Crime, Law & Social Change 38: 239–266, 2002.© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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From Cali to Rotterdam: Perceptions of Colombian cocainetraffickers on the Dutch port∗

DAMIÁN ZAITCHDepartment of Criminology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands(e-mail: zaitch@frg.eur.nl)

Abstract. This article explores the subjective perceptions of Colombian traffickers on theport of Rotterdam. I identify those factors that, from their perspective, make Rotterdam (andthe Netherlands) a low-risk area for cocaine import into Europe. It is argued here that whileeconomic factors and human resources have a central impact on their key decisions, lawenforcement risks tend to be secondary or to vary very much regarding actor and type ofintervention. The article is based on my recently completed ethnographic (PhD) research onColombians involved in the cocaine business in the Netherlands, and on my current researchon cocaine smuggling through the port of Rotterdam.

Introduction

The port of Rotterdam is considered to be, at least by academic research-ers, law enforcement agencies and drug traffickers themselves, one of themain entrance doors for South American cocaine into the European market(Bovenkerk, 1995; Fijnaut et al., 1996; Farrell, 1998; DIC, 2000; Zaitch,2002). While cocaine export-import operations through this port involve vari-ous business modalities (regarding initiative, financial risks and human re-sources), several smuggling methods (in ship, containerised and so on) and avariety of infrastructure arrangements (collusion with legal/illegal firms), theimport of large quantities of cocaine in the Netherlands has been mainly or-ganised by Dutch, Colombian, Surinamese and Antillean drug entrepreneurs(Zaitch, 2002).

In contrast with the other 3 groups, Colombian drug traffickers (traquetos)do not belong to a large, local (native or immigrant) social group.1 So thequestion arises: why is it that Colombian traquetos manage to keep an im-portant share of the import business? In other words, why do they ventureto go to the Netherlands? In this article, we intend to tackle these questionsby exploring their subjective perceptions on local conditions, in particular onthose around the port of Rotterdam. How do different actors involved differin their views? More important, to what extent do these perceptions influencetheir decisions?

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Tracing their views on a number of issues concerning the port of Rotter-dam, we aim to describe how Colombian traffickers assess risks, opportunitiesand obstacles. An attempt is finally made to establish their main reasons touse (or avoid) the port of Rotterdam to import cocaine into Europe.

Entrepreneurs’ and employees’ perceptions

Cocaine traffickers are illegal entrepreneurs that trade their illegal goods ininnovative ways, investing capital and choosing amongst available means tomaximise profits and minimise risk (Arlacchi, 1986; Haller, 1990: 208; VanDuyne et al., 1990; Krauthausen and Sarmiento, 1991: 37). Also seekingstatus and recognition, they tend to use symbolic and material resources ina rational fashion. The same can be claimed about their employees: thoughmuch more constrained, their actions reflect the tension between skills andopportunities, potential incomes, and the high risks involved in their perform-ances.

Thus, as rational actors, their perceptions about particular resources orbusiness environments – in this case the port of Rotterdam – can be regardedto a certain extent as risk assessments (Cornish and Clarke (eds), 1986; Bru-insma and Van de Bunt, 1993). Even when they manage limited or falseinformation that eventually lead them to make “wrong” decisions, or evenif they face risk in fateful moments by appealing to fortuna (Giddens, 1991:113), cocaine entrepreneurs and employees do calculate chances of successand failure and deploy strategies to minimise risk. Their views on particularissues can be revealing to understand their performances.

However, we should be cautious about taking for granted a simplistic re-lationship between perceptions and action, certainly in a research involvingnon-systematic ethnographic material in which traffickers reflect about pastoperations and other people.

While asking people about the port of Rotterdam, we came across with atleast three dilemmas that attest a complex relation between traffickers’ viewsand actions. Firstly, in many cases these views were post hoc rationalisa-tions (fabrications, justifications, self-aggrandizement, exaggerations) ratherthan actual reasons in a decision making process. This seems particularlyevident, as we will illustrate, in some risk-taking trafficker’s views on lawenforcement and controls. Secondly, some informants who posed their viewsabout the port had no choice to do otherwise, their views having a limitedimpact on the course of action they undertook. This is, for example, the caseof unskilled employees who only follow orders and have no say in operationaldecisions. Finally, we found a couple of cases in which perceptions of high

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risks were actually loaded with positive connotations, actions reflecting bothrisk enjoyment and risk minimising strategies.

In what follows, perceptions will be, as much as possible, presented intheir interaction with performances, so they can reveal more about the traf-fickers’ social world.

Another problem refers to the diversity of people interviewed. Colom-bians involved in the cocaine business in the Netherlands do not form asingle, homogeneous social or cultural group. Either performing as entre-preneurs, intermediaries or employees, they vary very much in terms of socialbackgrounds, economic resources and criminal involvement, facing of coursedifferent personal and financial risks.2

Their views about the port reflect, to a certain extent, these differences.Some people performing as mulas (air couriers), boleros (body-packers) orcocaine importers only engaged in air operations were unfamiliar with it, sothey are not addressed here. Others involved as local wholesalers or peri-pheral helpers did have statements about Rotterdam despite their experiencewith the harbour was superficial or second-hand. Still others in Colombiareferred to the port, but were actually never there.

In general, and partially in line with earlier research findings in Britain(Dorn et al., 1998: 547), we can conceive three groups of Colombian traffick-ers that differ a great deal in terms of risk perceptions:

a) Capitalised exporters (“cut out” numbers 1)These are Colombian cocaine entrepreneurs who can decide on key logisticand operational matters (including destinations); who do not travel to theNetherlands; and who count with enough financial resources to pay othersto perform the most risky tasks, and to cover costs in cases of eventual loses.In that sense, they can be considered risk-adverse.

b) Non-capitalised exporters, importers and distributors(“hands on” numbers 1)These risk-taking entrepreneurs lack enough capital or contacts to remainwell insulated. They make decisions and operate in the Netherlands (tempor-ally or permanently), but still are able to transfer risk to more vulnerableemployees or subordinates. However, they are often close to the cocaineloads, and can run into trouble if the operation is busted.

c) High-risk employees (“hands on” numbers 2 or 3)These are potentially expendable employees who take the most risky tasks,including smuggling, unload, stashing or money handling in the Netherlands.They do not make key decisions on destinations, run very high personal risks

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l Goods transported l Transport and communication l Import-Export arrangementsl Use of legal companies l Financial si tuat ion of export er l Facilities for money laundering l Entrepreneurial mentality

l In ternational meeting point l Availability of partners / clients

/ employees l Importer/Wholesaler at unload

point l Access to corruption (police,

customs, harbour personnel)

l Police investigation l Border controls l Sentence length and prison

condi tions l Profits forfeiture

l Police controls l Customs controls l Sentence length and prison

condi tions l Social climate (toleration,

indifference, levels of violence)

Economic Infrastructure Logistics

Human Resources

Tactical Enforcement Risk (drug seizure and capture)

Strategic Enforcement Risk (planner/organiser capture)

Figure 1. Accumulative list of aspects handled in Colombian discourses and performances.

and have no room for mistakes or failure. They depend on others, are oftenmisinformed and constantly feel at the edge of the sward.

Although all informants addressed in this article belong to groups b) andc), we will present whenever possible more general and secondary materialcollected in Colombia about the port.3

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The issues considered

Colombian cocaine traffickers referred to many issues, which we have or-ganised under four categories: Economic Infrastructure, Human Resources,Strategic and Tactical Enforcement Risks.4

Figure 1 should be regarded as an accumulative list of (interdependent)aspects handled in Colombian discourses and performances. The list has onlya heuristic value: each informant often referred to only some of the listedtopics, neglecting or claiming ignorance about others. Moreover, no attemptshave been made to operationalise or quantify the answers. The fact that theseissues are interdependent (for example positive experiences regarding lo-gistics or human resources are often translated into less fear against drugenforcement) also encourages keeping some arguments rather descriptive.However, some trends and striking agreements are perceivable throughoutthe traffickers’ accounts.

Economic infrastructure and logistics

In general, all sorts of informants stressed the large volume of the port –in terms of traffic and capacity – as a main reason to use it for smugglingcocaine. A recurring argument pointed out that larger settings and trade move-ment decreased the risk of interception, since the illegal merchandise waseasier to conceal. Informant #4:

Yes, I know about the scanner, but there are thousands of containersgoing everyday. Do you know why drug trafficking goes through Rot-terdam? It is very efficient. They do not want to control more; no, theysay that they are investing in making things easier for those using theport. When the “things” arrive, the machines put them very fast on boatsor whatever. In other places, the boat has to wait, and while waiting,anything can happen. And now they want to make it even faster (laughs)!

The port was well known in Colombia, even by people who were neverabroad. Amongst peripheral connoisseurs of the illegal business circuit inColombia, it had a good reputation and was usually referred as thoroughlypraiseworthy. Most believed it to be the largest port in the world, which wasnot actually the case. Informant #12:

I don’t know the Netherlands to tell you why [cocaine goes to the Neth-erlands], but as far I heard, looks like there are more containers thanpeople there.

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“Hands on” importers and distributors in the Netherlands, and also drug cour-iers imprisoned tended to share this picture.5 Let us see some of the specificissues referred by informants.

Goods transported

If the cocaine is exported along/hidden in legal merchandise, the nature andpackaging of the traded legal good influences decisions about destinationpoints. This is clear for example in cases involving South American freshfruits, deep-freeze juice, dehydrated food or containerised cargos, especiallyin the modalities of “rip-off” (cocaine inside the legal cargo, but disconnectedfrom – thus misusing – the legal importer or carrier) and when legal exportersor transporters offer their infrastructure to illegal exporters to move cocaineaside their cargo. In both cases, it is the routing and handling proceduresof legal goods what actually determines how, when and where the cocaineshould be rescued or unloaded. Informant #3:

This man in Ecuador was exporting frozen fruit juice to Germany, so hesaid he could bring some coca, but he wouldn’t do it for less than 100kg. . .

Everybody agreed that all sorts of goods have been used to smuggle cocaineby sea, but that a key issue is the way in which the goods are handled whenentering or staying in the port (Bill of Lading, type of container, and so on).Some informants claimed that the traditional exports (especially container-ised food, fruits and frozen juice) are a safe option if they are handled byestablished shipping lines or container groupage services. Not only contain-erised cargo (especially in reefer containers) but also dry bulk (e.g. coal,asphalt, aluminium and agro-bulk from various South American ports) isconsidered useful as potential carrier, especially to Rotterdam. Others hadhowever a different opinion. One informant explained us that you have toavoid both using

too obvious goods such as tropical fruits and too ridiculous things suchas microchips from Peru. . . The safest way is to move it around so youdon’t know that that container comes from Colombia. And if you movearound, there is a good chance you pass by Rotterdam.

In some smuggling modalities, the good transported is not so relevant in de-termining the routing. This is the case for example of shippers-own containerscontrolled by cocaine exporters or importers: they are primarily concernedabout disguising routes and adulterating container contents, outlook and billof lading. The goods transported are only adapted to other circumstances

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(contacts in transshipment areas, etc.) as they are in the cases of cocaine sentby post or air cargo. Finally, some modalities involve no legal shipment at all,for example, when the cocaine is hidden in/under the ship, liner or smallervessel.

Transport and communication facilities

A second issue mentioned by drug traffickers is the good transport and com-munication infrastructure connected to the port of Rotterdam. The port is wellknown for its efficient and quick handling. Informant #5 explains:

Yes, you can say that a small place is better, but they just keep sendingto Rotterdam. Sometimes you loose something, as a month ago whenthe divers did not find it and I had to pay. I also take risks. Nobodyknows what happened, but the thing disappeared. See, what is good inRotterdam is that it goes fast, you take the thing and you sleep elsewhere[the cocaine container or load can be quickly moved to stash, DZ]. Themess is often made before, but if you follow the rules, the papers are inorder and nobody “sold” you, man, you “crown” [safe arrival of cocaineshipment, DZ].

Trans-oceanic smugglers (mala fide ship owners) adapt their routes (whichthey offer to cocaine entrepreneurs) to risk minimising considerations, tar-geting for example ports and transshipment areas with a long tradition ofcontraband, especially where they can buy authorities and harbour employ-ees, or have access to strong local groups. In this way, Rotterdam does notseem to be the best option for this type of smuggler (Spain far ahead).

However, local cocaine traffickers considered that good communicationinfrastructure (train connections, good highways, public and mobile telephonefacilities, and so on) are central for business performance, especially since thecocaine trade consists of connecting people who live and work far from eachother. Informant #1 explains about local communication facilities:

X goes to Antwerp very easy, he goes and comes back the same day.Public transportation here, no, you can’t complain, the train and the tramare safe. One is accustomed to larger distances, and the routes there[in Colombia] are like hell. Here you know what you can expect, forexample, yesterday they announced the train delay.

One person mentioned that in the Netherlands it was very easy to buy mo-bile phones and “throw them later to the channels”. The most importantremarks were however on the excellent network of intermodal (sea-rail), in-ner shipping (sea-river) and especially TIR truck (sea-road) transportation,

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which allows to easily move the illegal merchandise to further destinations inEurope. Since most cocaine passes Rotterdam “in transit”, this infrastructureis vital for traffickers.

When asked about the geographical position of the Netherlands for estab-lishing cocaine lines through the port of Rotterdam, nobody seemed to takethis factor into serious account. The Netherlands is objectively well placed forreceiving cocaine – on a sea coast, close to other centres and markets, halfwaybetween West and East extremes – although other neighbouring places sharethe same features, and countries such as Spain or Russia have even longer andwilder coasts, with larger non populated and inaccessible areas better suitedfor smuggling and concealing cocaine loads. However, these considerationswere absent in illegal entrepreneur’s discourses. Distance does not seem toplay an important role for cocaine exporters, for whom transportation costsare very small regarding the potential benefits. All efforts are devoted to re-duce risks, and if that implies a particular shipment should enter through aremote port in Russia before returning to Germany, so be it. Of course, someColombians living legally in the Netherlands enjoyed the fact that they couldeasily move to other parts of Europe, but in general, geography seemed toplay a secondary role in Colombian dealer’s minds. One informant explainedin this regard that Spain was far better positioned for cocaine import fromSouth America.

Some people emphasised the many options and routes available to smug-glers. Informant #12:

You know all the possible methods, you can go everywhere. The cocainegets sick before getting there, it travels all over.

Import-Export arrangements

Cocaine lines to Rotterdam are often shaped by the possibilities to constructor use import-export firms located in South-America and the Netherlands. Al-though they can vary from actual up- and unload spots, cocaine entrepreneurspositively regard places with more facilities to set up these firms. We shouldnot forget however that for many of them, import-export arrangements areagain a difficult and far away option: they smuggle the cocaine on the shipwith or without supervision.

Colombians use and set up import-export firms to enter cocaine throughthe port. They either construct tapaderas (import-export front stores) or relyon existing firms.

Informants indicated several pros and cons regarding the first option. Onthe one hand, own front stores allow for a better operational managementin terms of timing and unload. They can also be easily adapted to cocaine

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exporter’s and importer’s needs, especially in terms of goods transported,routing and storage. Moreover, some people claimed to lack contacts withexisting firms, so they were forced to set up their own bridgeheads. Oneinformant explicitly argued that the conditions imposed by the local Chamberof Commerce to open up a firm are not very restrictive.

On the other hand, they also indicated various problems and risks. Thefirst limit refers to visibility. The volume of Colombian firms6 – or legalbusinesses run by Colombians – engaged in import-export in the Netherlandsis extremely small, therefore fake companies cannot be so easily concealedbehind other legal Colombian affaires. The main Colombian imports passingthrough Rotterdam – coal, coffee, food and fruits – are mainly in the handsof non-Colombian enterprises, so new, small companies run by Colombiansare priority and easy targets for customs and the police. In fact, most peopleclaimed to recognise front stores straight away. Informant #25:

There was a paisa [Colombian from Antioquia] playing football a coupleof years ago, he lived in The Hague and every day he took the train toRotterdam. He said he worked in the import-export firm of his father, Ithink that was true. He said that the business was doing well, that theywere very glad, and so. Well, he was detained between Brussels andRotterdam with 10 kg and one million floros [gilders] (. . .) Look, whensomebody tells me that he has an import-export, I smell dirty business.I also know another paisa, and he said he was importing blue-jeans[laughs]. . . he worked for people in Medellín. . . he got 8 years and isnow in Leeuwarden but he keeps denying, he won’t talk to you.

Next to visibility by outsiders, tapaderas are often considered a source ofproblems. Since they hardly handle the legal good they are supposed to beimporting, they often attract the attention of trade partners, neighbours, cus-toms or tax authorities for obvious omissions, mistakes and irregularities.The people running these companies are usually either short-term minded– disappearing overnight, letting small problems grow, always improvising –or just not the “best” candidates for the job. In this way, these firms can hardlycope with the informality and degree of improvisation required in the cocainebusiness. Informant #1:

I told you before, people do not think too much in advance. They onlyworry if problems arise, and they arrange almost everything along theway. It can go wrong, but that is the only way in which things can alsoend OK.

The use of existing legal import-exports firms, on the contrary, was usuallyregarded as a much safer and successful option. Established, active bona fide

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companies are certainly more interesting since they do not catch the lawenforcement eye. Non-Colombian enterprises trading with South Americaare usually targeted, especially those importing food, coffee, fruits, flowers,clothing, minerals or industrial raw materials. In some cases, only specialemployees or managers are involved, and the operation is performed behindthe company’s back. In other cases, small enterprises in financial need areapproached by drug importers, who tempt the owners with overnight profits.Informant #19 claimed that the local import-export infrastructure is perfectlysuited for engaging in criminal activities:

It’s not just cocaine. Look what happens here with under and over-invoicing, or with ghost subsidised products. They can do what theywant with import-export infrastructure. They talk about us, but they havea longer experience in doing business, all sort of business.

One Colombian observer also commented that although cocaine entrepren-eurs might find it difficult to use large leading import-export companies (re-lying more often on small firms with a single office and few employees), theirpresence and activities in the Netherlands functions as a “protective shield”:controls of any sorts become difficult and undesired.

Use of other legal companies

Next to transport and import facilities, a whole range of other legal businesses– whether they are close to the port or not – provides cocaine entrepreneurswith additional services. We can think here not only of freight forwarding,stevedoring, ship repair, bunker service, storage and warehousing (some com-panies offering many of these services), but also of car, van and truck rentals,container rentals and repair, and even hotels or internet cafes. Informant #9explained that

You don’t need corruption with so many legal business around.

Finally, some under-capitalised drug distributors regarded local businesses,especially some restaurants, bars, retail-shops and coffee-shops in the handsof Dutch nationals, as suitable enough for covering illegal activities aroundcocaine import and distribution.

Financial situation of exporter

The financial capacity of cocaine exporters certainly influences the smugglingmethod and the destination of the shipment. Many exporters cannot affordsea transportation and can only send cocaine by air couriers or post, these

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actors being excluded from the port of Rotterdam. However, the port notonly attracts big players with large investment capacity. Under-capitalisedexporters handling only few kilos and taking greater risks can also find theport relatively convenient, especially if they bring the cocaine on the ship(with only a couple of crewmembers/employees involved) or if they “rip-off”a legal cargo from South America.

Facilities for money laundering

Several informants indicated that the Netherlands counts with good bank-ing and financial facilities, which without being exceptional or extraordinarylargely fulfil Colombian importer’s and distributor’s needs for moving orsending money away. Despite the fact that the port of Rotterdam offers vari-ous financial services, we could not find any Colombian trafficker makinguse of them. They stay away from real estate speculation, local investmentsand too obvious conspicuous consumption, all this reserved for their per-formances in Colombia. They also showed serious doubts about using theirlocal tapaderas to launder money. Cash transportation and money remit-tances, informant #5 argued, were enough resources well available in theNetherlands.

We also asked informants about the influence of wholesale prices in de-ciding destinations. We wandered if higher prices in more remote Europeanregions (also with sea coasts) did not tempt exporters to change routes. In-formant #1:

I don’t think the price influences the destination. US$ 24,000 per kilo isenough when you think about the US$ 1,500 you pay in Colombia. Theprice is also arranged in advance, you see. . . If in Finland the kilo costsmore, they are not going to send there if they don’t know people. Thereare better chances here, more chances to “crown” in Rotterdam than inFinland.

However, others claimed that cocaine entrepreneurs react against pricechanges or local saturation by re-localising trade activities. Both interviewedColombians as well as drug experts agreed that although compared with othercountries Dutch kilo prices are moderate, the Netherlands shows a remarkableprice stability – i.e. mild “bottle-necks”, no “over-stocking” – with a fastcirculation of the incoming cocaine.

Business mentality

Remarks by Colombian traffickers about the economic infrastructure sur-rounding the port were not only limited to the material dimension. They also

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referred to the long merchant tradition and to general cultural features suchas the existence of a strong business mentality in the Netherlands. Even whenColombians were negative or derogatory about Dutch people, stressing forexample notions of distance, indifference, meanness or materialist interest,they also stressed other more positive values around professionalism, effi-ciency and pragmatism. They were not confined to describe entrepreneursonly, but seemed to be broader and generalising statements about ordinarynative Dutch people in their daily environment and social interaction. Prag-matism, for example, is a useful attribute for an illegal business based onflexible arrangements, changing people and strong uncertainties.

While we do not believe that this dimension plays a central role for Colom-bian exporters, it is traceable in some Colombian importers and distributorsactive in The Hague and Amsterdam.

Human resources

Next to the economic infrastructure, proper human resources and social con-tacts are essential in the cocaine business.7 In the European cocaine trade,even at national level, individuals and groups from many countries are in-volved. Countries or regions either with strong local groups that are able to ar-ticulate upper and lower business levels – for example Galician organisationsas middlemen between Colombian exporters and European distributors – orwith a local palette of multinational groups and individuals able to operateand get in contact with each other – for example the Amsterdam internationallegal and illegal business scene – have good chances to host a significant shareof cocaine transactions.

The cocaine business has experienced during the, 1990s further interna-tionalisation (geographical dispersion, new routes); more integration withother legal and illegal activities (other drug markets, the weapons industry andthe legal economy); professionalisation (more expertise, strategic manage-ment, re- and de-qualification in a dual tendency) and flexibilisation (multipletasks, entrepreneurs without enterprises, increased sub-contracting, tempor-ary and unskilled workers) (Zaitch, 2002). These processes only reinforce therole of social relations in business performances.

Cocaine entrepreneurs and employees were certainly positive about thesocial environment found in the Netherlands. They had many remarks on thenature of these social links.

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International meeting point

The Netherlands offers an international meeting point for potential partners,operations and intermediations to arise: native Dutch, British, Colombians,Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks, Yugoslavs, Russians, Israelis, Chileans, Itali-ans, all nationalities likely to be found and linked in the Netherlands. Theymanage in various forms privileged access to source, transit or destinationareas, to heroin or weapons trade and routes, or to international financialresources.

In line with what has been earlier described in other local studies basedon in-depth interviewing with cocaine entrepreneurs (Korf and Verbraeck,1993; Bovenkerk, 1995) or in more general surveys on the nature of organisedcrime, mainly based on judicial files (Fijnaut et al., 1996; Kleemans et al.,1998), we also found that cocaine traffickers stress the international natureof the Dutch cocaine scene. Colombian importers, for example, were oftenexplicitly enthusiastic about the Netherlands as a market place for meetingpeople from all over. Informant #27 explains from prison:

It’s nice to do business with Italians. Here in prison we get along verywell, we eat together.

In addition, informant #1 claims that

I meet people from places I never imagined before. The owners of thecoffee-shop are Dutch, they did time in Spain. X is from Venezuela.Then you find Surinamese, Antilleans and Moroccans, all trying to getsomething when you enter and tell you are a Colombian. Y sells toGermans, and so on. It is fantastic, so different people, I learnt a lotin Amsterdam, I don’t want to leave.

Opportunities to meet and establish business relations, for example betweenColombians and Dutchmen, can also develop far from the polders. The DutchAntilles, for example, has been repeatedly indicated as a major meeting pointfor drug entrepreneurs. Many informants stressed the fact that the place isstrategically located as transshipment area, that a large Colombian communityis living in Aruba, and that mostly Aruba and Curaçao are frequented byColombian drug entrepreneurs, either for holidays, for family visits or forbusiness. Many deals are closed there, mostly all Colombian cocaine targetingthe United States and the Netherlands.

Many Colombians liked the fact that English and Spanish were widelyspread business languages in the Netherlands. Although speaking Dutch wasconsidered an advantage, many transactions are conducted in Spanish, espe-cially with Dutch and Antillean individuals.

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Trust on partners, clients and employees

The degree of trust placed in a particular overseas business partner – evenindependently of his/her actual position, skills or level of protection – isoften essential for transactions and operations to arise or abort. Cocaine en-trepreneurs devote time and efforts in trying to reduce the risk of dirty play,a very common feature in the cocaine business. This risk can include beingstolen, ripped-off, injured or killed by partners, competitors, employers oremployees. Places (countries, cities, ports, neighbourhoods, bars) with trustedindividuals (by reputation, social or ethnic closeness, and so on) are positivelyregarded by cocaine traffickers. In fact, many operations are shaped around atrusted individual overseas. Informant #1:

They sent to Switzerland because they knew that woman there.

Some informants indicated that the Netherlands combines reliable poten-tial buyers and partners (native, local minorities and foreign nationals) witha large pool of illegal employees and service providers, often Colombianfriends and relatives of cocaine exporters. Working with reliable partners andemployees is essential for Colombian traffickers: it lowers risks concerningstash, cross-border transportation and cash collection. The port of Rotterdamis thus not regarded as a mere entrance door, but more generally as a socialsetting for business with people living in the Randstad (round formed by the4 major cities).

Some well-positioned Colombian distributors argued that it was difficultto find strong and reliable local Dutch partners “from the same level”. Theyoften regarded the native drug milieu as polarised between a truly “Dutchmafia”, as they call it, with experience in illegal business, locally and inter-nationally well connected, but more interested in less risky soft and syntheticdrugs than in cocaine, and those individuals ready to become business part-ners, often belonging to the criminal underworld with no connections, noexperience and no infrastructure and capability to handle multi-kilo importtransactions by themselves. Even when a family tie exists between a Colom-bian and one of these entrepreneurs, they are portrayed as unreliable, cowardand ready to talk with the police if necessary. In other words, it is difficultfor some Colombians to identify native Dutch individuals or groups willingto engage in large import operations who are neither vulnerable membersof the so called penose,8 or drug enforcers trying to get a grip on them.The contrast is always made with regions such as Galicia or Southern Italy,where native illegal entrepreneurs do count with the protection of local powerbrokers. However, this gap is solved by the existence of a very dynamic localmarket place for multi-ethnic and multi-national groups in which Colombianentrepreneurs can compete and operate keeping a low profile.

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Importer/Wholesaler at unload point

Operations are often constructed or co-financed by importers, making co-caine lines a matter of decisions at source and destination points. In fact,many smuggling operations through the port of Rotterdam are organised andperformed by people or groups already active in the Netherlands.

The same can be argued for cocaine wholesalers. Although most of themengage in transactions already disconnected, even geographically, from theactual import operation, Colombian “first hand” distributors are in some casesinvolved in the import-export line as co-financers.

Corruption

Passive or active corruption of law enforcement officials, controllers or legalemployees can play a central role in shaping a smuggling operation. Accessto corruption at source (South America) is wide and often not a problem forillegal entrepreneurs, but corruption at destination points is a scarce preciousresource. Entire operations can be organised around a single contact thatguarantees access to the port.

All informants insisted on the key role of corruption, especially individu-als who “look the other way around”. However, answers were evasive andvague when they had to come up with concrete details. Some informantsclaimed that corruption was there, but Colombians were excluded from thegame. Informant #5:

They wouldn’t accept my money. The Dutch mafia, because there isa Dutch mafia, they can bribe whomever they want. For Surinamesepeople it is also easier, but nobody wants to get involved directly withColombians, it’s too hot. When somebody tells me that he has a cop inhis pocket I really doubt, I tell him to watch out.

Others argued that customs and policemen were both unnecessary for theoperation and difficult to bribe, but harbour employees were on the contraryeasily involved. Informant #1:

They don’t need anybody in the harbour if the coke is sent for ex-ample in deep-freeze or within food through a legal firm. If the busi-nesses involved are tapaderas (front stores), they have a bad reputationor the route is very hot, then they need to pay people to look the otherway around. How this is done I don’t know, but everybody says that ithappens all the time.

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Informant #16, for example, controlled several lines, usually paying bag-gage handlers, chauffeurs, stevedores and terminal operators. Informant #1explained the safe position of these employees involved in passive corruption:

If you are only paid to look the other way around, you are safe. If thething “crowns”, you get a lot of money. If it falls down, let’s say thatother person found something strange or controlled before, you changeside and nothing can happen to you. You get nothing but you are nevermade responsible. They even pay them something anyway to keep theconnection.

In this sense, it might well be that corruption is for some informants a ta-boo subject: they talk about it in general, but carefully protect their contactsavoiding any particular finger pointing. However, we believe that in the vastmajority of Colombian related cases, no corruption of Dutch customs andpolice takes place, their strategies being primarily oriented to evade harbourcontrols.9 Despite this fact, two reasons prompted Colombians to neverthelessemphasise police and customs corruption. Firstly, claims of access to officialsenhance the reputation, power and status of cocaine traffickers. They im-pressed others by claiming to have contacts in the harbour. The second reasonfor Colombians to stress corruption had more to do with a technique of neut-ralisation: they reacted against stigmas and bad reputation by “condemningthe condemners” (Sykes and Matza, 1957).

Informant #3 was a cocaine exporter who came to the Netherlands toarrange import details and cash handling. He behaved as if he was still inColombia. While doing expensive shopping, he always had money readyto bribe the police. His companion tried to convince him that Dutch policeofficers were not the same than in Colombia, but he would not listen. He hadno clue about local customs and police strategies. He regarded every cocaineshipment as very much based on luck.

All informants agreed that other countries such as Russia, Spain or Italyhave better conditions for the development of collusion between the State,local powers and illegal enterprises.

Strategic enforcement risks

Strategic enforcement risk is the personal risk of planners/organisers to becaught, receive a criminal conviction and lose their illegal profits (Dorn etal., 1998). Many decisions are made in order to avoid being captured orexpropriated. In practice, many well-insulated bosses (“cut out” exporters orimporters) can transfer this risk to their subordinates, especially regardingsmuggling and unload operations.

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT 255

All informants in Colombia and the Netherlands agreed that “numbers1” do not hang around the port. They consider it too risky and unnecessary,sending employees, intermediaries or envoys to either negotiate with harbourpersonnel, supervise operations or perform the most risky tasks (especiallythe recovery of the cocaine load). Informant #1:

I was yesterday with two traquetos [Colombian cocaine traffickers]. Wedidn’t know each other. They didn’t want to go to pick up somethingbecause they thought it was too risky. They were going to pay somebodyto do it.

Most Colombian exporters do not even cross the ocean, so they have littlestrategic risks to fear. Even exporters and importers closer to the action preferto stay far from the port. Informant #1 explained about informant #4:

Yes, he gathers information about the port. He has people that go to theharbour to take pictures for him. He knows some timetables and manythings about the traffic there. Other people do it for him. He wants toknow everything because he is investing a lot of money.

Those who did show concern about strategic risks mentioned four issues ofdistress: long-term police investigations, border controls, sentence lengthsand prison conditions, and profit forfeiture.

Police investigation

Undoubtedly, many decisions concerning a smuggling operation (selectionof partners and employees, modus operandi or even daily routines) are basedon the principle of avoiding or neutralising police detection. Attitudes to-wards the police were rather divergent amongst Colombian cocaine entre-preneurs. Some “hands on” risk-acceptors operating in Amsterdam and TheHague seemed to be more concerned about routine, unexpected controls thanelaborated, long term investigation. These people would take extra meas-ures to avoid “hot” places and conspicuous behaviour, being on the contraryrather floppy with phone-calls or strangers. Some claimed that the police onlyintervened if violence or large amounts of money were involved.

Others felt truly smarter than the Dutch police, playing down their en-forcement capacity. Informant #4, for example, believed that he was alwaysone step head. He felt comfortable with replacing his set of mobile phonesevery two weeks. Informant #1:

#2 is now in a comfortable position to measure risks. He is no goingto join operations to gain less than ¤ 150,000. He was in jail in Spain,where his family still lives. He is wanted there and in Colombia, but in

256 D. ZAITCH

Amsterdam, he feels like a master in his castle. I myself remember aspot on television, years ago, after the fall of the big capos.

Still others were more paranoid about possible police infiltration, but theyusually suspected earlier from the DEA than the Dutch authorities. Informant#5 was far more impressed by the German police.

At this level of strategic risk, both “cut out” and “hands on” Colombiancocaine traffickers always considered the Dutch police as a unity. They hadno idea about differences between the Fluvial police, the “Prisma Team”, oreven the Foreign police. It can be argued that, in general, planners/organisersshowed either no or a limited concern about being caught in the Netherlandsby the police.

Border controls

Cocaine entrepreneurs took extra-measures when entering or leaving the EU,what they considered especially risky. However, none of our informants (ex-cluding crewmembers) entered the country through the port of Rotterdam,which they neither regarded as an entrance for people. Therefore, all per-ceptions referred to airports. By far, Colombians (involved and not involvedin cocaine trafficking or prostitution) preferred Frankfurt as “the” airport toenter the Netherlands. In contrast with Schiphol, a visa was not required forColombian visitors with no EU residence permit. Even those traffickers whotravelled “clean” took several precautions. Some used false passports; othersresorted to various alibis to be regarded as simple tourists or visitors. Inform-ant #10, for example, arrived with a large video camera, tourist informationabout Germany, and reservations in an exclusive hotel in Frankfurt.

The car is considered the safest mean to cross the Dutch border by land,especially from/to Germany.

Sentence lengths and prison conditions

Another variable that can hypothetically influence business decisions is therisk of facing long prison sentences. People with international capture or-ders avoid leaving safe countries or areas, and caught or suspected traffickersspend lots of money in lawyers.

All informants agreed that prison conditions in the Netherlands are lessbad than in countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany and the UK,let along Colombia or the US. Some also argued that real prison lengths forColombians in the Netherlands are shorter than in other EU countries, a factthat is difficult to attest.10

However, no evidence was found that fear for sentences had any impacton key decisions regarding operations through the port of Rotterdam. Cocaine

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entrepreneurs seem again to transfer this strategic risk to their subordinates.For people organising cocaine export in Colombia, sentences in the Nether-lands were not a matter of personal concern. Informant #20, criminal lawyerfrom Cali:

Many of the big guys are already imprisoned here [in Colombia]. Theysend people with balls in their stomachs, they tip European airportsabout their own couriers, they hardly help them with a lawyer or withmoney. These people are disposable for them. It doesn’t matter whathappens after arrest. They only care about the merchandise, and if some-body is caught, about people’s silence.

Some informants in Colombia declared that exporters only fear extraditionand imprisonment in the US, Europe remaining as a less hostile and threaten-ing environment.

Profit forfeiture

Informants considered the Netherlands a low risk country concerning profitsforfeiture, which mainly has to do with the fact that Colombians do not investlocally but immediately send the money abroad, either back to Colombia orto the international financial circuit. In our opinion, Colombians prefer toinvest in places where they either live (Colombia, US), can enjoy conspicuousholidays and living standards (Caribbean, Southern Spain) or can protect theirbusinesses from state action (Eastern Europe).

Stronger controls on banks, money exchange and remittance houses areeasily evaded by smurfing smaller quantities or transporting cash. In thisway, Dutch money laundering legislation and enforcement does not seem tojeopardise the position of the port. Some cocaine importers and distributors(and their employees) claimed to be more worried about protecting cash frombeing stolen by partners, competitors or thieves.

Tactical enforcement risks

Tactical enforcement risk is the risk to the drugs (seizure) and to subordinatepersons (helpers, employees, contractors, and so on, so called “numbers 2and 3”). Many decisions of planners/organisers (”numbers 1”) are aimedto protect or sacrifice cocaine loads and employees. Risk-accepting subor-dinates are thus easily confronted with capture as they are paid to do so.Indeed, whatever the intentions and manifest priorities are, drug enforcementefforts mainly hit drug shipments, risk-taking entrepreneurs (group b) anddispensable employees (group c).

258 D. ZAITCH

In contrast with strategic risks, which do not seem to play an importantrole in Colombian perceptions on the port of Rotterdam, tactical risks area main concern for shaping smuggling, unload and transport arrangementsaround the port. Daily life is also shaped by their efforts to avoid detection.

Risk-taking informants were certainly worried about police and customscontrols, and about going to prison. Moreover, those operating in the Nether-lands had many (positive) remarks on the local social climate.

Police controls

Cocaine loads and employees have to be protected from police intervention.However, cocaine entrepreneurs can afford being more risk-tolerant regard-ing their employees. In the case of “hands on” importers and distributors,strategies to avoid capture are mixed with all sorts of mistakes and risk-takingbehaviour.

Indeed, a rather ambiguous and paradoxical attitude seemed to prevailamongst risk-taking entrepreneurs and employees towards police controls. Onthe one hand, they either claimed to feel unthreatened by police investigation,or they accepted or ignored it as a given, natural risk inherent to the illegalbusiness. Some informants let clear that they feared more the possibility ofbeing killed or ripped-off by people within the circuit. They all knew andenjoyed the fact that the Dutch police was invisible on the streets and thatrazzia’s on illegal foreigners were exceptional. Others insisted that the Dutchpolice was friendly and naïve. Informant #11 explained:

Yea, I laugh about the tombos [police]. I never saw anything more cow-ard, compare it with Colombia! They can’t cross the line so easily. Theytake their time to build their case, to observe, to follow people for monthsbefore doing anything. It is just gambling to know the space you have tomove, but they just let you work. I don’t give a shit about the cops.

Still others supported the idea that many risk-taking actors did not even knowor feel a difference in police enforcement between EU countries. Informant#1:

They move around Europe and do not change attitudes regarding thecountry in which they move. You couldn’t believe the stupid mistakesthey do all the time. They only worry when they have the cocaine withthem, otherwise they couldn’t care less. They talk openly through thephone, the same mobile phone all the time!

He also argued:

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT 259

Look #10 for example, for him the Netherlands, France or Germany areall the same. I told him about the differences, but for him is all the same.

On the other hand, they did take many measures to avoid detection, like talk-ing through secure phones, avoiding “hot” places or behaving with low-keyprofiles. These measures were often aimed to avoid accidental, unnecessarypolice control rather than to neutralise long-term, complex, strategic policeinvestigation. Explanations for this go in two different directions.

First, they were in many cases unable to undertake complicated intelli-gence counter-measures: they lacked contacts with law enforcers, they simplyignored the details of police surveillance or they lacked the infrastructure toneutralise police efforts. Regular claims that “professional” drug dealers com-mit “amateurish” mistakes – such as passing sensible information through thephone, working with the “wrong” people, and so on – should not surpriseanyone: in many cases, risk-taking employees cannot do otherwise.11

Second, they seemed to underplay the existence of pro-active police activ-ities, and did as if the only thing to fear was unexpected detection. Some evenfeared that they were “followed”, but would surprisingly underplay the factall together.

Customs controls

Although police controls were in general considered mild regarding personalcapture, police and customs surveillance in the port aimed to intercept co-caine was more seriously taken into account. Smuggling routes and packagingmodalities are shaped to avoid customs or police interception. Depending onthe quantities smuggled, the logistic support and the organisational skills ofsmugglers, the chances for interception vary and so the risk perception oftraffickers involved.

Cocaine importers and smugglers were rather puzzling when talking abouttheir chances to successfully “crown” shipments. Some tended to exaggeraterisks. For people who failed, exaggeration was a way of legitimising theirsituation. For others, it was a good opportunity to gain status or credibility infront of partners and employers, or to present their turnovers as a deservedprice. Informant #27:

#27: For every 10 people loaded only one can get away with it.DZ: You mean, the other way around. . .

#27: "No, no, it is extremely dangerous. I mean. . . sooner or later youfall.

260 D. ZAITCH

While most informants agreed that containerised shipments had the best chancesto pass through, some thought that it was easier to enter the cocaine by acrewmember. Informant #11:

Nobody controls your baggage on ships, you can easily enter whateveryou want. A friend of mine arrived in a big ship, and he could haveentered with a bag full of cocaine.

Most people knew about new techniques to scan suspected containers, butattitudes were divided regarding their power. Informant #1:

The police invest millions in scanners, and traquetos only ¤ 5 in carbonpaper, you see, the one everybody can buy on the corner. Yes, theyresearch a little bit, but then they solve the problem cheaply and cre-atively. Well, maybe some really invest a lot in that (packaging andcontrol avoidance) but most of them just go for the carbon paper, orother home-made tricks.

Others, such as informant #2, acknowledged that the port was becoming dan-gerous with this container scanner. However, he ignored how many were they,where were they installed, and how did they work.

Everybody considered unload operations the most dangerous task, es-pecially when no corruption or import-export firms were involved. If theoperation was tipped-off, many feared the police to intervene at that time. Anunload attempt can easily fail by unexpected controls or, as it is often the case,by practical and technical mistakes. Problems regarding the unload were alsoevidenced by the frequent delays: there were often some days between theship arrival and the actual cocaine unloading. Delays were seen as increasingthe chances of detection. They were caused by bureaucratic problems, by mis-takes (personnel not showing up or targeting the wrong ship or container) orby cautious handling (employees discovering police surveillance and waitingfor a safe move). In some cases, fear could delay cocaine unload indefinitely.Informant #5:

Can you believe that the thing [cocaine freight] arrived to France butnobody wants to take it out? It is there, and somebody has to go and getit but it looks like a tough one, I think they will abandon it.

It was repeatedly argued that some cocaine seizures are provoked by cocaineexporters as “sacrifices”. Informant #9 explained:

They catch only a small amount. In many containers with bananas fromColombia or Ecuador, they sneak in some aparatos (cocaine kilo blocks).

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT 261

They put some, let’s say 4 or 5, to entertain the police and they sendmuch more after or through another place.

While personal risks during unload can be easily transferred to employeesor subcontracted personnel, the organisers run the financial risks in case ofseizure. Informant #1:

If somebody controls the bajada (unload) he means that he has the con-tacts to enter the thing and he is fully responsible if the thing se cae(“falls down”, is seized).

It can be finally argued that meanwhile “cut out” cocaine exporters werenot concerned about capture and had many ways to reduce interception risks(through transshipments, corruption, new routes and modalities, sacrifices,and so on), “hands on” entrepreneurs and employees were directly confron-ted with both securing the merchandise and avoiding capture. For this secondgroup, Rotterdam was often regarded as hostile.

Sentence lengths and prison conditions

While “cut out” traffickers only care that their vulnerable subordinates andemployees get a fair trial or keep loyal while serving time, the latter have acloser experience with the prison system.

Some imprisoned informants claimed to had been fooled, misinformedabout the chances to be caught, or directly double-crossed. Two divers forexample were told that the job was simple and safe. Other employees arguedthat they had no choice but acting as they did, feeling the victims of injusticeor desperate situations. One informant claimed that he could not disobey andhe had to move the best he could. In general, all these informants were noteffectively deterred by possible punishments and only realised what did theyimply after going to prison.

However, most employees connected with operations through the port ofRotterdam were well aware about the possible sentences they faced if caught.Those who also experienced other prisons outside the Netherlands, clearlystated that Dutch prison conditions were by far a better option. Informant#27:

I was three years in Portugal and it was the law of the jungle. Esserheemlooks like a luxury hotel, even compared with De Koepel.

Informant #11:

I survived two years in the famous Section 3 of the Palmira prison, so Isurvive anything.

262 D. ZAITCH

Most informants also agreed that sentence lengths in the Netherlands for sub-altern, unskilled personnel who are not regarded as belonging to a “criminalorganisation” are shorter than in other places.

Social climate

Many remarks about a less repressive, more tolerant environment to conductillegal businesses did not refer to formalised social control agencies (police,customs, prison), but to the Dutch social climate in a broader sense. ManyColombians noticed, especially in cities as Amsterdam, a local attitude of in-difference regarding what others do, choose or even trade. Cocaine traffickerspositively regard the fact that business conversations can openly take place inrestaurants and bars with few or no reaction from surrounding visitors.

Sometimes, cocaine operations became a matter of public and open cel-ebration. In these cases, fear and secrecy around an incoming ship contrastedwith joy and publicity after the load made it through. When a large ship-ment crowned successfully, even peripheral people around the local Latinostreet circuit would get the news. Nobody would know dangerous details,but gossips about the quantity and the celebrations would circulate very fast.Informant #28:

Two months ago it was a big one. There was lots of money for manypeople. . . they are still spending the money. You see it everywhere: withthe girls, at the restaurants and at the rumba. We sell more food, somepeople close their debts, see, an endless hangover. . .

Finally, the low levels of (street, police or interpersonal) violence in the Neth-erlands were considered beneficial by several informants. Some had the feel-ing that cocaine was “just another business”. Another informant explainedthat lower levels of violence allowed people “like you and me” to trafficcocaine.

Conclusion: Pondering containers, contacts and control

From most views presented above, the port of Rotterdam seems to be posit-ively considered by Colombian cocaine traffickers. However, their percep-tions on particular issues seem to vary according to their position in thebusiness (organisers or employees) and the degree of insulation they en-joy (“cut out” or “hands on”). We argue that the three groups identified inpage 2 – i.e. (a) risk-adverse exporters; (b) risk-taking exporters, importersand distributors; and (c) risk-taking employees – tend to stress and perceivedifferently the various aspects considered above.

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT 263

Earlier research has pointed out that the Dutch comparative advantagefor illegal drug import is heavily based on its economic infrastructure andinternational business environment.12 While our material supports for a largeextent such a claim, it is clear that human resources (social contacts) and lawenforcement activities (tactical and strategic risks) play an important role forsome cocaine traffickers, shaping their operations through the port and theirdaily routines in the Netherlands.

Capitalised Colombian exporters who do not come to the Netherlandsand can invest in large cocaine shipments (group a)13 tend to stress logistic,economic or human resource considerations when sending a shipment toRotterdam. We should keep in mind that they are often those taking the cru-cial decisions about operational matters. Import/export arrangements oftenform the basis for their choices. While they transfer personal risks to oth-ers, they only care about tactical enforcement risks attached to the shipment.They manage to minimise these risks by investing in a particular smugglingmodality, sacrificing cocaine, or even sharing with others the financial risks.

For a second group (b) of Colombian traffickers, that of exporters andimporters taking personal risks and coming to the Netherlands, decisionsseem also mainly based on logistic considerations and on human resources.Informant #3 explained:

When it happened I was in Colombia, other people bought it and sent thecash. That fruit company is very reliable and they arrange everything. . .

I know they have new scanners [in plural], yea, nevertheless they did notfind anything. . . See, I think it is too big [the port].DZ: Why did you send to Rotterdam?#3: Only because this firm had to put their fruit in Rotterdam. It can beanywhere, I don’t give a shit.DZ: Do you know anybody there?#3: No.

However, since many of these people often handle smaller quantities in amore risky fashion (using less credible firms and limited operational resources),many informants of this group often put business (social) contacts above lo-gistic factors. This group regards the business environment around the port asvery positive, but complains about a limited access to corruption. In contrastwith the first group, they are not able to transfer strategic risks, so they dotake into account local drug enforcement strategies, moves and possible pun-ishments. In general, this group tends to consider police and customs controlsin the harbour as dangerous (tactical risks to the drugs) but feel rather “safe”in the Netherlands. Indeed, many express that the Dutch law enforcement istolerant and mild, that police controls are relaxed, prison sentences are shorter

264 D. ZAITCH

and prison conditions are better. Many refer to a tolerant social climate withlow levels of violence as very apt to conduct illegal businesses.

Despite this “positive” assessment on law enforcement that obviously shapessocial behaviours, no informant of this group claims to have considered itas a reason to use the port of Rotterdam. The way in which enforcement isexperienced is often paradoxical. Routine controls and border surveillance areoften more feared than long-term, pro-active investigation. Paranoid attitudescoexist with conspicuous and hazard behaviour.

Finally, the many risk-taking employees such as unloaders, divers, chauf-feurs or other helpers (group c), operate around the port of Rotterdam ex-clusively following human resource considerations: they go to work with/forpeople who offers them attractive sums of money to take all the personalrisks. They are neither in a position to decide destinations nor to pondermany alternatives or choices. While they might have a positive view on theeconomic position of the port, their primary concern is to do their job, toprotect the drugs and to avoid capture. Law enforcement is for them (frompolice controls to prison sentences) a matter of (hard) fact, and they are wellprepared to run far more tactical risks than in the present.

These diverging perceptions can be finally summarised as follows:

Table 1. Perceptions of Colombian cocaine traffickers

Infrastructure Human Strategic Tactical

resources risks risks

“cut out” ++ + • transferred to • neutralised

exporters others

“hands on” + ++ • not transferred • feel unsafe

exp., imp. & • feel rather safe • do react to

distributors • not decisive enforcement

“hands on” – ++ n/a • feel unsafe

employees • no choice

Notes

∗ Paper originally presented at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the American Society ofCriminology, Atlanta, 7–10 November, 2001. This research has been possible with thefinancial support of the WODC (Organised Crime Monitor, Dutch Ministry of Justice).I thank Henk van de Bunt for supervising the project and Hans Nelen, Frank Bovenkerkand Francisco Thoumi for their fruitful commentaries.

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT 265

1. There are around 10.000 Colombian immigrants in the Netherlands, from which 2/3 arewomen. They are dispersed, disorganised and do not develop visible forms of “ethniceconomy” typical of other larger minority groups. This, in open contrast with the situationin the US.

2. See Zaitch (2002) for a detailed description of the several types of drug dealers involved.In many cases, reality blurs strict boundaries between them. In other cases, the distinctionsare purely analytical.

3. Although it was beyond the possibilities of the present study to conduct direct fieldwork atthe level of large cocaine exporters, some relevant material collected in two research visitsto Colombia in 1996 and 1997 is used here. It includes interviews with criminal lawyers,businessmen, Dutch authorities, friends/employees of cocaine entrepreneurs, and variousdrug experts.

4. The latter two categories refer to the activities of law enforcement agencies. However,from the point of view of drug traffickers, a key distinction should be made betweenstrategic and tactical risks. Strategic risks are the risks to the planners/organisers, numbers1 of groups a) and b). Tactical risks are the risks to the drugs and to helpers/employees,numbers 2 or 3 of group c). See Dorn et al. (1998).

5. See also the testimony of the drug entrepreneur B. Gordon (Bovenkerk, 1995: 166).

6. The few formal or informal Colombian businesses – restaurants, bars and shops – andthe Colombian community in the Netherlands hardly depend on or consume Colombianimports.

7. For the centrality of social bonds in organised crime, see a.o. Ianni (1972), Gambetta(1996); Kleemans et al. (1998) and Hobbs (2001).

8. The Dutch word penose comes from the Yiddish (occupation, livelihood) and refers to thecriminal, not powerful underworld.

9. See also Van de Bunt et al. (1999, 2001).

10. For international cocaine trafficking, prison sentences in the Netherlands can go up to amaximum of 12 years. Adding punishments for “belonging to a criminal organisation” orfor violent offences, the sentence can vary very much according to the cocaine amountinvolved, the personal background, the organisational aspects and other circumstances.It can range from the 1 year given to the vulnerable, first-time mula (air courier), to the16 years imposed upon a leading, well-known – and badly defended – violent cocaineentrepreneur. Medium and large Colombian importers would normally receive an averageof between 4 and 6 years, apparently less than in countries such as Spain or Italy. However,these countries know a larger gap between judicial and real sentences.

11. Van de Bunt et al. (1999) argue that the “arms race” view on the interaction betweendrug dealers and law enforcement often departs from misleading assumptions: neitherlaw enforcement is so seriously taken or even known by drug dealers, nor the power ofdrug dealers is as large as claimed by law enforcers (Van de Bunt et al., 1999: 400–401).

12. See for example Bovenkerk (1995); Fijnaut et al. (1996); Farrell (1998: 30) and Van deBunt et al. (1999: 403).

13. As explained before, perceptions of these traffickers have only been transmitted by variouskey informants in Colombia close to them in one way or the other.

266 D. ZAITCH

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