G.R. No. 110592; January 23, 1996

PEOPLE VS. VELASCO

FACTS:

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully selling “shabu,” in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” (R.A. 6425).

Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991. Velasco was caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a designated poseur-buyer. Five more decks were found in her pockets.

Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as evidence against her since those were acquired through a warrantless arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly, appellant questions the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in her possession.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired through a warrantless arrest.

2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest when done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person to be arrested is actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be justified under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish that the members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when they entrapped her.

2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for in R.A. 6425, agrees with the appellants argument that under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty is prision correccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the

minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.”

R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. However, R.A. 7691 shows that retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. RTC’s jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation.

At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.

G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011PAULINO S. ASILO, JR.,

Petitioner,vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SpousesVISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI,

Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 159059VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, INREPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T.COMENDADOR,

Petitioner,vs.

VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C.BOMBASI,

Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS OF THE CASEPrivate Respondent Visitacion’s late mother MarcianaVda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and theMunicipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a leasecontract whereby the Municipality allowed the use andenjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a storein favor of the respondent’s mother for twenty years,extendible for another 20 years. The lease contractprovided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build afirewall on her rented property which must be at leastas high as the store; and in case of modification of thepublic market, she or her heir/s would be givenpreferential rights. Visitacion took over the store whenher mother died Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’spermits.A fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. UponVisitacion’s request for inspection, District EngineerGorospe of the then Ministry of Public Works andHighways, found that the store of

Visitacion remainedintact and stood strong. This finding of EngineerGorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan. The store of Visitacion continued to operateafter the fire. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issuedResolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador todemolish the store being occupied by Visitacion usinglegal means. Mayor Comendador relying on thestrength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183and 156 authorized the demolition of the store withAsilo and Angeles supervising the work.Visitacion, filed with a case for damages before theRTC. Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminalcomplaint

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against Mayor Comendador, Asilo andAngeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, finding theaccused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec.3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019. The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion forReconsideration alleging that the death of the lateMayor had totally extinguished both his criminal andcivil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the extinctionof the criminal liability is concerned and denied theextinction of the civil liability holding that the civilaction is an independent civil action.Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.ISSUE1.WON the accused is guilty of violating RA 30192.WON the actual damages prayed for isunconscionable

DECISION

1.

The Supreme Court sustain the Sandiganbayanin its finding of criminal and civil liabilities againstpetitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that theaccused are public officers or private persons chargedin conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officerscommit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their publicpositions; (3) that they caused undue injury to anyparty, whether the Government or a private party;(4) OR that such injury is caused by givingunwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to theother party; and (5) that the public officers have actedwith manifest partiality, evident bad faithor grossinexcusable negligence.Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was carriedout without a court order, and notwithstanding arestraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of officialduties which apparently was attended by evident badfaith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusablenegligence as there is nothing in the two (2)resolutions which gave the herein accused theauthority to demolish plaintiff’s store. The accused public officials were devoid of any powerto demolish the store. A closer look at the contestedresolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was onlyauthorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish thebuilding using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was notamong those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, itis a legally impossible provision.2.The amount of actual damages prayed for isunconscionable. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary toprove the actual amount of loss with a reasonabledegree of certainty, premised upon

competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. n this case, theCourt finds that the only evidence presented to provethe actual damages incurred was the itemized list of

damaged and lost itemsprepared by Engineer Cabrega,an engineer commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi toestimate the costs. The amount claimed by the respondent-claimant’switness as to the actual amount of damages "

shouldbe admitted with extreme caution consideringthat, because it was a bare assertion, it shouldbe supported by independent evidence."Whatever claim the respondent witness wouldallege must be appreciated in consideration of his particular self-interest. There must still be aneed for the examination of the documentaryevidence presented by the claimants to supportits claim with regard to the actual amount of damages. The price quotation made by EngineerCabrega presented as an exhibit partakes of thenature of hearsay evidence considering that theperson who issued them was not presented as awitness.

CHING vs. NICDAO

G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007

Facts:

Nicdao was charged eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.

MTC found her of guilty of said offenses. RTC affirmed.

Nicdao filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the decision and acquitted

accused.

Ching is now appealing the civil aspect of the case to the Supreme Court.

Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA, the

Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability. He

anchors his contention on Rule 111, Sec 1B: The criminal action for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and

no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. Moreover,

under the above-quoted provision, the criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily

includes the corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount of the

dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee.

Nicdao’s defense: Sec 2 of Rule 111 — Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof,

after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved

cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action. Accdg to her, CA’s decision is

equivalent to a finding that the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The

instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is

thus allegedly already barred by the final and executory decision acquitting her.

Issue:

1. WON Ching may appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period? YES

2. WON Nicdao civilly liable? NO.

Held:

1. Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period.

“Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Extinction of the penal action

does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a

declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

Petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect

of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil action was

impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it

separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil

aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as

it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended

party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case

within the period therefor.

GENERAL RULE:

Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal:

1. where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;

2. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only

civil in nature; and

3. where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the

accused is acquitted.

2. A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s

acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability.

There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.

CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is

based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular,

the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor

delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching.

CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated

that she had already fully paid her obligations. The finding relative to the P20,000,000.00

check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability

thereon as well.

Under the circumstances which have just been discussed lengthily, such acquittal carried

with it the extinction of her civil liability as well.

Duterte v. Sandiganbayan

Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)

FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly entering into an anomalous contract for the purchase of computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated.

It appears that four years prior to filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan, petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in a civil case filed against them before the RTC and on the allegations in an unverified complaint filed before the

Ombudsman by the Anti-Graft League. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being conducted.

Petitioners filed a motion a motion for reconsideration alleging among others that they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy disposition of their case, which the Sandiganbayan denied. They filed a motion to quash but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners’ right to speedy trial was violated by the inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation?

HELD: YES. The preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07. The inordinate delay in the conduct of the “preliminary investigation” infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case.[22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[23] we held that an undue delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case.

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.

Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.