Crime and Punishment: The Case of Alcohol...reaction to increased national awareness of the...
Transcript of Crime and Punishment: The Case of Alcohol...reaction to increased national awareness of the...
Crime and Punishment: The Case of Alcohol David Turner Advisor: Stefano DellaVigna Economics Senior Honors Thesis
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Introduction:
Drinking and Driving is an important problem within the United States. In 2004,
16,694 drivers died in alcohol related accidents and some estimate that driving drunk
increases the likelihood of an accident by over seven times. 1 National attention to this
problem began early, around the time of prohibition. Modern regulations originated in
1964, when a study in Grand Rapids, Michigan first identified a link between Blood
Alcohol Content (BAC) and automotive accidents. This study helped initiate the passage
of numerous Driving Under the Influence (DUI) laws. These laws are classified as �per
se� laws, which mean that one is a criminal by simply falling in a certain classification.
That is by having a certain BAC and driving a car one is offending, regardless of any
other actions. DUI laws were soon passed in every state.2
DUI laws are associated with falling drunk fatalities across the United States,
although it has been argued that their deterrence effect is outweighed by enforcement
cost.3 In 1984 congress passed the Federal Uniform Drinking Age, which raised the
national drinking age to 21. This represented shifting political intentions and was also
found to have a significant effect on drunk driving.4 Yet most DUI laws still did not
differentiate between drivers aged 21 and younger. Therefore, in 1995 an amendment
was added to National Highway Systems Designation Act, in which states were required
to adopt �Zero Tolerance� (ZT) laws for underage drunk driving by fiscal year 1999 or
forfeit federal highway funds.
Zero Tolerance laws make it illegal, as is, for any driver under the age of 21 to
have any measurable amount of alcohol in their blood. The law was passed after a study
compared states with zero tolerance laws and those without, and in which the authors
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found a significant decrease in alcohol related youth fatalities at night.5 Yet this study
was essentially cross-sectional, and subject to confounding by regional characteristics.
Although they attempted to alleviate this problem by comparing two neighboring states,
this is a poor solution at best because regional characteristics depend on more than
geography. They also only looked at the numbers of drinking fatalities, and while this
variable seems relevant, it could reflect other factors. Carpenter (2004) tried to answer
how these laws worked by finding a reduction in self reported heavy episodic drinking.6
But this does not address the criminality inherent in drunk driving. Because the choice to
drink and drive is in its very nature a criminal decision, it should then be analyzed as a
crime.
This paper uses a crime economic framework to identify the specific impact that
Zero Tolerance laws have. Using Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) data on fatal accidents,
I will estimate the relative criminal propensity by the proportion of the population that
responded to stricter laws. The federal requirement provides a natural experiment with
which to study ZT laws because of the different times in which each state passed the
required legislation. In 1994, 20 states had them before the law was passed; and by the
end of 1998 all 50 states had passed ZT laws. I will use a cross sectional time series
approach to analyze the impact of the laws. The dependant variables will be the
distributions of BAC by age. I will use a similar model to Lee and McCrary7, who
looked at the drop in arrest rates on the 18th birthday when penalties rose discontinuously.
Using this framework I will find the change in probability of committing an offence to
identify the comparable distributions punishment and criminal utility.
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Model:
I will use a version of Becker�s initial model used by Lee and McCrary (2005). A
rational individual will only commit a crime when the utility of the crime is greater than
the utility of not committing the crime.
ptUt(p) + (1- pt)Ut(np) > Ut(nc)
(1)
Where pt is the probability of apprehension. Ut(p) is the utility of punishment, Ut(np) is
the utility of committing the crime and receiving no punishment, and Ut(nc) is the utility
of not committing the crime. And the index t is the age of the individual. Solving for pt
produces the reservation probability of committing the crime.
pt,r = Ut(np) - Ut(nc) / Ut(np) - Ut(p)
(2)
The individual commits a crime when probability of apprehension is less than the
reservation probability, assuming that U(p)<U(nc)<U(np)
Lee and McCrary assumed each individual samples from a distribution of
criminal �opportunities.� They also assumed that the general reservation probability
stays the same. But it is logical to assume that each person�s relative utility causes the
decision to commit the crime. I then adjust the model so that an individual commits a
crime when their reservation probability is below the general probability of getting
caught and each individual has different reservation probability. Therefore, the degree of
violation depends on the relative utilities. In this model the individual commits the
crime, drives drunk, until their reservation probability equals their chances of getting
caught.
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p(apprehension) = pt,r
Assuming the probability of apprehension is constant across age groups. Than the
frequency at which each group violates the law depends on the proportion with a low
enough pt,r. Therefore, the distribution of utilities determines the rates of criminal
behavior.
Pt(committing crime) = Fg(pc)
(3)
With Fg as the cumulative distribution function of group g and pc is the chance of
apprehension, as a function of m.
Identification Strategy:
My identification strategy uses the time of Zero Tolerance laws throughout the
United States. These laws expand the penalties of a DUI to minors (hereafter defined as
under 21), who have any measurable trace of alcohol (BAC usually above .02).
Previously, DUI law did not discriminate by age. Both a 20-year-old caught with a .05
BAC and a 21-year-old with the same BAC would be allowed to drive home. After the
law was passed the 20-year-old is now arrested for a DUI. The year by year change in
distribution of offending by age will then give an idea as to the relative efficacy of these
laws.
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA),
administers the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS). They compile data on every
accident that involved a fatality in the United States. These statistics are compiled yearly
from state reports and include data on a variety of factors, included data on the driver.
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The statistics generally give the state, age, sex, hour of accidents, and Blood Alcohol
Content of each driver. I will use the BACs indexed by state and year, to identify relative
criminal frequencies of each age group.
By 1995, when the Federal government required states to pass ZT laws, only
twenty states had them. By the end of 1998 all 50 states had zero tolerance laws. This
provides a natural experiment with which to study the impacts of these laws. Each state
that passed the laws did so because of an exogenous federal requirement (punishable by
withheld federal highway funds). This helps account for internal factors affecting the
drunken driving rate. Previously states that passed ZT laws might also have a greater
internal concern for minor drunk driving, and this social concern could also be the reason
for decreased accidents documented by the original study of Hinsgon, Hereen, and
Winter(1994). Therefore this natural experiment is perfect for analysis using panel data
regression.
Crash statistics have an advantage over arrest statistics because it reduces effects
from varying enforcement. If ZT laws are associated with vigorous enforcement than
arrest statistics will be directly related, but crashes will only be affected by how much
people react to the increase in enforcement. So the effect is diluted and directly
correlated to the underlying factor. This helps eliminate bias from the data.
This sample is not random�drivers killed in auto-accidents tend to be aggressive,
reckless, or poor drivers, characteristics which might be correlated with drinking and
driving. In addition it has been well documented that alcohol increases the likelihood of
an accident by as much as ten times. Levitt and Porter attempted to identify the number
of drivers on the road using crash statistics. However, they also showed that the
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increased likelihood was similar across age groups (10.13 times for over 25, and 10.88
for under). Therefore both factors will increase BAC averages but the effects which
cause the exaggeration are similar across relevant age groups. Therefore while the
sample is biased toward drunk and especially very drunk drivers, this bias is not likely to
be effected by the timing of ZT laws and is therefore uncorrelated with the independent
variable. But it will cause somewhat of a bias in the estimates of the changes in the
dependant variable.
Other studies have documented increases in drunk driving deaths immediately
following the age of 21, which the authors attributed to inexperience while driving
drunk.8 While interesting, this should not affect the results. I am looking at the change in
underage drinking and driving after the law is passed. Therefore the inexperience effect
will not be large because only those who turn 16 in the next year would be affected. So
only the 16-year-olds whom the law impact (ie those willing to drive with some alcohol),
would internalize the inexperience effect, and it would not be noticed until five years
later when they turned 21. Therefore, the immediately post year change would not be
impacted by a reduction in experience.
Exactly how to apply the BAC data depends on whether or not individuals are
capable of targeting their drinking to the desired concentration. Few would doubt that a
person is capable of targeting their drinking to a desired level of intoxication; perceived
intoxication might be different from relative BAC level. One reason is the BAC is based
on numerous factors other than number of drinks, including weight, sex, time drinking,
and metabolism of alcohol9. However, a small level study done at Bradley University
found that students were fairly capable at identifying their BAC level.10 Therefore it
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seems logical that an individual�s decision to drink and drive is cognizant of this level.
However, it is common knowledge that alcohol impairs judgment, and this would be a
judgment call. So I will attempt to relax this assumption later on.
Assuming BAC is a rational choice, I would expect that the amount of minors
driving under .08 BAC to drop. All of a sudden their previous action is illegal, so those
whom the penalties would deter no longer drive drunk. This effects the reservation
probability, because it changes the utility for the marginal drunk driver. All of a sudden
their reservation probability is higher, and the individual no longer commits the crime.
The relative number of those who no longer offend can give an indication to the impact
the law has on the utilities.
This effect might capture more than just the specific reaction to the details of the
law, it could capture a shift in political intention. For instance part of the logic behind the
zero tolerance law is that if alcohol is illegal to consume for minors, than consistency
merits punishment even if they are safe to drive.11 Additionally the law was also in
reaction to increased national awareness of the consequence of drunk driving. Therefore
the reaction to the law may also be a signal of political intentions to enforce underage
drinking. However by isolating the states and looking at different years I can identify the
specific effect of law.
Essentially, before the law the probability of driving under .08 was simply:
Prob(DD)<21 = P[Ut(np) > Ut(nc)]
But after the law is passed it becomes essentially equation (3).
Prob(DD)<21 = P[pcUt(p) + (1- pc)Ut(np) > Ut(nc)]
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and U(p) is always less than U(np) so the probability must be less as well. One would
expect to see a discontinuity after the law is passed, when a previously illegal action
becomes legal and the size of the change would be Ut(np) � [pcUt(p) + (1- pc)Ut(np)] =
pcUt(np) - pcUt(p) =
pc[Ut(np) - Ut(p)]
(4)
Which is the change in the probability of offending. Therefore if I find the change in this
probability along with the probability of apprehension, I can find the difference in the
two utilities.
In order to find the change in probability, I will use two proxies for criminal
offending: DrunkFraction and AllFraction. DrunkFraction is equal to the number of
BAC�s in the .01 to .081 range over the total number of drunk accidents, and AllFraction
is equal to the number of BACs between .01 and .08 over all accidents where a BAC was
recorded. DrunkFraction is used under the assumption of BAC targeting. If individuals
target BAC�s then after the law is passed this proportion should decrease because drivers
either drink more or don�t drink at all. AllFraction relaxes this assumption because,
while it is still identifying the decrease within the targeted range, it also reflects a
decrease in overall drinking and driving. If drivers who were over the .08 range were
under the impression they were under it, then DrunkFraction would underestimate the
actual effect of the law. Therefore AllFraction identifies the real change in those
breaking the law, out of the entire sample. The reason I still used the .01 to .08 range is
there is significantly less bias due to impaired driving ability. AllFraction attempts to
1 At the time many states had a DUI limit of .10 BAC not .08. But information was difficult to obtain on the specifics, but all were at least .08. Therefore, any reduction in the under-.08 range will still indicate propensity.
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find a better estimate for the actual number. While it only divides by the number where a
BAC was recorded this number is also influenced by the bias towards drunk accidents,
which pull AllFraction in each direction. So bias is difficult to determine. Using
DrunkFraction (DF) to estimate the proportion of drunk drivers who drop out of criminal
behavior, I use the following framework.
Prob(BAC(drunk)<.08) = (L + A)/T = DrunkFraction (5)
L = the drivers who drive drunk when it is legal
A = Those who drive below .08 anyway, regardless of the law
T is the total number of drunk drivers.
Because the total number of drunk drivers is difficult to estimate the proportion L/T is
more useful. The change in DF gives us an indication. In period 1, DF1 = (L+A)/T, and
in period 2, DF2 = A/(T-L). L/T then equals.
L/T = (DF1� DF2) / (1 � DF2)
AllFraction (AF) gives a similar determinate. Define P as the population.
Prob(BAC(drunk)<.08) = (L + A)/P
But because P already contains A and L either way the change is much simpler
L/P = (AF1� AF2) (6)
The change in L/T and L/P will give us a value for the change in the reservation
probability.
To solve for the appropriate values I will need to identify the effect of the law on
DF and AF. I will use the difference in difference technique for panel data to find the
change in DF, = ∆DF, and use the average value of the post-ZT states to estimate DF2
(with an identical approach for AF). In the pseudo-experimental framework, I will use a
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panel regression model with fixed effects to identify the effect of ZT laws. I will use a
binary variable as my independent variable, Xsy, which equals one when the state, s, at
the year, y, had a Zero Tolerance law, and equals zero otherwise.
I will solve the following regression:
DFsy = β0 + γs + γy + τ Xsy + εsy
qsy = empirical proportion
β0 = Intercept for all states and times
γs = Fixed effect per state
γy = Fixed effect by year
εsy = Error term under basic linear assumptions, the proportions will be weighted by the
number of observations to account for heteroskedasiticy.
τ Xsy = Effect of the Zero Tolerance law on proportion, X is a dummy that is zero for
when the state does not have a zero tolerance law, and one when it does. (because most
states passed the law in the first six months X is also one during that year)
Because the τ identifies the change in DF (or AF) due to the law passed I can find
the proportion that stopped drinking and driving. In this case -τ is (DF1� DF2), because τ
represents the change to period 2, then its negative is (DF1� DF2). In order to find (1 �
DF2) I need to estimate the �constant� proportion after the law is passed, in this case β0 +
τ could serve as a proxy. Note that due to selection bias all DF�s are likely to
underestimate their real value, as high BAC crashes are much more likely. Therefore the
actual ratio L/T will be different. If a is the scaling factor that represents the under
prediction of DF, then
L/Tactual = (aDF1� aDF2) / (1 � aDF2) = aτ/(1-a β0)
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To find a I would need to find the relative propensities to crash. Fortunately Levitt and
Porter estimated the relative risk of a legally drunk driver crashing to a sober driver as
13.24 and 14.39, for two and one-car crashes respectively, and the effect of any drunk
driver to a sober driver is 7.51 and 7.45 (Levitt and Porter 2001). Therefore legally drunk
drivers are 1.76 to 1.93 times more likely to crash than and under .08 BAC driver. They
are slightly under two times more likely to end up in the sample. DF would be low by
that factor.
AllFraction, however, has two contradicting impulses. One is that because .01 to
08 BACs are more likely to crash, therefore their proportion is overrepresented and the
numerator is large. But the denominator is the total number of BAC�s in which alcohol is
more likely to be represented, so the effects will pull in opposite directions. Hence the
value is going to have error but it is difficult to tell if L/Pactual would be smaller or larger
than it should be.
I use this change in the probability of offending, τ, to solve for the relative
utilities. The difference in utility before and after is:
τ = pc[Ut(np) - Ut(p)]
Ut(np) - Ut(p)= τ/ pc
Which can gives an indication of the deterrence effect.
Data:
I used the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), for the statistics on fatal
accidents. This database records accident information for every fatal vehicle accident
within the United States. The data is categorized yearly, and each set contains
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information on the person who died in the accident. Among the factors recorded are age,
sex, person type (driver or passenger), whether the accident was alcohol related, the
Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) in percent, and the state in which the accident took place.
Table 0 documents the basic summary statistics for this data set.
Yearly Statistics(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year:1994 92,761 23,016 9,542 1,770 60,357 31,013 18.5% 7.7%
1995 95,423 25,387 9,511 1,837 62,192 31,938 19.3% 7.2%
1996 96,888 23,680 9,516 1,860 62,619 32,873 19.5% 7.9%
1997 95,810 23,588 8,872 1,711 61,303 33,056 19.3% 7.3%
1998 94,782 23,239 8,766 1,702 60,859 32,675 19.4% 7.3%
1999 94,375 23,634 8,780 1,709 61,009 32,103 19.5% 7.2%
2000 94,422 24,079 9,022 1,750 61,475 31,739 19.4% 7.3%
2001 94,852 24,493 9,043 1,774 61,926 31,599 19.6% 7.2%
2002 95,423 25,387 9,511 1,837 62,192 31,938 19.3% 7.2%
2003 95,496 25,324 9,328 1,788 61,980 32,309 19.2% 7.1%
All 950,232 241,827 91,891 17,738 615,912 321,243 19.3% 7.3%
Table 0: Summary Statistics
Notes: The Demo version of Stat Transfer was used to convert the data. This version transfers 15 of 16 cases, therefore the absolute numbers need to be multiplied by 1.07 to get the approximate real value. Because I was using the crashes as a pseudo random sample, the nature of stat transfer does not affect my analysis.
Accidents with Male Drivers
Accidents with
female Drivers
Drunk Fraction
All Fraction
Total Accidents
Accidents where a BAC was recorded
Recorded BAC over
0
Recorded BAC .01
to .08
I looked at the years from 1994 to 2003, because prior to 1994 the data
categorized differently. The BAC information indicates a possible systematic error, as
you can see less than a third of the accidents recorded one. Also, one can see a slight
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yearly effect as the numbers decline in the late 90�s and then began to rise in 2000.
These changes are notable in that they vary less than one percent from year to year,
which indicates the self selection within the sample is relatively constant from year to
year. 1994 represents somewhat of an outlier in terms of DrunkFraction and AllFraction,
as the initial value is very different from subsequent years. Notice that DrunkFraction
rises while AllFraction falls. This shows that these values are not necessarily equivalent
and might represent other factors. Also among the genders, male drivers are consistently
twice as likely as female drivers to be involved in accidents.
In order for the natural experiment to be effective the relative reasons behind the
passage of Zero Tolerance laws must be random. The introduction of the federal
requirement ensures that internal concerns are somewhat controlled for by an overriding
federal one. Additionally the states which were affected need to be relatively randomly
selected. Table 1 shows the state and the year in which they passed the Zero Tolerance
law.
Year1993 or earlier
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998www.nhtsa.dot.gov
Table 1: State and Year it Passed Zero Tolerance Law
StateArizona, Maine, Maryland, Oregon, New Jersey, Arkansas, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Minnesota
Massachusetts, Virginia, West Virginia, Michigan, Ohio, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Idaho, New Mexico, California, and Washington.Iowa, Illinois, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, North Carolina, and MontanaNew York, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Alabama, Oklahoma, and AlaskaNorth Dakota, Colorado, Texas, Georgia, Kansas, Indiana, Florida, Vermont, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Nevada, and Hawaii
Wyoming, South Dakota, South Carolina, and Mississippi
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The states do not appear to have a geographical correlation, with the exception that 1997
and 1998 seem to contain a large number of generally conservative states, judging by
recent election results. It is possible than that the later states might be more reluctant and
one would see less of an effect. However, this law was passed by a Democrat House and
signed by a Democrat President, therefore the reluctance could be a partisan concern, not
related to the law itself. However, 1995 and 1996 contain a significant number of
generally liberal states, so any partisan or political effect would be mitigated.
Additionally 1993 and earlier seems to have an eclectic mix of geography and politics,
which imply that ZT laws are not a polarizing political issue.
One of the assumptions of the model is that bias in the dependant variable
(DrunkFraction or AllFraction) is systematic and does not significantly differ across age
groups. One problem is that BAC is recorded for less than a third of the accidents, to
identify if any bias existed I compared the subset of BAC data to the general sample. A
comparable statistic is whether or not the accident was determined to involve alcohol.
According to Levitt and Porter, this is generally determined by the officer on the scene.
So it is a different, although more subjective, measure of alcohol Figure 1 shows the
distribution of the two measures, both graph the percentages of fatalities that involved
alcohol. As you can see, there is a clear bias in BAC subset, all the percentages are
higher, but fortunately the shape appears to be the same. See Appendix II for the
distribution of BAC averages by age, which follows approximately the same shape.
Figure 1
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In order to better see if any bias exists per age group, I calculated the chance that a BAC
test was performed given that alcohol was determined to have been involved. The data
was aggregated across all years.
Figure 2
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It appears that in nearly 80% of cases a BAC test was performed. This means that the
distribution of BAC�s is a very good representation of the actual accident BACs, and that
most selection bias is then due to the greater likelihood of crashing while drunk.
Figure 1 also indicates that Drunk Driving is a criminal behavior. The
distribution of percentages follows a standard age-crime curve documented by David
Farrington.12 These curves represent the likelihood of criminal behavior by age and are
typified by a quick early rise followed by a declining effect with age. The type of trend
in most of Farrington�s analysis is clearly visible in figure 1. This lends credibility to the
use of BAC�s as a proxy for the probability of offending. Notice also the discontinuities
at age�s 21 and 18. This discontinuity at age 21 is evidence that underage drinking laws
have an effect on driving behavior.
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Another source of error could arise from the driving ability of those in the sample.
From appendix I, one can see the distribution of accidents across age groups. While this
does not control for the amount of drivers on the road, it shows that those under 21 are
much more likely to crash than any other age group. Fortunately my analysis uses
proportions instead of absolute numbers, which account for the inexperience effect.
The regression indexes DrunkFraction and AllFraction by state and year. In order
to initially see if any effects were present I combined the states by the year they passed
the law. Figure 3 shows the DrunkFraction per year for the sample.
Figure 3
There appears to be no clear trend, but there is a lot of variation in the data. In order to
better see if a trend existed, I grouped the DrunkFraction and AllFraction values before
the law on one side, and after the law on the other. The line indicates the trend. (Larger
graphs are available in appendix III and IV)
Figure 4
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Therefore you can see that the average DrunkFraction and AllFraction values dropped
after the Zero Tolerance laws were passed. The decrease in the values gives an indication
that the laws had an effect, but does not say whether or not it was significant.
Results:
Table 3 summarizes the general results for the regression analysis. Each column
represents a different control or restriction in the model. Column 1 is a standard Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) without controls, state and year fixed effects are added for
increasing columns. Also note that two different types of estimates were used, MLE and
OLS. One is a fixed effects model which clustered the errors by state, but estimated the
coefficients using maximum likelihood and the other did not cluster the others but used
least squares (see notes for an expanded discussion). One can see then, significant
variation in the intercepts and significance of each specification. The variety in
significance and intercept show the need to cluster errors, as state effects have significant
internal correlation. MLE then, better estimates the model, and under certain
assumptions on the normality of the errors is the same as OLS. These assumptions
appear to be valid for the majority of the regressions. Therefore, the result for column 6
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would be the most reliable estimate for the model. Yet the estimates for intercept
indicate a possible problem with the model, because they are so much higher for
AllFraction, when the average is closer to 10%. The software seems to pick the highest
value as its intercept and each state effect then subtracts from this (see notes). For fitting
the model the intercept for the no effects specification is used because it provides a more
general average. Also, the MLE and OLS estimates return a different value of fit - OLS
returns R squared, and MLE returns the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC
has no absolute interpretation rather it describes relative goodness of fit and penalizes for
using too many estimations, a lower value indicates a better model. In this case it helps
identify if the year effects are important for the model. If the addition of year effects
reduces the AIC then that model is a better fit. In Table 3, one sees that when the effect
is significant, the AIC is indeed lower.
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(Binary = 1 for (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Zero Tolerance Law)Intercepts 0.098*** 0.102** 0.304*** 0.110** 0.112*** 0.427***All Drivers -0.0042 -0.0083 -0.2302 0.0026 -0.0020 -0.1481
N = 35,923 (0.0051) (0.0049)* (0.0201)*** (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0274)***0.00002 0.20629 -12.24 0.01807 0.21746 -59.61
MLE X XOLS X X X XState Fixed Effects X X X XYear Fixed Effects X X X
Intercepts 0.289*** 0.300*** 0.336*** 0.312*** 0.318*** 0.403***All Drivers -0.0011 -0.0187 -0.0381 0.0177 -0.0077 0.0015
N = 11,764 (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0331) (0.0166) (0.0183) (0.0437)AIC or R2 0.00002 0.20629 355.52 0.01807 0.21746 373.31
Intercepts 0.092*** 0.097** 0.078*** 0.091** 0.093*** 0.078***All Drivers 0.0023 -0.0042 0.0170 0.0108 0.0015 -0.0016
N = 48,298 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0074)** (0.0051)** (0.0055) (0.0101)0.00475 0.31651 -1126.25 0.02217 0.33474 -1066.22
Intercepts 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.149*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 0.149***All Drivers 0.0118 0.0023 0.0305 0.0188 0.0023 -0.0046
N = 24,713 (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0126)** (0.0098)* (0.0100) (0.0169)0.00475 0.31651 -609.07 0.02217 0.33474 -559.29
Table 3: Summary of Coefficients
Notes: An observation in the linear probability model is a state and year in one of all 50 US States and the 10 years in the sample The dependant variable is the proportion of drivers who had .01-.08 Blood Alcohol Content(BAC), per the selected group. DrunkFraction is over all drunk drivers, AllFraction is over all drivers, and each hs for a different age group. The independent variable is a binary variables that equals one if the state had Zero Tolerance Laws during that year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, errors for MLE estimation were clustered by state, errors for OLS were not clustered. The observations are weighted by the number of accidents covered in the sample.
Dep. Var.: DrunkFraction Drivers 16 to 20
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
AIC or R2
AIC or R2
AIC or R2
Dep. Var.: AllFraction Drivers 21 and Older
Dep. Var.: AllFraction Drivers 16 to 20
Dep. Var.: DrunkFraction Drivers 21 and Older
As one can see there is a significant effect on AllFraction from the imposition of
Zero Tolerance laws. According the to the regression, the probability of offending drops
by 14% after Zero Tolerance laws are passed (a standard error of 2.74% gives a 95% CI
of [9.43% , 20.1%]). Even using the lower bound of .09, the change in offending is very
significant. The drop in AllFraction is also significant because there is no corresponding
drop for drivers 21 and older, as the model predicts-there is a one percent increase and it
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is far from significant. Had there been a corresponding drop for older drivers, it could be
attributed to a general reduction in drunk driving. This general reduction would mean
that ZT laws are associated with other DUI legislation or policies. One can see a
significant increase in the proportion before controlling for year effects. This might
internalize a general reduction in excessive drunk driving, by substituting for legal
methods (under .08 BAC). Also, social pressures against drunk driving from groups such
as MADD might also encourage drivers who normally drink and drive, to drink less.
This drop is a strong indication that zero tolerance laws have a direct effect on the
behavior of drivers, yet the other measure of criminal propensity, DrunkFraction, did not
have a corresponding decrease. This could be due to two factors. One, people are very
bad at estimating their BAC and the decrease in AllFraction (.01 to .08 BAC) was
correlated with a drop in over .08 BAC driving as well (and a general decline from all
categories means, that the relative proportions do not change). It is well known that
alcohol impairs judgment, so it is a logical extension that it also impairs ability to
objectively determine intoxication as well. The second explanation is that this general
reduction in drunk driving is due to other social and political pressures that happen to be
correlated with Zero Tolerance laws. This is a less plausible explanation because this
model controls for year effects, and the states imposed ZT laws because of a federal
requirement.
Men and women might respond differently to driving rules and regulations. The
fact that men are twice as likely as women to be involved in a fatal accident indicates that
they might also be differently affected by driving laws. Table 4 summarizes these
differences.
23
Dependant Variable: For ages 16 to 20(Binary = 1 forZero Tolerance Law)
(1) (2) (3) (4)Women 0.10036 0.31040 0.0208615 0.0617996
(0.0491)** (0.0682)*** (0.0106)* (0.0163)***AIC or R2 0.17839 571.38786 0.17622 387.47338
N 1,749 1,749 9,251 9,251
Men -0.02466 0.00863 -0.009842 -0.1141692(0.0193) (0.0499) (0.0083) (0.0252)***
AIC or R2 0.20489 505.53610 0.26891 -113.55587N 10,012 10,012 26,671 26,671
MLE X XOLS X X
X X X X
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Sex and Reaction to Zero Tolerance Laws
DrunkFraction AllFraction
Notes: To see intercpets and the results for each specification please see the Appendix
State and Year controls
We see a most unusual effect in the data on sex. Women seem to increase their relative
fractions after the ZT laws are passed. They are more likely to drive drunk in the under
.08 range. This result is suspect because the data involving women is not very
comprehensive. There are only 1749 drunk crashes of women within the age group
throughout the entire period. This means 175 per year, or a little over 3 per state.
DrunkFractionwomen will take very discrete values. Thus the sample size is so small that
the effects are going to be widely exaggerated.
One possible explanation is that although women as a whole tend to be safer
drivers, the subset of risky ones might be risk loving, and enjoy the breaking the law.
Another possibility is that because men are much more likely to drive drunk, police
24
officers rarely target female drivers, and are more likely to let them go without arrest.
But even if this is the case its hard to imagine a scenario where women offend more after
a law is passed, unless their utility from violating the law is increasing the probability of
getting caught. Neither explanation is very credible, most likely the small amount of data
caused the unusual result. Men, however seem to represent the decrease quite well. As
you can see from the sample size, men are almost twice as likely to drive drunk as are
women, and their reaction to ZT laws is around 11% (95% CI = [6.47%,16.34%]). This
demonstrates that regardless of the unusual result for women, men are still significantly
affected by the law.
A useful extension of the model is to identify at what times during the day Zero
Tolerance laws are most effective. This could effect allocation of police resources to find
DUI�s. If drivers are more likely to be affected by laws at different times of the day, then
police could devote resources toward times where incidence is high. Over 80% of
alcohol related accidents occur between the hours of 7pm and 4am. Anecdotally this
seems to represent two types of drunk drivers: The first I will call the �Happy Hour�
driver, who drinks early in the evening before going home; the second is the �bar and
club� driver who drinks until late at night before deciding to drive. Table 5 summarizes
the coefficients and specifications for each below.
25
Intercept 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.079***Tau 0.002064 -0.003939 -0.003393 0.013525 0.005114 -0.023583
N = 8,503 (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0361) (0.0152) (0.0173) (0.0447)AIC or R2 0.00006 0.15341 427.71992 0.01548 0.16593 417.19562
Intercept 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.237*** 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.335***Tau -0.012389 -0.015897 -0.1436395 -0.006601 -0.010582 -0.069783
N = 9,988 (0.0092) (0.0095)* (0.0227)*** (0.0118) (0.0129) (0.032)**AIC or R2 0.00362 0.20918 88.04696 0.04600 0.25056 97.13796
MLE X XOLS X X X XState Fixed Effects X X X XYear Fixed Effects X X X
Intercept 0.226*** 0.241*** 0.202*** 0.249*** 0.259*** 0.132***Tau 0.01025 -0.00164 0.04279 0.03042 0.00900 0.04115
N = 5,632 (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0389) (0.0221) (0.0252) (0.0490)AIC or R2 0.000752 0.158295 466.74439 0.016158 0.169941 489.87554
Intercept 0.337*** 0.350*** 0.376*** 0.349*** 0.364*** 0.499***Tau -0.01523 -0.03320 -0.09324 -0.00593 -0.03096 0.00970
N = 3,496 (0.0213) (0.0226) (0.0453)** (0.0275) (0.0310) (0.0555)AIC or R2 0.00109 0.18162 484.34060 0.03296 0.21439 487.52808
7pm to 11:59pm
DrunkFraction Under 21
AllFraction under 21
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: These results are taken from the tables in the back. The equivalent data fro over 21 yeilds no signficance once controls are used.
Table 5: Deterrence effect by hour of the Day
12am to 4am
7pm to 11:59pm
12am to 4am
Results show that the laws have a much more important effect on the happy hour driver
than they do on the bar driver. DrunkFraction increases and again is not significant, but
one can see a significant decrease of around 7% for AllFraction (the 95% CI is [.728%,
13.25%]). The significance can be explained if drivers are more likely to be rational
early in the day. Possible reasons: driving early means less time to get drunk and the
driver is more alert when they do drive home, both of which aid judgment and ability.
26
The hours after 12am are also associated with a large increase in sober accidents, as the
ability to operate machinery declines with alertness. Thus the frame of mind earlier in
the evening is better suited to both drive and follow the laws. This explains how drunk
accidents are actually less of a proportion after midnight than before. If this is the reason
for difference in significance, it shows importance of maintaining rationality for
punishment to work.
Estimating the Model:
Depending on the specification tau takes separate values, 14% for all drivers at all times,
11% for male drivers, and 7% for evening drivers. All three confidence bands contain
10% to 13%. For simplicity I will assume 11%, which is the discontinuous change in
offending before and after the law is .11. Therefore the proportion of the population who
no longer drive drunk = L/P = (AF1� AF2) = .11. Recall equation (4).
pc[U(np) - U(p)] = L/P
pc[U(np) - U(p)] = .11
We can find several different estimates for pc, Levitt and Porter estimate the chance of
being arrested for a DUI as 1/27,000 miles driven drunk. The National Survey on Drug
Use and Health find that for 21 and older, .6% of drivers are arrested for a DUI and 2.9%
of those who report driving under the influence in the pervious year were arrested,13 this
indicates that around 20% drove drunk during the year ([arrest per population] / [arrest
per number who drove drunk] = [number who drove drunk out of population]). Using
Levitt�s estimate, equation (4) equals:
U(np) - U(p)= τ/ pc = 27,000 * .11 = 2970
27
I now attempt to calculate utilities in terms of drunk miles, which seems arbitrary.
Almost by definition utilities are used as relative measures. Therefore I set U(nc) = 0,
which indicates U(p) < 0, and U(np) > 0. The values of the utilities will then give the
drunk miles driven each is valued at. If 2.9% are arrested per year, and the chances of
being arrested is 1 per 27,000 drunk miles:
.029 = (average drunk miles driven per year)/27,000
Solving yields, .029 times 27,000 = 783 miles are driven drunk by the average offender
per year. Recall, Prob(Drunk Driving) = P[pcU(p) + (1- pc)U(np) > U(nc)], or if U(nc) =
0, P[pcU(p) + (1- pc)U(np of 783) > 0]. If I assume then that the average expected utility
is equal to the drunk miles driven, then pcU(p) + (1- pc)U(np) = 783. This is done to
maintain simplicity, in order to not identify functional forms for U and P. Arbitrarily
assigning utilities in units of drunk miles then gives two equations.
U(np) - U(p) = 2970 and pcU(p) + (1- pc)U(np) = 783, with pc = .029
solving for U(np) = U(p) + 2970, then pcU(p) + (1- pc)[U(p) + 2970] = 783
U(p) = 783 � (1-pc)2970
U(p) = -2100 Drunk Miles
Because the utilities were calculated in terms of realized behavior, the deterrence effect
of the DUI punishment is then worth around 2100 drunk miles per person. These
equations assumed arbitrarily simple functional forms for utility and probability, so the
estimated utility should only be used as heuristic to human behavior, not a true measure.
Nevertheless, it does give an indication of the substitution effects of DUI laws.
28
Conclusion:
This paper presents a new way to identify the criminal probability for drunk
drivers. By using crash statistics, I help isolate the effects of penalties alone, without
problems from increase enforcement. Zero Tolerance Laws provide an excellent
experiment to test the efficacy of DUI laws in general. DUI penalties were pseudo-
randomly assigned to different states throughout the time period following the passage of
the Highway Act in 1995. Using this natural experiment, I found DUI laws reduce 10-
14% of drunk driving incidence. Heuristically this indicates DUI penalties are worth
2100 miles of drunk driving to the average potential offender. This has several potential
impacts on public policy. One, DUI penalties have a significant deterrence effect on
drunk driving. While no one doubts penalties deter actions, the relative rates of
deterrence effect policy expenditure. Two, the fact that laws are more effective in the
evening than past midnight indicates that police officers would be able to arrest more
potential offenders after midnight. More arrests late, might effect public perception of
the probability of apprehension. The higher the probability of apprehension will lower
the incidence rate. Finally, the fact that only 10% of a population is deterred by DUI
penalties indicates that the penalties might be to light, given the large negative externality
(estimated by Levitt and Porter as 30 cents a mile). Therefore, policy makers would be
justified in enacting even harsher penalties.
The problems with this study arise from the nature of state-indexed data, and its
large variation of errors. Clustered errors were able to show significance but better
regression forms might be able to identify more information in the data. Additionally the
data on women show that problems exist in the analysis. Nevertheless, Zero Tolerance
29
Laws represent a near ideal natural experiment, and the results are not unusual. DUI laws
should deter drunk driving, and 10% is a likely estimate. Further research should identify
the efficacy in enforcement and policy restrictions as this effects were funds should be
allocated for maximum deterrence. Drunk driving is an important national issue and
research on its efficacy should continue to guide the deterrence laws and policies.
References: 1 Levitt, Steven, Porter, Jack. �How Dangerous Are Drinking Drivers?� Journal of Political Economy. 2001, vol 109, no 6. University of Chicago Press, 2001. 2 Traffic Safety Center. �A History of the Science and Law behind DUI.� University of California, Online Newsletter, Volume 1, No 3. 2003. 3 Sen, Anindya. �Do Stricter Penalties Deter Drinking and Driving?� Canadian Journal of Economics. Vol. 34 No. 1. Canadian Economics Association, 2001. 4 Wilkinson, James, T. �Reducing Drunken Driving: Which Policies are Effective?� Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 54, No. 2. 1987. 5 Hingson R, Heeren T, Winter M. Lower legal blood alcohol limits for young drivers. Public Health Rep 1994;109:738-44. 6 Carpenter, Christopher. �How do Zero Tolerance Drunk Driving Laws Work?� Journal of Health Economics, 2004. 7 Lee, David, McCrary. �Crime, Punishment, and Myopia.� NBER Working Paper No.11491. National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2005. 8 Ash and Levy. �Young Driver Fatalities: The Role of Drinking Age and Drinking Experience.� Southern Economic Journal. Vol 57, No 2. Southern Economics Association, 1990. 9 Brautbar, Nathan. �Principles and Pitfalls in Alcohol Toxicology: Intoxication Defense.� http://www.environmentaldiseases.com/article_alcohol_toxicity.html. 2002. 10 Sage-Bollenbach and Baker. "Friday the 13th.� Study conducted by HEAT (Help, Encourage And Teach), a faculty sponsored campus group. 11 Clinton, William. �Statement on signing the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995.� Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 12/4/1995. US Government Printing Office, 1995. 12 Farrington, David P. �Age and Crime.� Crime and Justice. Vol. 7. (1986). University of Chicago Press. 13�Arrests for Driving Under the Influence among Adult Drivers.� The National Survey on Drug Use and Health Report, Office of Applied Studies. September 2005.
30
Notes:
1. The statistical program used for this analysis was the open-source R, given by the Comprehensive R Archive Network. The specific analysis used the functions lm and lme. lm is a standard OLS function for any given formula, and was used for most of the regressions. Unfortunately lm cannot cluster the standard errors, therefore I used lme, from the package nlme. This was a linear mixed effects model. I set the random effects to 0, and entered the same equation that was used in OLS into the fixed effect formula. There were two problems with this software and the first is the estimates were maximum likelihood, not least squares. Under certain assumptions on the errors, normality and no correlation, these two estimates are identical. And both standard errors were approximately normal, and mostly uncorrelated identified by quantile-quantile plots, for normality, and the Durbin Watson test for auto correlation. Therefore the estimates appeared to be acceptable.
2. Another problem is how well the function handles blank spots in the data. Initially I set the weights to zero for the NA�s, but this produced an error message, therefore I was forced to set the weights to one. How the package ignores NA�s might effect the final estimate if it uses the weights. But for the cases of men, all drivers, 11pm to 2am, and 7pm to 10pm, all had under 1% NA�s. Therefore the significance of these estimates is not in doubt, however, the significance for women is because 69 of the 500 dependant variables returned an NA. More information is needed on how lme reacts to NA�s.
3. The fact the intercepts are much higher for the MLE estimation causes doubt with the model. I do not fully understand how the MLE estimator works, but the state effects all seem to be negative, indicating that the intercept is in fact the highest state value. However, the results given by the change in AllFraction seemed to indicated that after the law the incidence dropped to about 25% depending on specifications. This is close to the 20% nationwide estimate (see model estimation), and lends credence to the use of MLE for both effects and estimate.
31
Appendix: Appendix I
Data for 2003
32
Appendix II
Data for 2003, Ages 16 through 25 can be seen below
33
Appendix III
Appendix IV
34
Appendix V � Complete Tables and Specifications
Table 6: .01 to .08 BAC as a Proportion of Drunk Accidents, age 16 to 21
(Binary = 1 for Drivers 16 to 20Zero Tolerance Law) All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Intercept 0.289*** 0.300*** 0.336*** 0.312*** 0.318*** 0.403***Tau -0.00115 -0.01874 -0.03811 0.01772 -0.00767 0.00146
N = 11,764 (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0331) (0.0166) (0.0183) (0.0437)
MLE X XOLS X X X XState Fixed Effects X X X XYear Fixed Effects X X X
0.00002 0.20629 355.51668 0.01807 0.21746 373.31467
Intercept 0.058*** 0.063** 0.029*** 0.069** 0.071*** 0.028***Tau 0.04078 0.01326 0.22235 0.11734 0.10036 0.31040
N = 1,749 (0.0327) (0.0347) (0.0551)*** (0.0432)*** (0.0491)** (0.0682)***0.00362 0.15103 538.67594 0.03363 0.17839 571.38786
Intercept 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.238*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.382***Tau -0.00861 -0.02513 -0.01848 0.00147 -0.02466 0.00863
N = 10,012 (0.0133) (0.0139)* (0.0380) (0.0173) (0.0193) (0.0499)0.00084 0.18790 482.00629 0.02143 0.20489 505.53610
Intercept 0.226*** 0.241*** 0.202*** 0.249*** 0.259*** 0.132***Tau 0.01025 -0.00164 0.04279 0.03042 0.00900 0.04115
N = 5,632 (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0389) (0.0221) (0.0252) (0.0490)0.000752 0.158295 466.74439 0.0161582 0.169941 489.87554
Intercept 0.337*** 0.350*** 0.376*** 0.349*** 0.364*** 0.499***Tau -0.01523 -0.03320 -0.09324 -0.00593 -0.03096 0.00970
N = 3,496 (0.0213) (0.0226) (0.0453)** (0.0275) (0.0310) (0.0555)0.00109 0.18162 484.34060 0.03296 0.21439 487.52808AIC or R2
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: An observation in the linear probability model is a state and year in one of all 50 US States and the 10 years in the sample The dependant variable is the proportion of drunk drivers under 21, who had .01-.08 Blood Alcohol Content(BAC). The independent variable is a binary variables that equals one if the state had Zero Tolerance Laws during that year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, errors for MLE estimation were clustered by state, errors for OLS were not clustered. The observations are weighted by the number of accidents covered in the sample.
AIC or R2
Dependant Variable: DrunkFraction = Proportion of Accidents with .01 to .08 BAC over all Drunk Accidents
Women
AIC or R2
AIC or R2
AIC or R2
Men
1am to 4am
7pm to 11:59pm
35
Table 7: .01 to .08 BAC as a Proportion of Drunk Accidents, age 21 and older
(Binary = 1 for Drivers 21 and olderZero Tolerance Law) All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Intercept 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.149*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 0.149***Tau 0.0117767 0.00225147 0.03050433 0.018764 0.002328 -0.004554
N = 24,713 (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0126)** (0.0098)* (0.0100) (0.0169)
MLE X XOLS X X X XState Fixed Effects X X X XYear Fixed Effects X X X
0.00475 0.31651 -609.07059 0.02217 0.33474 -559.29411
Intercept 0.210*** 0.204*** 0.136*** 0.208*** 0.202*** 0.097*Tau -0.000625 -0.0073933 0.05674609 -0.002656 -0.02007 0.0112405
N = 3,329 (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.0376) (0.0237) (0.0272) (0.0487)0.00000 0.16486 345.36816 0.01180 0.17622 387.47338
Intercept 0.169*** 0.177*** 0.122*** 0.160*** 0.165*** 0.117***Tau 0.013954 0.00402112 0.05580207 0.022469 0.006341 0.0264043
N = 21,384 (0.0081)* (0.0078) (0.0147)*** (0.0103)** (0.0107) (0.0195)0.00599 0.29485 -431.43335 0.02682 0.31602 -395.17593
Intercept 0.143*** 0.150*** 0.155*** 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.173***Tau 0.0102546 -0.0016399 0.0427891 0.030422 0.008998 0.0411503
N = 11,598 (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0389) (0.0221) (0.0252) (0.0490)0.00075 0.15829 466.74439 0.01616 0.16994 489.87554
Intercept 0.180*** 0.184*** 0.190*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.205***Tau -0.01523 -0.033202 -0.093244 -0.005932 -0.03096 0.0097035
N = 7,362 (0.0213) (0.0226) (0.0453)** (0.0275) (0.0310) (0.0555)0.00109 0.18162 484.34060 0.03296 0.21439 487.52808
AIC or R2
Men
Dependant Variable: DrunkFraction = Proportion of Accidents with .01 to .08 BAC over all Drunk Accidents
Notes: An observation in the linear probability model is a state and year in one of all 50 US States and the 10 years in the sample The dependant varaible is the proportion of drunk drivers over 21 who had .01-.08 Blood Alcohol Content(BAC). The independent variable is a binary variables that equals one if the state had Zero Tolerance Laws during that year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, errors for MLE estimation were clustered by state, errors for OLS were not clustered. The observations are weighted by the number of accidents covered in the sample.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
AIC or R2
AIC or R2
12 am to 4am
AIC or R2
7pm to 11:59pm
AIC or R2
Women
36
Table 8: .01 to .08 BAC as a Proportion of All Accidents, age 16 to 21
(Binary = 1 for All Drivers 16 to 20Zero Tolerance Law) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Intercept 0.098*** 0.102** 0.304*** 0.110** 0.112*** 0.427***Tau -0.004217 -0.008339 -0.23023863 0.0026285 -0.002049 -0.1481416
N = 35,923 (0.0051) (0.0049)* (0.0201)*** (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0274)***
MLE X XOLS X X X XState Fixed Effects X X X XYear Fixed Effects X X X
0.00139 0.30212 -12.23918 0.02505 0.32585 -59.61402
Intercept 0.058*** 0.063** 0.029*** 0.069** 0.071*** 0.028***Tau 0.006145 0.003558 0.03151501 0.020702 0.0208615 0.06179961
N = 9,251 (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0121)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0106)* (0.0163)***0.00140 0.16822 -638.91932 0.02841 0.19573 -581.69041
Intercept 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.238*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.382***Tau -0.007429 -0.011755 -0.13942271 -0.0038316 -0.009842 -0.1141692
N = 26,671 (0.0060) (0.006)* (0.0188)*** (0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0252)***0.00304 0.24995 -59.15374 0.02065 0.26891 -113.55587
Intercept 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.079*Tau 0.002064 -0.003939 -0.00339297 0.0135252 0.0051143 -0.0235835
N = 8,503 (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0361) (0.0152) (0.0173) (0.0447)0.00006 0.15341 427.71992 0.01548 0.16593 417.19562
Intercept 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.237*** 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.335***Tau -0.012389 -0.015897 -0.14363948 -0.0066014 -0.010582 -0.0697827
N = 9,988 (0.0092) (0.0095)* (0.0227)*** (0.0118) (0.0129) (0.032)**0.00362 0.20918 88.04696 0.04600 0.25056 97.13796
AIC or R2
Men
Dep. Var.: AllFraction = Proportion of Accidents with .01 to .08 BAC over all Accidents
Notes: An observation in the linear probability model is a state and year in one of all 50 US States and the 10 years in the sample The dependant varaible is the proportion of all drivers under 21 who had .01-.08 Blood Alcohol Content(BAC). The independent variable is a binary variable that equals one if the state had Zero Tolerance Laws during that year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, errors for MLE estimation were clustered by state, errors for OLS were not clustered. The observations are weighted by the number of accidents covered in the sample.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
AIC or R2
AIC or R2
12am to 4am
AIC or R2
7pm to 11:59pm
AIC or R2
Women
37
Table 9: .01 to .08 BAC as a Proportion of All Accidents, age 16 to 21
(Binary = 1 for All Drivers 21 and olderZero Tolerance Law) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Intercept 0.092*** 0.097** 0.078*** 0.091** 0.093*** 0.078***Tau 0.00231 -0.004203 0.0169759 0.01075015 0.001524 -0.00163427
N = 48,298 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0074)** (0.0051)** (0.0055) (0.0101)
MLE X XOLS X X X XState Fixed Effects X X X XYear Fixed Effects X X X
0.00067 0.25001 -1126.25319 0.02910 0.27079 -1066.21759
Intercept 0.074*** 0.080** 0.043*** 0.078** 0.083*** 0.046***Tau -0.002926 -0.00929 0.00991676 0.00169052 -0.010629 -0.00654337
N = 9,698 (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0120) (0.0092) (0.0103) (0.0158)0.00035 0.17249 -622.88557 0.01142 0.18172 -578.16286
Intercept 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.079*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.077***Tau 0.003356 -0.002851 0.01937671 0.01243385 0.004551 0.00576389
N = 38,600 (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0082)** (0.0057)** (0.0063) (0.0111)0.00113 0.20238 -1021.75256 0.03247 0.22843 -966.82074
Intercept 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.118***Tau 0.004763 -0.005856 -0.0150027 0.01380082 -0.002516 -0.02376978
N = 14,270 (0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0139)* (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0195)0.00070 0.13841 -432.74056 0.02044 0.15695 -371.82475
Intercept 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.064*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.061***Tau 0.004923 0.000681 0.03209833 0.00567919 -0.001191 0.02403238
N = 12,414 (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0157)** (0.0100) (0.0115) (0.0207)0.00084 0.13664 -398.47812 0.02040 0.15816 -348.90738
12am to 4am
AIC or R2
Dep. Var.: AllFraction = Proportion of Accidents with .01 to .08 BAC over all Accidents
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
AIC or R2
Notes: An observation in the linear probability model is a state and year in one of all 50 US States and the 10 years in the sample The dependant varaible is the proportion of all drivers over 21 who had .01-.08 Blood Alcohol Content(BAC). The independent variable is a binary variables that equals one if the state had Zero Tolerance Laws during that year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, errors for MLE estimation were clustered by state, errors for OLS were not clustered. The observations are weighted by the number of accidents covered in the sample.
AIC or R2
Women
AIC or R2
7pm to 11:59pm
Men
AIC or R2