Criminal Law I Case DigestsBalderas|Candolita |Delabahan |Elizaga |Masanguid |Pacquiao |Pastor----------------------------------------------------------------------Art. 8 Conspiracy- Levels of ConspiracyFernan Jr. et. Al v. PeopleSIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 145927August 24, 2007VELASCO, JR., J.:86 million highway scam; 119 criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977. FACTS:Accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII came up with the plan to steal large sums of money from government treasury. Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and employees. In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor; the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year to provide the supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to the Regional Office.

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.

Thus, in the initial report of the auditors (Exhibit D), it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations:

LAAs were generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year.

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.

It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable to Account 8-81-400, obviously because, they were not properly funded.

The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On the basis of her testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions were obtained, and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused. On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in 6 criminal cases (Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918) allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers. Fund releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general vouchers. On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in 9 criminal cases (Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.)The Sandiganbayans RulingPetitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner Fernan, Jr. Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal cases, to wit: Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall the adverse judgments against them which was declined by the August 29, 2000 SB Resolution.Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing, they now interpose the instant petition to clear their names.ISSUE:Whether petitioners are liable as co- conspirators of the crimes committed.HELD: YES. Petitioners guilt was established beyond reasonable doubtOn the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related documents which became part of the supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually the disbursement of public funds. The tally sheets are statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at specific places.The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential elements of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents were present. There is no question that petitioners, at the time of the commission of the crime, were public officers civil engineers assigned to the MPH. Their signing of tally sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their official positions, especially considering that they had the duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the documents and the statements contained in them.The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents are present in the cases against petitioners, as follows:1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road construction and maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented. In doing so, petitioners: 1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses;1.2. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers; and1.3. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact. 2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the case of Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies. By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs that were in the custody of the NBI. Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs were not introduced in evidence. It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges something must prove it. Petitioners assertion that the documents they signed were all genuine and duly covered by genuine LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies. We hesitate to give much weight and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear, convincing, overwhelming, and hard evidence adduced by the State. If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense, and they firmly believed that the documents were indeed in the custody of the NBI, then petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory process to compel the production of said documents. However, petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which the court a quo could have readily granted. The inability to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of evidence proved disastrous to petitioners cause. Their conviction was indeed supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which was not overturned by defense evidence.Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one anotherIndeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. The Court finds that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the wheel conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate spokes of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel.After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti-graft court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused, headed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat, who were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications, it will accord finality to the findings of facts of the SB. The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any consideration. The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with the other accused, for such requirement, in many cases, would border on near impossibility. The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. In the case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for supplies and materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds. Without such fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks.In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the accused including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained.

----------------------------------------------------------------------Art. 9 GRAVE, LESS GRAVE AND LIGHT FELONIESNo CASES ASSIGNED----------------------------------------------------------------------ARTICLE 10 OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODEGO-TAN V. TANG.R. No. 168852FACTS: Sharica (petitioner) and Steven Tan are married with 2 daughters. Petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, alleging that Steven, in conspiracy with her parents in law, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.Respondents contended that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by Sec 3 of the said law which explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationshipPetitioner argued that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence. R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory RPC and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262ISSUE: WON R.A No. 9262 may be liberally interpreted to include the parents-in-law as an offender.HELD: Yes. While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus: SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals----------------------------------------------------------------------ARTICLE 11 JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCESA. SEL DEFENSEPEOPLE V. ABRAZALDO ----------------------------------------------------------------------DOCTRINE OF RATIONAL EQUIVALENCEDELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE----------------------------------------------------------------------B. DEFENSE OF PROPERTYPEOPLE V. APOLINARFacts: Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant andappellant Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong was at thattime the occupant of a parcel of land owned by JoaquinGonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan.Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said landwhen he observed that there was a man carrying abundle on his shoulder.Believing that he was a thief (of palay), the defendantcalled his attention but he ignored him.The defendant fired in the air and then at the person.The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was able to getback to his house and consequently narrated to AngelNatividad, the barrio chief, that he had been woundedin the back by a shotgun.He then showed the two wounds - one in each side of the spinal column - which wounds were circular in formand a little bigger than a quarter of an inch, according tothe medical report of Dr. Mananquil.Petras died of the wounds he sustained.The defendant surrendered to the authoritiesimmediately after the incident and gave a swornstatement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.

Issue: WON the killing of Petras was justified by defenseof property

Held: No; the right to property is not of suchimportance as right to life, and defense of property canbe invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it iscoupled with an attack on the person of one entrustedwith said property.

----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.

On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.

HELD:1. NO. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. YES. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:

a. Unlawful aggression - In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possessionb. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack - In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.c. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. - Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep.

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. NO. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Defendant was found guilty of homicide but with mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

---------------------------------------------------------------------BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (RA NO. 9262)PEOPLE V. MARIVIC GENOSA

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self defense.2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"----------------------------------------------------------------------C. STATE OF NECESSITYTY V PEOPLE[G.R. No. 149275.September 27, 2004]Tys mother and her sister were confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for almost 2 years. Since the bill reached 1,075,592.95,Ty drew 7 PDCs covering 30k each against Metrobank payable to the hospital. However, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital filed 7counts of violation of B.P 22. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. The hospital also suspended medical treatment of her mother. ISSUE: WON the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.HELD: No. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph:(1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated, thus, the defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime.By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.----------------------------------------------------------------------ARTICLE 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCESA. INSANITYPEOPLE V. DOMINGO----------------------------------------------------------------------B. MINORITY RA 9344 (JUVENILLE JUSTICE AND WELFARE LAW), AS AMENDED BY RA 10630 AM NO. 02-1-18-SC (NOVEMBER 24, 2009) RA 10630 (AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE SYSTEM) IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF RA 10630----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. ALCABAO----------------------------------------------------------------------LLAVE V. PEOPLE----------------------------------------------------------------------JOSE V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 162052 January 13, 2005)

Facts: On November 14, 1995, P/Supt Joseph Castro received an information from an unnamed informant that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking. Acting on such report,SPO1 Bonifacio Gueverra was assigned to act as a poseur buyer. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people going in and out.

In the afternoon a Toyota Corolla arrived, Sonny Zarraga was the driver, and with him was Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money. Guevarra said yes. He showed the aforecited bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover to Guevarra. SPO1 Guevarra, inturn, handed the bundle of "money bills. Then the other police approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose.

The RTC finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425.On appeal to the CA, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime. Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not Alvin Jose can be exempt from criminal liability underthe mitigating circumstances of minority.Ruling: Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs.

----------------------------------------------------------------------US V. MARALIT----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. CORTEZANO & CORTEZANO[G.R. No. 140732.January 29, 2002]FACTS: Lourney Cortezano had 3 children, one of whom was Leah who was still 8 years old at that time. She left her 3 children to the care of her parents-in-law who were living under the same roof with their children, accused - Joel (13), Butchoy (12), Tinggang (6), and their nephew Boyet (6).Early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and Bernardo ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their parents room. Joel threatened to whip her if she refused. She was woken up by her uncles Joel and Butchoy who were undressing her; she struggled as they raped her.When Boyet arrived, Joel and Bernardo ordered him to rape Leah and threatened to box him if he refused.Joel and Bernardo laughed as Boyet was having his turn with Leah.Joel and Bernardo then called Leah Lou and Lionel into the room, letting them see their sister naked.Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the members of the family if she told anyone about what happened to her.Petrified, Leah did not reveal to her grandparents what happened to her.After that first harrowing incident, Joel and Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily.Joel and Bernardo were charged with 4 counts of rape. ISSUE: WON the Joel and Bernardo, being minors, 12 and 13 years of age, respectively, should be exempt from criminal liability.HELD: NO. They are not exempt from criminal liability.Article 12.(3) The following are exempt from criminal liability: (3). A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the crimes is exempt from criminal liability only when the said minor acted without discernment.It is the burden of the prosecution to prove that a minor acted with discernment when he committed the crime charged.In determining if such a minor acted with discernment, the Courts pronouncement inValentin v. Duquea[34]is instructive:The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that the appellants acted with discernment when they raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victims vagina before they raped her; (b) one of them acted as a lookout while the other was raping the victim; (c) they threatened to kill the victim if she divulged to her parents what they did to her; (d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping the victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their sister naked after the appellants had raped her.----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. CAPISTRANO----------------------------------------------------------------------VALCESAR ESTIOCA V. PEOPLE----------------------------------------------------------------------ROBERT SIERRA V. PEOPLE----------------------------------------------------------------------RAYMUND MADALI V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009)CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: AAA, the victim, went with the three accused, Rodel, Raymund, and Bernardino, and the witness, Jovencio, near the Romblon National High School. The group proceeded to climb the stairs leading to the reservoir. As soon as they reached the reservoir, Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted out, Join the rugby boys. AAA replied, Thats enough. Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard coconut frond. Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same coconut frond. Before AAA could recover, he received punches to his head and body from Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. AAA lost consciousness. Raymund then placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied to a dog chain, and then three malefactors pulled the body up a tree. Before leaving the scene, the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the incident to anyone, or he would be next. Out of fear for his life, did not divulge the incident to anyone for the next few days.

Three days later, a certain Eugenio Murchanto reported to the police authorities about a dead man found in Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon National High School. The policemen went there and found the hung cadaver, along with paraphernalia for inhaling rugby, empty bottles of gin and a coconut frond.

Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., who conducted the autopsy, opined that the victim died due to head injuries and not to asphyxiation by hanging, declaring that the victim was already dead when he was tied to the tree, and that the variety of injuries sustained by the victim could be attributed to more than one assailant. Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the perpetrators of the crime. Because of the threat made on him by a certain Wilson, an uncle of Raymund and Rodel, Jovencio executed a second affidavit repudiating his first affidavit. Later he reverted to his first affidavit.The accused advanced the defense of denial and alibi. According to Rodel, 16 years old, he was with his father Rodolfo Madali in the house of a friend named Noel Mindoro. Rodels testimony was corroborated by his father and Noel Mindoro. Raymund, 14 years of age, and Bernardino declared that they were in their respective houses on the night in question. Bernardinos testimony was supported by his father Bernardino Maestro, Sr. and by his neighbor Diana Mendez. Raymunds friend, Pastor Mario Fajiculay backed up the formers alibi. The RTC rendered a guilty verdict against the three accused. On account of the prosecutions failure to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, they were only convicted of homicide. The RTC also appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of the three accused. Bernardino applied for probation. Thus, only Raymund and Rodel elevated their convictions to the Court of Appeals.

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC but pursuant to Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344 which exempts from criminal liability a minor 15) years or below at the time of the commission of the offense, Raymunds case was dismissed. Rodels conviction was sustained but the imposition of said penalty was suspended pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344. Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and the Court of Appeals findings, which gave weight and credence to the account of the incident given by prosecution witness Jovencio, whose testimony according to them was replete with patent and substantial inconsistencies. Moreover, petitioners contend that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in disbelieving the defense of alibi they interposed, considering that the prosecution failed to muster the required quantum of proof, and that said defense was corroborated by testimonies of the other defense witnesses. ISSUE: What are the criminal liabilities of the accused?

HELD: 1. Raymond - Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit: SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. If it has been determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code." Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344. 2. Rodel Rodel was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility -- A child above 15 years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. The CA could not have been more accurate when it opined that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period. However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence-- Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. The petition is DENIED.

----------------------------------------------------------------------JOMAR ORTEGA V. PEOPLEGR No. 151085 August 20, 2008FACTS:The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was charged with the crime of rape for allegedly raping AAA, who was about 8 years old. That the rape happened in 3 occasions, the first one happened sometime August 1999, when AAAs mother left her in the care of the petitioner smother, Luzviminda. That the petitioner woke up AAA and led her in the sala and raped her. The second occasion happened the next day when the petitioner led AAA into the bathroom and raped her there. In all the instances, petitioner warned AAA to not tell her parents or he will spank her. The third and last time happened in the house of AAA, where her brother caught her and the petitioner naked waist down and having intercourse. The brother then told the incident to his mother. MMM testified that when she asked AAA what happened, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers and penis into her vagina. And when MMM examined the private part of her daughter, she noticed that it was reddish and white fluid was coming out of it. MMM called Luzviminda and confronted her about what happened. Luzviminda then demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination. The Rural Health Officer, however, did not find any indication that AAA was molested. Subsequently, the two families reached an amicable settlement that requires the petitioner to depart from their house and stay with a certain priest. However, a year later, the family of AAA charged the petitioner with 3 counts of rape, in which the petitioner plead not guilty. The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC, RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law. At the case at bar, because the petitioner was a minor under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, he can be relieved from criminal liability.ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance provided by the newly enacted law on minors in conflict with law.HELD: YesRATIO: The petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve him from criminal liability because the law enacted was favorable to the accused, and is therefore retroactive in application. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act provides that a child under 15 years of age in the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability, but is subject to an intervention program. Exemption from criminal liability, however, does not include exemption from civil liability. Section 64 of the newly enacted law also provides that cases of children under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. The Court therefore held that the case against Joemar Ortega is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.

----------------------------------------------------------------------REMIENDO V. PEOPLE(GR 184874; October 9, 2009)FACTS: Robert was charged with a crime of rape against a minor allegedly committed on March and May 1997. He waited forAAAs parents toleavethe house before defiling thelatterand threatening to kick her if she should shout for help. He was a minor whose age is above 15 butbelow 18 years oldat the time of the crime.He was then convicted of rape but on appeal invoked a suspension of sentence pursuant to R.A. No. 9344. By the time he was convicted by the trial court and before the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, he was already 22 years old.ISSUE: WON RA 9344 may be given retroactive effect, thus exempting the petitioner, who is convicted by RTC & already 22 y/o before the case was elevated to CA.HELD: NO. Pursuant toSec.38 and 40of RA9344, thesuspension ofsentence can nolonger be availed since by the time his sentence was imposed by the trial court, he was already 22 years old. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of RA 9344, if a child is above 15 and below 18 years old, the finding ofdiscernment is necessary to determine if he would be exempted from criminal liability. Culled from the records of this case, it is manifested thatRobertactedwithdiscernment,beingableto distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts. His act of waiting for the AAAs parents to leave the house before defiling the latter and threatening to kick her if she should shout prove that Robert can differentiate what is right and wrong. He was born on January 21, 1982. The Joint Judgment was promulgated on October 27,2004. Thus, at the time of the imposition of his sentence, he was already 22 years old and could no longer be considered a child for the purposes of the application of R.A. No. 9344.Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence ofphysical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act,but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minorknew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature ofthe crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. HERMIE JACINTO----------------------------------------------------------------------C. ACCIDENTPEOPLE V. BANDIAN----------------------------------------------------------------------US V. TANEDO----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLEV. FALLORINA----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. AYAYA----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. GENITA[G.R. No. 126171.March 11, 2004]FACTS: One night, while the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon were loading firewood in a truck, appellant who was drunk and armed with an M-14 rifle, asked Reynaldo for a Christmas gift.He was told to come back, and so he did. He soon returned and fired his gun at Jesus feet, hitting his left leg. Appellant then went near the trucks bumper and fired at the tire near the chassis.Thenhe changed the magazine of his gun and fired againat Jesus, this time, hitting his right leg.Reynaldo ran away but appellant chased him and fired at him, hitting his nape and right hand.The two victims died.Appellant contended that the incident was a mere accident. According to him, he was a member of the CAFGU and was on his way to the camp, when, suddenly somebody grasped his neck.As a result, he accidentally pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle slung on his shoulder, which automatically fired. Immediately he rushed to the camp and reported the incident to Sgt. Montealto who placed the camp on alert. ISSUE: WON the appellant should be exempted from criminal liability given his contention that the incident was an accident.HELD: NO. Considering the number of gunshot wounds, the shooting could not have been an accident. Appellants version that he accidentally shot the two victims is incredible.Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.It must be stressed that in raising this defense, appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was incumbent upon him to establish that he was exempt from criminal liability.[9]He must show with clear and convincing proofs that:1)he was performing a lawful act with due care,2)the injury caused was by a mere accident, and3)he had no fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering appellants evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance were not proven.First, appellants manner of carrying his M-14 rifle negates his claim of due care in the performance of an act.Knowing that his rifle was automatic, he should have seen to it that its safety lock was intact.Worse, he admitted that his finger was constantly on the trigger.With the safety lock released and his finger on the trigger, how can we conclude that he acted with due care?We cannot accept his version that he was just following his trainers instruction to release the safety lock while in a critical area.[10]For one, he never presented his trainer to corroborate his statement; and for another, he was not in a critical area.Second,the number of wounds sustained by the victims shows that the shooting was not merely accidental.Both victims sustained more than one wound.While it could have been possible that the first wound sustained by both victims was by accident, however, the subsequent wounds sustained by them in different parts of their bodies could not have been similarly inflicted.Andthird, appellant manifested an unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he re loaded his rifleafter his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them.Jesus had already sought refuge by jumping into the truck when another bullet hit his right leg.Reynaldo was already running away when he was shot on his nape and right hand.That appellant chased the victims and shot them several times clearly show that he had the intent to kill them.[11]His defense must necessarily fail.Moreover, if it were true that someone attacked appellant, thus causing him to accidentally pull the trigger of his rifle, then his natural reaction should have been to defend himself.Instead, he rushed towards the camp. Furthermore, he did not present any evidence to support his allegation that the CAFGU was placed on alert. And not a single witness corroborated his version of accidental shooting, an indication that it is fabricated.----------------------------------------------------------------------AMPLOYO V. PEOPLE----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. CASTILLO (G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007)YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:Facts: Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening of November 5, 1993, between 9:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock, the accused came home drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked the door and table, and then threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his sling and arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to the adjacent house of his daughter in-law Yolanda. From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the hospital but to no avail.From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated the accuseds version that he was practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the prosecutions contention that the shooting was intentional.To sustain the accuseds assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiportas testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the hospital and while on the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further testified that while the victim was being attended to by the medical personnel of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital premises, then he disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside the comfort room of a premises in an adjoining barangay. The accuseds omission to surrender himself to the authorities is a clear indication of guilt.The trial court found Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, however the CA denied appellants appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied, hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.Among the appellants contention in the appeal is that if indeed he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional.ISSUE: WoN the exempting circumstance of accident is attendant in this caseHELD: NO, the exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability:4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it."Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence.21 The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:1. A person is performing a lawful act;2. With due care;3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;4. Without fault or intention of causing it.By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial court: Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon cannot attain the standards as an instrument for archery competitions. To sustain the accuseds assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiportas testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.

Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.24 Other than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the same.----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. ABRAZALDO----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. LATOSA----------------------------------------------------------------------D. UNCONTROLLABLE FEARPEOPLE V. MORENO----------------------------------------------------------------------

ARTICLE 13 - MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCEA. PRAETER INTENTIONEM

PEOPLE V. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE(C.A.No.384February21,1946)FACTS: Amado Capina is Avelinas admired. It all started when he snatched Avelinas handkerchief bearing her nickname while it waswashed by her cousin. Later, Amado professed his love for her whichwas refused, and thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts. She then slapped him,gave him fist blows and kicked him. She armed herself with a long fan knifewhenever she went out. Few days after, Amado climbed up the house ofAvelina and entered the room where she was sleeping. She felt her forehead and she immediately screamed forhelp which awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Amado came out from where hehad hidden and kissed the hand of Avelinasfather, Nicolas. Later, they learned that Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighbourhood of having taken libertieswith her person.One night, Avelina Jaurigue and her father went to the chapel of Seventh Day Adventists. Amado went and sat byAvelinas right side, andwithout saying a word, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. This prompted her to pull out the fan knife withthe intention of punishing Amados offending hand. Amado seized her right hand but shequickly grabbed the knife on her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of theleft side of the neckinflicting upon him a mortal wound (4 in deep). He died in a few minutes.Avelina was found guilty ofhomicide. She appealed to completely absolve her ofall criminal responsibility forhaving acted in defense of her honor, to findin her favour additional mitigating circumstances and omit aggravating circumstance.ISSUES: WON should find the additional mitigatingcircumstances of voluntary surrender, presence of provocation and absence of intent in her favour.HELD: YES. Mitigating circumstances are considered in her favour. Circumstances includeher voluntary and unconditional surrender to the barrio lieutenant, provocation from the deceased which produced temporary loss ofreason and self-control of the defendant and lack of intent tokill the deceased evidenced by infliction of only one single wound.The defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities; and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor.Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor.----------------------------------------------------------------------B. VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSEAS V. AMPAR----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. IGNAS----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. BENITO----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. DAVID----------------------------------------------------------------------C. PASSION OR OBFUSCATIONUS V. HICKS----------------------------------------------------------------------SANICO V. CA----------------------------------------------------------------------US V. DELA CRUZ----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. RABAO----------------------------------------------------------------------D. VOLUNTARY SURRENDERPEOPLE V. DAWATON ----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. VIERNES----------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. ABOLIDOR ET. AL

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