 by the
Investigating Officer PW.59 and in the presence of panch
141
witness PW.12. Amongst the articles seized in this mahazar
are MO.11 was CPU, MO.11(a) was Monitor, MO.11(b) was
Key board and Mouse, MO.12 was Computer Printer, MO.13
was Khaki colour pant and shirt, MO.16 was file containing
26 pages, MO.17 was diary containing telephone numbers,
MO.18 and considerable amount of literature not only
relating to Deendar Anjuman movement and organization,
but also religious thoughts of other religion were also seized
during this Mahazar.
145. The book, titled Lingayath published by Deendar
Anjuman organization, is amongst the material object seized
and this book found along with other books during search.
146. Seized articles have been testified by PW.59 - the
investigating officer and supported by PW.12 panch witness.
147. Significance of the prosecution case for seizure is that
MO.11 the computer was opened on 12.7.2000 at the office
of PW.59 by PW.7 – Police Constable in the presence of
142
PW.12 and it was found that when the same was opened,
screen displayed the content of the pamplets MOs.2 and 3,
which had been seized under Ex.P.1 at the spot and was
part of the data ambit in the hard disk of the computer.
148. The other mahazar drawn at the spot is under
Ex.P.179 on 10.07.2000 whereunder, the maxi cab bearing
reg. No.KA-04-8296 belonging to PW.8 which had been
damaged due to the blast was seized. The seizure was upon
the complaint lodged by PW.8, as consequent to the blast,
maxi cab is badly damaged.
149. The Investigating Officer has drawn the next mahazar
Ex.P8 at the residence of A.17, which has come to light from
the letters and other materials seized at the residence of A.1
on 10.7.2000 under Ex.P.7.
150. The mahazar was drawn on 15.7.2000 by PW.66 the
third Investigating Officer – M.B.Appanna, who had taken
143
over the investigation on and after 15.7.2000 being DSP in
COD and as per the orders of Superior officers.
151. When Ex.P.8 the mahazar was drawn, A.17 was not in
the house and it was drawn in the presence of panch
witness PW.13 and the material object MOs.70 to 86 were
seized from the house of A.17 situated at No.49, Gundappa
Layout, 5th Cross, R.T.Nagar, Bangalore City.
152. The seizure materials included MO.70 – Passport of
Amanath Hussain Mulla, MO.72 – Invitation sent to Pope
Paul from Deendar Anjuman, Pakistan, MO.78 – list of
Muslim institutions of Bangalore City and their
correspondence, copies of newspaper of voice of peace, Xerox
copy of the passport of Shaikh Dawood Abdul Lathief etc.
153. A.17 was arrested on 27.7.2000 and after his arrest
and on his interrogation and after recording the statement
as per Ex.P.271, has drawn another mahazar at the instance
of A.17 in his house on 28.7.2000 as per Ex.P.12 and in the
presence of PW.18 and further seized MOs.95 to 109.
144
154. In the mahazar drawn on 28.7.2000 at the house of
A.17, amongst the recoveries of MOs.95 to 109, MOs.104 to
106 are the documents including the registration certificate
of the maruthi van in which explosion had taken place on
9.7.2000 which was found in the dickey box of the scooter
bearing registration No.KA–04-E-8825 and which had been
parked near the house of A.17.
155. MOs.96 to 99 constituted the computer set comprising
MO.96 – CPU, MO.97 – Digicam company monitor, MO.98-
Chikoni Electronics company key board, MO.99- Compact
company mouse. As per the mahazar, computer set was
found underneath the cot in the house A.17 and contents of
the seizure mahazar was drawn in the presence of A.17 and
the panch is to the effect that A.17 had produced the
computer set kept below the cot in his house and stated
that, that was the computer from which he had sent mail
messages to Pakistan by using the email account
“hsdchandrashekar (moonforehead).
145
156. Insofar as mahazar Ex.P.12, which is drawn at the
house of A.17 on 28.7.2000, the argument of Mr.Pasha,
learned counsel for the appellants is that this computer set
had not been noticed by PW.66 when he had searched the
house of A.17 earlier on 15.7.2000 and had drawn Ex.P.8
mahazar and so also the scooter and the recovery from the
scooter MOs.95 to 109, but not noticing the computer set
which is stated to be just below the cot is doubtful seizure,
though it is stated to be at the instance of A.17.
157. Insofar as A.17 is concerned, another mahazar was
drawn at his workplace under Ex.P.13 drawn on 29.7.2000
at the BEML factory, wherein A.17 was working as Machine
Operator and in the presence of panch PW.19 - G.
Vishwanath, Assistant General Manager of the factory at
that time and the mahazar being drawn in the presence of
A.17 by PW.66 –the investigating officer and in the presence
of A.17 seized MOs.120, 147, which are produced by A.17
from his cupboard pursuant to his voluntary statement.
146
158. Amongst the recoveries are Xerox copy of the photo of
Late Channabasavshwara Siddique and photo of Zia Ul
Hassan, five copies of the book Lingayat, and as listed at
Sl.No.34 the items recovered under the mahazar, five visiting
cards of S.M.Ibrahim in Barkath and company, auditors and
tax practitioners, identity card of A.17 – Imulla Staff No.R
721 02231, machine shop, BEML, Bangalore, the cover with
the above description and inside the cover was found four
copies of last warning to Christian missionaries, map of
India, flag and pamplets on which the instruction of namaz
in Urdu and below that Peeju – Bul – Mujaiduddin has been
written and many other correspondence and Urdu diaries
and journals giving information about Deendar Anjuman
movement and organization etc.,
159. With regard to recoveries made pursuant to the
mahazars, contention on behalf of the appellants by Sri.
Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel is that PW.19 in his
deposition had stated that the Chief Security Officer of
147
BEML on coming to know about the arrest of A9 and A17
had sealed the cupboard of A17 and also table drawer of A9
and though it is in his evidence that seal put by the Chief
Security Officer of BEML was intact on 29.07.2000 and
Ex.P13 mahazar was drawn and this obviously throws doubt
about the genuineness of the recoveries etc., particularly, as
the recitals in Ex.P13 does not recite the factum of the seal
being intact.
160. It is also pointed out by Sri. Hashmath Pasha, learned
counsel for the appellants that A17 had been arrested by the
Investigating Officer on 27.07.2000 and on the very day on
he being interrogated, his voluntary statement as per
Ex.P271 had been recorded, but the mahazar at his
residence was drawn on 28.07.2000 and mahazar at the
work place even the next day on 29.07.2000 and the
recoveries being not made immediately following recording of
his voluntary statement, throws doubt about the
genuineness of the recoveries.
148
161. One another contention urged in the context of Ex.P13
by Sri. Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants
is that even as per evidence of PW.19, whenever a visitor
enters the factory premises of BEML, an entry is made at the
gate about the person, particulars and the purpose of the
entry etc.,; that no such entry being found nor having been
made good by the prosecution on the day when PW.66 has
drawn mahazars inside the factory premises of BEML is a
circumstance to doubt the very presence of PW.6 within the
factory premises on the day and the mahazars and
consequent recoveries etc.
162. Ex.P177 is a mahazar drawn on 23.07.2000 by PW.66
– Investigating Officer at the residence of A9 and in the
presence of panch witness PW.57 and by which time it is
indicated that MOs 168 to 185 were recovered pursuant to
voluntary statement of A9 as per Ex.P264 recorded on that
day. Amongst the recoveries in MOs.168 to 185, are pocket
diary which contained the address of A7 and phone number
149
and that he was contacting A7 and his son often over this
telephone number. It is also indicated that in the diary was
placed one passport size photo of S M Ibrahim as told by A9
and also in the diary was found a folded paper containing
name of A9 along with names of A2 & A3 and other names
and A9 is further said to have stated that A4 [since expired]
had given these names for instructing as to which person
has to place bombs in which place and seizure mahazars
recites that they were all seized. The mahazar further
recites that A9 had shown to the Investigating Officer and
the panch witness a cot on the side of the wall where he had
sat along with A2 & A3 to discuss as to in which of the
Churches bombs have to be placed and that the bombs to be
exploded had been stored in an almirah near the door for
about a month and that on 9.7.2000, A1, A2 & A3 had
brought two bombs and that A9 had given one bomb which
was with him to them and that A1, A2 & A3 had sat on the
very cot and had checked three bombs.
150
163. In this regard, Sri. Nilogal, learned SPP has placed
reliance to accept the contents of the mahazar wherein is
recorded the statement/information said to have been given
by A9 about the discussion that had taken place amongst
A1, A2 and A3 and involving himself and exchange of
handing over of bombs as admissible evidence within the
scope of section 8 of the Evidence Act.
164. The next mahazar Ex.P14 is one that is drawn on
3.8.2000 at the work place of A9 i.e., inside BEML factory
premises in the presence of PW.19 – the then Assistant
General Manager and effecting seizure of MOs. 148 to 153.
Amongst the seizures effected, significance is in respect of
the seizure of ten floppies in MO Nos.148 & 149 each
containing ten floppies and MO No.150 a big packet
containing two small packets containing 18 and 19 floppies
respectively. It is stated in the mahazar that these items
produced by A9 from his table drawer.
151
165. Significance of these floppies is that floppies under MO
NOs.148 and 149 had been taken to the office of the COD
Head quarters and print outs of the contents of the floppies
had been retrieved on 29.08.2000 as per Ex.P26 drawn by
PW.66 and in the presence of panch witness PW.21 and the
print outs being marked as Ex.P16 to P25 said to be print
outs from the floppies MO Nos.148 and 149 that had been
seized at the instance of A9 from his table drawer.
166. It is the version of the prosecution that the print outs
revealed a wealth of information. The mahazar recites that
Sri. Venkatesh – computer expert had inserted the floppies
one after the other into a print machine and had taken out
the prints published from each of the floppy and had shown
the prints to the panchas and it had been signed by the
Panchas and said Venkatesh on each print out and details of
the print outs from these floppies revealed about Defence
installations, Oil Refineries of ONGC, details of Defence
Establishment in Bangalore City, particularly, ISRO and
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Satellite Centre at Hassan, the access to National Remote
Sensing Centre, aerial survey and mapping of National
Remote Sensing Centre, about Hassan INSAT Master Control
Facility, about training centre at IIRS Dehradun, about
image processing software, names and telephone numbers of
the officers in these organizations, information about
nuclear fuel complex as per print out and floppy-PH, about
Army-54, INF Division, Seabird, Hyderabad, Defence
Laboratories and telephone numbers about LPG Bottling
plants, Southern Region, blue print of Kirana Manufacturer
at Bangalore, blue print of Jacquar etc.
167. While submission on behalf of the prosecution by Mr.
Nilogal, learned SPP, with reference to such material is that
these are all very vital information about the Defence
establishments and strategic establishments supporting
defence activities and also Oil & Gas Manufacturing Plant
and very possession of such information points to the
purpose for which information has been gathered. The copy
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of the translation of the letter at pages 6 to 9 of the print out
from the floppy had indicated communication sent by A8, A9
and A4 to A7 giving information about the Defence
installations and also about strong base of RSS being
present at Bangalore and strategy to attack these Defence
establishments and need for setting up a missile launching
station within the radius of 7 kms., from Bangalore city
which all indicate acts of sabotage and waging of war being
planned and at any rate, conspiracy being made in this
regard.
168. On the other hand, submission of Sri. Hashmath
Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants – accused persons
with reference to recoveries effected at the work place of A9
and A17 is that firstly the mahazar not indicating the
opening of the seal which admittedly had been put by the
Security Officer of BEML on learning about the arrest of A9
and A17 and secondly the considerable interval between the
recoveries made following statement of A9, as A9 had been
arrested on 23.07.2000 and recovery at the work spot was
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on 3.8.2000 after interval of 12 days and that too after a
search had been conducted at the residence of A9 on the
very day of his arrest and at his behest, whereas the
recovery at the work place is only after about 11-12 days
thereafter which definitely creates doubts about the
genuineness of the recoveries. The argument addressed is
also in respect of recoveries at the work spot of A17, namely,
absence of entry at the gate about the entry of PW.66 –
Investigating Officer and the seal, is urged in respect of the
recoveries at the work place of A9 also. Insofar as the
contents of the print outs are concerned, the non
examination of the computer expert Venkatesh who had
taken out the prints is pointed out to be yet another
circumstance to doubt the genuineness of the print outs and
the floppies recovered and non fulfilling of the
requirement of accepting the printouts in the nature of
secondary evidence by not producing the originals of the
floppies and not adhering to the procedure under section
65[b] of the Evidence Act are all pointed out to constitute
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infirmities in the quality of the evidence and cannot be
admitted as evidence as against the accused persons and it
is therefore submitted that recovery and the material and
information pursuant to the mahazars under Ex.P177 and
P14 drawn at the work place of A9 and A17 and the
mahazars depicting printouts taken at the office of PW.66
cannot be admitted as evidence against them and at any rate
does not constitute acceptable legal evidence based on the
legal position that emerges from the authorities relied upon
and referred to above, by Sri Hazmath Pasha.
169. One mahazar that has been drawn and referred to and
relied upon by learned trial Judge is at the residence of A10
under Ex.P9 on 23.07.2000 drawn by PW.49 – Police
Inspector who had been deputed to search house of A10 by
PW.66 and in the presence of PW.14 and PW.15 and the
recovery of MOs.84 to 94 pursuant to the voluntary
statement of A10 and Ex.P262. Significant recoveries
amongst other things is said to be on behalf of the
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prosecution, the recovery of English pamphlets with
inscription of warning to Christian Missionaries which
according to the prosecution case reveals conspiracy to wage
war was made which was in common amongst A1, A10 and
A17 from whose residences had been recovered the very
pamphlets.
170. Mahazar Ex.P273 drawn on 8.8.2000 drawn up by
PW.66 at the residence of A-8 which is in the official
quarters of Air force at Gurgaon, Delhi and in the presence
of his wife and seizure of MOs 188 to 202 and negatives of
photographs as per Ex.P284(a) to Ex.P298(a). A-8 had been
arrested from his quarters on the morning of the very day
and his house had been searched. No particular
incriminating material has been seized from the residence of
A-8 except for material showing his involvement with
Deendar Anjuman Organization and he being a follower.
171. The other mahazars which are relied upon on the side
of the prosecution are Ex.P161 to P166 which were drawn at
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the instance of A9 & A10 within the limits of Hyderabad city
who according to these mahazars have pointed out the
places where members of the Organization had met for
working out plan of action about the activities that they have
to try out to achieve the object of their organization, but no
recoveries have been made at these places.
172. We shall now examine the evidentiary value of the
documentary evidence in the form of these mahazars. The
earliest mahazar drawn after the blast that took place in the
Maruthi Van in Magadi road is the mahazar drawn at the
house of A1 on 10.7.2000 under Ex.P7. Accepting the
contents of the mahazar at its face value, the material
recovered at that time would at the best indicate that A1 is a
member of Deendar Anjuman organization. He may be a
very ardent follower and has been keeping in contact with
other members of the organization. Ex.P7 by itself does not
contain any positive incriminating material either against A1
or against other accused persons. The next mahazar drawn
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under Ex.P1 is at the spot. Contents of this exhibit does
show that A1 was in possession of the blast material planted
at the van which he was driving from which can assume for
certainty as even the accused has stated that he was driving
the vehicle and was trying to impart lessons in driving to A3
and therefore, was found in company with regard to the
presence of A3 accused himself has stated that he had been
picked up at the request etc. Be that as it may contents of
this mahazar definitely reveals that the Maruthi Van bearing
registration number KA-02-8296 was in his possession and
was carrying blast material and at that time A2 and A3 who
died pursuant to the blast were in the van and in fact A1
himself has also got seriously injured in the blast. The
mahazar, its contents etc. apart from the other oral evidence
does reveal incriminating material of possession of
explosives with which A1 can be associated. The recovery of
pamphlet containing the slogan warning to Christian
missionaries to stop conversion or quit India is a material
that can link A1 who whatever message he wanted to infer
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from the contents of the pamphlet and also recovery of the
computer that had been found in his house and seized
under Ex.P7-mahazar also containing in its hard disk, soft
copy of the contents of the pamphlets MOs 2 and 3.
Prosecution case is that pamphlets seized as MOs 2 and 3
are in the nature of materials sought to be planted by the
accused persons at the place where bombs were sought to
be exploded and in churches and in the present case the
blast having not taken place at any place of worship, but
even as stated by the prosecution itself that it may be due to
friction when the vehicle was being driven at high speed and
because of the road hump, the vehicle had a severe jolt, MOs
2 and 3 at the most constitute material which was intended
for an act of sabotage or even possibly causing disruption
and disharmony to create communal rift between the two
communities in the form of members of Christian
community being warned or otherwise, the other
consequences would be such bomb blast etc. and the marks
‘om’ on this to create an impression that it was done by
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members of hindu community so that members of Christian
community become hostile towards the members of the
hindu community and as such if achieved would have been
the cause for prosecuting the accused persons for the
offences u/ss. 124A and 153A cannot have much
significance as a piece of evidence in a situation of
accidental blast, but could have constituted material if had
been used for the purpose for which it was created as
suggested by the prosecution.
173. The contents of Ex.P179-spot mahazar revealing the
damage caused to the Maxi Cab owned by the complainant-
PW8 in supportive of the bomb blast have taken place but
that by itself cannot and does not take the prosecution case,
any further, particularly regarding the presence of accused
persons except A1 who was present in the Maruthi Van
when the blast took place, the mahazar drawn at the house
of A17 on 15.7.2000 and the recoveries made therein also
discloses the involvement and membership of A17 in the
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Deendar Anjuman institution and its movements. Nothing
incriminating regarding A17 with reference to the offences
charged with are found or recovered pursuant to this
mahazar.
174. The mahazar drawn at the residence of A10 under
Ex.P9 on 23.7.2000 at the best can be said to constitute
material for recovery of the pamphlets containing slogan
MO87 and recovering six English pamphlets which are the
inscription of warning against Christian missionaries and
the other material literature particularly not only about the
Deendar movement, but other religious activities does show
that A10 is also a member and follower of the movement,
which by itself does not reveal the commission of any
offences, but nevertheless constitute material for drawing
possible inference if found as a fact that along with the other
accused if they have a common plan or agreement to carry
any offence in furtherance of such agreement.
175. The mahazar Ex.P177 drawn on 23.7.2000 at the
house of A9 yet again while it has revealed from the
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recoveries that A9 is also a member of the Deendar
movement and was a active participant etc., here again no
specific incriminating material is seized or recovered at the
instance of A9 which can said to be a new fact discovered
pursuant to an information given by the accused person
within the scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Submission of Nilogal Special SPP is that the mahazar also
contains the statement made by A9 who had pointed out to
the panchas the place where he along with the accused
persons A1 to A3 sat and discussed about the deployment of
bombs in the churches and the other accused checking the
bombs sitting in a corner near the wall are sought to be
accepted as reliable and as an admission on the part of A9
based on the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme court in
NAVJOT SANDHU [supra] pointing out that it could be
relevant with regard to the conduct of the accused u/s.8 of
the Act, is, in our considered opinion not as indicated in the
above said case particularly as the statement incorporated in
the mahazar attributed to A9 is not thereafter supported by
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examining any person with regard to the same nor does it
constitute discovery of a new fact pursuant to the
information given by the accused as the accused had not
stated anything about the bombs having been brought to his
house by A2 and A3 and A9 said to be in possession of the
bomb given to them was not part of the information given to
the investigating agency which has led to the discovery of
the fact but being in the nature of admission made before
the police officer and as already pointed out by Mr.Pasha
cannot be proved against the accused and on the other hand
as per Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act it is not
permitted to be proved against the accused persons.
176. We also notice that in the Parliament bomb blast case,
the information given to the police persons was by a person
who was caught red handed during the operation and it was
only for the purpose of conduct of the accused, reliance was
placed about the information given regarding the place or
purchase of material used in the commission of offence of
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the deceased terrorist and in fact in this case the Supreme
Court found that on facts while that information also could
not be used within the scope of Section 27 in that case it
was sought to be saved only with the help of Section 8 of the
Evidence Act and to the extent regarding the conduct of the
accused.
177. Moreover, we are of the clear view that the narration in
a panchanama or a mahazar by itself is not proof, unless it
is further made good by any person who has knowledge of
the same, so testifying before the court and without the
same the contents cannot be admitted as evidence.
Submission of Sri Pasha that criminal jurisprudence as
administered in this country and in terms of the procedure
under the CrPC ensures a degree of safeguard to the
accused persons; that anything which is said to be against
accused persons has to stand the test of challenge and when
a witness testifies in respect of any fact before a court as
against an accused person, the accused person has a right
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to cross-examine the witness, which is a sine qua non and
part of principle of natural justice; that accepting the
narration as inserted in the panchanama drawn by police
officer without further proof of the narration or statement
incorporated in the panchanama will clearly amount to a
denial of opportunity and failure of justice as against the
accused persons.
178. It is, therefore, that we cannot place reliance on the
statement that is merely incorporated into a panchanama
which is a panchanama to drawn for depicting the state of
affairs that existed at the time of drawing of the
mahazar and not to recapitulate a past event or to forecast a
future event. In the instant case, it is a fortiori so being in
the nature of an admission made by the accused before a
police officer and as noticed earlier being hit by the
provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.
Reliance placed by Sri Pasha on the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the case of NARBADA DEVI GUPTA
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[supra] and MALAY KUMAR GANGULY vs SUKUMAR
MUKHERJEE [2010 SCW 769] in the context of
acceptability of the contents of ExP260 and the ratio therein
equally applies to the present situation for accepting the so-
called statement attributed to A-9, stating and indicating the
place where he along with A-3 sat and discussed the plot for
carrying out the criminal activities of planting bombs in
churches etc. It is, therefore, we find ExP177 does not
constitute a material more than for drawing an inference
that A-9 was an active member of the organization in
question and not for anything more. We reject the
argument on behalf of the prosecution as submitted by Sri
Nilogal for accepting the statement attributable to A-9 as an
admissible evidence against A-9 on the basis of the ratio of
the decision of the Supreme Court in the parliament attack
case.
179. That takes us to the mahazars drawn at the workplace
of A-9 and 17, which, to some extent, have certain common
167
features. There is no doubt if the recoveries at the
workplaces of A9 and 17, if are proved against these accused
persons in a manner as permitted in law, it may constitute
incriminating materials as against A-9 and 17. Except for
cover containing four copies of the pamphlets mentioning
‘last warning to Christian missionaries etc., may be on par
with the effect of recovery of a like material from the
residence of A-10 and it is, perhaps, the only incriminating
material, there is a challenge posed to this also. While Sri
Pasha pointed out that recovery itself is suspect for the
reason that the witness who has testified to ExP13 mahazar
i.e. PW19 and who was also a witness at the time of drawing
of the mahazar and later deposed as PW19, the evidence not
indicated that whether in the presence of the investigating
officer – PW66 the seal that had been put by the security
officer as stated by him in his deposition was got opened in
their presence and at any rate not so indicated in the
mahazar drawn on the date of the drawing of the same i.e.
on 29-7-2000, but the information to this effect being
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forthcoming before the court for the first time when he
deposed before the court 5 to 6 years later, the contents of
ExP13 and the recoveries made pursuant to it becomes
suspect and non-entry at the gate of the factory, about
PW66 visiting the factory on that day is yet another infirmity
pointed out and this infirmity coupled with the fact that
recoveries at the instance of A-17 from his workplace was
made two days after his arrest, though the next day a
mahazar was drawn at his house pursuant to the
information said to have been given by him and certain
recoveries had been made. These circumstances definitely
create a doubt about the acceptability of the evidentiary
value of ExP13.
180. Similar argument in respect of ExP14 mahazar drawn
on 3-8-2000 and the recoveries yielding MOs 148 to 153
from the desk drawer of A-9, suffers from the very same
infirmity as pointed out by Sri Pasha in the case of ExP13.
Non-mentioning of opening of the seal by the security officer
in ExP14, absence of entry about PW66 entering the factory
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premises at the factory gate and the fact that the recovery
being almost 10 to 11 days after the arrest of A-9, are all
circumstances creating doubt and throwing suspicion about
the acceptability of the contents of the mahazar and the
recovery pursuant to it. Even otherwise, we find that the
recoveries under ExP14 particularly in the form of floppies
MOs 149 and 148 by themselves are not complete to reveal
any incriminating material or data against the accused, as it
is the version of the prosecution that the floppies were taken
to the office of the CoD headquarters and printouts were
taken on 29-8-2000 through a computer expert namely
Venkatesh and in the presence of PW21 Lokesh and the
mahazar being drawn by PW66 investigating officer. Here
again, there is a considerable time gap between the date of
seizure and retrieval of the floppies and taking out of
printouts as per ExP16 to 25 and the panchas or the
investigating officer not speaking about the safeguard which
was required to be observed when seized materials are
sought to be retrieved and used for other purpose, further
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compounded by the non-examination of the computer expert
who, admittedly, is a person who had taken out prints using
his expert knowledge, are all yet again circumstances which
render suspect for accepting the contents of the printouts
and the information and fresh facts as disclosed from the
contents. The contents, no doubt, being in the form of rich
information about the defence institutions, strategic
manufacturing places, oil and gas producing factories, navy
or air force bases, information about the officials of army,
navy and air force and particularly if it is being sent to any
person in a foreign country can definitely constitute material
against persons possessing it and more importantly the
contents of Urdu letter said to have been sent by A-4 to A-7
in Mardhan in Pakistan not only passing on such
information but also egging upon the person to have a
missile launching station within a radius of 7 kms from
Bangalore for striking at strategic defence locations. The
manner in which these facts are sought to be discovered and
the procedure followed leave much to be desired and creates
171
doubts about the genuineness of the recoveries and follow
up action. At any rate, the recoveries and the information
sought to be made out from the recoveries not meeting the
legal requirements of seizure mahazars and making use of
the seized materials as material objects to constitute
evidence against the accused persons and with the settled
legal principle that the benefit of doubt always enures in
favour of the accused, we find it rather difficult to accept
the information or fact as revealed from recoveries pursuant
to ExP14 mahazar as acceptable evidence to support the
prosecution case.
181. This apart, the contents of the mahazar by themselves
also not in the nature of a primary material, unless proved
in the manner known to law and not being testified by
further follow up action, we find even accepting it at its face
value, the recoveries as per mahazars may not get elevated
to the status of proof or meeting the requirements of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The recovery mahazar ExP26
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drawn up at the office of PW66 on 29-8-2000 in the CoD
headquarters also suffering from this infirmity, we find
incriminating materials in terms of ExP14 against A-9 is
lacking, if ExP14 itself should be taken as material read in
combination of ExP26 and 177.
182. One another argument of Sri Pasha, learned counsel
for the appellants, is that any evidence attributable to an
electronic equipment, in the sense an electronic record, can
be proved in the form of and in the manner envisaged under
Section 65B of the Evidence Act, viz., the contents of the
electronic record in the form of printouts, can be proved as
documents by fulfilling the conditions mentioned in sub-
section (2) viz., that the computer was used regularly and
the person so operating the computer have lawful control
over the use of the computer; that such information has
been regularly fed to the computer in the ordinary course of
said activities; that the computer was functioning normally
during the period and that the accuracy record should not
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be affected and that it should be acceptable as secondary
evidence, is countered by Sri Nilogal by pointing out that the
provisions of Sections 65A and 65B were not on the statute
book at the time when the printouts in question were taken,
we have even without reference to these provisions examined
the acceptability of the printouts by observing the normal
safeguards for producing a secondary evidence, as noticed
above, and having found that it is not one inspiring the
confidence for accepting it as in the form of secondary
evidence, the question does not arise for our examination,
but we are definitely not fully convinced about the manner of
taking out the prints from the floppies said to have been
recovered in terms of ExP14 mahazar and therefore not
much credence can be placed for supporting the prosecution
case on the contents of ExP16 to 25.
183. Exp273 is another mahazar drawn on 8-8-2000 at the
residence of A-8, which is inside the official quarters of air
force at Gurgaon, New Delhi. The material seized there
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under in the presence of wife of A-8 viz., MOs 186-202, at
the best, only revealing A-8 is also a follower of Deendar
Anjuman organization and even as per the prosecution case
not yielding any incriminating documents as against A-8
may not have evidentiary value for proving the prosecution
case against A-8 or any corroboration with other materials
or evidence on record.
184. The result of drawing up of mahazars ExP161 to 166 at
the instance of A-9 and 10 and in the presence of panch
witness is only to record the statements attributable to these
accused to show the places where the A-9 and 10 had met
with other accused persons for holding meeting to carry out
the objects of the movement etc., and these statements
attributable to these accused again suffer from the very vise
which we have noticed in respect of the statement attributed
to A-9 under ExP177 – mahazar drawn at the residence of A-
9 on 23-7-2000. We find the contents of the mahazar and
the information, if one can gather from, are not of any
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acceptable evidentiary value supporting the prosecution
case.
185. That takes us to other evidence in the form of oral
evidence let in by the prosecution to support the prosecution
case and the prosecution has while placed heavy reliance on
the evidence of PW.28 and PW46, it has also placed reliance
on the document ExP260 and in fact is sought to contend
that it constitute substantial evidence for proving the
prosecution case.
186. The testimony of PW28, who is sought to be a witness
who had seen A-1 to 3 in the vicinity of a Church where a
bomb blast had taken place and A-1 and 2 having gone into
the said church namely St Peter and Paul Church, located
within the jurisdiction of Jagajeevan Nagar police station,
Bangalore. It is stated by this witness that he had seen A-1
and 2 going inside the said church holding a bag and
returning after some time and that they had told the other
person, who was sitting in a van, the very van in which a
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blast took place at Magadi road, and telling that chalo, kam
hogaya.
187. We find the testimony of this witness not very relevant
for this case, particularly as the blast which took place in
the church at J J Nagar is the subject matter of SC No 696
of 2005 and in the present case it is not in dispute, even by
the prosecution, that the blast that took place in the Maruti
van at Magadi road on the night of 9-7-2000 was an
accidental blast.
188. Sri Nilogal, learned SPP has contended that the
evidence of PW28 is very material to demonstrate that A-1 to
3 had by their joint action planted a bomb inside the church
at J J Nagar and were proceeding with bomb for further
plantings in other churches, and that could not be achieved
because of the accidental blast, but nevertheless, their past
conduct has to be looked into and on the other hand Sri
Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants, submitting that
mere intention in itself is not one constituting an evidence
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amounting to preparation of further commission of offence
and that having been aborted even at the stage of
preparation and not even an attempt being made for the
commission of any offence for which no penal provision is
provided for in the IPC, except for a situation covered by
Sections 122, 399 and 402 IPC and there being no charge
against the accused under any of these sections, evidence of
PW28, even accepting it at its face value and even assuming
for arguments’ sake but without conceding, can be accepted,
it does not result in the accused being found guilty of any of
the offences with which they were charged. It is of no
consequence and therefore accepting this submission, we do
not want to go into the evidence of PW28 any further. We
find this argument of Mr. Pasha to be sound on the legal
premise.
189. In so far as the testimony of PW46 is concerned, it is
relied upon by the prosecution to make good the case of
conspiracy punishable under Section 120B IPC. In so far as
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the charge under Section 120B IPC is concerned, legal
hurdle of double jeopardy under Section 300 CrPC was
pressed into service and we have found as above that the
charge being bad in law and on the same fact, attracting
Section 300 would depend on the fact situation, as pressed
into service by the prosecution for making good the charge
under Section 120B IPC.
190. Further the evidence of PW46 is concerned, while
substantial part of his evidence only indicates the
background of the movement of the organization and the
meetings held at Hyderabad and Nuzvid and this set of facts
having been sought to be the facts leading to the charge
under Section 120B IPC in the case before a Hyderabad
court and in fact some of the accused having been found
guilty of the charge also in the same set of facts the accused
had faced trial and they cannot be proceeded against in the
present case also. However, the argument of Sri Nilogal,
learned SPP being that the evidence of PW46 also reveals
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facts relating to meeting held at Batkurki in Raydurg taluk
and it is here that further plans were hatched for carrying
activities in furtherance of activities which had already been
agreed to.
191. No doubt, Sri Pasha has raised a legal contention that
PW46 being in the position of an accomplice who had very
much participated in the meeting, if at all the meeting had
taken place, it should not have been brought through the
backdoor testimony of PW46 as a witness and the argument
is sought to supported by authorities referred to above, we
find that in the testimony of PW46, there is no reference to
the action plan sought to be carried out at Bangalore, as the
present case relating to the incident which had taken place
at Bangalore and more importantly which is the result of an
accidental blast. While for the purpose of examining the
testimony of PW46, we do reject the submission of Sri Pasha
that this witness could not have been examined as a witness
for the reason firstly that he had not been arrayed as an
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accused and secondly the testimony does reveal that he had
not agreed to be part of the acts of sabotage or acts of
sedition or waging war against the state, if at all was
suggested to be carried out by the leader of the movement.
In this state of factual position and as to whether he could
have been arrayed as an accused at all being firstly in the
wisdom of the prosecution and secondly if found it is a case
of a person committing offences, it is for the court to direct
him to be arrayed as an accused, and that having not been
done, we find that this witness was in fact a de facto witness
and not an accused person. The procedure that is required
to be followed for accepting the evidence of an accused as
approver as permitted by court in terms of Sections 306 and
307 CrPC is not exactly attracted to the present situation.
It is, therefore, we are examining the evidence of this witness
at its face value.
192. While our examination of the position of PW.46 for
testifying before the court has revealed that his evidence
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cannot be rejected for not following the procedure of sections
306, 307 of Cr.PC as virtually he will be in the position of
the accused and therefore his testimony cannot be kept out,
but nevertheless, this witness having himself stated that he
was a participant in the meeting that had taken place at
Batkurki in Karnataka and even the earlier meeting in
Hyderabad and though he had exonerated himself by
claiming that he had attended the meeting only for the
purpose of recovering the dues from other accused persons
and he had also expressly disassociated from carrying on
violent acts of sabotage, nevertheless, in our considered
opinion, remains in the position of an accomplice whose
evidence is made acceptable within the scope of section 133
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 133 of this Act
recognizes even accomplice to be a competent witness
against the accused persons and the conviction being not
rendered illegal merely because it is based on
uncorroborated testimony of accomplice. However, as
pointed out by Sri. Pasha, learned counsel for the
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appellants, there is a rider to this section 133 of the
Evidence Act at illustration[b] to section 114 of the Evidence
Act, reads as,
“That an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars;
and begins with preamble ‘The court may presume’.
193. Though Mr. Nilogal contended that PW.46 cannot also
be placed in the position of an accomplice as he was only
attending the meeting for recovery of money etc., we find it
difficult to accept this proposition and on the other hand
even according to his own testimony he having attended the
meeting regularly and being a follower of the movement even
as per his own statement, necessarily stands in the position
of an accomplice and therefore the caution aired in
illustration[b] to section 114 of the Evidence Act, has to be
kept in mind while appreciating his evidence and therefore
corroboration to his testimony which is in our opinion is the
required aspect which merits examination.
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194. In this regard, while Mr. Pasha, learned counsel for the
appellants has placed reliance on the Judgment of the Privy
Council in the case of ‘BHUBONI SAHU v. THE KING’
reported in AIR 1949 PC 257 and submits it does call for
corroboration, Mr. Nilogal, learned SPP has submitted that
corroboration has to be found in the admission and
submitted even assuming PW.46 should be treated as
accomplice, then corroboration is very much available in the
form of admission of the accused persons themselves.
195. We find it difficult to accept the submissions of Mr.
Nilogal, learned Public Prosecutor for the reason that
corroboration should be forthcoming from independent
quarters and not by way of admission of accused person and
on the other hand it could be the other way that in respect of
an admission, testimony by witness who is in the position of
accomplice may constitute corroboration but not vice versa.
196. Though Mr. Nilogal, learned SPP contends that even if
he is an accomplice, being in the nature of passive
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participant who had not agreed to participate in the
conspiracy, there is no requirement of examining his
testimony for acceptance with corroboration any material
particulars, we are unable to accept this submission, as we
find that PW.46 is not a totally independent witness, but a
witness who had been involved in the activities of other
accused and belonging to the same organization and
therefore he is very much in the position of an accomplice
and the provisions of section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, is attracted, particularly, illustration[b] of section 114
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
197. With no independent corroboration forthcoming to
corroborate the material particulars the testimony of PW.46,
evidence adduced by the prosecution through PW.46
remains a weak evidence for the purpose of securing
conviction based on such weak evidence.
198. We, nevertheless, find the testimony of PW46 is not
linking to the meetings said to have been held at Batkurki or
185
to the incident at Bangalore and the testimony only relates
to the conspiracy for the subject matter of the case and the
trial before the Hyderabad court and even according to the
prosecution, there is fresh facts, fresh conspiracy hatched
and in the present case, even in terms of the prosecution
version, the conspiracy if at all is hatched in the house of A-
1 and 9 and there being no reference in the testimony of
PW46 to these efforts at Bangalore and for the purpose of
such efforts, we are of the considered opinion that the
testimony of PW46 does not constitute a piece of evidence to
make good a charge of conspiracy against the accused
persons in respect of the event of accidental blast that had
taken place in the Maruti van belonging to A-1, which got
blasted on 9-7-2000.
199. Yet another situation which creates doubts about the
testimony of PW46 and as pointed out by Sri Pasha, learned
counsel for the appellants, is that PW46 was not a charge
sheet witness, but has been examined as a witness much
later on an application filed by the prosecution on 29-9-
186
2006, an application filed under Section 311 CrPC. It is on
record that this witness had been examined under Section
164 CrPC in connection with a case registered at
Keshavapura police station, Hubli by a magistrate at Hubli.
More so, when the version of PW46 being sought to be
brought on record more than six years after the prosecution
filed charge sheet as against the accused persons and
therefore the evidence of PW46 does not necessarily inspire
the confidence of this court for acceptability of his
deposition. It is, therefore, we hold that the testimony of
PW46 in no way advances the case of the prosecution for
supporting the charge under Section 120B to hold that there
was a conspiracy to commit offences and which, according to
the prosecution, could not be carried out due to the
accidental blast that took place at Magadi road.
200. From the examination of the evidence of PW46, we find
that the testimony is not supportive of the prosecution case
of a fresh conspiracy being hatched up either at the meeting
187
held at Batkurki or in the houses of A1 and A9 at Bangalore.
We have also found on an examination of documentary
evidence, particularly, through the mahazars drawn at the
house of A1, at the house and work place of A9, the
prosecution has failed to make good its version of fresh
conspiracy being hatched up on acceptable legal evidence.
Mr. Nilogal, learned SPP, appearing for the respondent-state,
having specifically contented that the prosecution case and
the charges pressed into service against the accused persons
being based only on the fact situation, such as, further
meeting and conspiracy for the bomb blast that took place in
the Maruthi van on Magadi Road, Bangalore and therefore
the argument of Sri Pasha, learned counsel for the
appellants, that the prosecution is bad for violating the
safeguard of double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 300
CrPC is not violated, as the prosecution itself has limited the
case and therefore technically speaking Section 300 CrPC is
not attracted on facts. Prosecution having failed to make
good the case of fresh conspiracy, prosecution charge under
188
Section 120-B IPC fails. However for the purpose of
answering point No.1 raised, we hold that in the present
case on the version of the prosecution case, Section 300
CrPC is not attracted and this point is answered accordingly.
201. In so far as the evidentiary value of ExP260 is
concerned, considerable weighty arguments have been
advanced, both on the side of prosecution and the
appellants-accused. It is no doubt true that on the
authorities referred to and relied upon by Sri Pasha, learned
counsel for the appellants, it cannot constitute a
confessional statement either within the provision of Section
164 CrPC nor is a piece of evidence to advance the case of
prosecution, but the prosecution has sought to support the
contents of ExP260 by contending that it is in the nature of
extra-judicial confession, admissible within the scope of
Section 24 of the Evidence Act.
202. It is also the version of prosecution that once it is
admitted to be an extra-judicial confession saved under
189
Section 24, and within the limits of Section 24, there cannot
be any further restriction for the operation of Section 30 of
the Evidence Act for the confession of an accused
constituting a material for securing conviction of a co-
accused.
203. On the other hand, though Sri Pasha, learned counsel
for the appellants, very strongly contended that ExP260
being in the nature of a letter addressed to the third
additional chief metropolitan magistrate, Bangalore and the
circumstance under which it had come into existence is
highly suspicious and doubtful, particularly as it was said to
have been written by A-8 while he was in jail and running
into such details; that it was not possible for any one to
remember so much of the past incidents so vividly and put
into in narration running into 42 pages and the contents of
it by itself makes it highly doubtful about the voluntary
nature etc., before going into the contents etc., we would like
to examine the legality, in the sense, acceptability of ExP260
190
as a piece of evidence. If ExP260 should have been an extra
judicial confession, it could not have been sent to a
magistrate and a confessional statement addressed to a
magistrate is, as per the submission of Sri Pasha, to be only
in accordance with the provisions of Section 164 CrPC and
the authorities to support this argument to say that a thing
required to be done in law, in a particular manner, can be
done only in that manner and in no other manner. This
proposition is supported by authorities referred to above.
204. It is to be noticed that Section 164 CrPC is a special
provision in CrPC and enables using of confessional
statement of an accused as an admission and can be proved
as evidence against him. It constitutes an exception to the
settled legal principle, that an accused cannot be compelled
to lead evidence against himself. It is, therefore, the
procedural safeguard should be followed to the hilt, as
contemplated in Section 164 CrPC. Though it is addressed
to a magistrate by A-8, the magistrate has not bestowed his
191
attention to it nor has he examined A-8 before him to follow
the procedure and also to administer caution etc., required
to be done under Section 164 CrPC.
205. It is also submitted by Sri Pasha who has placed
reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
SITA RAM [supra], pointing out that even a letter
addressed by an accused person found near the body of his
wife that he had murdered was good enough as an extra-
judicial confession, we find that and as pointed out by Sri
Pasha that the accused person was in judicial custody at the
relevant time and the contents of ExP260 while is addressed
to the magistrate is more in the nature of a bargain for
securing his freedom and for being pardoned and therefore
cannot be a voluntary free confessional statement but being
in the nature of a bargain.
206. Though the learned SPP has placed reliance on an
authority to submit that a confession coming from the
bottom of the heart should not be doubted, we have our own
192
doubt as to the acceptability, having regard to the nature of
the contents of ExP260, whether it is a confession made out
of remorse or for bargaining a pardon, is not free from
doubt. But, more importantly, and as pointed out by Sri
Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants, ExP260 remains
as a letter assuming that it had been written by A-8 and was
testified by PW65 – superintendent of central jail, Bangalore,
it does not go further, as it has neither reached the person to
whom it has been addressed, in which event the procedure
contemplated under Section 164 CrPC should have been
followed, nor the contents of it, which is sought to be relied
upon by the prosecution has been made good in the manner
as permitted by law and under the provisions of Sections 61
and 62 of the Evidence Act. What is pointed out by Sri
Pasha is that if it should be treated as an extra-judicial
confession to any third party, other than the magistrate, it
can be proved only by examining the person to whom an
accused person has confessed, who should come and testify
before the court to withstand the test of cross-examination.
193
207. In the instant case, we find the contents of ExP260
assuming that it can be treated as a document in the nature
of confession statement, it has not been proved by
examining any person much less the magistrate to whom it
has been addressed to. Examination of the magistrate to
prove the contents of ExP260 also being not permitted, in
view of the requirement of strict compliance of the provisions
of Section 164 CrPC, that is not a legally permissible course
of action. In such circumstance, it should be held that
ExP260, assuming that it is a letter in the nature of a
document which the prosecution seeks to rely as an extra-
judicial confession, having not been proved for its contents
nor can it be admitted as evidence in the absence of proof of
the contents, it remains as a letter and not resulted in either
an extra-judicial confession within the scope of Section 24 of
the Evidence Act or as a document proved for its contents in
terms of Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act. When
ExP260 is not a piece of evidence which has been admitted
194
as per legally enabled provisions, it being relied upon in
terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act for constituting
material against other accused is a far fetched proposition.
208. Sri Nilogal, learned SPP, has pointed out that A-8 has,
for the first time, disputed contents of ExP260 while being
examined for recording his statement under Section 313
CrPC, which was more than seven years and therefore the
court should not reject ExP260 as a confession statement
just because of the retraction, we find that it is of no
consequence, as the question of examining the effect of
retraction in the wake of earlier confessional statement
comes into picture only when the confessional statement is
accepted and is a statement as recognized in law, either as a
confessional statement or as a document, contents of which
have been proved. We, having found that ExP260 cannot be
either treated as a confessional statement even within the
scope of Section 24 of the Evidence Act as an extra-judicial
confession and even otherwise to be treated as a piece of
195
evidence whose contents having been proved. It being not
an admissible piece of evidence for the contents of the
documents though it had been so marked, the acceptability
of the confession and rejecting the retraction does not arise
in the present situation.
209. Therefore, we do not propose to examine further the
reliance placed on by Sri Nilogal, learned SPP on several
authorities to indicate that just because a voluntary
statement is retracted later and much later, the confessional
statement does not necessarily lose all its value and it is for
the court to examine the acceptability of the earlier
confessional statement in the wake of a belated or an
afterthought retraction. It is, therefore we hold that Ex260
cannot have any evidentiary value for supporting the case of
prosecution.
210. That takes us to the testimony against A.16 the
evidence on record available against A.16 for finding him
guilty of the offences with which he was charged on the
196
basis of Ex.P.265 said to be a chit in the handwriting of A.16
which reveals the distribution of responsibilities to different
persons including the accused for carrying on the different
acts of sabotage and for achieving the object of the
organization. Ex.P.265 is a chit recovered under Ex.P.177
mahazar drawn at the residence of A.9.
211. This recovery being independent of any information
contained in any electronic device and recovery by itself and
the prosecution having got it exhibited and having claimed
that is in the handwriting of A.16 and recovery in the house
of co-accused pursuant to Ex.P.177 -mahazar and if it is so,
the effect of this recovery will have to be examined vis-à-vis
A.16. It is the case of the prosecution that Ex.P.265 had
been sent for examination and verification of the
handwriting to the handwriting expert PW.67 along with
specimen writings of A.16 and the handwriting expert PW.67
had opined that it is in the handwriting of A.16 and
confirmed in the oral testimony the report that in his opinion
197
handwriting on Ex.P.265 and the specimen sent for
comparison are similar and tallies with one another. It is
therefore, the prosecution has attributed that A.16 is also
one of the active participants in the criminal activities for
which the accused persons have been charged. It is not
even the case of prosecution that except for this material
there is any other evidence on record, which connects or
links A.16, who is the resident of Movva, Krishna District,
Andhra Pradesh to the offending acts with which he and
other accused persons have been charged.
212. Mr. Pasha, learned counsel for the appellants has
pointed out that a testimony of this nature is never sufficient
to secure conviction for the serious offence with which A.16
has been charged even assuming that is acceptable.
However, Mr. Pasha has pointed out that the evidence
against A.16 based on the opinion of the handwriting expert
is not trust worthy of acceptance for the reason that the
comparison of the handwriting on Ex.P.265 is not with
198
reference to any admitted writings and signatures of A.16,
but even the prosecution case is that it is with some request
writings of A.16, that further weakens the quality of the
evidence and in our considered opinion a weak material and
a weak evidence of this nature, while it is rather difficult to
sustain the conviction based on only an incriminating
document being attributed to an accused person based on a
handwriting expert opinion; that is similar to the one
examining, the comparison being not with that of admitted
writing but with a specimen writing, the quality of evidence
further gets deteriorated and it is therefore, that we have to
hold that convictions in respect of A.16 on this material
alone is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside.
213. In addition to the above evidence prosecution has also
relied upon the testimony of the investigating officers PW.58
and PW.59. PW.59 was the second investigating officer and
PW.66 was the investigating officer, who took over from
PW.59 and completed the investigation and laid charge-
199
sheet before the Court. These witnesses have supported the
prosecution case by supporting the mahazars draw by
speaking to the correctness and validity of the mahazars
drawn by them.
214. This apart, we find the evidence of PW.49 – R.N. Natraj
Police Inspector, who had drawn the mahazar at the
residence of A.10 in Chikkaballapur, has also supported the
mahazar Ex.P.9 and the recovery of pamphlets MOs.87 to 94
amongst, which was MO.87 consisting 6 letters at Item No.7
and there was 6 copies of the pamphlets warning Christian
Missionaries, etc.
215. Mr. Nilogal, learned SPP, for the purpose of supporting
the judgment under appeal, apart from placing reliance in
the above evidence on behalf of the prosecution has also
submitted that the involvement of the accused persons in
similar offence and being prosecuted for like conduct in the
sessions case before the Hyderabad Court and being
convicted for criminal conspiracy and being prosecuted in
200
other sessions case, where the accused persons were tried
for like offence is relevant consideration in appreciating the
conduct, we find it is not a supporting circumstance in
favour of the prosecution to make good its case before the
court and to prove the charges against the accused persons.
A court undoubtedly is permitted to examine and appreciate
the evidence on record. What has happened and what is
the allegation made against the very accused in some other
case cannot have any bearing and at any rate cannot be
supplemented as additional evidence for the purpose of
making good the prosecution case in any given case.
216. Sri H N Nilogal, learned SPP has very strongly urged
that the organization of which the accused persons are
members, has been shown to be a militant organization
since its inception; that the members of the organization
have been systematically carrying out acts of violence
against the members belonging to other communities and
the organization has also been now declared as banned
201
organization with effect from 28.04.2001, but this should
not make any difference to the nature of the activities of the
members of the organization, as they are carrying on violent
acts even before the organization came to be formally
declared as a banned organization and in this background,
the incidents leading to the blast of explosive materials in a
public place resulting in injuries to persons and loss of
properties cannot be overlooked, though on the date of the
actual incident of blast, the organization was not one which
had been banned for its existence.
217. We have examined this argument, but found no
substance to accept the same, as any act which amounts to
an offence either under the provisions of IPC or other special
enactments, must be an offence on the date of its
commission and subsequent amendments in existing law or
enacting a new law making the very act an offence will not in
any way rope in the persons who might have committed the
202
act before the activity was declared to be an offending act
under a law made by a competent legislature.
218. We find that there is a constitutional bar on the
making of an accomplished act an offence by enacting a
retroactive law. Also mere membership of an organization
unless it is a banned organization and even by being a
member cannot also result in the commission of an offence.
That by itself will not render such a member an offender and
if the organization is not a banned organization, unless the
members of such an organization are shown to have
committed other acts which constitute an offence under
different laws, those persons cannot be prosecuted. We are
supported in taking this view in the light of the decisions of
the Supreme Court in the case of ARUP BHUYAN vs
STATE OF ASSAM [AIR 2011 SC 957] and INDRA DAS vs
STATE OF ASSAM [2011 CRL.L.J 1646]. In this view of the
matter, we reject the argument advanced on behalf of the
state by Sri H N Nilogal, learned SPP.
203
219. Evidence placed before the court by the prosecution
though has revealed possible subversive activities on the
part of persons who may be either in possession of such
material, relating to strategic defence organizations and their
locations, places of manufacture of essential goods and
supplies and names of senior executives in the control of
such organizations, that by itself is not an end, as unless it
is also shown that the information was in possession of the
accused persons and the same was further used for sending
it outside the country, and in this case to Pakistan where A-
7 resides, and the involvement of accused is also
demonstrated, a mere possibility of enabling the accused to
do something with the information and such possibility
being not made good beyond reasonable doubt and the
prosecution having not tied up all loose ends to definitely
attribute the recoveries from A-9 and 17 specifically to any of
the accused persons and such materials having remained
without a definite connecting link to the accused persons,
204
the accused cannot be found guilty of the offences with
which they are charged with any degree of certainty. It is
because of such uncertainties, the accused persons get the
benefit of doubt resulting in acquittal by reversing the order
of conviction.
220. What is relevant is only the evidence adduced on
behalf of the prosecution, in that particular case, until and
unless otherwise enabled in law either for taking note of any
other material or evidence as enabled in law. On the other
hand, we notice that in terms of the provisions of Section 53
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 “In criminal cases, previous
good character relevant.- In criminal proceedings, the fact that
the person accused is of a good character, is relevant.” and
not bad character of an accused unless it had been held
previously that he was a person of a good character. It is
therefore, that we find no relevance or weight can be given to
the factum of the accused either being prosecuted or having
been convicted in other similar cases to advance the case of
205
prosecution and at any rate not supportive of the evidence of
accused persons. It is for this reason, we reject the
argument addressed on behalf of the prosecution. It is in
the light of the above evidence, it is required to be examined
as to whether prosecution has made good its charges against
the accused persons.
221. We find that accused persons A.5, A.6, A.13, A.14 and
A.18 have all been convicted for the offences punishable
reading as follows :-
“A.5 namely Shaik Hashim Ali is hereby convicted U/s.235 [2] Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s. 120-B r/w
S.121-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.124-A IPC shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.153-A IPC shall undergo RI for 3 years. A.6 Mohd. Farooq Ali is hereby convicted U/s.235
[2] Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s. 120-B r/w S.121-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.124-A IPC shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.153- A IPC shall undergo R1 for 3 years.
A.13 namely Abdul Habeed is hereby convicted U/s. 235 [2] Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s. 120-B r/w S.121-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment
206
for life and for the offence U/s.124-A IPC shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.153-A IPC shall undergo RI for 3 years.
A.14 namely Syed Shamshuzama is hereby convicted U/s. 235 [2] for the offence U/s. 120-B r/w.S.121-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.124-A IPC shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s. 153-A IPC shall undergo RI for 3
years. A.18 namely Syed Abdul Khader Jilani is hereby convicted U/s.235 (2) Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s. 120-B r/w S.121-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.124-A
IPC shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.153-A IPC shall undergo RI for 3 years.”
222. It is not in dispute that the substantial evidence as
against A.5, A.6, A.13, A.14 and A.18 as discussed above is
only the so called confessional statement of A.8 in terms of
Ex.P.260. We have already found that Ex.P.260 is not
proved as either extra judicial confession statement or as to
the contents of the document.
223. Insofar as the evidence as against these accused
persons A.5, 6, 13, 14 and 18 are concerned, we find that
207
the conviction by the Sessions Court is mainly based on
Ex.P.260, which we have already held has not been proved
as acceptable piece of evidence for its contents. We do not
find any other evidence, which can otherwise incriminate
these accused and bind to the offence with which they are
charged.
224. In this view of the matter it is obvious that the
conviction of A.5, A.6, A.13, A.14 and A.18 under the
provisions referred to above cannot be sustained as the rest
of the evidence against them is very weak and not really one
convincing for convicting them for the offences with which
they were charged. The evidence on record in our
considered opinion, does not make good the charges beyond
reasonable doubt with which they were leveled and therefore
reverse the order of conviction against them and we acquit
A.5, A.6, A.13, A.14 and A.18 of the offences with which they
were charged and accordingly, the sentence is set aside.
208
225. Insofar as A.8 is concerned, who is convicted for the
offences as follows :-
“A.8 namely Syed Hasanuzama is hereby convicted U/s. 235[2] Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s. 121 IPC and sentenced to death, he shall be hanged by neck till he is dead, subject to confirmation by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka U/s. 366[1] Cr.P.C. A.8 Syed
Hasanuzama is hereby convicted U/s.235 [2] Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s. 120-B r/w. 121-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment for life. This A.8 Syed Hasanuzama is also convicted U/s.235 [2] Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s. 124-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment for life. For the
offence U/s.153-A IPC to undergo imprisonment for 3 years.”
Here again the prosecution has placed heavy reliance on his
confessional statement Ex.P.260 for securing such
conviction. Other than Ex.P.260 in the case of this accused,
we do not find any commensurate evidence to secure
conviction of this accused for the offences with which he was
charged.
226. Insofar A.10 is concerned, who is convicted for the
offences punishable as follows :-
209
“A.10 namely Mod. Siddique is hereby convicted U/s.235 [2] Cr.P.C. for the offence U/s.120-B r/w.S.121-A IPC and he shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s. 124-
A IPC shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.153-A IPC shall undergo RI for 3 years.”
and we find that apart from reliance placed by the
prosecution on Ex.P.260 insofar as this accused is
concerned, the other evidence placed before the Court by the
prosecution is in the form of recovery of four pamphlets from
his house at Chikkaballapur and we find as submitted by
Mr. Pasha, learned counsel that recovery of material cannot
by itself pin point for securing conviction under the serious
nature of offence with which he had been charged. In our
considered opinion, the evidence on record is not in the
nature of a clinching evidence and if at all the benefit of
doubt enures to the accused and not to the prosecution and
as such the conviction is not sustainable.
210
227. A9 has been found guilty of the offences p/u/ss.121,
121A, 153A of IPC and is imposed the death sentence apart
from other smaller sentences.
228. The prosecution has heavily relied upon the recoveries
made at the instance of this accused at his residence and
work place and also the oral testimony of PW46 and
documentary evidence of P260 for securing conviction.
Having found that the recoveries from the residence and
work place of this accused which according to the
prosecution has revealed incriminating material particularly
for holding the accused guilty of the offence u/s.121 and
121A and other smaller offence and we have found the kind
of evidence as revealed through the recoveries is not
foolproof, for not having observed the necessary safeguards
for the purpose of effecting seizure and also for the purpose
of retrieving the information that had been stored in an
electronic device. The evidence on record is not good enough
to secure conviction under various provisions under which
211
he has been charged and even u/s.121A of IPC conspiracy
very material based on which charges were placed against
this accused being found not foolproof. Therefore, the
conviction does not sustain.
229. A16 has been found guilty of the offences punishable
under Section 120B r/w Sections 121A, 124A and 153 IPC
and sentenced as below :-
He shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offices U/s 124-A IPC shall undergo imprisonment for life and for the offence U/s.153-A IPC shall undergo RI for 3 years.
230. We have already discussed evidence against these
accused to be only in the form of the testimony of PW67
hand writing expert and said to be only incriminating
document against these accused. We find conviction does
not sustain.
231. In so far as A17 is concerned, he is also found guilty of
the offence u/s.121 and 121A, 124A and 153 and he is also
212
imposed the punishment of death sentence with other lesser
sentences.
232. In case of A17 also the evidence against A17 as per the
prosecution case is, apart from reliance placed on the
testimony of PW46 and Ex.P260, the information as revealed
from the mahazar drawn at his house and at his work place,
we have held that recoveries at his residence during the
second search and on being led to his residence on the basis
of the information as revealed by this accused, is suspect
and even the material and information as revealed through
the recovery in terms of the mahazar Ex.P13 is also suspect
due to the factum of the seizure that has been put by the
security officer have not been opened and not so opened
before the panchas before recoveries were effected. The
evidence against this accused in terms of the recoveries
therefore, become suspect and that other evidence having
been found wanting, we are of the view that prosecution has
213
not been able to make good the charges as against this
accused to sustain the conviction.
233. That leaves us with the conviction and the punishment
imposed on A1. Though Mr.Pasha has urged the arguments
as to the quality of evidence as against this accused for
securing conviction, he submitted that it is also suspect and
an alternative argument is also submitted that if at all A1
can be found guilty of the offence punishable u/s.5 of the
Explosive Substances Act, and Section 9(1)(b) of the
Explosives Act, and that he cannot be convicted u/s.3 of the
Explosive Substances Act or u/s. 304 Part II of IPC, we find
that on the evidence available on record and it being a fact
as proved by the prosecution evidence that A1 was found in
possession of the van wherein was being transported
explosive substances, is a person who is to be held guilty of
the offence punishable under Section 5 of the Explosive
Substances Act and under rule 5 of Explosives Rules r/w.
Section 9(1)(b) of the Explosives Act.
214
234. Insofar as conviction u/s.304 Part-II of IPC is
concerned, we find that submission of Sri.Hashmath Pasha,
learned counsel for the appellants, merits acceptance for the
reason that the explosion that took place in the Maruthi Van
while it was being driven on Magadi Road is not any
deliberate act, but is an accidental explosion and if at all can
be attributed to the rash and negligent driving of A1, the
explosion being accidental, provisions of Section 3 are not
attracted as it is not a deliberate explosion and for the same
reason conviction u/s.304 part II cannot sustain as it is not
an intended act of explosion. However, we find that the
accused is to be found guilty of a lesser offence viz.
u/s.304A of the penal code for causing the accident
resulting in the death of A2 and A3 due to rash and
negligent driving of the motor vehicle and accordingly we
convict him for the offence u/s. 304-A IPC.
235. Due to the explosion caused in the Maruthi Van the
damage to the Maxi cab which was in the vicinity and
215
injuries to PW1, the driver of the Maxi cab is made good on
record and through the evidence and therefore, the
conviction u/s.337, 427 are sustained.
236. We find that the conviction insofar as the offences
punishable under Sections 121, 121A, 124A and 153A IPC
and u/s. 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 are not
made good by the prosecution on acceptable, clinching
evidence and therefore, the conviction of A1 under these
provisions is not sustainable.
237. As an outcome of the discussion of the evidence on
record, we have held that the evidence of PW46 being in the
nature of weak evidence not by itself capable of securing
conviction and Ex.P260 cannot be of evidentiary value either
as an extra judicial confession or as an independent
document to prove its contents. We have also held that the
recoveries and the material gathered to as recoveries as
evidence, are suspect and therefore, the evidence on record
can hardly sustain the convictions against accused persons
216
except for A1 and in respect of the offence as noticed above
and on record.
238. It is therefore, we hold the evidence and the documents
placed on record before the trial Court by the prosecution
was not good enough to sustain the charges against the
accused except against A1 and to the limited extent of the
offences for which we have found guilty as discussed above.
239. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction and sentence
imposed by the trial Court on all accused except for A1 and
to the extent he is found guilty for the offence punishable
under Sections 304A, 337, 427 of IPC and u/s. 5 of the
Explosive Substance Act, and u/s. 9(1)(b) r/w. Rule 5 of the
Explosives Act and Explosives Rules respectively.
240. A1 is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period
of two years for the offence u/s.304A of IPC, rigorous
imprisonment for six months for the offence u/s.337 of IPC
and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
217
a period of two years for the offence under Section 427 of
IPC.
241. Insofar as the conviction u/s.5 of the Explosive
Substances Act is concerned, the sentence as imposed by
the trial Court sentencing him to undergo R.I. for a period of
10 years is affirmed.
242. In respect of the conviction u/s.9(1)(b) r/w.Rule 5 of
the Explosives Act and Rules sentence of two years R.I. as
imposed by the trial Court is affirmed.
243. We direct the sentences imposed on A1 under the
above statutory provisions to run concurrently.
244. In respect of the sentences of imprisonment imposed
on A1 is concerned, he is entitled for the set off in terms of
Section 428 Cr.PC. for the period of detention which he has
already undergone.
218
245. For the purpose of claiming set off for the period of
detention, Mr.Pasha has submitted that A1 had been
arrested by PW59 and had obtained an order of detention
from the Jurisdictional Magistrate till 21.7.2000 which
subsequently came to be extended as and when it expired.
246. This step has been taken by PW59 as A1 was seriously
injured in the blast and was not in a position to be produced
before the Magistrate. Therefore, he submits that he has
already served the sentence as his period of detention is
much longer than the sentence imposed on him which is 10
years. It is therefore, requested that direction may be issued
to the jail authorities to set him at liberty forthwith.
247. Sri.Nilogal, learned Special SPP on the other hand
submits that this accused has not, as per the records,
undergone detention for more than 10 years as after his
detention in the present case he had been taken to
Hyderabad under a body warrant for the purpose of
investigation and trial of the case before the Hyderabad
219
Court and had not been brought back to the Central Jail at
Bangalore under body warrant on and after 23.12.2004.
Therefore, the accused cannot claim set off of the period he
has spent for the purpose of investigation and trial of the
accused before the Hyderabad court. In view of the language
of the provisions of Section 428 which specifically indicates
that the period for which set off can be claimed is only the
period of detention which he has undergone during the
investigation, enquiry or trial of the very case and not in
respect of the period of detention, assuming that he was
under detention, during the period of investigation, enquiry
or trial or the cases before the Hyderabad Court.
248. While on a perusal of the provisions of Section 428, it
does appear that set-off can only be claimed in respect of
period during which investigation, enquiry or trial was
taking place in respect of the very case for which the person
is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, but we
nevertheless find that the initial detention of the accused
220
person which was on 14.7.2000 was in connection with this
case and that had not come to an end or brought to an end
by any positive judicial order, but he was only allowed to be
taken to Hyderabad under a body warrant issued by the
court at Hyderabad and even otherwise he had not been
released from custody in the present case and therefore, his
custody in the present case is deemed to have been
continued more so when the investigation and trial before
the Hyderabad court was over, he having been brought back
under body warrant as on 23.11.2004 and his custody
having been continued thereafter also till date. Therefore,
we are of the view that the detention which A1 has
undergone is taken to be from 14.7.2000 and as part of the
detention undergone in connection with the present case.
249. In the result, we find the judgment and convictions
rendered by the trial Court is not sustainable in terms of the
above discussion. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the
following:
221
ORDER
Criminal Appeal No.1202/08 insofar as it relates to
accused Nos.8, 9 & 17 is concerned is allowed in full. The
judgment and order of conviction and sentences passed on
the said appellants are all set aside. These
accused/appellants are acquitted of all the offences with
which they are charged and convicted by the trial Court.
They are ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required
in any other case.
Insofar as the first appellant/first accused in Criminal
Appeal No.1202/08 is concerned, the appeal is allowed in
part.
Insofar as the conviction and sentences passed on him
u/ss.121, 120-B r/w.121A, 124A, 153A and 304 Part II of
IPC and u/s.3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 are
concerned, they are set aside.
222
In respect of his conviction u/s.304 Part II of IPC, we
set aside the same. Instead, we convict him on a lesser
charge for the offence punishable under Section 304A of IPC
and sentence him to undergo R.I. for two years.
Insofar as the conviction for the offences u/s.337, 427
of IPC and u/s.5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908 and
u/s.9(1)(b) of the Explosives Act, 1884 r/w.Rule 5 of the
Explosives Rules 1983 is concerned, it is confirmed. The
sentences as imposed by the trial Court on the first accused
for the said offences is also confirmed.
All the sentences passed on accused No.1 are ordered
to run concurrently. He is also given the benefit of set-off for
the period of detention he has undergone so far.
ORDERS ON R.C.NO.5/08
The reference made by the trial Court for confirmation
of death sentence imposed on A1, 8, 9 and 17 does not
sustain for examination in view of our allowing the appeals
and these accused persons against their conviction for the
223
offence u/s.121 of IPC and having acquitted them for the
offence punishable under Section 121 of IPC for which
conviction alone they were imposed the death sentence and
that by setting aside of the conviction, automatically the
sentence falls to ground and reference does not survive for
examination and is accordingly, rejected.
Registry is directed to communicate the operative
portion of this order to the jail authorities immediately for
taking necessary action.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
AN, SA, RS, pjk, SS, MP, KM, NG
224
DVSKJ/HSKJ:
27-02-2013
Criminal Appeal No 1202 of 2008
C/w Criminal Appeal No 39 of 2009
& Criminal RC No 5 of 2008
ORDER ON ‘BEING SPOKEN TO’ These appeals and Criminal RC, which were disposed
of by our judgment dated 12-12-2012, have been listed
again before the court for issuing directions to prepare the
operative portion of the judgment fully in consonance with
the operative portion of the judgment which was dictated on
the same day and which was also directed to be
communicated to the jail authorities for implementation.
We have subsequently noticed that the last paragraph
of the operative portion ordered to be communicated to the
jail authorities, reading as under:
Crl.A.39/09 preferred by Accused Nos.5, 6,
10, 13, 14, 16 and 18 is allowed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentences passed on
the said accused/appellants is set aside. They are acquitted of all the charges leveled against them. They are in custody. They are ordered to
225
be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.
is not incorporated into the main judgment, though it is to
be part of the judgment and operative portion had already
been signed by us and also communicated through the
registry to the jail authorities immediately. We find that the
discussion relating to this aspect though figures at
paragraphs 224 and 226 of the judgment, this part of the
judgment which is in the operative portion relating to the
result of Criminal Appeal No 39 of 2009 has not been found
part of the main judgment, which makes the judgment
incomplete and it is for issue of direction to include this
portion as part of the judgment, the matter is listed today.
Sri Hashmath Pasha, learned counsel for the
appellants-accused also submits that it is so and, as noticed
above, discussion with regard to appellants in Crl Appeal No
39 of 2009 is found in paragraphs 224 and 226 of the
judgment, but the omission is a mistake and for making the
judgment complete, adding this part in the operative portion
226
of the main judgment is a proper course of action. It is also
submitted by Sri Pasha that this omission is in the nature of
a typographical mistake and by correction to the judgment
what had been ignored or omitted is being included.
Sri H N Nilogal, learned special public prosecutor
appearing for the respondent-state also submits to the same
effect. He submits that it is necessary to issue such a
direction for incorporating the said portion as part of the
main judgment.
In the light of the above discussion and reasoning and
in view of the submissions made by the learned counsel, we
direct the registry to incorporate the following portion in the
operative portion of the judgment:
Crl.A.39/09 preferred by Accused Nos.5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16 and 18 is allowed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentences passed on the said accused/appellants is set aside. They are acquitted of all the charges leveled against them. They are in custody. They are ordered to
be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.
227
and issue certified copy of the judgment, free of cost, to the
parties who have already obtained certified copy of the
judgment and also to the learned special public prosecutor.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
*pjk