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CREATIVE THINKING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING IN FLYING INTRODUCTION Since the jet era began in the late 1950s, air transport operations had evolved to be one of the safest modes of mass rapid transport, at least statistically speaking. But with the increasing air traffic year after year, the absolute number of crashes we see virtually every week involving large jetliners are still unacceptable. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out what the chances are that we may be one of those unfortunate statistics! Every time we fly, we face a lot of natural and man-made hazards. To put it crudely, it is as though there is always “somebody” out there who is trying to kill us! As aviators, we must be on our guard all the time, to minimize the odds to the lowest we possibly can. Company philosophy, policies, procedures and practices (the 4 Ps) are bedrock foundations to be observed and followed. They ensure standardization, observing them closely will make you a safe and competent pilot. However, to become an expert pilot, you have to leap beyond the 4 Ps. Expert pilots make use of their vast flying experience, team-building and good teamwork ability, sound aircraft and environmental knowledge, high situational awareness, superior judgment and decision making skills to prevail over seemingly insurmountable situations. They are creative in their problem solving skills and possess the unsurpassed ability to cope with immensely stressful situations. Of course not every one can be an expert pilot, by gaining an insight into their experiences, we could perhaps better place ourselves if similar dire situations do happen to us. That is why it is so important to read up on such material. The advent of the Information Age has given us this unprecedented edge over our classic-airplane pilots; we must seize upon this moment and profit by reading this gem of information either from the Internet or from books written by these experts. AIM In spite of the advances in computers and avionics, machine cannot do reasoning for themselves and creative thinking by the pilots is still the necessary facet of the job. The aim of this document is to share with you the experiences I gleaned from some of these creative aviators gathering from reading books and reports about them, especially how they got away with situations that many would thought impossible. I also like to share with you experiences drawn from those who died in tragic accidents that they could not escape and the lessons learned from the blood they shed. Essentially I am trying to share with you in how to deal with situations that are beyond the scope of the non-normal procedures, learning from experiences and insights gained from others who “have been there” before. DISCLAIMER Opinions expressed here are either by the authors of these books and reports or by flight safety investigators involved in the reported incidents/accidents. I merely regurgitate what I have read; you must exercise your own judgment as to whether you should draw lessons from these stories here. I shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to be caused, directly or indirectly by the information contained in this document. Eddie Foo S N - Box 725 dragon52@pacific.net.sg Updated on 1st October 2002 (See vertical black lines on page 3 & 15)

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1. LOW-SPEED HANDLING AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT CHECKS If it is not your lucky day while flying, you may find yourself flying a big, crippled bird! These days, transport airplanes are huge, L-1011, DC-10, A300, A310, MD-11, B777, B340, A330, B747 and the coming A380, are all wide-body big-birds, not to mention the Russian airplanes. If we ever lose control of any of them, the consequence is unimaginably disastrous. Therefore, we must endeavor to keep them flight-worthy, under any circumstances, until we put her wheels down and kiss the mother earth (on the runway) gently! Airplanes can suffer airframe damage due to a wide variety of reasons: Lightning strike, bird-strike, engine separation, engine explosion, cargo door dislodge, severe turbulence upset (e.g. standing waves), flying through severe hail storms, or mid-air collision with any other flying object, in which you are “lucky” enough to find yourself in the airplane you are flying is still flyable etc. etc. When you are flying an airplane that has just suffered from some airframe damage, your immediate action is to keep your airplane under control, i.e. keep it flying at least 20kts or more above the minimum clean speed and maintain straight and level flight whenever possible. If you must turn, keep the bank angle small. Unless you have to land immediately due to uncontained fire or smoke or lack of fuel, or the aircraft is in imminent danger of breaking up, you should first attempt a low-speed handling & damage assessment checks. Always bear in mind that whenever an airplane’s flight control or airframe is damaged, its stalling speed will increase, and when slats/flaps are lowered during approach, the possibility of the airplane entering an uncontrollable yaw or roll (and without sufficient height to recover) is always there. There are two famous accidents in the past: First, the El-Al B747-200 Flight 1862 Cargo plane that crashed in Amsterdam on 4th October 1992, which caused by the No 3 engine separated from the mounting when its pylon pin broke, which in turn hit the No 4 engine. The aircraft, despite losing both No 3 & 4 engines, was still flyable initially. When the crew attempted to land by carrying out the approach configuration actions at low altitude, the ill-fated jumbo flipped and crashed. Killing all 3 on board and 43 on the ground in the apartments it plowed into. The second case was the AA DC-10 Flight 191 that crashed after take off from Chicago O’Hare Airport on 25th May 1979. Due to poor maintenance practice, its port engine separated from its pylon shortly after airborne, and flew over its wing, ripping the slats and rendered them inoperative and retracted. When the crew tried to slow the aircraft for landing, it rolled and crashed, killing all 271 on board and 2 on the ground (to the crew concerned, the cockpit indications were still indicating that the speed was above stalling but it was not). Post crash investigations of both cases revealed that if only both airplanes were to maintain higher speeds, they could have survived by attempting to land with a higher-than-normal approach speeds! Of course all these are said with the benefits of 20/20 hindsight! Should you ever find yourself in a similar predicament, It is generally suggested that you should climb to at least 10,000ft a.a.l., keeping clear of weather and maintaining wings level whenever possible. You must limit all turns with a small bank angle only, and to keep the airplane out of populated areas, at the same time, be close enough to make a speedy landing if needed (you have to figure that out or ask ATC for advice).

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Once leveled at 10,000ft, reduce the aircraft speed slowly and carefully. Should the onset of airframe buffeting be experienced, increase at least 20 knots above the speed where buffeting first encountered. If not, select slats/flaps step by step, until the first sign of buffeting is felt, revert back to the earlier flap setting but add at least 20 knots first. Remember; once airframe damage is verified, its stalling speed will definitely go up because of degradation of the aerodynamic characteristics of the airframe. Fly at least 20kts above the onset of initial airframe buffeting or you may stall the airplane! Asymmetric flight controls can cause unexpected sharp roll or yaw movements. If caught unaware, it may quickly degenerate into an uncontrollable situation. Should any signs of uncommanded yaw or roll develop, recover by increasing the airspeed by lowering the aircraft nose. At 10,000ft, there should be sufficient height to recover from any uncontrollable yaw or roll. With the controllable approach speed established, lower the gear to make sure that they operate normally too. If not, you have plenty of time to prepare for abnormal gear landing as well, in addition to your new approach speed. Request ATC for a long finals and always use the ILS to land, even in good visual conditions. Give yourself plenty of time and space to figure out the new handling characteristics of the airplane and devise a strategy to bring about a safe landing. Remember, landing at an unusually high approach speed (even if it is above 200kts) is still better than stalling and crashing the airplane! Low speed-handling and damage assessment checks are regularly practised by military fighter airplanes because of the high probability of mid-air collision during close formation flying or air-combat maneuvers. In the commercial air transport world, it is rare. Nevertheless the possibility is there. Note 1: Please refer to the B744 FCTM Chapter 6 on pages 6.39-6.44 “Situations Beyond The Scope Of Non-Normal Checklists” under “Damage Assessment and Airplane Handling Evaluation on pages 6.42–6.44” for more information. Note 2: You must not miss the excerpt in page 6 here, depicting how Capt David Cronin, commander of the ill-fated United B747-100 Flight 811 (Hawaii-Auckland-Sydney), which suffered an explosive decompression during climb out due to the mysterious “unlocking” of the front cargo door by itself, faced with extreme odds stacked against him, landed the crippled aircraft safely back in Honolulu. You can learn a great deal by merely reading this excerpt here. For the full account, you can either write to me for a copy or read the book “Air Disasters Vol. 2 – By Macarthur Job”.

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2. WHAT TO YOU DO WHEN YOU FIND YOURSELF IN A SPIN? No commercial pilot will intentionally put his huge passenger jetliner into a spin. The thought of willfully spinning a jetliner is sheer madness! However, it is certainly possible to get into one unintentionally; for example, when encountering turbulence upsets, engine failure, flight control failure or airframe damage due to a variety of reasons. The following are some frightening cases:

1. CAL B747-SP Flt 006 (TPE-LAX) on 18th Feb 1985. Outcome: Successfully recovered and diverted to San Francisco.

2. TWA B727-100 Flt 841 (JFK-Minneapolis) on 4th Apr 1979. Outcome: Successfully recovered and diverted to Detroit.

3. Aeroflot A310-300 Moscow-HKG flight on 23-03-1994. Outcome: Crashed and killed all 75 on board due to insufficient height to pull out of the dive.

In all swept-wing jetliners, the distribution of mass along the fuselage, hence its moment of inertia (pitching moment), which has a value B, is always greater than the distribution of mass along its wingspan, hence its moment of inertia (rolling moment) which has a value A. If the B/A ratio is significantly greater than unity, it means that this type of airplane is reluctant to spin and will recover more easily if the controls are used correctly. Conversely, incorrect use of controls may delay or even prevent recovery if the B/A ratio is high. If a jetliner encounters an upset and enters into an incipient spin inadvertently, swift pilot control actions by neutralizing the flight controls should in most cases result in a successful recovery (with thrust levers close to check speed increase initially until pulling out of dive and keeping wings level). However, if the spin has developed into a steady state with high sink rate and constant speed, full opposite rudder to the direction of the yaw is necessary to check and recover from the spin. (Note: Information extracted from RAF’s AP3456A Part 1, Section 1 of Chapter 6). If, by your assessment, there may not be enough time to recover from the spin, your last ditch maneuver is to put the gear down, hopefully that will slow the aircraft sufficiently enough to aid you in making a positive spin recovery. At least that was how the CAL B747 (gear was lowered unintentionally) and the TWA B727 (gear was lowered intentionally) saved their day. But do bear in mind that such departure from normal flight path is rare and there is insufficient data to suggest a formalized recovery procedure. Besides, a lot of good luck is needed! For the interesting CAL Flt 006 and TWA Flt 841 stories, please read “Emergency – Crisis On The Flight Deck, Chapter 8, Roll Out The Barrel - page 185-224” by Stanley Stewart. I promise you both incidents are exciting tales to read. You will also learn a great deal from the pilots in those hot seats! (Captain Ho Ming Yuan of CAL and Captain Harvey ‘Hoot’ Gibson of TWA). In the case of the Aeroflot A310-300 that crashed in Mezhduretshensk in Siberia, Russia, you can also learn how ill-disciplined some pilots could be, by allowing an unqualified person to occupy the captain’s seat in flight (in this case, it was the captain’s son). Interesting enough, this ill-fated A310-300 would have escaped if there were enough height remaining for the spin recovery to take effect. Because the crew had finally managed to check the spin and was in the process of pulling out of the dive when they hit the ground at an incredible 13,500fpm sink rate in almost level attitude! You can read this bizarre story in “Air Disaster – Volume 3” by Macarthur Job. Finally, spin recovery is a flying technique generally taught in the early stages of flying training in the military air services. However, it is not commonly taught in the civil transport aviation because you have to be really ham-fisted to get into a spin in normal flight operations.

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3. WHAT IS YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AND ACTIONS WHEN YOU FIND OUT THAT THE CREW OXYGEN SUPPLY IS READING ZERO? A recent incident over Bangkok is still ringing loudly in our minds. Frankly, I wonder if any of us has given a further serious thought about how to handle a similar situation but under a different scenario? I have posted this question to many pilots before: Supposing you are flying over the Pacific Ocean and cruising at FL350, you suddenly realized that the crew oxygen supply is reading zero, upon testing the oxygen masks it confirms the problem. Most pilots I spoke to would suggest to descend to FL140 for 30mins, and then cruise at FL100 for the rest of the flight and to land in a suitable alternate. Such decision and action are basically sound; one should be able to find an emergency alternate to land. Our pre-flight planning allows enough fuel to do just that, provided that the emergency alternate is operational and its real time weather is not below landing minima! Losing all crew oxygen is a serious abnormal situation. At FL310 or above, one must descend to a safe altitude as soon as practicable to prevent from exposure to the possible danger of rapid decompression, in which case, without any oxygen left, the consequence can be disastrous. According to the book “Crew Resource Management” by Dr Robert L Helmreich”, (Chapter 5 - “Decision-making in the cockpit” - by Judith M Orasanu - page 149-150). Dr Orasanu related an incident in which a large jet transport airplane had experienced just such a problem, but the resourceful and creative captain did something quite extraordinary, instead of descending to 10,000ft amsl, he chose to descend to FL250 instead! Because the anonymous captain (in his ASRS report) reasoned that at FL250, the useful time of consciousness is at least 2 to 3mins. Even in the event of a rapid decompression, there is sufficient time to make an emergency descent safely to 10000ft before any hypoxic effects can set in. It typically takes less than 2mins to descend from FL250 to 10,000ft. Just for the record, the useful time of consciousness at FL200 is about 10mins (See chart below).

Useful Time OF Consciousness

Altitude above sea-level Time Of Useful Consciousness 40,000ft 15 seconds 35,000ft 20 seconds 30,000ft 30 seconds 26,000ft 2 minutes 24,000ft 3 minutes 22,000ft 6 minutes 20,000ft 10 minutes 15,000ft Indefinite

Source: “Respiratory Physiology”, chapter 5 on “Fundamentals Of Aerospace Medicine” by

Dr Paul Sheffield and Dr R. Heimbach (Edited by Dr Roy DeHart) The big difference in descending to FL250 (or FL200?) instead of 10,000ft is the fuel remaining and range. At FL250, the fuel remaining on board will give you a much longer range than you are at 10,000ft. When cruising over the Pacific Ocean (or any ETOPs routes), it may allow a lot more options in the decision-making process.

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The increase in range may allow picking a better alternate where weather and ground supports are more favorable instead of being limited to one or two less desirable choices. In some cases, one may even accomplish his mission without really compromising anything! It all depends on the prevailing conditions and situations, but the choice is yours. By cruising at FL180 to FL250, it is definitely superior to cruising at 10,000ft where the fuel endurance is critical. You are the final authority to make that decision. Think about it. More on rapid or explosive decompression: Most commercial pilots have never experienced an explosive decompression in their entire flying careers. Explosive decompression is indeed a rare event. When it does happen (depends on the size of the hole or rupture concerned), based on the United B747-100 Flight 811 on 24th February 1989 (Honolulu–Auckland sector) and the Aloha B737 Flight 243 on 28th April 1988 (Hilo-Honolulu sector) experiences gained in Hawaii, apart from the usual effects such as sudden wind blast, dust and mist and loose articles flying all over the place, the post decompression ambient noise is typically very loud and noisy and may render radio communications very difficult, if not totally impossible. In most cases, pilot-to-pilot or pilot-to-ATC radio communications are only possible when the aircraft speed is slowed down sufficiently, always be mindful of that. In the United B747, while climbing past FL220, the forward cargo door somehow suddenly “unlocked” itself, resulting in an explosive decompression, meanwhile tearing and buckling the floor board of the front section, 9 seats, with 8 properly seated and strapped-in passengers were sucked out together with their seats. One passenger was alleged to have been sucked into the No 3 engine, causing it to flame out and disintegrated later, which subsequently affected the No 4 engine, causing it to suffer substantial damage and had to be shut down in flight as well. Captain David Cronin, left with only two engines running on the left hand side, through his sheer superior piloting skill and airmanship, brought the aircraft back to Hawaii in “one piece” with no further loss of properties or lives! Here is the essential excerpt: “…exercising superb airmanship and drawing on all his accumulated skills to fly the approach asymmetrically with the portside engines only, the captain deliberately maintained a high airspeed of between 190 and 200 knots to ensure he could retain full control. As he called for the flaps, and they began to extend, the crew had an indication of asymmetrical flap. The captain therefore elected to limit the flap extension to only flaps 10 for the high-speed touchdown. Despite the fact that the outboard leading edge flap also failed to extend, the captain retained accurate control, finally touching down very fast but smoothly, close to the runway aiming point. He then selected idle reverse thrust on the two live engines, relying on heavy wheel braking to bring the 747 to a stop in a little over 2000m”. In the case of the Aloha B737 Flight 243, whilst cruising at FL240, suddenly the whole front section of the aircraft skin structure was explosively peeled off due to metal fatigue, an explosive decompression ensued and a flight attendant, who was working and walking in the front isle, was sucked out without warning. The rest of the cabin crew and passengers were spared because the seatbelt sign was still ON and they were properly strapped in. Amazingly, this aircraft also made a successful emergency landing in Kahului airport on Maui Island! It was in fact Captain Robert Schornstheimer’s first flight as pilot-in-command after his promotion. His co-pilot was SFO Madeline Thompkins. (The fascinating accounts of both these two incidents are vividly illustrated and reported in Macarthur Job’s “Air Disasters - Volumes 2 and 3”). For the die-hard smokers, here is a grim reminder that your personal oxygen altitude is already at a disadvantageous 8000ft! If you are cruising at FL390 at night, the cabin altitude is 6800ft, you are already slightly hypoxic with impaired vision as well!

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4. NON-PRECICION APPROACH (A MAJOR KILLER IN AVIATION) – A MAJOR CAUSE OF CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN IN IMC CONDITIONS – A SIMPLE 1 IN 60 RULE MAY GET YOU OUT OF THIS POTENTIAL DANGER In one of the Flight Safety Foundation’s reports (“Killers In Aviation” FSF’s Flight Safety Digest – Nov-Dec 1998 & Jan-Feb 1999 editions), a major contributing factor to CFIT accidents by large hull airplanes is when executing a non-precision approach in foul weather. The reasons are many and the causes are complex. In the period from 1984-1996, there were well over 30 crashes, of which 65% happened while executing non-precision approaches, (VOR or NDB), and 80% of these tragic crashes were flown by the captains (I wonder what happened to the co-pilots concerned? Only if they were more assertive and vigilant, the outcome could have been different). FSF has identified the “Count-down count-up VOR-DME approach” to be especially hazardous, e.g. the Agina (Guam) Runway 06 VOR-DME approach (Korean Air B747-300 Flt 801 on 6th August 1997), Kathmandu Runway 02 VOR-DME approach (Thai Airways A310-300 Flight TG311 on 31st July 1992 and PIA A-300B4 Flight PK268 on 28th September 1992). Even our very own Changi Runway 20L VOR-DME approach is also in this category! A count-down count-up VOR-DME approach is one having the VOR station located between the approaching aircraft and the landing runway, in which the flight crew will have to monitor the DME counting down before station passage. After station passage, the crew will now have to monitor the DME counting up. Then, under high workload situation, it is easy to forget whether your aircraft is before or after the station. In a mountainous terrain environment, such as in Guam or Kathmandu, the situation can be really dangerous. Most of the non-precision approaches have descent gradient or angle published, as well as the approach speed and rate of descent. This information helps the pilots a great deal in preparing for the letdown. Unfortunately there are just as many non-precision Jeppeson approach plates that provide none of this essential information! In such instance, it is absolutely essential for the pilots to figure out the descent gradient, the slope angle, the approach speed and the rate of descent well in advance. This can be easily done by using a simple 1 in 60 rule calculation or by trigonometry using tangent, if you are a mathematics genius. Of course you have to do this well before hand, say, while you are in cruise phase. This prior preparation may keep you out of troubles if you do it diligently. 1 IN 60 RULE: We know that for every 60ft distance, a one-degree angle will subtend a height of 1 foot. Therefore 6000ft in distance, a 1° angle will subtend 100ft. A 3° angle will subtend 300ft. As we all know 6000ft is approximately 1nm (If you really want to split hair, 1nm equals 6080ft). The 1 in 60 rule is an approximation but is good enough for our flying purposes. 1 part in vertical 1° angle distance 60 parts in horizontal distance

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On a typical 3° ILS approach, if the final approach fix is at 10nm (app. 60,000ft) landing distance, and the commencing height is 3000ft, it obeys the 1 in 60 rule very well, because for 60,000ft horizontal distance, a 1° will subtend a vertical height of 1000ft, therefore 3° will subtend 3000ft. FAF 3000ft 3° ILS glide slope angle 60000ft (10nm) Expressing Slope In Gradient Percentage: As you can see, a 3° ILS slope will have a gradient of 5%. Because the ratio of 3000/60000 is 1/20, when multiply by 100%, it is 5%. Gradient is simply an expression of vertical distance over horizontal distance. Expressing gradient in percentage, simply multiply the ratio by 100.

Gradient = Vertical distance ÷ Horizontal distance Gradient % = Vertical distance x 100 / Horizontal distance

3000 = 1 in ratio. Express in gradient % = 1 x 100 = 5% gradient 60000 20 20

FAF 3000ft 3° glide slope angle = 5% gradient 60000ft (10nm) Example I: 3000/60000 = 1/20 = 5% gradient Gradient / Slope Angle Relationship: I have proven that a 3° glide slope = 5% gradient. In fact, you can convert a slope given in gradient % to degree simply by multiplying a factor of 0.6, bearing in mind that the relationship is linear throughout.

Example II. 5% gradient x 0.6 = 3° (Your typical ILS slope). Example III. 11% gradient x 0.6 = 6.6° (VOR-DME - Rwy 02 in Kathmandu)

Conversely, dividing slope angle by 0.6 will give you the gradient percentage.

Example IV. 3° slope ÷ 0.6 = 5% gradient.

Just for the record, a 3° slope is actually equal to 5.2% gradient when using tangent to calculate: Opposite side over adjacent side (Tangent 3°= 0.052 or 5.2%). However, we aviators like to use familiar heuristics such as the 1 in 60 rule to make life easier, the difference is essentially academic and with no safety consequences.

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Gradient x Groundspeed = Rate of Climb or Rate of Descent: Here is yet another interesting 1 in 60 rule. When you multiply gradient with velocity, you will get rate of climb or rate of descent. For example, if your approach speed is 150kt (groundspeed) on a 3° ILS glide path, your rate of descent is:

150 x 5 = 750ft. Because 3° slope is 5% gradient.

FAF 300ft 3° ILS = 5% gradient glide slope 6000ft (1nm) On a typical SID, if your V2 is 150kt, and your minimum climb gradient required to clear obstacle is 5%, the minimum rate of climb will be 5 x 150 = 750ft! Gradient % x groundspeed = r.o.d. or r.o.c. e.g. i: 5% minimum climb gradient x 180kt = 900fpm r.o.c. e.g. ii: 5% descent gradient (3° slope) x 150kt = 750fpm r.o.d. e.g. iii: 10% descent gradient (6° slope) x 150kt groundspeed =1500fpm r.o.d! The B744 has a typical heavyweight takeoff V2 speed of 180kt. If the minimum climb gradient required is 5%, what is the rate of climb it must be able to achieve with four engines running? It is easy to prove that the minimum climb gradient of 5% will give a 900ft r.o.c. Answer: 180kt = 3nm per min, the 1 in 60 rule states that at 1nm (6000ft), a 1º will subtend 100ft, therefore at 3nm, it will subtend a height of 300ft. Since the relationship is linear, therefore, in 3nm, an angle of 3º will subtend 3 x 300ft = 900ft, and 3º is 5% gradient, therefore 5% = 900fpm! 900ft per min 600ft rate of climb 300ft 3º = 5% gradient 1nm (6000ft) 2nm (12000ft) 3nm (18000ft) Climb performance is a function of thrust available, not the lift force. A Harrier jet requires no lift at all to climb, it can climb by purely using the thrust from its powerful Pegasus engine! That is why the regulatory requirement for a 4-engine jetliner has a specified minimum climb performance of 5.0% climb gradient, and a minimum specified climb performance of 3.0% climb gradient with an engine out at second climb segment, the most limiting one. Note: For further regulatory minimum climb performance requirements for big transport airplanes, please refer to FAA - FAR Part 25.

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These handy “1 in 60 rule” formulae will keep you out of a lot of troubles when you are shooting an unfamiliar non-precision approach over an unfamiliar airport. Whenever you are flying into some unknown, unfamiliar, backward and sub-standard airport without a precision approach, it is prudent to take some time off to study the non-precision approaches there, both VOR and NDB. If the approach plate does not provide any gradient, speed or rate of descent information, do not be despair, as long as the airport elevation and landing distance are given, we can work out the gradient, once we know the gradient, we can find out the angle (gradient % x 0.6). We know the landing speed through our landing weight and Vref, hence the r.o.d. (gradient % x groundspeed). We can now use the FPV (flight path vector) to guide us through the approach. For A310, simply by placing the FPV with its “tit” just touching the horizon, that will indicate a 3° fly-down flight path angle. As for the B744, just allow the two “horizontal legs” of the FPV to sit on the -5° line, that will give us a 3° fly-down flight path angle. FINAL TIPS: Prepare early, work out the descent gradient, the descent angle, the approach speed and the expected rate of descent. It will be time and effort well spent during the cruise phase. Spend time to study and to digest these scanty non-precision approach charts and work out an approach strategy, in doing so, you should never get caught off guard!

These 1 in 60 rule formulae work like magic, as for the rate of descent or rate of climb, it is based on zero-wind (or simply the groundspeed). During approach, it is obvious that a strong head wind component will need a shallower rate of descent and more power to stay on the glide slope (or descent angle), conversely, a strong tails wind means you need a steeper rate of descent and less power, a potentially dangerous situation! (Hence the 15kt tail wind limit). One final advice, when you have briefed for a precision approach (ILS) to land. ATC then, out of good intention to expedite your approach, offers you a non-precision approach. My advice is that you should never accept it unless the weather is good and you are visual with the ground and terrain and the landing runway. Because you will not have time to brief and prepare for the much higher workload non-precision approach. Unknowingly, you may actually set yourself up for a disaster to happen. Most of the CFIT crashes occurred because the crews were often lured into doing just that in IMC conditions (e.g. AA B757 Flight 965 in Cali, Columbia on 20th Dec 1995 and CrossAir Avro RJ100 Flight 3597 at Zurich on 24th Nov 2001). You should stick to the intended ILS approach. Of course, if you have briefed for a non-precision approach and the ATC offers you an ILS approach instead, go ahead and accept it because an ILS approach is always a less demanding and safer option!

CAUTION! Do not mix up gradient % with slope angle, e.g. it is potentially fatal to regard 5° angle as 5% gradient!

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Crosswind correction using 1 in 60 rule: If your initial approach speed is 180kt, a 1º heading error will yield a track error of 3nm in an hour. Therefore, if you have crosswind of 9 knots (close to 10kt) from the right, all you need is to select a heading of 3º to the right of track, you would have corrected for the crosswind! Question: What if your approach speed is 150kt, and the ground track for the approach is 270º, and you have a cross wind from the right of 10kt, what is your heading to make good the track? Answer : The heading is 274º. At 150kt, a 1º heading error will yield 2.5nm in an hour, a 4º track error will yield 10nm in an hour, or a 4º heading correction into the wind will correct precisely for a crosswind of 10kt. Wind: 360º/10kt Heading: 274º 10nm 8nm 4nm 4º 150nm 120nm 60nm Track: 270º Similarly, if you are flying over Iran at FL370 (or any level), and your ground speed is 480kt, your track is 180º and the wind is 270º/80kt, what should be your heading be to make good the track? Try to figure it out. It’s fun! (The correct answer is given at the bottom right hand corner of this page.) This simple and effective “Rule-Of-Thumb” 1 in 60 rule is a rudimentary ground school knowledge I learned during my military service days. Little wonder that it is still pretty handy to use even when flying the advanced, high technology big jets. Answer: Fly 10° right of track - 190° heading

Caution: It is safe to use the 1 in 60 rule to figure out your descent angle or path of a non-precision approach (VOR-DME, VOR only or NDB/LOCATOR approach) as long as there are no obstacles along the descent path. However, if obstacles do exist, you still have to follow and obey the prescribed safety heights. I know it is common sense, but I better reiterate here just in case!

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5. CRM - UNITED DC-10 FLIGHT 232 - LESSONS LEARNED & PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS CRM is now considered indispensable for improvement of crew performance especially under abnormal situations. One outstanding example to highlight this is the ill-fated DC-10 of United Flight 232, on 19 July 1989 over Sioux City. The damaged tail-mounted engine caused an incredible “One-In-A-Billion” chance catastrophic total hydraulic systems failure, where the disintegrating engine fan blades completely severed all the hydraulic lines. In the ensuing events, the pilots, cabin crew, the ATC and the airport rescue services displayed the highest standards of airmanship and CRM resulted in saving many lives that would otherwise be of certain death. Of the 296 persons on board, 110 passengers and 1 flight attendant died in the crash, but the remaining 185 survived. Considering the gravity of the emergency situation, it was indeed a miracle that the death toll was not much higher! Reproduced here is extracted from the NTSB report on UA Flight 232:

“Flight Crew Performance: Because of the loss of the three hydraulic systems, the flightcrewwas confronted with a unique situation that left them with very limited control of the airplane.The only means available to fly the airplane was through manipulation of thrust available fromthe No. 1 and No. 3 engines. The primary task confronting the flightcrew was controlling theairplane on its flightpath during the long period (about 60 seconds) of the "phugoid" or pitch oscillation. This task was extremely difficult to accomplish because of the additional need touse the No. 1 and No. 3 power levers asymmetrically to maintain lateral (roll) control coupledwith the need to use increases and decreases in thrust to maintain pitch control. The flightcrew found that despite their best efforts, the airplane would not maintain a stabilizedflight condition. Douglas Aircraft Company, the FAA, and UAL considered the total loss of hydraulic-powered flight controls so remote as to negate any requirement for an appropriate procedure to countersuch a situation. The most comparable maneuver that the flightcrew was required toaccomplish satisfactorily in a DC-10 simulator was the procedure for managing the failure oftwo of the three hydraulic systems; however, during this training, the remaining system wasavailable for movement of the flight controls. The CVR recorded the flightcrew's discussion of procedures, possible solutions, and coursesof action in dealing with the loss of hydraulic system flight controls, as well as the methods ofattempting an emergency landing. The captain's acceptance of the check airman to assist inthe cockpit was positive and appropriate. The Safety Board views the interaction of the pilots,including the check airman, during the emergency as indicative of the value of cockpitresource management training, which has been in existence at UAL for a decade. The loss of the normal manner of flight control, combined with an airframe vibration and thevisual assessment of the damage by crewmembers, led the flightcrew to conclude that thestructural integrity of the airplane was in jeopardy and that it was necessary to expedite anemergency landing. Interaction between the flightcrew and the UAL system aircraft maintenance network (SAM) did not lead to beneficial guidance. UAL flight operationsattempted to ask the flightcrew to consider diverting to Lincoln, Nebraska. However, theinformation was sent through flight dispatch and did not reach the flightcrew in time to have altered their decision to land at the Sioux Gateway Airport. The simulator reenactment of the events leading to the crash landing revealed that lineflightcrews could not be taught to control the airplane and land safely without hydraulic power available to operate the flight controls.

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The results of the simulator experiments showed that a landing attempt under these conditionsinvolves many variables that affect the extent of controllability during the approach and landing.In general, the simulator reenactments indicated that landing parameters, such as speed,touchdown point, direction, attitude, or vertical velocity could be controlled separately, but itwas virtually impossible to control all parameters simultaneously. After carefully observing the performance of a control group of DC-10-qualified pilots in the simulator, it became apparent that training for an attempted landing, comparable to thatexperienced by UA 232, would not help the crew in successfully handling this problem.Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the damaged DC-10 airplane, although flyable, could not have been successfully landed on a runway with the loss of all hydraulic flightcontrols. The Safety Board believes that under the circumstances the UAL flightcrew performance was highly commendable and greatly exceeded reasonable expectations.” Theyadded that the interaction between the pilots during the emergency was “indicative of the valueof CRM”

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he captain, Alfred C. Haynes, is a tremendous supporter of CRM and has said: “I am firmly onvinced that CRM played a very important part in our landing in Sioux City with any chance of urvival. I also believe that its principles apply to no matter how many crewmembers are in the ockpit.” Capt Haynes also mentioned that, the cockpit crew’s effort alone would not have been ufficient to get the aircraft to the airport without the steady guidance (and calming influence) of ne controller from Sioux City Approach, Mr. Kevin Bauchman. Capt Haynes final advice to us: Use them (your crew and ATC, and other ground support personnel) as team members – you re not alone up there.”

essons leant and practical applications: No better lessons can be learned from this accident han those described by Capt Haynes himself. Use all of your resources:

Work as a team. Tap into your fellow pilots’ knowledge, skill, expertise – and hands. As noted in CRM research, by allowing the first officer to fly the airplane in an emergency situation, the captain then has the opportunity to evaluate the problem and make sound decisions.

Be open to suggestions. The captain viewed each crewmember’s ideas as instrumental to the safe outcome of the flight.

Communicate clearly and directly. This applies to the entire flight crew. Every crew member from Flight 232 communicated in a clear manner. There were no disjointed comments, confusing statements, or domineering attitudes.

Maintain cockpit discipline. The crew did not allow themselves to become distracted. They maintained vigilant of the situation throughout the flight.

Keep ATC in the loop. The captain had commented that tensions were high, but hearing the steady voice of the approach controller provided tremendous calming influence to the crew.

Brief flight attendants. Don’t keep an emergency situation a secret. Passenger survival depends on a prepared cabin.

efinition of CRM: “Using all available resources, information, equipment and people to achieve afe and efficient flight operations”

Extracted from “Aircraft Safety - Accident Investigations, Analyses, & Applications” - Written by hari Stamford Krause, PhD) If you are really keen, you may write to me for a full NTSB report on

his exciting episode.

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6. GLIDING A BIG JET – IF YOU HAVE TO The Canadian pilots time and again proved themselves to be expert glider pilots in every sense of the word. On 23 July 1983, Captain Robert Pearson, did the incredible feat of successfully gliding down a B767 onto a disused military airfield in Gimli, 40nm north of Winnipeg, after both the engines flamed out due to fuel starvation, and suffered only a collapsed nose gear. As if one such feat is not enough, 18 years later, one morning on October 2001, another Canadian pilot Captain Piche of Air Transat A330 Flight TS236, after a serious fuel leak situation, again both the engines flamed out, he decided to divert and glide-landed successfully on Lajes airport in the Azores, bursting only a few tires in the process! This amazing feat was accomplished at night! Do bear in mind that there is no performance charts whatsoever found in any of our flight manuals for an all-engine out situation. The skills and verve these pilots possessed are nothing short of incredible and undoubtedly earned them the unqualified “expert pilots” distinctions! With two big-hull jetliners having been saved by pilots like Pearson and Piche, I wonder we should pay more attention to the gliding performance of our airplanes? As pilots, if we have to face such a predicament one day, we must at least have some ideas of how best to combat the situation to the best of our ability, “never say die” must be the spirit at least. For the B744, in an all-engine out situation, so long as the engines are still windmilling, the aircraft is still controllable as long as we keep the flying speed above 160kts. The windmilling engines will ensure sufficient hydraulic power available to power the flight controls. Based on the BA B747 Flight 009 on 24 June 1982, whilst cruising at FL350, its four engines flamed out one by one over the recently erupted volcano (but not reported) Mt. Gulunggung just south of Jakarta due to volcanic ash ingestion. Subsequently all engines were relit but the crew have to shut down No 2 engine again due to compressor stall. The aircraft landed in Halim Airport with 3 engines “uneventfully”, and the crew became BA heroes! At that time, the weight of the B747 was estimated to be around 280 tons, (it took off with 304 tons from Kuala Lumpur en-route to Perth). According to Stanley Stewart, author of “Emergency – Crisis On The Flight Deck”, at an initial height of FL350, the B747 was capable of gliding 4nm for the loss of 2000ft at FL350 at a speed between 250kts to 270kts. The range is in the region of 140nm in clean configuration. Of course the glide range is hardly affected by the weight of the aircraft but the airborne time is (the heavier the aircraft, the faster the speed and higher the rate of descent). This 1:2 glide range (a loss of 1000ft in altitude, a range of 2nm is gained in nil wind condition) is a rough but still a good guide for a typical B747. I worked out that the average gradient is 4.167%, which gives a glide angle of 2.5º; the FPV will come in handy to fly down on such imaginary glide path. (Another method, a rough guide, would be placing the aircraft “square” symbol just seating on the horizon, adjusting as necessary to maintain 250-270kts range. (Or fly a minimum clean speed of Vref30 + 80kt to Vref30 + 100kt in any given weight). This will ensure optimal glide range and adequate speed for windmilling engine start. Judging the glide distance from touch down point: If you are gliding in clean configuration, on a straight in approach, when the runway begin to recede from you, that means you will never be able to make it on that runway, your glide range is not enough. If the runway begins to disappear under your aircraft nose, it is good news; you have a good chance of making it to the runway, well, at least at 250kts (or the minimum clean speed)!

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As long as you have sufficient glide range, landing preparation is really a matter of judgment. Remember, it is always far better to belly land on the runway, even at 250kts, then to crash land or to ditch elsewhere. The runway (or taxiway) offers an unobstructed platform even just for crash landing; besides, you have all the emergencies services ready at your disposal. Slowing down for the approach is again purely a judgment call, but you should select flaps (by alternate method only) step by step, hopefully there is enough windmilling hydraulic power to extend the flaps at the first place. If you can successfully get down to Flaps 10 or Flaps 20 to land would be good, but never let the speed bleed below 160kts or the flight controls will freeze and you are a dead man! If you judge that you are very high on the approach and there is a high probability of overrunning the runway, select gear down, also by the alternate method, but be mindful that once the gear is down, the glide angle will steepen considerably and if you find yourself to be short, there is nothing you can do unless your still have excess speed, which you can still convert the excess speed to reduce your rate of descent. If you can reach over the airfield above 6000ft and speed at about 225kt, keep the airplane within 3nm from the centerline of the runway. Plan to be at the dead-side by 6000ft (high key) and at mid to late downwind at 3000ft (low key). At base-leg, you should not be lower than 1500ft, remember your rate of descent is around 1500fpm or more depends on your weight and configuration, and not 750fpm! Start configuring at 6000ft (high key), and adjust your bank angle and base leg as necessary (it is a judgment call, nobody has done that before anyway!). I have no information as to when you should begin to flare. It is a matter of judgment and depends on the real-time landing configuration. The sink rate will be high and commonsense suggests that you should begin flaring at 500ft a.a.l. and adjust the aircraft attitude as necessary to reduce the sink rate to touch down safely! The rest is good luck! It is easier said than done! Some of us had practised such simulated approach only on jet fighters but not a B744. I think only Capt Pearson and Capt Piche had done it successfully in the entire history of jet transport flying! Just remember, landing with gear down is desirable but not a necessity. If you can crash land or belly land on a runway without becoming a big ball of fire, you are already a hero, if you can glide down and land in one piece without causing any further damage to properties and lives, you can join the ranks with Capt David Cronin, Capt Alfred Haynes, Capt Robert Pearson and Capt Piche, and be immortalized by the pilot community as super-heroes too! Caught with an all-engine out and unable to relight, it is indeed a situation of dire proportions, to say the least. And to be able to glide to a successful landing subsequently calls for plenty of luck and expert skills! What about weather conditions? The time of day – is it day or night? God of fortune and good luck must be smiling at you all the time! NOTE 1: As for the A310 jockeys, the minimum flyable speed is 140kts, a limitation of the RAT (ram air turbine) that delivers the emergency yellow hydraulic system for the flight controls. As for the A340 and B777, I have no idea whatsoever. NOTE 2: According to Stanley Stewart, the ill-fated BA B747, which ingested the volcanic ash that led to all engines to flamed out, the No 3 engine generator was still on line and continued to provide all aircraft electrical power. Apparently the windmilling alone is sufficient enough to keep that generator powered. As a result, Capt Eric Moody, commander of the B747, was still able fly with autopilot engaged. (The BA B747s are equipped with triple-spooled RB-211 engines). As for our twin-spooled PW-4056 equipped B744, be mindful that the engine-driven electric generator will cut in after engine start at about 62% N2, it will go off line if N2 drops below 50%.

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EPILOGUE Flight Safety is a fascinating subject. As pilots, we must endeavor to learn as much as we can from past lessons. Much blood has been shed by those fallen airmen, at least lessons were drawn and learned, which subsequently helped bring about better equipment to install and better procedures to put in place to improve flight safety (e.g. GPWS, TCAS, Terrain Warning Systems). From the 1980s onwards, giant leaps were made in the field of human factors, much aviation psychology research work was carried out since then to shed lights on the intimate working relationship of the pilots and the advanced technology “glass-cockpit” airplanes. These research materials are now available in the Internet and major bookstores and should be read by all pilots. Contrary to popular belief, flying is no longer just “stick and rudder skills”. The advent of advanced technology EFIS-equipped “glass-cockpit” aircraft demands pilots to acquire new operating skills. “Flight deck management skill” – as it is known now, ensures this new breed of pilots to handle a myriad of new and complex tasks without the benefit of having the flight engineer on board. The potential advantages and benefits of modern jetliners can only be exploited fully when these new but essential flight deck management skills are evident. If such skills are wanting, the glass-cockpit aircraft can be just as tricky to handle as some older classical types! Having said so, it is by no means should we neglect to improve our flying skills; the basic stick and rudder skills are always the minimum pre-requisites for operating these new jets. This is because the possibilities of having to fall back on your basic flying skills in times of emergencies when all avionics on board may be denied for use (due to unforeseen or unprecedented electronic glitches that may occur). Such “total CRT blacked out” scenarios have happened before and certainly will occur again to any unsuspecting crew when the situations are ripe! In a way, modern technology aircraft has heralded some real benefits in flight safety, because these extremely reliable onboard computers can perform complex tasks so much faster and faultlessly! Yet these “unthinking” machines lack creativity and the capacity to see, understand, to think ahead, to decide and take appropriate actions. The pilots on the control seats are still the essential thinking entities, which no computers can replace, at least in the foreseeable future. It is not wrong to say that modern jets have reduced workload in phases of flight that are traditionally mundane and routine, e.g. during cruise, and increases workload dramatically during traditionally high workload phases of flight such as takeoff and approach landing phases, especially under abnormal situations. Benefits and reliability notwithstanding, when down to just two pilots in the flight deck, and landed with a handful of abnormal situations to cope with, these modern “glass-cockpit” jets can be very menacing to handle! References: 1. “EMERGENCY – CRISIS ON THE FLIGHT DECK” By Stanley Stewart 2. “AIR DISASTERS” By Stanley Stewart 3. “CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT” By Dr Robert L Helmreich 4. “AIR DISASTERS Volumes 1, 2 and 3” By Macarthur Job 5. “KILLERS IN AVIATION – FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST” By Flight Safety Foundation 6. “AIRCRAFT SAFETY, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS, ANALYSES, & APPLICATIONS”

By Shari Stamford Krause 7. “Air Publication 3456A – The Principles Of Flight ” By The Royal Air Force 8. Associated NTSB or FSF accident investigation reports, plus other unspecified reports.