SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 192150 October 1, 2014FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.D E C I S I O NBRION, J.:We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 23, 2009 and the resolution3 dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.The CA affirmed the April 28, 2008 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126, finding petitioner Federico Sabay guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries. The RTC decision in tum affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC) judgment.The Antecedent FactsAt around three oclock to four oclock in the afternoon of June 12, 2001, while the petitioner and his daughter Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of Godofredo Lopez (Godofredo), the latter confronted the petitioner about his (the petitioners) alleged intrusion into Godofredos property. A verbal altercation ensued between them.In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object. The petitioner joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredos face, breaking the latters eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy.5 The petitioner and Erlinda then shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the course his efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo.6 The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the parties.The Medico Legal Certificates7 dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while Jervie sustained a wound in his right palm.On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the petitioner before the barangay.8 The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June 20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.10 Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action.The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC with the crime of Physical Injuries under two (2) Informations11 that read:Criminal Case No. 209934That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one JERVIE LOPEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for not more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for the same period of time.CONTRARY TO LAW.Criminal Case No. 209935That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one GODOFREDO LOPEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for not more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for the same period of time.CONTRARY TO LAW.The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light Threats12 for allegedly uttering threatening words against the private complainant, Godofredo.When arraigned, both accused pleadednot guilty to all the charges. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.At the trial, the prosecution presented the following eyewitnesses: Rodolfo Lata, Sr. y Dolping (Rodolfo) and Dina Perez y Alapaap (Dina) (who both testified on the details of the crime); Godofredo; Jervie; and Dr. Melissa Palugod (Godofredos attending physician). The defense, on the other hand, presented the petitioner, Wilfredo Verdad and Caridad Sabay.The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in self-defense. He narrated that on the date of the incident while he was putting a monument on his lot, Godofredo suddenly hit him with an iron bar in his right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez (Jessie), Godofredos son, went out of their house and with a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he got a stone and threw it at Godofredo.The MTCs and the RTCs RulingsIn its decision, MTC believed the prosecution's version of the incident and found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical injuries. The MTC, however, dismissed the light threats charged, as this offense is deemed absorbed in the crime of slight physical injuries. Further, it absolved Erlinda for the crime of light threats as there was no allegation that she uttered threatening words against Godofredo.The MTC rejected the petitioners claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence. The MTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that there had been unlawful aggression by Godofredo; he did not even present the medical certificate of his injury as evidence. The dispositive partof its decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Federico Sabay y Bactol is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries and is meted a penalty ofimprisonment of Eleven (11) Days for each count as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.SO ORDERED.In due course, the petitioner appealed his judgment to the RTC, which fully affirmed the MTCs decision.The petitioner sought recourse with the CA, arguing in this appeal that: (1) the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case in view of the prosecutions failure to offer the Certification to File an Action in evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in not sustaining his claim of self-defense.The CAs RulingThe CA rejected the petitioners arguments and affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that even if there had been no formal offer of exhibit pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, the Certification to File an Action could still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has been incorporated into the records of the case. Noting that the Certification to File an Action was identified by the complainants and is attached to the records of the case, the CA ruled that an exception to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence could be recognized.The CA also dismissed the petitioners plea of self-defense. The CA ruled that self-defense is essentially a factual matter that isbest addressed by the trial court; in the absence of any showing that both the MTC and the RTC overlooked weighty and substantial facts or circumstances that could alter their conclusion, the appellate court saw no reason to disturb their factual ruling.On March 22, 2010, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.The IssuesOn the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the petitioner questions: (1) the jurisdiction of the MTC over the criminal cases in view of the alleged inadmissibility ofthe Certification to File Action; and (2) the lower courts finding of guilt, its appreciation of the evidence and its rejection of the claim of self-defense.The Courts RulingWe find no reversible error committed by the CA and affirm the petitioners conviction for two counts of slight physical injuries.On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the lower courts erred in disregarding the existence of the Kasunduan executed by the parties before the Lupon. This existing settlement between the parties rendered the Certification to File an Action without factual and legal basis, and is hence null and void. The petitioner also contendsthat the CA erred in not holding that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the noncompliance (i.e., issuance of the Certification toFile an Action despite the existence of an agreement) with conciliation procedures under Presidential Decree No. 1508.We see no merit in these contentions.The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded From Issuing a Certification to File an Action Where NoActual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to File an ActionIssued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Luponfor conciliation prior to the institution of the criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact admitted that a meeting before the Lupontranspired between them, resulting in a Kasunduan.Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduanthat embodied their agreement was never implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his promised recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to File an Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any settlement.The CA correctly observed and considered the situation: the settlement of the case was conditioned on the recommendation of the building inspector; with no recommendation, no resolution of the conflict likewise took place.Furthermore, the BarangayCaptain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly in the performance of official duty.13 In the absence of contrary evidence, this presumption prevails; his issuance of the disputed Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to law.14 Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued the Certification to File an Action.Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captains issuance of the Certification toFile and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC. As we held in Diu v. Court of Appeals:15Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. Similarly, in Garces v. Court of Appeals,16 we stated that:In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioners case; the claimed irregularity in conciliation procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification to File an Action, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity merely affected the parties cause of action.17The petitioner next contends that even if there was a valid Certification to File an Action, the lower courts still erred in admitting the Certificate into evidence as the prosecution did not formally offer it as required by the Rules on Evidence. He emphasizes that in Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato,18 the Court held that a formal offer is necessary because judges are required to base their findings solely upon evidence offered by the parties. In the absence of a formal offer, the Certification is not admissible pursuant to Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, and cannot be considered by the court.We do not find this argument sufficiently persuasive.The Certification to File an Action is Admissible.Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any evidence that has not been formally offered.19 Formal offer means that the offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their admissibility in case the adverse party objects.20 Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been previously marked and identified.This rule, however, admits of anexception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.The cases of People v. Napat-a,21 People v. Mate,22 and The Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. The Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.,23 to cite a few, enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case.In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present.1wphi1 As the lower courts correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action during his crossexamination, to wit:24Q: And Im referring to you thisCertification from the Office of the Brgy. docketed as 181-01, is this the one you are referring to?A: This is with respect to the hitting of my head.Atty. Bihag: At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to request that this particular certification referring to the case 181-01 entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie Lopez versus Mr. Federico Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda Castro, be marked as Exh. "1" for the defense. [TSN, Godofredo Lopez, page 119; emphasis ours.]Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit "1" and attached to the records of the case.25 Significantly, the petitioner never objected to Godofredos testimony, particularly with the identification and marking of the Certification. In these lights, the Court sees no reason why the Certification should not be admitted.The Claim of Self-DefenseOn the claim of self-defense, we recognize that the factual findings and conclusions of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA as in this case, are entitled to great weight and respect and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.26In the absence of any indication thatthe trial and the appellate courts overlooked facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, we will not disturb their factual findings.27We thus uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of the crime of slight physical injuries fully established during the trial. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected the petitioners claim of selfdefense because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, implies the admission by the accused that he committed the acts that would have been criminal in character had it not been for the presence of circumstances whose legal consequences negate the commission of a crime.28 The plea of self-defense in order to exculpate the accused must be duly proven. The most basic rule is that no self-defense can be recognized until unlawful aggression is established.29Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that he satisfied the elements required by law;30 he who alleges must prove. By admitting the commission of the act charged and pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence to prove that the facts that the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the prosecutions evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged.31In this case, the petitioner admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that he acted in self-defense. His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful aggression that Godofredo hit him with an iron bar on his right hand.As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed self-defense because he did not even present any medical certificate as supporting evidence, notwithstanding his claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he everpresent the doctor he allegedly consulted. His contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses Rodolfo and Dina who both testified that it was the petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimonies were supported by the medico legal certificates showing that Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion on his left cheek. These medico legal findings are consistent with Godofredo' s claim that the petitioner hit him and inflicted physical injuries.In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical injuries, as the lower courts found. His claim of self-defense fails for lack of supporting evidence; he failed to present any evidence of unlawful aggression and cannot thus be said to have hit Godofredo as a measure to defend himself.WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the decision dated October 23, 2009 and the resolution dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.SO ORDERED.ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 205821 October 1, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN, Accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NLEONEN, J.:"Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused."1This resolves an appeal from a conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.On September 15, 2004, accused-appellant Garry dela Cruz (dela Cruz) was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in two separate informations,2 as follows:Criminal Case No. 5450 (20920)VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, A[R]TICLE (sic) II K OF THECOMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)That on or about September 14, 2004, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, transport, distribute or give away to another any dangerous drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, SELL AND DELIVER to PO1 WILFREDO BOBON y TARROZA, a member of the PNP, who acted as buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic pack containing white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.0120 gram which when subjected to qualitative examination gave positive result to the tests for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu) knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.CONTRARY TO LAW.Criminal Case No. 5451 (20921)VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II OF THECOMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)That on or about September 14, 2004, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession and under his custody and control six (6) pieces heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance, each weighing as follows: 1) 0.0135 gram; 2) 0.0183 gram; 3) 0.0542 gram; 4) 0.0197 gram; 5) 0.0100 [gram]; and 6) 0.0128 gram or a total of 0.1285 gram; which when subjected to qualitative examination gave positive result to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) knowing same to be a dangerous drug.CONTRARY TO LAW.3 (Citations omitted)As alleged by the prosecution, dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation. The buy-bust operation was allegedly conducted after a civilian informant (the informant) tipped the Zamboanga City Police Office that a certain "Gary" was selling illegal drugs at the parking area for buses behind Food Mart, Governor Lim Street, Sangali, Bunguioa, Zamboanga City (the target area).4The buy-bust operation team included PO1 Wilfredo Bobon (PO1 Bobon), as poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Roberto Roca (SPO1 Roca), as back-up arresting officer. It was agreed that "PO1 Bobon would remove his bull cap once the sale of illegal drugs was [consummated]." The buy-bust team prepared a _100.00 bill with serial number KM 776896 as marked money.5At around 11:00 a.m. of September 14, 2004, the buy-bust operation team, accompanied by the informant, went to the target area. The informant initially brokered the sale of shabu. It was PO1 Bobon who handed the marked money to dela Cruz in exchange for one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected shabu. After which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then arrested dela Cruz.6Upon frisking dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered six (6) more heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed the sachet he purchased from dela Cruz in his right pocket and the six (6) other sachets in his left pocket. SPO1 Roca recovered the marked _100.00 bill.7Dela Cruz and the seven (7) sachets seized from him were then brought to the Zamboanga City Police Station.8 There, PO1 Bobon taped the sachets. He then marked the sachet from his right pocket with his initials, "WB."9 He marked the sachets from his left pocket as "WB-1," "WB-2," "WB-3," "WB-4," "WB-5," and "WB-6."10On the same day, the seven (7) sachets were turned over to SPO1 Federico Lindo, Jr., the investigating officer, who prepared the request for laboratory examination. Subsequently, the tests yielded positive results for shabu.11During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO1 Bobon, SPO1 Roca, and forensic chemist Police Inspector Melvin L. Manuel. The sole witness presented for the defense was dela Cruz himself.12For his part, dela Cruz acknowledged that on the morning of September 14, 2004, he was in the target area. As he was leaving the comfort room, someone embraced him from behind, while another poked a gun at him. He was then handcuffed and brought to an L-300 van which was parked in front of Food Mart. Inside the van, he was asked if he was Jing-Jong, alias Jong-Jong. Despite his denials, he was brought to the police station. It was when he was already detained that he learned that he was charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.13On August 19, 2010, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Zamboanga City, convicted dela Cruz for violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of _500,000.00. He was also convicted for violating Article II, Section 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and sentenced to 12 years and one day up to 14 years imprisonment and a fine of _300,000.00. The dispositive portion of this decision reads:WHEREFORE, this Court finds:1. In Criminal Case No. 5450 (20920), accused GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;2. In Criminal Case No. 5451 (20921), accused GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY to FOURTEEN YEARS of imprisonment and pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.The methamphetamine hydrochloride used as evidence in these cases are hereby ordered confiscated to be turned over to the proper authorities for disposition.SO ORDERED.14On appeal to the Court of Appeals, dela Cruz assailed the prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody of the seized sachets of shabu. He also assailed the validity of the buy-bust operation and the prosecutions failure to present the informant in court.15On May 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision16 affirming dela Cruz conviction in toto. Thereafter, dela Cruz filed his notice of appeal.17In the resolution18 dated April 15, 2013, this court noted the records forwarded by the Court of Appeals and informed the parties that they may file their supplemental briefs.On June 6, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion,19 on behalf of the People of the Philippines, noting that it would no longer file a supplemental brief as the brief it filed with the Court of Appeals had adequately addressed the arguments and issues raised by dela Cruz.On August 7, 2013, dela Cruz filed a manifestation20 indicating that he, too, would no longer file a supplemental brief and that he was instead re-pleading, adopting, and reiterating the defenses and arguments in the brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.For resolution is the issue of whether dela Cruzs guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was established. Subsumed in the resolution of this issue are the issues raised by dela Cruz in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, foremost of which is whether the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs are settled:In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.21With respect to the element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640 provides for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Particularly on the matter of custody before a criminal case is filed, Section 21, as amended, provides:SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification;. . . .The significance of complying with Section 21s requirements cannot be overemphasized. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.We reiterate the extensive discussion on this matter from our recent decision in People v. Holgado:22As this court declared in People v. Morales, "failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti."23 It "produce[s] doubts as to the origins of the [seized paraphernalia]."24The significance of ensuring the integrity of drugs and drug paraphernalia in prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 is discussed in People v. Belocura:25Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.26 (Emphasis supplied)In Malilin v. People,27 this court explained that the exactitude required by Section 21 goes into the very nature of narcotics as the subject of prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165:Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.28 (Emphasis supplied)Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal. As this court stated in People v. Lorenzo:29In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.30 (Emphasis supplied)The prosecutions sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties will suffice. In fact, whatever presumption there is as to the regularity of the manner by which officers took and maintained custody of the seized items is "negated."31 Republic Act No. 9165 requires compliance with Section 21.Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice. In People v. Magat,32 for instance, this court had occasion to emphasize the inadequacy of merely marking the items supposedly seized: "Marking of the seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165."33The exactitude which the state requires in handling seized narcotics and drug paraphernalia is bolstered by the amendments made to Section 21 by Republic Act No. 10640. Section 21(1), as amended, now includes the following proviso, thereby making it even more stringent than as originally worded:Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:In People v. Nandi,34 this court explained that four (4) links "should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court."35In Nandi, where the prosecution failed to show how the seized items were handled following the actual seizure and, thereafter, turned over for examination, this court held that the accused must be acquitted:After a closer look, the Court finds that the linkages in the chain of custody of the subject item were not clearly established. As can be gleaned from his forequoted testimony, PO1 Collado failed to provide informative details on how the subject shabu was handled immediately after the seizure. He just claimed that the item was handed to him by the accused in the course of the transaction and, thereafter, he handed it to the investigator.There is no evidence either on how the item was stored, preserved, labeled, and recorded. PO1 Collado could not even provide the court with the name of the investigator. He admitted that he was not present when it was delivered to the crime laboratory. It was Forensic Chemist Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. who identified the person who delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory. He disclosed that he received the specimen from one PO1 Cuadra, who was not even a member of the buy-bust team. Per their record, PO1 Cuadra delivered the letter-request with the attached seized item to the CPD Crime Laboratory Office where a certain PO2 Semacio recorded it and turned it over to the Chemistry Section.In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the considered view that chain of custody of the illicit drug seized was compromised. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be applied in this case.Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.With the chain of custody in serious question, the Court cannot gloss over the argument of the accused regarding the weight of the seized drug. The standard procedure is that after the confiscation of the dangerous substance, it is brought to the crime laboratory for a series of tests. The result thereof becomes one of the bases of the charge to be filed.36 (Citations omitted)As Holgado emphasized, "[e]ven the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice."37 In People v. Garcia,38 this court noted that the mere marking of seized paraphernalia, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of photographs, and in the absence of the persons required by Section 21 to be present, does not suffice:Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and the police investigator (whose identity was not disclosed), no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. We observe that while there was testimony with respect to the marking of the seized items at the police station, no mention whatsoever was made on whether the marking had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official had been present during this inventory, or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.39 (Citations omitted)In this case, the Regional Trial Court acknowledged that no physical inventory of the seized items was conducted.40 Similarly, there is nothing in the records to show that the seized items were photographed in the manner required by Section 21. Likewise, none of the persons required by Section 21 to be present (or their possible substitutes) have been shown to be present.The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals assert that dela Cruz must nevertheless be convicted as "it had been clearly established that the identity of the items were [sic] properly preserved."41 They anchor this conclusion on PO1 Bobons having supposedly kept the seized sachets in his own pockets: one (1) sachet in his right pocket and six (6) sachets in his left pocket.The Court of Appeals reasons:We found no gap in the prosecutions presentation of the chain of custody. There was a seizure of seven (7) heat-sealed sachets of shabu as a result of a valid buy-bust operation. PO1 Bobon and SPO1 Roca testified how the seizure was conducted. PO1 Bobon was able to identify the shabu which were involved in the illegal sale vis-a-vis the one involved in illegal possession because he knowingly put them in different pockets. The seized drugs were marked at the police station which was only 200 meters away from the area where the arrest was made. The identity of these seized items were secured as PO1 Bobon placed tapes on the respective heat-sealed sachets of shabu and marked them with his initials which he later identified in court.42 (Citation omitted)The circumstance of PO1 Bobon keeping narcotics in his own pockets precisely underscores the importance of strictly complying with Section 21. His subsequent identification in open court of the items coming out of his own pockets is self-serving.The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust operation until the seized items turnover for examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not only had they been in his possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been nowhere else but in his own pockets.Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity of the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding that PO1 Bobon took the necessary precautions, we find his actions reckless, if not dubious.Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21, common sense dictates that a single police officers act of bodily-keeping the item(s) which is at the crux of offenses penalized under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is fraught with dangers. One need not engage in a meticulous counter-checking with the requirements of Section 21 to view with distrust the items coming out of PO1 Bobons pockets. That the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both failed to see through this and fell hook, line, and sinker for PO1 Bobons avowals is mind-boggling.Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even offering the slightest justification for dispensing with the requirements of Section 21.Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." Plainly, the prosecution has not shown that on September 14, 2004, when dela Cruz was arrested and the sachets supposedly seized and marked there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. All that the prosecution has done is insist on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachets has, despite all its lapses, nevertheless been preserved.Apart from the blatantly irregular handling by PO1 Bobon of the seven (7) sachets, it is also admitted that no physical inventory and taking of photographs in the presence of dela Cruz or of any of the other persons specified by Section 21 were conducted.43As in People v. Garcia, the mere marking of seized paraphernalia, will not suffice to sustain a conviction in this case.The miniscule amount of narcotics supposedly seized from dela Cruz amplifies the doubts on their integrity.1wphi1 In total, the seven (7) sachets supposedly contained all of 0.1405 gram of shabu. This quantity is so miniscule it amounts to little more than 7% of the weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0 grams).As we have discussed in People v. Holgado:While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malilin v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.". . . .Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. . . . 44 (Citations omitted)As the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crimes for which dela Cruz is charged has not been established, it follows that there is no basis for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is proper that dela Cruz be acquitted.We close by hearkening to the same words with which we ended in Holgado:It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.45WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated May 31, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00869-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Garry dela Cruz y de Guzman is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this court within five days from receipt of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency for their information.The Regional Trial Court is directed to tum over the seized sachets of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.SO ORDERED.MARVIC M.V. LEONENAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 196005 October 1, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.D E C I S I O NCARPIO, Acting C.J.:The CaseOn appeal is the Decision1 dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 3 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053, U-10054, and U-10055.The FactsAppellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and for camapping.The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa.CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.3 The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.4The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping committed as follows:That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having just escaped from the BJMP Compound, Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to gain, conspiring with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one (1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Bau[z]on without the latters knowledge and consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle. CONTRARY to R.A. 6539, as amended.5Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.Version of the ProsecutionThe prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto Gancea, Dionisio Badua, Police Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes, SPO1 Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres, Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector Reyland Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen, Warden Romeo Jacaban, SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to open all the cells for the routine headcount.Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to answer the phone.After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he turned his head towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the main gate. After seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gateand returned to his cell.Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the lattersknowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field and arrested appellants and their companions.Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the death was caused by shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno also testified that based on the injuries sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting was preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that the death was caused by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot wound that damaged the heart.Versions of AppellantsAppellants denied any criminal liability.Fieldads TestimonyAt around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and ordered him to clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the offices, he was told to fix a vehicle parked inside the jail compound. He needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find the jack handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1 Bacolor. JO2 Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2 Gamboa handed Badua the key of the jail compound. Badua went out of the compound, while Fieldad continued to look for the jack handle.While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the other inmates playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the outpost. He peeped through the windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard the exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people calling for help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the people pushing it dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took cover.While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed the latter to go with him. Fieldad, along with other inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal to a Tamaraw jeep parked outside. Leal pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive the vehicle. Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they picked up Delim and Chan.Pimentels TestimonyAt around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed to go out of his cell. He proceeded to the basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or three gunshots, but did not immediately mind it because he was used to the guards firing their guns in the morning. When he saw Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house outside the jailcompound. He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange of fire. Inmates were running in different directions.Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to the latter by pointing his armalite downward several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who ordered him to remove the stone blocking the tire of the jeep parked near the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other companions were. Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to alight from the jeep, and to board the other vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.Cornistas TestimonyCornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning the jail compound. He was shocked and confused when he heard three rapid gunfires followed by consecutive gunfires coming from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal and Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2 Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail guards lying down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot him if he did. Fieldad drove the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined them along the way. Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to transfer to the other vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in Tarlac.The Ruling of the Trial CourtThe dispositive portion of the trial courts Joint Decision reads:WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual damages and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning capacity.Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING and each is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS AND EIGHT MONTHS to SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of Php15,000.00 and moral damages of Php25,000.00.For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.x x x xSO ORDERED.6Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since Chan had died.7 They assigned the following errors:ITHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.IITHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.IIITHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.IVTHE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TESTIMONIES.8The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with respect to the penalties imposed upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054, taking into account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalties of imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054. Accordingly the penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, per each information.IT IS SO ORDERED.9The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts."10 The Court of Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the latters head clearly demonstrated his discernment. He took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would weaken the latters defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he usedin opening the main gate clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted with discernment may not be excused from criminal liability.11Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals decision. In the interim, Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw Appeal12 dated 15 June 2011, which the Court granted in a Resolution13 dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and executory as to Cornista on 5 October 2011.14 The instant appeal thus pertainsto Fieldad and Pimentel only.Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs15 filed before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs in this case.16The Courts RulingThe appeal is unmeritorious.Nature of the KillingsFieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound."17 This argument is untenable.There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.18In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, we held:x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)In the case of People v. Tabaco,21 treachery was appreciated in the killing of three peace officers, one of whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and order. They were attending an event where many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order. In that case, the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the sudden attack.In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and shot JO1 Bacolor.Fieldads Identity was EstablishedAccording to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a participant in the killings of JO1 Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings were not established. However, contrary to his contention, Fieldads identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the testimony of Badua, who categorically identified Fieldad and recounted in detail his participation in the incident:Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo?A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath there were persons grappling possession of the armalite, sir.Q With whom?A Charlie and Cornista, sir.Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and brought the water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath and you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with whom?A Bacolor, sir.PROSECUTOR AMBROSIOYou are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor?A Yes, sir.Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now?A Yes, sir.Q Will you please point to him, you step down?A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand (sic) with accused and who when asked his name he answered Felmer Fieldad).Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?A Yes, sir.COURTDo you know Charlie?A Yes, sir.Q Is he in the courtroom?A Yes, sir.Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie Fieldad).COURTWarden what is the name?BJMP WARDEN JACABANFelmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.PROSECUTOR AMBROSIOHow about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?A Yes, sir.Q Will you please point to him?A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when asked his name he answered Ryan Cornista).Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling possession of the armalite of Jail Guard Bacolor?A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?A Cornista, sir.Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back of his head?A Bacolor fell down, sir.x x x xQ What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?A He fell down, sir.Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?A They got his gun, sir.Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?A Charlie, sir.COURTWhat kind of firearm?A 9 MM, sir.PROSECUTOR AMBROSIOWhat did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa?A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?A Two (2) times, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.23 Positive identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused.24In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads self-serving defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.25 True, the conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of accused beyondreasonable doubt, conviction is in order.Sufficiency of the Prosecution EvidenceMoreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A careful examination of the record reveals that the following evidence establish Fieldads active participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of the latters armalite gun, and JO1 Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him at back of the head;262. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor;273. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor, testified that because of the abrasions, the shooting of the victim may have been preceded by a fight between the victim and the shooter;284. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa hut before heading out the main gate;295. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but moments before the gun shots rang;306. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin casts31 of the hands of Fieldad;32 and7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that the paraffin test done on Fieldads hands was positive for the presence of gun powder nitrates,33 as contained in her report.34 In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We note that Fieldads counsel manifested duringtrial that the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance of counsel, contrary to the right of the accused.35 However, all the exhibits offered by the prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results, wereadmitted in the Order dated 3 March 2000.36 To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the accused against self incrimination. In People v. Gamboa,37 we held:As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively thathe just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.38 (Emphasis supplied)Conspiracy in the KillingsA conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.39 Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.40 Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.Penalty and Damages for MurderSince treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs of each deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; however, the amount of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00.41 Exemplary damages are recoverable due to the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the commission of the crimes.42The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the funerals of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00 and P87,349.45, respectively, are supported by receipts and are in order.The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and P178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the formulaNet earning capacity = {2/3 x [80 age at the time of death] x [grossannual income reasonable and necessary livingexpenses]}43

However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed the net earning capacity using the monthlyincome. Hence, we multiply the amounts by twelve in order to arrive at the amounts of P1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.Elements of CarnappingCarnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.44 The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.45All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered for being hearsay because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.Appellants argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he arrived home, his Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the place where he parked it, and that he had to retrieve it from Bactad:PROSECUTOR AMBROSIOWhen you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was parked what did you do?A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.x x x xCOURTWhat is the description of your tamaraw?A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.PROSECUTOR AMBROSIOWhat is the color of your tamaraw jeep?A Red, sir.Q Plate number?A CDY 255, sir.Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?A In my name, sir.Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep was in Bactad?A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.COURTDid you leave the key?A Yes, sir, at the ignition.Q Is it visible?A Yes, sir.x x x xCOURTDid you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?A Yes, sir.46 (Emphasis supplied)As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:47Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.48Defense of Uncontrollable FearTo escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.49 For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.50 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.51 It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character asto leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.52In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In addition, according to appellants testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the Court ofAppeals is quoted with approval:x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape individually. Bynot availing of this chance to escape, accused-appellants allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable.53To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstance.54 The circumstances under which appellants participated in the commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.Penalty and Damages for CarnappingThe penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539:SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than the minimum prescribed.55 Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to sixteen years and two months is in order.The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be adjudicated.56 Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.57 Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.58The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order.1wphi1 However, we delete the award of moral damages since there was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any similar injury.Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.59WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3 November 2008 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to P30,000.00; 3. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to P30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to P1,836,336.00;5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1 Bacolor in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to P2,142,000.00;6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-10055 is deleted; and7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.SO ORDERED.ANTONIO T. CARPIOActing Chief Justice