Crim Law 2 Cases jt

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THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus

ALFREDO LAZARO, JR.a.k.aJUN LAZARO y

AQUINO,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 186418

Present:

CARPIO MORALES,*J.,CHICO-NAZARIO,

Acting Chairperson,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,**

andABAD,

***JJ.

Promulgated:

October 16, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

For review is the Decision[1]

dated 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02258 which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]

dated 27

April 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio City, in Criminal

Cases No. 23227-R, No. 23228-R and No. 23229-R, finding accused-appellant

Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. a.k.aJun Lazaro y Aquino guilty of illegal sale, possession and use

of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu,under Sections 5,

11, and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

On 17 June 2004, two separate informations were filed before the RTC

against appellant for illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections 5 and 11,

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the informations read:

Criminal Case No. 23227-R

The undersigned accuses ALFREDO LAZARO, JR. a.k.a JUN

LAZARO y AQUINO for VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OFREPUBLIC ACT 9165 otherwise known as the COMPREHENSIVE

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, committed as follows:

That on June 15, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused, x x x, and without authority of law, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and/ordeliver One (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet

containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabuin

the amount of P3,000.00 [should be P300], weighing 0.05 gram to

Poseur Buyer SPO1 Dennis G. Indunan, knowing fully well thatsaid Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabuis adangerous drug, in violation of the aforementioned provision of

law.[3]


The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO y AQUINO for

VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165

otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of2002 committed as follows:

That on June 15, 2004, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously have in his possession and control One (1) small heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine

Hydrochloride known as Shabuweighing 0.04 gram, a dangerous

drug, without the corresponding license or prescription inviolation of the aforecited provision of law.

[4]
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On 18 June 2004, an information was filed with the RTC against appellant

for illegal use of shabuunder Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, thus:


The undersigned accuses JUN LAZARO for VIOLATION OFSECTION 15 [ARTICLE II] OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165 [otherwise knownas the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002], committed

as follows:

That on or about the 15th

day of June, 2004, in the City of

Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,unlawfully and feloniously use Dangerous Drugs particularly

Methamphetamine per the result of a Qualitative Examination

conducted on the urine sample taken from him, in violation of the

aforecited provision of law.[5]

Subsequently, these cases were consolidated. When arraigned on 28 June

2004, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded Not guilty to each of the

charges.[6]

Trial on the merits thereafter followed.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Hordan T.

Pacatiw, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Dennis G. Indunan, SPO1 Emerson A.Lingbawan and PO3 Paulino A. Lubos, all of whom are members of the Philippine

National Police and were assigned at the Criminal Investigation and Detection

Group, Anti-Illegal Drugs Team unit, Baguio City. Their testimonies, taken together,

bear the following:

On 15 June 2004, at about 12:30 p.m., an informant went to the Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Anti-Illegal Drugs Team unit

(AIDT), Baguio City, and reported to PO3 Paulino Lubos (PO3 Lubos) the drug

trafficking activities of appellant in Central Bakakeng, BaguioCity. PO3 Lubos

relayed the information to Police Senior Inspector Hordan T. Pacatiw (Inspector

Pacatiw), head of AIDT, who in turn, referred the matter to Senior Superintendent

Marvin V. Bolabola (Superintendent Bolabola), chief of CIDG, Baguio City, for

appropriate action. Superintendent Bolabola formed a team and planned a buy-

bust operation. The team was composed of Inspector Pacatiw who would act as the

team leader; SPO1 Dennis G. Indunan (SPO1 Indunan) as the poseur-buyer; PO3

Lubos as the seizing officer; and SPO1 Emerson A. Lingbawan (SPO1 Lingbawan) as

the arresting officer. Superintendent Bolabola handed SPO1 Indunan three One

Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills to be utilized as buy-bust money. SPO1 Indunan

marked the monies with DG-06-15-04. Thereafter, the team coordinated the

planned buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

At around 2:30 p.m. of the same date, the team, together with the

informant, went to appellants house at 181 Km. 3, Central

Bakakeng, BaguioCity. Upon arriving thereat, the informant and SPO1 Indunan saw

appellant standing at the balcony of the third floor of the three-storey house. The

informant proceeded inside appellants house and talked with appellant at the

balcony of the third floor, while SPO1 Indunan stood outside the house at a

distance of 10 meters. The rest of the team positioned themselves outside

appellants house at a distance of 25 meters. Later, the informant signaled SPO1

Indunan to approach him and appellant at the balcony of the third

floor. Thereupon, the informant introduced SPO1 Indunan to appellant as user and

buyer of shabu. The informant subsequently excused himself and left SPO1

Indunan and appellant. Appellant then asked SPO1 Indunan how much worth

of shabuhe would want to buy. SPO1 Indunan answered he would like to purchase

three hundred pesos (P300.00) worth of shabu. Appellant knocked at the door of a

room in the balcony and called a certain Bong. Bong is appellants brother whose
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full name is Ferdinand Bong Lazaro. A man opened the door and handed a green

box to appellant. Appellant opened the green box, took a plastic sachet from it,

handed the plastic sachet to SPO1 Indunan, and demanded payment from the

latter. After examining the contents of the plastic sachet and believing that the

same contained shabu, SPO1 Indunan gave the three marked one hundred peso

bills to appellant. At this juncture, SPO1 Indunan removed his sunglasses and

placed it in his pocket as pre-arranged signal to the other members of the team.

The other members of the team rushed to the crime scene and identified

themselves as police officers. Appellant tried to resist arrest but he was subdued by

the team. Inspector Pacatiw then apprised appellant of his constitutional

rights. Afterwards, SPO1 Indunan frisked and recovered from appellant the buy-

bust money and the green box which contained another plastic sachet with whitesubstance. SPO1 Indunan marked with DG-06-15-04 the plastic sachet containing

white substance sold to him by appellant, as well as the plastic sachet with white

substance found inside the green box.

Meanwhile, Inspector Pacatiw knocked at the door of a room on the

balcony and called on Bong to open the door but to no avail. Inspector Pacatiw and

some members of the team then forcibly opened the door. Although the team

found no one inside the room, they, however, subsequently saw a man, whom they

believed to be Bong, running down the basement of the house and exiting through

its back door. The man then disappeared.

Thereafter, the team discovered and seized at the third floor of the house

several drug paraphernalias. The team made a written inventory on said

paraphernalias, as well as the plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan and

the plastic sachet recovered in appellants possession, in the presence of

representatives from media, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and

the barangay. Said representatives signed the inventory document on the seized

items. Inspector Pacatiw took custody of the said seized items.

The team immediately brought appellant, as well as the items seized, to

the office of the CIDG, Baguio City. Thereupon, the team made a booking sheet,

arrest report, a Joint Affidavit of Arrest and an Affidavit of Poseur -Buyer as

regards the buy-bust operation. Superintendent Bolabola made a written request

for physical examination of appellant to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime

Laboratory Office. After conducting a physical examination on appellant, Dr.

Elizardo D. Daileg, medico-legal officer of the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime

Laboratory Office, issued a medico-legal certificate attesting that no injuries were

found on appellants body. Superintendent Bolabola also made separate writtenrequests to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for drug test on

appellant and a laboratory examination on the plastic sachet containing white

substance sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan and the plastic sachet with white

substance found in appellants possession. After conducting a laboratory

examination on the urine sample taken from appellant, Police Officer 1 Juliet

Valentin Albon, Forensic Analyst of the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory

Office (Forensic Analyst Albon), issued a report stating that appellant was positive

for shabu. Likewise, after making laboratory tests, Forensic Analyst Albon issued a

chemistry report certifying that the plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1

Indunan contained 0.05 gram of shabuwhile the plastic sachet recovered from

appellants possession contained 0.04 gram of shabu.[7]

The prosecution also adduced documentary and object evidence to

buttress the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) joint affidavit of the arresting

officers signed by Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3 Lubos (Exhibit
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A);[8]

(2) affidavit of the poseur-buyer signed by SPO1 Indunan (Exhibit B);[9]

(3)

booking sheet and arrest report for appellant (Exhibit C);[10]

(4) request to conduct

laboratory examination on the two plastic sachets recovered from appellant which

was signed by Superintendent Bolabola;[11]

(5) request for drug test on appellant

signed by Superintendent Bolabola (Exhibit D);[12]

(6) request for physical

examination on appellant signed by Superintendent Bolabola (Exhibit E);[13](7)

medico-legal certificate signed by Dr. Daileg (Exhibit E-1);[14]

(8) chemistry report on

the drug test of appellant signed by Forensic Analyst Albon (Exhibit H);[15]

(9)

chemistry report on the content of plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan

and the content of the plastic sachet recovered from possession of appellant

signed by Forensic Analyst Albon (Exhibit I);[16]

(10) inquest disposition issued by the

Office of the City Prosecutor, Baguio City (Exhibit J);[17]

(11) written inventory on the

items seized from appellant signed by representatives from the media, DOJandbarangay(Exhibit M);

[18](12) coordination sheet with the PDEA (Exhibit

N);[19]

(13) receipt of the items seized from appellant signed by the members of the

buy-bust team (Exhibit O);[20]

(14) two plastic sachet containing shabusold by and

recovered from the possession of appellant (Exhibit K);[21]

and (15) buy-bust money

confiscated from appellant (Exhibit L).[22]

For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of appellant and his

father, namely Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. to refute the foregoing accusations. Appellant

denied any liability and claimed he was framed.

Appellant testified that on 15 June 2004, between 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.,

he was sleeping in his room at the third floor of a three-storey house located at 181

Km. 3, Central Bakakeng, Baguio City. He was roused from his sleep by the barking

of dogs outside his house. He opened the door of his room and saw PO3 Lubos,

Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan, SPO1 Indunan and some members of the

CIDG, Baguio City, namely Warren Lacangan, Jojo Unata and Jun Digula

approaching. PO3 Lubos tried to hit him with the gun but he evaded it. Inspector

Pacatiw hit him several times in the stomach with a gun. Said policemen kicked him

several times causing him to fall on the floor. Thereafter, the policemen destroyed

the door of his brothers (Ferdinand Bong Lazaro) room and entered therein. He

was dragged inside the said room. Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3

Lubos then took the laptop, diskman, Buddha coin bank and power tools inside the

room. Subsequently, the policemen brought him to the second floor of the house

where he saw Jade Salazar (Jade), the live-in partner of his brother, Renato

Lazaro. The policemen apprehended Jade, took the latters bag and a green box,

and asked her the whereabouts of Bong. He and Jade were later brought to the

CIDG office, Baguio City. Thereupon, the policemen took his wallet, demanded an

amount of P200,000.00, and told him to contact Bong so that the latter may helphim settle his case.

While appellant and Jade were being held at CIDG office, Baguio City, a

certain Rosita Salazar (Salazar), allegedly a Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge from

Abra and Jades grandmother, arrived and introduced herself to the policemen. The

policemen ignored Salazar as the latter did not have any identification card. The

policemen then brought appellant and Jade to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime

Laboratory Office where they were subjected to physical examination. Upon their

return to the CIDG office, the policemen showed them three plastic sachets

of shabuwhich would be used against them as evidence. Later, however, appellant

learned that Jade was released by the policemen in exchange for a certain amount

of money. During his detention in the CIDG office, he saw PO3 Lubos preparing the

marked money. At that point, he realized that a case would be filed against him in

court.
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Appellant denied having sold to SPO1 Indunan one plastic sachet

containing 0.05 gram of shabuon 15 June 2004. He claimed that it was impossible

for the back-up members of the buy-bust team to have witnessed his alleged sale

of shabu to SPO1 Indunan because there were big trees beside the three-storey

house which blocked the view of persons on the ground looking up to the balcony

of the third floor. He denied having received from Bong a green box during the

alleged buy-bust and averred that Jade owned the green box.[23]

Alfredo Lazaro, Sr., appellants father, testified that on 15 June 2004, at

about 2:00 p.m., he was watching television inside his room at the third floor of the

three-storey house situated at 181 Km. 3, Central Bakakeng, Baguio City. Later, he

heard the barking of dogs outside the house. Curious, he opened the door of his

room. He then saw PO3 Lubos and several policemen mauling appellant. Shocked,he uttered apay dayta? (Why is that?). PO3 Lubos and the policemen stopped

beating appellant. As he was already experiencing chest pains, he returned to his

room. Subsequently, he saw the policemen carrying a backpack and a plastic bag

the contents of which belonged to Bong.[24]

The defense also submitted a written undertaking of Jade and a receipt of

custody signed by Salazar in support of its contentions.[25]

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant in all of the

criminal cases. In Criminal Case No. 23227-R, appellant was found guilty of violating

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and was sentenced to life

imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On the other

hand, in Criminal Case No. 23228-R, appellant was found guilty of violating Section

15 of Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal use of shabu) and was penalized with six months

drug rehabilitation in a government center. With respect to Criminal Case No.

23229-R, appellant was found guilty of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165

(illegal possession of shabu) and was meted an imprisonment of twelve (12) years

and one (1) day as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum. He was further

ordered to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 18 July 2008, the Court of

Appeals promulgated its Decision partly granting the appeal. The appellate court

affirmed the conviction of appellant in Criminal Cases No. 23227-R and No. 23229-

R. However, it reversed the RTCs ruling in Criminal Case No. 23228-R by acquitting

appellant in the said criminal case.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 August 2008.[26]

In his Brief[27]

and Supplemental Brief,[28]

appellant assigned the following

errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT

OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVENBEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THETESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSESS WHILE TOTALLY

DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE PROSECUTIONS

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN RA

9165.[29]


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In the main, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish his

guilt for illegal sale and possession of shabu.

To secure a conviction for illegal saleof shabu, the following essential

elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, theobject of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and

the payment thereof. In prosecutions for illegal sale ofshabu, what is material is the

proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation

in court of the corpus delictias evidence.[30]

In the case at bar, the prosecution was

able to establish, through testimonial, documentary and object evidence, the said

elements.

SPO1 Indunan, the poseur-buyer, testified that appellant sold to

him shabuduring a legitimate buy-bust operation.[31]

Per chemistry report of

Forensic Analyst Albon, the substance, weighing 0.05 gram, which was bought by

SPO1 Indunan from appellant for P300.00, was examined and found to

be methamphetamine hydrochlorideor shabu. SPO1 Indunan narrated the

transaction with appellant as follows:

Q What happened next when you were already at the

residence of the accused?

A When we were near the house, we saw a man standing atthe balcony, Sir.

Q How many storeys is the house of the accused?

A About three (3), Sir.

Q Where is the balcony where the man was standing?

A At the third floor, Sir.

Q What happened next?

A The Informant told me to wait first and he would go ahead

and talk to Jun, Sir.


A After talking, the Informant signaled me to go near them,

sir.

x x x x


A The Informant signaled me to go near them, Sir.

x x x x


A I was introduced to Jun as user and buyer of shabu, Sir.

Q Were you introduced by name?

A No, Sir.


A The Informant excused himself, Sir.

Q And them?

A We talked with Jun and asked me how much will I buy, Sir.

Q In what language or dialect?

A Tagalog, Sir.

Q How?

A Magkano bang bibilhin mo and I said tatlong daan lang,

Sir.



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A He knocked at the door and called out for Bong. Sir.


A Bong opened the door and handed Jun something a greenbox, Sir.

Q How did you know that it was Bong?

A That is what I heard, Sir.

Q Were you able to see the face of Bong during that time?

A Yes, Sir.

Q After Bong had opened the door, what happened next? Allthis time you were beside Jun?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What happened next after the green box was handed to

Jun?

A The person told Jun eto na yongbox, Sir.


A And Jun opened the box and brought out one (1) plasticsachet and handed it to me and demanded for the

payment, Sir.

Q How?

A He said akina yong bayad, Sir.

Q After he handed to you that sachet and asked for the

payment what did you say also?

A I first examined the content and after believing that itwas shabu, I handed the marked money, Sir.

x x x x

Q After that what happened next?

A After handling him the money, I gave the pre-arranged

signal, Sir.

Q What was your pre-arranged signal?

A By removing my sunglasses and placing it in my pocket, Sir.

Q After you have made the signal what happened next?

A My back-up team rushed to where I am (sic), Sir.

x x x x

PROS. CATRAL:

Q The subject of your operation you already know him

initially as Jun, did you eventually come to know his full

name?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What is his full name?

A Jun Aquino Lazaro, Sir.

Q If Jun Aquino Lazaro is in the courtroom would you be ableto identify him?

A Yes, Sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to a male person who gave his name asJun Lazaro.

[32]

Inspector Pacatiw, SPO1 Lingbawan and PO3 Lubos corroborated the

aforesaid testimony of SPO1 Indunan on relevant points.
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The prosecution adduced as its documentary and object evidence the

transparent plastic sachet of shabu sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan during the

buy-bust operation, the chemistry report of Forensic Analyst Albon confirming that

the plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan contained 0.05 gram of shabu,

and the marked money used during the buy-bust operation.

Parenthetically, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, such as shabu,

the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is

identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[33]

All these

elements have been established. SPO1 Indunan testified that after appellant sold

to him shabu, he (SPO1 Indunan) and the members of the buy-bust team arrested

appellant. He then frisked appellant and recovered from the latter a green box

which contained plastic sachet with white granules. The chemistry report of

Forensic Analyst Albon confirms that such plastic sachet found inside the green box

contains 0.04 gram of shabu. The relevant portion of the testimony of SPO1

Indunan is as follows:


A After we controlled Jun we brought him to our office, Sir.

Q Immediately?

A Yes, Sir.

Q He was not searched at the area of operation?

A He was searched, Sir.

Q Who searched him?

A I, Sir.

Q What was the result of your search?

A I was able to find the marked money, Sir.

Q Aside from the money what else did you recover from the

person?

A The content of the box there is still one (1) sachet, Sir.

Q If this sachet which you recovered from the accused will beshown to you again will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How sure are you that you would be able to identify it?

A I placed my initials, Sir.

Q I am showing to you another sachet, please tell us if this is

the same sachet that you said that was confiscated?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Please point to your initial?

A Yes, Sir.

Q When did you place that?

A After the arrest of the accused, Sir.

PROS. CATRAL:

The other sachet may we pray that this be marked asExhibit K-1, your Honor.

COURT:

Mark it please.[34]

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding appellants illegal

sale and possession of shabuare consistent with the documentary and object


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evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found

the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to be credible. Both courts also

found no ill motive on their part to testify against appellant.

The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses

are entitled to great respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing

the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings

were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been

affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this

Court.[35]

To rebut the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, appellant

interposed the defense of denial and frame-up. Appellant denied he soldshabuto

SPO1 Indunan and he possessed a green box containing shabuduring the buy-bust

operation. He claimed that said green box was seized from Jade and that the

arresting officers tried to extort money from him in exchange for his freedom.

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this

Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard

defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to

prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and

convincing evidence.[36]

In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient

evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no

plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations.

It is true that appellant submitted a written undertaking of Jade and a

receipt of custody signed by alleged Abra MTC Judge Salazar in support of his

contentions that the green box was seized from Jade and that he was

framed. Nonetheless, there was nothing in said documents which proved his

defenses. In the said undertaking, Jade merely declares (1) that on 15 June 2004, at

about 2:30 p.m., she was apprehended in the house of appellant by the officers of

the CIDG, Baguio City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 9165; (2) that she

was informed of her constitutional rights by the CIDG officers; (3) that she was

humanely treated by the CIDG officers during her investigation and that none of her

personal property was taken or damaged by said officers; (4) that she had no

complaint whatsoever against the CIDG officers; and (5) that she promised to

appear if called upon in the investigation regarding said incident. On the other

hand, the receipt of custody signed by Salazar merely states (1) that she received in

good health the living person of Jade from the custody of CIDG, Baguio City; and (2)

that she promised to present Jade for investigation as regards the incident if

required by the proper authorities. Indeed, the above-cited documents merely

describe the circumstances and conditions of Jade during and after the

incident. There was no reference at all to appellants claim that the green box was

seized from Jade and that he was framed.[37]

Further, it should be noted that appellant has not filed a single complaint

for frame-up or extortion against the buy-bust team. This inaction clearly betrays

appellants claim of frame-up.

Appellant imputes ill motive on the part of the buy-bust team by

asseverating that he had a previous quarrel with PO3 Lubos and that he knows

some members of the buy-bust team. Withal, this allegation is uncorroborated and

unsubstantiated. Hence, the imputation of improper motive should be

negated. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no

motive to testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that

they have performed their duties regularly.[38]
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Moreover, motive is not essential for conviction for a crime when there is

no doubt as to the identity of the culprit, and that lack of motive for committing the

crime does not preclude conviction for such crime when the crime and participation

of the accused are definitely proved.[39]

In the instant cases, SPO1 Indunan

positively identified appellant as the one who sold to him shabu during the buy-bust

operation. He also testified that he recoveredshabufrom appellants possession

during said incident.

The defense presented appellants father, Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. to

corroborate appellants version of the incident. Initially, it must be emphasized that

the testimony of Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. should be received with caution he being the

father of appellant.[40]

Alfredo Lazaro, Sr. testified that upon opening the door of

his room, he saw PO3 Lubos and some policemen beating appellant. He

uttered apay dayta?(Why is that?), left the scene, and went back to his

room. There was no testimony at all from him that he tried to restrain PO3 Lubos

and the policemen from mauling appellant, or that he immediately called or sought

the help of barangayofficials or higher authorities. His court statement hardly

inspires belief as it would be highly unnatural for a father not to react defensively or

sought help if his child is being maltreated in his presence. In addition, the physical

examination report on appellant states that no injuries were observed on

appellants body immediately after his arrest. His testimony, therefore, deserves

scant consideration.

Given the foregoing circumstances, the positive and credible testimonies

of the prosecution witnesses prevail over the defenses of denial and frame-up of

appellant.

Appellant tried to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution

witnesses based on the following reasons: (1) there was inconsistency in the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to what language was used in apprising

appellant of his constitutional rights; (2) the informant was not presented as

witness during the trial; and (3) there was no buy-bust operation because appellant

was merely instigated by the informant to sell shabuto SPOI Indunan.[41]

For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as

basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence

of the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has nothing to do

with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the

accused.[42]

The inconsistency cited by appellant refers to trivial matter and is clearly

beyond the elements of illegal sale of shabu because it does not pertain to the

actual buy-bust itself that crucial moment when appellant was caught

selling shabu. Such inconsistency is also irrelevant to the elements of illegal

possession of shabu. Besides, the inconsistency even bolsters the credibility of the

prosecution witnesses as it erased any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[43]

Anent the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of the

informant, it is well-settled that the testimony of an informant in drug-pushing

cases is not essential for conviction and may be dispensed if the poseur-buyer

testified on the same.[44]

As to the claim of instigation, where the police or its agent lures the

accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him and which is

deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause,

[45]

there is


11/108

nothing in the records which clearly and convincingly shows that appellant was

instigated by the informant to sell shabuto SPO1 Indunan. What is apparent therein

is that the informant merely introduced SPO1 Indunan to appellant as a user and

buyer of shabu andthat the informant did not in any way allure or persuade

appellant to sell shabu to SPO1 Indunan.[46]

Also, after such introduction, it was

appellant who hastily asked SPO1 Indunan how much worth of shabu the latter

would want to buy.[47]

This obviously manifests that the idea to

sell shabuoriginated from appellant without any instigation from SPO1 Indunan or

the informant. Indeed, what have transpired in the instant case was a legitimate

buy-bust operation and not instigation. A buy-bust operation is a form of

entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting

violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers

as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a

crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the

offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.

Appellant further posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with

the procedures laid down in Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 because:

(1) although the written inventory of the seized items bore signatures of

representatives from the DOJ, the media, and the barangay, only the

representative from the media was named; (2) no pictures of the seized items were

taken; (3) Forensic Analyst Albon did not testify with regard to her chemistry report

on the subject drugs; (4) there were gaps in the chain of custody of the subject

drugs because the officer who received the request for laboratory examination of

the same did not testify, and the custodian of the subject drugs from the time they

were examined up to their presentation in trial was not identified; and (5) the

prosecution failed to show the condition of the subject drugs and the precautions

taken in preserving their condition.

[48]

It should be noted that appellant raised the buy-bust teams alleged non-

compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on

appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v.

Sta. Maria[49]

in which the very same issue was raised, we held:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiablegrounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the

police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from

complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, becauseappellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the

items seized from him. Indeed, thepolice officersalleged

violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 werenot raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the

first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate

at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of

seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value.Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence

offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such

objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on

appeal.(Emphases supplied.)

Moreover, we have held in several cases[50]

that non-compliance with

Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an

accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him

inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and

the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the

determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[51]

In the present case, the

integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of

the drugs subject matter of the instant case was shown not to have been broken.

Records revealed that after SPO1 Indunan confiscated two transparent

plastic sachets containing shabufrom appellant, he marked each of the two sachets
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of shabuwith DG-06-15-04 and turned them over to Superintendent Bolabola,

who, in turn, handed them to Inspector Pacatiw who brought the same to PO1

Guingahan of CIDG office, Baguio City. The latter then delivered the two plastic

sachets each marked with DG-06-15-04 to the PNP Benguet Provincial Crime

Laboratory Office for laboratory examination. The same two sachets were received

by SPO1 Carino of PNP Benguet Provincial Crime Laboratory Office.[52] After a

qualitative examination conducted on the contents of the two sachets each marked

DG-06-15-04, Forensic Analyst Albon found them to positive

for methamphetamine hydrochlorideor shabu. Upon being weighed, the one

plastic sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan was found to be containing 0.05

gram while the other plastic sachet found in appellants possession was determined

to have 0.04 gram of shabu.

When the prosecution presented the two sachets of shabueach marked

with DG-06-15-04, SPO1 Indunan positively identified them as the very same

sachets he bought and recovered from appellant in the buy-bust operation. The

two plastic sachets containing 0.05 and 0.04 gram of shabu,respectively, each had

the marking DG-06-15-04 as attested by Forensic Analyst Albon in her chemistry

report. The existence, due execution, and genuineness of the said chemistry report,

as well as the qualifications of Forensic Analyst Albon were admitted by the

defense.[53] Further, SPO1 Indunan categorically declared during the trial that he

put DG-06-15-04 marking on each of the two transparent plastic sachets

of shaburecovered from appellant. Clearly, the identity of the drugs recovered

from appellant has been duly preserved and established by the prosecution.

The fact that Forensic Analyst Albon and the persons who had possession

or custody of the subject drugs were not presented as witnesses to corroborate

SPO1 Indunans testimony is of no moment. The prosecution dispensed with the

testimony of Forensic Analyst Albon because the defense had already agreed in the

substance of her testimony to be given during trial, to wit: (1) that she examined

the subject drugs; (2) that she found them to be positive for shabu; and (3) that she

prepared and issued a chemistry report pertaining to the subject drugs.

Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are

required to testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule

implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As long as the chain of

custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to have been broken and that

the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not

indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs

should take the witness stand.[54]

In People v. Zeng Hua Dian,[55]

we ruled:

After a thorough review of the records of this case, we

find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not

broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properlythe drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation as witnesses of

other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, andPO3 Alamia, the officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the

prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by theprosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the

discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right tochoose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.

Since appellants violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act

No. 9165 were duly established by the prosecutions evidence, we shall now

ascertain the penalties imposable on him.

Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the unauthorized sale

of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, carries with it the penalty of life
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imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos

(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).

Pursuant, however, to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled,

An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, only life

imprisonment and fine shall be imposed. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals

were correct in imposing the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00

on appellant in Criminal Case No. 23227-R.

Section 11(3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that illegal

possession of less than five grams of shabuis penalized with imprisonment of

twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years, plus a fine ranging from Three

hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos

(P400,000.00).

Appellant was charged with and found to be guilty of illegal possession of

0.04 gram of shabuin Criminal Case No. 23229-R. Hence, the RTC and the Court of

Appeals aptly sentenced appellant to imprisonment of 12 years and one day, as

minimum, to 15 years, as maximum, and fined himP300,000.00, since said penalties

are within the range of penalties prescribed by the aforequoted provision.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02258 is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto.

SO ORDERED.


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[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in

defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the

inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating

the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that

"individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social

interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is

imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost,

against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in

interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The

only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a

civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-

preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the

body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel

obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism

wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of

fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporarysocio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions

became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors,

the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the

law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its

members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when

individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to

its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted

under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as

amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so

defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the

valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this

Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,

according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the

"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the

element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all

of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused

to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation

against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have

transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are

reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,

enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two

(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,

agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the

following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds

or raids on the public treasury;


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(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in

connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or

position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or

government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future

employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit

particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the

damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by

himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or

consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,

accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt

or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or

total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime

of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who

participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense

contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In

the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of

mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code

shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten

wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties

and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in

favor of the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it

shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in

furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten

wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt

or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy

(underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight

(8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of

RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive,

for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019

(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for

violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183

of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An

Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to

the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of

the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for

reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and

"c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other

documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds

raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation

of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported

ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are


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charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness

and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim.

Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to

justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001

petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No.

26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable

offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness,

and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense.

On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and

five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the

Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion toQuash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September

2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The

Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less

evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the

rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA

7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to

so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of

legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is

presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their

sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional

attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection

for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch

of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has

been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch

accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the

courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges

of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and

for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the

majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with

the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with

caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the

courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In

construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether

an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as there issome basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the

challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available

grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a

fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,

where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic

law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental

law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party

challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of

doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a

showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-

founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to

sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his

burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.


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(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR

THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of

overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY

IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS

(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF

GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY

HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose

'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE

DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY

OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in theamount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,

representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00)

tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.

7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma

Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,

AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT,

the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000

SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),

329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN

THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE

HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS

(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION

SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS

(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION

EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT

THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND

BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN

CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES

BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE

HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS

(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH

BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT

NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN

CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS

THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR

THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS

(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME

'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is

obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to

proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are

easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the

prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely

informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an

intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory

definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a

combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2,

and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render

the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and

deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against

him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.


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The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered

uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of

the employment of terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define

every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory

command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.

Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so

define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness

or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can begathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute

will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and

signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or

special legal meaning to those words.[8] The inte ntion of the lawmakers - who are,

ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory

phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate

Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words

"combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining.

To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual

characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in

spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood

in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on

the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say

THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS

MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we

actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number

one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of

the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will

these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means

not twice of one enumeration.


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REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two

different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combinationor series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I

said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under

ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts.

So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...


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REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe

even two acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the

Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or

conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating

a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts

mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the

particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or

more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr.

President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two

(2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par.

(d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent

conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),

subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or

criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.

(d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of

which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a

technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken

greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this

term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or

series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).

Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is

directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to

amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be

an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. Ascommonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan

of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others

conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative,

if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by

multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to

attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning

and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,


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petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.

The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to

the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with

sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what

conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of

legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either

by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards

that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in

its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in

two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the

parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law

enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an

arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as

against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which

nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are

apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first

may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as

against the second whenever directed against such activities.[11] With more

reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free

from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether

the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conductwhen measured by common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed,

however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of

certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical

exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous

specificity, is permissibl

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