Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon. Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do...

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WHAT’S YOUR PROBLEM? THE EU’S SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon

Transcript of Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon. Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do...

Page 1: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

WHAT’S YOUR PROBLEM? THE EU’S SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THEORIES

OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Craig ParsonsUniv. of Oregon

Page 2: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Problem structure and IOs Extremely reasonable place to start to

analyze IOs:What problem do actors confront?What capacities, incentives, relevant norms

do they have?From these conditions follow the shape of

an international organization and its capacity to solve problems

Page 3: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Or as Milner re-slices and dices it “Political scientists use three factors to

explain trade deals”: Preferences: where do you sit in the

economy?○ In terms of “factors” (land, labor, capital)○ Or sectors and “asset specificity” (mobility)

Domestic institutions: who can influence policy?

Structure of international system: who threatens whom? ○ Presence of “hegemon” helps cooperation

Page 4: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

The problem with problem structure? The narrower and more technical the

deal, the more it should make senseTuna fishing regulation? Sure.

The bigger and more politically important the deal, the less promisingOften fundamental conflict over: What is the

problem?

Page 5: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

And often organizations are a separate kind of problem….

Problem-structure view of international organizations suggests that organizational design flows from substantive policy challenges

But often people have separate concerns about organizational authorityAs a precedentOr as an issue in itself

Page 6: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

EU basics

A unique quasi-federal government over 28 countries

Capital in Brussels, Belgium

Page 7: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

A real governmentwith big buildings…

Page 8: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Flag, motto, holiday, anthem All the symbols of a state:

12-star flagSemi-official motto: “united in diversity”Holiday: “Europe Day,” May 9Anthem: Beethoven’s Ode to Joy

Page 9: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

EU’s state-like institutions and policy process

Council of Ministers votes

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL

some implementationby Commission bureaucracy

most implementation bynational governments

European Commission proposes

European Parliament votes

European Court ofJustice

adjudicates disputes

Page 10: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.
Page 11: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.
Page 12: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Categories of theories of IOs Rationalist-materialist: problem-structure approach Institutionalist:

(beware: this word has many meanings!!)

Problem-structure approach with feedback○ Have problem, build institution (=organization); it then

alters your problems and possibilities thereafter

Ideational: How people interpret problems/solutions causes more

variation in the world than the “real” structure of problems

People build IOs around certain ideas/models that diagnose problems and match to solutions

Page 13: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

What problems does the EU solve??

Cycle of warCreated to make war impossible

Temptation to protectionismBinding countries into free-trade framework

Competition with US, othersBuild more dynamic big market

Lack of influence for smallish countriesEmpower collective voice in global trade, monetary

affairs, foreign policy Instability of weaker economies and polities

Imposes/supports/subsidizes reform

Page 14: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Building the EU institutions Origins in the 1950s:

European Coal and Steel Community, 1952European Economic Community, 1958

Expansion of powers in 1980s/1990sSingle European Act, 1986Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 1992

Tinkering, Enlargement, Public RelationsTreaties of Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon since

Page 15: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

SEA as key episode for EU SEA “relaunches” languishing EEC

Gives renewed authority to institutions, inaugurates 15 years of massive change

Seen as fairly modest at time, but…Mandated hundreds of liberalizing directives

○ Including full capital liberalization, which led on to monetary union…

Torrent of liberalizing measures peaks early 1990s, but continues today

Also relaunch of scholarship on EU:Main theories developed out of this case

Page 16: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Also key for broader literature on IOs, globalization

WTO Director General: Global Governance Based on the EU Model

The EU as a Model for Asia?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: EU “maybe the biggest example in the world today of globalution” [sic]

MORAVCSIK: “a possible harbinger of future global political structures”

RUGGIE: “a lens through which to view other possible instances of international transformation today”

ANTHONY GIDDENS: EU “forging a way that could, and very likely will, be followed in other regions as well.”

Australian PM: Asian Century, European Model?

Page 17: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

The SEA story (NEUTRAL VERSION)

EEC in doldrums in early 1980s… Thatcher leading moves toward liberalization 1985: Delors Commission assembles “Single

Market program” Meanwhile Mitterrand finds Euro-topia March 1985:

All govts endorse White Paper on Single Market Fr/Ital/Ger/Benelux outvote UK/Den/Greece to convene talks

to renegotiate treaty

Negotiations fall 1985, December deal: Vast new liberalizing mandate EEC reform: extension of majority voting

Page 18: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Consider dominant views (I) “Liberal intergovernmentalism”:(problem-structure/rationalist theory of “normal politics in a globalizing context”)

SEA: structural imperatives led govts to “Pan-European trend” to liberalization Seek EEC reform to commit credibly to it

Structuralecon

change

Interest group prefs

for openness

Nat’l govtsaggregate

prefs

Bargain with other govts on policies

Institution-building for

crediblecommitments

LiberalizationInstitutional reform

Page 19: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Consider dominant views (II) Haas-style institutionalism:

SEA: Supranat’l entrepreneurship persuaded govts of EEC-level liberalization through “Single Market 1992” idea And that liberalization requires EEC reform (majority voting)

Structuralecon

change

Interest group prefs

for openness Nat’l govts

indisposed to listen

Govts persuaded to new bargain

LiberalizationInstitutional reform

Nat’l govtsbargain

Create new instits with own agents

Interest group prefs for more openness

IO agents mobilize,

lead, persuade

Page 20: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on

1981

Moravcsik logic

If Moravcsik were strongly right…

Page 21: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on

1984

Moravcsik logic

Page 22: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on1985-6Moravcsik logic

SEA deal

Consider, bargainhow to achieveliberalization

Page 23: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on

1981

Haas-style logic

If Haas-style view were strongly right…

Page 24: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on

1984

Haas-style logic

Page 25: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on

1985-6Haas-style logicSEA deal

Commissionentrepreneurship

Page 26: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on

1981

Actual positions

1984

Page 27: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Support for EEC institutional reform

Sup

port

for

libera

lizati

on

What happens in 1985-6?

[SEA deal]???

??

?

Page 28: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Brits persuaded of reform? 1985: liberalization, no need for reform

Oppose vote to open treaty negotiations In fall 1985, accept linkage of White Paper

& majority votingBut even Moravcsik says they saw “little to lose from

qualified majority voting on the internal market”

Keep fighting: in bargaining, remain until end “major obstacle to an initiative linking internal market liberalization and procedural reform…”

Page 29: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Thatcher accepts a deal Midnight press conference after deal :

“We could have done a great many of the things which have been done here with treaty changes, we could have done without treaty changes, had we agreed to go about it that way. Now, people very much wanted an intergovernmental conference, so they had one…I think we could have done what we have done … that we could have done by agreement without it…but if they wanted to do it this way, so be it.”

Page 30: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

French sold on something new? Accept White Paper in 1985 with little

enthusiasmEven initial confusion in 1985 over whether EEC

reform proposed as alternative… In fall 1985 propose text that cuts back on

Commission’s SMP proposalsAnd push monetary, social “embedding” steps

Still fighting, December 1985: “An Anglo-German front has formed against French

positions on three essential subjects: the Internal Market, monetary policies, social policies….”

Page 31: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

Mitterrand accepts a deal 1986: “I will not hide that the transaction, which rallied

general support, remained very far below what I would call the vital minimum for Europe…”

Delors “despondent” at result (said an aide) What else did they want?

More interventionist monetary & social policies to embed, balance liberalization

Accept deal to “relaunch” institutions……spend next decade pursuing ways to balance

a liberal Europe

Page 32: Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant.

In sum, on the EU story: European leaders have very different ideas

about policy problems and IO solutions Liberalization + institutional change united

in politicsNeither structural imperatives nor Commission

persuasion made the connection Problems of globalization, pressure for

liberalization would not have produced more powerful EU without distinct Europeanist push for institutional reform(and vice versa)